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Thomas Aquinas on Virtuous Warfare Author(s): Darrell Cole Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 57-80 Published by: on behalf of Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40018215 . Accessed: 12/04/2012 01:22
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THOMAS AQUINAS ON VIRTUOUS WARFARE Darrell Cole

ABSTRACT Thomas Aquinas, one of the "foundingfathers"ofjust war theory,offers an account of virtuous warfare in practice. The author argues that Aquinas's approachto warfare, with its emphasis on justice and charity,is helpful in providing a coherent moral account of war to which Christians can subscribe. Particular attention is given to the role of charity, since this virtue is the distinguishing characteristic of the Christian soldier. Charity compels him to soldier justly, and by fighting justly, he is elevated by God to friendship with God.Notable features of this approachare its emphasis on the criteria forjudging whether a war is just and its relativizing of the criteria for proper combat behavior. KEYWORDS: Aquinas, charity,justice, just war, rules, virtue
THAT ALASDAIR MACINTYRE COMPLAINS MODERN WRITERS just war begin in on

the wrong place (Maclntyre 1980, 40-41). Modernaccounts center in that concern largelyuponproblems war:thosecritical-stage problems for example,of saturationbombingor hostage taking. Such decisions, of problemsare symptomatic earlier moralfailings. The point Maclnwishes to make is that we should seek to avoid the extreme tyre situationsin the first place.Howwe go aboutdoingthis will tell us a lot how we handlethe moralproblems aboutourselves.Put morestrongly, moralcapacity. of war identifiesourfundamental of on Accounts warthat concentrate critical-stage oftenrely problems upon rules for makingdecisions.These rules more often than not are culledfromwhat are generallyknownas the just war criteria.This unfortunatesituationhas bequeathed a rule-driven us accountof war that pays little attentionto howwar is actuallyfought.1

I thank G. Scott Davis, Stanley Hauerwas, and Eugene F. Rogers Jr. for their helpful comments on an early version of this article. 1 This is not the place to enumerate all of the "Thomistic" war positions of relevance, just but two very influential recent accountsare those offeredby John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and GermainGrisezin Nuclear Deterrence, Moralityand Realism (1987) and by the U.S. Catholic bishops in The Challengeof Peace (1983). Finnis et al. argue from what they refer to as the natural law position, but it resembles Thomas Aquinas very little, and it emphasizes rules at the expense of virtue. Thereis also an emphasis on rules with a correspondingly sad lack of virtue language in the U.S. Catholicbishops'pastoral letter on war and peace.

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I believe that a close examination of Thomas Aquinas's account will reveal resources necessary for reformulating modern just war approaches that are overly dependent upon rules and lacking in any account of how anyone can obey those rules and why they should want to do so in the first place. I will argue that a turn to Aquinas, with his synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine, shows why an account of the virtues is desirable if we are to construct a coherent moral account of war to which Christians can subscribe. For example, an account of the virtues will deal with moral dilemmas in a way quite different from rule-driven accounts and will even show us how to avoid such dilemmas. The virtuous in soldier acts in view of who he is and does not make critical "decisions" the way described by critical-stage moralists. Thus, critical-stage problems can often be forestalled because the very nature of the virtuous combatant prevents, in the first place, the sort of actions that, in their chain of consequences, inevitably issue in such dilemmas. For the Christian, however,it is not enough to formulate an account of how the natural virtues help us in just war approaches,for it is the theologicalvirtue of charity that enables the just Christian soldier to act in reference to his ultimate end: happiness with God. For the Christian, then, any just war accountthat does not include attention to charity will have to find some other way to groundthe agent's acts of forcein that agent's way of life, such that the acts of force are constitutive of a way of life that brings the agent closer to God. My purpose is to show the double value of following Aquinas in grounding the solder's action in charity: his argument encourages us to expand the range of permissible Christian attitudes toward war and provokesfresh thinking about how moral concerns can best be protectedin the theater of combat. Aquinas'saccount is virtue driven. He is concerned,of course, with the virtue of justice, but what is surprising to the modern reader, even the modern Christian reader,is the prominencehe gives the virtue of charity in his discussion of the violence of war. Aquinas'slogic, however,is impeccable; charity is the virtue necessary for acquiring all other virtue and, hence, for acquiring excellence in any worthy practice. Love and war are not incompatible, and to be morally acceptable, warmaking must be a work of love. This means that a soldier cannot be an excellent soldier qua Christian soldier without charity.The account of excellence in soldiering leads to a potentially troubling aspect of Aquinas'sapproach:the absence of rules for fighting in war (what we commonlyrefer to as the jus in hello). As I have already suggested, the scarcity of rules in Aquinas's account is one of its most noticeable features. Although Aquinas offers a few criteria that define the just war, he has almost nothing to say about how a war should be fought. This is not to say that Aquinas is unconcernedwith how soldiers fight, but that he locates the questions about properbehavior in right intention and virtue- especially the virtue of charity.

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1. Aquinason PracticalRationalityand Virtue2

Aquinas argues that practical human activity is informed by different kinds of directedness (inclinatio) such as self-preservation; the birth, nurture, and education of children; the pursuit of goods; and most important, the pursuit of the knowledge of God. These inclinations must be rightly ordered, and to know how to do that, we must know our end (telos) (ST I-II 94.2). For Aquinas, the ultimate end of human life is otherworldly. Nothing can be the final end for human beings except that perfect state of happiness found in the beatific vision of God, which can take place only in the afterlife (ST I-II 1.6, 2.8). The virtues are those dispositional character traits that allow us to act rightly; they enable us to act in accordancewith our end. Our natural aptitude for virtue needs to be trained, and when our intelligence leads us to ask what our good is, the attempt to formulate an answer will lead us to discover that it cannot be answered without the help of another. The inquiring person, therefore, will seek to learn the good through relationships with those who know the good. In his discussion of human law, Aquinas argues that it is
difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing a man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue [ST I-II 95.1; cf. CNE 8, lect. 1].

The pupil achieves excellence in a practice only by learning from a master (someone who has already acquired excellence in that practice). Aquinas claims that we enact virtue by performingvirtuous acts (for instance, we become just by performingjust acts). This means that we must be able to know what is virtuous before we can possess the virtue that allows us to judge and act rightly. As we have seen, he holds that trusting the virtuous is the most commonway of knowing virtue. Insofar as positive law conformsto natural law, it, too, provides a guide (ST I-II 95.1). Furthermore, we can know what is virtuous by divine revelation - most notably the Ten Commandments, which, Aquinas says, are the primary precepts of justice and all law (ST II-II 122). Virtuous acts are those human acts that reproducethe order that God creates (ST I 22.1). Each act of disobedience (failure to reproduce God's order) is brought
2 The following sketch of Aquinas's account of practical rationality and virtue is derived fromhis Commentary Aristotle's"Nicomachean on Ethics"and his Summa theologica (henceforthcited as CNE and ST, respectively). I have also found Mclnerny 1982, Mclnerny 1992, and Maclntyre 1988, 164-208, very helpful; readers familiar with these secondary works will easily see my debt.

