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Materials Reliability Program: Proceedings of the 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference and Exhibit

Materials Reliability Program:

Proceedings of the 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference and Exhibit Show

(MRP-154)

Proceedings

Program: Proceedings of the 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference and Exhibit Show (MRP-154) Proceedings

Materials Reliability Program:

Proceedings of the 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference and Exhibit Show

(MRP-154)

1012089

Proceedings, December 2005

Cosponsors

AREVA

3315 Old Forrest Road

Lynchburg, VA 24501

Westinghouse P.O. Box 158 Madison, PA 15663-0158

Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.

6855 S. Havana Street, Suite 350

Centennial, CO 80112-3869

Welding Services, Inc.

1115 Syland Court

Norcross, GA 30071

EPRI Project Manager C. King

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304-1395 • PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303-0813 • USA 800.313.3774 • 650.855.2121 • askepri@epri.com • www.epri.com

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NOTE

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Copyright © 2005 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

CITATIONS

This report was prepared by

Dominion Engineering, Inc. 11730 Plaza America Drive, Suite 310 Reston, VA 20190

Principal Investigators

G. White

J. Gorman

N. Nordmann

This report describes research sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), AREVA, Westinghouse, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc., and Welding Services, Inc.

The report is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner:

Materials Reliability Program: Proceedings of the 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference and Exhibit Show (MRP-154). EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, AREVA, Lynchburg, VA, Westinghouse, Madison, PA, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc., Centennial, CO, and Welding Services, Inc., Norcross, GA: 2005. 1012089.

REPORT SUMMARY

Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) can lead to increased costs for operation, maintenance, assessment, repair, and replacement of pressurized water reactor (PWR) components. This international conference was a forum for exchange of technical information related to PWSCC of Alloy 600 components including J-groove penetrations and dissimilar metal piping butt welds.

Background Previous conferences have provided extensive coverage of PWSCC of Alloy 600 materials in pressurizer instrument nozzles, pressurizer heater sleeves, and hot leg instrument nozzles. Studies of crack growth rates and investigations to determine the causes and consequences of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzle PWSCC have been presented in the past and the results have been incorporated into industry practice. Over the last five years, the issue of PWSCC of Alloy 600 materials has received considerable attention with discoveries of PWSCC in new locations such as piping butt welds and reactor vessel bottom mounted nozzles and many plants considering replacement of reactor vessel closure heads.

Objectives To bring together key nuclear engineers, scientists, and vendors to provide a forum for summarizing nuclear experience with PWSCC of Alloy 600 material in nozzles and welds of PWR plants. The conference provided a forum for updates on recent research activities conducted by EPRI and other utility programs including both Alloy 600 and its replacement material, Alloy 690, as well as for sharing field experience with Alloy 600 inspection, mitigation, and replacement activities.

Approach The 2005 International PWSCC of Alloy 600 Conference—held March 7–10, 2005, in Santa Ana Pueblo, New Mexico—attracted approximately 180 representatives from U.S. and international utilities, PWR vendors, research laboratories, regulatory authorities, and consulting organizations. The workshop included sessions on predictive modeling, strategic planning, replacement materials, repair methods, laboratory investigations, field experience, boric acid corrosion, inspection methods, possible remedial measures, and regulatory issues.

Results In recent years, considerable attention has been devoted in the United States and abroad to managing PWSCC of Alloy 600 components in PWRs. In reflection of the wide range of activities associated with PWSCC of Alloy 600 components other than steam generator tubes, the conference used two parallel sessions during most of the meeting time, and 72 presentations, including four keynote addresses, were made in total during the 12 half-day sessions. The

keynote speakers emphasized the need for proactive management of materials degradation issues and provided utility, EPRI, and regulatory perspectives.

