Kashiwazaki011208 Vol1

IAEA Original English
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
MISSION REPORT ENGINEERING SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES SEISMIC SAFETY EXPERT MISSION
2nd FOLLOW-UP IAEA MISSION IN RELATION TO THE FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 16 JULY 2007 EARTHQUAKE AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP
The Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake
Tokyo and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, Japan 1-5 December 2008
ENGINEERING SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES (ESRS) DIVISION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATION SAFETY DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY
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REPORT ENGINEERING SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES SEISMIC SAFETY EXPERT MISSION
REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN
Tokyo and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, Japan 1-5 December 2008
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Mission date: Location: Facility: Organized by: 1-5 December 2008 Tokyo and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, Japan Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, Units 1 7 International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA/NSNI/ESS, Team Leader IAEA/NSNI/ESS, Deputy Team Leader Aspinall & Associates, UK EQECAT Inc., USA Consultant, Turkey James J. Johnson & Associates, USA Risk Engineering Ltd, Bulgaria Universita dellInsubria, Italy Consultant, USA Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, USA IAEA 2008 Issue Date: 29 January 2009
IAEA Review Team: GODOY, Antonio R. SOLLOGOUB, Pierre ASPINALL, William CAMPBELL, Kenneth GRPINAR, Aybars JOHNSON, James J. KOSTOV, Marin MICHETTI, Alessandro SWAN, Frank H. TAYLOR, Theodore
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Findings, conclusions and recommendations are intended only to assist national decision makers, who have the sole responsibility for the regulation and the safe operation of their nuclear power plants. Moreover, they do not replace a comprehensive safety assessment, which needs to be performed in the framework of the national licensing process.
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CONTENTS
SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 1 1. BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE MISSION ............................... 3 1.1. BACKGROUND........................................................................................................ 3 1.2. OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................ 3 1.3. SCOPE OF THE MISSION ....................................................................................... 4 2. CONDUCT OF THE MISSION ........................................................................................ 5 3. MAIN FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED .............................................................. 7 3.1. GENERAL FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED .............................................. 7 3.2. SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED ................................................ 9 4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. 12 5. FINDINGS SHEETS........................................................................................................ 12 A1-01 EXCEEDANCE OF THE DESIGN BASIS GROUND MOTION BY THE EARTHQUAKE............................................................................................................... 13 A1-02 RE-EVALUATION OF THE SEISMIC HAZARD. ......................................... 21 A2-01 OFF-SITE POWER............................................................................................ 41 A2-02 SEISMIC SYSTEMS INTERACTION ............................................................. 43 A2-03 FIRE PROTECTION ......................................................................................... 47 A2-04 SOIL DEFORMATION ..................................................................................... 53 A2-05 ANCHORAGE BEHAVIOUR .......................................................................... 56 A2-06 BASIC INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT POLICY ................................................ 58 A2-07 INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS ............. 61 A2-08 SEISMIC RESPONSE EVALUATION TO NCOE .......................................... 65 A2-09 EVALUATION FOR STANDARD SEISMIC GROUND MOTION............... 69 A3-01 OPERATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT RESPONSE AFTER SHUTDOWN ................................................................................................................... 71 A.3-02 RELEASES ....................................................................................................... 73 APPENDIX I - MISSION PROGRAMME.............................................................................. 75 APPENDIX II - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................ 82 APPENDIX III SITE VISIT .................................................................................................. 89 v
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APPENDIX IV LIST OF DOCUMENTS PRESENTED TO THE MISSION..................... 90 APPENDIX V SELECTED PHOTOS.................................................................................. 93 APPENDIX VI IAEA PRESS RELEASE .......................................................................... 104
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SUMMARY
On 16 July 2007, a strong earthquake, the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki (NCO) earthquake, with a moment magnitude of 6.6 (MJMA=6.8 according to the Japanese Meteorological Agency), occurred at 10:13 h local time with its hypocentre below the seabed of the Jo-chuetsu area in Niigata prefecture (37 33 N, 138 37E) in Japan, affecting the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) located approximately 16 km south of its epicentre. Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP is the biggest nuclear power plant site in the world. It is located in the Niigata prefecture, on the northwest coast of Japan, and it is operated by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The site has seven units with a total of 7965 MW net installed capacity. Five reactors are of BWR type and two reactors are of ABWR type. The five BWR units entered commercial operation between 1985 and 1994 and the two ABWRs in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Following the NCO earthquake, in August 2007, the Government of Japan through the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) requested the IAEA to carry out a fact finding mission with the main purpose of identifying the preliminary findings and lessons learned from this event in order to share them with the international nuclear community. This first mission took place from 6 10 August 2007. Six months after the event, in January 2008, a second IAEA mission was conducted as a 1st follow up of those preliminary findings of the August 2007 mission considering the available results of the investigations and studies performed and corrective actions taken up to that time. The reports of both missions are available on the IAEA web page http://www.iaea.org. Upon invitation from the Government of Japan, an IAEA-led team of international experts conducted a 2nd follow up mission with the purpose of continuing to share the lessons learned from the effects of the July 2007 earthquake on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP and focusing particularly on the status of Unit 7. This second follow up mission took place from 1 to 5 December 2008. Further evidence was received confirming the findings of previous missions regarding the safe performance of the plant during and after the earthquake. The mission found that there is consensus in the scientific community about the causes of the unexpectedly large ground motions experienced at the plant site during the July 2007 earthquake and, consequently, it has been possible to identify the precautions needed to be taken in relation to possible future events.
These precautions were based on extensive studies and assessments conducted by a number of specialized institutions and experts in different fields. The necessary upgrades and actions were consequently defined and are being implemented for both safety and non-safety related components at the nuclear power plant. The main findings and lessons learned are included in Section 3 of this report while detailed information is provided in the findings sheets in Section 5.
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1.
1.1.
BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE MISSION

BACKGROUND
On 16 July 2007, a strong earthquake, the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki (NCO) earthquake, with a moment magnitude of 6.6 (MJMA=6.8 according to the Japanese Meteorological Agency), occurred at 10:13 h local time with its hypocentre below the seabed of the Jo-chuetsu area in Niigata prefecture (37 33 N, 138 37E) in Japan, affecting the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) located approximately 16 km south of its epicentre.
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP is the biggest nuclear power plant site in the world. It is located in the Niigata prefecture, in the northwest coast of Japan, and it is operated by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The site has seven units with a total of 7965 MW net installed capacity. Five reactors are of Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) type with a net installed capacity of 1067 MW each. Two reactors are of Advanced Boiler Water Reactor (ABWR) type with 1315 MW net installed capacity each. The five BWR units entered commercial operation between 1985 and 1994 and the two ABWRs in 1996 and 1997 respectively. At the time of the earthquake, four reactors were in operation: Units 2, 3 and 4 (BWRs) and Unit 7 (ABWR). Unit 2 was in start-up condition but was not connected to the grid. The other three reactors were in shutdown conditions for planned outages: Units 1 and 5 (BWRs) and Unit 6 (ABWR). The earthquake caused automatic shutdown of the operating reactors, a fire in the in-house electrical transformer of Unit 3, release of a very limited amount of radioactive material to the sea and the air, and damage to non-nuclear structures, systems and components of the plant as well as to outdoor facilities, as reported by TEPCO on their web page.
Following the NCO earthquake, the Government of Japan through NISA invited the IAEA to carry out a fact finding mission with the main purpose of identifying the preliminary findings and lessons learned from this event in order to share them with the international nuclear community. The mission took place from 6 10 August 2007. Six months after the event, in January 2008, a second IAEA mission was conducted as a 1st follow up on those preliminary findings of the August 2007 mission considering the results available of the investigations and studies performed and corrective actions taken up to that time. The reports of both missions are available on the IAEA web page http://www.iaea.org. As was indicated in the report of the August 2007 mission, the first visit was considered to be an initial activity that would continue the knowledge sharing in relation to this event. Thus, NISA invited the IAEA to conduct a second follow-up mission from 1 to 5 December 2008 with the objectives, scope and details as indicated below. Detailed terms of reference for the follow-up mission were prepared and agreed by both parties. 1.2. Since the occurrence of the earthquake in July 2007, extensive studies, investigations, analyses and assessments have been carried out by Japanese organizations for re-assessing the seismic hazard at the site and for evaluating the response and the safety of the plant in relation to the NCO earthquake and the newly defined seismic hazard at the site. OBJECTIVES
Thus, the purpose of the 2nd IAEA Follow up Mission was to conduct almost a year and a half after the 2007 seismic event- a follow up of the findings and lessons learned from the previous 3
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missions on the basis of the latest results of the studies and investigations performed to date by TEPCO and the Government of Japan in relation to the seismic safety of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, focusing mainly on Unit 7, and to discuss specific technical issues and lessons learned of the ongoing works which will be shared with the international nuclear community. 1.3. 1. The specific scope of the mission was as follows: SCOPE OF THE MISSION
General approach and organizational structures set up by NISA and by TEPCO to deal with the seismic safety issue: Current status of the organizational structure used by the involved Japanese organizations (NISA/JNES/TEPCO). Assessment of the results obtained from the Inspection Plan performed on Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs): Actions taken since January 2008.
2.
Seismic hazard investigations: Status and results obtained from the studies and investigations related to follow up of lessons learned as discussed during previous missions on geophysical, geological, seismological studies and investigations performed on-shore and off-shore, including the determination of the new seismic hazard at the site for evaluating the seismic safety of the plant. Status and results obtained on the assessment of the seismic response of SSCs to the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake: Analytical simulation of structural building response to the recorded ground motions from the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake; Comparison with design values and assessment of margins; Comparison between original design seismic loads, real seismic loads and limit state loads, for systems and components (analysis and/or tests). Comparison between originally calculated and actually recorded / evaluated response, i.e. Floor Response Spectra (FRS). Status and results obtained on the re-evaluation of the seismic safety based on the newly defined seismic hazard: Structural analysis of building and equipment; Criteria decided for the re-evaluation of the seismic safety;
3.
Seismic Safety
Status and final results of the integrity and functional inspections and investigations performed on the SSCs for Unit 7 regarding the behaviour and response to the NCO earthquake: documentation, reporting, etc.
Seismic qualification of systems and equipment (e.g. analysis, testing, comparison, earthquake experience data); Results of the application of the evaluation criteria and decision and design on upgrades (if any); 4
Discussions related to the work plan prepared by TEPCO regarding the assessment of the residual
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risk at the plant. 4.
Discussions on future actions proposal between IAEA and Japan (NISA, TEPCO) in relation to Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP.
Future actions
2.
CONDUCT OF THE MISSION
The follow-up mission was conducted through meetings at NISA offices in Tokyo and a one-day site visit to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site. In the first part, presentations from and discussions with the counterparts specialists took place. During the site visit observations were made of the seismic upgrades performed at Reactor and Turbine buildings of Units 6 and 7, as well as to outdoor facilities; in parallel, geomorphological and geological observations were made at the Nagaoka Plain Western Boundary Fault Zone and in the site vicinity. The IAEA team was composed of a leader, a deputy leader and eight international experts, all well recognized specialists in the subject, as follows: 1. Team Leader: Antonio R. Godoy, IAEA, Acting Head of Engineering Safety Section (ESS/NSNI), 2. Deputy Team Leader: Pierre Sollogoub, IAEA, Senior Officer, (ESS/NSNI). 3. External Experts: 2. 1. W. Aspinall (UK)
Two Groups were constituted for the indicated tasks: Group 1: Seismic Hazard: A. Grpinar (Task Leader), K. Campbell, W. Aspinall, A. Michetti, F. Swan. P. Sollogoub (Task Leader), T. Taylor, M. Kostov, J. J. Johnson.
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7.
6.
5.
4.
3.
F. Swan
A. Michetti
T. Taylor
M. Kostov
J. J. Johnson
A. Grpinar
K. Campbell
(USA). (USA)
(Turkey) (Bulgaria)
(Italy)
(USA)
(USA)
Group 2:
Integrity Evaluation- Seismic Response Buildings and Equipment
Counterparts: NISA:
A number of documents were prepared by NISA in English, summarizing the investigations, studies and inspections performed, the results obtained, and the proposed future actions. They were sent to IAEA in advance of the mission. The mission report is composed of one volume. The detailed mission programme and the list of 5
Mr. Kentaro Morita/ Mr. A. Fukushima
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participants are included in Appendices I and II of this mission report respectively. Details of the experts are provided in Appendix II. Appendix III provides the details of site visit on Thursday 4 December 2008. Appendix IV contains all supporting documentation and information collected during the mission and provided by the Japanese counterpart to the IAEA team (see CD attached) and Appendix V a set of selected photos taken during the mission. A press release, included in Appendix VI summarising the findings of the follow-up mission was distributed on the final day from IAEA headquarters in Vienna and an opportunity was provided for journalists, in Tokyo, to interview the IAEA team leader.
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3.
3.1.
MAIN FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