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about by an undisciplined natural tendency, which is a sign of a corrupt will and for which the only remedy is divine grace. Virtues that guide us toward our supernatural end are infused by grace (ST I-II 62.1, 63.3). Aquinas'sconceptionof the will is very importantto our discussion. For Aquinas the will is always free, inasmuch as it acts on the basis of contingent judgments as to what is goodor bad (ST I-II 10.2). When the intellect judges some end to be good, an act of the will toward that end ensues (ST I-II 8.2). The will must also consent to the means judged appropriateby the intellect through the process of deliberation (ST I-II 13.3). Thus, for example, when my intellect judges peace with my neighbor to be a good end, my will acts on the basis of that judgment. Moreover,my will must consent to whatever means the intellect judges appropriatein achieving peace (whether it be minding my own business, quiet discussion, or calling a policeman).This deliberationof the intellect, which ends in election by the will, is always, if fully rational, directedtoward an end only insofar as that end is a further means to the ultimate end. The beatific vision constituting the ultimate end gives the will its ultimate delight and rest (ST I-II 11.3). So, in keeping with the above example, if my deliberationabout how to keep peace with my neighbor is fully rational, then my ultimate aim in keeping peace is not peace itself but union with God.This is not to say that my deliberationis irrational or nonrationalif my acts of securing peace with my neighbor are not ultimately done for the sake of my final end; it simply means that if I do not deliberate with the final end in view, then my acts are less rational than they would (and could)have been had I deliberatedwith my ultimate end in view. Roughly speaking, for Aquinas, any human act is an act that can be called praiseworthy or blameworthy. "Moralacts and human acts are the same" (ST I-II 1.3); consequently, all human acts contribute to the virtuous or vicious character-in-formationof the human being. These acts (actiones) proceed from a "deliberatewill" (ST I-II 1.1), and because the "objectof the will is the end and the good,"the starting point of human acts (actuum) is the end (ST I-II 1.3). That is to say, the principle of human acts is the end, and "inlike manner it is their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end"(ST I-II 1.3). Intention is that which makes a plurality of acts one moral act (ST I-II 12.1), so now we can say with more precision that intentional human acts are those acts we call praiseworthy or blameworthy.3 What makes an intentional act good or bad is, first of all, its object (ST I-II 18.1), but Aquinas expands this when he discusses the fourfold
3 When Aquinas talks about completedintentional human acts, he usually uses a form of the Latin word actus, which should, generally speaking, be translated as "act." Aquinas uses forms of the Latin words actio or operationeto designate mere movement or to talk about human acts in the abstract, and these are usually translated as "action."

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goodness of the human act: its genus, species, circumstances, and end (ST I-II 18.4). An act's genus is good in an ontological sense; that is, it is good insofar as it has being, for all being has goodness. Moral appraisal of acts begins with an act's species, "which is read from the fitting object";hence, insofar as reason judges some object fitting, it is a good act. Circumstances are those accidents surrounding any act that can add to the goodness or badness of it. The end is that to which an action can be referred; it is what is most closely bound to intention. So to sum up: a good act must be a good kind of act, done at the right time and at the right place (the appropriate circumstances), and for the purpose of achieving some good end (right intention). Moral virtue is the ability to do good acts time and again. Properly formed habits allow the person to act well consistently. Acquiring such habits depends upon properly governed passions- passions that operate in accordancewith reason. When Aquinas talks about having passions in the right way, he means our passions need to be ordered not only by reason but also by our passion for God, since supreme happiness (union with God) is the final goal which all rational appetite apprehends and by which it is drawn. Aquinas's goal in the discussion of the passions (ST I-II 22-48) is to prepare the reader for the discussion on habits, for we have to be moved correctly feel correctly before we can act correctly.The successful integration of reason and passion allows us to abbreviate deliberation into "snapdecisions"that are rational by abridgment. The virtuous person is able to act- or better, react- rightly because such "snapdecisions"are a product of a will in which the passions are integrated with reason to such a degree that acting "passionately"is in accordancewith some good end. Put differently,the virtuous person's quick reactions are rationally habitual and not instinctual.4 Indeed, we can see that one of Aquinas's concerns in discussing the passions is to display the degree to which "snap"bodily transmutations (passions) are all already rational because they are, in some sense, ordered toward an approach/avoidancescheme; however, he considers them fully rational only if they are ordered toward the beatific vision that constitutes the final end (this is especially clear in the discussion of the anger/revenge scheme in I-II 46-48). Aquinas quotes Aristotle's claim that "we must reckon pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of the habit existing in us" (ST I-II 32.5) and that such habits are the product of an arousal of the
4 G. Simon Harak claims that the process is best describedas turning "snapdecisions into long-rangeplanning,"and if he means that "snapdecisions"become a part of the virtuous person'slong-rangeplanning- that is, that the virtuous person'scharacteris so constituted that "snapdecisions"are made in accordancewith a rational deliberationtoward a good end- then he is perfectly right (Harak 1993, 8).

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imagination of the good in the person. Then Aquinas goes on to say, "Although the actions (operationes) of another do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either producein me something that gives pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mine; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love"(ST I-II 32.5). So now it becomes important to become accustomed to doing good acts and imagine oneself doing more good acts. Rationality, therefore, allows passions to endure and form our character.Virtue translates passivity into activity, and a habitual right passion is a virtue. Ultimately, Aquinas's discussion of the passions tells us that we are responsible for how we react to things, for how much or how little importance we place on things- in short, for the meaning things have for us. We will not be able to react to things correctly,however, if charity does not inform all our loves. For Aquinas, objects that cause passion (that cause us to want to draw near) must be fitting for a rational animal. When we love a fitting object, the object perfects and improves us, so we are most perfected and most improved through the love of God (ST I-II 28.5). Therefore, the most fitting and most rational thing to do is to love God, and by loving God, all our passions can be ordered.This means that charity enables us to give the most meaning to God. When we possess the ability to react to things correctly,we can also act correctly.We then acquire those habits constitutive of the moral life we wish to lead.

