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On the Dualistic Assumptions Underlying G. H. von Wrights Non-Causal Explanatory Model

Robert Lantin

Department of Foreign Languages & Literature, Aletheia University & Department of Philosophy, National Chung Cheng University

Abstract
I first offer a brief characterization of the argument supporting von Wrights non-causal explanatory model for the human sciences (section I). The discussion then moves on to compare von Wrights argument to Donald Davidsons causal theory of action (section II). My contention here is that von Wright is committed to denying token physicalism, thus embracing some form of event-dualism. This has traditionally been understood to entail the congruence problem for von Wrights modelthe problem, that is, of accounting for the very occurrence of bodily movements given an agents intentions. In the last section of the paper (section III), I sketch a possible solution to the congruence problem.

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I
1. Introductionthe von Wrightian approach

In what follows, I wish to re-open a number of issues that were actively discussed, throughout the 1970s, and up to around the mid-1980s, in the areas of Epistemology, the philosophy of action, and the philosophy of human and social sciences. The issues I am particularly interested in involve the concepts of human action, human behavior, intentionality, explanation, and causation, to name just a few. The discussion I am aiming at will be centered on the debate between causal and non-causal models of explanation of human action. This debate, as I hope to show in a later section, has evolved into a couple of important strands in the philosophy of mind, starting roughly in the early 1980s and running pretty much through the 1990s until nownamely, the problem of externalism, on the one hand, and that of mental causation, on the other. As the title of my paper makes clear, I will be approaching the issues from the perspective opened up by the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright. As I understand the crux of his position, von Wright aimed at articulating what I would call an anti-Cartesian view of intentionality, whereby an agents intentions, to paraphrase Putnam, just aint in her head. In Explanation and understanding (hereafter EU), published in 1971, von Wright wrote: To say that intentionality is in the behavior is at once suggestive of something important and easily misleading. The truth in that formulation is that intentionality is not anything behind or outside the behavior. It is not a mental act or characteristic experience accompanying it. The misleading thing about the formulation is that it suggests a location of the intention, a confinement of it to a definite item of behavior, as though one could discover the intentionality from a study of the movements. One could saybut this too might be misleadingthat the behaviors intentionality is its place in a story about the agent. (von Wright, 1971: 115) As far as I can telland I hope it will become clear later, this passage encapsulates at once the originality, the strength, and the weakness in von Wrights perspective. In

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a nutshell: with intentions no longer located within the agent, it becomes all but impossible to conceive of them as bona fide causes of behavior. Hence we can appreciate one important feature of von Wrights non-causal perspective. Yet at the same time, it becomes especially hard to see how intentions and behavior are kept in phase, as it were. But I am getting ahead of my story here, so lets back-pedal a bit and start from the beginning. In EU, von Wright is preoccupied with the concept of explanation and its evolution throughout the history of science and what he calls the philosophy of scientific method. He distinguishes between two traditions with regard to scientific explanation: one focused on teleological explanations, and which he calls Aristotelian; the other focused on causal explanations, and called Galilean. Teleological explanations, von Wright notes, are typically found in the province of Hermeneutics, a discipline concerned with (i) the study of the individual, unique features of its objects of study; (ii) the psychological and semantic aspects of understanding; and (iii) the moral sciences (from the German Geisteswissenschaften). This tradition is also characterized by a defense of methodological dualismthe view that there is a fundamental, irreducible difference between the natural and the human sciences. On the other hand, the Galilean tradition defends methodological monismthe view that scientific method should be unique for any and all scientific disciplines. The Galilean tradition is based on mathematical physics and causal explanations. The view was epitomized by Carl Hempels subsumption theory of explanation, also known as the covering law model of explanation. A sharp debate between the two traditions was fueled by Hempels publication of a paper titled The function of general laws in history, in which he introduced his explanatory model back in 1942. This, von Wright tells us, has led to a string of seminal publications towards the end of the 1950s, including William Drays Laws and explanation in history (1957); Elizabeth Anscombes Intention (1957); and Peter Winchs The idea

