VOTEWATCH: EXAMINING VOTING PROBLEMS USING A MIXED METHOD APPROACH

Paper Presented at the 2004 AAPOR Conference, Phoenix, Arizona Saturday May 15th 4-5:30 pm Presenters:
Steven Hertzberg, Founder, Votewatch Nicole Vicinanza, Ph.D. The Aguirre Group Susan Gabbard, Ph.D. The Aguirre Group

Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

Legal Information: Copyright Votewatch Corporation 2003. All rights reserved. This document and the information contained herein are proprietary and confidential. It may not be duplicated, redistributed, reused, or displayed to any other party without the express written consent of Votewatch Corporation. Votewatch and the Votewatch logo are trademarks of Votewatch Corporation. All other names are trademarks of their respective companies, and are only used for identifying product and company information.
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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

Table of Contents
I
(a)

Introduction: Too Close to Call ............................................................. 4

Voting Irregularities Make a Difference ................................................................. 4

II
(a) (b) (c) (d)

Votewatch ............................................................................................ 6
What we do....................................................................................................... 6 Who we are ...................................................................................................... 6 Methodology for understanding voting anomalies................................................... 7 Pilot efforts during The October 7th Recall Election and Super Tuesday Primaries ...... 8

III Eyes on Elections: Mixed Methods for Documenting Voting Irregularities................................................................................................ 9

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Questionnaires .................................................................................................. 9 Polling place observations ................................................................................. 10 On-line Questionnaires and Logs........................................................................ 11 Vote Over and Undercounts .............................................................................. 12 Findings when information is put together .......................................................... 14

IV

Next Steps and Conclusions ................................................................ 15

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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

Introduction: Too Close to Call

(a) Voting Irregularities Make a Difference 1) Will the next election be too close to call? During the 2000 presidential election 17 states were decided by a margin of victory less than 6.5%, with 1.1 million votes separating the winner from the loser across all of these states combined. 69% of the 270 delegates required to win the presidency were decided in these Battleground States. Gore Won 9 (96 delegates) of these states and Bush Won 8 States (90 delegates). Of these 17 Battleground States, 6 were decided by a margin of victory of less than 1%, with 24,171 votes separating the winner from the looser across these states. Of these, Florida and New Mexico experienced the closest margin of victories, representing 535 and 366 votes, respectively. For five of these six states, the missing vote rate for the presidential candidate question exceeds the margin of victory, in some cases more than doubling it. (For the sixth state missing vote rates are not available.) Table 1: 2000 Presidential Election Battleground States

Battleground State during Election 2000

Total Presidential Votes Counted 5,963,110 598,605 2,598,607 1,315,563 1,533,968 569,081 2,846,776 2,438,685 608,970 4,701,998 2,076,181 4,913,119 651,817 4,232,501 921,781 2,487,433 1,532,016 39,990,211

Number of Votes separating Gore & Bush 537 366 5,708 4,144 6765 7211 52,844 58607 21,597 166,735 80,229 204,840 33,335 217,279 50,172 138,788 96,311 1,145,468

Margin of Victory between Gore & Bush 0.01% 0.06% 0.22% 0.31% 0.44% 1.27% 1.86% 2.40% 3.55% 3.55% 3.86% 4.17% 5.11% 5.13% 5.44% 5.58% 6.29% 2.86%

Percent Blank Votes*

Delegates at Stake

Percent of Total Delegates

Winner

Florida New Mexico Wisconsin Iowa Oregon New Hampshire Missouri Minnesota Nevada Ohio Tennessee Pennsylvania Maine Michigan Arkansas Washington Arizona Summary

2.86% 2.68% NA 0.94% 1.62% 1.65% NA 0.75% 0.72% 1.96% NA NA NA 1.09% NA 1.18% 1.76%

25 5 11 7 7 4 11 10 4 21 11 23 4 18 6 11 8 186

4.66% 0.93% 2.05% 1.30% 1.30% 0.74% 2.05% 1.86% 0.74% 3.91% 2.05% 4.28% 0.74% 3.35% 1.12% 2.05% 1.49% 34.6%

Bush Gore Gore Gore Gore Bush Bush Gore Bush Bush Bush Gore Gore Gore Bush Gore Bush

* Blank Votes = number of ballots cast minus number of presidential votes recorded for the presidential question.