2. The CardinalVirtuesand Charity

With this in mind, I turn now to Aquinas'sdiscussion of the four cardinal virtues. As we begin this discussion of the cardinal virtues, we must keep in mind that charity- not justice- is the crucial virtue in Aquinas's account of Christian soldiering. Justice is, of course, the key cardinal virtue insofar as we want to know what a just war looks like, but the virtue of charity is what gives the impetus for Christian participation.The point is that justice alone does not exhaust Aquinas's thoughts on virtue in war. Aquinas classifies each virtue in terms of its formalprincipleand in terms of the subjectmatter with which it deals (ST I-II 61.2). Prudenceis the exercise of reason, and its subjectmatter is the way reason should operatein practice that is, it enables us "toapply right reason to action (ad opus)" (ST II-II 47.4). This is the virtue that, for example, enables soldiers to make sound decisions in planning and fighting. Justice is the employment of reason in human conduct, and its subject matter is how the will is directed toward good acts. Justice, then, is that virtue that grants the person "the perpetual and constant will to render each one his due"(ST II-II 58.1). This is the virtue that, among other things, enables us to distinguish just wars from unjust wars. Courageis the controlof those passions that drive us to act unreasonably in the face of danger or hardship (ST

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II-II 123.1), and its subjectmatter is the irascible appetite, which can urge us to act unreasonably(ST I-II 61.2). The value of this virtue to the soldier is obvious.Temperanceis the restraint of the passions when they are contrary to reason;it is the virtue "thatinclines a man to something in accord with reason"(ST II-II 141.1), and its subject matter is the concupiscible appetite, which provides the passions with their force. This is the virtue that can, for example, check actions bornfromhate and revenge. Needless to say, each of the cardinal virtues plays a role in guiding propercombat behavior. Aquinas follows Augustine in claiming that justice is one of the names applied to God. Although Aquinas does not affirm Augustine's view that the standard of justice is something afforded to the mind by God, he does affirm with Augustine that God conceives justice perfectly and is perfect justice. He agrees with Augustine, therefore, that justice as God is the arche to which all other attributions of justice must be referred (ST I 21). Conceived in this way, justice is an eternal standard that never changes, and it is ultimately grounded on a theological ordering of goods informed by the virtue of charity. Charity is what enables the will to be rationally directed toward right and just conduct. What is rightly owed to another, both in accordancewith the natural law and positive law, is called ius. The virtue of living by those norms is spelled out under ius (and hence of possessing a character that always seeks to give what is rightly owed to others), and the universal standard of the right is called iustitia (ST II-II 57, 58). For Aquinas, the Ten Commandments are the primary precepts ofjustice and all law, "andnatural reason gives immediate assent to them as being plainly evident principles" (ST II-II 122.1). The precepts of justice- those that show "that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due"5
5 There is an apparent exceptionto this, and that is lying. Commonsense seems to tell us that when a lie can save another's life, a lie is due that person. Aquinas does not see it that way. In his view, it is "unnaturaland undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind"(ST II-II 110.3); hence, it would be an injustice- not giving the questioner his due- should I tell him a lie in orderto save the life of another. So instead of locating the justice of the act in the relationship between me and the person I might save, Aquinas locates it in the relationship between me and the questioner.Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that natural law seems to be the controllingfactor here instead of virtue, for virtue would seem to indicate that the relationship between me and an innocent person I might be able to save is more worthy of considerationthan the relationship between me and, say, an agent of the Gestapo. However,it must be said that Aquinas does considerthe lie told with the intention of saving another's life the least blameworthyspecies of lying. Moreover,the injunction not to lie does not demand complete transparency.We must not forget what Peter Geachrefers to as the "snakishcunning of the Saints, commendedin the Gospel,"which allows the prudent to answer, say, an inquiring Gestapo agent in a way that avoids both lying and the capture of an innocent person. Geach'sdiscussion of lying occurs in the chapter on justice (Geach 1977, chap. 6).

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are not to be thought of as means to an end; indeed, they help to establish relationships that make up our living a just life, the end of which is our ultimate end: the beatific vision of God. We keep these precepts, therefore, because failure to do so would destroy our character and prevent us from achieving our ultimate end. It is important to note that neither justice nor the other cardinal virtues can exist as complete natural virtues for fallen humanity unless they are informed by the infused supernatural virtue of charity (caritas). According to Aquinas, charity is the form of all virtue; it is the friendship of a human being for God, and no true virtue is possible without it (ST II-II 23.7). Charity,a gift of grace from God (ST II-II 23-44, especially 23.7), is what guides the virtues in the right direction; it is always ordered to the good. The fact that charity guides the virtues in the right direction suggests in what way Aquinas recognizes pagan virtues as virtues, and a comparison with Augustine may be helpful in drawing the contours of Aquinas's account more clearly. In Augustine's view, the earthly citizen is marked by, among other things, the inability to attain any true virtue, and the story of the two cities tells us why this is so. In The City of God, Augustine says that the earthly city began with the fallen angels who possessed evil wills and delighted in themselves instead of God (12.1). Human beings fell for the same reason: love of self over love of God (12.6). By exercising the preference of self over God, human beings have slipped into a bestial condition, where the original misuse of free will has started a chain of disasters from which only God can save us (13.14). Those driven by evil wills desire to live by their own standards instead of God'sstandard, which is the standard of truth (14.4). This love of self is what citizens of the earthly kingdom share and what marks them as a commonwealth (14.28). Such people cannot possibly attain true virtue. Nevertheless, there is earthly virtue of a sort. When we recall what Augustine has said about the so-called virtues of the Romans, we should also recall his argument that what is perverted must of necessity have a part in that from which it has derived its being (19.12). In other words, the virtues of the Romans are only so-called because they are parasitical upon true virtue. This explains, for example, how vicious political kingdoms can function well, and it provides a space for the criticism that the "betterthe objects of this agreement, the better the people" (19.24). Or put differently,we can say with Oliver O'Donovanthat "what Augustine's reader carries away with him in the end is not a denigration of the role of virtue in politics . . . but an ability to discern shadows cast by virtue in surprising places"(O'Donovan1987, 103). Consequently,for Augustine, pagan virtue is virtue of a sort, but it approaches virtue only insofar as it is modeled on true virtue, which is informedby perfect charity (love of God).