of a social science (1958). A common theme among the three books is the rejection of Hempels covering law model, as applied to the study of history and social phenomena. One central idea put forth by Dray is what he called rational explanation, which, he argues, is the form of explanation privileged by historians. One key aspect of Drays model is his insistence on the sui generis nature of explanations of human actions. Parallel to Drays study, Anscombe was developing a perspective centered on the study of the practical inference as a mode of explanation of intentional action. Throughout the 1960s, a lot of effort was devoted to the development of a theory of intentionality and a model for the explanation of intentional human action, owing to the central place the concept of action had secured in the philosophy of human sciences. Indeed, several participants in the discussions considered intentional human action as the object of study of most human sciences. This has fueled renewed interest in the philosophy of action.

2. Theory of actionthe basic issues

There are two sets of basic issues in the philosophy of action. The first set consists in accounting for the intentionality of action. The second set is focused on the explanation of intentional action. Accounting for the intentionality of action usually involves articulating a sharp distinction between behavior that is intentional and behavior which amounts to mere bodily movement. It is important to notice the presence of physical movements whenever intentional behavior is performed (except perhaps in cases of forbearing, but I leave those cases aside for present purposes). I may close my eyes so as to avoid the discomfort of an excess of dust in the air around me, say; in the same manner, my eyes may close as I fall asleep sitting on a long bus ride. The first instance is a case of intentional behavior; the second is mere bodily movement. The distinction is important for the concept of human action: it is only by reference to intentionality that human action may be distinguished from mere behavior. Furthermore, human action,

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whether intentional or non-intentional, always involves intentional behavior. I may intend to turn on the light but flick the wrong switch and turn on a fan instead. My turning on the fan is unintentional, but nonetheless involves intentional behaviornamely, the flicking of a switch.

The second set of issues is focused on the explanation of intentional action. The central problem here is to characterize intentional explanations and show how they differ from explanations of mere behavior. Usually, this is accomplished by pointing out that intentional explanations make reference to reasons for acting, whereas explanations of mere behavior do not. The term reason here covers an agents beliefs, desires, motives, and other such volitional factors in light of which her behavior may be justified. But justifying behavior is not to be confused with explaining behavior. An agents reasons may be said to justify her intentional behavior and account for its intentionality. A full-fledged explanation of intentional behavior must show that the behavior occurred because of the agents reasons.
This provides for a rather intricate set of difficulties. The physical movements involved in intentional behavior are typically caused by neural processes. But what about the reasons for acting ? What role do they play in the production of intentional behavior ? The typical Galilean answer was straightforward: reasons for acting are ultimate causes of intentional behavior subsumed under general laws. The distinction between proximate and ultimate causes made the case quite simple indeed. Ones reasons for acting cause ones intentional behavior by causing the right sort of physical movements to be brought about via proximate causes. Defenders of the subsumption theory of explanation pointed out that general psychophysical laws, although highly complex, would eventually be discovered. Hempel spoke of explanation sketches in this context.

3. The Logical Connection Argument (LCA)

Opponents of the covering law model claimed that explanations of intentional behavior could not be causal because reasons and the actions they explain are not logically independent from one another. According to the Humean theory of causality, causes must be logically independent from the effects they bring about. The notion of logical independence between an event-cause and the event-effect it brings about can be minimally understood as meaning that the two events do not share all their intrinsic properties. Donald Davidson saw the potential for confusion in the claim. I return to this point in the next section. The claim that reasons and actions are not logically independent stemmed from considerations of the practical inference ([PI]) as the preferred schema to account for intentional action. The following schema is representative: A intends to bring about p. A considers that she cannot bring about p unless she does a. Therefore, A sets herself to do a. Several philosophers have pointed out that a schema such as [PI] at once shows the teleological nature of intentional action. The fact that the two premises of [PI]indeed the reasons for actingalready mention the action to be undertaken is taken to show the logical connection between them.