GENERAL FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED
These findings and lessons learned from the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki (NCO) earthquake of July 2007 and its effects on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP constitute the 2nd follow up of those already reported in previous IAEA missions conducted in August 2007 and January 2008. As a continuation of these two IAEA reports, the findings and lessons learned that are presently reported reflect the developments and results achieved from the extensive investigations, studies, inspections and upgrades performed during the past ten months in relation to: (a) the determination of the causative structure of the July 2007 earthquake, the evaluation of the seismic response and the assessment of the integrity of the plant structures, systems and components to this event, and (b) the assessment of the new seismic input and, correspondingly, the re-evaluation of the seismic safety of the plant to this higher seismic load. In general, the IAEA team concurs on the need to emphasize the general conclusions from the previous mission regarding the following aspects:
The consequences of the July 2007 earthquake on the plant were unique in the sense that the levels of seismic ground motion estimated in the design process were very significantly exceeded by the event. Consequently, the newly calculated seismic hazard at the site is much higher than both the July 2007 event and the original design earthquake level.
NISA, JNES, TEPCO and a large number of specialized institutions and universities as well as experts in different fields, have performed numerous activities related to the evaluation, regulatory guidance and the review aspects of the situation of the KashiwazakiKariwa NPP after the earthquake as well as for its safety re-evaluation to a higher seismic input. Once again, it should be highlighted that the participatory approach that has been chosen by NISA for the safety evaluation framework provided for a transparent and consensus seeking process that, as it was verified by the mission, resulted in a final output of high quality where problems, remarks or differences among participants were identified and addressed in a timely manner.
The related current IAEA Safety Standards, as well as those under development, have been very useful for the IAEA follow-up mission in identifying findings and lessons learned in the areas of the evaluation of seismic hazard and the seismic response and 7
This led the experts to concur that the lessons learned from the results of the plant integrity evaluation process applied to the July 2007 earthquake and applied to the seismic safety re-evaluation to the new higher seismic input will improve the design and evaluation criteria and approaches currently used in Japan and worldwide. In the same way, these results are contributing to the ongoing review and revision of the related IAEA safety standards. It is also likely that, eventually, there will be an influence on the state-of-the-practice for assessing the seismic safety of nuclear power plants worldwide. For this reason, it is again emphasized that it is essential that findings and lessons learned are well identified and are promptly communicated to the international scientific and technical nuclear community.
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The present follow up mission focussed on the results of the investigations and assessments related to the determination of the new seismic input, the evaluation of the potential for fault displacement at the site, the completion of the integrity evaluation of the structures, systems and components for the July 2007 NCO earthquake and for the new higher seismic input mainly for Units 6 and 7. In general, the IAEA team concurs on the following: -
It was also confirmed by the Japanese counterpart that the IAEA missions achieved the objective of sharing the lessons learned with the international nuclear community in many different ways. For NISA, cooperation with the IAEA was desirable given the fact that neither international regulatory guidance nor experience was available for dealing with events like this. For TEPCO (the plant operating organization), the missions provided for a clearer road map to characterize the effect of the NCO earthquake on the plant, to assess its safety and capacity to withstand the new high seismic input and to implement the required upgrading, if needed. For the international community, it was an invaluable chance to share the experience of Japan and learn from this event through all activities performed by IAEA, NISA and TEPCO. It was well understood that public perception, the need for outreach and a consistent flow of information to the local and international communities are critical components for dealing with a post earthquake situation.
capacity evaluation of structures, systems and components. Through discussions with the Japanese counterparts, it was confirmed that the IAEA Safety Standards can be used to address many of the specific findings that are detailed in Section 5 of this report, especially in relation to the evaluations to be performed and criteria to be applied for assessing the seismic safety for a higher seismic input. These discussions also indicated that in general the IAEA Safety Standards does not contradict but reinforces the current Japanese regulatory guidance.
Extensive investigations and studies were performed to understand and to explain the causative structure of the NCO earthquake and to define the new seismic hazard at the site. Thus, the resulting new seismic ground motion was estimated using highly conservative assumptions. According to the IAEA team certain related topics require additional investigations. In this regard, NISA and TEPCO underlined the importance of seeking new scientific and technical information and undertaking additional studies. Having these considerations in mind, TEPCO has launched a confirmatory research programme for the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) related to the vibratory ground motion as well as a probabilistic fault displacement hazard analysis (PFDHA) using the vast amount of data collected. The integrity of structures, systems and components important to safety (SSCs) was confirmed for the NCO earthquake. The evaluation criteria were based, essentially, on assuming elastic behaviour regarding the seismic response and the capacity of SSCs, which lead to the conclusion that damage did not occur. In support of this overall approach, the issue of hidden damage was addressed through expert judgement and detailed physical inspections of representative sample of structures and equipment. As a by-product of the evaluations performed, areas of significant margin were identified.
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More specific findings and lessons learned are provided in the following sub-section 3.2. 3.2. 1. SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Extensive physical modifications to the site and plant structures, systems and components were observed by the IAEA team during the mission. Major soil stabilization projects were in progress or completed, which ensures minimal adverse effects to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa on-site activities in case of the occurrence of future earthquakes. Modifications to Unit 7 structures included the reactor building roof structure, crane rail supports and exhaust stack. Numerous new pipe supports and modifications to existing pipe supports were seen. Modifications to components, such as tanks were also observed. Generally, these upgrades were based on very conservative assumptions and were made to assure safe performance against the newly defined higher standard seismic ground motion.
The evaluation of the seismic safety of Unit 7 to the new definition of the seismic design ground motion was completed and presented to the IAEA team. Structures, systems and components important to safety were assessed with respect to their compliance with acceptance criteria as established by the Japanese Codes and Standards (JEAG-4601). Upgrading of some systems and components was implemented, e.g. reactor building roof and piping systems. In addition, some structures, systems and components not important to safety were upgraded to minimize the potential for adverse effects to operation in case of the occurrence of future earthquakes.
3.2.1. Re-evaluation of the Seismic Hazard at the Site
2.
Following significant debate and research, there is consensus within the Japanese scientific community regarding the causative fault of the NCO earthquake. Extensive studies have been performed by NISA, JNES and TEPCO to reach a better understanding of the reasons for the very high level of ground motion that the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP experienced during this event. Furthermore, the different levels of ground motion experienced at the two sections of the site (Units 1-4 and Units 5-7) are much better explained by the recent studies. These findings have greatly contributed to the re-evaluation of the seismic hazard at the site.
3.
The recently conducted seismic hazard studies for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP units have yielded the largest values for ground motion ever considered for a nuclear power plant site. The newly defined seismic ground motion is named as Standard Seismic Ground Motion (SSGM). Because of the observations during the NCO earthquake and the investigations conducted following the event, the ground motion values at the geological outcrop (or free surface of the base stratum according to the Japanese terminology) to be considered as basis for the seismic safety re-evaluation of the plant are over twice as large for Units 1-4 (i.e. 2.3g) compared to those of Units 5-7 (i.e. 1.2g) (as a reference, the original design value was 0.45g for all units). Through the missions and technical meetings held since 2007, IAEA experts have stated that, as a seismic hazard comprises both vibratory ground motion and fault displacement aspects, they should be treated in a consistent manner as reflected and established in the corresponding IAEA safety standards and has suggested that there 9
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The experience from the NCO earthquake and the work done subsequent to the event by NISA, JNES and TEPCO has had a significant impact on the preparation of the revision of the IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-3.3 on the evaluation of seismic hazards for nuclear installations especially in relation to the modelling of ground motion from nearby faults. Similarly the recognition of the possibility of the occurrence of a beyond design basis earthquake and treating both the ground motion and fault displacement resulting from such phenomena within a probabilistic context will be an important activity to follow for the international scientific community. This is especially because the availability of an impressive amount of geological, geophysical and seismological data will make this activity at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP an exemplar international project. It is also recognized that the current Japanese regulations will receive the benefits from the results of all these developments, particularly in the area of the implementation of the requirements for evaluating the residual risk. JNES and Japanese utilities are now preparing a programme for addressing the evaluation of the residual risk by using a probabilistic approach. Basic Integrity Assessment Policy and Integrity Assessment of Structures, Systems and Components.
may be merit in investigating certain related topics for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP case in a probabilistic context. According to these recommendations, TEPCO has launched a confirmatory programme of methodological research for the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) related to the vibratory ground motion as well as a probabilistic fault displacement hazard analysis (PFDHA) using the vast amount of data collected for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site after the NCO earthquake and data collected throughout Japan for other earthquakes. Keeping in mind the synergies between these studies especially in the near region of the site, it is recognized that there will be merit to consider both aspects (i.e. vibratory ground motion and fault displacement) within a common overarching framework.
3.2.2. Integrity Assessment for evaluating the effects of the NCO Earthquake (a) 1.
2.
3.
Through the discussions with NISA and TEPCO, IAEA team was informed that the testing at a system level was those tests usually performed during the periodical inspection and plant start-up with additional specific attention to the possible effects caused by the NCO earthquake on systems performance. The system testing complies with Japanese requirements. 10
The inspection policy has been successfully implemented at Unit 7 of KashiwazakiKariwa NPP. The integrity assessments and additional examinations that have been performed at Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP at the component level have been reviewed by NISA. After NCO earthquake, the system integrity and functional testing was sound and was based upon the plants technical specifications. The results were used to ensure that the intended functions of the systems of Unit 7 could perform without problems.
The integrity assessment policy and procedures that have been developed under the direction of NISA for implementation at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP involve a combination of analysis and inspections. In addition it was explained to IAEA team that TEPCO requested the evaluation of the proposed inspections at Unit 7 through a convened experts panel by US-EPRI related to the hidden damage issue.
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(b) 1.
Seismic Response and Seismic Behaviour
2.
The main finding is that all structures and components of Unit 7 behaved in an elastic manner without noticeable damage and, generally, with additional margins with respect to the ones established by the acceptance criteria. Analysis results helped in defining additional inspections to confirm the absence of damage, when margins were small. As highlighted in the first follow-up mission, more refined structural models would help to understand some discrepancies between measured and calculated responses (e.g. in vertical direction). These refined methods for modelling, analyses and evaluation correspond to the state-of-the-practice by the international nuclear engineering community and may safely be used in the future.
The systematic evaluation of the structures and components under the NCO earthquake was performed by methods and models used for the original design with updated system configurations and material characteristics corresponding to as-is conditions. The acceptance criteria as indicated by NISA during the discussions- are based on the requirements that the plant SSCs important to safety behave in the elastic range with no damage considering that it is assumed that the plant may continue operation in future. Therefore, NISA demonstrated that the SSCs important to safety satisfy regulatory technical requirements.
3.2.3 Assessment of the safety to the Standard Seismic Ground Motion (SSGM) 1.
2.
3.
Structures and components of Unit 7 were analyzed by TEPCO using similar models as for linear analyses and as a result, some SSCs require upgrading. These upgrades have been completed at the site. JNES is now conducting a cross checking of the analysis performed by TEPCO on safety related components.
For the assessment of structures, systems and components to the newly defined standard seismic ground motion, acceptance criteria are based on the requirements that the plant should accomplish the three fundamental safety functions but can behave in the nonlinear range, with possible permanent deformations.
In parallel, the verification of the integrity and functionality of safety related components and systems to the newly defined SSGM is under way in Unit 7 in accordance with Japanese requirements and using related and available test results and the new loading conditions.
3.2.4. Ground Deformations 1.
3.2.5. Anchorage 1.
The lesson transmitted is that although the observed large ground deformations are not affecting safety related SSCs they are important for the overall safe performance of the plant as well as for the expected immediate actions that usually follow a strong earthquake. Road accessibility, water intakes, underground piping and facilities, electric switchyards, etc. could be significantly adversely affected by large ground deformations and that is why significant measures have been taken to reduce the negative effects in case of the future possible occurrence of an earthquake higher than the original design basis.
The safety related anchorage in Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP has performed very well during the intensive seismic shaking in 2007. Sharing of information about specific 11
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3.2.6. Fire Protection 1.
details and design praxis with the international community will contribute to increasing the seismic safety of anchorage in the nuclear industry. Fire protection has been significantly improved through a dedicated on site fire brigade available 24/7, new diverse sources of water with 17 new water tanks located underground in areas where there are potential sources of fire, new water distribution (piping) systems installed aboveground and supported on buildings or foundation pads, and upgrades of different aspects of fire extinguishing systems in the buildings.
4.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
As in the previous IAEA missions in August 2007 and January 2008, throughout this followup mission, the IAEA team experienced good cooperation from all the Japanese counterparts and the institutions participating in the meetings. Detailed presentations and documentation material were provided. All questions asked by the expert team were addressed with precision and, when needed, accompanied by adequate documentation. The programme of the one-day visit to the plant allowed the team to obtain a proper impression of the upgrades performed indoors and outdoors of Units 6 and 7 as well as of the geological and geophysical investigations performed on tectonic structure located in the site vicinity and near region.
5.
FINDINGS SHEETS
In the following pages the Findings Sheets for each of the areas covered by the three missions are attached.
However, for some of the findings that were identified in the August 2007 and January 2008 missions, there were no activities during the present 2nd follow-up mission. This is due to the definition of the scope of the mission that was agreed between NISA and IAEA based on current priorities. Those previous findings sheets are kept in the present report for completeness. Therefore, for the items A2-01, A3-01 and A3-02, it is indicated on the corresponding Findings Sheet that there has been no action during the present follow-up mission. With respect to items A1-01 and A1-02, the former was maintained as prepared during the previous mission while the latter was expanded during the present mission since most of the findings and lessons learned correspond mainly to the studies and investigations for assessing and re-evaluating the seismic hazards at the site.
A new item was created in this mission; the Findings Sheet A2-09 corresponding to the evaluation of the plant structures, systems, and components to the new seismic input (the SSGM). For the remainder of the items, the new findings and lessons learned from the present followup mission were added to the findings and lessons learned from the August 2007 and January 2008 missions.
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FINDINGS SHEET
1. FINDING IDENTIFICATION NPP: Unit: Finding Number: A.1-01
KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP UNITS 1 TO 7
Assessment Area: Finding Title:
A.1 SEISMIC DESIGN BASIS, INSTRUMENTAL RECORDS AND RE-EVALUATION OF SEISMIC HAZARD A1-01 EXCEEDANCE OF THE DESIGN BASIS GROUND MOTION BY THE EARTHQUAKE
2. FINDINGS -
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION: BACKGROUND
Recent studies for the evaluation of seismic hazard for new and operating nuclear facilities have consistently shown significantly higher values compared to those evaluated in previous decades. Also in the past several years, two nuclear power plant sites in Japan experienced earthquakes (Onagawa: Aug 2005, Shika: Mar 2007) that exceeded the design basis response spectra without any damage to safety related structures, systems and components.
2.2. FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP -
As a result of this, the IAEA started an extra-budgetary programme on the seismic evaluation of existing nuclear power plants (hazard and design evaluation) supported by, among other Member States, Japan where TEPCO is a major contributor. Therefore, although the 16 July 2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki was a major earthquake that exceeded very significantly the design basis response spectra of the plant at the base mat level, its occurrence was not totally unexpected by the plant because of the awareness brought by earlier events and the related ongoing international interaction.
There are a multitude of reasons for the exceedance of design basis ground motions and for these reasons the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake needs to be studied in detail for a thorough understanding of the event in question and to share feedback on the experience with the international nuclear safety community. From the discussions and documents presented to the IAEA team, some of the reasons seem related to the identification and characterization of the seismogenic sources (e.g. among others, the estimate of potential maximum magnitudes) of the seismotectonic model in the near region of the site, while other reasons concern the validation of the attenuation relations for areas close to the epicentres.
TEPCO experts have made and presented comparisons of the seismic response spectra used for the design of structures, systems and components with the response spectra that were obtained by site accelerographs during the 16 July 2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake. As the records from the free field accelerographs were overwritten by 13
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aftershock records it was not possible to have a comparison of these. Instead comparisons were calculated for records that were obtained at the base mat levels for all seven units. These are provided in Volume II of this report. These comparisons show that there was significant exceedance of the design basis levels by the observed values for a very wide range of spectral frequencies. From the presentations made by TEPCO experts as well as reports by the regulatory authority NISA, and as was confirmed by plant walkdowns performed by IAEA experts, it is indicated that the safety related structures, systems and components of all seven units of the plant (in operating, start-up and shut down conditions) demonstrated exceptionally good apparent performance in ensuring the basic safety functions concerning control of reactivity, cooling and confinement. Therefore, it is important to understand all the elements involved in the derivation of the seismic design basis and to identify the sources of conservatism as well as sources that contributed to the exceedance of the design basis ground motions.
1.
3 LESSONS LEARNED
The chain that makes up the process of the derivation of the seismic design basis and the actual design of the plant structures, systems and components has a multitude of links that have varying degrees of uncertainty and that are evaluated by earth scientists, hazard analysts, geotechnical, civil, mechanical, electrical and systems engineers. As the design basis response spectra and thus the seismic design is a composite product, an analytical approach is needed for this process. 10/08/2007
Fault mechanism and directivity:
2.
When there are significant contributions to the seismic hazard by active faults in the site vicinity or the near region (see the IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-3.3 for definitions of the terms site vicinity and near region), source parameters such as the fault mechanism and directivity effects may play an important role. This may cause variations in the hazard even within areas very close to each other. Ways of including these effects in seismic hazard studies need to be considered when such active faults are present in close proximity to NPP sites. Local Geological Conditions: The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP has seven operating units, with four units located in one part of the site and the other three units about one and a half kilometers away. However, both the intensity of damage (to non safety items) and the levels of free field acceleration are quite different at the two locations higher in the part of the site where the four units (1 to 4) are located. Part of the explanation may be due to the differences in the age and the depth of the underlying geological formations. At the site of Units 5 7 the Pliocene formations has a thickness of about 120 m above the Upper Miocene to Lower Pliocene formations, while at the site of Units 1 4 the Pliocene formations have a thickness of over 300 m, with an anticline separating the two sites. Such differences need to be taken into account in seismic hazard evaluations. Attenuation relationships: Attenuation relationships generally play an important role in seismic hazard assessments. 14
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They have always received much attention and the data on which they are based have steadily and exponentially increased. Until about ten years ago the number of accelerograms recorded in the near vicinity of an epicentre was relatively small. For this reason this part of the attenuation relationship had large uncertainties and some extrapolation from other parts of the curve was needed. With the deployment of dense networks in some parts of the world, e.g. K-NET in Japan, there has been a dramatic increase in the records of near field earthquakes and in general these records have shown larger than expected peak and spectral accelerations compared to earlier derived attenuation relationships. When seismic sources are present in the near region or the site vicinity of a nuclear facility, it is necessary to take into consideration the recent records that have been obtained in the near field. In general, response spectra may not be representative of the energy content of the ground motion. It may be possible to have the same response spectrum for ground motions with significantly different energy content. For this reason additional representations of the earthquake ground motion are needed to account for these differences. Generally, power spectral density functions and cumulative absolute velocities (CAV) may be used to check and compare the energy content which may have played a role, as a metric of the potential of the earthquake to cause damage. The deeply embedded structures of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP showed interaction with the soil. Especially for the aftershock record (16 July 2007, 15:37) the reduction in the peak ground acceleration is remarkable (from 298 Gals1 free field to 60 Gals at the base mat level). This difference is much less for the main shock, possibly owing to saturation of the free field acceleration because of soil non-linearities. It should be noted that this soil structure interaction took place for the local geological conditions at KashiwazakiKariwa NPP which varies from hard soil to soft rock. Conservatism of the design: Although the design basis response spectra and the observed response spectra at the base mat level show significant differences (i.e. exceedance of the observed values) the fact that design basis response spectra are not necessarily representative of the final seismic design is once again confirmed. Volume II of this report contains a comparison of the maximum response acceleration values observed at each floor where records are available with the values estimated at the design stage for the S2 earthquake level. It can be observed here that there is very little difference between the design response acceleration and the observed acceleration values. It is also noted that in Japan the design of nuclear power plants is often governed by requirements that are related to multiples of static design coefficients of the building code. It is important to understand and document the conservatism at different steps of the design process. Accounting for uncertainties: Regardless of the method used (deterministic or probabilistic) each step of seismic hazard Soil structure interaction: Energy contents of the ground motion:
5.
6.
7.
1 Gal = 0.01 m/s2.
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evaluation contains both uncertainties that are random (i.e. aleatory) and uncertainties that are related to the modelling (i.e. epistemic). Identification and quantification of these uncertainties is very important and is usually not straightforward. The data used needs to be qualified in terms of its reliability and the method needs to allow for alternative models that are in agreement with the data. Japan has a wealth of seismic data that may be used to decrease uncertainties associated with seismic hazard evaluation. Although part of the free field records of the 16 July 2007 earthquake were lost due to overwriting by aftershocks in the process of transmitting these to TEPCO headquarters in Tokyo, there is still considerable data that will facilitate the understanding of this earthquake at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP. Free field, downhole, base mat and instructure records have been obtained and these are used for comparing with the response spectra and time histories used as basis for the design. Importance of seismic instrumentation:
For the future, redundancies should be considered in the processing of data so that plant personnel have immediate access to this information and that loss in transmission is avoided. Experience from modern instrumentation installed in nuclear power plants in the world that provides immediate indication to the operator of the severity of earthquake using updated criteria needs to be considered.
4. FOLLOW-UP MISSION
1. 4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP
Date:
01/02/2008
The main findings of the IAEA August 2007 Mission related to this subject involved two major aspects: -
Summary of Findings and Lessons Learned (from August 2007 Mission):
In this section of the present report only the first aspect will be considered. The second aspect is addressed in Findings Sheet A2-08 of this report. 2. Summary of investigations performed by TEPCO and other specialized institutions:
The second aspect was more related to the apparent excellent behaviour of the safety related structures, systems and components and the reasons that made this possible so that these could also be shared by the international community. The two findings in this area were identified as: (1) soil structure interaction and (2) conservatism of the design.
The first is related to the earthquake phenomena itself; that is, the understanding of the reasons why such high accelerations (both pga and spectral accelerations) were recorded even though detailed seismic hazard studies had been conducted for the site. The questions focused on the identification of the earthquake phenomena that needed to be better understood in order for these to be shared with the international scientific community. These were identified as: (1) fault mechanism and directivity, (2) local geological conditions, (3) attenuation relationships, (4) energy content of the ground motion and (5) accounting for uncertainties.
The vast amount of investigations that were performed after the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki 16
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earthquake of July 2007 can be grouped under two major headings, as follows:
In the following both aspects are discussed. -
investigations that were performed within the site area in order to identify the origins of the ground deformations such as fractures, subsidence, sand boils and slope failures.
investigations that are aimed at identifying the causative fault of the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake, and
2.1 Summary of investigations to identify the causative fault:
(3) The 2007 Chuetsu-oki Japan Earthquake: A case of difficulty determining the source fault plane, by Koketsu et al, Earthquake Research Institute, University of Tokyo. (5) Evaluation status of earthquake resistance safety of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS in light of the Niigata-Chuetsu-oki earthquake, December 5, 2007, TEPCO. Evaluation status of earthquake resistance safety of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS in light of the Niigata-Chuetsu-oki earthquake, December 25, 2007, TEPCO. Geological survey at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS in light of the Niigata-Chuetsu-oki earthquake, January 25, 2008, TEPCO. In particular, the following sections of this TEPCO report were discussed: o Interim report of seismic prospecting at site and in site environs o Interim report of geological survey of the Nagaoka plain western faults zone o Report of tsunami measurement record o Survey on faults at site (shaft excavation survey) (4) Offshore active faults and folds in and around the source area of the 2007 Chuetsu-oki Japan Earthquake, by Okamura Y., Geological Survey of Japan.
(2) Current state of researching project for the 2007 Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki earthquake and strong ground motions due to this earthquake, by Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization.
(1) Current status of investigation in Seismic & Structural Design Subcommittee, by NISA.
The performed investigations aimed to identify the causative fault of the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake are reported in five main documents:
http://riodb02.ibase.aist.go.jp/db085/RIO-DB-SEISMIC/Sado/index_Sado.html 2.2 Summary of site area investigations: -
The reports (1) and (2) indicate that the most probable causative fault was a thrust plane dipping to the SE. The focal depth -where the main asperity was located- was estimated at about 10-12 km, north of the site. To reach these conclusions they used aftershocks distribution, static displacement (GPS and INSAR), tsunami propagation, teleseismic records, strong motion records and seismic reflection profiles. Some seismic reflection profiles are reported at the website of the Geological Survey of Japan:
The investigations performed for the understanding of the effects of the 2007 earthquake are reported in the NISA, JNES and TEPCO document indicated in section 2.1 above. It describes all the effects occurred at the site and the investigations already carried out and ongoing. In particular the effects were ground deformation, cracks and sand boiling. These 17
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3. -
investigations consist of topographical surveys; aerial photogrammetry, various foundation surveys; excavations; shallow and deep boreholes, a large shaft for inspecting fault displacement and seismic profiles. Status of the Finding:
3.1. Investigations to identify the causative fault of the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake:
The offshore seismic reflection studies have concentrated on the so called F-B fault, first identified to be 7 km long but not active (during the stage of getting the construction permit of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP). Later, further investigations conducted in 2003 concluded that this fault was active and actually 20 km long. Presently, investigations performed after the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake in July 2007 provide evidence that the fault is at least 23 km long.
There has been a very significant amount of work performed both in the seismological and geophysical areas to study the July 2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake. The seismological work started with the fault plane solution of the main shock and continued with the study of the aftershock distributions. Both of the two possible planes (SE and NW dipping) have been considered by the seismologists to be credible. The plane that dips towards the site (SE) seems to have more scientific support at the moment of present mission. The Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion Earthquake Research Committee stated that: . . . In a large sense, the 2007 Niigata-ken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake was caused by reverse fault with SE dip (inclination from sea to land). Furthermore, it is estimated that the fault with of NW dip(inclination from land to sea) also ruptured in northeastern source area , January 11, 2008
3.2. Site area investigations -
Whether or not the F-B fault is the causative structure of the July 2007 Niigataken Chuetsuoki event is not immediately obvious. This would mean that the SE dip of the fault plane would be the preferred seismological model. It should also be pointed out that the aftershock hypocenters extend to a length of approximately 30 km, that would further elongate the F-B fault, if in fact it is the causative structure of the July 2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake.
The site is in an area of where crustal deformation due to the earthquake was observed. This is seen in the INSAR representation of the uplift that has taken place near the site area during the earthquake. There is folding within the site area (both an anticline and a syncline structure) which is still continuing as well as faults that last moved more than 125000 years BP.
The seismic profiles and the borehole data confirm the folding of the Neogene sediments beneath the site. The Upper Pleistocene sediments have been reported as unconformable covering the folds, unaffected by the deformation. The site is located partly above an anticline, and partly along the adjacent syncline. The anticline has a longer and less steep western limb with respect to the eastern one, indicating that the underlying thrust is verging to the east. This thrust is very well visible in the seismic profiles provided by TEPCO.
The investigations performed by TEPCO are aimed at understanding the behaviour of the faults (not capable, according to the IAEA NS-G-3.3 definition) during the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake. This is being done through investigating the relationship of surface fractures observed during the earthquake with the tectonic features that show no sign of 18
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deformation within the Quaternary sediments 125000 BP. TEPCO is trying to understand whether or not possible reactivation of these faults may have contributed to the large values of the ground motion recorded at the site. Most of the ground deformation is evident with decimetric fractures, mostly striking parallel to the walls of NPP structures in the site area. They have been interpreted as differential settlement generated by either compaction or liquefaction of the backfill sediments filling the excavated area for the construction of the NPP. Only a few of the fractures trend obliquely to the walls of the NPP structures. All deformations and fractures have been mapped. Some decimetric sand expulsions have been reported in association with the 16 July 2007 event. All these features have been analyzed in situ or in the laboratory in order to check whether or not they are related to potential deep capable faults.
4.2. LESSONS LEARNED 1. -
During the excavation of the plant, several faults affecting the Pliocene and the Pleistocene sediments have been reported. However these normal faults were sealed by the post 125000 years old sediments. A significant shaft with access to one of these faults (the called fault between Units 1 and 2) was excavated and it clearly demonstrates that this fault did not move during this earthquake.
2.
Fault capability is an issue that depends on the seismotectonic regime in which the site is located. The time frame which needs to be considered for fault capability is much shorter for seismically active areas (such as the site of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP) than areas in intraplate regions of the world. This is indicated qualitatively in the IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-3.3. The Japanese regulatory guidance classifies active faults (capable faults in the sense of the IAEA Safety Guide) as those that moved repeatedly in recent geological age and have possibility to move in the future. In this regulation, recent is considered as the late Pleistocene, i.e. the last interglacial period). The results obtained so far at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site and the results yet to be obtained in future investigations at the site will certainly contribute to the lessons learned in this subject and provide a firmer basis for the recommendations of IAEA safety standards. 19
Site area investigations:
Especially in offshore investigations, it is difficult to identify the total length of a fault. This is particularly the case when the fault in question is part of a much larger system of faults (a fault zone). It is difficult to decide whether or not the identified length represents the total length of the fault or the segment that has been recently ruptured. Again this has an implication in the seismotectonic model when these lengths are used to estimate maximum magnitudes that these structures can generate.
The causative fault of earthquakes may be difficult to determine even when good seismological and geophysical data is available. This is a particular characteristic of blind thrust faults. The fact that it is difficult to identify the causative fault of the earthquake (after the event) even with the exceptional expertise and considerable human and financial resources available is a lesson learned especially in the predictive modelling of faults for seismic hazard evaluation (see also the next finding).
Investigations to identify the causative fault of the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake:
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The ongoing investigations at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site are expected to provide a better understanding for the contribution of folded structures and buried faults to the characteristics (amplitude and frequency content) of the vibratory ground motion.
5. SECOND FOLLOW-UP MISSION

