Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

167671 September 3, 2008

[That] the testimonies of both prosecution witnesses, Henry Cruz and Tolentino C. Mendoza [did] not establish with moral certainty the culpability of the accusedappellant for the falsification of the subject travel expense vouchers. 18 This pronouncement did not state that Cruz lied. The CA merely stated that Cruz's testimony was insufficient or inadequate to sustain petitioner's conviction for falsification in Criminal Case Nos. Q-9783, Q-9784 and Q-9788. In Criminal Case No. Q-9787 however, the CA found Cruz's testimony in relation to "Exhibit AA-1" sufficient to prove that petitioner committed the crime of falsification of public documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to paragraph 2, Article 171 of the RPC. Falsification of documents under paragraph 1 of Article 172 refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial documents. Its elements are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document. 19 Petitioner was a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Lands. 20 He was a public official. While the CFI did not state in its decision that petitioner took advantage of his position in the government in committing the crime, the CA made a more definite pronouncement to this effect. 21 Petitioner's functions as disbursing officer did not include the duty to make, prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the falsified travel expense voucher. His function was only to pay payees of treasury warrants and other cash vouchers or payrolls.22 Nonetheless, he took the liberty of intervening in the preparation of the travel expense voucher in question. The first element for the crime under paragraph 1 of Article 172 of the RPC was present. The second element was likewise there. Petitioner allegedly committed the crime by "causing it to appear that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact so participate."23 Its requisites are: (1) that the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or proceedings; and (2) that such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding. 24 Both the CFI and the CA found that petitioner asked Cruz to sign the falsified voucher on the promise of a share of the proceeds, even if Cruz was not entitled it. Petitioner claims that he could not have induced Cruz to falsify the travel expense voucher because he did not have the power of supervision or control over Cruz. We disagree. The power of supervision or control over another does not preclude inducement. A person may be induced to commit a crime in two ways: (1) by giving a price or offering a reward or promise and (2) by using words of command.25 In this case, petitioner was found by both the CFI and the CA to have offered Cruz a share of the proceeds in exchange for his act of falsification. That promise was the inducement for the falsification. Finally, the parties never disputed the finding that the travel voucher was a public document. We see no reason to depart from the findings of the CFI and CA. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 26, 2004 decision and April 7, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

RICARDO S. SANTOS, JR.1, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES2, respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. assails the July 26, 2004 decision3 and April 7, 2005 resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA). On October 8, 1969, four separate informations for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents were filed in the Court of First Instance 5 of Rizal (CFI), Branch V, Quezon City against petitioner and nine others.6 These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q9783, Q-9784, Q-9787 and Q-9788.7 After trial, the CFI found petitioner and his co-accused Pedro Velasco8 guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the complex crime of malversation thru falsification of public documents under Articles 217 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).9 All of the accused who were convicted appealed the consolidated decision10 of the CFI to the CA. However, all of them except petitioner died during the pendency of the appeal. In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the CA held: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V, Quezon City, in Criminal Case[s] Nos. Q-9783, Q-9784, Q-9787 and Q-9788, is hereby MODIFIED, in that the accusedappellant Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case[s] Nos. Q-9783, Q9784 and Q-9788, but is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, as defined and penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2, of the same code xxx11 The CA held that petitioner was a principal by inducement, 12 based on the testimony of state witness Henry Cruz13 that petitioner induced him to sign the travel expense voucher (Exhibit AA1), subject of Criminal Case No. Q-9787 in exchange for receiving a share of the proceeds of the claim even if he was not entitled thereto. Petitioner finds it incredulous that the CA believed the testimony of Cruz with respect to "Exhibit AA-1" but not Cruz's testimony with respect to "Exhibits G, H, I, W, X, X1 and X2." 14 Hence, petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding him guilty, as a principal by inducement, of falsification of a public document. We disagree. The credibility of a witness is left primarily to the judgment of the trial judge. He is in a vantage position to assess the witness' demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination because he has the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand. 15 The factual findings of the appellate court are also given great weight especially if in complete accord with the findings of the lower court.16 In holding that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses must be left to the trial court as the agency in the best position to observe the witnesses' demeanor on the witness stand,17 the CA merely applied a well-settled rule. We find no reason to rule otherwise. The CA acquitted petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. Q-9783, Q-9784 and Q-9788 after it found:

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138 August 5, 2009

of his pending cases. This, she said, made it possible for him to be nominated and, subsequently, appointed. In his comment, respondent admitted that complainant had lodged criminal and administrative cases against him in the Ombudsman. He, however, insisted that these were already dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective and executory March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman. Thus, there were actually no more pending cases against him during his interviews in the JBC from February to August 2005. Accordingly, there was no impediment to his nomination to and assumption of the position of judge. However, he insisted that he informed the JBC of the said cases. The complainant filed a reply, stating that the March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman was not yet final and executory as it was timely appealed by way of a petition for review filed on October 28, 2004 in the CA. In fact, the petition was even granted. To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent on March 21, 2006 in the Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC 12 Personnel Division. According to her, respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any infraction. On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by both parties, the OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended respondents dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service. We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official document. We have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the JBC, as both he and complainant never backed their respective allegations with concrete 13 evidence. Thus, no probative value can be given either to the charges or to the defenses. However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he committed dishonesty when he checked the box indicating "No" to the question "Have you ever been formally charged?" in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed 14 in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel. Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered "No" to that very simple question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant, and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS. However, whether or not the charges were already dismissed was immaterial, given the phraseology of the question "Have you ever been formally charged?," meaning, charged at anytime in the past or present. In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro, we held that the making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty,
15 11 10

