ENGINEERING FOR SAFETY FOCUS

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Probable cause

Probabilistic risk analysis should be used more often for fire-engineered designs. Michael Belsham explains, using the example of a proposed hotel design

ROBABILISTIC risk analysis (PRA) forms part of the British Standard, BS 7974: Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings, yet remains under-utilised within the fire engineering industry. The reasons for this under-use are unclear, since: PRA provides an ideal method to assess fire engineering solutions, especially where consequence-based methods, such as available safe egress time (ASET)/required safe evacuation time (RSET), may not be suitable for example, in sleeping-type use the standards and technical guidance documents that support UK Building Regulations, such as the Technical Handbook in Scotland or Approved Document B in England and Wales, are all risk-based (the ultimate objective is to ensure that the risk of death in a building type is acceptably low); thus a risk-based approach, such as PRA, is inherently a more consistent and coherent method of developing alternative fireengineered solutions PRA methods enable a better understanding of failure modes, and this enables better informed and more focused design. PRA formally determines the required reliability of a system, not just its performance if it works as designed

The inherent reliabilities within the standards may not be appropriate for a specific design situation (for example, a fire alarm system specified to BS 5839: Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings may not have sufficient reliability for a specific situation, and could require additional detectors and/or circuits to achieve the required reliability). Conversely, providing a number of systems in parallel can be used to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, whereas a system on its own would not have sufficient safety. It is usually much cheaper to provide duplicate systems with typical reliability, rather than a single system with enhanced reliability. Worked example Although it is a well-established technique in mature riskbased industries (such as nuclear, transport, process, and oil and gas), it is recommended that PRA be used on a more regular basis in fire-engineered designs. The engineers and approving authorities need to have the required expertise (since an engineered solution requires an engineered approach to approvals). PRA can be used to show the reliability of individual systems and the benefit of systems operating in parallel, to provide various paths of achieving an acceptable level of safety. This article provides a worked example of a PRA design a proposed hotel design and aims to provide a benchmark

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In the proposed hotel, the bedrooms on each upper level are to be accessed via a protected corridor from a single stairwell preceded by a protected lobby. The building height is 17m. As an alternative to a second escape route, it is proposed to enhance the active fire protection by providing sprinklers throughout the building. It is also proposed to provide a smoke shaft within each corridor on the upper levels to enable smoke purging of the escape route in the event of a fire. In addition, the building will incorporate a protected lobby to the stairwell. With the provision of sprinklers and smoke ventilation, a single escape route is considered sufficient to allow the escape height restrictions in the Technical Handbook to be exceeded for a single escape stairwell. However, justification of this design is problematic for standard ASET vs RSET fire modelling, due to the sleeping use (which entails long pre-movement evacuation times and the risk of swift transport of smoke into escape routes), and so PRA is utilised to justify this alternative solution by comparative risk analysis. Of particular interest is the floor area. The size of the building inherently reduces the number of potential fire sources and reduces fire risk; this can be incorporated into PRA analysis.
Figure 1: Floor plan of upper hotel level

Probabilistic analysis Fire safety engineering is inherently based on a measure of risk. Despite the amount of protection to escape routes, there is always a risk that fire could endanger occupants due to the systematic failure of protection systems for example, the wedging open of fire doors, or a non-functional alarm system. Fire engineering design should include sufficient redundancy such that failure of one or more elements does not compromise the safe evacuation of the building, and permits an appropriate level of risk. PRA allows this level of risk to be quantified and compared by assigning probabilities of failure to fire protection systems. Risk is a function of the consequence of a hazard and the frequency of that hazard occurring. For fire engineering, the consequence is injury or fatality from a fire, and frequency of fire affecting occupants from historical data. PD 7974-7 describes two categories of acceptance criteria: comparative analysis and absolute analysis (see Table 1). The comparative analysis method compares the level of risk in the proposed design to the level of risk in a design

for the use of PD 7974-7: Probabilistic risk assessment within the industry. The PD provides guidance on PRA in support of BS 7974, outlining the circumstances where this approach is appropriate and giving examples illustrating its use. It also includes data for PRA and criteria for assessment. One reason for scepticism of PRA is the validity of historical probability data. However, using the data within PD 7974-7 allows a level playing field for use of data for assessment. Proposed hotel A new five-storey hotel is proposed for Glasgow. It features sleeping accommodation on the upper levels (see Figure 1) and reception and common spaces on the ground floor. The building has a footprint area of only 430m2, with 12 bedrooms per floor. A single escape stair per floor level is proposed. Section 2.9 of the Scottish Building Regulations NonDomestic Technical Handbook says that every space more than 7.5m above the final exit level should have at least two escape routes.
Table 1: Typical types of acceptance criteria Analysis method Life safety Comparative Absolute

Fire safety objectives Financial Comparison of design alternatives (cost-benefit analysis) Acceptable average loss per year

Level of risk equivalent to code-compliant solution, such as Approved Document B Number of casualties per year