5.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP
Date:
05/12/2008
At this stage, the investigations performed for the better understanding of the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake are being used for the re-evaluation of the seismic input. Therefore please refer to the Findings section of A1-02 for the continuation of this topic. 5.2. LESSONS LEARNED At this stage, the investigations performed for the better understanding of the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake are being used for the re-evaluation of the seismic input. Therefore please refer to the Lessons Learned section of A1-02 for the continuation of this topic.
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FINDINGS SHEET
1. FINDING IDENTIFICATION NPP: Unit: Finding Number: A1-02
KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP UNITS 1 - 7
Assessment Area: Finding Title: 2. FINDINGS -
A.1 SEISMIC DESIGN BASIS, INSTRUMENTAL RECORDS AND RE-EVALUATION OF SEISMIC HAZARD A1-02 RE-EVALUATION OF THE SEISMIC HAZARD.
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION: BACKGROUND
Any action relating to the seismic re-evaluation or upgrading of the structures, systems and components of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP needs to be preceded by a seismic hazard reevaluation to re-define the ground motion parameters. In September 2006, i.e. before the earthquake of 16 July 2007 earthquake occurred, NSC issued guidelines for the conduct of reviews of the seismic design of nuclear power plants in Japan with significant recommendations relating to the identification and characterization of capable and active faults. Deterministic evaluation of seismic hazards at the sites of the existing nuclear power plants will be followed by a reference probabilistic analysis (PSHA). With the occurrence of the 16 July 2007 earthquake, the investigations carried out by TEPCO at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site have taken a new direction.
The September 2006 guidelines issued by NSC are very much in line with the recommendations of the IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-3.3 Evaluation of Seismic Hazards for NPPs issued in 2002. According to the programme developed by TEPCO in response to the seismic hazard re-evaluation requirement at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site, detailed geophysical investigations are foreseen both on land and offshore with the aim of identifying and characterizing capable and active faults in the site vicinity, the near region and the region. The attenuation relationships to be used for faults in the near region include both empirical methods based on observed seismic data as well as analytical methods producing synthetic seismograms compatible with the fault mechanism and the travel path. It is expected to be able to address directivity issues using this methodology. It is also recommended to conduct a deterministic seismic hazard evaluation followed by a reference PSHA.
The results of the PSHA would be used for seismic PSA studies that are now foreseen for NPPs operating in Japan. The new guidelines also address the issues relating to uncertainties and recommend that these are treated appropriately.
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3. LESSONS LEARNED 1.
2.
A significant amount of investigations both on land and offshore are foreseen in the upcoming programme for the re-evaluation of the seismic hazard at the KashiwazakiKariwa NPP site. It is expected that these investigations will provide information relating to the identification and the characterization of the faults in the region. This would significantly enhance the geological database and help in reducing uncertainties regarding their existence, location and characterization. Both deterministic and reference probabilistic methods will be used in the re-evaluation of seismic hazard. Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis will be needed for the seismic PSA study. It is important to conduct both studies for this site in order to understand the different ways of quantifying uncertainties. There is worldwide interest in conducting seismic PSA and PSHA studies are needed for this purpose for a variety of seismotectonic settings. A site such as Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP will attract attention owing to the close proximity of active faults to the site (16 km) and the way these are treated in a seismic hazard evaluation. The faults in the near region of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site will also be of interest for the modelling of the attenuation relationship and how new methods such as empirical Greens functions can be applied within the context of a nuclear power plant seismic hazard evaluation. Source related parameters such as fault mechanism and directivity were observed to play an important role in the recent earthquake. It is expected that new methods may provide more information relating to these issues. The variations of the geological conditions at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site both in terms of age and depth seem to have played a role in the damage patterns to non-safety related items. Modelling of these characteristics in the seismic hazard analysis (with the knowledge of the actual damage distribution) will be a very interesting study to follow for the international nuclear safety community. Date: 01/02/2008 Local geological conditions: Faults in the near region: Use of deterministic and probabilistic methods:
Need for strengthening of the database to decrease uncertainties:
10/08/2007
3.
4.
4. FOLLOW-UP MISSION 4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP 1.
The main findings of the previous IAEA August 2007 Mission related to this subject involved the following subjects: (2) (3) (1) Use of deterministic and probabilistic methods; Faults in the near region; and Need for strengthening of the database to decrease uncertainties;
Summary of Findings and Lessons Learned (from August 2007 Mission):
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The finding A1-01 related to the Exceedance of the Design Basis Ground Motion by the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake of July 2007 (previous Findings Sheet A1-01) is closely linked to the re-evaluation of the seismic hazard discussed in the present findings sheetbecause the estimation of what will happen in the future is based on the past experience. In this sense, and also following the nature of the work that has already been performed, the items under this finding have been regrouped under different headings as follows. Item 1 Construction of a seismotectonic model (a) Geological and geophysical investigations: (1) Summary of investigations performed by TEPCO and other specialized institutions: The east verging thrusts of the region are back thrusts with respect to the west-directed convergence of the main thrusts affecting the western Japan and the eastern side of the Japan Sea. Therefore a possible explanation is that the main active geometries are triangle zones, where the basal dominant thrusts are west-vergent, cross-cutting with ramps the entire crust, as indicated by the aftershocks of the 16/7/2007 event. The wedges forming the triangle zones are completed by the east-vergent back thrusts at the top (e.g., the Nagaoka fault could be one of these). The back thrusts have likely shallower (<10 km) decollement (as evidenced by the shorter wavelength of the related fault-propagation folds), and they seem to branch at about 10 km into the opposite verging thrusts. The main shock of the 16/7/2007 event could have been determined by a SE-dipping thrust at 10 km depth. The aftershocks propagated deeper down dip, SE-ward. Therefore, the site could have been affected by the earthquake located to the north along the deeper SEdipping thrust, and it is located also in the hanging wall of the shallower back thrust, raising E-ward beneath the NPP. The area shows relevant non-cylindrical geometries. This supports strong heterogeneities in the structural setting, possibly generated by the inherited lateral and vertical variability in the stratigraphic and tectonic record associated to the previous geodynamic evolution of the area, such as for the example the Tertiary opening of the Japan Sea rift. Therefore the study area presents an inversion of the pre-existing grabens and horst, and is characterized by diffuse transfer zones, which are evident by the brachianticline geometries, suggesting also a fragmentation of the ramp-related thrusts. However, during the progression of the deformation, these thrusts and back thrusts should eventually (although undulating) merge in single longer fault planes, increasing the seismic risk.
(4)
Local geological conditions.
The regional setting shows active thrust tectonics and several studies have been shown to the mission in this respect. At present the seismotectonic model of the region, near region and site vicinity is still under construction. The necessary database for constructing this seismotectonic model was extensively discussed during the meetings. In this regard it is needed to integrate all the acquired data (geological geomorphological, marine terrace analysis, geophysical, in particular seismic reflection profiles, instrumental and historical seismicity, focal mechanisms, GPS measurements, aftershock analysis, bathymetry information, structural undulations of key-reference sedimentary beds, etc.) to construct the seismotectonic model for the site, taking into account the different scales recommended by the IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-3.3 in order to demonstrate the completeness of the information. 23
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(b) -
Seismological Investigations:
This model should also help for assessing the maximum potential magnitude earthquake for each identified seismogenic source, including a complete fault characterization
Most of the effort applied to date by TEPCO and other investigators has been concentrated on understanding the seismological characteristics of the NiigatakenChuetsu-oki earthquake. At the request of the IAEA Team, TEPCO provided a map of the historical and instrumental seismicity of the region, which was derived apparently from publicly available earthquake catalogues. This map showed that earthquakes up to magnitude 7.5 have occurred within 150 kilometres of the site, the most recent being the earthquake that occurred offshore Niigata City in 1964, about 100 kilometres north of the site in the same tectonic environment, which caused widespread liquefaction and shaking damage. Special studies of the larger earthquakes that have occurred in the site region, compilation or calculation of focal mechanisms for these earthquakes, and integration of this information with available geological and geophysical data to better understand the seismotectonic environment of the region will be an important aspect of the development of a seismotectonic model for the site region.
(2) Status of the Finding: -
The amount of information on the different topics has been summarized above. It is rare to find such abundance of high quality data -and also of related expertise- in other regions of the world. Probably and, partly, because of this- an overarching synthesis is particularly difficult to do. Bringing together the vast amount of data in the fields of seismology (including historical seismology), geophysics and geology coming from a variety of specialized institutions is already a major challenge. Furthermore the high level of expertise in the specialized institutions provides for a multitude of credible interpretations of this data. The abundance of data may also induce a preference for using the data most relevant to the site, i.e. the data from the near region (~25 30 km radius), while the complete region is to be considered as a whole.
A number of data such as heat flow, crustal thickness, and strain rate based on GPS shortening rate should be integrated in order to construct a rheological profile and to determine the maximum magnitude expected. Considering the wealth of data, a model of the area is recommended. Standard geological cross-sections, both at regional and site scales, dip and strike, should be prepared, integrating the seismological, geophysical and borehole prospecting.
Item 2 Treatment of uncertainties -
(1) Summary of investigations performed by TEPCO and other specialized institutions:
The studies are not yet at the stage of incorporating the uncertainties into a seismic hazard evaluation. From the presentations, it is clear that uncertainties are reduced through the collection of a very large set of data in the relevant fields of study. There are also varying viewpoints regarding the interpretation of these datasets.
The construction of a reliable database is one of the most important recommendations of the IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-3.3. It is pointed out that there is a trade off between the 24
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collection of sufficient and reliable data and the uncertainty that needs to be dealt with by the analyst when performing the seismic hazard evaluation. The collection of relevant and reliable data decreases the epistemic uncertainties associated with key parameters used in the analysis because with better data it may become easier for experts to have convergent interpretations.
(1) Summary of investigations performed by TEPCO and other specialized institutions: -
Item 3 Characteristics of the earthquake ground motion
With the excellent earthquake related data that Japan possesses, it should be possible to decrease the uncertainties associated with many parameters to levels lower than in other parts of the world.
This does not mean, of course, that the decrease in uncertainties will necessarily induce a decrease in the seismic hazard. In fact, the hazard may increase because of the confirmation of a negative finding through collection of more data.
TEPCO showed to the IAEA Team the accelerograms recorded at the site from the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki main shock. These ground motions were recorded in the free field, in down-hole arrays, and at the base of the reactor buildings. These ground motions included pulses that TEPCO and other investigators have interpreted as coming from at least two asperities on the source fault. In addition, these instruments recorded many of the aftershocks. TEPCO also installed several temporary instruments to better understand the distribution of ground motion over the site area from aftershock recordings. Once these recordings have been analyzed, it will be possible to use them to calibrate the models used to calculate site response from the bedrock on which the design ground motion is specified to the bedrock and backfill that forms the foundation level of the various structures at the site. They can also be used to understand the variation of ground motion over the site area and, together with the geological, geological and geotechnical data being accumulated at the site, to identify the possible causes of this variation. Such an understanding will help to better constrain the estimation of ground motions at the site from faults in the site region.
Item 4 Potential for surface faulting at the site -
Thanks to the increase in the number of recorded strong ground motion during earthquakes, our knowledge on the characteristics of ground motion is steadily growing. Because of the systematic instrumental coverage of the country with arrays such as the KNet, this increase can be best felt in Japan. Therefore, it is now possible to model a multitude of parameters related to the source, pathway and the site in the empirically derived attenuation relationships. In particular, new research is indicating specific aspects related to the ground motion due to thrust faulting.
TEPCO is extensively studying the potential for surface faulting at the site taking into account the previous knowledge of the site area (e.g. faults affecting the Pleistocene sediments but not affecting the 125000 year old terrace). This was extensively discussed during the meeting held during the site visit. In particular the faults present at the site area can be related either to the external hinge of the underlying anticline or to gravitational sliding induced by the topographic gradient between the site and the deep offshore in the 25
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Japan Sea.
Therefore, to properly assess the fault capability, it is important to better understand the significance of these faults.
The IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-3.3 treats the issue of capable faulting separately from the hazard due to vibratory ground motion. In the present Safety Guide, there is already an indication related to the potential hazard from capable faults in terms of the rate of activity of the fault within the context of the seismotectonic regime within which they are situated. The concept of rate is closely related to the probability of the hazard that can be expected from the fault.
Item 5 Soil failures at the site -
Studies are also in progress to verify if the mapped faults in the bedrock affecting the late Pleistocene have been reactivated by this event. With the present knowledge it can be asserted that there are no signs of reactivation in the investigated area. Studies are also ongoing to understand the relationship between the local and near regional tectonics.
The detail of the ongoing investigations at the site seems to be sufficient to enable a quantitative assessment of the potential for surface displacement. This assessment will be facilitated by the large number of investigations that have been already carried out as well as other studies that are envisaged to check if some of the features produced by the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake could be related to surface faulting effects. At present none of them can be associated to surface faulting. In this regard, studies are in progress to verify if the mapped faults, in the bedrock of the site area, affecting the Pleistocene sediments but not affecting the sediments of the last interglacial period (Late Pleistocene) have been reactivated by this event. It is important to remark that according to present knowledge, these faults were formed during the Quaternary, as shown by the fact that their offset is the same in the Pleistocene and the Pliocene sediments.
The new revision (draft) of the IAEA Safety Guide (DS 422) even recommends a quantitative probabilistic evaluation of the capability of faults based not only on their rate of activity but also other characteristics that may influence their potential for causing a surface displacement that may adversely affect nuclear safety.
TEPCO has conducted a very detailed study of the soil failures that occurred at the site (such as liquefaction, subsidence, fracturing and slope failures). All these surface manifestations were mapped. Then their relationship with the material (backfill or natural soil), water table, proximity and direction relative to NPP structures were investigated. The possible relationship of the surface fractures to the known faults at depth was also a focal point of the studies. Although there was widespread liquefaction, fracturing, subsidence and slope failure at the site, safety related structures, systems and components were not affected by these effects. Safety related building were founded on deep foundation (either deeply embedded or on piles) enabled them to survive the earthquake without apparent damage.
TEPCO is now studying these phenomena in great detail. All these phenomena have been 26
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mapped and correlated with such parameters as the water table, type of material (e.g. back fill) etc. 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED 1. A large amount of work has been performed in order to understand the earthquake of July 2007 and to assess the possibility of future earthquakes that may affect the KashiwazakiKariwa NPP. This involved geophysical, geological, geodetic and seismological investigations both onshore and offshore. Many specialized and highly recognized Japanese institutions are taking part in these investigations. Considering the complexity of the problem it will be a challenge to bring together all this information and interpretations within a coherent framework so that an appropriately conservative seismic hazard evaluation can be performed.
2.
3.
More specifically, the lessons learned may be listed as follows: 1.
Making the adequate use of the IAEA Safety Standards will facilitate the process of integration and synthesis, thus providing a unique example for the international nuclear community. In this regard, the meetings and the site visit allowed substantial discussions regarding the approach to be used for reaching this objective. Furthermore, it was recognized that the application of the IAEA Safety Standards does not present any conflict with applicable Japanese regulations. Construction of the seismotectonic model, specific to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site: Interdisciplinary aspects of seismic hazard studies may be as important as the intra disciplinary studies. Synthetic models (such as the seismotectonic model recommended in the IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-3.3) may be useful in bringing together the various databases (seismological, geological, geophysical, geodetic, etc.) and the expertise to focus on the specific issues of the project. Often, experts coming from different disciplines may provide alternative interpretations to the same data and this may be represented as a modelling uncertainty and integrated within the scope of the seismic hazard evaluation (valid for both deterministic and probabilistic approaches). Regional, near-regional, site vicinity and site area studies are all part of understanding the relevant earthquake phenomena at different scales. Focusing on the prominent features that are near or at the site in great detail is of course very important. It is also important to consider these within the wider framework of regional seismotectonics. It is possible that there may be several interpretations (i.e. issue of fault segmentation) for the length (and other characteristics) of faults to be considered in the seismic hazard evaluations. If these alternatives are all credible for different reasons and to varying degrees, their inclusion into the seismic hazard evaluation will enrich the study and bring a wider consensus to the process. Treatment of uncertainties: As the results of the current investigations indicate, even though an impressive amount of 27
2.
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3.
Ground motion characterization:
The treatment of uncertainties is a subject that is independent of the approach used for the evaluation of seismic hazard (i.e. deterministic or probabilistic). This aspect of the treatment of uncertainties is underlined in the new revision (draft) of the IAEA Safety Guide on the Evaluation of Seismic Hazards DS422.
high quality data has been collected, there are still random uncertainties associated with these. Furthermore, there are different interpretations of the data leading to various models that can be used in the seismic hazard evaluation (e.g. regarding the segmentation of faults). To understand the effects of these uncertainties on hazard values would be important because Japan possesses excellent databases in the relevant subjects and also the expertise to bring credible interpretations to these databases.
The estimation of ground motions from faults in the region, near region, and site vicinity identified in the development of the seismotectonic model will require the incorporation of earthquake source characteristics, such as fault mechanism, hanging-wall effects, source directivity, radiation pattern, and three-dimensional rupture characteristics (length, width, depth and dip of the rupture plane). This can be achieved using either attenuation relationships or numerical ground motion simulation methods, or a combination of the two, as long as these methods are calibrated using strong motion recordings obtained in a tectonic environment similar to that in the site region.
4.
Assessment of the potential for surface faulting at the site:
It is important that state-of-the-art attenuation relationships and numerical modelling methods be used in order to account for recent advances in ground motion estimation that have resulted from the recent availability of near-source ground motions from moderate-tolarge earthquakes worldwide. This will allow a robust estimate of ground motions from both blind and surface-rupturing earthquakes that are hypothesized to occur in the site region and will help to capture the important source and site characteristics that are expected to influence the ground motion characteristics at the site.
Regional, near-regional, site vicinity and site area studies are all part of understanding the relevant earthquake phenomena at different scales. Focusing on the prominent features that are near or at the site in great detail is of course very important. It is also important to consider these within the wider framework of regional seismotectonics. (Lesson learned from Item 1 repeated).
Similarly, there are lessons to be learned regarding the influence of the co-seismic movement of folding at the site. How the anticline and the syncline at the site have affected the observed ground motion will be a very valuable lesson for all the international community.
Assessing the potential for surface faulting at the site will require investigations to correlating surface cracks with local tectonics and the understanding of local tectonics within the near regional framework. There is much to be learned from the final results of the ongoing investigations at the site regarding the methods for the evaluation of the potential for fault displacement.
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5.
Soil failures at the site:
The results of the ongoing investigations are likely to provide new insight to geotechnical and structural engineers in the understanding of hazards such as liquefaction, subsidence and surface fractures.
One lesson learned may be related to the design and construction of backfills, the interaction (or separation) of the backfill from the structures and the foundation design of the adjacent structures. Date: 05/12/2008
5. SECOND FOLLOW-UP MISSION 5.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP 1. a.
Seismogenic structures relevant for the assessment of the seismic hazard at the site
b.
c.
Following the suggestion of the last IAEA mission, TEPCO conducted a review of the relations between crustal heat flow and magnitude of earthquakes in Japan based on published data. The Niigata region, including the area where the seismogenic structures relevant for the seismic hazard at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site are located, underwent tertiary crustal extension related to the Japan Sea rifting, and was subsequently affected by compressional tectonics mainly during the Pliocene and Quaternary. The Niigata region may be a relatively high heat-flow region compared with the rest of Japan; for instance the Nobi earthquake of 28/10/1891, which is the only MJMA 8 crustal earthquake (i.e. non subduction) in inland Japan, occurred in the Central Backbone range that is a region with a 29
The assessment made by TEPCO, following the evaluation released by the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion (HERP) of Japan in 2004, of the simultaneous rupture of the Kamitomioka-Katakai, Kihinomiya and Kakuda-Yahiko faults is based on the assumption that faults within 5 km should be considered as linked. The resulting 91 km of overall rupture length, according to the Matsuda (1975) empirical relationships for Japan, yields a MJMA value of 8.1. This value is very conservative. It is poorly supported by the available paleoseismological and tectonic geomorphology data. The Neogene fold and thrust belt, which includes the Niigata Province, shows a structural evolution and seismotectonic character that is not typical compared to the rest of Japan. In particular, based on the observations made during the 4 December , 2008, field trip the value of MJMA 8.1 appears to be an overestimate. The geomorphic relations between uplifted terraces along the Shinano River Valley, and the evidence of secondary surface faulting along the Katakai Fault exposed on a deep road cut, are inconsistent with the assessed magnitude.
TEPCO presented new seismic reflection sections across the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site (pages 54 to 57 in Document 03-G1-TEPCO 01) that investigate the geological structure at a crustal scale in the offshore and onshore areas, from the FB fault (NW) to the Chuo anticline (SE), and down to the hypocentral depth of the July 16, 2007 seismic event. The interpreted cross sections shown on pages 55 and 57 are an important step in the integration of the data from seismic reflection profiles for the upper 3-4 km (using balanced cross section techniques) and seismological data for the deeper part of the section. Their composite cross-section illustrates the possible geometry of the earthquake causative tectonic structure in two dimensions.
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lower heat flow.
e.
TEPCO also evaluated the capable tectonic structures along the Western border of the Nagaoka Plain using a different approach based on fault asperity modeling, following the methodology described by Sommerville et al. (1999) and adapted by Irikura (1999) to the Japanese tectonic environment. This supports a more realistic assessment of the fault parameters for the Western Nagaoka seismogenic structure. However, it implies the use of the Mw magnitude scale, which is different from the MJMA magnitude scale used for the reevaluation of seismic ground motion. TEPCO conducted a compilation of the available information related to surface faulting phenomena during strong earthquakes in Japan. Only one case of significant and well documented coseismic surface faulting was found related to the NE Japan compressional tectonic environment, namely the 1896 Rikuu Mj 7.2 earthquake along the Senya Fault and Kawafune Fault, which produced 36 km of surface rupture. The stress environment is a critical controlling factor and the use of a wider database including faults with normal and strike slip kinematics significantly increases the level of uncertainty in this analysis. The application of empirical relations between rupture length and magnitude would give inconsistent results if this factor is not adequately taken into consideration. TEPCO has conducted extensive investigations of the site, site vicinity and site near region to detect and measure permanent near-surface bedrock movements associated with the July 2007 earthquake. Relevant activities conducted since the earthquake included: Satellite interferometry GPS surveys Potential for surface deformation at the site
a.
2.
Identification and characterization of the geologic structures in the site vicinity (See finding #1 for further discussion)
Topographic and levelling surveys
Excavation of deep shafts at the site
Surveying of buildings at the site; Photogrammetric surveys
b.
A survey of 15 borings along two profiles at the site perpendicular to the trend of the Madonosaka syncline Shallow seismic reflection profiles across the Madonosaka syncline Deep seismic reflection profiling using bay cable techniques to provide information linking the offshore geophysical investigations to the on-land investigations
Survey of six borings across the Madonosaka syncline north of the site
c.
In general the deformation in the site area consists of broadly distributed uplift and 30
These investigations clearly document the occurrence of both horizontal and vertical coseismic deformation at the site. TEPCO, NISA and JNES are analyzing these data to better understand the nature and origin of the surface deformation and to assess the possible relationship of the deformation to the underlying geologic structure. The objective is to make a scientifically based assessment of the potential for surface deformation associated with future earthquakes at the site.
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d.
There are apparent down-to-the-east displacements of about 10 to 20 cm on the level line profiles where they cross the Madonosaka syncline north of the site. TEPCO, NISA and JNES have investigated these features extensively. Based on the results of their detailed analyses, they have concluded that the displacements are the result of differential compaction of the surface deposits during the earthquake and that they are not due to fault slip on the Madonosaka fault. A field inspection along the North 2 and North 1 leveling lines has been conducted during the mission. TEPCO and NISA evaluated Madonosaka fault as not active fault on the basis of the Japanese regulatory guide in consideration of the fact that Ata-Toihama tephra (approx. 240ka) within the Yasuda formation is distributed almost horizontally across the Madonosaka syncline. Meanwhile, the IAEA team members discussed the results of their analyses and possible alternative interpretations of the data. An important consideration is the resolution of the various survey methods, which determine the minimum displacement that can be detected. The IAEA experts find that TEPCO, NISA and JNES have developed a comprehensive data base that will enable them to assess the potential surface fault displacement hazard with a high degree of confidence in the results. Due to limitations in the geologic conditions at the site, it may not be possible to entirely preclude slip on the Madonosaka fault from a viewpoint of the resolution of the investigations, nonetheless the existing data indicate that, if there has been slip on the fault the cumulative displacement during the Pleistocene is small and the likelihood of fault displacement at the site is extremely low. TEPCO presented their plans for probabilistic seismic hazard and probabilistic fault displacement hazard analyses that will quantify the hazard and explicitly incorporate the uncertainties in the data and analytical methods. Their proposed program is consistent with the draft IAEA Safety Guide (DS422). Ground motion characterization (including uncertainties) A major and comprehensive deterministic seismic hazard analysis has been performed for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site. This takes into account observations from the 16 July 2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake, and all the investigations and analyses that were performed both on-shore and offshore after the event and in compliance with the Japanese regulations and in particular the NSC Regulatory Guide published in September 2006. The calculations were based on the JEA spectra approach and on the empirical Greens function method (eGF), taking as major seismic sources the offshore F-B fault and the onshore Nagaoka Plain West Boundary fault zone, i.e. including these fundamental influences in both methods. The guiding principles for the formulation and evaluation of the Seismic Ground Motion Ss were described. Seismological aspects of the evaluation of the Ss are based on the 31
subsidence. A primary focus of the investigations has been to assess the potential for concentrated deformation in localized areas, especially along the Madonosaka fault, which extends through the site. This assessment is important for two reasons. First, a combination of coseismic slip on this fault (even if it is blind and did not rupture to the surface) and hanging-wall directivity effects associated with the displacement on the FB fault during the NCO earthquake might explain the unusually high ground motions at Units 1 and 2 compared with the other Units, which are farther away from the Madonosaka fault (and closer to the F-B fault). Second, assessment of the rate of activity on the Madonosaka fault directly impacts the assessment of the potential for fault displacement at the site.
a.
3.
b.
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d.
Due to evident contrasts in recorded ground motion at different parts of the NPP site (i.e. motions near Units 1-4 differ from motion near Units 5-7), the possible causes of these differences were investigated in extensive additional work, and findings were folded back into the seismic hazard evaluation and the determination of the new Standard Seismic Ground Motion Ss. In this work, a combination of the above-mentioned sources and the alternative analysis methods are used, and the maximal ground motion outcome is being taken as the design basis for the confirmation of the present seismic safety evaluation process (and upgrading, if needed). The new horizontal peak acceleration Standard Seismic Ground Motion Ss values, obtained in this way, are 2300 gal horizontal for the free surface of base stratum below Units 1-4, and 1209 gal horizontal for the free surface of base stratum below Units 5-7. Motions at foundation levels of the reactor units are calculated corresponding to these new Ss design basis motions, and the ratios between the resulting values and those recorded in the NCO earthquake range from 1.24x to 1.98x for Units 1-4, and from 1.37x to 2.25x, for Units 5-7. For any forthcoming actions, these new Ss values, derived on the basis described and reported to NSC on 20 November 2008, will be used. There was extensive description of the basis for specifying fault source parameters, for assessing propagation effects from the NCO earthquake, and of the consideration given to the adequacy of uncertainties in the seismic source model. For the F-B fault source, and a M7 event, the necessary spectral correction to replicate NCO effects is a multiplier of 6x, across the whole period (frequency) range (0.02s 5 s). This work leads to the estimate that future seismic motion at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP would only exceed the newly established standard seismic motion level with a probability of between 10-4 to 10-5 p.a.
important insights obtained from the NCO earthquake. Detailed elements in the evaluation involve selection of active faults and selection of earthquakes for examination, and evaluation of source, propagation path and site influences. As noted above, two approaches are used: the response spectrum method with the JEA spectrum formulation, and the eGF waveform method. Variants for the different methods and the different examination earthquakes are derived (i.e. Ss-1 to Ss-5, in the case of KashiwazakiKariwa NPP), with outcomes expressed in terms of response spectra. Spectrum-matching artificial time histories are also produced.
e.
f.
In relation to recorded seismic motions at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, it is found that a strong acceleration pulse, appearing in the second half of the site record time histories, is the dominant feature of those records. It is present in all records, including those captured in the Service Hall down-hole array. However, while the pulse appears to be maximal for E-W orientation under the reactor units, it appears greater in the N-S orientation on the Service Hall instrument records. Particle motion plot analysis would help inform wave nature of this pulse and hence its contribution to ground and surface response, and may help explain the difference between the Unit base-mat motions and the Service Hall downhole array observations. Further understanding of the possible causes for this exceptional and prominent pulse is aided by detailed spectral analysis. For example, TEPCO analysed the time history record in two parts, showing that the frequency response effects and peak accelerations would have been different, without this particular dominant pulse. It was shown that the whole response spectrum of the record was elevated in amplitude and dominated by the second part, i.e. solely by the big third pulse. Thus the interesting question is whether the ground 32
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motions experienced at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP in the earthquake would still be regarded as very exceptional, without the contribution of this pulse of motion. The elucidation of what role, if any, secondary fault structures might have played coseismically in this extreme motion would be invaluable for understanding the potential for such effects. It was expressed by Japanese counterpart that there is consensus in Japan that the third pulse in the record is generated by the asperity No.3, and the secondary fault structures were proposed by HERP so as to explain the areal crustal deformation, not for the strong motion evaluation. TEPCO specialists have further considered the factors that may have helped magnify ground motion at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, relying on more detailed investigations of the data and on further analytical work. The seismic motion was estimated at the free surface of the base stratum, using the JEA spectrum method with records from the Service Hall array and from the R/B foundations. Simulation of the maximal accelerations up-hole in the Service Hall array are said to confirm the validity of the modelling; however, the match between observed and calculated peak accelerations for EW components of motion are far less convincing than those for NS components. Additional commentary on this and any possible explanation of why, in particular, discrepancies arise in the EW peak accelerations but not the NS might be useful for understanding site-specific response inhomogeneities.
h.
i.
Incorporating detailed information about the structure of the upper 2 km under the site provides the important finding that marked increases in SV and SH response are generated, up to four times greater than those from a uniform layered structure model. The issue arising from this is whether a different earthquake on the same fault, with different mechanism and radiation pattern - or on a fault located elsewhere - might produce the same marked increase in shear-wave responses. Information was presented on the location of boreholes drilled by oil companies. If such data is accessible, information might be obtainable on stress directions (e.g. from borehole breakouts) and that could help inform an understanding of the local crustal stress state, and hence the vulnerability of faults of different orientations to mobilize under tectonic loading conditions.
j.
k.
A comparison of the peak acceleration values in records from the foundations of the Units with the estimated accelerations on the free surface of the base stratum was presented in a table of values for E-W direction components. There are systematic differences between the trends of values at depth and those at the base-mats. It is not immediately clear, and will be helpful, if an explanation can be given why there is this systematic reduction in peak acceleration, when other aspects of the interpretation seem to rely upon motion amplification to characterize the observations.
l.
An inversion to a preferred fault source model was described, using recordings at 17 onsite and nearby instruments (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP; K-Net; KiK-Net; F-Net). Although some valuable comparisons of results calculated with this model against observed time histories were presented for horizontal displacement records at these stations, complementary results were not provided for acceleration or velocity records, nor for vertical motion characterization. This limited the scope for appraising the dependability of the approach, in this case. Other issues also relate specifically to vertical motions in the earthquake. Whereas the horizontal motions at the reactor locations are said to be well replicated with the modelling 33
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procedures and their associated assumptions, the same is not so true for vertical motions. Finding reasons for weaknesses in matching vertical component motions could be instructive.
n.
On basis of the JEA spectrum method, the motion at Unit 1 side was 6x (4x) expected level, at Service Hall it was 3x (1.5x), and at Unit 5 side, 2x (1.5x) expected. The ratio values cited are without an offshore/inland correction to JEA and with the correction, in brackets ( ), where this correction is based on a separate analysis of 3 different offshore earthquakes (not including NCO earthquake), and 5 inland earthquakes. There was therefore a large variation of peak horizontal accelerations within the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP compound, about a factor of three times, from largest to smallest, over distance of not much more than 1km. Whilst specific subsurface model parameterisations may be able to replicate these effects in terms of peak acceleration, it would be desirable to explore whether other seismologic processes or effects could also give rise to such variations. The inversion to the causative fault source properties by the empirical Green Function (eGF) method involved the inference that the stress drop resulted in a short period asymptotic moment level which was about 1.5x higher than the average for an event with the moment of NCO earthquake. Using this eGF model for Unit 5, simulated site motions ..corresponded to the observed ones in acceleration, velocity and displacement. Findings for other Units would be informative. .
o.
The evaluation of ground motion at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP in the NCO earthquake describes various complementary approaches to the appraisal of the observational data, source characteristics, underground structure models, amplification effects at Unit 1, Unit 2, providing corroboration of the TEPCO findings. A very sophisticated 3-D FDM simulation of wave propagation from the fault source through the upper crust and deep structure to the site vicinity has been undertaken, with 50 x 50 x 50m grid and 0.002s timestep; however, the upper frequency limit in this simulation, ~2Hz, means wavelengths in the model are no shorter than 1km and therefore near-surface basin effects and geological structure are not manifest in the visualization results. The simulation explain well the large pulse in time history at the frequency of about 1 Hz and the propagation to the site.
a.
4.
b.
TEPCO has committed to performing a Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site in order to assess the reference probability associated with the newly proposed Standard Seismic Ground Motion Ss that they have developed for upgrading the plant. Such an analysis will be of great value to the international community because it will be the first opportunity to apply the new guidelines contained in the draft IAEA Safety Guide on the Seismic Hazard Evaluation of Nuclear Installations (DS422) to the performance of a PSHA in a region of moderate-to-high seismic hazard with known active faults both in the Near Region (approximately 30 km surrounding the site) and the Site Vicinity (approximately 5 km surrounding the site). The methodological treatment of attenuation scatter with the JEA spectrum formulation is one specific topic that may warrant further attention. The finding here is that, whilst conservative assumptions are adopted in other elements of the seismic hazard assessment, the use of just the median value curve to represent the attenuation of ground motion with distance is not consistent with current international practice. 34
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
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c.
d.
e.
f.
TEPCO used the same empirical attenuation relationship of Noda et al. (2002) that was used for the evaluation of the Standard Seismic Ground Motion Ss to estimate response spectra for each of the hypothesized events (both faults and background seismicity) included in the PSHA. The response spectra estimates included the regional and propagation path and site correction factors that were determined from the evaluation of the NCO earthquake, which included the differences in ground motion observed for the Arahama and Ominato sides of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP. The correction for the onshore earthquakes, which lowered the short-period response spectra estimates, was given 50% weight in the logic tree. TEPCO used two possible values for the standard deviation of the estimated response spectra, which they based on that observed from the data, as reported by Noda et al. (2002), and a standard value of 0.5 (natural log units). TEPCO used alternative values of the Gutenberg-Richter b-values for the area sources in the vicinity of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site. The b-values for other area sources as and the characteristics of faults other than the F-B Fault and the Nagaoka Plain West Boundary Fault Zone were not treated with uncertainty, because of their limited contribution to the hazard at the site.
TEPCOs preliminary PSHA model for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site included the following: (1) active faults within 150 km of the site based on assessments made by HERP and TEPCOs own geological and geophysical studies, (2) active faults within 30 km of the site based on TEPCOs own geological and geophysical studies, (3) fault recurrence intervals based on estimated geological slip rates and average slip per event based on assessments made by HERP, (4) time-dependent occurrence probability for selected faults assessed by HERP using the Brownian Passage Time (BPT) conditional probability distribution, and (5) background seismicity based on the source zonation model of Kakimi et al. (2003), refined in the vicinity of the site by distinguishing between offshore and onshore events and the detailed studies conducted in the Site Vicinity, and Gutenberg-Richter (exponential) recurrence relationships developed from historical and instrumental seismicity by TEPCO.
During the meeting, TEPCO presented the results of their preliminary PSHA for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site, which they based on data acquired in the Near Region from their own geological and geophysical studies and in the larger region surrounding the site from their own seismicity studies and fault-hazard information developed by HERP. The attenuation relationship and fault data for the offshore F-B Fault, which dips beneath the site, and the Nagaoka Plain West Boundary Fault Zone along the western side of the Nagaoka Plain located just east of the site, were based on geological and geophysical studies conducted for the Site Near Region. The preliminary logic tree that was used to incorporate epistemic uncertainty in the PSHA was similar to that used to quantify conservatism in the deterministic evaluation of the Standard Seismic Ground Motion Ss. TEPCOs conclusion from the preliminary PSHA was that the most conservative deterministic assumptions regarding the fault-hazard characteristics of the F-B Fault and the Nagaoka Plain West Boundary Fault Zone used to develop the Standard Seismic Ground Motion Ss corresponds to a mean annual exceedance probability that ranges between 10-5 and 10-4, depending on the spectral period.
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5.2. LESSONS LEARNED 1 a. Seismogenic structures relevant for the assessment of the seismic hazard at the site An overall, integrated crustal cross section, from the offshore (F-B fault) to the onshore (Nagaoka Plain Western Boundary Fault Zone), including the source areas of both the 2004 and 2007 Niigata Chuetzu earthquakes, would be of great interest in order to completely characterize the main seismogenic structures in the site near region. The overall structural model of the region around the site is one of the most relevant topics for the seismic hazard evaluation of the site. The existing data form a unique database that enables the development of valuable structural models that explores possible alternative solutions for the westerly verging trending imbricate fan thrust association in the offshore, and the relationships to the west-dipping Nagaoka Plain Western Boundary Fault Zone.
b.
c.
a.
Potential for surface deformation at the site
The assessment of a Mj 8.1 along the Nagaoka Plain Western Boundary Fault Zone poses a critical challenge for paleoseismological analyses. It would be of extreme value for the international scientific community if the hypothetic occurrence of such large magnitude seismic event can be checked against the paleoseismological evidence (such as maximum displacement per event and coseismic coastal uplift). TEPCO has developed an extensive geological and geophysical data base that can be used to develop reliable seismotectonic and structural models of the site area. The existing and new information provide a sound technical and scientific basis for evaluating the potential for the occurrence of tectonic and soil deformations during future earthquakes at the site. TEPCO is continuing the analyses of these data and presented their plans of completing probabilistic seismic hazard analyses (PSHA) and probabilistic fault displacement hazard analyses (PFDHA) for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site as a reference.
To take full advantage of the excellent set of relevant data collected in the site near region, and for a more explicit assessment of the seismogenic structure bordering the Nagaoka Plain to the West, various existing methods can be applied, including the comparison with tectonically similar areas in Japan and/or in the world. In particular, the re-evaluation of the 1964 Niigata earthquake seismogenic structure would be of great interest, because this event might represent the characteristic event for the fault and thrust tectonic province along the West coast of Japan. Also, the surface deformation and displacement associated with the recent Iwate Miyagi thrust faulting earthquake of June 14, 2008, may represent a valuable analogue.
b.
The Ushirodani anticline, the Madonosaka syncline and the Madonosaka fault trend northwest (parallel to fault FB) and extend through the site. These structures are well imaged on two east-west seismic profiles north of the site. Leveling data co-located with the seismic profiles show the coastal area (west side) being uplifted relative to the syncline. TEPCO prepared simulation models predicting the surface deformation from the July 2007 earthquake. According to the interpretation of the obtained results, it was expressed by TEPCO that the levelling data across the Madonosaka syncline can not be explained by the movement of the Madonosaka fault and the NISAs expert (geologist) supported it. The IAEA experts consider that the results may also be consistent with more localized deformation associated with coseismic growth of the Ushirodani anticline in response to slip on a blind (possibly near-surface) fault (i.e., the Madonosaka fault). There 36
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d.
3.
TEPCO, NISA and JNES have developed an extensive geological and geophysical data base that reliably demonstrate the cumulative middle to late Pleistocene displacement associated with the folds and faults beneath the site is negligible (none to a maximum of a few meters). The potential for slip during future earthquakes at the site is very low and the deformation would not exceed movements that may have occurred during the 2007 NCO earthquake. This event did not produce any significant damage to safety related structures at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, which is being further strengthened in response to this earthquake. Based on the information presented, the IAEA experts conclude that TEPCO will be able demonstrate with a high degree of confidence that fault displacement does not pose a significant risk to the site. Ground motion characterization (including uncertainties)
Horizontal and vertical movements identified from GPS measurements are generally consistent with movements and deformation that would be expected in the hanging wall of the F-B fault. The observed vertical movements are interpreted by TEPCO as representing broad regional uplift and tilting. NISA and the committee members support TEPCOs evaluation. Alternative interpretations, permitted by the data, suggest that there could be abrupt small changes in the vertical displacement (up to about 10 cm) across the northeasttrending geologic structures. TEPCO plans to address the uncertainties due to limitations in the geologic data and plausible alternative interpretation in their ongoing probabilistic analysis of the fault displacement hazard. Regarding the Probabilistic Fault Displacement Hazard Analysis (PFDHA), a significant amount of preparatory work has already been performed, and the final quantification is planned for 2009 - 2010.
is a down-to-the-east flexure coincident with the eastern limb of the Ushirodani anticline. On the North 1 line, there is a 10 to 15 cm offset between stations 2500m and 3500m. On the North 2 line there is a 10 cm offset between station ~1100m and station 1300m. Both TEPCO and IAEA experts recognize that there are some anomalous survey points where there was undoubtedly some fill subsidence related to the road embankment. Settlement of the near-surface deposits alone does not seem to adequately explain the overall survey results.
a.
b.
Given the experience at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, one potential lesson of generic 37
The deterministic seismic hazard that is the new design basis for seismic safety confirmation and (if needed) upgrading of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP has been calculated using, to the fullest extent possible, all data, investigations and analyses carried out following the NCO earthquake. The values that are proposed represent by far the highest earthquake design basis for an NPP, anywhere in the world. The safety margins entailed by this hazard characterization exercise should encompass substantial levels of related uncertainties and the re-evaluation of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP will surely provide significant assurance that the plant will have good response capacity to vibratory ground motions in any future earthquakes. The methods used to derive these hazard values have a significance beyond the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP: although specific geological and tectonic conditions at this site may have caused the exceptionally high ground motions, there are certain to be instances where many of the same concepts of hazard characterization can be applied elsewhere, both in Japan and in the wider world. It is for this important reason that the valuable insights from the intensive investigation work at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, following the NCO earthquake, should be reported and shared.
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c.
d.
The TEPCO analyses include specific inferences on layering and velocities in the subsurface structure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site. It would be helpful to the international community, if simplified orthogonal schematic (or, better yet, fully balanced) cross-sectional profiles of the preferred model could be produced. Then, other specialists could more easily appraise the key properties of this particular site, and judge how such ground conditions might inform site categorization assessments and ground type criteria elsewhere.
significance for the international community concerns post-earthquake analyses and investigations. Given the huge amount of data and the myriad possibilities for different forms of analysis and modelling which can be mobilised nowadays, following a significant earthquake affecting a NPP, it may be desirable to introduce the concept of an over-arching directing mind or conductor, responsible for synthesizing all the many aspects of the seismology, geophysics and geotechnical factors that influence ground motion dynamics, with the objective of ensuring, as far as possible, a total, coherent and self-consistent picture of the earthquake of interest, its wave propagation controls and site response effects. In the case of the NCO earthquake, a unique opportunity is afforded by the extensive data to advance understanding of ways to analyse and comprehend the complexities of ground motion, and a full exploration of the range of all possible interpretations would be valuable for the international community.
e.
f.
It was indicated that modelling (by SHAKE) of the vertical propagation of waveforms from the free surface of the substratum up to the level of the reactor basemats, which utilised the Service Hall 250m recorded motion as input, had not been successful in 38
Important information on the source radiation pattern and on the influence of fold structures in the upper 2 km of the ground under the site is contained in the evidence presented from the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site. On this basis, it appears the reactors are positioned exactly where ground motion effects were maximised for this particular earthquake, because major fold features and other subsurface strata structural effects served to focus seismic energy directly to the reactor building localities. This prompts the question: could an earthquake on a fault elsewhere (or with different orientation of mechanism, or with different source characteristics/asperity geometry but on the same 2007 causative fault) produce the same exaggerated effects? Modelling other plausible scenarios can be informative, and can help signify whether the present case had uniquely special conditions leading to high levels of seismic response on the site.
TEPCO presented accelerograph recordings from Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site and summary information on the seismology of the 2007 NCO earthquake. The seismological data captured for this earthquake is vast and multi-faceted, and the site-related strong motion data extensive. In such cases, care is needed in any joint utilization of the data to ensure that inversion analyses and forward modelling efforts are distinctly separated, and that inversion and forward modelling efforts are independent, as far as possible, and relevant assumptions and conditions all clearly described. This is necessary so that concerns do not arise that inferences relying on inversions from observations are not passed back through forward modelling to generate outcomes that, inevitably, will in turn be conditioned by the main features of the original records (i.e. the danger is recognized of developing a process which involves circular reasoning and becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy). Stochastic representation of uncertainties in model parameters, before forward modelling, can be considered.
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g.
replicating the effects measured at base mat level. Motions were said to be underpredicted at Unit 1, over-predicted at other Units. This modelling exercise will have been subject to the well-known limitations of the SHAKE method (simplified one-dimensional analysis; assumption of a vertically-incident SH wave, etc) but most importantly assumes the same input motion is arriving at the base stratum of the deposits at all relevant locations under the site. Waveform differences in the records at shallow depths, under both sets of Units and at the Service Hall array (noted above), and known limitations in the SHAKE modelling hint that the fundamental assumption of a uniform input waveform for all locations is a critical postulation that may not be fully substantiated in reality. This may be a valuable lesson for similar simplified soil profile response analyses at other NPPs. At various places in the counterparts presentations, comments were made, for instance, about good matching between observed and modelled time histories. Applying a formal goodness-of-fit metric to the cases of interest would be helpful for substantiating these partly subjective assessments. Various numerical formulations exist that are suitable for this purpose with time history records, such as accelerograms.
h.
i.
Time history data relating to low-level earthquake activity, gathered by a suitable modern site-specific seismograph network, can help characterise site response properties and identify potential controls and influences on ground motion levels and spectral content. As demonstrated at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, with such real local data, the empirical Greens Function technique and other forward waveform modelling techniques offer the possibility for anticipating site-specific effects. These methods can also be applied within a probabilistic framework, e.g. by Monte Carlo simulation or other methods for conducting a PSHA. In an examination of response spectra at the site, the data were categorized in terms of offshore and onshore hypocentres. The systematic differences in amplification that are identified in this way represent important diagnostic information. The offshore/onshore groupings are an ad hoc categorization, which may be masking further useful insights. It could be beneficial to investigate further whether this systematic difference is due to genuine differences in earthquake source properties for the two different areas, or whether it is due, at least in part, to some pathway factor closer to the site, such as the special geometry of the major fold units or irregularities in the bedrock / base stratum at depth.
j.
a.
4.
Based on experience with the many comprehensive studies undertaken at KashiwazakiKariwa NPP following the NCO, the development of guidance for a generic framework for integrating multiple post-earthquake analysis studies of this kind, in the context of providing a definitive determination of actual effects and performances, would be a valuable asset for the wider international community. Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
The preliminary PSHA that TEPCO has conducted provides a valuable point estimate of the approximate reference probability of exceedance for the new deterministically derived Standard Seismic Ground Motion Ss that will be used for evaluating and upgrading the plant. The results of the PSHA would be of even greater value to the international community if it were expanded to include the new international guidelines specified in the draft IAEA Safety Guide on the Seismic Hazard Evaluation of Nuclear Installations (DS422) that will be issued in 2009. These guidelines specify that all relevant uncertainties 39
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b.
c.
d.
Some additional methodological alternatives that could be included in the PSHA according to the draft IAEA guidelines include: (1) a broader sampling of the informed scientific community in terms of alternative models, parameters, or opinions as expressed in the branches of the logic tree, (2) a peer review committee whose specific task is to review and comment on the process for sampling the informed scientific community, (3) a formal quality assurance program to ensure that inadvertent errors are discovered and corrected before issuing the final PSHA results, and (4) a complete documentation of the data, methodology, hazard models, and results that would allow an independent understanding by the international community and that would provide a means of assessing when new information that becomes available in the future has a significant impact on the estimated hazard. To make effective progress in future in developing ground motion hazard and fault displacement hazard appraisals for design and other purposes, it is desirable to create an overarching probabilistic framework for addressing the role and contribution of faults to those hazards, and to ensure that harmonization, coherency and balance are engendered in such (probabilistic) assessments, allowing the inclusion of all plausible hypotheses.
Some additional epistemic uncertainties (uncertainties in scientific knowledge) in the hazard characterization that could be included in the PSHA according to the draft IAEA guidelines include: (1) alternative attenuation relationships and their associated standard deviations, (2) alternative characteristic and maximum magnitudes for faults and area sources, (3) the assignment of characteristic versus exponential magnitude-frequency relationships for fault sources, (4) alternative values of recurrence rates for faults and area sources, (5) alternative source zonations for the area sources near the site, especially if this seismicity is not uniform within the conventional source zonation model. Additional aleatory uncertainties (inherent randomness in the earthquake process) in the hazard characterization that could be included in the PSHA include the probability distribution in each of the assigned characteristic or maximum magnitudes in the logic tree inferred from the magnitude versus length relationships. Which uncertainties should be included in the logic tree can be determined using a sensitivity study to avoid creating an overly complex logic tree.
should be included in the PSHA and that these uncertainties should be derived from data to the extent possible. Because of the large amount of data that has been collected by TEPCO at the Site and in the Site Vicinity after the NCO earthquake, the uncertainties associated with the characterization of the hazard in these regions can be based largely on actual site data rather than being imported from other regions.
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FINDINGS SHEET
A.2 PLANT BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS A2-01 OFF-SITE POWER
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION:
2.2
It is common practice to assume that off-site power is lost when evaluating nuclear power plants for earthquakes with peak ground acceleration (PGA) values greater than about 0.25g, owing to the common cause nature of the earthquake. Even though conventional power generation plants may be operational and transmission lines may be intact, the transformer substations are vulnerable to failure during earthquakes, making power unavailable to the nuclear power unit being evaluated. This assumption has been confirmed in many observations over the past decades. In some cases, especially when applying methods to address earthquakes beyond the design basis, it has been permitted to take credit for off-site power if it can be shown with high confidence that power generation, transmission lines and substation functions are demonstrated to be operable. At Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, off-site power was maintained during and after the 16 July 2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake even though recorded ground motion on the surface of soil at the site had peak ground acceleration values approaching 1g, affecting the switchyard. FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA
BACKGROUND
A lesson of the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake is that the assumption of loss of off-site power (LOSP) for earthquake events with peak ground accelerations greater than about 0.25g may be conservative in countries like Japan where the seismic design of electrical facilities is relatively advanced. Detailed evaluations of the off-site power generation, transmission lines and switchyard may provide justification for raising the threshold of LOSP to earthquakes greater than 0.25g PGA.
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4. FOLLOW-UP MISSION 4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP This item was not included in present follow-up mission. 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED: As indicated in August 2007 mission. 5. SECOND FOLLOW-UP MISSION 5.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP 5.2. LESSONS LEARNED:
Date:
01/02/2008
Date:
05/12/2008
This item was not included in present follow-up mission. It is considered closed. As indicated in August 2007 mission.
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FINDINGS SHEET
Assessment Area: Finding Title: 2. FINDINGS
A.2 PLANT BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS A2-02 SEISMIC SYSTEMS INTERACTION
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION: BACKGROUND -
The major seismic systems interaction issues are described as follows:
Falling interaction is a structural integrity failure of a non-safety or safety related item that can impact and damage an item classified as seismic category I (SC-I) (or in the nomenclature of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, as seismic class A or As). In order for the interaction to be a threat to a SC-I item, the impact must contain considerable energy and the target must be vulnerable. A light fixture falling on a 10 cm diameter pipe may not be a credible damaging interaction to the pipe. However, the same light fixture falling on an open relay panel is an interaction, which can cause failure of the device to perform its required function. A light fixture or a series of connected light fixtures can be hazardous to personnel and structures, systems and components (SSCs). Examples of other types of falling hazards include structural or nonstructural elements failing and falling on SC-I SSCs. Proximity interactions are defined as conditions where two or more items are close enough together that any unsafe behaviour of one of them may have consequences on the other one. The most common example of proximity interaction is the impact of an electrical cabinet containing sensitive relays by items adjacent to it that were not secured against seismic loads. Spray and flood can result from failure of piping, systems or vessels that are not properly supported or anchored. Inadvertent spray hazards to SC-I SSCs arise most often from the failure of non-seismic category I items containing a liquid such as water. Fire protection systems using water may also cause spray of flooding issues. Inadvertent actuation of fire protection piping systems is one such cause. If spray sources can spray equipment sensitive to water spray, then the source should be modified. For fire protection piping, this usually is accomplished by adding support to reduce deflections and impacts or stresses. Large tanks may be potential flood sources. If a flood source can fail, an assessment should be made of the potential consequences taking into account the flow paths and dispersion of the liquid through penetrations, drains, etc. Flow paths may be difficult to assess and can most appropriately be performed in the plant rather than only relying on drawings. Seismic systems interaction is one of the most repeatable phenomena resulting from earthquake events. 43
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2.2 1.
The walkdowns of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP demonstrated that: Anchorages:
FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA
Generally, the extensive use of strong anchorages for non-safety and non-seismic category items prevented falling hazards from occurring during the earthquake. A general observation is that the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa units have very good housekeeping procedures, i.e. items used for maintenance or other similar activities are tied down and in designated areas even for those units under maintenance or outage conditions. Examples of falling hazards during the earthquake were: - Failure of the connection of the work platform as observed in the spent fuel pools for Units 4 and 7. Although no damage is believed to have occurred, potential consequences of this failure would be damage to the spent fuel or the support structure within the fuel pool. - Failure of the attachments of the interconnecting multiple fluorescent light fixtures to the ceiling of the control room as observed in Units 6 and 7. No significant consequences were observed, but adverse effects to the control room electrical equipment or to the operators could have occurred. As an example, it was reported in the course of the plant walkdown that in Unit 6 a control room operator suffered a minor shoulder injury due to a falling light fixture. - Failure of the attachments of the ventilation air conduit diffusers to the ceiling of the Unit 3 control room partially dropped. There were no adverse consequences, but adverse effects to electrical equipment or to the operators could have occurred. 3. Falling hazards: 2. Housekeeping:
4. Spray or flooding hazards: Examples of flooding hazards during the 16 July earthquake were: -
Tipping/falling of a cabinet in Unit 2 control room impacting a non-safety related cabinet. The tipped cabinet was attached to the raised control room floor the cabinet and a small portion of the raised floor tipped.
Sloshing of the spent fuel pool water onto the reactor building operating floor of Unit 6 and leakage through cable penetrations in the floor leaking water to lower elevations. Failure of the rubber flexible connection of the condenser B seawater box and connecting valve in Unit 4 leaking sea water onto the turbine building floor at lower elevations. The flexible connection that failed had originally been installed 13 years ago plant personnel stated that the normal replacement schedule was 10 to 15 years and so ageing of the flexible connection was a factor in its failure. Localized soil failure caused failure of fire suppression piping at a cable penetration to the Unit 1 reactor building. Water (about 2000 m3) and soil entered the reactor building at grade elevation and flowed through floor penetrations and stairwells to lower levels, finally reaching the B5 level at about 38 m below the plant grade level. A 40 cm deep puddle of water formed at the B5 level. It seems that this water and soil did not produce adverse consequences to SSCs. The total evaluation by TEPCO is not completed yet. 44
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For all nuclear power plants:
10/08/2007
2.
Diligence is required in the design, construction and operational phases of all plants to assure that seismic systems interaction issues are minimized, as observed in the case of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP.
Plant walkdowns performed to evaluate conditions for potential seismic vulnerabilities should extensively consider the potential consequences of failures due to non-seismically designed conditions. Date: 01/02/2008
4. FOLLOW-UP MISSION 4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP This item was not included in present follow-up mission. 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED As indicated in August 2007 mission. 5. SECOND FOLLOW-UP MISSION 5.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP
Date:
05/12/2008
The IAEA team verified the actions taken by TEPCO with regard to identified hazards from the NCOE regarding seismic systems interactions (housekeeping, falling, proximity, spray/flood) and other lessons learned in this subject, as follows:
Observed that housekeeping continues to be generally good within the nuclear power plant units visited; The sources of falling hazards that occurred during NCOE and have occurred in other world-wide earthquakes, specifically falling of light fixtures and diffusers in the control room when supported by drop ceilings, were addressed through hardware changes. The IAEA team was informed that support wires between the light fixtures/diffusers and support points above the dropped ceiling were put in place; Proximity issues were addressed by implementing blocking of light cabinets and other office equipment on wheels and located in the control room; effectiveness of this approach should be verified for the expected accelerations/displacements at this location for the new standard seismic design ground motion; Sources of spray or flooding hazards from the spent fuel pools due to sloshing were addressed through a flexible splash shield being added to the railing around spent fuel pool; in addition, for Unit 7, any spilled water that is not contained by the splash shields and possibly leaks through the water sealer around the junction box containing the control/power cables will only leak into a controlled area; for Unit 6, the configuration of the control/power cables for the fuel handling machine was re-worked to be similar to that of Unit 7 so that the cables are in a junction box slightly above the elevation where 45
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Emphasis should be placed on the following additional lessons learned: 3.
The lessons learned on this subject as listed in the August 2007 mission report continue to be valid and applicable to all nuclear power plants: 1. Diligence is required in the design, construction and operational phases of all plants to assure that seismic systems interaction issues are minimized, as observed in the case of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP. 2. Plant walkdowns performed to evaluate conditions for potential seismic vulnerabilities should extensively consider the potential consequences of failures due to nonseismically designed conditions. A seismic systems interaction programme for spray and flooding hazards should be implemented to verify the lack of failure of sources of water and/or verify no negative consequences to safety-related equipment if leaks or failure occurs. This type of programme is most effectively performed by a walkdown by a team comprised of seismic capability engineers and engineers with expertise on internal flood reviews in the nuclear power plant design or re-evaluation. The capacities of Class B and C SSCs should be verified when considering the new seismic hazard for seismic evaluation of existing NPPs: a. They should continue to provide the function required in support of Class A and As equipment and components housed in these Class B and C structures. b. Further, potential failures of Class B and C SSCs should be verified not to cause damage or failure to Class A and As SSCs.
5.2. LESSONS LEARNED
they penetrate the floor this change in configuration and the addition of water sealant is thought to be adequate to prevent leaking of water from the controlled area to the noncontrolled area; The failure of Class B and C SSCs should not cause failure or damage to Class A or As SSCs so that they cannot perform their required functions. Verification that these failure modes do not exist is an especially important issue for the new standard seismic ground motion, Ss. The effectiveness of the seismic design criteria for Class B and C SSCs in light of the size of the Ss requires evaluation, i.e., given the occurrence of the Ss ground motion, Class B and C SSCs should not cause failure or damage to Class A and As SSCs. The seismic design criteria of Class B and C structures remains unchanged, i.e., for Class B, equivalent static horizontal loads equal to 1.5 times the story shear coefficient for the region (0.2g for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant), which equals 0.3g, and for Class C, equivalent static horizontal loads equal to the story shear coefficient for the region (0.2g for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant), which equals 0.2g. In some cases, Class B structures, such as the turbine building, house Class A and/or As systems and components. As stated above, because Class B structures are designed to equivalent static loads significantly less than the Ss, it should be verified that the Class B structures continue to provide the support required for Class A and As SSCs. TEPCO indicated that additional evaluations were conducted to verify that the performance of Class B or C structures does not adversely affect the performance of higher class SSCs, housed within these structures.
4.
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FINDINGS SHEET
1. FINDING IDENTIFICATION NPP: Unit: Finding Number: A203
Assessment Area: Finding Title: 2. FINDINGS Background:
A.2 PLANT BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS A2-03 FIRE PROTECTION
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION-BACKGROUND One of the first announcements to the public after the earthquake of 16 July 2007 that affected the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP concerned the fire in the in-house electrical transformer of Unit 3. The fire was initiated by sparks from a short circuit caused by large ground displacements (settlements) of the transformer foundation (see Appendix V of Volume II of this mission report). The spark caused the ignition of oil leaked from the transformer. The fire was extinguished by the local municipality fire brigade approximately 2 hours after it began. Although the transformer was separated by a firewall, active actions for extinguishing the fire were not possible because the outdoor fire protection system of Units 1-4 was damaged.
Safety Significance: -
The particular fact of the fire in the in-house transformer has no safety significance for the plant. The in-house transformer is not an item of safety related equipment and does not affect the nuclear safety of the unit. Nevertheless, the fact is significant from the broad point of view of safety due to seismically induced events.
The damage of the outside water fire protection system of Units 1 to 4 is a cause of serious concern.
Frequently fire protection systems are not seismically qualified and may suffer seismic damage. However, the IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.6 recommends that seismically induced events, such as fires, be carefully considered in the plant safety analyses and adequate counter measures be taken.
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The underground piping is very vulnerable to large soil deformations such as those that occurred at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP and this should have been considered as a weak link in the analyses of the fire extinguishing system. Associated counter measures should have been properly taken.
An upgrade of the fire extinguishing system is planned with increased capacity. The source of water is the filtrated water tank that is shared by Units 1 to 4. The indoor and outdoor fire systems have a total capacity of 350m3/h and they are driven by motor and diesel pumps, respectively. Although the present capacity might be sufficient, the effects of the earthquake showed that the outdoor system has been affected by a common cause failure.
The multiple failure of the fire protection system was caused mainly due to large ground deformations produced by the earthquake. The fire protection piping was not seismically qualified because this is not required by current codes. It was indicated by TEPCO that the code requires only the installation of fire protection walls and that has been provided.
Date:
10/08/2007
2. 3.
In any case, common cause failure should be avoided. Failure of the fire fighting system (tanks, pumps, piping, distribution system) and its consequences can be minimized by providing adequate seismic capacity, redundancy and diversification of the systems. Large soil settlements often cause piping failure, as was the case at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP when subjected to the 16 July 2007 earthquake. Flexible joints, flexible penetrations, protective buried channels and other means could be used in order to minimise probability of failure. Date: 01/02/2008
Seismically induced fires are frequent events after an earthquake in urbanized areas but are relatively rare at a nuclear power plant. Although not directly related to nuclear safety, the fire in the in-house electrical transformer started as result of the 16 July 2007 earthquake demonstrated problems in the fire fighting capability of the plant. The analyses made by the plant personnel and the regulatory authority show that there is a clear understanding of the root cause of the fire, of the deficiencies in the fire management system and of the ways for improving them.
4. FOLLOW-UP MISSION 4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP -
As related to fire safety, the earthquake on 16 July 2007 had multiple effects as it was already identified during the first IAEA mission in August 2007:: Fire of the in-house transformer in Unit 3; Multiple failures of the fire fighting water system in Units 1 to 4; Failure of one of the fire fighting water storage tank; Failure of other fire suppression systems; Communications problems to call in the fire brigade. 48
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The post earthquake analysis identified some weak points in the fire protection programme such as: Insufficiency of in-house fire fighting capability Insufficiency of training in the fire protection area Areas for improvement in regulatory guidelines
NISA set up a specific working group to investigate these fire safety issues. The group proposed a revision to the fire safety regulations in order to better integrate fire safety aspects in nuclear safety and to improve the current guidelines in matters related to fire protection management. These regulations will incorporate the input from different sources such as the Nuclear Safety Commission and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, as well as the comments and suggestions from IAEA OSART missions, research in fire safety and the available operating experience. These recommendations cover the following areas: In-house fire brigade; On-site fire extinguishing systems identifying the need to design the fire water system to earthquake loads; Alert and communication systems; Education, training, drills and exercises; Fire prevention, operating experience feedback Information and communication with the public and authorities.
TEPCO, as presented during the mission, implemented a number of corrective actions on the site, including: Fire water system improvements; In-house fire fighting capabilities; Training, education and prevention measures
As mentioned above, the fire that occurred in the in-house transformer of Unit 3 showed that a fire event could be the consequence of an earthquake. In this specific case, the existing fire walls provided adequate protection to other systems and components -located close to the transformer- through proper fire separations in order to limit the damage only to the transformer itself. As discussed during the site visit, it should be confirmed that this protection mechanisms are available in all units (e.g. in Unit 6 the inlet opening to the emergency diesel generator might not be well protected and/or separated from the in-house transformer, and the in-house transformer is not provided with an automatic fire supression system).
During the site visit, it was also discussed and identified some corrosion problems in several parts of the fire water piping systems (e.g. the supports of the fire suppression piping system welded to the oil tank of the emergency diesel generator). The effects of these corrosion problems on the integrity of the structural elements need to be confirmed. It is important to implement the planned inspection programme on these parts of the fire water system in order to provide for the necessary repairs, (Periodic inspection of fire protection system is required under the Japanese fire code). Since fire fighting relied on the public fire brigade, on-site fire fighting capability was not adequate. Just after the earthquake, the public fire brigade was not immediately available 49
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It is noted that TEPCO is improving the on-site fire water system by installing 17 buried fire water tanks. The associated fire water piping will be installed on above ground supports.
for fire fighting on the plant site. Taking this into consideration, recently, the on-site fire brigade was established with 10 people on a permanent basis. A successful exercise was organized by this fire brigade during the site visit. Two fire fighting trucks to support the on-site fire fighting capability were available during the site visit.
The lessons learned already identified in the first IAEA mission of August 2007 are confirmed. Regarding the present mission, the following lessons can be highlighted: 1.
2.
For nuclear power plants located in coastal areas, corrosion problems could affect the resistance of fire protection systems exposed to the exterior environment. The use of corrosion resistant material and the implementation of adequate inspection programmes will be important to prevent unexpected failures due to earthquake occurrence.
3. 4.
NISA decided to improve the fire safety guidance in order to better integrate fire safety aspects in nuclear safety and to improve the current guidelines in matters related to fire protection management, including input from different sources. It would also be helpful to give due consideration to important aspects such as secondary effects of fire suppression systems, spurious operation of automatic fire protection systems, and fire related explosion hazards which is under research internationally. The IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.7 on Protection Against Internal Fires and Explosions in the Design of Nuclear Power Plants provides useful guidance for improving the fire protection programme in these areas. Large soil settlements and deformations due to an earthquake should be considered in the design of fire fighting system in particular in the penetration areas from outside to the buildings.
5.
Communications with the local authorities, the media and the public during emergency situations can be made easier by establishing a permanent dialogue between the local stakeholders, the regulatory body and the licensee. Date: 05/12/2008
The confirmation of appropriate staffing (i.e. number of staff) of the in-house fire brigade including addressing scenarios involving the occurrence of multiple fires, will certainly improve the response capabilities. Training through appropriate exercises based on potential fire scenarios will also be helpful in this regard.
5. SECOND FOLLOW-UP MISSION 5.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP
As related to fire safety, the earthquake on 16 July 2007 had multiple effects as it was already identified during the first IAEA mission in August 2007:: Fire of the in-house transformer in Unit 3; Multiple failures of the fire fighting water system in Units 1 to 4; Failure of one of the fire fighting water storage tanks; 50
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Failure of other fire suppression systems; Communications problems to call in the fire brigade.
The post earthquake analysis identified some weak points in the fire protection programme such as: Insufficiency of in-house fire fighting capability Insufficiency of training in the fire protection area Areas for improvement in regulatory guidelines
The 2nd follow-up mission activities included verification of many of the proposed improvements itemized in the above mission reports: The on-site fire brigade of 10 people was visited in their temporary quarters; The IAEA team was informed of the facilities being constructed, the training program of the fire brigade, the schedule of ten fire fighters being on-site 24/7/52, and three fire trucks with capability to fight chemical and other fires; The IAEA team observed the locations of many of the 17 buried tanks on the site, judiciously placed to provide water for fire fighting, as the fire brigade requires; The IAEA team observed the newly installed fire fighting water pipes supported above ground and on structures to prevent piping failures due to soil failures that may occur in future earthquakes; the sources of water for these lines are flat bottom tanks located in the yard; The new structure being constructed (a garage for 4 fire trucks and living quarters for the fire fighters) was seen from a distance; Within the plant, fire fighting equipment (hose stations, fire extinguishers, etc.) were being clearly marked with exclusion areas in their neighbourhood to prevent equipment or other items from being parked and blocking their access; Within the plant, some of the fire protection piping had been modified adding supports to maintain natural frequencies in the rigid range; A new administrative base isolated building is being constructed, which will house communications, presumably including communications to the local fire department for support, if necessary. 5.2. LESSONS LEARNED 1.
2.
As a first lesson learned from this event, it should be emphasized once more that after the occurrence of a major natural disaster the first responders to the emergency situation should not be restrained from performing their functions due to failure of their systems.
The seismic design criteria for the new fire brigade building (garage and living areas) should be similar to the seismic design criteria used for other critical portions of the nuclear power plant (e.g. for Class B items) or other scenarios hypothesized where ingress and egress is limited and the fire fighters trained to manage each situation, e.g., garage doors inadvertently blocked or jammed preventing the fire trucks from exiting. In 51
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3. 4.
any case, these facilities should not collapse once subjected to a major earthquake.
Although, there is high confidence that fire protection systems in the nuclear power plant buildings will not inadvertently fail (leak or spray), these systems should be included in the seismic systems interaction programme for spray and flooding hazards indicated in the Findings Sheet A2-02. This should be implemented to verify no failure of sources of water and/or verify no negative consequences to safety-related equipment if leaks or failure occurs to the fire protection systems.
The seismic design criteria for administration buildings should be established with particular care because of the specific critical functions that may be housed within (e.g. location of the emergency operation centre).
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FINDINGS SHEET
A.2 PLANT BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS A2-04 SOIL DEFORMATION
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION - BACKGROUND
Background: TEPCO personnel reported several instances of damage caused by large soil deformation: the station road was cut off, liquefaction of soil occurred in a large area of the site, fire in the in-house transformer of unit 3 occurred due to large settlements, the fire extinguishing system was cut at five locations due to settlements, the bank protection of the north-south discharge outlet sank, the north slope of the soil disposal area collapsed, etc. None of the seismically induced ground failures on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site are having any safety significance. The behaviour of the safety related structures was not affected by the settlements and the liquefaction. The IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.6 recommends attention and prevention of the seismically induced ground deformations as excessive settlements, liquefaction, etc. Although the safety related structures of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP are either founded directly on base rock or on piles that reach the base rock, the large ground deformation of the near surface deposits should be taken into account. Date: 10/08/2007
The large ground settlements caused the oil leak of several transformers on the site, as well as the fire in the in-house electrical transformer of Unit 3. 53
The ground failures caused a common failure of the outdoor fire extinguishing system that prevented quick and immediate response to the fire in the in-house transformer of Unit 3.
Although not of safety significance, the large ground deformations blocked the road to the plant at a critical moment when any delay in help and access was of importance.
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3 LESSONS LEARNED
The large ground deformations around the safety related buildings most probably have caused damage in most of the piping penetrating the building walls.
1. In case of large seismic shaking, as was the case during the earthquake of 16 July 2007 that affected the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, large ground deformations are frequently inevitable. Nevertheless measures to limit their effects could be taken.
2. Such measures include the use of proper soil materials for backfill and proper soil compacting, protection of the penetration by expansion joints that can allow large displacements and/or concrete channels to protect the underground piping, drainage of the site in order to reduce the underground water level as well as proper handling of precipitation water, etc. The use of a combination of most of these measures may help to reduce damaging effects of large ground deformation. Date: 01/02/2008
4. FOLLOW-UP MISSION 4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP This item was not included in present follow-up mission. 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED As indicated in August 2007 mission. 5. SECOND FOLLOW-UP MISSION 1. 5.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP
Date:
05/12/2008
Although the observed ground failures have not been affecting safety of the plant TEPCO reported that extensive large scale measures have been taken to reduce the risks due to large ground deformations induced by seismic excitations in the future. Those measures include: -
2.
The partial results presented from site response analysis are showing excessive strength reduction of the surface layers, i.e. large ground deformations are expected. Because of the low strength of the surface layers they have not been considered in the structure analyses. 54
re-routing of fire protection piping, that has recently been placed in open channels or above ground is implemented.
additional deep pile foundations are introduced to strengthen the house transformer foundation pad (adjacent cable shelves that failed during the earthquake in 2007).
soil improvement (cementation) have been performed reaching a depth of about 1520m below plant grade. The soil strengthening is especially important for auxiliary structures as the ventilation stack, the transformers, roads, etc.
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3.
5.2. LESSONS LEARNED 1.
The emergency water piping that is a safety related buried structure has been examined for defects. Analyses were also performed. Results were found to satisfy the requirements for tightness and capacity during earthquake. Although the observed large ground deformations due to NCOE did not affect nuclear safety related SSCs, these ground deformations had an influence on the overall performance of the plant including the possibility to carry out the expected immediate actions that usually follow a strong earthquake. Road accessibility, water intakes, underground piping and facilities, electrical switchyards, etc. could be significantly and adversely affected by large ground deformations. Taking all that into consideration, a number of improving measures have been implemented by TEPCO in KashiwazakiKariwa NPP to reduce these negative effects in case of occurrence of future events.
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FINDINGS SHEET
A.2 PLANT BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS A2-05 ANCHORAGE BEHAVIOUR
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION BACKGROUND
The seismic qualification of nuclear power plants requires analyses, testing and care for the anchorage. Anchorages frequently shows brittle seismic behaviour. In the case of the earthquake on 16 July 2007 that affected the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant some anchorage failures were reported. All reported cases refer to equipment that is not safety related; in particular anchorage failures were found for transformers (Units 1, 2 and 3) and water tanks (Units 5, 6 and 7) as well as at a heat exchanger in the turbine building of Unit 4 (walkdown finding). The anchorage failures found have no safety significance for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant. As the plant had been subjected to moderate earthquake in 2004, the question arises of whether the anchorages were properly investigated after that earthquake and if the ageing management programme was updated. Date: 10/08/2007
2.2 - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP -
Some of the failed anchorages of the service water tanks (Units 5, 6 and 7) show signs of corrosion. That may have been caused by minor cracks from previous heavy loadings. As the earthquake on 16 July 2007 exceeded the design values, it could be expected that some of the anchorages might have suffered micro damage. A proper ageing management programme should be established to prevent sudden and abrupt changes in the anchorage behaviour. There are long embedded anchorages where some minor longitudinal cracks in the reinforced concrete have been observed (e.g. on the turbine condenser of Unit 5). After examination, those cracks need to be properly closed as they may affect the long term behaviour of the anchorages. 10/08/2007
The long term behaviour of anchorages should be guaranteed by a proper ageing management programme reflecting the safety significance of the equipment as well as the possible interactions. Because of the lack of experience for anchorage behaviour after a strong 56
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earthquake that exceeds the design values, the anchorages should be subjected to detailed evaluation and long term monitoring.
4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP This item was not included in present follow-up mission. 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED As indicated in August 2007 mission.
Date:
01/02/2008