OLGA M. SAMSON, Complainant, vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO, Respondent. RESOLUTION Per Curiam: This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. In her complaint, complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and 2 independence , and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending 3 administrative case. According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003. At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain 4 improprieties and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted. On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges. It also denied the 6 complainants motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for review on October 28, 2004 in the 8 Court of Appeals (CA). In a decision dated November 25, 2005, the appellate court held that it could not take cognizance of the criminal charges against respondent on the ground that all appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman pertaining to criminal cases should be taken to the Supreme Court by way of a 9 petition for certiorari. As to the administrative aspect, the CA reversed and set aside the decision and joint order of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against respondent. The CA then directed Ombudsman to file and prosecute the administrative charges against respondent. While the complainants petition was pending in the CA, respondent was interviewed several times in the JBC from February 2005 to August 2005 for the position of RTC judge. On August 25, 2005, he was appointed to the RTC, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. The complainant charged that respondent never informed the JBC
7 5 1

being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service. Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false statement in his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a judge makes it all the more unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a member of the judiciary. Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should conduct himself in a manner which merits the respect and confidence of the people at all times, for he is 16 the visible representation of the law. Regrettably, we are convinced of respondents capacity to lie and evade the truth. His dishonesty misled the JBC and tarnished the image of the judiciary. He does not even seem remorseful for what he did as he sees nothing wrong with it. He deserves the harsh penalty of dismissal from the service. This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-0217 SC. This resolution, entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides: Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers. In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied) Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated 18 separately. However, pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary 19 proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar. This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of the following 20 Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act. CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who 21 disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer. In this particular case, respondents dishonest act was against the lawyers oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court." Respondents misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be suspended or disbarred. Thus: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied) This Court did not hesitate to apply the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC in a 22 plethora of cases. Of particular importance to this case is our decision in Caada v. 23 Suerte where we applied the rule to its fullest extent: automatic disbarment.1avvphi1 In Caada v. Suerte, complainant charged respondent Judge Suerte with grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, grave coercion, dishonesty, harassment, oppression and violation of Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint alleged, among others, that respondent tried to sell a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck and Daewoo car to complainant. The latter refused. Their friendship later on turned sour when they failed to reach an agreement on the commission respondent was supposed to receive as agent-broker for the contemplated sale of complainants beach lot. The complainant voiced out his fear that respondent would use his judicial power to persecute him for what respondent may have perceived as complainants infractions against him.

In his comment, respondent denied offering to sell the vehicles to complainant since, according to him, he never owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck nor could he recall if he had a Daewoo car in 1998. However, a perusal of respondents Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the years 1998-2001 revealed that among his personal properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996 and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1998. Accordingly, we found respondent guilty of dishonesty for having falsely denied that he ever owned the aforementioned vehicles. For his infraction, respondent judge was fined in the amount of P40,000. He would have been dismissed from the service were it not for the fact that he had 24 already been dismissed therefrom because of an earlier case. Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, we deemed respondent Judge Suertes administrative case as disciplinary proceedings for disbarment as well, and proceeded to strip him of his membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and show cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order for him to comment on 25 why he should not be held administratively liable as a member of the bench. In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of 26 "automatic conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by 27 treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals 28 and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court. It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice 29 of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, 30 than the possession of legal learning. A parting word. The first step towards the successful implementation of the Courts relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is and should be higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of an official document. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be entered into respondents records in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

(1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00. Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. 5 Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7 For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows: Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register .... The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads: Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996 CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:p This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1 Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. 2 On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.
3

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." 4 Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction. The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one

one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry. The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. 8 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business transaction, or business . . . . For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 9 In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau." The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the

above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young." All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name. Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench. It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Nos. 164368-69 April 2, 2009

B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the account name "Jose Velarde" on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit receipts duly marked in evidence): a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. "MMMMM") b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. "LLLLL") c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. "NNNNN") d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. "OOOOO") e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. "PPPPP") f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. "QQQQQ") g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. "RRRRR") h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. "SSSSS") i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT") j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU") k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV") l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW") (2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5. The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003. 4 The accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution;5 the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions. 6 The Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.7 After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases.8 In its Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury). Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905.10 His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds11: 1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the name "Jose Velarde"; 2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001; 3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following proper procedures; and 4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder. The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that presented the following arguments:12

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayans Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estradas (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565. 2 THE FACTS On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads: That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. CONTRARY TO LAW. Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565. Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued. On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada.3 At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The Peoples evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of: A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;