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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

2) Residual votes in 2000 and sources of error Caltech/MIT found 4 6 Million residual votes nationally during the 2000 election. (4 6% of the total ballots cast). 1 Caltech/MIT define residual votes as the number of uncounted, unmarked, and spoiled ballotsproviding a yardstick for measuring the effect of different machine types on the incidence of lost votes. Sources of error included: 1.5 to 2 Million Lost Because of Faulty Equipment and Confusing Ballots 1.5 to 3 Million Lost Because of Registration Mix Ups Up to 1 Million Lost Because of Polling Place Operations Unknown Losses Because of Absentee Ballot Problems

These difficulties resulted in residual vote rates for the election that exceeded the margins of victory in some of the battleground states. 3) Alabama 2002 Governors Election2 Incumbent governor Don Siegelman (DEM) lost to challenger Bob Riley (REP) after figures originally reported by Baldwin County, near Mobile on Alabama's Gulf Coast, were adjusted by approximately 6,000 votes The initial tally showed Siegelman received about 19,000 votes, making him the state's winner by two-tenths of 1 percent. But hours after the polls closed, Baldwin officials said the first number was wrong, and that Siegelman had received just fewer than 13,000 votes. Those figures made Riley the winner by about 3,000 votes. Chuck Grainger, general counsel for the Alabama secretary of state, said a computer glitch led to the first figure. The glitch was fixed, and the latter figure of 13,000 has been certified by Baldwin County. Siegelman, however, said he believed a small group of vote-counters recounted the ballots after official poll watchers had gone home, in defiance of state law. He said no other candidates on the ballot saw their totals change. "I asked for a statewide recount of every vote in this election -- a recount of every vote in every precinct, of every vote in every county," Siegelman said. "Let's recount all of the votes and discover once and for all who was the legitimate winner of Tuesday's election." But Baldwin County did not recount its votes.

Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, 2001

Source from several sources, however, some of the included text was taken from Alabama governor calls for recount, CNN.com http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/11/07/elec02.al.g.dispute/

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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

II

Votewatch
(a) What we do Votewatch is a citizen-driven nonprofit non-partisan organization that monitors public elections in the U.S. to identify voting anomalies which impact election results. In 2004 Votewatch will deploy teams of volunteers in key states to scrutinize the election process in real time. The data that is collected will be analyzed by our panel of statistical experts and the findings immediately communicated to interested parties, the media and the public. Our long term goals are to: Determine the accuracy of the election process, particularly in precincts and regions where paperless electronic voting systems have been implemented and where communities of color have been hindered in the election process; Create transparency by providing real time independent non-partisan election data directly to the public through a variety of media technologies; Provide state legislatures with data on election system performance so that legislators may formulate new election laws and regulations based upon objective data that unmistakably identifies election system problems and offers insights on how to correct them. Improve the ability to legally contest elections where there is evidence of voting irregularities. Provide evidence to lawyers and advocacy groups in a timely manner to allow them to file legal contests of election results prior to certification of these results.

Based on the existing research, and guidance from voting experts on our advisory committee, Votewatch intends to target communities most likely to be impacted by voting anomalies: Communities that are rolling out electronic voting equipment. Communities where voter registration database purging is likely to differentially effect citizens of color. Communities where margins of victory in key races are likely to be within the margin of error. Communities that previously experienced high levels of anomalies.

(b) Who we are Votewatch is comprised of citizen volunteers, a small staff, a field research partner, and an advisory committee. Specifically, contributors to the Votewatch include: the General Public including Voters, Concerned Citizens, Media, Advocacy Groups and Political Candidates, all of who may submit reports on suspected malfeasance or voter rights infringement. Videographers, who can upload video content taken from polling locations, including interviews with voters who experienced infringement(s) on their rights. Lawyers, who can share legal briefs or discuss legal strategies with other lawyers in an open but secure discussion forum. Journalists, who can submit commissioned article concepts for approval, and then write and upload approved commissioned articles. Other Media Participants who may request hourly headlines of Votewatch collected reports on Election Day.
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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

Citizen Observers (Votewatchers), who can provide raw qualitative and quantitative exit polling data, record affidavits from victims of voter rights infringement, and log voting machine malfunctions that can later be tracked so as to ensure their resolution prior to the next election. The Votewatch Advisory committee helps oversee Votewatch methods and data collection approaches, guides our actions in presenting information to the public, and helps us connect to other resources and organizations. Members already recruited include leaders in the statistical community, the media, the legal community and experts on voting issues, as well as concerned citizen representatives.

