FOREWORD

The Reaction Force Air Staff (RFAS) is a multinational staff whose primary purpose is to support the Strategic Commanders with central air expertise. The staff is responsible for deployment-related aspects of strategic and operational air planning throughout the full range of NATO operations. The key elements of this mission are to provide central air planning expertise in the fields of deployment, beddown, integration, sustainment and redeployment of NATOs High Readiness Forces (Air) and other deploying land-based air assets. This handbook is issued by the Reaction Force Air Staff as a reference book based on the planning considerations for Deployable Forces (Air). It is necessary to note that this is not a formally agreed NATO document. This unclassified handbook is part of our continuing efforts to provide easily referenced information for use by educational institutions and the Nations forces. NATO is currently undergoing significant changes. The implementation of the new NATO Command Structure (NCS), the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the expansion of NATO membership, the changing relationships with the European Union and many other factors are causing NATO policies and programmes to evolve at an unprecedented pace and scale. These processes will continue beyond publication of this document, which will therefore avoid speculation and concentrate on known air power concepts.

The Handbook provides a brief background on Deployable Forces (Air). It also reviews the Operational Plan development, force activation, and deployment processes. Finally, the Handbook outlines command and control principles, communication and information system (CIS) requirements, ground-based air defence (GBAD), logistics support, force protection, movements, training and evaluation. RFAS will continue to update the handbook periodically. The handbook is also located at our CRONOS web site at http://nww.rfas.nato.int/RFAS. We value your comments and solicit your suggestions for improvements. Please contact the Chief of Staff RFAS if you have any suggestions for improvements or would like to request an additional copy. Commercial: ++49 - (0) 2824 - 90 2202 Insecure Fax: ++49 - (0) 2824 - 90 2274 Secure Fax: (ID 01967) 218 - 1215 IVSN: 234 or 239 2202

Horst Martin, Lieutenant General, GEAF Director, Reaction Force Air Staff

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CONTENTS
CHAPTER
Foreword Contents 1. NATOs Graduated Readiness (Air) Forces Why High Readiness Forces are needed The High Readiness Forces HRF Essential Parameters GRF (Air) Packages 2. NATO Response Force (NRF) Capability Guiding Principals NRF Missions NRF Structure 3. NATO Force Activation Political/Military Decision Making 4. Operation Planning Planning Tools Operational Planning Principles The Operational Planning Process (OPP) Stages of the OPP 5. DF(A) Deployment Planning 6. DF(A) Command And Control 7. Communication And Information Systems CIS for deployed DF(A) DF(A) Resource Planning

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8. Ground Based Air Defence SHORAD SAM 9. Force Protection Active Defence Passive Defence Recuperation 10. Logistics Multinational Logistic Concepts Logistics Doctrine and Procedures Logistics Command and Control Logistic Phases Logistic Aspects 11. Movement And Transportation (M&T) Movement And Transportation Principles NATO Structure for M&T Sequence of M&T Planning Air Transport Sea Transport Inland Surface Transport 12. Air To Air Refuelling 13. Training, Exercise & Evaluation Training Exercise Evaluation 14. Reaction Force Air Staff Background Mission Organisation

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Annex: A. Abbreviations

CHAPTER 1
NATOS GRADUATED READINESS (AIR) FORCES
WHY HIGH READINESS FORCES ARE NEEDED 0101. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. In spite of some positive developments in recent years, the security of the Alliance remains subject to uncertainties and to a wide variety of risks that can suddenly develop into a crisis. At present, the risks

NATO developed and introduced the NATO Response Force to meet future mission requirements.

to NATO are multifaceted and less predictable in nature and location than previously. The use of asymmetric warfare in the form of terrorist attacks including the use of weapons of mass destruction is an emerging risk to NATO and the rest of the world.

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0102. In order to reflect the requirements of the full spectrum of Alliance missions, a combination of In-Place Forces (IPF) and Headquarters (HQs), and a pool of Deployable Forces (DF) and HQs are required. These forces and HQs must have the necessary flexibility for effective planning and force generation/activation and be available at graduated levels of readiness. Asymmetric threats may require the Alliance to engage in combat operations varying in intensity. Flexible employment of both rapidly deployable multinational forces and reinforcement forces is necessary, to counter this type of aggression. 0103. Following unilateral force reductions by nations, NATO now needs a higher degree of multinationality in order to field a balanced, appropriate force in a crisis area that may be outside NATOs area of responsibility. Therefore, mobile, flexible and highly responsive multinational forces at a high readiness are required.

NATO requires mobile, flexible and highly responsive multinational forces.

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0104. The guidance provided by the Military Committee foresees that the architecture and the posture of Allies forces must be built on the strengths of different national structures. These forces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of collective defence and other Alliance missions and held at appropriate and specified graduated readiness. The aim is to achieve an optimum balance between forces at high readiness, forces at different levels of lower readiness and a longer-term build-up and augmentation capability. With the introduction and development of the NATO Response Force (NRF) following the Prague Summit in 2002, a new higher readiness status for NATO forces was created that is evolving to meet future mission requirements. 0105. The key to NATO mission success is force availability, sustainability and multinationality. To ensure availability, NATO forces must be generated quickly and be mission ready and deployable. As part of the quick generation process, NATOs Readiness Forces form a single set of Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF). The GRF consists of High Readiness Forces (HRF) and Forces of Lower

The key to NATO mission success is force availability, sustainability and multinationality.

Readiness (FLR). Nations allocate air assets to the different Readiness categories. They are further categorised into Deployable Forces (DF), capable of the entire spectrum of missions and operations, and the In-Place Forces (IPF), designated to operate within a specific geographical area of the Alliance predominantly 1-3

Deployable forces meet the full range of NATO missions.

for Article 5 operations. Longer Term Build-up Forces (LTBF) provide an augmentation capability and a force posture to cope with the remote scenario of large-scale air operations for Article 5 collective defence. Developed independently of the GRF structure, the NRF air components will consist of designated units that meet specified criteria similar to HRF/DF concepts during their period of NRF service. When required for an Article 5 operation or a non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation (CRO), the selected force structure from the pool of HRF will be identified, tailored, packaged and made available upon Transfer of Authority (TOA), from the Sending Nation (SN) to the appropriate NATO commander. 0106. This handbook concentrates on how deployable HRF(Air) (HRF(A)) are presently defined and employed in the NATO Force Structure (NFS) and how they relate their functions to the FLR and LTBF. First we look at the emerging NRF capability. Then we follow with the more traditional force activation processes, operational and deployment planning, and how NATO conducts Command and Control of its forces to include the required Communication and 1-4

Information Systems (CIS). We conclude the handbook by discussing the specific mission capabilities of Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD), Force Protection (FP), Logistics, Movement & Transportation, Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), and Training, Exercises and Evaluations. THE HIGH READINESS FORCES 0107. HRF are land, air and maritime forces that are designated to be available on short notice in order to react as quickly as necessary to a collective defence or non-Article 5 CRO.

High Readiness Forces have to react and deploy quickly.

HRF ESSENTIAL PARAMETERS 0108. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) can call upon HRF to respond very quickly to meet an Article 5 Collective Defence operation anywhere in the NATO area of interest. HRF can also be tasked to support non-Article 5 CROs. The implementation method that SACEUR would use for such activation is detailed at Chapter 2. The three essential parameters that provide the framework 1-5

of the NFS are: Types of Forces, Readiness of Forces and Designation of Forces.

Force capability packages will be developed based on mission and type of operation.

0109. Types of Forces. Based on the requirement to conduct both Article 5 operations and non-Article 5 CROs, High Readiness HQs/ Forces can be grouped into two types that reflect their availability to the NATO commander and, in particular, their ability to be deployed: a. Deployable Forces are available for the full range of NATO missions, fully deployable throughout Alliance territory and beyond, composed of primarily multinational HQs and forces and held at the appropriate readiness level. b. In-Place Forces are predominantly HQs and forces required for collective defence within or near the territory of the nation providing them. Therefore, IPF need not be fully deployable but are also held at appropriate readiness levels. With the acquisition of new equipment, there will be an increase in reach-back capabilities, 1-6

therefore the value of IPF HQs should improve for non-Article 5 out-of-area operations. 0110. Readiness of Forces. This parameter defines the period of time measured from an initiation order to the moment when the HQ or unit is ready to perform its task, or is ready to deploy from its peacetime location. Readiness Levels, Ranges and Categories further clarify Readiness of Forces. Readiness Levels were described earlier as HRF, FLR and LTBF. The time range that all HRF, FLR or LTBF must meet is given by Readiness Ranges. The Readiness Category breaks down the HQs and forces into more refined time ranges for planning purposes. 0111. Force Designation. The Force Designation Category (FDC) is used to describe the degree of assurance with respect to the availability that nations are willing to declare for their forces. The FDC provides NATO commanders and planners with as much assurance as possible of the availability of NFS HQs and forces for any NATO operation. The FDCs are broken into four categories: a. NATO Command Forces. Forces/HQs which nations have already placed under operational command (OPCOM) or the operational control (OPCON) of the NATO commander. b. NATO Assigned Forces. Forces/HQs which nations agree to place under the OPCOM/OPCON of a NATO commander within an agreed readiness time. c. NATO Earmarked Forces. Forces/HQs which nations intend to place under OPCOM/OPCON of a NATO commander at some future time. d. Other Forces for NATO. Forces/HQs which might be placed under the OPCOM/OPCON of a NATO commander.

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GRF (AIR) PACKAGES 0112. The composition and size of force capability packages will be variable, based on the nature of the situation creating the requirement (Article 5 or non-Article 5 CROs), and inherently the mission and type of operation. As a reference, air packages would normally include Command and Control (C2), Air Combat, Special Operations Forces, Electronic Warfare (EW), Support Jamming (SJ), Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), Reconnaissance, Surveillance Target Acquisition (RSTA), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) and Tactical Airlift. 0113. Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) elements, such as Logistics, Communications & Information Systems, Medical, Security, Strategic Airlift, etc, should also be available and be maintained on the same readiness level as their supported unit. The arrangements for this support are generally a responsibility of the individual Sending Nations (SN). 0114. NATOs concept for modular Response Forces will draw on the operational capabilities provided through the GRF concept. They also will be mission-tailored, however, due to the envisioned deployment and employment concept, force packaging will have to be more flexible and rapid. The NRF will consist of air, land and maritime components brought together for a joint and combined campaign of limited duration. 0115. Also, with the realisation of NATO out-of-area (OOA) operations in recent years, the necessity to tailor operations to consider concerns and participation by non-NATO members has become more evident. Therefore, as the situation warrants, force packages may be developed that include Partnership and other nonNATO Nation participation.