5.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP 1.
Date:
05/12/2008
2.
The presented information during the mission shows that due attention has been paid for analyses and justification of anchor behaviour during the NCO earthquake. Generally the anchorage of the safety related equipment was found to be in very good condition. Practically all anchor bolts of the RPV have been tested and found in good conditions. In other cases some loosening of bolts was found but without safety consequences.
3.
4. 5.
Not seismically caused cracks in non safety related anchor concrete pads have been analyzed within the crack management program and treated with epoxy material.
5.2. LESSONS LEARNED 1.
Expansion anchorage was identified by EPRI international expert panel as a potential item of hidden damage and TEPCO has confirmed that no expansion anchorage has been used in safety related SSCs.
The anchorage of safety related SSCs in Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP performed very well during the NCO earthquake. Sharing of information about specific details and design practice as presented by TEPCO to the IAEA missions and in a number of forums, with the international community will contribute for increasing the seismic safety of anchorage in the nuclear industry.
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FINDINGS SHEET
A.2 PLANT BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS A2-06 BASIC INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT POLICY
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION -BACKGROUND Basic Integrity Assessment Policy As a post earthquake action, after the occurrence of the July 2007 earthquake, NISA developed and set up, through the Japanese Administrative Management and Facility Integrity Assessment Working Group, a basic policy to investigate and assess the integrity of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP. Part of the objective of the IAEA mission was to understand the policy developed by the working group, to discuss the policy with Japanese counterparts and to exchange information relevant to the policy. The basic policy guidance document uses a combination of inspection and analysis to determine the integrity of systems and components.
Safety Significance:
The Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake of July 2007 caused the shutdown of the four units at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP that were operating at the time (Units 2, 3, 4 and 7). The shutdown was conducted safely and in accordance with the design of the reactors. Units 1, 5 and 6 were already in shutdown condition for planned outages. Developing a policy that ensures the structures, systems and components (SSCs) necessary to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition is of high safety significance. Date: 01/02/2008
2.2 - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP
The basic policy guidelines state that when conducting the assessment of integrity of facilities, the following points are confirmed from the perspective to conform to the technical standards related to nuclear facilities for power generation: o o Functions required by the technical standards (e.g. the operability of the ECCS systems, etc.) are maintained. Large and widespread plastic deformation does not occur with the structure, and
The basic policy guidelines require that the adequacy of the implementation process be confirmed from the standpoint of the quality management system in principle as for the 58
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The basic integrity policy requires that SSCs in the facilities in the scope of inspections are to be classified according to their seismic categorization. Standard inspection methods are prepared for each classification and based on that, inspection procedures are deployed to all facilities. NISA will evaluate the assessment results and recommendations developed by TEPCO. 01/02/2008
implementation process. Especially, when a plant manufacturer or inspection company is involved with the inspections and assessment other than the operator, the confirmation of procurement control status becomes important. It is adequate to conduct these confirmations before the basic inspection is fully in progress, .
NISA issued a directive to TEPCO to formulate for each unit at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, a detailed inspection and assessment plan. This plan is submitted to NISA for approval.
2.
It was agreed that the basic framework of the policy was sound from an engineering viewpoint and that the consequential related inspection plan developed by TEPCO is recommended to be made available to the international nuclear community.
The earthquake that occurred at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP significantly exceeded the design basis for this NPP. This is the first time such an event has occurred. Therefore, NISA set up a basic policy to investigate and assess the integrity of the KashiwazakiKariwa NPP as a result of the earthquake. This basic policy uses a methodology based on the combination of inspections and analyses to determine the integrity of SSCs.