(c) Methodology for understanding voting anomalies Problems with voting that lead to disenfranchisement, lost votes, wrongly counted votes or other voting anomalies have many sources. They can stem from: record keeping problems that occur before the voter reaches the polls (e.g. incorrect purging of registered voters); errors in check-in procedures at the polls (e.g. providing someone the ballot for the wrong precinct or party); voter interface issues (e.g. confusing ballot designs, or malfunctioning voting equipment); vote counting/recounting errors (e.g. machines, ballots or precincts excluded), or; failure to follow appropriate and required processes at any point (e.g. closed, inaccessible, or late opening polling locations, shortage of provisional ballots, failure to ask for correct identification, lack of qualified poll workers, lack of signage or assistance available in needed languages, lack of handicapped access to equipment, or the inability to audit the voting process).

Because these problems and their sources are so varied, no one vantage point can get feedback on them all. Voters may believe that they have completed a ballot correctly when, in fact, their choice failed to register in the voting equipment. Observers may see that voters are asking many questions about how to vote their ballots or get equipment to work, but not be able to find out what the resolutions to the problems are. Existing data from elections may show anomalies in terms of missing vote rates, but offer no explanation as to why they happen. In order to identify voting anomalies and problems encountered by voters, Votewatch takes a mixed method approach to understanding voting anomalies that gives us as many different viewpoints into the voting process as possible. Polls at local precincts, voter logs, and on-line surveys allow us to identify problems from the voters point of view. Observations at local precincts provide us with information on what problems occur in the poll workers area. Analyses of over- and under-vote data help identify or corroborate reports of equipment or ballot issues. Observation of recounts gives insight into ballot, equipment and process problems that were encountered, as well as allowing assessment of the auditability of the vote. (See Table 2)

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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

Table 2: Votewatch Documentation Approaches and Information Collected

Documentation Approach Exit Surveys Point of View Sampling Approach Types of Problems Documented

Individual Voter

Stratified Random Sample

Individual Registration, Accessibility, Checkin, Ballot, Disenfranchisement issues (some), or Voter- experienced Equipment Problems; Voter Confidence Polling Location Accessibility, Check-in, Ballot (some), Procedural Issues, Disenfranchisement problems (some),or Equipment Problems (some) Individual Registration, Accessibility, Checkin, Ballot, or Equipment Problems; Voter Confidence Detailed descriptions of Individual Registration, Accessibility, Check-in, Ballot, or voter-experienced Equipment Problems; Voter Confidence Ballot and Equipment Problems (those not readily obvious the voter), Auditability/Verifiability of Vote

Polling Place Observation

Observer/Polling Location

Stratified Random Sample

Internet Surveys

Individual Voter

Non-Random/ Voluntary

Voter Log

Individual Voter

Non-Random/ Voluntary

Recount Observation

Observer/ Recounting Location or Station County/ Statewide

Stratified Random, where possible otherwise a Convenience Sample of observable precincts Universe for State or County

Election Data

Trends in over and under vote which may indicate ballot or equipment problems.

(d) Pilot efforts during The October 7th Recall Election and Super Tuesday Primaries Votewatch pilot tested these multiple methods for feasibility during Californias October 7th Recall Election, and conducted more extensive testing of processes for missing vote rate tabulations during the Super Tuesday Primaries. We planned to test the methods to see if untrained volunteer surveyors could be used, to identify whether voters would respond to survey questions that addressed their voting experience, and to see if polling place observation could yield useful results. We found that by having intensive coverage of an individual site with multiple approaches and view points, and supporting information from the web page, we were able to identify voting problems much more quickly than we anticipated.