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CHAPTER 2
NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF) CAPABILITY
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 0201. A key element of the NRF is the ability to move quickly to whatever areas in the world where NATO influence may be required. NATOs operations and interests have been continuing to extend beyond typical Cold War era boundaries. Airpower with its rapid response, range and diversity of capabilities, will be a crucial component to NRF mission success. To attain the quick responsiveness required in todays asymmetric threat environment, projecting forces will be required on even shorter notice than ever before. This responsiveness will be provided by the rotation of forces to ensure the burden is shared and that forces are trained and ready for action at a moments notice. The ability to deploy a capable NRF on short notice could act as a deterrent and aid in the quick resolution of an emerging crisis.

NRF air missions include tactical air lift.

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0202. Another key element of the NRF is its flexibility. The NRF will be capable of performing some missions on its own as well as participating in an operation as part of a larger force. It will be limited in size, composition and capabilities to ensure responsiveness, but can also be tailored once a specific operation has been identified. The NRF consists of only a limited selected group of NATO forces and other units can be tasked to expand force packages. 0203. Command and Control of the NRF is based on the principles and structures described in the NATO Force Structure (NFS), in the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and in the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. They result in a joint NRF C2 capability embedded in NATOs 3-level C2 structures. When the NRF HQs are deployed, it will be carried out in accordance with the CJTF HQ concept. 0204. Another key contribution of the NRF concept is the influence it will have to be a catalyst for transformation of capabilities in the Alliance. To reach the predetermined standards of military capability and interoperability, nations wishing to contribute forces to the NRF will need to update their capabilities in order to efficiently integrate their operations with the entire NRF package. In addition, it will provide a forum for evaluation of transformational concepts. NRF MISSIONS 0205. The NRF missions will mirror the requirements of rapid response in the initial phase of a crisis situation. Some types of missions which the NRF may execute include: a. A stand-alone force for crisis response.

b. An initial entry force into a Joint Operation Area (JOA) to include a hostile environment without Host Nation Support (HNS). c. A demonstrative force to show the resolve of member nations. 2-2

0206. NRF (Air) Missions. The NRF(A) component will provide a rapidly deployable capability able to conduct the appropriate air tasks to include the use of precision-guided munitions. NRF air missions include Air Defence, Offensive Counter Air, Air Reconnaissance, SEAD/SJ, Close Air Support, Air Interdiction, CSAR, Airborne Early Warning, Tactical Airlift, AAR and Special Operations.

Support elements should be maintained at the same readiness level as their supported unit.

NRF STRUCTURE 0207. The NRF HQs and forces will not be a standing force. Both will be periodically committed by nations during NRF Generation Conferences to meet the Military Committee (MC) approved Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). Once trained and certified as combat ready and capable of deploying, HQs and forces will be placed on Stand-by and will be ready to deploy at very short notice. All NRF forces should be capable of operating in a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment.

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0208. Joint Force Command (JFC). The CJTF HQ capabilities are drawn on a rotational basis from the JFC HQs/JHQ at the operational level of command of the NCS. The rapid deployment capability requires a Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) HQ staff element. This staff element will offer a standing capability to deploy forward on short notice and should be able to cover J1 through J9 disciplines. It will be critical to the success of the NRF capability. Subordinate to the DJTF, there will be component command HQs tailored to the mission. For Air, it will be a CJFACC with an embedded Air Operations Centre (AOC).

Airpower with its rapid response is a crucial component to NRF mission success.

0209. Whilst the NRF capability is the worst-case scenario with regard to time available to respond, other capabilities must be maintained for those occasions where sufficient time is available to plan a full military operation in response to an emerging threat to NATO interests. The following chapters address the legacy capabilities within NATO to respond to the traditional threats envisaged throughout the recent past.

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CHAPTER 3
NATO FORCE ACTIVATION
POLITICAL/MILITARY DECISION MAKING 0301. In order to set the stage for NATO involvement in military action, NATO must activate the military forces provided by the nations. Three different Directives from the political level are required at three critical stages: a. Initiating Directive. The Initiating Directive is issued by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to SACEUR. It contains planning guidance and initiates the process leading to the analysis of several response options, until one or more of them is chosen in response to the situation. Once an option is chosen, it will normally be refined into a Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

The Initiating Directive issued by the NAC will lead to the development of a Concept of Operations.

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b. Force Activation Directive. Once the CONOPS is approved, the NAC issues the Force Activation Directive (FAD), which directs SACEUR to conduct the force activation process. Upon receipt of the FAD, SACEUR commences the activation process through an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) to JFCs/JHQ and the Nations informing them that a force is required. The type and scale of forces and capabilities required are provided in the form of a provisional Statement of Requirements (SOR) issued together with the ACTWARN. The nations respond to these requirements with informal force offers. These offers will be properly discussed and balanced at a Force Generation Conference culminating in the development of a draft SOR. After completion of the draft SOR, SACEUR issues the Activation Request (ACTREQ) to nations, asking for the formal commitment of forces, which nations will confirm in the Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) message. Eventual force shortfalls or excesses are detected and corrected in a Force Balancing Conference, until a final set of forces is decided. c. Execution Directive. Once the Operation Plan (OPLAN) is approved by the NAC and the final force list is released, the NAC will release the Execution Directive. Based on that Directive, SACEUR issues the Activation Order (ACTORD) to all participating nations, which initiates the movement of the national forces to the Theatre of Operations. To ensure the properly co-ordinated intratheatre movement of forces, including their transit to designated staging or beddown locations, nations will normally authorise TOA of these forces to SACEUR when operationally ready in theatre. 0302. In order for NATO to get to the force activation stage, however, much preparation is required. Operational Planning for NATO military action is one of the key initial functions that must be carried out to ensure successful mission accomplishment.

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CHAPTER 4
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
0401. Operational Planning is conducted for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from routine training and exercises to an actual aggression on NATO territory. Although military commanders are expected to develop prudent military planning in response to possible situations, the ultimate responsibility for initiating planning within NATO rests with NATOs political leadership, the NAC. Even though the Operational Planning Process in NATO is based upon the same concepts as found in national doctrines, certain aspects of it are different since NATO is an Alliance of nations, and military forces are made available to NATO through the contributions by the nations in the force generation and activation process. In addition, current changes in the NCS and creation of the NRF may alter command relationships and provide new states of readiness factors for selected forces, but the basics of operational planning remain valid.

Operational Planning will focus on the mission, the desired end states and the criteria for success.

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PLANNING TOOLS 0402. The NATO military commanders planning tools include the following: a. Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). The GOP is the basic reference document for NATO military planning staffs to assist in the development of all operational plans: Contingency Plans (COPs), Standing Defence Plans (SDPs), Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Support Plans (SUPLANs). It addresses all aspects of an operational plan and provides guidance on the planning factors to be taken into consideration during the development of a plan. It also specifies the standard structure and content of an operational plan. b. Functional Planning Guides (FPG). The FPG provide specific guidance to air, land and maritime NATO military planning staffs on the planning factors to be taken into consideration during the development of a joint operational plan to optimise the synergistic effects of the synchronised application of the combined capabilities inherent in a joint force. FPG also provide function-specific guidance on matters such as airspace and waterspace management, etc. c. Regional Planning Guides (RPG). The RPG provide specific guidance to NATO military planning staffs on particular regional planning factors to be taken into consideration during the development of an operational plan. This includes factors such as climate, geography, oceanography, terrain, etc.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING PRINCIPLES 0403. The Bi-SC GOP provides Commanders and their staffs with the framework for Operational Planning. The broad principles guiding planning within ACO are set out below.

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0404. General. Operational planning demands that a commander and his staff answer four questions: a. Which military conditions must be attained to achieve the strategic and operational objectives? b. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions? c. How should military resources be applied to best accomplish that sequence of actions? d. Are the associated risks acceptable?

The Planning process enables the staff to translate strategic political objectives into an appropriate military plan.

0405. Planning Focus. Planners should focus on: a. b. The mission. Desired end states and the criteria for success. 4-3

c. d. e. f. g. h.

Centres of Gravity (COG). Unity of Command. Unity of Effort. Flexibility. Sustainability. Ensuring that the plan serves as a sound basis for subordinates planning.

Operational Planning determines the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks.

0406. Operational Design. Proper operational planning demands a thorough understanding of the concepts and elements of operational design. Planners must understand and apply concepts such as Centres of Gravity, decisive points, etc., and incorporate the principles of war during the planning phase. Well considered operational design will, from the outset, enhance the effectiveness and chances of success of any plan during execution. 4-4

THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS 0407. The Operational Planning Process (OPP) is a co-ordinated staff process to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks or of planning for possible future tasks. The OPP is applicable to any Strategic, Operational or Tactical HQ conducting planning for any theatre, for any kind of plan and with any size of force. Whereas the OPP is applicable for both Advanced and Crisis Response Planning, Advance Planning is usually conducted with more time available to complete the process. Crisis Response Planning, due to time constraints, normally demands an accelerated use of the process.

The emerging situation may demand an accelerated Crisis Response Plan.

0408. The OPP is used to produce plans to reach the desired endstate and to achieve the mission that has been assigned to a commander. The objectives of the OPP are to: a. Standardise the planning process within the Alliance.

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b.

Ensure strategic/political control is effected during the development of the plan. Enable the staff to translate strategic political objectives, provided in an Initiating Directive, into appropriate military objectives. Enable commanders to guide the development of the plan. Maximise the staffs creative thinking and associated thought processes. Evaluate the products of the planning process.

c.

d.

e.

f.

STAGES OF THE OPP 0409. The OPP consists of five stages, leading from the initiation of planning through to plan review. The process is essentially the responsibility of the commander and his planning team and consists of a deductive reasoning process, starting from the known facts and moving to specific options. STAGE I - OPP INITIATION 0410. Operational Planning may be initiated at varying levels in response to either political or military events. In addition, commanders may initiate the planning process in recognition of changing circumstances. The initiation phase begins when the task is received and, as the name implies, initiates the planning. Normally it starts with the Initiating Directive. During this stage of the process, the Initiating Directive is received, the Operations Planning Group (OPG) is formed and the necessary information is gathered.

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STAGE II - OPP ORIENTATION 0411. On receipt of the Initiating Directive, the Commander will determine exactly what has to be accomplished. Depending on the situation, the initiation may result from a directive or a verbal briefing from the command group anticipating a future requirement. Regardless, the end-state(s) must be clearly expressed and the higher commanders intent must be clearly understood for effective planning to commence. The Orientation Stage is summarised in Figure 4-1. 0412. The product of the Orientation Stage is the Commanders Planning Guidance, a formal document, which may serve as an Initiating Directive to start further planning by his staff and subordinate HQ(s).