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Aquinas affirms much of the Augustinian account:The pagan virtues are not guided by charity; hence, pagan virtues do not lead the virtuous to their ultimate end. That is why pagan virtues are deficient virtues: they lack the necessary and correct telos (ST II-II 23.7). Aquinas also agrees with Augustine that charity is the form of all virtue and that acquired moral virtues not guided by charity are deficient. Yet Aquinas holds that earthly limited goods can be attained with acquired moral virtue without charity. Hence, pagan virtue is real virtue, albeit deficient virtue. In Aquinas's view- and here he departs from Augustine - this does not mean that pagan virtues are only virtues of a sort; they are real virtues, but without charity to guide them, they cannot lead the person to the supernatural end for human beings. The orderof charity in Aquinas and how it establishes preferences(ST II-II 26) is very important, for it makes a place for acts of forcequa charitable acts. There must be love of Godbeforeall since charity is love of God. A person'slove of self is the model for neighbor-love,so an individual must love himself or herself more than his or her neighbor.The commongood, however,is sought above even one's own good since love for oneself makes no sense apart from the common good. Moreover,charity discriminates between neighbors in that we love proximate neighbors in more ways than distant neighbors.Finally, love for bloodkin is stronger than love for neighbors. When it comes to preferences in actions, the subject matter tells us what to do: "in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred the most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our fellowsoldiers"(ST II-II 26.8). There is, then, no inherent conflictbetween charity and acts of force. The order of charity admits preferences for loved ones, fellow citizens, and fellow soldiers. These preferences sometimes call for acts of force, and this is the subject to which I now turn.

3. Aquinason the Just War

3.1 Thepresumption against violence Virtue and the commongood are the pivots of Aquinas's account of the just war. He says that war is contrary to peace, but that is not always a bad thing since peace is not always a just order worth preserving (ST II-II 40). Aquinas follows Augustine in conceiving peace as tranquility of order, asserting that all things desire this order. War is a means to achieve a real (just) peace and a means to break a false (unjust) peace. True peace can only concern the good;peace, therefore, is not a virtue in itself but only the last temporal end of virtuous acts in war. We keep the peace and fight just wars because these are acts of charity and, hence, meritorious acts (ST II-II 29.4 and 40.2).

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ThatAquinasconsidersfightingjust wars to be actingmeritoriously suggests a divergencefromthe modernpresumption against violence (all acts of force)that is foundin manyrecentjust waraccounts. Stanley Hauerwas,for example, has argued that just warriorsand pacifists sharea presumption againstviolenceand that this presumption generates just war criteria. Indeed, Hauerwasgoes so far as to say that "Christians createdjust war reflectionbecauseof their nonviolentconvictions" (Hauerwas1994,139-40).Aquinasknowsof no suchpresumption against violencein this modernsense of the term. WhenAquinas discusses the New Law and its relationshipto the Old Law,he says, "Theintentionof the [Old]Law was that retaliationshouldbe sought out of love ofjustice . . . and this remainsstill in the New Law" I-II (ST on 107.2,cf. 108.3).In his commentary the verses in Paul'sletter to the Romansin which Paul discusses the role of the governingauthorities (13:1-7),Aquinassays that it is not just allowable(licet)but positively "meritorious Princes to exercise vindicationof justice with zeal for in badpeople(in malos)" Romanus13,lect. 1).Moreover, the (Ad against discussionof murder(ST II-II64), he insists that it is both"praiseworfor thy and advantageous" someonewith the properauthorityto kill someonedangerousand infectiousto the community (64.2). Whenwe addthese comments Aquinasto whathas beenshownabove,we have by for strongreasonsto suggest that the presumption Aquinasis against In his view, charitydoes not merelyallow for violent action, injustice. ratherit actuallydemandsit.6 Of course, not everyoneis suitable for virtuous warfare.Aquinas maintains,along with Ambroseand Augustine,that it is unlawfulfor bishops and clerics to fight in war (ST II-II 40.2). It is unlawful, however,not because war is somehowevil, but because warlike pursuits preventthem from doing their properjob- that is, they cannot practicetheir skills qua bishopsand clericsif they are busy acquiring
6 David Hollenbachand RichardMiller claim that a presumptionagainst violence can be found in Aquinas. Jeffrey Stout persuasively argues against both (Stout 1990). According to Stout, Hollenbach'sevidence is based on a misreading of the form of the question about war in the Summa: "Whetherit is always sinful to wage war."Hollenbachbelieves that the fact that the question is posed in this way shows a general presumption against going to war (Hollenbach1983, 14). Stout argues that the question is so framedin orderto help the reader get past such "overlysimple presumptions"(Stout 1990, 22). Miller,in an argument similar to Paul Ramsey's,uses Aquinas's remarks on killing in self-defense as the model for Christian participationin war, thus making love rather than justice the controlling factor in using just force. (Miller was a respondent to an early version of Stout's essay, and his remarks are quoted by Stout; see Stout 1990, 32 n. 53.) While I have some sympathy with treating love as a factor in the Christian'smotivations, it is simply wrong to read Aquinas as a precursorof Ramsey.As Stout argues, Aquinas'sconcernin the question of self-defense is "that certain acts be restricted to those who possess genuine public authority to performthem"(Stout 1990, 24).

Thomas Aquinason Virtuous Warfare 67 or exercisingskills for warfare.Nevertheless,they offerspiritualhelp to the military,whichis moremeritorious than actualphysicalparticiof Aquinasalso approves prayersthat ask Godto inflicttempopation.7 ral ills on enemies(ST II-II83.8 ad 3). Finally,Aquinasinsists that it is the dutyof clericsto urge and counselothersto engagein just wars (ST II-II40.2 ad 3). He clearlydoesnot seek to keep the bishopsand clerics clearof militaryconcerns. 3.2 Rulesand rightconductin war ForAquinasthereare onlythreerequirements warmust meetin that orderto be considered (ST II-II40.1): just on 1. It must be conducted the authorityof the sovereign,since care of is of whois the only the commonweal the responsibility the sovereign authoritycompetentto decidewhen such cases requirerecourseto the swordin defenseagainstinternaland externalstrife.8 2. It musthave a just cause,sincethose attackedshoulddeservethe attack on accountof some fault (herehe quotesa list fromAugustine: whathas been seized avengingwrongs,punishinga nation,restoring unjustly).9 with rightfulintention,sincewe must intendto 3. It must be conducted securadvancethe goodand to avoidthe evil (againfromAugustine: ing peace,punishingevildoers,upliftingthe good).10 in to Rightconduct war is dependent somedegreeuponthe virtuesof the the soldiersand,especially, commanders wagingthe war.Following Aristotle,Aquinasviews the militaryas a place where virtue can and
7 Aquinas follows a long tradition of Christian thought here, but see particularly Origen's Contra Celsum (8.73) and Eusebius's Demonstrationof the Gospel (1.8). Nevertheless, Aquinas says that a religious order for the purpose of soldiering is acceptable. Such orders must be established not for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine worship, to ensure public safety, or to protectthe poorand oppressed(ST II-II 64.2, 64.3). The difference, then, is that religious military orders, unlike civil authorities, cannot punish evildoers. 8 In like manner Aquinas says that capital punishment is praiseworthyif the offender threatens the commongood and if one in authority does the killing (ST II-II 64.2, 64.3). 9 Augustine's belief that humanity is a mass of sin inherently at odds with God and under just condemnation (City of God 21.12) leads him to view the political order as a human constructthat holds evil human action in check (Letter153.6.16). The goal of war is to preserve the orderthat holds evil in check. Augustine's thoughts on war are unsystematic and scattered, but the best places to start are the discussions in City of God 19 and ContraFaustum Manichaeum 22. 10 In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas says that punishment of the wicked is divinely authorized as a means of restoring moral order and concord(3.140, 146).