Presentations addressed the specific approaches to managing PWSCC applied in various countries, including inspection methods and crack evaluation criteria. In the United States, the PWR industry has recently adopted generic guidance for comprehensive programs addressing all plant Alloy 600 components (EPRI report 1009561), and crack growth rate disposition curves have been developed for thick-wall Alloy 600 wrought material (EPRI report 1006695) and for Alloy 82 and 182 weld materials (EPRI report 1006696). Other presentations addressed recent developments in inspection, repair, and mitigation technologies. Discussion in this area emphasized new repair options, improvements made in the weldability of Alloy 52/152 replacement weld materials, and advances in stress improvement remediation technologies. One session was devoted to cracking and reliability studies of Alloy 690 replacement materials including Alloy 52 and 152 weld metals. Work is ongoing to demonstrate the long-term resistance of these materials to cracking. Another session addressed recent laboratory state-of- the-art crack characterization studies and other destructive examination projects focused on the fundamental factors that promote PWSCC. Finally, one session was devoted to the related issue of boric acid corrosion of carbon and low-alloy steel components, which can potentially result from through-wall cracking and pressure boundary leakage. This session on boric acid corrosion included plant experience, results of laboratory testing, recommended generic inspection guidance, and one example of a local leak detection technology.

EPRI Perspective This international conference met its objective of promoting a worldwide information exchange on issues related to management of PWSCC in Alloy 600 PWR components. EPRI continues to coordinate its work in this area with the domestic PWR owners groups and the Nuclear Energy Institute. Related EPRI reports on this subject include 1009561 (Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126)), 1009807 (Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Safety Assessment for U.S. Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Plants (MRP-110)), 1009549 (Alloy 82/182 Pipe Butt Weld Safety Assessment for U.S. PWR Plant Designs (MRP-113)), 1010087 (Primary System Piping Butt Weld Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines (MRP-139)), and 1009801 (Resistance to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Alloys 690, 52, and 152 in Pressurized Water Reactors (MRP-111)). The report numbers of the five previous PWSCC of Alloy 600 conferences sponsored by EPRI from 1991 to 2000 are TR-100852, TR-103345, TR-105406, TR-109138, and 1000873.

Keywords

Alloy 52/152 Alloy 82/182 Alloy 600 Alloy 690 Boric acid corrosion

Mitigation

Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) Strategic planning

ABSTRACT

An international meeting was organized on primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 600 pressure boundary parts in PWRs (other than steam generator tubing) to give those working in the area an opportunity to share their experiences, thoughts, and plans regarding: the causes of PWSCC in Alloy 600 pressure boundary parts, field experience, predictive modeling, laboratory investigations, strategic planning, inspection methods, repair methods, replacement materials, possible remedial measures, boric acid corrosion, and regulatory issues.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks are extended to the utility, contractor, and laboratory personnel who made presentations at the workshop. The individuals who attended the workshop are recognized for their thoughtful questions and participation in the discussion of presentations.

Gratitude and recognition are also extended to the conference co-sponsoring organizations:

AREVA, Westinghouse, and Structural Integrity Associates, Inc./Welding Services, Inc.

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1-1

1991, 1992, 1994, 1997, and 2000 Workshops

1-1

Overview of 2005 Workshop

1-1

Keynote Speakers and Discussion Panel

1-2

Session 1A: Crack Growth and Initiation

1-4

Session 1B: Strategic Planning

1-6

Session 2A: Cracking and Reliability Studies of Alloy 690

1-7

Session 2B: Repair Methods and Technologies

1-8

Session 3A: Laboratory Investigations of Cracks

1-10

Session 3B: Field Experience - Mitigation and Repair

1-12

Session 4A: Boric Acid Corrosion

1-14

Session 4B: Inspection Technologies and Planning

1-15

Session 5A: Mitigation Methods

1-16

Session 5B: Field Experience - Inspections

1-18

Session 6: Regulatory Issues

1-20

2 KEYNOTE ADDRESSES

2-1

U.S. Utility Keynote, address by David Mauldin, Arizona Public Service (Keynote K.1)