STAGE III - CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 0413. Concept Development begins with a review of the Commanders Planning Guidance, produced in the previous stage. This provides the necessary direction and guidance to the planning staff to conduct a staff analysis and subsequently shapes the development of the Courses of Action (COAs). A COA is a possible option open to the commander that would accomplish the mission. It is initially stated in broad terms, with further details determined during the actual COA analysis. Additionally, it provides a framework for the necessary staff analysis that must consider all factors and deductions to determine the viability of the various options. The final product of this planning stage is a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) based on a single COA chosen by the Commander. The Concept Development Stage is summarised in Figure 4-2.

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STAGE IV - PLAN DEVELOPMENT 0414. An approved plan will be the final product of the OPP. The development of the plan is based on the approved CONOPS. If major changes to the CONOPS are introduced during Plan Development, it may be necessary for planners to return to an earlier stage of the OPP. There must be a continuous exchange of information between the various staff branches subordinate commands. It is important at the Plan Development Stage to ensure that potential shortfalls are identified and that the plan addresses their resolution. The Plan Development Stage is summarised in Figure 4-3.

Changes in the situation may result in the revision of the plans at all levels.

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STAGE V - PLAN REVIEW 0415. During an operation there will often be changes in the situation, which may necessitate the review of a plan, or higher authority may direct it. The review should focus on the new threat, availability/ flow of forces, suitability of contingency plans, requirement for additional branch plans, etc. Once the review is complete, the Commander should be briefed, along with any recommendations for action, to deal with the changed situation. The Plan Review Stage is summarised in Figure 4-4. 0416. Review of a COP or OPLAN must occur whenever a major change has occurred. It must be kept in mind that any major changes or amendments to the plan will require renewed approval.

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4-10 Figure 4-1

4-11 Figure 4-2

4-12 Figure 4-3

4-13 Figure 4-4

CHAPTER 5
DF(A) DEPLOYMENT PLANNING
0501. The Air Component Commanders (ACC) CONOPS is paramount for DF(A) deployment planning. Thereafter, the Plan Development stage of the Operational Planning Process takes consideration of: a. Base Availability. Host Nation (HN) or other nation basing, Main Operating Bases (MOB), Deployment Operating Bases (DOB) or civil airfields, en-route bases, and Ports of Debarkation (POD). b. Agreements. Bi-lateral basing and HN support agreements.

c. Contingency Operation Plan Basing. Other COP basing or historical deployments.

Ports of debarkation options must be considered during the Operational Planning Process.

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d. Restrictions. National constraints and national peacetime restrictions. e. Collocation. Collocation of national assets, if possible; if not, basing of similar assets together. f. Air and Sea Ports of Debarkation (APODs/SPODs). Minimising the number of Ports of Debarkation (PODs) a single nation must use. g. Infrastructure. Avoid a basing requirement that could cause a heavy infrastructure build-up. 0502. DF(A) units will be planned for deployment to the most suitable locations. For potential crises in NATOs area of interest, basing options may be limited in choice and lacking in facilities.

During Out-of-Area missions basing options may be limited in choice and less suitable.

0503. As a quick reference for the screening of DF(A) basing during operational planning, RFAS has developed special criteria to standardize the assets basing requirements for Initial Operational Capability. Because of the high readiness of NRF and HRF(A) units, some requirements have to be met by facilities that are in place or 5-2

that are readily available from local sources, while others may be met by assets that are deployed into theatre. These criteria, coupled with the associated basing considerations, provide a 90% deployment solution.

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CHAPTER 6
DF(A) COMMAND AND CONTROL
0601. Deployed air units will be integrated into either the in-place NATO regional command and control structure at the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) level or into the CJTF/ NRF structure at the Combined Joint Forces Air Component Command (CJFACC) level, for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. Figure 6-1 compares the operational relationships between the NATO Command structure and the CJTF/NRF structure used for non-Article 5 operations.

Deployed units will be integrated into the existing command and control structure.

0602. Upon arrival of air assets in-theatre and when operationally ready, TOA will occur and Operational Command (OPCOM) and/ or Operational Control (OPCON) will be transferred to SACEUR by the nations. SACEUR will then delegate OPCON of these assets to the deployed Joint Force Commander (JFC), who in turn will decide on further delegations of C2 to the appropriate CJFACC. 6-1

0603. The CJFACC will employ the deployed air assets, exercising command and control over them via the C2 structure. If considered necessary, liaison elements of nations providing air units can be established at appropriate command levels. If the in-place C2 facilities are inadequate in the crisis area, enhancement using deployable facilities may be appropriate. Following the introduction of the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) (scheduled for 2007), a Deployable ACCS Component (DAC) comprised of a Deployable Combined Air Operations Centre (DCAOC) and supporting elements will be made available. The CONOPS for the DCAOC is under development. 0604. Deployable air C2 facilities are required to meet air asset C2 requirements prior to the implementation of ACCS. Therefore a DAC Working Group was created with the support of nations and the ACCs. It was tasked to identify available deployable elements and to define the policy for their use. The resulting SHAPE Operational Employment Sub-Concept for the SACEUR-Assigned Deployable ACCS defines the need for the four building blocks equating to elements of the ACCS structure. This policy identifies potential assets available from NATO and national resources including, for example, the HRF(A) Tactical Air Control Squadrons (TACSs).

Deployable air C2 facilities include assets from NATO and national resources.

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0605. Effective C2 of deployed air units depends on the provision of reliable, secure Communications and Information Systems (CIS). The next chapter deals with CIS for C2 and supporting functions.

Effective C2 of deployed air units depends on the provision of reliable and secure CIS.

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6-4 Figure 6-1

6-5 Figure 6-2

CHAPTER 7
COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
CIS FOR DF(A) 0701. Provision of appropriate CIS for deployed air units is a mission critical area. The NATO Deployable CIS Concept (DCC) identifies the NATO information transfer requirement for deployed air elements. This includes the need for access to the NATO Wide Area Network core services, and air command and control and other functional services. Deployed air elements may also require CIS access back to their parent nations for the purposes of national command, logistics or administration.

Provision of appropriate CIS is mission critical for deployed air units.

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0702. Responsibility for the provision of the CIS for deployed air elements falls to the following three agencies: a. NATO. NATO is responsible for the provision of the CIS required to support the NATO C2 of deployed air elements down to the highest national or multinational HQ, which will normally be the Combined Air Operations Centre. Wherever possible, existing NATO and national CIS infrastructure will be used, but where this is inadequate, system enhancement may be achieved using NATO or national deployable assets. The provision of CIS services from the CAOC to the Deployed Operating Base (DOB) will normally also be provided by NATO. b. Sending Nations. The SN are responsible for the provision of internal CIS within the deployed element and for any required rearlink communications to the parent nation. To eliminate overlap/ duplication, sharing of connectivity to meet NATO and national requirements will be co-ordinated wherever possible. c. Host Nation. The HN is responsible for providing access to local commercial tele-communications facilities and to their national military systems in order to facilitate the provision of NATO CIS services. The Host Nation may also provide CIS services for their use or other Sending Nations use under a bilateral or multinational Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU). 0703. As noted in Chapter 6, additional deployable air C2 elements may be required to support deployed air units. NATO is responsible for providing CIS services to these deployed elements in accordance with STANAG 5048 where higher formations provide connectivity to the lower formation. 0704. Common NATO-wide distributed CIS are required by deployed air elements to meet the needs of C2, battle management and Intelligence, as well as for a number of support areas. Such elements will, in due course, be provided under the ACCS and ACE Automated Command, Control and Information System (ACCIS) programmes. 7-2

In the interim, a variety of prototype systems will be used on an ad hoc basis.

NATO is responsible for the provision of CIS required to support the C2 of deployed forces.

0705. Improvements to the static infrastructure to meet DF requirements are being implemented by NATO. Prior to project completion, increased reliance on the use of deployable CIS facilities will be necessary for in-area as well as OOA applications. Some deployable NATO CIS equipment is currently available, and further packages are in the procurement process. Their usage will be in accordance with the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). To meet specific deployment needs, particularly during the build-up of the Force Goals, nations have been requested through the DPQ process to assign deployable CIS facilities to deployable air units. In addition, NATO is working with Partnership nations to enhance their CIS interoperability with NATO for improving operations in a wide spectrum of contingencies.

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DF(A) RESOURCE PLANNING 0706. DF(A) CIS planning is co-ordinated at a variety of levels. The design and provision of CIS facilities within NATO is a joint service function, and hence the prime co-ordinating and controlling staff for the development of an operational or exercise CIS plan is that of the JFC or CJTF Commander. Air CIS requirements will be identified by the staff of the Air Component Commander, in association with RFAS and the deploying nations. Any CIS shortfalls will be identified in the plan and passed through the chain of command to SHAPE J6 and the NATO CIS Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA). Provision of additional resources in support of deployed units will be co-ordinated with SHAPE J5/Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) and, for deployable air aspects with RFAS. CIS resources can be made available either by re-allocation of existing assets, by allocation of deployable NATO CIS Contingency Assets Pool (NCCAP), by the use of national deployable assets (e.g. DF(A) assigned equipment), by renting commercial facilities on an ad hoc basis, or by NATO emergency or urgent procurement. Use of NCCAP facilities will be co-ordinated/ de-conflicted by SHAPE J6/NACOSA in association with J5 / CJPS and RFAS. NACOSA will co-ordinate the use of, and access to, the NATO CIS infrastructure. 0707. The use of common CIS standards by NATO and the nations is of paramount importance if the required flexible usage of DF(A) elements is to be achieved. Nations should utilise NATO recommended digital standards as laid down by the Consultative Committee on International Telephone and Telegraphy (CCITT) and in accordance with International Standards Organisation/Open System Interconnection principles for their internal CIS. Where this is not possible, SN and HN are responsible for providing interfaces to NATO systems in accordance with NATO Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs).

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CHAPTER 8
GROUND BASED AIR DEFENCE
0801. To support a JFC or a CJTF Commander in the completion of his mission, it may be necessary to reinforce a Region or Theatre with Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD). The spectrum of NATO GBAD systems varies from basic Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) and Manual Portable Air Defence (MANPAD) through modern Radar Guided and Controlled Short-Range Air Defence (SHORAD) systems. In order to be able to defend DF and high value assets or populated areas against ballistic or aerodynamic missile threats, sophisticated Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems capable of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) are in the inventory of some NATO nations. When special system expertise is not available within the region/theatre or when deploying OOA, the deployment of GBAD units requires particularly careful planning and co-ordination. The different roles of GBAD in the Integrated Extended Air Defence Structure (IEADS) and the demanding requirements for automated

Some surface to air missile systems are capable of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).