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should be cultivated.11Excellence in soldiering depends especially upon courage (ST II-II 123.5; CNE 3, lect. 14), while excellence in leading soldiers depends especially upon prudence (Summa Contra Gentiles 3.128). How do soldiers acquire military virtues? Aquinas has nothing directly to say about this, but there seems to be no reason to doubt that virtue is acquired by those in the military as it is acquired by anyone seeking excellence in some practice:we learn excellence in a pupil-master relationship. Military commanders,then, must be virtuous soldiers who are able to teach the soldiers under them. The rules hammered into recruits in training are all commanded for the purpose of making them soldiers of excellence. Rules, therefore, are not entirely discarded but are given a certain secondary place. Or perhaps it would be better to say that there are two kinds of rules in this account of acting morally: the primary ones that guard the boundaries of acceptable practice and the secondary ones that are crucial to moral formation. The former are always kept because they actually define the parameters of the activity within which excellence is sought. To act contrary to these would be to abandon the practice. The latter, in contrast, are only rough and ready rules- they are not absolutely binding. An analogy may be helpful in clarifying this point. Let us take the game of baseball as an example of what is going on here.12There are two kinds of rules in baseball. Most important are those rules that help define what baseball is: a player gets three strikes before he is called out; a team gets three outs before they must quit batting; a player must tag each base as he rounds the base path; and so forth. These are all rules that define the game of baseball. To break these rules would mean that you do not want (or do not know how) to play baseball, for you will not be playing baseball if you do not play by these rules. The second set of rules are what we can call rules of training. Rules of training are imposed upon would-be players who are learning how to play the game well. These rules are "rulesof thumb"learned through experience by coaches and passed on to those learning how to play. A good example of such a rule is the standard proper "classic"swing of the bat (back straight, shoulders square, back elbow high) taught to every person who ever tried to learn how to play the game. Yet a glance at a professional baseball game reveals that very few of those who have attained
11Aquinas is not unique in emphasizing the importanceof virtue for soldiers and commanders. The chivalric tradition also emphasizes the virtuous nature of the combatants and seeks to keep those without properexcellence away from battle (for a nice account of this tradition, see Johnson 1975, 64-75). 12 John Rawls uses the game of baseball to illustrate two kinds of rules (Rawls 1955), but the use to which the rules are put has little similarity to my account of Aquinas.

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excellence in the practice of baseball actually use the "classic"swing of the bat. That is because they have learned over time and through experience that deviation from the rule of thumb enables them to be better players. In short, they have developed virtues. In summation, we can say that training rules are a means of developing excellence in a practice, but excellence in a practice cannot be reduced to any set of rules; thus, as excellence grows, so does the freedom to depart from the formative rules by which the skill was nurtured. One of the lessons learned from this account of rules in the moral life is that there is no need to get entangled in the language of absolutes. It adds nothing to the discussion to say that the rules defining some practice represent absolute rules. Because such rules define an area of proper moral practice, it goes without saying (or should go without saying) that these criteria cannot be ignored. In the same way, it is pointless to say that it is, for example, an absolute rule in baseball that a batter gets only three strikes. The "absolute"here is redundant. Three strikes for a batter is part of what makes baseball what it is; so we do not have to say the rule is absolute- instead, we say that it is baseball. Similarly, rules defining the just war are just war.13 How virtuous behavior plays out in Aquinas's virtuous soldier suggests part of the reason why Aquinas does not enumeratejus in hello criteria. As James Johnson has shown, rules for right conduct in war in Aquinas's time come from a twofold secular tradition: the chivalric code and the jus gentium (itself influenced by canon law) (Johnson 1975, 8-21). This suggests that right conduct in battle is largely culturedependent; what counts as praiseworthy or blameworthy action in combat will vary from place to place. We see something like this at work in Aquinas. One objection to Aquinas's proposition that all acts of virtue are prescribed by law is that "acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing is virtuous in one and vicious in another."Aquinas's answer is that "it is owing to the conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportionto them" (ST I-II 94.3 obj. 3). So the specific rules used to approximate virtue vary from place to place. Custom, in other words, can help specify what a virtuous act may look like. From Aquinas's point of view, however, something more must be said: rules governing just acts in combat must be, to some degree, rules of
13 None of this is to deny the developmentalcapacity of a practice.Just as baseball remains baseball after the introduction of the designated batter, so just war remains just war after the criterion of last resort is introduced.Both additions are meant to make the practice a better practice in some way. Whether they succeed or not is a hot topic among sports enthusiasts and just war advocates.

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thumb for soldiers. That some moral rules are not absolutely binding is made clear from the following passage:
Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a properconclusion,that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of the cases; but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country.And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail . . . because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore [ST I-II 94.4].

Clearly, Aquinas recognizes certain precepts that do, for the most part, ensure correct acting, but these precepts are not always binding since circumstances may require other acts. It is the prudent person who knows how to act appropriately in given circumstances; the prudent person knows when to disregard the rule of thumb. I suggest that the absence of a specifiedjus in hello is due in part to the uncertain circumstances that constitute the context of right acting in combat. Rules that govern how one should fight in a war are very difficult to formulate in any way that is permanently binding. The rules that define a just war, however, can never be disregarded, for to disregard any boundary marker is to cease "to play the game" in this case, to cease to wage a just war. The main point is this: the virtuous soldier is not constrained by the rules of thumb in just warfare, but he or she is constrained by rules constituting what a just war is. Aquinas quotes Ambrose in maintaining certain rights of war and covenants that ought to be observed among combatants (ST II-II 40.3), but he does not tell the reader what they are. Though Aquinas does not name them in his text, these are the rules of war that can be found in Ambrose's De Officiis: (1) agreements with the enemy should be kept (2.7.33); (2) no unfair advantage of the enemy should be taken (1.29. If 139); (3) mercy should be accordeda foe in defeat (3.14.87).14 my argument is correct,we can say that Aquinas does not discuss these rules for two reasons: first, they are largely under the province of local custom, but also, and more importantly, such rules are of only secondary importance in a virtue-governed account of just war. To put the matter more bluntly, for Aquinas the just soldier may be in circumstances where, for
14 I say "can be found"because Ambrose never calls them rules of war as such. He seems merely to suggest that this is how virtuous soldiers behave on the field of battle. The argument could be made, therefore, that Ambrose'sreticence indicates that Aquinas reflects a tradition that simply does not recognizehard and fast rules of fighting in a war, but this is not the place to make such an argument.