Date:
05/12/2008
The objectives of the integrity policy are achieved by conducting assessments of structures, systems and components as follows: (1)
(2) (3) (4)
If the results of the inspection show damage (abnormality) the SSCs should be repaired, replaced or upgraded following extensive and detailed investigations. If the results of the inspections show no damage (no-abnormality) and the comparison between the original seismic design criteria and the response to the NCO earthquake shows appropriate margin it is judged that the SSC has maintained its integrity. If the results of the inspections show no damage (no-abnormality) and the comparison 59
SSCs important to safety, as defined in the original seismic design, are subject to the integrity assessment programme. Thus, SSCs are subjected to a visual inspection and to detailed inspections including checking of operability, leakage inspections, and other functionability inspection, as appropriate. Some inspections were performed by dissembling the equipment and components. In addition to these inspections, the seismic responses of SSCs were obtained through analysis. The comprehensive evaluation is the result of the combination of the results of the inspections and analyses performed.
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Based upon the policy above, NISA issued detailed instructions to TEPCO regarding the preparation of a comprehensive inspection/evaluation plan for each unit of the KashiwazakiKariwa NPP. 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED 1. The integrity assessment policy, procedures and programmes that have been developed under the direction of NISA to cope with the effects of NCO earthquake to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP are sound and should be shared with the international nuclear engineering community. Details of this policy and its application are provided in the presentations by NISA and TEPCO and included in the Appendix IV of this report.
between the original seismic design criteria and the response to the NCOE shows a lack of margin it is judged that additional more detailed evaluations and inspections should be performed..
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FINDINGS SHEET
A.2 PLANT BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS A2-07 INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS
2. FINDINGS Background:
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION -BACKGROUND The integrity assessment for SSCs, as defined in previous A.2-06 Findings sheet, consists of the following process:
Inspections of SSCs
Examples: Visual Inspection Leak Test Functional Test
Seismic Response Analyses