8-1

C2/EW for these systems must be taken into consideration.

SHORAD units will protect specific high value locations or assets.

0802. The receiving Air Component Commander is responsible to integrate deployed GBAD reinforcements into an Integrated Extended Air Defence System. GBAD units can be deployed either to augment and enhance the existing Regional Air Defence (AD) (Article 5) or to build, together with other systems, a constructive Air Defence Capability to fulfil the CJTF Commanders mission for OOA operations. They will be employed to defend high-value military and civil assets at specific geographic locations against air attacks, or attacks with ballistic or aerodynamic missiles. The introduction of modern GBAD units has reduced the clear distinction between the systems with regard to range and altitude and their specific role. In addition it provides a capability against specific ballistic/ aerodynamic missile threats.

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GBAD roles can be identified as follows: a. SHORAD. Due to the nature of their task, these units will normally be employed in a point defence role to protect specific high value locations or assets under local command and adhere to regional standard airspace co-ordination rules. SHORAD units can also be employed within a GBAD cluster and be used as gap fillers to enhance the overall capability of the AD. b. SAM. SAM units, being an integral part of the IEADS, are primarily employed in an area defence role and are mostly structured in clusters. They contribute to regional AD in order to provide general theatre low/medium to high altitude coverage, and protection to

SAM units are primarily employed in an area defence role.

designated high-risk areas. Under exceptional circumstances, SAM units can be employed in a Point Defence Role. SAM units can be included in the main body of DF(A). In those circumstances where a ballistic missile threat exists, deployment of TMD-capable GBAD units, as part of the deployed forces, will be required.

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GBAD units will be deployed to build, with other systems, a constructive Air Defence Capability.

When possible, GBAD units in an Area Defence and/or TMD Role are to be supplemented by ground-based, airborne and space-based sensors and additional Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) facilities. Developments in TMD and continuing interconnectivity improvements will, however, allow for stand-alone employments. 0803. GBAD units, especially SAM systems in an AD Role, must also be able to operate in close co-ordination with ground / sea-based forces when employed in a multi-service environment. C2 arrangements are developed to maximise effectiveness of IEADS and safety to allied forces.

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CHAPTER 9
FORCE PROTECTION
0901. Force Protection (FP) is defined as all measures taken and means used to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, so as to preserve the freedom of action and operational effectiveness of a force. The generic title of FP covers the functions of Active Defence, Passive Defence and Recuperation in both conventional and NBC environments. For DF(A), the increased possibility of rapid deployment to forward bases in much more volatile threat/risk areas only serves to reinforce the continued importance of protecting air forces on the ground.

DF(A) units should have organic FP capabilities for deployed operations.

0902. This chapter gives an outline of FP arrangements for DF units to ensure that the FP dimension to deployed operations is properly considered, prior to and in the planning phase, thus allowing FP requirements and capabilities to be assessed and fully satisfied. 9-1

As FP facilities may be provided by IPF, by one or more of the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN), or by a combination of both, contributions must be carefully coordinated to ensure comprehensive provision without duplication of effort.

Active Defence forces protect deployed air forces against ground and low-level air attacks.

ACTIVE DEFENCE 0903. Active Defence comprises the measures necessary to prevent an enemy from successfully attacking a unit; it includes the physical defence of a unit against ground and low-level air attack. a. Active Ground Defence. The active ground defence concept seeks to counter the threat of terrorist and conventional (including Special Forces) attack by a layered defence which includes control of entry measures, point defence of vital assets, on- and offbase patrolling and the domination of vital ground thus denying a potential enemy the freedom of movement required to operate successfully. Active ground defence encompasses protection from 9-2

close (i.e., direct attack by small arms, grenade or improvised explosive device) and stand-off attack (i.e., mortar, sniper, heavy machine gun or MANPAD) and thus needs to extend beyond the perimeter of an airbase into the area from which attacks could be mounted. This area is deemed the Ground Defence Area. A high degree of coordination and cooperation is required between the airbase ground defence commander and the local military commander, who will normally have primacy for defence arrangements of the whole area in which the airbase is located. b. Low Level Air Defence. Low level air defence will be deployed to engage targets at distances beyond their effective range of weapon release; these targets may include manned aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and missiles.

Active Defence prevents an enemy from successfully attacking a unit.

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PASSIVE DEFENCE 0904. Passive Defence consists of those measures necessary to minimise the effects of enemy air and/or ground attack; it includes the physical defence and protection of personnel and essential equipment and all NBC defence aspects. Components of passive defence include redundancy of key facilities, physical protection measures (such as sandbagging and revetment), sheltering of critical assets, Camouflage, Concealment and Deception (CCD), and all NBC defence measures.

Force Protection covers conventional and NBC environments.

RECUPERATION 0905. Recuperation comprises the measures necessary for the recovery of a unit from the effects of enemy attack it includes the functions of Post-Attack Reconnaissance (PAR), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Airfield Damage Repair (ADR), Fire Fighting and Casualty Care.

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Handling and final disposal of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) is a major recuperation activity.

Further definitions of recuperation activities are included below: a. PAR. The detection, identification and location/plotting of mission inhibiting damage or hazards to enable the rapid execution of damage repair functions. PAR comprises NBC Reconnaissance (NBCR), Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR) and Airfield Damage Repair Reconnaissance (ADRR). (1) NBC Reconnaissance. Consists of the detection, location, marking, identification and reporting of NBC hazards. (2) Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance. The investigation, detection, location, marking, initial identification and reporting of suspected Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). (3) Airfield Damage Repair Reconnaissance. The detection, location, initial assessment and reporting of damage to airfield operational flying support capability. 9-5

b. EOD encompasses the detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). c. ADR comprises the measures necessary to restore an airfield operational flying support capability including the Repair of Aircraft Operating Surfaces (RAOS) and the Restoration of Essential Services and Facilities (RESF). 0906. DF(A) units should have organic FP capabilities for deployed operations to enable them to operate from their assigned functional area on a deployment base with minimal support from IPF or other TCN forces. They should be capable of carrying out the following FP activities: a. b. Warning, alerting and controlling all FP functions. Providing point protection and control of entry to their vital assets. Concealment and dispersal of their equipment. Providing immediate casualty care. Fighting fires with local first aid fire fighting extinguishers. Carrying out PAR, EOR and NBCR in their designated area of operation. Implementing individual NBC protective measures. Decontaminating critical equipment unique to their unit.

c. d. e.

f.

g. h.

Where possible, DF(A) units should deploy with infantry-trained manpower that can be used to supplement HN defence forces. 9-6

0907. Unity of FP planning and C2 arrangements on a multinational deployment base will be an essential element of successful employment of DF(A). Even well developed IPF facilities may be overwhelmed by the demands of a DF(A) operation and thus a TCN may be required to take the lead on FP, especially in providing integrated FP C2. Moreover, there is a high probability that DF(A) units may have to operate from bases where existing FP measures are inadequate, especially when operating away from NATO infrastructure. In such cases, TCNs will be required to provide the full range of FP measures to ensure the survivability of their deployed units. Accordingly, nations should retain sufficient deployable FP capability, covering the full spectrum, at the same readiness as their DF(A) units.

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CHAPTER 10
LOGISTICS
1001. Multinational logistics support principles and policies state that national and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for the logistics support of NATOs multinational operations. Nations must ensure the provision of logistic resources to strategically deploy and sustain their own forces in peace, crisis and war. Non-NATO nations should be integrated into the force generation process for non-Article 5 operations at the earliest opportunity. Logistics capabilities required should be identified within the force planning process and the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). 1002. Multinational logistics for DF(A) is based upon interoperability, standardisation and mutual support and is heavily dependent upon Host Nation Support. Support at the deployment base may be multilateral, while the support at the theatre level may be both multilateral and, most probably, joint-Service oriented. The current Deployed Force Concept emphasises the importance of co-operation, co-ordination and the efficient use of limited resources. The evolution of the NATO Response Force will take these concepts and develop them further. 1003. DF(A) units deploying to well-equipped locations within NATO should be provided with as high a degree of logistics support from the HN as possible. Deployments to less well-equipped bases, or to locations outside NATO, where not all Support Service is available, either militarily or commercially, may require nations to provide deployable assets to meet any shortfalls. Deployed units, with their high readiness requirements, are likely to be very dependent on inplace support and services. To support rapid deployment of combat aircraft, en-route bases with Aircraft Cross-Servicing (ACS) capabilities are evaluated and then nominated to support the deployment, rotation and redeployment of aircraft packages. 10-1

Nations must ensure the provision of logistic resources for deployed forces.

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC CONCEPTS 1004. Multinational logistics is a tool, which, depending on the operational requirements, the level of interoperability of the systems, and the specific situation in theatre, can enhance efficiency and effectiveness of a multinational force. More specifically, the benefits of multinational logistics can be the following: a. b. c. d. e. Reduction of the overall costs. Reduction of the logistic footprint in theatre. Increased flexibility of the force. Lesser use of scarce local resources. Efficient use of national expertise. 10-2

1005. Multinational logistics is not an aim in itself. During the early stage of the Force Planning and Force Generation process, the applicability, necessity and benefits of multinational logistics must be considered. Unilateral national logistic decisions could adversely impact the effectiveness of the NATO Commanders mission. 1006. Besides national logistic arrangements to support own forces, where ad-hoc support may be provided to other nations and /or NATO Commanders (e.g., Logistic Time Sharing (LTIS) and Logistic Sorties (LS)), there are three recognised levels of multinational logistics: a. Pre-planned mutual support, HNS and Third Party Logistic Support Services (TPLSS) that are arranged nationally. b. A nation formally undertakes to provide support or services to all or part of the multinational force, but under national command (Logistic Lead Nation (LLN) or Logistic Role Specialist Nation (LRSN)). c. One or more nations formally undertake to serve all or part of the multinational force, under OPCON of the NATO Commander (e.g. Theatre Support Unit (TSU), Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit (MILU)). 1007. Multinational logistics can be pre-planned or introduced during an operation as the situation evolves. Based on the mentioned levels, NATO and nations can decide to apply multinational logistics where it replaces less effective or efficient national solutions. As a neutral party RFAS is uniquely well suited to act as broker between nations to facilitate multinational logistic arrangements. This is usually accomplished through development of appropriate Technical Agreements (TAs) and Joint Implementation Arrangements (JIAs) detailing the functional, administrative and resource-related implications of such relationships.