1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no moment considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was already prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular No. 302; 2. Movants reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced; 3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the alias and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard to convict movant for illegal use of alias; and 4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is not absorbed in plunder. Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply Opposition. THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYANS RULING The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution are: First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is described in the Information i.e., the testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the disjunctive "or" between "on or about 04 February 2000" and "sometime prior or subsequent thereto" means that the act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply the prosecutions procedural tool to guard against any variance between the date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a situation in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or events separate and distinct from those that took place on the single date "on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto." The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from interpreting the Information any other way. Second the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals. 13 It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estradas case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended, 14 and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.15 Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde": a. Estradas use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings with Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under the Information were the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, "Estrada did represent himself as Jose Velarde in several transactions," standing alone, violates Estradas right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase "and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde" which "is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." Thus, Estradas representations before persons other than those mentioned in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the "Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities" specified in the Information. Estradas

representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not therefore covered by the indictment. b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application of the libel law definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a communication to a third person covered by the privileged communication rule to be non-actionable. Estradas use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan said: Movants act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents being absolutely confidential, the witnessing thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot be considered as public as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account of the absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be known by this name in addition to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. Ursua instructs: Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended. c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde" is shown by the nature of a numbered account a perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity the obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and liabilities. 16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank account (such as the name he used to open it). Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute should be construed in a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that the use of an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160. THE PETITION The People filed this petition raising the following issues: 1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias

"Jose Velarde" was not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000; 2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142; 3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142; 4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper; 5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" by respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000; 6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its earlier final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its application to the instant case. THE COURTS RULING The petition has no merit. The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read: Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry. How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias "a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority." There must be, in the words of Ursua, a "sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended."18 Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:

The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.19 Following the doctrine of stare decisis,20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142. Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estradas position in the government; at the time of the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make based on the Peoples claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be. The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application of Ursua under the following tenor: The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term "alias" means "otherwise known as" (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using an "alias" logically implies that another name has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended information adverts to "several transactions" and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused. The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the Ursua case where another name was used by the accused in a single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day by this name in addition to his real name.22 The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling. We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a motion to quash23 that cannot be given the attributes of finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case. 24 The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest.25 It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.26 Perez v. Court of Appeals,27 albeit a civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez:

The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted.28 Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecutions case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua. In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its petition that Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name "Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" was designed to cause and did cause "confusion and fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estradas use of the alias was public. In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias. What is the coverage of the indictment? The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estradas use of the alias "Jose Velarde" on February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction one that took place on February 4, 2000 but there were other transactions covered by the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto; the Information specifically referred to "several transactions" "with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." To the People, the restrictive finding that the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" is absorbed by the phrase "on or about 04 February 2000" drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and the documents signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship between the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional antecedent of "prior to or subsequent thereto," on the other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally unwarranted escape route. The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying the constitutional requirement that the accused has to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This liberality

allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the "time" given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the time of the commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the additional clause "prior to or subsequent thereto"; under the liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus claims that no surprise could have taken place that would prevent Estrada from properly defending himself; the information fully notified him that he was being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance. We see no merit in these arguments. At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. 29 As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment. 30 The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.31 The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. 32 In short, the allegations in the complaint or information, as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused the primary reader of and the party directly affected by the complaint or information of the charge/s laid. The heretofore cited Information states that " on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [did] willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the Information, as this was how the accused might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have simply said "on or about February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase "sometime prior or subsequent thereto" would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the "on or about" already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the "prior or subsequent thereto" phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary consequence of

the use of the "OR" between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different (and would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples present interpretation) had the Information simply used "AND" instead of "OR" to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the use of "OR" is the reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information. Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged in the Information.1avvphi1 The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples case, as it deals a fatal blow on the Peoples claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual," as it does not amount to a customary practice or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua. The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405, and R.A. No. 9160. We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues. The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua when Estradas signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public" use of an alias that violates CA No. 142. On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of Estradas prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estradas prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias (except for certain purposes which do not include banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142. On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142s coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at least related with one another. The three laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to one another; they each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a different conduct, and covers a different class of persons,33 and there was no need to force their application to one another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present case. The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the People, may not be considered a deposit because it does not create the

juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust operation is separate and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended). The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion that the transaction or communication was privileged in nature was erroneous a congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a person who signs in a public or private transaction a name or alias, other than his original name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an alias to other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua. Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of crimes. The People contends that the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted, understood and applied so that right and justice would prevail. We see no merit in these arguments. We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest. To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity. The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature. 34 We previously rejected, in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,35 the Peoples nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits and trust transactions, when we said: The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank.

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1: SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country. (Underscoring supplied) If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country. Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers "deposit, placement or investment of funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law. Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term "deposits" was intended to be understood broadly: SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1 The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of "deposits." Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the word.lawphil.net Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase "or invested. Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858. 36 We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. 37 Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly. The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws. 38 We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estradas use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties to the transactions; it is at this

point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read together when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his indictment. In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estradas use of the alias "Jose Velarde" vis--vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether Estradas use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the offense charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.