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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

III Eyes on Elections: Mixed Methods for Documenting Voting Irregularities

(a) Questionnaires Votewatch staff and volunteers with experience in survey design developed an 18 item exit survey. Exit survey items were based on a review of literature regarding sources for voting anomalies, including the 2001 Caltech/MIT report, reports on anomalies during the 2000 Florida elections and on other sources including voter logs from the Votewatch 2002 web page reflecting problems encountered by voters during the November 2002 elections. It was pilot tested in English with a small number of volunteers to ensure question clarity and appropriateness, and then translated into Spanish. The Spanish version was re-piloted with bilingual staff and volunteers. The survey covered the following topics: Registration experience Sample ballots Ease of locating and accessing precinct Experience at the precinct Items intentionally left blank Voter confidence that their vote was counted Other voter concerns expressed Polling Place Logistics/Adherence to Regulations Demographics/ Voter Information

Because part of our goal was to pilot test the ability of volunteers to implement a random sample survey, we collaborated with a local volunteer group (the California Jaycees) and with individuals who had volunteered through the Votewatch web page to conduct surveys at two polling locations. One location, in southern California, used paper scannable ballots, the other, in northern California used punch cards. A third location using touch screens was observed, but no polls were conducted due to lack of volunteers in that location. Volunteers were provided with a one hour training via Webex two days before the election. Volunteers were trained in appropriate ways of approaching voters to complete the survey, how to address refusal attempts, how to implement the survey, random selection procedures, how to document response rates, appropriate handling of completed surveys, and how to field questions about the organization. In addition, supervisors were assigned to at each site provide additional on-location guidance and to monitor the random voter selection process. (The supervisors also ensured that each site had Spanish language capacity, if needed.) At each site, volunteers carried out two shifts of data collection. Data collection times were randomly selected. (At one site, the randomly selected times were compromised because volunteers showed up late.) Volunteers were able to collect approximately 62 surveys in a total of four 2 hour shifts, with a response rate of 65%. Survey results indicated that while most voters felt their experience had been relatively problem free, some encountered equipment problems, 8% had difficulty finding their polling place, and several (12%) noted deliberately skipping at least one item, usually the candidate for governor item.
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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

(b) Polling place observations In addition to surveying exiting voters, Votewatch also stationed observers with structured observation guides in the two precincts with exit polling volunteers and in an additional precinct for which no volunteers were available. Observers were trained researchers (as opposed to volunteers), and each received two hours of instruction on the observation guide being used. The observation guide covered the same issues as the exit poll, however from a polling location point of view. It also had expanded items on issues such as accessibility, parking, poll opening and closing times and other issues that could be readily observed at the polling locations that individual voters might miss. As part of the guide, observers were asked to do periods of (unstructured) ethnographic observation, as well as conducting counts of numbers and types of individuals waiting at the polls in selected periods of time. We went into the observation process with some skepticism about the ability of this method to uncover problems at the polls. However, observations turned out to be a very quick way to get a snapshot of many problems that were occurring and were later reported through the web or exit surveys, as well as offering insight into missing vote (over and undervote) information obtained later. In general, our observers noted that while most voters had no difficulty finding their candidate on the ballot (which was what we anticipated would happen, as there were 135 names listed), some were confused about how to make their intentions clear. At one polling place several voters asked where to mark their ballot to vote for Gray Davis after not finding him on the candidate list. Poll workers explained that Davis was the current governor and not a candidate on the ballot. Polling places were merged in counties throughout California, and the location observed in Orange County was crowded, although the wait to check registration rarely exceeded 15 minutes. Some voters in Santa Clara received incorrect information about their polling place from a web site, and a number of voters were asked to cast provisional ballots because their name was not on the list of registered voters. After a certain point in the day, the observer noted that poll workers stopped providing provisional ballots to individuals who came to that precinct, and instead asked them to go to their correct polling location. The observer at the site using DRE equipment (for the first time) noted several voters, particularly older voters, having difficulties using the equipment. Voters on DRE equipment appeared to face particular challenges finding their candidates names on the list. The following comments were heard: Caucasian couple (60-70) Woman---I liked the other way better Man---it was a bit confusing because I looked at it at home and there were only three pages of candidates but here there were 8 screens of names Woman---yes that was confusing but how often do you have 130 candidates? Another incident observed: Hispanic male (45-50) registers for the touch screen and is directed to one of the screens. The man stands there for several seconds looking at the screen. He gets closer to it and put the voting card in. He looks at the screen for a while and then
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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