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1008. Multinational logistics may create opportunities for nations to contribute their fair share to a mission especially for those nations that cannot provide the full range of own logistic support or whose contribution to the mission is of a size not justifying own logistic arrangements. RFAS is able to advise and assist NATO and nations in the development of concepts and plans for multinational air logistics for a mission.

Multinational logistics can enhance efficiency and effectiveness of a multinational force.

LOGISTIC DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES 1009. Current Air Forces Logistic Doctrine and Procedures provide NATO and national authorities the doctrine for the logistic support of air forces, including DF(A). RFAS is the custodian for this document, and for the document that includes the format for the JIA template for airfield beddown. This format can be used to detail Sending Nations Statement of Requirements and HN capabilities (based upon site surveys). 10-4

LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL 1010. Logistic co-ordination and control arrangements are currently being analysed and further developed within NATO, but basic concepts will continue for DF(A), NRF, and GRF. Sending Nations, through their unit-level logistic support elements and/or National Support Elements (NSE), will control and co-ordinate their own logistic activities. Where multinational air forces are collocated in the same theatre, a Multinational Logistic Centre (Air) (MNLC(A)) may be established. Where a principle joint headquarters is established, a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) may be set up. A diagram summarising a potential Logistic Organisation is at Figure 10-1. 1011. National Support Elements (NSE). A deployed NSE in close co-operation with the units will maintain the necessary stock controls and consumption data to support national elements. The NSE will provide the reports, required by national and higher authorities, through the Air Component Commander and co-ordinate activities with the appropriate MNLC(A)/MJLC, if established. 1012. Multinational Logistics Centre (Air). Multinational operations may require the establishment of an MNLC(A). The MNLC(A) will co-ordinate logistic, including movement and medical requirements between the Sending Nations and the Host Nation. The MNLC(A) main functions are to manage requirements for the entire operation, to provide liaison with respect to temporary shortages and to provide mutual assistance in resource allocation. The MNLC(A) will co-ordinate with and provide reports to the ACC, MJLC (if established) and execute the NATO Commanders authority to redistribute assets. 1013. Multinational Joint Logistics Centre. Where a principal headquarters is established with representation from all Services, a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) may be set up as an executive logistic element reporting to the Force Commanders CJ4 10-5

(logistic policy & planning) staff. Tasks may include those previously outlined for MNLC(A)s, together with priority allocation and control. National liaison teams or augmentation staff should be provided, as appropriate. 1014. SHAPE. SHAPE Operation Centre (SOC) (or after activation, the Logistic Co-ordination Centre (LCC)) at SHAPE provides the strategic level interface between Nations (through national representatives), SACEUR, the International Staff and NATO Civil Wartime Agencies. Besides being the liaison agency co-ordinating national surpluses/deficiencies and processing requests for emergency material assistance, SOC or the LCC provides the focus for liaison between SACEUR, Operational Commanders, Force Commanders and TCN on logistic matters.

RFAS is able to advise and assist NATO and nations in the development of multinational air logistics concepts.

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LOGISTIC PHASES 1015. Logistics planning for DF(A) units during crisis will be accomplished in phases. During all phases, RFAS is able to support a standing multinational joint force headquarter by playing the role of Broker Agent between SN, HN and force contingents. The phases are: a. Assessment and Preparation/Pre-deployment. Co-ordination of multinational logistic requirements and capabilities for multinational air forces is essential. To execute deployments of these forces in a timely manner, to enable the best selection of forces for a particular deployment base and to optimise the logistic support package for that force, the logistic support will be planned on a modular basis, with standardised pre-deployment procedures. b. Deployment. In this phase, the initial deployment of national air force contingents and the build-up of the initial operating stocks take place. c. Employment/Sustainment. During this period, the continued deployment of additional required forces and employment of forces in-place occur. Logistic activities like the establishment of resupply routes and operations support services must concentrate on sustaining on-going operations and should be adaptive to any increased level of operations. d. De-escalation. Throughout this phase, selected air contingents will be re-deployed and supply pipelines will be reduced. A re-organisation of the theatre logistics C2 structure may occur. In some operations, the logistics architecture may transition to support non-NATO follow-on operations. e. Recovery/Re-deployment. In this stage, the withdrawal of the deployed forces and operating stocks, as well as the termination

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of logistic and administrative support arrangements will take place. Special attention will be given to the requirements necessary to avoid restricting the effectiveness of forces for either re-deployment to another area of the operation or future operations.
Note: The timing of these phases will be dependent on many factors, including operational requirements, timings as laid down in relevant contingency plans and the requirements for readiness, deployability and sustainability of the units.

LOGISTIC ASPECTS 1016. Survey Teams. Each SN should form a specialist team composed of a cross-section of functional skills capable of evaluating selected deployed operating locations and preparing the location facilities in advance of the units deployment. In addition, SN teams must ensure adequate equipped en-route bases are established, with capability to support both DF(A) and associated airlift as necessary. 1017. Supply Requirements. The SN, in co-ordination with the SC, is responsible for determining supply requirements for deployed units and for identifying sources of supply or co-ordinating HNS. RFAS as a central air planning staff is able to assist in defining the requirements and exploring support options. 1018. Service Support. Service Support will be a composite of individual SN, mutual support and HN responsibilities. RFAS is able to assist in the brokerage of arrangements for Service Support. An example of a table summarising service support responsibilities is at Figure 10-2. 1019. HNS. Responsive and flexible HNS is a vital supplement to the organic support of a deployed unit. HNS will be provided to the greatest extent possible, taking into account national legislation, national priorities and the actual capabilities of the Host Nation. HNS reduces the need for SN to deploy equipment or people, although it is not a mechanism to offset deficiencies or shortfalls 10-8

Host Nation support reduces the need to deploy equipment or people.

from each SN contribution. HN should provide the maximum possible support for deployed forces, but not to the extent that it reduces a HN operational capability. RFAS is able to assist in the brokerage of arrangements for HNS.
Note: RFAS is involved in the development of a concept that supports bare base operations. Bare base modules are intended to provide the necessary non-organic support to DF (A) units when they deploy to bases with no or limited Host Nation Support. The aim of the process is to include the Deployable Operations Capabilities for DF (A) units in the Force Proposal.

1020. Initial Operating Stocks. Logistic assets needed to provide initial operating stocks, pending establishment of the resupply pipeline, will be to a large extent defined by the SN. Deployment stocks need to be readily available and stored in air-transportable packs. The required weapons and equipment, as well as the declared missile loads and supplies, must be collocated with the deployed air unit or suitably positioned.

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Sending nations are responsible for identifying logistic assets required to support a deployed unit.

1021. Resupply. DF(A) units stocks are required initial sustainment after deployment and a resupply logistics support system for these forces is to be established within prescribed timelines. Theatre stock levels will normally be crisis/Operation Plans (OPLAN) specific. 1022. Unit logistics. DF(A) units should be equipped with a Mission Support Kit in which vital mission operating assets are assembled and maintained at a high readiness level. Units should maximise the use of containerisation for the aggregation of spares, material, and weapons. Units should develop deployment listings that provide the framework of their logistic requirements and availability of deployable logistic assets. 1023. Maintenance. Deployable forces must be able to repair or replace mission essential equipment and weapons under deployed 10-10

conditions. Shared or co-use of support equipment resources must be planned. First line preventive maintenance, battle damage repair, and corrective maintenance should be organic to the DF(A) unit and deployable. Second line preventive maintenance will normally be a
Deployable forces must be able to repair mission essential equipment under deployed conditions.

DF(A) unit main operating base responsibility, while national third line organisations should be prepared to support national and deployed units. 1024. Reporting. Logistic reporting will follow the requirements of the Bi-SC Reporting Directive, as amended and amplified by specific instructions issued by the directing NATO authority. 1025. Deployability. Deployable tactical/mobile combat logistics systems have great benefits such as: flexibility for rapid deployment, the ability to augment existing fixed systems or to compensate for the lack of infrastructure provided by the HN. Although the deployment of these systems will compete for scarce airlift assets, non-Article 5 deployments to austere locations may require their use to enhance the deployed unit support capability. 10-11

Examples of these assets are: a. Operations Support Services. Where HN are unable to provide all essential operational support services (such as arrester gear, runway or airfield lighting, sweepers, cranes, navigation aids etc.), nations with spare capacity, or those not committed to deploy, could offer available services to support deployed air operations. b. Fuel Capacity Enhancement. SN should be prepared to provide tactical fuel storage and handling facilities to meet any shortfalls at deployment bases. This could include fabric bladder tanks - and the necessary pumping equipment to enable emergency installations - and the creation of additional pipelines. c. Liquid Oxygen (LOX)/Liquid Nitrogen (LIN) Capacity Enhancement. SN should be prepared to provide deployable LOX/ LIN tanks or a manufacturing plant to meet shortfalls. d. Field Accommodation Modules. In the event that accommodation at a deployment location is insufficient or unsuitable and the HN is unable to provide any alternative, the SN should be prepared to deploy with a full range of field accommodation to support its force. e. Field Catering (Messing) Modules. SN should be prepared to deploy catering support for its forces, where necessary. f. Deployable Base Medical Facility. SN should be prepared to provide fully equipped medical facilities, with a limited hospital capability, where necessary, to supplement HN base medical capability at the Role 2 level. Additionally, a field hospital facility may be required to supplement local hospitals at the Role 3 level. g. Maintenance. Consists of deployable engineering and/or avionics workshops and test facilities for repairs beyond First Line, including Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR). This aspect also includes hangarage, protection and handling facilities. 10-12

10-13 Figure 10-1

10-14 Figure 10-2

CHAPTER 11
MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION
1101. The NATO principles and policies for movement and transportation document reflects the need of the nations and the Alliance to provide flexible support to NATO operations. Military Movement and Transport resources will always be limited. National M&T resources are likely to be tailored to meet the rapid strategic deployment of key elements of the force and to provide operational and tactical mobility. The greater the scope and the size of the operation, the greater will be the reliance on civil M&T resources. Military planners must appreciate that civil M&T resources are also limited, are not specifically designed for military use, and might therefore be neither available, nor capable of meeting the military requirements.

NATO and nations have collective responsibility for M&T support to NATO operations.

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Recognising that in some instances individual nations M&T requirements will exceed their capabilities, policies and procedures for providing mutual assistance between nations have been established. MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION PRINCIPLES 1102. NATO and Nations have a collective responsibility for M&T support to NATO operations. Specific responsibilities are: a. NATO. NATO Commanders are responsible for establishing the M&T requirements and for initiating, prioritising, coordinating and de-conflicting the deployment (including Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM)), transportation for sustainment (re-supply), and redeployment of forces. This must be done in co-operation with nations. b. Nations. The nations are responsible for obtaining transportation resources to deploy, sustain, and redeploy their forces. This principle must be balanced with the need for cooperation, coordination and economy, which may result in bilateral and/or multilateral cooperative arrangements. (1) The SN is responsible for planning, controlling and executing the movement of: (a) (b) Its national forces. National components of multinational forces.