Analyses with Conservative Conditions/Methods
N
Basic Inspections
Abnormal?
N
Result <IIIAS?
Y
Analyses with More Realistic Conditions/Methods

N
Enough Margin?
Y
Additional Inspections
Examples: Non-destructive Test Destructive Test with Mockups N
Abnormal?
Y
I-1
I-2
A-2
A-1
Comprehensive Evaluation (see the matrix below)
Analyses
Comprehensive Evaluation Matrix No Abnormality (I-1) Judged as Sound Further Analyses and/or Inspections
Inspections
Enough Margin (A-1) Less Margin (A-2)
Abnormal (I-2) Restoration (Repair/Replacement) Restoration (Repair/Replacement)
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Safety Significance:
After experiencing the earthquake in July 2007 and safely shuting down all the nuclear units in operation (Units 2, 3, 4 and 7) at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP it is very important to the public safety to maintain all units in a safe shutdown condition. TEPCO has developed an integrity assessment programme that has two objectives. First, the policy helps ensure that functions required by the technical standards (e.g. maintaining the nuclear power station in a safe shutdown condition) are maintained. Second, the policy uses a combination of inspections analyses and to ensure that any widespread damage to components is detected and appropriate corrective actions are taken. This policy and the integrity assessment are of high safety significance. 2.2 - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP Date: 01/02/2008
During discussions with NISA and TEPCO, it was understood that the integrity assessment plan developed by TEPCO uses both analysis and inspection to assess the integrity of SSCs. The use of both inspection and analysis to assess the integrity of components leads to separating the components into four basic categories as shown above. Once the components have been separated into categories, the criterion used by TEPCO to determine what additional examinations should be performed is based upon expert judgment. The expert judgment is developed using recommendations from subject matter experts and vendors. The inspection policy as implemented by TEPCO shows that components designated as A1/I1 could be judged sound. In practice, TEPCO has developed a programme of additional inspections for all categories of components. Once all components in a system are shown to be sound, TEPCO then subjects the system to a series of further inspections and analysis to demonstrate system integrity. The full scope of additional inspections has not been fully decided for all components at this time because the additional inspection programme is decided by expert judgment, and also, not all components have been subjected to the integrity assessment process. Based upon the visual inspections performed to date, no damage has been identified in safety related equipment. However, according to information presented the following abnormalities were observed.
a. b.
In Unit 5 Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals: a fuel bundle and a wedge of a jet pump have been displaced. Investigations performed after the 1st follow up mission indicates that the NCO earthquake was not the main cause of these issues. 62
In Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals: one storage leg and one guide pin of the steam separator which was temporarily placed in the D/S pool, were bent.
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01/02/2008
2.
While discussing the analytical portion of the integrity evaluation plan developed by TEPCO, it was noted that the simple models used by TEPCO in its analysis following the same criteria adopted at the time of the original design- may not always provide answers or explanations to the effects observed as consequence of the earthquake and may not always provide conservative results. This topic was discussed with the Japanese counterparts who agreed with the observation.
3.
It was noted that some of the analyses presented by TEPCO used a set of assumptions, criteria and methods that may need to be reviewed, should the plant be re-evaluated to a higher seismic input. It was suggested to TEPCO that it would be better to adopt a more realistic (to eliminate excess conservatism) set of assumptions, methods, modelling and acceptance criteria for these analyses, in order to proceed consistently during the entire reevaluation process. It was noted that while the current integrity assessment developed by TEPCO is reasonable for assessing the impact of the earthquake on the nuclear installations at KashiwazakiKariwa NPP, any further action in the sense indicated above would require much more detailed policies, procedures, inspections and analyses that are based upon internationally accepted practices.
4.
5.
It was noted that the conducted visual inspections are adequate to detect large and widespread deformation such as bent piping. However, the visual inspections will not identify damage that may be internal to the component or localized plastic deformation. Examples where this may occur are anchor bolts or fuel elements where the damage may be localized and internal to the component or simply not visible because of the design of the component. While there is no standardized inspection method to detect localized plastic deformation in a non-destructive fashion, it was suggested that TEPCO applies the methodology through a comprehensive combination of inspections and analyses to help ensure that no internal (hidden) damage exists. As an example, detailed analytical computations using real loads will help to assess if localized plastic deformation occurred and if so to what extent
On the other hand, some effects of plastic deformation, e.g. cracking, can be detected. TEPCO is currently required by JMSE code to conduct periodic examinations for cracking. Therefore, it was suggested that TEPCO reviews the current JMSE requirements and, if it is determined appropriate, augment its current in-service inspection programme using a sampling scheme to inspect components important to safety to help ensure that no internal (hidden) damage exists.
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Date:
05/12/2008
During discussions with NISA and TEPCO, it was understood that the process outlined below was used to assess and confirm the integrity of structures, systems and components. The integrity of components was assessed using the following process. 1. All SSCs related to safety were visually inspected looking for damage that may have been produced by the NCO earthquake. Thus, SSCs were subjected to detailed functional, operability, and structural integrity tests or inspections, as appropriate. 2. Seismic responses of the SSCs were calculated for assessing potential for damage due to the NCOE. 3. The results of the inspections, tests and seismic response analyses were provided to an independent Committee of outside experts, the Sub-working Group for Facility Integrity Assessment and the Working Group on structures. This Committee conducted assessment of the results of the inspection evaluation work by TEPCO and NISA and provided suggestions for additional examinations, if appropriate. 4. Based upon the recommendations of the outside experts, additional examinations were conducted on components. Once the integrity of all components within a system was confirmed, the system was (or will be) subjected to the same integrity and functional tests that were required for starting the plant.
Previous IAEA missions identified an issue of potential damage to SSCs that may not be detectable via visual examinations (hidden damage). In response to this issue and as part the component integrity assessments, TEPCO requested that a panel of international experts, organized by EPRI, review the inspections and evaluation planed for Unit 7 to ensure that the issue of hidden damage was appropriately addressed. The international reviewed the inspections and evaluations planned by TEPCO, compared the planned inspections with relevant international experience and concurred that the inspections planned by TEPCO were reasonable. 3. LESSONS LEARNED 05/12/2008 1. The integrity assessments that have been conducted at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Unit 7 to evaluate potential damage from the NCO earthquake required a comprehensive combination of analyses, inspections and tests. The IAEA teams review of the process founded to be appropriate and to be shared with the international nuclear community.
2. The integrity and functional testing of systems were performed at Unit 7 to ensure that they
3. NISA and TEPCO performed the integrity assessment with the participation of external third
will comply with the plant technical specifications with no eefects from the NCO earthquake. NISA and TEPCO decided that the testing of systems should be performed in the same manner as plant start-up. parties,
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FINDINGS SHEET
A.2 PLANT BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS A2-08 SEISMIC RESPONSE EVALUATION TO NCOE
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION -BACKGROUND
The seismic response analysis is one of the most important steps in the process of assessing the integrity of systems and components after the occurrence of the earthquake of July 16, 2007 that affected the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP and in which the original seismic input was largely exceeded. Thus, the seismic response analysis constitutes, together with the systematic basic inspections, the approach used for integrity assessment of the structure, systems and components of the plant.
The structural analyses conducted were aimed to reproduce the effects of the strong earthquake on all the plant components and structures using the records obtained from the strong motion recording systems. The integrity assessment policy adopted by NISA requires the application of conservative methods and assumptions as well as the use of assumptions, codes and standards applicable for design of new nuclear power plants. As explained by the counterpart the analyses are focused on safety related structures and components. Date: 01/02/2008
The recorded strong ground motions at the foundation mat and analytically determined transfer functions are used for simulating the seismic response at various locations of the reactor building. The calculated seismic response is compared with the recorded one at places where in-structure records are available. The simple models used are adjusted by changing stiffness and damping in order to achieve best fit between floor response spectra of recorded and computed motion. In case of significant differences between the spectra response correction factors are introduced. The computed motions are further used to analytically evaluate equipment and components. The capacity evaluation results show good safety margins in most of the cases. However considering the possible future increase of the design ground motion and the international experience it is preferable to have realistic assessment of the safety margins.
The site response analysis for the July 2007 earthquake is not yet performed. The reactor building foundations of all units are deeply embedded and placed on a Pliocene layer (designated as mudstone) with a shear wave velocity of about 450m/s. Despite the relatively lower shear wave velocity in the layer below the foundation in comparison to 65
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sound bedrock, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP units showed stable structural behaviour and very small gradients of the permanent structure deformations (settlement and uplift).
The seismic response of the equipment and components could also be assessed as elastic linear with minor and insignificant exceptions reported. Plant safety systems were fully functional and were able to assure safe shutdown and to maintain the plant in stable conditions. The safety related equipment remained fully functional. The cranes in the Reactor and Turbine buildings that have been exposed to very strong excitation remain functional (with the exception of the crane of Reactor Building of Unit 6). 01/02/2008
Observations indicated that the safety related concrete structures most probably preserved their behaviour expected in original design during the earthquake. The very limited extent (i.e. comparatively small number) as well as the size (minor dimensions) of the cracks would tend to confirm this observation. Despite the general trend, presented by the recent analyses that indicates shear strain within the shear crack limit, it could not be excluded that, due to local cracking or to bending moments in localized areas, or due to combined multidirectional excitation (i.e. the shear strain is the result of the combined action of axial and shear forces, bending moments, etc.), etc, limited non linear behaviour may have occurred at some places of the structures of the reactor building. Discrepancies between observed and calculated spectra would suggest a similar conclusion.
1.
3. LESSONS LEARNED
2.
The plant behaviour during and after the earthquake, which exceeded the design ground motion, was safe and kept in safe conditions. The observed seismic response and the effects on the structures and components showed that considerable safety margin exists above the design strength of foundations, structures and equipment. The preliminary findings identified in this regard during the first IAEA mission in August 2007 were confirmed by the results from the integrity evaluations conducted so far and reported during the meetings.
3.
4.
A change in the design ground motion to be used for the complete safety re-evaluation of the 66
As mentioned in previous Findings Sheet A2-06 of this report, the examination of the plant systems and components for integrity preservation started immediately after the earthquake. The general methodology adopted is based on: (a) basic examination (called basic inspections) and (b) preliminary analyses. The structural analyses as presented to the mission- were performed using methods, models and assumptions as those that were used in the design phase. Although this approach may be useful for a quick evaluation immediately after the earthquake of the integrity of plant SSCs, it may not necessarily be appropriate to apply them for assessing the safety margins for loads higher than those defined at the original design stage. With this in mind, some effort to consider realistic parameters (e.g. concrete Youngs modulus) was made. In case of insufficient safety margins, detailed analysis will be used according to the evaluation diagram presented by NISA and TEPCO.
There are numerous reasons for explaining the good behaviour to such extreme loads: the design was based on conservative assumptions, methods and modelling; the structural layout is regular and symmetric both in plan and elevation; the stiffness and the masses are smoothly distributed and concentration of stresses is avoided; there are no excessive eccentricities and changes in stiffness; the equipment and piping are properly anchored and there were no system interactions reported for safety related equipment.
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In this regard, the use of realistic methods and assumptions are well formulated in the international community. The IAEA published a safety report document on this subject and a safety guide is being developed (presently, for comments to Member States) which reflect the current international practice in the re-evaluation of the seismic safety of existing nuclear installations for seismic input higher than the one used at the original design phase. In contrast with the design methods (where conservative methods are intentionally applied) the evaluation of existing nuclear facilities is based on: as-is structural and material data; asis arrangements, loading and interactions; realistic and detailed modelling; realistic material behaviour, i.e. nonlinear behaviour (if applicable); realistic best estimate material and soil damping and other properties values; fatigue and ageing effects; etc.
existing facility is to be expected after a strong earthquake that exceeds the original design basis. In that case it appears very important to properly evaluate the relevant capacity reserves of the plant systems, structures and components. That is possible through the use of realistic assumptions, methods, modelling and acceptance criteria in all steps of the post earthquake re-evaluation process as recommended by the IAEA Safety Standards. The international experience in such cases shows that in a post earthquake assessment the evaluation of the seismic response and the available safety margin based on realistic best estimates is allowable.
5.
In the design phase the site response (convolution of the outcrop design motion) caused a significant reduction of the seismic motion at foundation level. The observed strong motions and the empirically derived amplifications of the site do not support those results. An important effort has been made to adjust the soil and structure parameters in order to reproduce a simple structural model, as close as possible, to the observed in-structure records. However, not all the characteristics of the response have been captured, as it can be seen from the comparison of response spectra (e.g. in vertical direction for all the units and in horizontal direction for the Units 3 and 4). More refined models for site response analysis and soil structure interaction may help in this matter. These models will also be very useful for a more precise evaluation of the shear wall loads and related cracking due to the NCO earthquake, and for the seismic safety re-evaluation of the plant to a higher seismic input.