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following the guidance in the Technical Handbook (which are solutions that are deemed to satisfy and thus achieve the required performance), calculated with the level of risk that is considered acceptable by prescriptive methods. Absolute analysis criteria require the level of risk to be above a predefined figure. A comparative analysis for life safety is used for the PDA in this article, as there are no generally accepted absolute criteria in relation to fire safety. However, the resultant level of risk is compared with some absolute risk values listed in PD 7974-7 for individual and societal risk, to help give assurance of the method of analysis. Event-tree analysis An event-tree analysis is used to assess the level of risk from the systematic failure of protection systems. Event trees describe the cumulative probability of a defined range of possible outcomes of an event (an example is shown in Figure 2). The frequency associated with each branch is given by multiplying the initiating frequency and relevant conditional probabilities of success or failure as follows:

where F = frequency of fire starts and P = probability of failure Applying it to the proposed hotel, event-tree analysis is used to assess a range of outcomes that would cause fire to threaten the escape stair. The following is a list of fire protection features available to the escape route from the hotel bedrooms on each floor: three fire doors between the bedrooms and the stair, with the provision of a protected lobby smoke shaft that provides smoke exhaust from the corridor of fire origin opening automatically on detection sprinkler system that controls fire at the source and limits smoke migration to the stair smoke detection to alert occupants and staff of fire ignition

Figure 2: Event tree showing the early stages of fire development

Is the item restricted to the item first ignited? Is the fire detected less than 5 minutes from ignition? Outcome Frequency 0.14 0.6 Ignition 0.24 fires per year 0.4 No Yes 0.05

0.5

0.5

0.05

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Hotel bedroom

mode 2: successful operation of life safety sprinkler system or smoke ventilation system mode 3: successful operation of smoke detection and manual intervention with fire extinguisher

Lobby Corridor Lobby

Stairwell

Stairwell

The modes of success are as agreed as acceptable with the local authority building standards department (supported with fire engineering modelling); this part of the process is outside the scope of this article. The probabilities are set out below:

Figure 3: Technical Handbook solution

Fire protection that needs to occur together Life safety sprinklers or smoke ventilation system Successful operation of one of five fire doors Successful operation of one of three fire doors Smoke detection and manual intervention

Probability of success

Probability of failure

This is compared to the protection required by a notional building that follows the guidance of the Technical Handbook: two lobbied stair shafts, with the corridor linking bedrooms to each shaft. The minimum fire safety measures of this solution are: two stairs with two lobbies this would require five fire doors to fail to close on demand between the hotel room and the stairs to expose both stairs (see Figure 3) smoke detection to alert occupants and staff of fire ignition

0.98

0.02

0.99968

0.00032

0.992 0.63

0.008 0.37

The calculation relating to this event tree (see Figure 4) is thus:

The probabilities of success of the individual fire protection features are described in Annex A of PD 7974-7, and listed below:
Fire protection feature Self-closing fire doors closing on demand Life safety sprinkler system successful operation Smoke ventilation system operating as designed Reliability of smoke detection system (commercial) Manual firefighting intervention* Probability of failure 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 Probability of success 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3

where F4 is the likelihood of failure and exposure of the escape routes For the stair to become untenable, all three modes need to fail. The failure mode for this is: all fire doors open AND (sprinkler system OR smoke ventilation failure) AND (smoke detection AND manual intervention failure)

And for the Technical Handbook solution: all fire doors open AND (smoke detection AND manual intervention failure)

Note (*) = there are no data for manual fire intervention listed in PD 7947, and so these data are obtained from international fire engineering guidelines

The probability of failure between the compartment and stair is described as follows. The Technical Handbook solution two stairs with smoke detection only has the following probability of failure for the exposure of both stairs:
Scenario Fire doors Sprinklers Smoke Total and venting detectors or manual intervention None 0.37 1.2 x 10-4

Probability of failure The event tree for the fire safety of the single escape route in the proposed hotel design is as follows. For the escape route to become threatened, a combination of the safety measures outlined above would need to fail: The three proposed modes of success are: mode 1: at least one fire door between fire compartment and escape stair operates successfully
Technical Handbook Five doors compliant hotel 0.00032 building Proposed hotel Three doors single escape route 0.008 sprinklers

0.02

0.37

5.9 x 10-5

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Fire door closed?

Sprinklers and smoke venting operate?

Detection and manual intervention function?

Stair protected?

The above shows that a code-compliant building is about three-times more likely to have a fire than the proposed hotel with its low floor area. Likelihood of failure

Fire starts (F) Yes

Success

No (PF1)

0.98 Yes Success

For the Technical Handbook solution of two stairs and smoke detection, and assuming a uniform building layout, the likelihood of failure for a five-level code-compliant hotel is calculated as follows:

0.02 No (PF2)

0.63 Yes Success

0.37 No (PF3)

Failure (F4)

Where F = frequency of fire starts = 0.4 PF1 = probability of failure of doors to close = 0.00032

Figure 4: Event tree for stairwell exposure

PF2 = probability of failure of smoke detection and manual intervention = 0.37 Likelihood of fire threatening escape routes = frequency of ignition x likelihood of systems failure = 0.4 x 1.2 x 10-4 = 4.7 x 10-5 per year For the proposed hotel with single stairwell, sprinklers and smoke control, the level of risk is given as follows:

It can be seen from the above probabilities of failure that the additional protection systems in the proposed hotel provide a higher level of safety than would be afforded within a building designed to the Technical Handbook. Frequency of fire starts For the proposed hotel, each hotel floor is 430m2. The total hotel bedroom floor area for the five-level building is therefore 1,720m2, with the ground floor being communal space. This is a key feature in the design, as the limited floor area reduces the frequency of ignition of the building because frequency of fires is proportional to floor area, according to PD 7974-7. According to the Technical Handbook, the maximum compartment area of a code-compliant hotel could be 1,000m2. For a building with the same number of floors as the proposed hotel, the total hotel bedroom floor area of our notional code-compliant hotel would be 5,000m2. Equation 1 of PD 7974 allows the frequency of ignition (Fi) to be calculated when given the floor area and probability of fire.

Where F = frequency of fire starts = 0.1376 PF1 = probability of failure of doors to close = 0.008 PF2 = probability of failure of sprinklers or smoke ventilation = 0.02 PF3 = probability of failure of smoke detection and manual intervention = 0.37 Likelihood of fire threatening escape routes = frequency of ignition x likelihood of systems failure = 0.1376 x 5.9 x 10-5 = 8.1 x 10-6 per year As this likelihood is less than the likelihood calculated for a Technical Handbook solution, the design is considered acceptable. Acceptable level of risk The following summarise the calculated code-compliant and actual building likelihood of failure per occupancy per year for the comparative analysis:
Technical Handbook 4.7 x 10
-5

where (a) and (b) are constants for the particular building and (Ab) denotes the total floor area To assess the level of risk, the risk of fire ignition must be established. Data within Table A.1 of PD 7974-7 describes the probability of fire starts per year per m2 for various occupancies. For hotels, (a) is 0.00008 (8 x 10-5) (yr.m2)-1 and (b) is 1. This is compared for both the proposed hotel and a codecompliant hotel as follows:
Building Proposed hotel Code-compliant hotel Frequency of ignition 0.00008 x 1720 = 0.1376 0.00008 x 5000 = 0.4

Proposed hotel 8.1 x 10

-6

Safety factor 5.8

The extent of fire separations and protection systems is considered to provide a greater level of safety than that inherently implied by a building designed to the Technical Handbook.

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Joint Code of Practice: Fire Prevention on Construction Sites

Every year, numerous major fires occur on construction sites and in buildings undergoing refurbishment. All have serious consequences, from causing injury to holding up completion dates. The code, jointly published by the FPA and the Construction Confederation, has been credited with helping to significantly reduce construction losses since its introduction in 1992. The 7th edition of the code, due for publication in early 2009, has been updated to address new legislation and to tackle emerging and existing risks, such as high-rise buildings and timber-frame construction. Aimed at designers, architects, engineers, building control and fire and rescue service personnel, contractors, site management staff, insurers and consultants, this FPA seminar will provide a clear overview of the code, and consider the practical implementation of requirements on site. Certification: CPD hours are available

PD 7974-7 lists values for absolute risk for both individual and societal risk. Although the above calculations for likelihood of failure cannot be translated to the number of injuries or deaths, it is interesting to compare the above results with that listed. For example, the number of deaths per building per year for hotels is 8.8 x 10-5. Therefore, as our figures are less than this number, this would imply that the analysis is in the right ball park and could indicate that the design provides a higher level of safety to this individual risk than the historical average, and also that it could be considered acceptable by society. Limitations and assumptions As this analysis is limited to the probability data within PD 7974, there are aspects of the design that cannot be reflected in the data that is available. Some examples are as follows: common mode of failure: with elements that are related by a common mode, such as the maintenance of door closers, the failure of two or more elements could be more likely location of fire doors: the probability does not reflect the fact that stair and lobby doors are more likely to be wedged open than a hotel door. Again, the data is not sufficiently detailed to provide this information, and only subjective judgment could be used to alter the probability to suit

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29 26 3 29 27 16 20 12 April Moreton in Marsh May Liverpool June Glasgow July London August Moreton in Marsh September London October York November Moreton in Marsh
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The above limits the extent of PRA assessment, however, with comparative analysis, the same probabilities are used for each assessment, reducing the risk of the data accuracy. Due to the various limitations, the design is kept as simple as possible, restricting to one set of data for accuracy in the source of information. Concluding remarks In this example, PRA has been carried out to assess the ability of a proposed fire engineering design of sprinklers and smoke control to protect a single means of escape from a hotel of limited floor area. An event-tree analysis is used to show the modes of failure that would expose the escape route to threat of fire. From the event tree, the likelihood of failure is calculated from frequency of fire starts and the probability of protection failure. In addition, comparative analysis is used to assess the likelihood of failure of the recommendations of the Technical Handbook (with its two-stair solution) against the proposed one-stair solution in the hotel. The PRA shows that the provision of sprinklers and smoke ventilation justifies the access to one stair for a building with limited floor area I

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Michael Belsham is a senior fire engineer with Safe Consulting Limited

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