(c) A multinational HQ group and/or unit with a high degree of multinationality, if the SN has agreed to assume the Lead Nation (LN) responsibility.

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(2) The HN has the ultimate authority to approve, coordinate and control all movements, including RSOM related activity, on its sovereign territory in accordance with the NATO commanders priorities. NATO STRUCTURE FOR M&T 1103. The M&T Architecture in the integrated NATO Command Structure and during a CJTF is shown at Figures 11-1 and 11-2.

The Nations are responsible for obtaining transportation resources to deploy, sustain and redeploy their forces.

a. NATO HQ. NATO HQ provides the political and military guidance through consultation with Nations for overall M&T aspects and by obtaining timely agreements for the transit of deploying forces through national territory when necessary. b. The Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC). The AMCC is the SHAPE agency for the overall management of strategic movements. In this respect, the AMCC in cooperation with Nations constructs the Multi-National Detailed Deployment Plan (MNDDP) and addresses strategic lift shortfalls.

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c. The Joint Force Command CJ4 M&T Staff. The Staff is to develop and to implement movement and transportation plans and directives and to prioritise movement requirements as they apply to the JFC tasks. The M&T Staff is the focus for all aspects of operational movements within the region in co-ordination with the HN. d. National Movements Control Centre (NMCC). The NMCC is the agency provided by the HN to approve, control and co-ordinate air, sea and inland surface movements on its own territory, in support of NATO operations. e. Joint Theatre Movement Staff (JTMS). The JTMS is the Commander Combined Joint Task Forces (COMCJTFs) primary focus for Deployment and Movement matters. Its role is to monitor, evaluate and provide continuous assessment of strategic and operational deployments. It is part of the CJTF HQ and is the focus for co-ordination and consultation between the SN, HN and the Component Commanders. f. Joint Transportation Co-ordination Centre (JTCC). The JTCC is a cell established on an as-required basis to co-ordinate the employment of any transportation assets, which may be assigned to COMCJTF for an operation at the theatre level. g. National Support Element (NSE). The NSE is a national organisation positioned in theatre when required by a nation. The NSE supports reception, onward movement, re-supply and redeployment of national forces. The NSE will interface with the NMCC or Theatre Movements Control Centre (TMCC) as applicable.

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h. Aeromedical Evacuation Control Centre (AECC). The AECC element is established by the designated NATO Commander to co-ordinate aeromedical evacuation. The AECC monitors patient movements and coordinates strategic aeromedical evacuation with the AMCC. i. Regional Air Lift Control Centre (RALCC). The RALCC is an agency within the CJTF structure (Air Component Command) and will plan, co-ordinate, execute and control the air transport operations within the Area of Responsibility (AOR). SEQUENCE OF M&T PLANNING 1104. The development of M&T plans in support of NATO operations requires close coordination between NATO Commands, SN and HN. This process is supported by the Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS). ADAMS is used for planning, evaluating and monitoring (tracking and tracing) M&T operations in support of NATO missions. 1105. Movement planning is part of the Operational Planning Process (see Chapter 4). The development of deployment/movement plans in support of NATO operations will be an iterative process and may begin with limited military guidance or political clearance. Force planning should identify all forces needed to fulfil operational requirements that have been established in the concept of operations in order to arrange the arrival of these forces into the area of operations in accordance with the NATO Commanders priorities and timelines.

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The development of deployment/movement plans in support of NATO operations is part of the Operational Planning Process.

The end product of deployment planning will be a Multi-National Detailed Deployment Plan, coordinated and de-conflicted at the SC level, to meet the NATO Commanders operational requirements. Figure 11-3 shows the deployment planning process. Sequentially, the main deployment planning documents are: a. Statement of Requirements (SOR). SACEUR will, with the designated NATO Commander, provide the SOR to the nations. The SOR lists the forces required by the NATO Commander for the mission. b. National Force Contribution (NFC). Based on the SOR, the Nations identify and offer forces they can provide in support of the mission. c. Allied Forces List (AFL). When combined at SC level, the NFCs become the AFL. The AFL provides the information contained in the NFCs and also includes the movement characteristics for each unit (Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units).

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d. Allied Disposition List (ADL). The ADL is an expression of the time-phased requirements for deploying the units listed in the AFL. The ADL specifies the NATO commanders operational requirements by listing the Commanders Required Date (CRD), Desired Order of Arrival, Ports of Debarkation (PODs), and Final Destination (FD) for each unit. e. Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP). Based on the ADL and identified constraints, nations develop their national DDP considering: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Force Packages; Time Phasing; Lines of Communication (LOCs); Modes of Transportation (MOTs); Assignment of Transportation Assets; Reception, Staging and Onward Movement.

National DDPs are then combined by the AMCC into a Multi-National DDP and de-conflicted as required by the AMCC, in conjunction with the designated NATO Commander(s), the Troop Contributing Nation(s) (TCN(s)) and HN(s) as appropriate. Reception and onward movement planning is an integral part of the deployment planning process. The HN(s), in conjunction with the TCN(s) and NATO Commander, will conduct reception and onward movement planning to maximise the throughput capacity of: PODs; reception, marshalling, staging, and assembly areas; and routes to final destinations to meet the CRD. In this respect, the early identification of HNs and infrastructure capabilities is essential.

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f. Sequencing. A series of Movement Planning Conferences chaired at SHAPE by the AMCC would be held to support the iterative process to develop a Multi-National Deconflicted Deployment Plan. Sequential simulations and evaluations of planned national movements using ADAMS will determine initial gross feasibility, provide data for analysis and refinement of the movement flow, and identify any shortfalls for resolution in subsequent planning cycles. During execution planning and deployment, nations will continue to provide National DDP updates to the AMCC. AIR TRANSPORT 1106. Nations are responsible for providing the military or civil lift necessary to move and sustain the forces they contribute to NATO military operations. The procedures for requesting and providing airlift resources for co-operative and/or shared use are found in Allied Joint Movement and Transportation doctrine. 1107. Air Transport (AT) is relatively expensive and, in most cases, the fastest mode of transport. However, contrary to broad thinking, it is not in all cases the most efficient means to deploy or re-deploy large units. AT is greatly affected by factors that can hamper the airflow significantly (e.g. weather, throughput capacity of airports, saturation of Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities, dependence on onward movement, etc.). 1108. Nations retain full Command and Control of their military airlift assets. Nations are encouraged to consider bilateral arrangements with other nations for the use of military and civilian airlift assets, prior to requesting NATO co-ordinated, co-operative airlift support. In addition, nations are requested to make available their surplus airlift assets under military control for NATO Military Command co-ordinated, co-operative and/or shared use. Nations can also elect to place airlift assets under operational control of a NATO Commander in specific instances or for a particular period or task.

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1109. Airlift assets placed under operational control of NATO for co-operative and/or shared use will be managed by AMCC or, if required, by Joint Movement Co-ordination Centre (JMCC). The day-to-day management of these assets may be delegated to subordinated organisations for an operation or exercise, for example, the NMCC/JTCC or the Regional Airlift Co-ordination Centre (RALCC). An Intra-Theatre Airlift System (ITAS) may be established to support in-theatre airlift requirements.

M&T resources must enable rapid strategic deployment and provide operational and tactical mobility.

1110. Military movements will rely heavily on airlift resources chartered directly from the commercial aviation market or upon utilisation of normal commercial services. Nations plan for use of commercial aviation resources during operations and retain control over their chartered airlift assets. However, they may encounter difficulty in chartering sufficient airlift resources to meet military requirements. 11-9

Nations may wish to co-ordinate their chartering activities in close co-operation with military planners of other countries within the AMCC. Co-ordination will not increase the number of aircraft available, but it could result in more efficient use of them and could restrain escalating charter hire rates. SEA TRANSPORT 1111. Nations are responsible for providing the military or civil sealift necessary to move and sustain the forces they contribute to NATO military operations. All military shipping assets remain under national control. However, it is envisaged that under certain circumstances, nations may be prepared to offer shipping assets, which are under military control for use by other nations. The AMCC may request nations to place available surplus shipping capacity under military control for use by other nations. 1112. Sea Transport (ST) is a very economic mode of transport. Although relatively slow on short distances because of the loading and discharging time, on long distances this mode of transport can be the only suitable way to move as quickly as possible a whole force package. Examples of efficient usage of ST are for units with outsized and/or heavy cargo and hazardous cargo such as fuel or ammo. A further advantage is that there are almost no problems with border crossings. 1113. Military movements rely heavily upon vessels chartered directly from the commercial shipping market or upon utilisation of normal commercial services. Nations plan for use of merchant shipping during operations and retain control over their chartered sealift assets. However, they may encounter difficulty in chartering sufficient tonnage of preferred types to meet military requirements. Nations may wish to co-ordinate their chartering activities in close co-operation with military planners from other countries within the AMCC. Again, co-ordination will not increase the number of ships available, but it could result in more efficient use of ships and could restrain escalating charter hire rates. 11-10

Sea transport is one of the most efficient means to deploy or redeploy large units.

INLAND SURFACE TRANSPORT 1114. Inland Surface Transport (IST) encompasses the use of ports and beaches, road, railroad, inland waterway transport, and pipeline modes, as well as the interrelationship between them. One or more of these modes will be required to accomplish operational deployments and redeployments of forces and their follow-on support. IST resources, and planning for their use, remain fully under national control during operations. However, planning requires co-ordination between nations and relevant headquarters. 1115. Civil resources will be necessary to meet operational movement requirements due to the limited availability of military IST resources. Consequently, ready access to civil transport resources will be beneficial. Harmonised military and civil procedures for regular use are prerequisite for easy acquisition of HN transport support, as well as for border crossing movements. 11-11

Surface transport will be required to ensure follow-on support for deployed forces.

1116. Characteristics. Selection of IST modes will take account of the specific lift requirements. Characteristics, capabilities, availability and cost effectiveness are factors in deciding upon which transport mode, or combination thereof, is to be used. a. Road Transport (RT). RT is, in general, suitable for intraregional deployment of forces and accompanying stocks, normally using military organic vehicles. RT is particularly suitable as a feeder service within a wide area for a variety of materials in relatively small units. b. Railroad Transport (RRT). RRT is particularly capable of transporting large numbers of personnel, large amounts of heavy equipment and cargo over distances exceeding 100 kilometres. However, there are stringent height and width restrictions for the equipment carried. Feeder and/or follow-on road transport support will be needed in most cases. 11-12

c. Inland Waterway Transport (IWT). IWT is especially suited for the transportation of heavy equipment and cargo over large distances. IWT is generally a slow method of movement and requires lifting facilities at Ports of Embarkation (POEs) and PODs. Followon support by other modes of transport will, in most cases, be required. d. Pipeline. Pipelines are suitable for fuel and water transport and may be used both overland and undersea. Infrastructure, distribution and intermodality issues heavily determine the usefulness of this option.