4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP -
Date:
05/12/2008
TEPCO reported a large scale program for analyses and inspections (field tests) performed in order to prove the seismic adequacy of the plant during and after the strong NCO earthquake in 2007. The general result is that the plant behaviour satisfies the requirements of the codes and the regulations. The integrity and the functionality of SSCs have been demonstrated.
The presented analyses and conclusions by TEPCO as result of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP evaluation for response and behaviour during the NCO earthquake also lead to a general outcome that IAEA Mission findings and conclusions from January 2008 are fully confirmed. 67
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The seismic evaluation of the SSCs is practically completed with the exception of some system tests as well as plant tests that will be performed after fuel loading and start of steam generation..
The presentations confirmed that seismic evaluation is performed by models and methods as well as acceptance criteria used for the original design. As-is system configuration and actual material characteristics are applied for the re-evaluation, some updates of the material and system characteristics due to changes and upgrades are introduced as well.
The performed response/capacity analyses of piping and equipment for the NCO excitation with conservative modelling and acceptance criteria demonstrate that elastic limits were not exceeded. The analyses were confirmed by numerous tests and field observations.
TEPCO analyses for NCO earthquake show very good safety margin on component and system level, both for strength and integrity as well as for functionality. This margin is demonstrated using conservative approaches and assumptions.
JNES demonstrated sophisticated analyses and approaches for linear response analyses, including soil-structure interaction. The results presented show better representation of the observations (essentially floor response spectra) of the structure behaviour. These results pointed out a need for refinement and improvement of the analyses in order to reflect the current state of practice in Japan as well as internationally.
Foundation stability and site response have been demonstrated. The site response results comply with the observed large surface deformations. In order to account for the complicated geological structure, deep foundation, nonlinear soil properties and the multidirectional character of the ground motion, an improved analytical procedure as proposed by JNES will improve the appreciation of the work performed. The lessons that have been outlined during the IAEA 1st follow up mission in January 2008 are confirmed regarding the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP safe performance during and after the NCO earthquake, which largely exceeded the original design ground motions. The SSCs of Unit 7 remained fully functional and complied with the requirements of the original design standards as confirmed by the analyses and the inspections performed by TEPCO. In this regard, the seismic response analyses show adequate safety margins within the elastic allowable limits during the NCO earthquake. The re-evaluation was performed by methods and models used for the original design with updated system configurations and material characteristics corresponding to as-is condition. 05/12/2008
1. 2.
3.
4.
The more refined methods for structural analyses used for verification by NISA/JNES show better correlation with the observed data from the NCOearthquake. These or other alternative methods correspond to the state-of-practice in the international nuclear community and should be used in the future. The seismic response analysis show significant reduction of the seismic ground motion at foundation level compared to the motion at rock outcrop. Comparison with recorded data, if available, may provide additional demonstration of these conclusions.
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FINDINGS SHEET
A.2 PLANT BEHAVIOUR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS
A2-09 EVALUATION FOR STANDARD SEISMIC GROUND MOTION
2. FINDINGS -
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION BACKGROUND
New standard seismic ground motion (SSGM) has been developed to evaluate the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP. The ground motion reflects the consensus of the scientific community about the seismic threat on the site. The SSGM is defined on rock outcrop and is significantly higher than the original design input.
The seismic evaluation is performed using models and assumptions used in the original design as well as updated system and material characteristics. The goals of the evaluation are to demonstrate ability for safe shut down and to maintain safe conditions after the SSGM. The acceptance criteria for building structure allow limited nonlinear deformations. The functionality criteria for equipment are as those used in the design. Date: 05/12/2008 TEPCO presented an evaluation of the Unit 7 reactor building based on nonlinear analyses performed on a lumped mass stick model as suggested by the Japanese practice defined in the JEAG 4601 - 1987. Vertical and horizontal motions are considered separately. Soilstructure interaction is considered by soil springs. Five standard motions are used and the model is adjusted correspondingly. The acceptable shear strain for reinforced concrete elements has been set to 2 x 10-3 as proposed by the Japanese practice. The building capacity evaluation results show good safety margins.
Site response analysis is used to develop equivalent linear soil properties as a function of each of the five earthquake motions and to provide the seismic motion for input to the overall dynamic analyses. The results show significant reduction of the seismic excitation at foundation level compared to the motion at the outcrop of rock. The soil deformation and damping values at the surface strata are excessive; therefore, these layers have not been considered in the evaluation of the structure. The foundation stability analyses demonstrate good margin.
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TEPCO reported that significant upgrading work has been performed including upgrading of a large number of piping supports, upgrading of roof trusses of reactor building, upgrading of crane and refuelling machine, upgrading of exhaust stack, etc. The reported evaluations are showing good safety margins both for integrity and functionality under conservative assumptions. 3. LESSONS LEARNED 05/12/2008
The analyses of systems and components are performed in a similar way as the integrity evaluation for NCO earthquake. A subset of analyses was presented and discussed. The main safety related equipment in the Reactor Pressure Vessel is analysed by a coupled model, including the building structure, which is modelled nonlinearly, and the NSSS, which is modelled linearly. In general, the applied acceptance criteria correspond to the current Japanese Guidelines JEAG 4601-1991 with allowable stresses corresponding to IV AS case.
1.
2.
In general, TEPCO demonstrated that the Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP has a high seismic capacity for the new standard design ground motion. However, some items requires upgrading which was already performed and shown during the mission (see Appendices IV and V). The margins shown by TEPCO for SSCs (some equipment have been upgraded) are adequate and derived using assumptions and acceptance criteria as prescribed in the current Japanese nuclear codes for extreme loading conditions (e.g. S2 earthquake). The analyses presented by TEPCO may need further refinement and adjustments in the future in order to meet the expectations of the international community for demonstrating adequate performance when subjected to such extreme event. More refined analyses, such as those performed by JNES for verification, would contribute to the appreciation of the obtained results by TEPCO. These or other alternative methods correspond to the state-ofpractice in the international nuclear community and should be used in the future.
3. 4.
The site response analyses have a significant effect on the seismic response of the SSCs. Thus, the site response analyses as performed by TEPCO should be enhanced in order to be compatible with the more refined structural models to be analysed as indicated above. The limited nonlinear deformations that have been assumed acceptable for the building behaviour requires additional clarification and specific research in order to verify the effects of stress concentration zones, combined multidirectional response, spatial interaction, etc. This future research likely will not change the present overall conclusion.
5.
TEPCO has established conservative criteria for evaluation of non-safety components and has implemented numerous upgrades measures when required. This experience should be shared with the nuclear international community.
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FINDINGS SHEET
A.3 OPERATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT
A3-01 OPERATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT RESPONSE AFTER SHUTDOWN
2. FINDINGS -
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION:
Operational safety management includes actions taken by the management of the power plant and the operating staff at a specific unit. Important elements in managing the response to an event are to ensure control of reactivity, removal of the decay heat from the core and confinement of radioactive material. Accident management also includes necessary communication to authorities and other organisations involved in emergency planning. FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP
BACKGROUND
2.2 -
Operating procedures exist and were applicable, and consist of emergency operating procedures, accident operating procedures and dedicated instructions for walkdown of plant safety systems after an earthquake. Assistance from other units, which is usually available at unplanned unit automatic shutdown, was not possible at this time, owing to the fact that all units were affected by the earthquake and the fire at Unit 3. Resources from the technical support centre and maintenance group were also limited.
The safe conditions of the plant were verified in the control room. Readiness for operation for all safety systems in all plants was first verified through visual inspection. Full testing of the safety systems with emergency diesel began on July 25.
All units in operation (Units 3, 4 and 7) and in start up (Unit 2) scrammed automatically on experiencing high seismic acceleration, as intended. For the scrammed units, the main feed water and turbine condensers were initially available as heat sinks and water make-up. The main steam isolation valves were closed manually for Unit 2 after 50 minutes and for Unit 7 after 7 hours and 55 minutes, which made the condensers unavailable in each case. The normal feed water systems were operating for all units at least the first day for all units, except for Unit 5 where the normal feed water system was stopped after 6 hours.
The reporting to the authorities of the leakage of radioactive material at Unit 6 was carried out at 18:52, whilst the earthquake occurred at 10:13. The reason for taking such a long time has been explained by TEPCO. The delay was mainly caused by a lack of personnel 71
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after the earthquake due to evacuation and other priorities. Preserving of the integrity of the communication systems is also a key issue in this respect.
3. LESSONS LEARNED
10/08/2007
1. The accident management of the event in all units was successfully carried out with respect to the operation of the reactor safety systems. The availability of both operating and safety systems and the existence of applicable accident procedures ensured the safety of the units and demonstrated the strength of maintaining several levels of defence in depth.
2. Verification of readiness for operation of the safety systems that were not activated was carried out through visual inspection. It should be carefully analysed if this procedure is sufficient or if it should be the accepted practice to test with full activation of safety systems without substantial delay after the occurrence of an earthquake. 3. There was a time delay in reporting the leakage of radioactive material to the authorities. Information from the plant should have been issued more promptly. It is of key importance to report information on releases of radioactive material to the authorities as soon as possible to provide guidance for off-site emergency organizations, even if no significant releases have occurred or are expected to occur as a result of the event.
Date:
01/02/2008

Date:
05/12/2008
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FINDINGS SHEET
1. FINDING IDENTIFICATION NPP: Unit: KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP UNITS 1 TO 7 Finding Number: A3-02
A.3 OPERATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT A.3-02 RELEASES
2. FINDINGS
2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION: BACKGROUND - Confinement of radioactive materials and control of operational discharges, as well as limitation of accidental releases is a fundamental safety objective in nuclear safety. It is important to detect and correct uncontrolled releases and possible pathways to the environment, even if the actual releases are very limited. 2.2 FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP: TEPCO reported detection of iodine particulate material (Cr-51 and Co-60) during a weekly periodic measurement performed at the main exhaust stack at Unit 7. The detected radioactivity (4x108 Bq of iodine and 2x106 Bq of other substances) was estimated to result in an individual dose well below the authorized limits for normal operating conditions. The release of radioactivity was found to come from the exhaust fan in the turbine gland steam ventilator. It was due to a mistake of an operator who failed to turn off a ventilator when the gland steam was no longer available. Under these circumstances, the ventilator continued to propel steam and incondensable gases from the turbine condenser to the main stack, which underwent further contamination. A small discharge of contaminated water into the sea occurred after the earthquake. The water spilled over from the spent fuel pool to the reactor building refuelling floor, where it filled up a cable chase. It then leaked into an uncontrolled area on the lower floor through a cable penetration that had a defective sealing. The water dripped down one additional floor along cables and a penetration. It finally collected one floor down in a pit of discharged water. The contaminated water was then sent to the sea by the discharge pump through the discharge outlet.
The volume of discharged contaminated water was estimated by TEPCO using the records of the pump activation. The activity of the discharged water was directly measured on samples of water from puddles in rooms above the pit. It was found out that the activity released was extremely small and it was estimated to result in an individual dose well below the authorized limits for exposure of the public under normal operating conditions. The phenomenon of water spilling over from the spent fuel pool is now well known and had already been observed during previous earthquakes. It seems therefore important to devote special attention to the leak-tightness of penetrations on the floor of the reactor building where the spent fuel pool is located. 73
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TEPCO considered that the events had a very low impact on the plant safety and individual radiation dose. The IAEA team finds this conclusion reasonable.
Significant displacements were produced by the earthquake in the ducts connected to the main exhaust stacks at Units 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. These displacements could have resulted into limited leakages and releases of contaminated air at the ground level instead of such contaminated air being exhausted and monitored at the top of the stack.
3.
LESSONS LEARNED
10/08/2007
1. Although no releases of radioactive material from the reactor core due to the earthquake were detected, careful attention should be paid to other possible sources of releases, even if the releases are of limited low amounts.
4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP This item was not included in present follow-up mission. 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED: As indicated in August 2007 mission.
Date:
01/02/2008

5.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP 5.2. LESSONS LEARNED:
Date:
05/12/2008
This item was not included in present follow-up mission. It is considered closed. As indicated in August 2007 mission.
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APPENDIX I - MISSION PROGRAMME

December 1 (Monday) Opening Session, General Explanation 8:40 9:00 1028 Meeting Room 10:00
(METI Annex Bldg10 F)
Time
Place
From the hotel to NISA/METI by chartered bus
Description of Activity
1. Opening Session Opening Speech and Introduction of Japanese Members (10) Mr. Komoda (Director-General, NISA) Speech from Team Leader (5) Mr. Godoy (Acting Head, IAEA /NSNI) Introduction of Team Members (5) Mr. Sollogoub ( IAEA) Briefing and schedule of the Mission (10) Mr. Fukushima (Deputy Director-General for Safety Examination) Logistics (transportation, working environments, cautions)(10) Mr. Morita (Director, International Affairs Office) 2 Outline of NISAs Actions Current Status of the Investigation and Study Regarding KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Plant affected by Niitagataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (20) / Shigeharu Kato, Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Power, NISA, Documents No.01-P-NISA 01 and 05 Q&A(10)
10:15 10:30 10:30 1028 12:00
Coffee Break 3 Presentation on Seismic Safety Evaluation
- Current Status of Confirmation on Seismic Safety of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Nuclear Power Plant / Shuuji Kawahara, Director of Seismic Safety Office, Nuclear Power Licensing Division, NISA, (25min) , Documents No. 01-PNISA 02 and 03. Q&A(20) 4 Presentation on Integrity Assessment
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant / Tetsuya Yamamoto, Director, Nuclear Power inspection Division, NISA (25), Documents No. 01-PNISA 04 and 01-G1-NISA 02 Q&A(20) 12:00 1038 Lunch Annex <Mission Members>All members 13:30 10F
- Current Status of Evaluation of Facility Integrity of Unit 7 of the
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13:30 1028 17:00
5Seismic Hazard Assessment

- Evaluation on ground motion of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP at the Chuetsu-oki Earthquake/ Tsutsumi Hideaki, Principal Officer, Earthquake and Tsunami Evaluation Gr. Seismic Safety Division, JNES (45) , Documents 01-G1-NISA 01 and 01-G1-JNES 01. - Analysis of the seismic observation record obtained during the 2007 Niigataken-Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake at the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant/ Presented by Mr Mizutani, TEPCO (45), Document No 01-G1-TEPCO 01 Q&A (90)
433 6Integrity Evaluation (seismic response)

Evaluation of Facility Integrity of unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Verification on Safety regarding Evaluation of System level and Fuel Loading) / Yukinori Maekawa, Director for Safety Examination, Nuclear Power inspection Division, NISA(15), Documents 01-G2NISA 01 to 05. Status of Investigation and Evaluation of Unit 1-7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant Inspection and Evaluation at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 / Kazuhiko Yamashita, General Manager, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Assert Management Department, TEPCO(100), Documents No 01G2-TEPCO 01 and 02
17:00 1028 17:30 18:00 Hotel eveni ng
Internal Meeting
Q&A(40)
Closing Session of the day (memo for the next day) From NISA/METI to the hotel by chartered bus Internal Meeting, @ 15F 1510 Meeting Room, Grand Prince Hotel Akasaaka
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December 2 (Tuesday)
Time Place
8:40 From the hotel to NISA/METI by chartered bus 09:00 1028 7Seismic Hazard Assessment 433 6Integrity Evaluation (seismic response) 12:00 - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Unit 7
Definition of the new design basis earthquake ground motion Ss at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant/ Presented by Mr. Mizutani, TEPCO (60), Document No 02-G1-TEPCO 01
Q&A (90)
Seismic Response Analysis of Equipment and Piping Systems for the Chuetsu-oki Earthquake / Presented by Takamatsu Naotaka, Director, Equipment and System Evaluation Gr. Seismic Safety Division, JNES (40), Document No. 02-G2-JNES 01. Comprehensive Evaluation of Equipment Integrity at KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 (Component Level) / Presented by Kenji Murano, Group Manager, Equipment Improvement Project Group, Nuclear Asset management Department, TEPCO (40), Document No.01-G2-TEPCO 03
Q&A(70)
12:00 13:30
Lunch / Seabonia restaurant @B1F Chunichi Building
13:30 1028 9. Integrity Evaluation (seismic response) - Result of Seismic Response Analysis, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 / Kenji Murano, Group Manager, Seismic Integrity Engineering Group, 17:00
Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Centre, Nuclear Assert Management Department, TEPCO, 01-G2-TEPCO 03 - Report on Equipment Integrity Inspections and Evaluation after Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 (Buildings and Structure) (Summary) - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7, Seismic Safety Evaluation of Reactor Building / Rikiro Kikuch, Group Manager, Architectural Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO (60), Document No. 02-G2TEPCO 02 and 03 - - Simulation on Floor Response Spectra of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Reactor Building / Motohashi Shohei, Assistant Director-General, Seismic Safety Division, JNES (40), Document No. 02-G2-JNES 02.
Q&A(60)
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17:00
1028 Hotel
IAEA Internal Meeting Closing Session of the day (memo for the next day) From NISA/METI to the hotel by chartered bus Internal Meeting, @ 15F 1510 Meeting Room, Grand Prince Hotel Akasaaka
18:00 -
17:30
evening
December 3 (Wednesday)
Time Place
8:40
From the hotel to NISA/METI by chartered bus 433 11Integrity Evaluation (seismic response)
- Assessment on System Level of Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant / Kazuyuki Nagasawa, Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Project Group, Nuclear Asset management Department, TEPCO (40), Document No. 03-G2-TEPCO 01
09:00 1028 10Seismic Hazard Assessment 12:00 Summary of the Report on the
Geology and Geological Structure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Site and Surrounding Areas / Makoto Takao, Manager, Civil Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Assert Management Department, TEPCO (60), Document No. 03-G1-TEPCO 01
Q&A
Q&A (90)
12:00 13:30
Lunch <Mission MemberS> All
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13:30 1028 10-continuedSeismic Hazard Assessment 15:30

-
11-ContinuedIntegrity Evaluation (seismic response)
Summary of the Report on the Geology and Geological Structure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS. A Plan of the Study on Probabilistic Fault Displacement Hazard Analysis / Makoto Takao, Manager, Civil Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Assert Management Department, TEPCO (90), Document No. 03-G1-TEPCO 01 and 02.
Q&A (90)
- Status of Studies and Investigation of Effects of Aging Deterioration / Presented by Kazuyuki Nagasawa, Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Project Group, Nuclear Asset management Department, TEPCO (40), Document No. 03-G2-TEPCO 02. - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7, Seismic Re-evaluation of Safety Related Component. - Upgrading Works in Unit 7 of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station / Kazuyuki Nagasawa, Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Project Group, Nuclear Asset management Department, TEPCO (30), Document No. 02-G2-TEPCO 04 and 05. and Appendix A01 to A04
15:30 Tran Bus sport NISA departure 15:30 Tokyo Station arrival 15:45 Super express train Tokyo Station departure 16:12 (Super Express, Toki 333) Nagaoka Station arrival 17:52 PM A hotel meeting room (3F Yamabuki) is available for IAEA internal meeting from 18:00 to 22:00
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December 4 (Thursday), Site Investigation, Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station 08:00 Transport Hotel Departure (Members divided into 2 groups for site tour) 09:00 16:00 Field observation Group 1. Observation on fault zones: <Mission Member> Mr. Grpinar Mr. Campbell Mr. Aspinall Mr. Michetti Mr. Swan <NISA> Mr. Fukushima, Mr. Mita <JNES> Mr. Abe <TEPCO> Mr. Takao, Mr. Takada, Mr. Mizutani <Interpreter> Ms. Shibagaki Group 2. Observation on the site <Mission Member> Mr. Godoy Mr. Taylor Mr. Sollogoub Mr. Kostov Mr. Johnson <NISA> Mr. Kato, Mr. Morita Mr. Sunouchi, Mr. Shiraishi <JNES> Mr. Nakagawa <TEPCO> Mr. Tsuchida, Mr. Toba, Mr. Kataoka, Mr. Matsumoto, Mr. Kawamura Mr. Nagasawa, Mr. Takada <Interpreter> Ms. Ishigaki
16:00 16:30 16:45
Service hall, KKNPP Transport
Press contact -Photo coverage at entering the power station, in the morning -Photo coverage at Nagaoka Heiya Nishi fault -Photo coverage Plenary meeting (wrap-up) Press Interview to the Team Leader and Deputy Team Leader Bus Power Station departure 16:45 Nagaoka Station arrival 18:00 Super express train (Shinkansen) Nagaoka Station departure 18:37 (Max Toki 344) Tokyo Station arrival 20:12 Bus Tokyo Station departure 20:30 Hotel arrival 20:45 A hotel meeting room (15F 1510) is available for IAEA internal meeting.
evening
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December 5 (Friday)
Morning
Time
Hotel
Place
IAEA - Internal Meeting Report draft preparation / Hotel Meeting Room No. 1510 From the hotel to NISA/METI by chartered bus 12Closing Session Report outline Mr. Godoy (Team Leader IAEA /NSNI /ESS), Mr. Grpinar and Mr. Sollogoub Future Actions: Proposal for Future Actions / Kentaro Morita, Director International Affairs Office, NISA, Document No. 05-P-NISA 01. Free discussion Comments - Closing speech (15) Mr. Godoy Closing speech (15) Mr. Komoda
Preparation of Report, Closing Session
13:10 13:30 15:30
1028
16:00 16:30
1028
17:00
Press interview <Mission Members> Mr. Godoy, Mr. Grpinar and Mr. Sollogoub <NISA> Mr. Morita From NISA/METI to hotel by chartered bus Departure of IAEA Experts from Tokyo.
Saturday, 6 December:
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APPENDIX II - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