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instance, to refuse mercy in defeat or to break an agreement may be the right course of action.15It takes only a moment of thought to formulate circumstances when this could be true (the wars of Israel under Joshua's leadership readily come to mind). None of this, of course, denies the usefulness of thejz/s in hello in controlling warfare. The rules of fighting are rules of thumb, but not merely rules of thumb. The end of the jus in hello is to approximate virtuous behavior in battle, but the specified approximationscan never be carved in stone. Put more clearly, what jus in hello rules strive to achieve- proportionand noncombatant immunity- is always binding upon the soldier and commander, but what is not (cannot be) binding is what may count as meeting the criterion of proportionor noncombatant immunity. However, no such latitude can be permitted with respect to the rules This point is emphasized that are constitutive ofjust war as a practice.16 in Aquinas's discussion of murder (ST II-II 64) and injuries to the person (ST II-II 65), a discussion in which he insists that only one in authority may kill or maim for the welfare of the community (64.3, 65.3). It is just for one in authority to kill, but it would be a species of injustice for a private person to kill or maim for the good of the community.Moreover,attacking those who do not deserve it or attacking with any intention other than a rightful one is always an unjust act. To break one of these rules is to opt out of waging a just war. 3.3 Virtue,double effect, and proportion One could argue, of course, that two of Aquinas's defining or constitutive rules of a just war- just cause and rightful intention- assume both the modern ad helium rules (and in this instance there is complete identity) and the modern in hello rule of discrimination (noncombatant immunity). In other words, one could argue that just cause and rightful intention in Aquinas encompass both the right reasons for going to war
15 Lyingis, again, the exceptionhere. As lying is a species of injustice, it is forbiddento lie to the enemy or to break a promise given to the enemy (ST II-II 40.3). 16When Aquinas discusses sedition, he says that a tyrant can be overthrown if the does not outweigh the good sought. Yet this is not a seditious act, "consequentdisturbance" properlyspeaking, for in such cases, it is the tyrant who is seditious (ST II-II 42.2). It is probablybest not to view such acts as acts of war, since warfare, properlyspeaking, comprises those acts of force that occurbetween sovereign powers. Nevertheless, the just war model is apt for rebellious conduct insofar as that conduct, when just, is a controlledand orderly plan of forceful action with the overthrowof a tyrant as its goal. I say "controlled and orderly"because I cannot see how the proportioncriterion that Aquinas invokes in considerationof such situations can be accommodatedany other way. The question of who the "lawfulauthority"may be in a rebellion is an interesting one, but one that will have to wait for a later article.

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and the intention not to harm those who do not deserve it, therefore entailing the prohibition against killing innocent people in war. Although there is a modicum of truth in this argument, it confuses matters unnecessarily for the Thomist. If the cause is just, the virtuous will attack people who deserve to be attacked. This means that no one undeserving of attack will be intentionally attacked. Of course, innocent people will be killed in just wars, but those people will be killed unintentionally. For Aquinas, the rule of double effect applies in such cases. In an often quoted passage of the Summa, Aquinas argues that "nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention" (II-II 64.7). Aquinas goes on to show how killing someone in self-defense is acceptable, so long as one intends only to defend oneself. We can apply this principle to combat behavior.17 just soldier will intend to kill inNo nocent people. Nevertheless, he may be required to take action against the enemy that he knows will cause injury to innocent people, but in such cases, he does not intend those injuries; he intends only to injure the enemy. When Aquinas talks about double effect, he does not mean that anyone can direct his or her intention a certain way in order to make any act just. Elizabeth Anscombe has pointed out how this kind of thinking is the result of a "Cartesian psychology"where "an intention was an interior act of the mind which could be produced at will" (Anscombe 1981, 58-59). The danger this poses to proper just war thinking is obvious. The temptation is for any soldier to justify acts simply by directing his intention in a certain way and saying to himself: "WhatI mean by bombing this railroad depot is that I intend to destroy transportation of enemy ammunition and troops to the front line." Aquinas would determine the intention of that soldier not by asking him about his "directed intention" but by first observing the soldier's completed acts. Roughly speaking, for Aquinas, what a person intends is what a person does. The soldier may describe his act as one of bombing a depot in order to
17We should not, however, apply double effect to soldiers killing soldiers. Hauerwas, for example, uses Ramsey's formulation of double effect (culled from Aquinas) to argue that just warriors "cannever kill gladly";moreover,"the Christian soldier should not intend to kill the enemy but rather seek only to incapacitate him so as to prevent him from (Hauerwas 1994, 152). Twothings need to be said here. First, Aquiachieving his purpose" nas's formulationof double effect is meant to distinguish killing in self-defense from murder. Aquinas never uses double effect in discussing warfare, but his use of intention in doubleeffect is ripe for such possibilities. Second,one of those possibilities is to use double effect to show how innocent people may be killed unintentionally in war without doing damage to the justice of that war. It is a mistake by Hauerwas (and Ramsey)to extend the principle of double effect to show how soldiers should fight each other in combat. In short, double effect is misapplied when it is used to cover soldier-on-soldier fighting.

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weaken the enemy's supply line or he may describe his act as one of bombing the depot in order to demoralize the civilian population as well as weaken the enemy's supply line. This is why Aquinas insists that the most important circumstance of a human act is the "why"(ST I-II 7.4). Because intention is an "act of will bearing on the end" (ST I-II 12.1), when a person answers the question, Why are you doing that? the person has a good idea what her or his intention is. In other words, when the will chooses to act in a certain way, it chooses to do so for some end. The end sought best answers the question why someone does something. Keeping to the above example, if the end is to weaken the enemy's supply line, then that action is best described as such (the intention is to attack an enemy objective). On the other hand, if the end is to demoralize the civilian population as well as to weaken the supply line, then the act is best described as one of attacking civilians as well as military objectives (the intention is to attack civilians and a military objective). Now, an agent may not intend every consequence of an act. Aquinas says that "since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be moved to the end without being moved to the means" (ST I-II 8.3). So, although the soldier knows his act will kill innocent people as well as destroy the depot, he does not intend their deaths (that is, he bombs the depot solely in order to damage the enemy's ability to fight). The soldier, if just, will not wish to kill the innocent people; indeed, he wishes that there were no innocent civilians living in the area he must attack. The reverse way of looking at this is to say that the soldier's only purpose is to destroy the depot and that he would performthe act even if no innocent people were living nearby; that is, the presence of innocent people serves no part in his motivation to bomb the target, nor can the presence of innocent people play any part in telling us why he bombedthe target. The presence of We regret in his actions is key.18 do not determine this merely by asking him to report his intention, but by observing the soldier's acts, which tell us why the act was performed.The act is good in its species insofar as it has a fitting object, which, in this case, is bombing an enemy railway depot- that is, bombing an enemy railway depot is a good act in war. Also, the end is good insofar as the bombing is carried out for the sole purpose of defeating a proper enemy. Lastly, it should be pointed out that sufficient care must be taken by the soldier if he is to incur no guilt. When Aquinas argues that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended is voluntary and intended accidentally (and hence imparts
18Aristotle says that regret shows that someone has acted in ignorance and, hence, involuntarily; such an act accrues no guilt (NicomacheanEthics 1110b 20-25). The difference here is that the soldier is not acting in ignorancebut regrets what he knows is likely to be one of the unintended consequencesof his act.