takes the card out again. He does this a couple more times. When he enters the voting card for the fourth time, he begins the voting process. He did not ask for help nor did any of the workers see him take the card out and re-enter it several times. Observers also saw multiple procedural problems at polling places including provisional ballots being mixed with regular ballots, voters receiving two ballots, and voters not being offered the option of voting a provisional ballot. (c) On-line Questionnaires and Logs A survey similar to the one used at the polling place exits was also deployed on-line to allow voters from other precincts to report their experiences. In addition, voters could write first hand reports about their voting experience through the Votewatch voter logs. Both the survey and the voter log required registration with the web page to help protect against users who attempt to shut down the web page by posting multiple, irrelevant responses. Both the log responses and the on-line surveys completed showed similar problems to those identified in the polling sites were encountered in other locations. Respondents on web surveys and logs are self selected, and almost always have something they want to report, therefore the concentration of problems encountered in on-line responses is much higher, however the types of problems encountered were similar. For example one log noted: Although my voting location changed for the third straight election (something which NEVER happened in NY), I voted, perhaps for the last time, using the punch card system. The election workers seemed serious and knowledgeable, adding to my confidence. There was a sign informing voters to make sure loose chads were removed. Another had problems removing a hanging chad: When leaving the voting booth I saw a sign that said "Got chad? It worked since I looked at my punch card and saw a chad. I went back to the machine and tried 3 times to fully punch out the chad. I moved the card; I pressed and wiggled, etc. I had to manually rip the chad off. Ballot problems noted in observations and in the missing vote rates were also reflected by the logs: I voted first thing this morning, and received lengthy instructions on how to mark the box, and to be sure to only mark one box for governor, and when I pulled out the three sheets to vote, I found my candidate, and marked the issues (53, 54), and placed this in the box. I realized that I did not check Yes on the first question. I think there may be a problem with people like me who intend to vote "yes"...because we might just look for our candidate, and miss the first question (whereas if you are voting no, you would just check the "no" box.) If others are like me, there may be a margin of error for people who meant to vote "yes" on question one, but just voted for a person.... I went to the official and explained by error, and he said it was too late to try to fix it.

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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

(d) Vote Over and Undercounts 1) Over and Undercounts from the October 7th Elections Immediately following the October 7th Elections, Votewatch staff collected information on missing vote rates in each of the California counties from the California Secretary of State Offices web site. These data appeared to confirm the observation and voter log comments that voters may have inadvertently skipped the recall item. They also showed the wide range in missing votes from county to county, and among different types of equipment. For example, on punch card equipment missing vote rates for the recall question were fairly high- around 7%, while on DRE equipment they were around 1.5%. On DRE equipment it would be very difficult to accidentally skip an item as the screen offers prompts for incomplete items. It should be noted that approximately 34% of the total votes cast in the recall election were cast on Votomatic punch card ballots, which had an 8.2% undervote rate for the recall item. (In comparison, the Diebold Accuvote-OS optical scanner accounted for 12% of the total votes cast and had a 2.4% undervote rate on the first item.) 2) Recount Observations Votewatch staff observed the recount of the ballots in two counties and was able to document the following: We were able to identify why or rule out causes for undervotes and overvotes. For example, in one precinct, approximately 3.7% of the 9.7% of the undervotes on Question #1 occurred due to a dimpled or not-fully torn chad. In addition, we also noted that 4.7% of the total population of ballots that recorded an under or overvote on Question #1 were completed accurately for the remaining three questions. In one county we observed a highly structure recount process where teams of four worked together to call out the vote recorded, tally the vote recorded and check the accuracy of the vote on the ballot as well as the tally of votes. In another county individuals worked in teams of two in an unstructured system where there were no inherent checks and balances, and where meaningful oversight was impossible. Recount observations also provide insight into the overall auditability and transparency of the vote data. In counties using DRE equipment, there are currently no processes by which observers can watch the recount process in a meaningful way.