A.II.1 IAEA REVIEW TEAM: IAEA STAFF MEMBER:
1. Mr. GODOY Antonio R.
Team Leader (TL)
2. Mr. SOLLOGOUB Pierre
Deputy Team Leader (DTL)
IAEA EXTERNAL EXPERTS: 3. Mr. ASPINALL, William External Expert
Acting Section Head Engineering Safety Section Division of Nuclear Installation Safety Department of Nuclear Safety and Security International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100 A-1400 Vienna, Austria Tel: +43 1 2600 22513 EMAIL: A.R.GODOY@IAEA.ORG Safety Officer Engineering Safety Section Division of Nuclear Installation Safety Department of Nuclear Safety and Security International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100 A-1400 Vienna, Austria Tel: +43 1 2600 25559 Email: P.SOLLOGOUB@IAEA.ORG Aspinall & Associates 5 Woodside Close Beaconsfield, Bucks HP9 1JQ UK Tel.: +44 1494 672746 E-mail: Willy@aspinall.demon.co.uk EQECAT Inc. 1030 NW 161st Place Beaverton 97006 OR USA Tel.: +1 503 533 4359 Email: KCampbell@eqecat.com Sekinpah Sitesi No. 100 Cesme Turkey Tel.: +43 664 5385787 E-mail: aybarsgurpinar@yahoo.com
4. Mr. CAMPBELL Kenneth
External Expert
5. Mr. GRPINAR Aybars
External Expert
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6. Mr. JOHNSON, James J.
External Expert
7. Mr. MICHETTI, Alessandro
External Expert
8. Mr. KOSTOV Marin
External Expert
9. Mr. SWAN, Frank H.
External Expert
10. Mr. TAYLOR, Theodore
External Expert
JJJ Associates 7 Essex Court Alamo San Francisco 94507 CA, USA Tel.: +1 925 8389227 E-mail: JasJJoh@aol.com Universita dell'Insubria Dipartimento di Scienze Chimiche e Ambientali Via Valleggio 11 22100 Como Italy Tel.: +39 031 326215 E-mail: alessandro.michetti@uninsubria.it Risk Engineering Ltd 34 Totleben Blvd., POB 4, Sofia 1606 Bulgaria Tel.: +35 988 807 582 Fax: +35 929 549 100 E-mail: kostov@riskeng.bg ; kostov@bas.bg Consulting Geologist 240 Laidley Street San Francisco CA 94131, USA Tel.: +1 415 282 2370 E-mail: bswan@geomatrix.com Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL) 920 Battelle Boulevard P.O. Box 999 Richland 99352 WA, USA Tel.: +1 509 3754331 E-mail: tt_taylor@pnl.gov
Group.1: Seismic Hazard: A. Grpinar (Task Leader), K. Campbell, W. Aspinall, A. Michetti, F. Swan. Group 2: Seismic Response Buildings and Equipment P. Sollogoub (Task Leader); M. Kostov, J. J. Johnson.
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A.II.2 JAPANESE ORGANIZATIONS NISA: Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100-8986 Japan Yasuhisa KOMODA Hiroyuki FUKANO Shigeharu KATO Hitoshi SATO Akira FUKUSHIMA Yoichi KATO Kentaro MORITA Kazuko NAGURA Tetsuo OHMURA Yoshinori MORIYAMA Shuuji KAWAHARA Osamu TAKENOUCHI Shunichiro MITA Tetsuya YAMAMOTO Yukinori MAEKAWA Shinji SUNOUCHI Naoki KUMAGAI Takenori KITAMURA Nobuhiko SHIRAISHI Director-General Deputy Director-General Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Power Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Safety Deputy Director-General for Safety Examination Director, Policy Planning and Coordination Division Director, International Affairs Office Assistant Director, International Affairs Office Director, Nuclear Safety Regulatory Standard Division Director, Nuclear Power Licensing Division Director, Seismic Safety Office, Nuclear Power Licensing Division Deputy Director, Seismic Safety Office, Nuclear Power Licensing Division Safety Examiner, Seismic Safety Office, Nuclear Power Licensing Division Director, Nuclear Power Inspection Division Director for Safety Examination, Nuclear Power Inspection Division Deputy Director, Nuclear Power Inspection Division Safety Examiner, Nuclear Power Inspection Division Safety Examiner, Nuclear Power Inspection Division Director, Fire Protection and Prevention Office, Nuclear
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Emergency Preparedness Division Toshihiro IMAI Director, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Inspector Office
JNES: Incorporated Administrative Agency Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization 3-17-1 Toranomon Minato-ku Tokyo 105-0001 Japan Hideki NARIAI Katsumi EBISAWA Shohei MOTOHASHI Naotaka TAKAMATSU Hideaki TSUTSUMI Hiroshi ABE Yuichi UCHIYAMA Shizuo NODA Masatoshi FUJITA Yoshio YAMAMOTO Masaki NAKAGAWA Yoko MORITA President Director-General, Seismic Safety Division Assistant Director- General, Seismic Safety Division Director, Seismic Safety Division Principal Officer, Seismic Safety Division Principal Stuff, Seismic Safety Division Senior Stuff, Seismic Safety Division Senior Officer, Seismic Safety Division Researcher, Seismic Safety Division Senior Officer, International Relations Office Senior Officer, International Relations Office Deputy Chief, Public Relations Office
TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company 1-3 Uchisaiwai-cho 1-chome Chiyodaku Tokyo 100-8560 Japan Akio TAKAHASHI Toshiaki TSUCHIDA Hiroto KATAOKA Akio TOBA Director, Site Superintendent, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Unit Superintendent (Units 1-4), Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Unit Superintendent (Units 5-7), Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Deputy Superintendent (Safety Management), Kashiwazaki-
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Kariwa NPP Hiroyuki ISHIKAWA Kazuhiro ASHIZAWA Tomoyoshi TAKEDA Masahiko YOKOO Tadashi IMAI General Manager, Administration Department (Architectural and Civil Engineering), Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP General Manager, Quality and Safety Management Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Group Manager, Civil Engineering Group (2), Administration Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Deputy Manager, Civil Engineering Group (2), Administration Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Civil Engineering Group (2), Administration Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP
Yoshihisa KOBAYASHI Group Manager, Architectural Engineering Group (1), Administration Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Haruo YOKOYAMA Fukashi WATANABE Akihiko TAKIZAWA Hideo NAKAMURA Takeshi HORIKAWA Group Manager, Architectural Engineering Group (3), Administration Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Group Manager, Safety Management Group, Quality and Safety Management Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Deputy Manager, Safety Management Group, Quality and Safety Management Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Deputy Manager, Safety Management Group, Quality and Safety Management Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Safety Management Group, Quality and Safety Management Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP
Yasuhiro MATSUZAWA Safety Management Group, Quality and Safety Management Department, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Atsushi TAKASHIMA Group Manager, Reactor Mechanical Group (Units 1, 4), Maintenance Department (Units 1-4), Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP
Keiichi YOSHIKAWA Takeo ENDOH
Reactor Mechanical Group, Maintenance Department (Units 5-7), Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Deputy Manager, Turbine Mechanical Group, Maintenance Department (Units 5-7), Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP
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Kazuhiko YAMASHITA General Manager of Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Katsuichiro HIJIKATA General Manager (Civil & Architectural Engineering), Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Jun MATSUMOTO General Manager, Seismic Issues Management Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Seismic Issues Management Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Group Manager, Seismic Integrity Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department
Kazuhito TAKADA
Kenji MURANO
Kazuyuki NAGASAWA Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Yoshinori WATAHIKI Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Equipment Improvement Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department General Manager, Civil Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Group Manager, Civil Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Manager, Civil Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management
Masanori HATORI
Ryousuke INOUE
Toshiaki SAKAI
Kazuo MOMOSE
Makoto TAKAO
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Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Masaki HONDA Deputy Manager, Civil Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Group Manager, Seismic Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Seismic Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Group Manager, Architectural Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department Architectural Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department
Isao NISHIMURA
Hiroyuki MIZUTANI
Rikiro KIKUCHI
Takayuki KOYANAGI
Shinichi KAWAMURA General Manager, Nuclear Corporate Planning Group, Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Administrative Department Kazuyuki SHINODA Deputy Manager, Nuclear Corporate Planning Group, Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Administrative Department
MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE FOR INVESTIGATION AND RESPONSE TO THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES AFFECTED BY CHUETSU-OKI EARTHQUAKE Naoto SEKIMURA Takao NISHIKAWA Kazuki KOKETSU Yuichi SUGIYAMA Yukinobu OKAMURA Professor, School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo Professor emeritus, Graduate School of Engineering, Tokyo Metropolitan University Professor, Earthquake Research Institute, The University of Tokyo Director, Active Fault Research Center, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology Deputy Director, Subduction-zone Earthquake Recurrence Research Team Leader, Active Fault Research Center, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
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IAEA
APPENDIX III SITE VISIT

PROGRAMME OF THE SITE VISIT - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Date: Thursday, 4th December, 2008 Group 1:
12:30-13:30 13:30-15:30
09:00-12:30
Observation of the Nagaoka Plain Western Boundary Fault Zone Lunch break Observation of the fault zone in the vicinity of the site;
Group 2; Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP 10:00-12:30 09:00-10:00
Fire brigade KK 1-4: KK 1:
Plant Walkdown:
Opening remarks / Whole Body Counter
Outdoor facilities
12:30-13:30 13:30-15:30 -
New administrative building: construction site Lunch break Continuation:
RCA, inspection works on RPV support bolts and recirculation pumps
KK 6 and 7: Control room KK 6: KK 7;
Piping system upgrades
Whole Body Counter Plenary session
Operating floor, upgrades. Turbine building, low pressure turbine blades installation
15:30-16:30
Summary of the findings, Q&A
General discussions
16:30-17:00 17:00
Press interview: IAEA
Departure from Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP
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APPENDIX IV LIST OF DOCUMENTS PRESENTED TO THE MISSION

OUTLINE OF NISAS ACTIONS (PLENARY SESSIONS) DAY 1 01-P-NISA 01 - Current Status of the Investigation and Study Regarding Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant affected by Niitagataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake / Presented by Shigeharu Kato, Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Power, NISA 01-P-NISA 02 - Current Status of Confirmation on Seismic Safety of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power plant / Presented by Shuuji Kawahara, Director of Seismic Safety Office, Nuclear Power Licensing Division, NISA 01-P-NISA 03 - Current Status of Integrity Evaluation of the Buildings and Structures at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant/ Presented by Shuuji Kawahara, Director of Seismic Safety Office, Nuclear Power Licensing Division, NISA 01-P-NISA 04 - Current Status of Evaluation of Facility Integrity of Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant / Presented by Tetsuya Yamamoto, Director, Nuclear Power inspection Division, NISA 01-P-NISA 05 - Measures of Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency concerning the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, Affected by the Niigataken Chuetsuoki Earthquake (Interim Report) Draft , Dec 2008 / NISA DAY 5 05-PS-NISA 01 - Proposal for Future Actions GROUP 1 - SEISMIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT DAY 1 01-G1-NISA 01 - Interim Report on the Geology and Geological Structure of the Ground Surroundings the Site and on the Evaluation of the Design Basis Ground Motion, Nov 18, 2008 / NISA 01-G1-NISA 02 - Report of the Evaluation on the Integrity of Building and Structures of Unit 7, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company, after Niigata Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, Oct 23, 2008 / NISA 01-G1-JNES 01 - Evaluation on ground motion of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP at the Chuetsuoki Earthquake/ Hideaki Tsutsumi, Principal Officer, Earthquake and Tsunami Evaluation Gr. Seismic Safety Division, JNES 01-G1-TEPCO 01 - Analysis of the seismic observation record obtained during the 2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake at the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant / Presented by Hiroyuki Mizutani, Seismic Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, TEPCO DAY 2 02-G1-TEPCO 01 - Formulation of Standard Seismic Ground Motions Ss / Presented by Hiroyuki Mizutani, Seismic Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, TEPCO DAY3 03-G1-TEPCO 01 - Summary of the Report on the Geology and Geological Structure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Site and Surrounding Areas / Presented by Makoto Takao, Manager, Civil Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Assert Management Department, TEPCO 03-G1-TEPCO 02 - A plan of the Study on Probabilistic Fault Displacement Hazard Analysis / 90
Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Assert Management Department, TEPCO GROUP 2 - INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT OF THE SEISMIC RESPONSE DAY 1 01-G2-NISA 01 - Evaluation of Facility Integrity of Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Component Level) / Presented by Yukinori Maekawa, Director for Safety Examination, Nuclear Power inspection Division, NISA 01-G2-NISA 02 - Evaluation of Facility Integrity of Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Verification on Safety regarding Evaluation of System level and Fuel Loading) / Presented by Yukinori Maekawa, Director for Safety Examination, Nuclear Power inspection Division, NISA 01-G2-NISA 03 - Report of Evaluation of Facility Integrity of Unit 7 of the KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Station (Integrity of Component level), Oct 3, 2008 / NISA 01-G2-NISA 04 - Interim Report of Evaluation of Facility Integrity of Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (System function test before Fuel Loading), Nov 6, 2008 / NISA 01-G2-NISA 05 - Evaluation of the Report Written by the Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. "Damage to the Moving Blade Fork Sections of the Low Pressure Turbines of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Units 6 and 7", Sep 29, 2008 / NISA 01-G2-TEPCO 01 - Status of investigation and Evaluation of Unit 1-7 of the KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Plant / Presented by Kazuhiko Yamashita, General Manager, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Assert Management Department, TEPCO 01-G2-TEPCO 02 - Inspection and Evaluation at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 / Presented by Kazuhiko Yamashita, General manager, Niigataken Chuetsuoki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Assert Management Department, TEPCO DAY 2 02-G2-JNES 01 - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7, Seismic Response Analysis Results of Equipment and Piping Systems for the Chuetsu-oki Earthquake / Presented by Takamatsu Naotaka, Director, Equipment and System Evaluation Gr. Seismic Safety Division, JNES 02-G2-JNES 02 - Simulation on Floor Response Spectra of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Reactor Buildings at the Chuetsu-oki Earthquake / Presented by Motohashi Shohei, Assistant Director-General, Seismic Safety Division, JNES 01-G2-TEPCO 03 - Result of Seismic Response Analysis, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 / Presented by Kenji Murano, Group Manager, Seismic Integrity Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Assert Management Department, TEPCO 02-G2-TEPCO 01 - Comprehensive Evaluation of Equipment Integrity at KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 (Component Level) / Presented by Kazuyuki Nagasawa, Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Group, NCO Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO 91
02-G2-TEPCO 02 - Report on Equipment Integrity Inspections and Evaluation after Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7 (Buildings and Structure) (Summary) / Presented by Rikiro Kikuch Group Manager, Architectural Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO 02-G2-TEPCO 03 - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7, Seismic Safety Evaluation of Reactor Building / Presented by Rikiro Kikuch Group Manager, Architectural Engineering Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO DAY 3 03-G2-TEPCO 01 - Assessment on System Level of Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP / Presented by Kazuyuki Nagasawa, Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Project Group, Nuclear Asset management Department, TEPCO 03-G2-TEPCO 02 - Status of Studies and Investigation of Effects of Aging Deterioration / Presented by Kazuyuki Nagasawa, Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Project Group, Nuclear Asset management Department, TEPCO 02-G2-TEPCO 04 - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Unit 7, Seismic Re-evaluation of Safety Related Component / Presented by Kazuyuki Nagasawa, Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO 02-G2-TEPCO 05 - Upgrading Works in Unit 7 of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station / Presented by Kazuyuki Nagasawa, Deputy Manager, Equipment Improvement Project Group, Nuclear Asset management Department, TEPCO: Appendix 01-Evaluation Results of Inspections for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Unit 7 Appendix 02 - A Method of the Pipe Analysis Appendix 03 - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Unit 7, Equipment Integrity. Evaluation and Seismic Safety Evaluation of the Reactor Building (Supplement) Appendix 04 - Report Equipment Integrity Inspections and Assessments after NCO: Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Unit 7 (Intake Canal for Emergency System) DAY 4 04-G2-TEPCO 01 - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 7, Comparison of Floor Response Spectra on the R/B base mat Equipment Improvement Group, Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO 04-G2-TEPCO 02 - Measures of Disaster Prevention and Fire Protection Adopted by TEPCO Based on Lessons Learned from the Niigata Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake. TEPCO 04-G2-TEPCO 03 - Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Circulation Water Pipe, Elbow deformation. Equipment Improvement Group, NCO Earthquake Restoration Management Center, Nuclear Asset Management Department, TEPCO.
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APPENDIX V SELECTED PHOTOS

GROUP 1: SEISMIC HAZARD.
Photo 1.1. Visit to a road cut where the Southern segment of the Nagaoka Plain Western Boundary can be observed
Photo 1.2. Same general location as Photo 1.1 where the reverse fault can be observed 93
Photo 1.3. Same general location as Photo 1.1 Media interest on the visit
Photo 1.4. Visit to a possible hanging terrace near the Madonosaka Syncline
94
Photo 1.5. Observing landforms near the Madonosaka Syncline
Photo 1.6. Walking along Levelling Line 2 North of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP site
95
Photo 1.7. Observing a feature near the Madonasaka Syncline
96
GROUP 2: STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS
Photo 2.1. Underground water tank for fire fighting system (redundancy and diversity).
Photo 2.2. Fire fighting system: new installed aboveground piping.
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Photo 2.3. Cleaning of the oil contaminated soil near Unit 2 T/B
Photo 2.4. Unit 1 - Circulation Water Pipe: repair
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Photo 2.5. Main stack and exhaust duct: repair of deformed bellow and soil capacity improvement
Photo 2.6. New administrative building: Foundations of the base isolation support structures.
99
Photo 2.7. Unit 6 and 7 - Control room: Hand-rail on control panels and blocking of office equipment on wheels.
Photo 2.8. Unit 7: New piping support
100
Photo 2.9. Unit 7 - New piping support, snubber.
Photo 2.10. Unit 7 - Fuel Handling Machine upgrade
101
Photo 2.11. Unit 7 - Fuel Handling Machine, upgrade of the anti derailment system
Photo 2.12. Unit 7 - Main R/B crane, additional axial stop and reinforcement of the rail supporting beam.
102
Photo 2.13. Unit 7 - Low pressure blades installation
Photo 2.14. Unit 7 - Low pressure blades installation, detail
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APPENDIX VI IAEA PRESS RELEASE

IAEA Completes Third Mission to Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant 5 December 2008 An IAEA-led team of international experts has completed its third mission, at the invitation of the Government of Japan. This follow up mission continued to share the lessons learned from the effects of the July 2007 earthquake on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant. The mission received further evidence confirming the findings of previous missions regarding the safe performance of the plant during and after the earthquake.
The mission found that there is consensus in the scientific community about the causes of the unexpectedly large ground motions experienced at the plant site during the July 2007 earthquake and, consequently, it has been possible to identify the precautions needed to be taken in relation to possible future events. These precautions were based on extensive studies and assessments conducted by a number of specialized institutions and experts in different fields. The necessary upgrades and actions were consequently defined and are being implemented for both safety and non-safety related components at the nuclear power plant. The lessons learned from the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa experience has also contributed to the development of IAEA Safety Standards related to seismic safety. These standards are expected to be released shortly. The mission's report will be provided to the Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and will be made publicly available in January 2009.
The IAEA conducted two previous missions to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP in August 2007 and January/February 2008. The experience from recent strong seismic events and the lessons learned through the missions to Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP have led to the establishment of an International Seismic Safety Centre (ISSC) at the IAEA that is working as a focal point for seismic safety-related information about nuclear installations. Press Contacts
Press Office Division of Public Information [43-1] 2600-21273 press at iaea.org
About the IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world's foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Established as an autonomous organization under the United Nations (UN) in 1957, the IAEA carries out programmes to maximize the useful contribution of nuclear technology to society while verifying its peaceful use. NOTE TO EDITORS: For additional information visit the Press Section of the IAEA's website (http://www.iaea.org/Resources/Journalists/), or call the IAEA's Division of Public Information at (431) 260021270.
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IAEA Original English

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

REPORT ENGINEERING SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES SEISMIC SAFETY EXPERT MISSION

Tokyo and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, Japan 1-5 December 2008

REPORT ENGINEERING SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES SEISMIC SAFETY EXPERT MISSION

REPORT ENGINEERING SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES SEISMIC SAFETY EXPERT MISSION

BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE MISSION

risk at the plant. 4.

CONDUCT OF THE MISSION

Integrity Evaluation- Seismic Response Buildings and Equipment

Mr. Kentaro Morita/ Mr. A. Fukushima

MAIN FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

3.2.1. Re-evaluation of the Seismic Hazard at the Site

Seismic Response and Seismic Behaviour

3.2.4. Ground Deformations 1.

3.2.6. Fire Protection 1.

KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP UNITS 1 TO 7

Assessment Area: Finding Title:

2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION: BACKGROUND

2.2. FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP -

Fault mechanism and directivity:

1 Gal = 0.01 m/s2.

Summary of Findings and Lessons Learned (from August 2007 Mission):

In the following both aspects are discussed. -

2.1 Summary of investigations to identify the causative fault:

http://riodb02.ibase.aist.go.jp/db085/RIO-DB-SEISMIC/Sado/index_Sado.html 2.2 Summary of site area investigations: -

3.2. Site area investigations -

4.2. LESSONS LEARNED 1. -

Site area investigations:

Investigations to identify the causative fault of the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake:

5. SECOND FOLLOW-UP MISSION

KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP UNITS 1 - 7

Assessment Area: Finding Title: 2. FINDINGS -

2.1 - FINDING DESCRIPTION: BACKGROUND

2.2. FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP -

Need for strengthening of the database to decrease uncertainties:

4. FOLLOW-UP MISSION 4.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP 1.

Summary of Findings and Lessons Learned (from August 2007 Mission):

Local geological conditions.

(2) Status of the Finding: -

Item 2 Treatment of uncertainties -

(1) Summary of investigations performed by TEPCO and other specialized institutions:

(2) Status of the Finding: -

(1) Summary of investigations performed by TEPCO and other specialized institutions: -

Item 3 Characteristics of the earthquake ground motion

(2) Status of the Finding: -

Item 4 Potential for surface faulting at the site -

(1) Summary of investigations performed by TEPCO and other specialized institutions:

(2) Status of the Finding: -

Item 5 Soil failures at the site -

(1) Summary of investigations performed by TEPCO and other specialized institutions:

(2) Status of the Finding: -

More specifically, the lessons learned may be listed as follows: 1.

Ground motion characterization:

Assessment of the potential for surface faulting at the site:

Soil failures at the site:

5. SECOND FOLLOW-UP MISSION 5.1. - FINDINGS AT KASHIWAZAKI-KARIWA NPP 1. a.

lower heat flow.

Topographic and levelling surveys

Excavation of deep shafts at the site

Surveying of buildings at the site; Photogrammetric surveys

Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis

Potential for surface deformation at the site