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no guilt on the agent), he nonetheless asserts that guilt still does accrue to the agent if he or she "be occupied with something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care"(ST II-II 64.8). To sum up: if the act of bombing itself is a species of injustice or if sufficient care is not taken in the act, the soldier is guilty of murder. One further thing would have to be settled before we could judge the soldier's acts of bombing to be just or unjust: we would have to examine them under the criterion of proportion.This concerns the circumstances of the act, and in this case we have to ask whether the hoped-for good (elimination of the depot) outweighs the consequence of the innocents killed. Prudence is the virtue that helps us arrive at an answer, and the fact that there is no hard and fast rule for such cases is no argument against the pursuit of virtue. There is no chart we can read that will tell us, for instance, that an army depot of such and such a size can be destroyed as long as the projectedloss of innocent life does not exceed some number. The only hope for acting rightly in such circumstances is to exercise prudence concerning the likely success of the mission (destroying the depot), the positive effect of the mission (debilitating enemy power), the negative effect (killing innocents), and the determination of when the positive outweighs the negative. The knowledge of when to carry out such acts falls within the province of the prudence of the soldier and, especially, the commander.The soldier cannot attain this prudence without the grace of God and the skill learned through training and practice under a master of soldiering. The virtuous commander knows when and with how much force to attack. Like most knowledge in skillful practice, it becomes habitual. This is not to deny deliberation on the commander's part. Perhaps the commander will have sufficient time to deliberate concerning the course of just action. The point is that the commanderqua virtuous commanderis the product of experienced deliberation and practice in warfare. His "snap decisions" are always made, if rational, with the final temporal goal in mind: a just fight that leads to a just peace. I said at the beginning of this article that how we deal with the moral problems of war reveals the kind of people we are. Nowhere in Aquinas is this clearer than in his thinking on war and the just war criteria of proper battle conduct in particular. As we have seen, Aquinas has little to say about the rules of conduct in war. Part of the reason lies in the culture-dependent nature of such rules; that is, custom may help specify what counts as virtuous acting- meeting the goals of proportion and noncombatantimmunity- in a battle. However,it is also true that when a just war rests upon rules of conduct in war, it rests upon a shaky foundation. When soldiers and their commanders have not been molded by the virtues, the rules of conduct by themselves are not likely to suffice. A vicious military commanderhas no ability to adhere to rules of conduct

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in war,or perhapsI shouldsay that his abilityto adhereto the rules of war rests only on fear of reprisalsshouldhe be foundout. A virtuous on commander, the otherhand, is the productof trainingin excellence Put the and,hence,findsmanyrules of conductsuperfluous. differently, doesnot need a set of rules to "check" behavior virtuouscommander his in battle;he knowshow to act and is of such a character that his right acts can be depended upon.

Just Warsand ChristianParticipation 4. Non-Christian

It has beenthe purposeof this articleto showhowAquinas's formulaaccountthat demandsthat just tion of the just war is a virtue-formed leadersknowwhen to go to war and that just soldiersand commanders knowhowto fightjustly in war.It is nowtime to probethe questionconcerningwho these soldiersare. Is Aquinasreferringto all soldiersor The fact that Aquinasdiscusseswarfareunder only Christiansoldiers? charityshouldgive us a clue. Because a just war is an act of charity, accountserves as a distinctlyChristianimpetusto fightjust Aquinas's wars.Aquinas,in otherwords,not onlyjustifies Christianparticipation but in just warswhenhe discussesit undercharity, he actuallydemands it. In a just war, the Christianfights for charity'ssake and therefore fights under the guidanceof the moralarche of the ultimate end. BecauseChristians fight suchwarsunderthe virtueof charity, they do not fightin orderto securethe goodsof peaceand orderforthemselves,but ratherfortheircountry, family,andfriends.If we pushAquinas's logicto we sake is its conclusion, can say that the soldierwhofightsforcharity's for actuallyengagedin a kindof actingthat uniteshim to God; charityis that virtue for Aquinasthat, as RomanusCessariostates, engagesthe believerwith "everything worthyof authenticChristianlove"(Cessario Thelessonis clear:fightingjust warsis an act of charity, wor1991,96). thy of Christianlove,that unites the believerto God. Thejus ad heliumspelledout by Aquinasis a set of criteriafor the Christian,whichis to say that the Christianmust ask these questions war. Does this mean that there can be no just wars about a proposed Doesit meanthat when non-Christians withoutChristians? fight a just are not fightingthe samejust war as the war alongsideChristians, they The Christians? answerhas to be no for both questions.Non-Christian war leaderscan make decisionsaboutwhethera proposed is just without knowingthe final end, forjustice is a naturalmoralvirtue,andjust wars are fought for limited earthly goods (peace and order).Aquinas worksconducing to says that humanbeingswithoutgrace"canperform a goodwhichis naturalto man" I-II 109.5).The sovereign declaresa (ST whethera projust war;hence,the sovereignmust be able to recognize in war is just- "just" the sense that, drivenby a natural moral posed