[PI]

II
4. Davidsons and von Wrights perspectives on LCA
Donald Davidson thinks that the logical connection argument fails insofar as it rests on a confusion between events and their descriptions. According to Davidson,

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causation holds between events, and not between descriptions of events. The fact that [PI] intertwines reasons and actions does not imply that the events being described are not independent. From a Davidsonian perspective, the reasons for acting are mental events. As intention to bring about p, for instance, is a dated particular taking place in A. The fact that the event is described as pointing to p has no causal effect in physical reality. For Davidson, [PI] serves to justify As intentional behavior, but it cannot serve as an explanation of action. It is important to mention that Davidson also rejects the covering law model of explanation of intentional action. His views are well-known. His anomalous monism is an explicit argument against the existence of any psychophysical laws. Yet, Davidson claims that reasons are causes, and defends a causalist view for the explanation of intentional action. To understand the position, one must keep in mind a number of claims, but the argument for the identity of mental and physical events [AI] is worth stating: [AI] (i) (ii) (iii) sciences, (iv) it (v) which in implies that (vi) (vii) physical (Davidson, 1970: 224) M is a physical event, and, thus, that every mental event that is causally related to a physical event is a event the strict law instantiated by M and P can only be physical; from which follows that M falls under a physical law, and thus has a physical description; turn if M, a mental event, causes P, a physical event, then under some description, M and P instantiate a strict law; but since strict laws are homonomic, and homonomic laws occur in physical

For present purposes, it will suffice to point out that for Davidson, the mental events that cause an agents intentional behavior are identified with neural events, and are thus located within the agent whose behavior they explain. This perspective may now be contrasted with the anti-Cartesianism I earlier attributed to von Wrights position. Von Wright takes a different route to defend the logical connection argument. His crucial strategy here consists in relying on the verification of the premises and conclusion of the practical inference. He asks how one can go about verifying an agents intentions. It is in this section of EU that he unveils his anti-Cartesian stance. After reflecting on a case involving ones intention to ring a bell, he writes: Am I saying then that my intention (right now) to ring the bell and my thinking the pressing of the button necessary for this end is the same as the fact that I now press the button ? To this should be answered: It is not the same as the sequence of bodily movements and events in the external world which terminates in my fingers pressing against the button and the buttons sinking into the hole. But it is this sequence meant by me (or understood by others) as an act of ringing the bell. (von Wright, 1971: 115) Here two things should be noticed: (i) the intention is to be understood as meaningful behavior; and (ii) the premises and the conclusion of the practical inference are mutually dependent. This mutual dependency is essentially von Wrights defense of the logical connection argument. The claim regarding intentions can use one last quotation from von Wright: Intentional behavior, one could say, resembles the use of language. It is a gesture whereby I mean something. Just as the use and the understanding of language presuppose a language community, the understanding of action presupposes a community of institutions and practices and technological equipment into which one has been

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introduced by learning and training. One could perhaps call it a life-community. (von Wright, 1971: 114) The analogy with language is striking. Intentional behavior thus becomes a sequence of physical movements invested with meaningpretty much the same way an uttered sentence is a sequence of physical sounds invested with meaning. Therefore intentional behavior is meaninglessi.e. misunderstood and unexplainableoutside of a given life-community. Intentions are not within agents. So von Wright must reject Davidsons claim that intentions are mental events located within agents. Hence, no more can intentions be identified with internal physical events. Yet, intentional behavior is meant by agents, and perceived and interpreted (understood) by others within the confines of a life-community. These meaningful sequences I shall refer to as external events, distinct from the physical events going on in an agents brain.