11-13

11-14 Figure 11-1

11-15 Figure 11-2

11-16 Figure 11-3

CHAPTER 12
AIR TO AIR REFUELLING
1201. AAR has proven itself to be a cornerstone for the successful execution of modern air operations. The rapid deployment of air assets is streamlined through NATOs ability to quickly establish AAR Air bridges. AAR is crucial to effectively project air power into any area where sufficient infrastructures and HN Support are not adequate. Operations mounted from Main Operating Bases reduce the theatre logistics requirements, thereby simplifying sustainment efforts. The use of AAR also permits the deployment of combat and combat support forces directly to their operating bases.

Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) enhances the overall combat effectiveness of aircraft during air operations.

12-1

AAR is a critical force multiplier that can enhance the overall combat effectiveness by extending the range, endurance, loiter time, payload, time on task and consequently employment flexibility of combat and combat support aircraft in all categories of air operations. 1202. As the number and variety of Alliance tanker platforms grew, so did the need for a centralised office to advocate interoperability and standardisation. In the Fall of 1999, RFAS was approved as the location for the new NATO AAR Co-ordination Cell (AARCC) and it became fully operational in September of 2001. 1203. Working with NATO and national AAR experts, the AAR Co-ordination Cell acts as a central location for all strategic issues concerning Alliance AAR. Its primary goal is to coordinate AAR issues with NATO nations in the interest of providing a more interoperable, standardised, flexible and effective AAR capability to the combatant commander during crisis or conflict. It provides AAR specialist advice to all levels of command in times of peace, crisis or conflict, as well as specified operations and major exercises. It also provides advisory support for AAR planning and participates in the development of AAR policy, doctrine, procedures and standards. AJP 3.3.4.2, NATO Air to Air Refuelling (better known as ATP-56) is not only the NATO standard for common AAR operating procedures, it is also considered to be the global standard. 1204. Several efforts are underway to strengthen and standardise NATOs AAR programmes. NATOs AAR Conference, hosted by RFAS, is designed to bring together AAR expertise from the NATO staffs, NATO nations and industry to discuss issues, developments and concerns in Alliance AAR operations. Additionally, a Tanker Planning Course is being developed for NATO AAR planning and staff officers. This course would help improve the basic AAR planning skills of the officers assigned to this task. Also, a NATO Tanker Combat Employment Manual is under development. This manual will provide a foundation for common tanker tactics, terminology and employment considerations during crisis situations. 12-2

Furthermore, NATO is establishing closer ties promoting AAR interoperability with the Russian Federation. This relationship could permit future co-operative AAR operations. Finally, the Air Refueling Systems Advisory Group (ARSAG) provides a global forum for industry, operators, and technical experts to discuss and work to solve AAR challenges. AAR Co-ordination Cell staff officers are key members of ARSAG including the Steering Group and Panel Chairman for the Interoperability Panel.

Air to Air Refuelling projects air power into any area where sufficient infrastructures are not available.

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CHAPTER 13
TRAINING, EXERCISE & EVALUATION
1301. The Essential Operational Capabilities (EOCs) as defined in the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept and the overall requirements to achieve a higher degree in Interoperability and Standardisation are directing the future Alliance training agenda, especially for DF(A). In addition, Lessons Learned from real world operations underlined the need to provide a better standardised training approach within NATO and between NATO and nations, which led nations to support the development of the NATO Training, Exercise and Evaluation Policy. 1302. Through this policy the Strategic Commands (SCs) and nations are tasked to develop supporting documents for the implementation of this training policy. The Bi-SC Training, Exercise and Evaluation Directive (Bi-SC TEED) provides the next step in the abovementioned hierarchy.

The NATO Training, Exercise and Evaluation Policy provides a better standardised training approach within NATO e.g. exercise AMPLE TRAIN.

13-1

This document sets regulations for both the NCS and NFS as a basis for operational readiness through joint training and exercise requirements for IPF(A) and DF(A). The directive provides guidance to commanders on who must be trained, who is responsible for conducting training and what the required training frequency is based on Peacetime Force Affiliations between the NCS and NFS. Thus, the Bi-SC TEED is the capstone document for detailed training and exercise programming for DF(A). The purpose of this directive is to ensure a co-ordinated approach in training to enhance interoperability and standardisation within the NCS and NFS and between NATO nations and Partners, to reduce duplication of effort and to make more efficient use of resources. TRAINING 1303. NATO has chosen to develop, conduct and evaluate military training at all levels using a model known as the Systems Approach to Training (SAT). Although training will vary to some extent between NATO Military HQs, nations, and even services, this model is to be used for all training within NATO. SAT encompasses four major steps: a. Analysis of HQs missions and the necessary job requirements to support these missions; Design of training to ensure the required training objectives will be met; Conduct of training; Evaluation of training.

b.

c. d.

1304. A Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) is a list of joint mission essential tasks selected by the commander to accomplish an assigned or anticipated mission. 13-2

It includes associated tasks, conditions, and standards and requires the identification of supporting tasks. The JMETL identifies the Commands mission requirements and forms the basis for determining the training requirements. It facilitates the set up of logical, sequential training programmes and provides guidance and direction to subordinate HQs. 1305. The following Military HQs are to develop a JMETL: a. b. c. d. e. f. SHAPE, Joint Force Command HQs, Joint HQ, Component Command HQs of the NCS, Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs), Deployable Combined Air Operations Centres (DCAOCs), Graduated Readiness Force HQs of the NFS.

g.

1306. Essential Training Goals (ETGs) are to be derived from the Alliance Strategic Concept, the defined EOCs, and the JMETL. ETGs will provide, inter alia, the basis for subordinate commands JMETL development. They should be reviewed periodically to ensure they meet the challenges of the Euro-Atlantic security environment. Based upon the ETGs, SHAPE is to develop an Overall Training Requirements List (OTRL) for their subordinated commands, assigned forces or national forces earmarked for NATO-led operations.

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1307. Based on the JMETL, the ETGs and the OTRL, commanders are to assess their staffs and units ability to perform their missions. This assessment will compare the actual level of proficiency against the required standards defined in the JMETL, and will determine the training requirements necessary to achieve and sustain desired levels of proficiency for each Joint Mission Essential Task.

Training enhances interoperability and standardisation between NATO nations and Partners.

EXERCISE 1308. NATO Military Exercise Policy is defined, and the Exercise Process is explained in MC 94/4, which is the authoritative NATO exercise document. The NATO Military Exercise Process consists of Programming, Planning, Conduct, Analysis, and Reporting. While the programming part is depicted in the NATO Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP), the Exercise Planning Directive (EPD) describes how exercises are to be designed and planned. This MTEP for instance incorporates the Air Live Flying Exercises (LIVEX) which offer good deployment training opportunities for the DF(A) of the nations. 13-4

1309. The aim of NATO Military Exercises is to establish, enhance and display NATOs Military Capabilities across the Alliances full mission spectrum, including deployed operations. Exercises must be developed with clear training objectives in mind, which are dependent on identified shortfalls through the commanders general training assessment or through evaluation. The focus of NATO as well as national exercises is to ensure that HQs and formations are efficiently and effectively trained to fulfil their missions within the given readiness criteria depicted in the Forces Standards. 1310. Exercise Priorities are to be defined in a top down approach. SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) must issue exercise priorities annually together with the MTEP to provide 18 months planning time. The priorities are to be derived from identified shortfalls through a mission oriented analysis of last years exercise programme, Lessons Learned from exercises and operations, and SACEURs annual guidance.

Commanders are to assess their units ability to perform their mission.

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1311. The NATO Training and Exercise Board (NTEB) will endorse the Strategic Commanders guidance on what exercise priorities are to be followed the next exercise cycle. Therefore, he will provide the NTEB in the January/February timeframe of each year with a written strategic directive. The NTEB will be responsible to ensure exercises are identified, which meet selected priorities and these exercises are fully funded and incorporated in the MTEP for the next following year (for example the NTEB in 2003 will decide upon the priorities in 2005) based on the strategic guidance. This approach automatically leads to the definition of Major NATO Military Exercises.

The NATO Military Training and Exercise Programme offers good deployment training opportunities.

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EVALUATION 1312. While SHAPE is responsible for the evaluation of subordinated HQs and forces assigned to NATO within the NCS, the evaluation of HQs and forces from the NFS is the responsibility of both NATO and nations depending on the function to be evaluated. SHAPE has delegated its evaluation authority to some extent to the JFC HQs/ JHQ. 1313. Evaluations will be carried out during HQs and Forces Training and Exercise periods depicted in NATOs and/or national programmes and will be co-ordinated during the respective training and exercise boards meeting as well as an annual Evaluation Conference. As far as NATOs evaluation programme is concerned, this will be an integral part of the MTEP.

Live exercises will also serve as evaluation vehicles.