3) Super Tuesday and Missing Votes Votewatch collected and analyzed election returns from counties in eight Super Tuesday states as they became available on Tuesday, March 2nd and Wednesday March 3rd. Our goals in conducting this analysis were to identify the types of data available in different states in the hours following the election and analyze available data for anomalies that might indicate problems with elections at the county or state level. Specifically we wanted to look at the differences in the number of ballots cast for specific items, and the number of votes recorded on those items. The ultimate goal of this trial was to see where, if and how missing vote information might be usable in coordination with other types of data.

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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

Although some percentage of undervote is to be expected in any election due to individuals who accidentally or deliberately skip an item, a high proportion of undervote on a statewide item in a particular county may indicate a voting equipment or ballot problem, or be a sign that a particular item was worded in a confusing way. Alternately, since data must be transferred from precincts to the county and from the county to the state before posting, it could be a sign that inaccurate data is being passed from one level to the next. The following table provides information about the availability of results on election night and the day following for the states monitored in the March 2004 Super Tuesday primary. (Although much of the needed data may be available for a fee from the Associated Press and/or other services public data was used, as this information is what is readily available to citizens who want to monitor their elections for fairness and accuracy.) Table 3: Availability of Election Results During 2004 Super Tuesday Primaries
State Results Posted on State Website Election Night? Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Total Votes Cast Available? Yes Yes No No No No Yes No When Results Get Posted (before/after certification?) Before Before Before Before After After Before Before

California Connecticut Georgia Maryland Massachusetts New York Ohio Rhode Island

The majority of states reported real-time election results on their websites on election night. California, Connecticut, and Ohio websites provided complete information, including the number of votes cast. Some problems with these states existed, however: Once imported, California and Ohio results had to be extensively reformatted before any analysis that might indicate problems could be conducted. Ohio reported results broken down by Democratic, Republican, and Republican-At-Large. It is not clear how Republican and Republican-At-Large differently affect the vote count for Republican candidates, which caused some difficulty with analysis. (Votewatch is in the process of clarifying this issue with Ohio.) Results from Connecticut were in a user friendly table although for some counties Number checked as voting, their equivalent of ballots cast, was still missing several hours after the total votes were in. However by three days after the election all data was updated and complete.

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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

In all, the lack of readily available data on the number of votes cast may make it difficult to use official election returns as a way to gain insight into voting anomalies immediately following elections, however in combination with other data sources this data can be helpful where it is available. (e) Findings when information is put together Looking across data sources in the October 7th Special Election allowed us to identify certain problems more quickly than by using individual sources. Specifically we were able to get information on: Voters inadvertently missing the recall question (from observations, later corroborated by the missing vote rates and voter logs online); Voters intentionally leaving the candidate selection item blank (from exit surveys); Equipment difficulties, particularly with older voters on DREs, or voters using punch cards for which chads would not fully detach (from surveys and observations, later corroborated by some on-line logs, although not supported by other logs); Voters having difficulty locating polling places (from observations, later corroborated by surveys and logs), and; Voters not receiving provisional ballots (from observations).

Although it is possible that exit polling alone could have provided much of this information, by triangulating data sources we were able to access information that voters could not tell us (for example, questions that they accidentally missed). With observation approaches, we were also able to notice trends early in the day which we could then check for in other data sources later on.

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Votewatch Examining Voting Problems Using A Mixed Method Approach

IV

Next Steps and Conclusions

Votewatch is currently planning a pilot test during the Georgia congressional primary election that will use all methods for documenting election issues simultaneously. Plans are dependant on resources, however we are hoping to be able to field between 20 and 100 precincts of polling and observation, while promoting the Votewatch website for web surveys and logs across the state. We are also investigating ways of working more closely with state officials, both to ensure support of Votewatch efforts and to help foster use of the findings. Based on our experience pilot testing these approaches in Georgia, Votewatch intends to field exit surveys and observations, track election results in key states during November 2004. Media support before the election will be used to direct voters to the web surveys and logs. By using multiple methods of documenting election problems, Votewatch ultimately hopes to help ensure that each vote counts and is counted. We recognize that it will take more than one, or two elections to make the changes needed in our system to support accuracy and fairness for the populations most at risk for disenfranchisement. However, by collecting information on the types, sources and causes of voting anomalies, Votewatch hopes to replace the existing mixture of anecdotal data on voting anomalies available on election day with systematic information that can be used by election officials, legislators, advocacy groups, and the public.

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