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virtue, it has as its end the commongood of the earthly city. Because this good is a true good, fighting such wars remains truly virtuous even without the thelogical virtue of charity, though the fight is only "imperfectly" virtuous (STII-II 23.7). I am trying to suggest two things: first, that there can be just wars without charity (and hence without Christians) and, second, that Christians and non-Christians can fight the same war for different endsthough not completely different ends. The ends of the non-Christian are subsumed by Christian charity and given another impetus and finality altogether. The non-Christian fights for peace and order,and so does the Christian; however, the Christian fights for justice under the aspect of God, which leads the Christian to fight for peace and orderqua goods for others and not for himself. The Christian, in so doing, performs an act that brings him closer to God.Aquinas says that "inour [Christian] good works, we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth"(ST I-II 108.3, emphasis added). Human beings were made for elevation to friendship with God (ST I-II 99.2), and insofar as fighting in just wars is an act of charity, that act elevates the believer closer to that ultimate friendship with God. In short, God elevates the soldier through his virtuous acts. We must remember that, according to Aquinas, human beings have only one human nature but a twofold happiness: human and supernatural (ST I-II 62. 1). A Christian can possess both the natural moral virtues and the infused virtues, which actually bring the natural virtues to completion insofar as they are reoriented toward the supernatural end. So, for example, both the Christian and non-Christian soldier can be courageous in battle, but while the non-Christian soldier's courage is oriented solely toward an earthly end, the courage exemplified by the Christian soldier is oriented toward a supernatural end. In the second article of the question concerning war, Aquinas insists that "amongthe faithful carnal wars should be considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel other men to engage in just wars"(ST II-II 40, reply to obj.3). The first part of this quotationreinforces what I have been suggesting up to now: that Christians fight wars with a spiritual end in view. The second part of the quotation, however, points to something else: Bishops and clerics are supposed to advise others concerningjust wars. This suggests that Christians, in engaging in the process of just war-making, should bring a certain temperance and order to the process that would be lacking without them. When Aquinas discusses the natural law, he makes it clear that human beings have an inclination for self-preservation, an inclination we share with animals (ST I-II 94.2); however, we also have an inclination accordingto reason that is proper to a human being, so that when we pursue goods such as

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self-preservation,we should do so in a rational, deliberate, and responsible way. The desire for peace and order,which is part of that natural inclination for self-preservation,is a goodpursued under the rational aspect of the just war. Without the guiding rationality of the just war criteria, war can quickly lose all trace of virtue, all reference to the good.

5. Conclusion
Many modern ethicists, including those who work in areas of war and peace, pursue a common project:the search for a theory providing universal principles that apply systematically to particular cases. Preoccupation with the jus in hello, the singular feature of the modern approach to just war, is the product of just this kind of moral project. The goal of this just war projectis to formulate a. in hello that can be universally jus recognized and agreed upon as applicable to all participants in all wars. Few seem to realize, with Scott Davis, that "a habit of concentrating on duties, obligation, and those aspects of ethics in general that lend themselves to systematization and 'theory'has led to the relative neglect of those facets of our vocabulary reflected in our day-to-day deliberations about action"(Davis 1992, I).19 Aquinas provides an Aristotelian account of war, fused with the account found in Augustine. Inheriting Augustine's account of the fallen nature of humanity and the importance of securing earthly peace, Aquinas makes the virtue of charity primary for just Christian participation in war. No true virtue is possible without charity, for the love of God is necessary to make practices truly excellent, that is, constitutive of our final end: the beatific vision of God. The virtuous Christian soldier obeys the just war criteria in going to war and fights virtuously in war because to fail to do so would destroy his character and prevent him from achieving the ultimate end of this practice: a just peace. Moreover,failure to fight virtuously would hinder his progress toward God. The virtuous Thomistic soldier is the kind of person who knows how to act on the field of battle because he is who he is. Because I have placed a great deal of weight on the virtue of charity in Aquinas's account of the just war, some may be tempted to gather my account under the charity account of war formulated by Ramsey. While I do think that Ramsey is right to emphasize charity in his account of the just war, we differ in an important way.
19 Davis offers Aristotle as the solution to such thinking in general, and to such thinking about war in particular.He realizes that just war thinking requires the support of a tradition of virtues, but as a strict Aristotelian, he has no need to consider charity. The work that charity does for Aquinas is carried out by friendship in Davis's Aristotelian account (Davis 1992, 111-38).

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is As Stouthas pointedout, thoughRamsey's account an Augustinian (Stout account,he sees Augustinethroughthe eyes of the Reformation 1990, 7-10). This readingof Augustineleads to a decidedly pessimistic view of what humanbeingscan accomplish. the first place,there can In be no trulyjust wars,sincehumanbeingsin the earthlycity are incapable of true virtue.ReadingAugustinein this way,Ramseysees in Aquinas too much emphasis on justice as a natural virtue that can be acquiredby most humanbeings. I, on the other hand, read Augustine throughthe eyes of Aquinas.I understand Augustineto be sayingthat virtueof a real (albeitparasitical) can be acquired citizensin the sort by sort hence,a real (albeitparasitical) ofjusticein waris earthlykingdom; possible. Charity,however,is that virtue that enables warfareto be guidedtowardthe ultimateendforhumanbeings.Charityis that virtue that compelsthe Christian fightin just warsandto fightjustly in war to (andthus be elevatedby God),but this doesnot denythe presenceof deficientjusticein the Christianorpagansoldier.20 Love,in otherwords,is facnot the controlling in usingjust force; factor justiceis the controlling tor.Loveis the Christianimpetusto fightjustly in just wars.Therefore, I am largely in agreementwith Stout, who claims that Aquinas'saccountof naturaljusticeallowsus to talk aboutpagankingdoms conductwars. ingjust moralThereis one last pointto makeaboutAquinasand rule-based Just war accountsthat are rule-based result fromthe kind ity systems. of rule-governed moralitysystems unheardof in Aristotle,Augustine, andAquinas.Aquinas's war accountis an accountof a practiceemjust beddedin the way of life of the virtuousin the faceof a fallenworldthat has beenat war almostfromthe verybeginning. Rules,of course,playa rolein Aquinas's of account: servein the formation virtueand they they the parameters an excellentpractice.But one of the probof help guard lems of recentjust war thinkingis an over-reliance upon rules of solconduct formulated fromjust war theories,with no accountgiven dierly of virtuouspracticein warfare.Such accountsnot only tend to ignore howwar is actuallycarriedout in practice, also tend to alienatethe but sincethey fail to showwhy a Christianqua Christianshould Christian, in want to participate warfare.A virtue-governed account,on the other in not only shows why Christianparticipation just wars is dehand, mandedin orderthat he or she can be a Christian,but also showshow in such participation makea difference rightconductin battle. can
20 Nothing in my remarks on virtuous Christian soldiers is meant to imply that these soldiers are perfectly virtuous. Just as pagan soldiers can progress (or regress) in virtue "ofa sort,"so Christian soldiers can progress (or regress) on the path to complete virtue (complete because it is informed by charity). It follows that Christians do not fight perfectly just wars, but the wars they do fight serve the ends of order,justice, and peace.

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