5. The congruence problem

When engaging in intentional behavior, an agent must engage in a sequence of physical movements. (Again, I leave out cases of forbearing for the sake of simplicity.) These movements are caused by neural events located in the agents brain. By identifying mental events with (a subset of) neural events, Davidson avoids what is known as the congruence problem. This, essentially, is the bringing together of the agents intentions with her bodily movements. One could perhaps claim that the demand that there should be congruence between reasons and actions is itself a Cartesian stricture, and as such should not infect a non-Cartesian view such as von Wrights. Nonetheless, the difficulty seems to me worth exploring. For the von Wrightian perspective, the problem consists in showing how the

intention is kept in phase with the sequence of physical movements. The movements are caused by internal events, but why should my body move in precisely the way it does if the reasons for acting the way I do are not causes ? Von Wright briefly touches upon the difficulty at the end of his discussion of teleological explanation. Here is the passage: ... on the whole, I can say with confidence that my arm will remain in its present position (we shall assume it is not raised) unless I raise it. That I should have this confidence is, moreover, necessary if I am to say
truthfully of myself that I can raise my arm. But this confidence, and the fact that I can raise my arm, does not conflict with the possibility that, every time my arm goes up, there is a sufficient condition, causally responsible for this event, operating in my nervous system. (von Wright, 1971: 129-30)

Von Wright goes on to claim that one can not at once observe the operation of a cause lifting ones arm while lifting it oneself. Either the operation of the cause is observed, or the agent makes things happen. But this does not solve the problem. At issue is the question why should there be precisely that humean sufficient cause accompanying my intentional behavior ? Von Wright does not answer the question.

III
6. A possible solution to the congruence problem
In this last section, I wish to sketch a possible solution to von Wrights congruence problem. One promising route simply consists in re-interpreting von Wrights position with regards to intentionality in terms of extrinsic and relational properties. The idea roughly breaks down as follows: the neural events causally

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responsible for an agents bodily movements do so in virtue of the intrinsic properties they instantiate at a time; but these same neural events also have extrinsic, relational properties, namely, the intentional properties providing the agents reasons for acting. One such externalist theory of behavior was put forth by Fred Dretske in a series of books and articles published mainly in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s (see, most notably, Dretske 1988). Dretske adopts a very interesting perspective on the nature of intentional and content properties (meanings), one that sheds light on an anti-Cartesian view of intentional behavior such as von Wrights. In a reply to Jaegwon Kim, Dretske made the following remarks, which apply, I believe, to our present discussion. He wrote: I think meanings are physical: in giving a psychological explanation of behavior, an explanation in terms of what Ss internal states mean, one is merely giving a very special kind of physical explanation, an explanation in terms of the extrinsic (physical) properties of Ss internal states. ... What makes psychological meaning a special kind of thing, what gives it its mental character (and, at the same time, makes its explanatory role puzzling), is the fact that the meaning of a systems internal states is constituted by properties that, though physical, are extrinsic to the system whose behavior they help explain. (Dretske, 1991: 211) The crucial element of Dretskes approach consists in the rapprochement, as it were, of the internal and external aspects of behavior in a way that solves the congruence problem, and yet maintains the anti-Cartesian character of von Wrights perspective. Of course, one central aspect of Dretskes theory that I leave to the side here was his defense of the causal efficacy of extrinsic properties. But I now feel that epiphenomenalism provides an acceptable and workable solution to the metaphysical puzzles of mental causation, especially those opened up by postulating the extrinsic

nature of intentional and content properties. According to this epiphenomenal perspective, mentality is the causal product of internal, neurophysiological events and external, world-head relations, as it were. Meaning and intentionality are extrinsic properties of an agents internal states and are the product of the agents commerce with her life-community. As such, those extrinsic, relational properties are causally idle in the production of behavior, but their being correlated to the agents internal states guarantees that things are kept in phase. Hence, von Wrights non-causalist perspective on action finds its way out of the congruence problem, while maintaining its brand of anti-Cartesianism. Whether this solution can withstand close scrutiny remains to be seen, of course, but that is a project that goes beyond the scope of the present paper.

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