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1314. Evaluation of SHAPE will be conducted in order to identify strengths, weaknesses or even shortfalls in strategic planning and direction of operations. The evaluation vehicle shall be the main Command Post Exercises (CPX). Evaluation of a strategic HQ is a multifaceted challenge. Therefore, each evaluation is recommended to cover only specified functions or divisions. 1315. JFC North and South, JHQ West and the CCs will be evaluated to verify strengths, weaknesses or even shortfalls of the joint and service command and control functions. Evaluation vehicles will be the major CPXs or Live Exercises, also in deployed condition. These will be identified as an integral part of SHAPE exercise planning. SHAPE in the Initial Planning Conferences will declare the level of ambition for the evaluation. SHAPE is responsible for defining the objectives, mounting the teams and conducting evaluations. 1316. Units and HQs selected for the NRF assume such responsibilities on a periodical basis. Prior to undertaking these responsibilities, certifications take place of each HQ and unit. Typically, the major LIVEXs and CPXs in deployed condition are the evaluation vehicles for the next rotation of NRF units and HQs. These exercises are identified as an integrated part of SHAPE exercise planning, and the evaluations for certification will be included in the exercise objectives. 1317. Units and HQs designated for GRF are evaluated under the existing NATO evaluation programmes. Nations will be responsible for the unit level training to meet the defined NATO training requirements and to ensure each formations/units capability to perform its assigned functions prior to the component level training. Nations are responsible for the unit level combat readiness certification, but are subject to Component Commanders verification. 1318. The Bi-SC operational and tactical evaluation programmes are designed for NATO-declared or assigned units. Therefore, the majority of such evaluations will have to be conducted at the tactical level. However, operational HQs that are responsible for the C2 of 13-8

Tactical Evaluations (TACEVAL) are the primary means to evaluate the operational capabilities of NATOs air forces.

the units to be evaluated are expected to comply with the relevant standards and participate in support of the evaluations. 1319. Tactical Evaluations (TACEVAL) are the primary means of evaluating the operational capabilities of NATOs Air Forces and are subject to permanent validation by the Evaluation Authority (EA). It is required to reflect the operational requirements of air operations, including CAOCs, Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS), NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C), Flying and GBAD units, in joint operations. The requirements for TACEVAL of air force units, IPF and DF, are laid down in the ACE Forces Standards and the SHAPE Tactical Evaluation Manual. The TACEVAL programme at the unit level comprises a two-tier system involving Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) and Operational Assessment (OPASSESS) of units. TACEVAL will be used as an overarching term for both. 13-9

1320. The primary aim of the ACE TACEVAL programme is to: Evaluate, assess and, where appropriate, rate against prescribed standards the operational capability of units allocated to ACE, indicate deficiencies and make recommendations. TACEVALs of DF(A) units should be conducted preferably during Air LIVEXs and in deployed condition whenever feasible, with the goal to evaluate the units capability to integrate in deployed multinational forces at the required level.

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CHAPTER 14
REACTION FORCE AIR STAFF
BACKGROUND 1401. In November 1991, NATO introduced the Reaction Force Concept into the Alliances Force Structure. Reaction Force Air Staff (RFAS) was formed in January 1993 in Kalkar, Germany, to develop concepts and plans for the deployment, support and redeployment of Reaction Force (Air) assets. During recent years, the formation of the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) at SHAPE, the restructuring of NATO including the NCS and NFS and the growth of operational needs have steadily expanded RFASs roles and duties. MISSION 1402. This evolution of RFASs role and functions has resulted in a new, adapted mission. RFAS continues to focus on planning and coordination responsibilities in NATOs force and operational fields. In response to new challenges and emerging requirements, RFAS is placing an increasing emphasis on supporting the CJTF/NRF and the JFACC concepts, and operations, in crisis and conflict. RFAS is able to make a substantial contribution to the NATO planning effort by providing expert air advice and assistance. 1403. RFAS is a multinational staff whose primary purpose is to support the Strategic Commanders and the Director Combined Joint Planning Staff with central air expertise. The staff is responsible for deployment-related aspects of strategic and operational air planning throughout the full range of NATO operations using NATO assets and capabilities. The new mission has resulted in three core functions for RFAS: 14-1

a. Preparation of Capabilities and Assessment, which includes all activities ensuring air assets provided to NATO meet Alliance needs. RFAS discharges this function through active participation in NATOs defence and force planning framework. b. Operational Planning and Support of Operations, which includes participation in the NATO Operational Planning Process. c. Central Co-ordinating tasks, on behalf of and, when delegated by SACEUR and SACT, such as: (1) Providing a focal point for NATO Air Transport and Air-toAir Refuelling issues including developing and implementing the Airto-Air Refuelling Co-ordination Cell. (2) Developing a Logistic Concept for DF(A).

(3) Hosting an annual Air Conference, as a tri-service forum for senior flag officers. 1404. In summary, RFASs core functions focus on force and operational planning and include the option to provide staff support for the execution of exercises and operations. The NATO commitment to deployed operations continues to evolve. In November 2002, the Prague Summit Declaration stated: In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including any environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, to achieve their objectives.

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As part of that commitment, the NATO Heads of State went on to call for the creation of a NATO Response Force to provide that capability. Presently, RFAS is contributing to the development of the NRF concept by aiding in many areas e.g. the Statement of Requirement (SOR), Airlift and APOD requirements etc. ORGANISATION 1405. Manned by personnel from 13 nations, the RFAS organisational structure is comprised of a Directorate and six functional sections specialising in all aspects of air power (Figure 14-1). 1406. All Nations who contribute to NATOs Deployable Forces (Air) are represented. Additionally, France, Hungary and the Czech Republic have Liaison positions within the staff. Future changes to the role and duties of RFAS will be made to ensure it remains viable in the future and is responding to the current expansion in NATO Nations and changes to the NCS.

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14-4 Figure 14-1

ABBREVIATIONS

A AAA AAR AARCC ABDR ACC ACCIS ACCS ACE ACO ACS ACT ACTORD ACTREQ ACTWARN AD ADAMS ADL ADR ADRR AECC AFL AMCC AOC AOR APOD ARSAG ASACS AT

Anti Aircraft Artillery Air-to-Air Refuelling Air-to-Air Refuelling Co-ordination Cell Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Air Component Commander/Air Control Centre Automated Command, Control and Information System Air Command and Control System Allied Command Europe Allied Command Operations Aircraft Cross-Servicing Allied Command Transformation Activation Order Activation Request Activation Warning Air Defence Allied Deployment and Movement System Allied Disposition List Airfield Damage Repair/Air Defence Region Airfield Damage Repair Reconnaissance Aeromedical Evacuation Control Centre Allied Forces List Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre Air Operations Centre Area of Responsibility Aerial Port/Airport of Debarkation Air Refuelling Systems Advisory Group Air Surveillance and Control System Air Transport

B Bi-SC

Bi-Strategic Command

A-1

C C2 C3I CAOC CC CCD CCITT CIS CJ4 CJFACC CJPS CJSOR CJTF COA COG COMCJTF CONOPS COP CPX CRD CRO CS CSAR CSS

Command and Control Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Combined Air Operations Centre Component Command Camouflage, Concealment and Dispersal Consultative Committee On International Telephone and Telegraphy Communications and Information Systems Logistics Policy and Planning Section Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander Combined Joint Planning Staff Combined Joint Statement of Requirements Combined Joint Task Force Course of Action Centre of Gravity Commander Combined Joint Task Force Concept of Operations Contingency Plan Command Post Exercise CINCs Required Date Crisis Response Operation Combat Support Combat Search and Rescue Combat Service Support

D DAC DCAOC DCC DDP DF DF(A) DJTF DOB

Deployable Air Command and Control System Component Deployable Combined Air Operations Centre Deployable CIS Concept Detailed Deployment Plan Deployable Forces Deployable Forces (Air) Deployed Joint Task Force Dispersal/Dispersed/Deployed/Deployment Operating Base

A-2

E EA EOC EOD EOR EPD ETG EW

Evaluation Authority Essential Operational Capabilities Explosive Ordnance Disposal Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Exercise Planning Directive Essential Training Goal Early Warning/Electronic Warfare

F FAD FD FDC FLR FORCEPREP FP FPG

Force Activation Directive Final Destination Force Designation Category Forces of Lower Readiness Force Preparation Force Protection Functional Planning Guide

G GBAD GOP GRF

Ground-Based Air Defence Guideline For Operational Planning Graduated Readiness Forces

H HN HNS HQ HRF HRF(A)

Host Nation Host Nation Support Headquarters High Readiness Forces High Readiness Forces (Air)

I IEADS IPF IST

Integrated Extended Air Defence System In-Place Forces Inland Surface Transport

A-3

ITAS IWT

Intra-Theatre Airlift System Inland Waterway Transport

J JFC JHQ JIA JMCC JMETL JOA JTCC JTMS

Joint Force Command(er) Joint Headquarters Joint Implementation Arrangement Joint Movement Co-ordination Centre Joint Mission Essential Task List Joint Operation Area Joint Transportation Co-ordination Centre Joint Theatre Movement Staff

K, L LCC LIN LIVEX LLN LN LOC LOX LRSN LS LTBF LTIS

Logistics Co-ordination Centre/Cell//Land Component Commander Liquid Nitrogen Live Exercise Logistic Lead Nation Lead Nation Lines of Communication Liquid Oxygen Logistic Role Specialist Nation Logistic Sorties Longer-Term Build-Up Forces Logistic Time Sharing

M M&T MANPAD MC MILU MJLC MNDDP MNLC MOT

Movement & Transportation Manual Portable Air Defence Military Committee Multination Integrated Logistic Unit Multinational Joint Logistics Centre Multi-National Detailed Deployment Plan Multinational Logistics Centre/Cell/Commander Mode of Transportation

A-4

MOU MTEP

Memorandum of Understanding Military Training and Exercise Programme

N NAC NACOSA NAEW&C NBC NBCR NCCAP NFC NFS NMCC NRF NSE NTEB

North Atlantic Council NATO CIS Operating and Support Agency NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Nuclear, Biological, Chemical NBC Reconnaissance NATO CIS Contingency Assets Pool National Force Contribution NATO Force Structure National Movements Control Centre NATO Response Force National Support Element NATO Training and Exercise Board

O OOA OPASSESS OPCOM OPCON OPEVAL OPG OPLAN OPP OTRL

Out of Area Operational Assessment Operational Command Operational Control Operational Evaluation Operations Planning Group Operational Plan Operational Planning Process Overall Training Requirements List

P PAR PARP PfP POD POE

Post-Attack Reconnaissance PfP Planning and Review Process Partnership for Peace Port of Debarkation Port of Embarkation

A-5

Q, R RALCC RAOS RC RESF RFAS RPG RRT RSTA RSOM RT

Regional Airlift Control Centre Repair of Aircraft Operating Surfaces Regional Command/Commander Restoration of Essential Services and Facilities Reaction Force Air Staff Regional Planning Guide Railroad Transport Reconnaissance, Surveillance & Target Acquisition Reception, Staging and Onward Movement Road Transport

S SACEUR SACT SAM SAR SAT SC SDP SEAD SHAPE SHORAD SN SOC SOR SPOD ST STANAG SUPLAN

Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Surface to Air Missile Search and Rescue Systems Approach to Training Strategic Command/Commander Standing Defence Plan Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Short-Range Air Defence Sending Nation SHAPE Operation Centre Statement of Requirements Sea Port of Debarkation Sea Transport Standardisation Agreement Support Plan

T TA TACEVAL TACS TCN TEED

Technical Arrangement Tactical Evaluation Tactical Air Control Squadron Troop Contributing Nation Training, Exercise and Evaluation Directive

A-6

TMCC TMD TOA TPLSS TSU

Theatre Movements Control Contre Theatre Missile Defence Transfer of Authority Third Party Logistics Support Services Theatre Support Unit

U, V, W, X, Y, Z UXO

Unexploded Ordnance

A-7