2-1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Keynote, address by Allen Hiser, U.S. NRC (Keynote K.2)

2-2

EPRI Keynote, address by Robin Jones, EPRI (Keynote K.3)

2-3

International Utility Keynote, address by François Cattant, EDF (Keynote K.4)

2-5

Keynote Speaker Panel Discussion

2-6

3 SESSION 1A: CRACK GROWTH AND INITIATION

3-1

MRP Development of Crack Growth Rate Disposition Curves for Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Thick-Section Alloy 600 Components and Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Weldments, presented by G. White, DEI (Paper 1A.1)

3-1

Comparative PWSCC Crack Growth Rate Studies of Alloy 52M and Alloy 182 Weld Metals, presented by R. Jacko, Westinghouse (Paper 1A.2)

3-3

Outline of "Evaluation Technology for SCC Growth of Ni Base Alloys (NiSCC) Project"

in Japan and Current Results in PWR Environment, presented by Y. Yamamoto,

 

JNES (Paper 1A.3)

 

3-5

Finite-Element Analysis of Welding Residual Stresses in Piping Butt Weldments and their Effect on Crack Tip Stress Intensity Factors, presented by J. Broussard, DEI (Paper 1A.4)

3-6

A

Novel Approach for the Mitigation of PWSCC, presented by B. Templeton,

Structural Integrity Associates (Paper 1A.5)

 

3-7

Effect of Cyclic Loadings on the Stress Corrosion Crack Growth Rate in PWR Primary Water, presented by C. Guerre, CEA (Paper 1A.6)

3-8

4 SESSION 1B: STRATEGIC PLANNING

 

4-1

 

MRP Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126), presented by S. Chu, EPRIsolutions (Paper 1B.1)

4-1

Programmatic Approach to the Management of PWSCC/Alloy 600 Issues, presented by D. Peltola, Duke (Paper 1B.2)

4-2

Development of Alloy 600 Management Plans, presented by G. White, DEI (Paper

 

1B.3)

4-4

 

Strategic Planning for Alloy 600 Programs, presented by G. Elder, Westinghouse (Paper 1B.4)

4-5

Probabilistic PWSCC Failure Assessment of Alloy 600/82/182 Reactor Vessel Subcomponents at Beznau 1&2 for a Sixty Year Life Extension, presented by G. Rao, Westinghouse (Paper 1B.5)

4-6

A

Matrix Evaluation of Repair/Modification Options for Reactor Pressure Vessel

 

Bottom Mounted Nozzles, presented by R. Payne, Framatome ANP (Paper 1B.6)

4-7

Assessment of the Repair/Remediation/Mitigation Techniques for Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds, presented by D. Waskey, Framatome ANP (Paper 1B.7)

4-8

5 SESSION 2A: CRACKING AND RELIABILITY STUDIES OF ALLOY 690

 

5-1

 

Assessment of PWSCC Resistance of Alloy 690: Overview of Laboratory Results and Field Experience, presented by F. Vaillant, EDF (Paper 2A.1)

5-1

A

Review of PWSCC, Weldability, and Thermal Ageing of Nickel Weld Metals in PWR

Primary Water, presented by J.-M. Boursier, EDF (Paper 2A.2)

 

5-2

Integrity of TT Alloy 690 Piping Material, presented by T. Yonezawa, MHI (Paper

 

2A.3)

5-4

 

Status of MRP Work to Demonstrate the Long-Term Resistance of Alloys 690, 152 and 52 to PWSCC, presented by J. Hickling, EPRI (Paper 2A.4)

5-6

PWSCC Growth Rates of Cold Worked Alloy 690 & Alloys 52/152 Weld Metal, presented by P. Andresen, GE Global Research Center (Paper 2A.5)

 

5-8

6 SESSION 2B: REPAIR METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES

 

6-1

Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly for Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrument Nozzles, presented by W. Sims, Entergy (Paper 2B.1)

6-1

"Small Pad" Weld Repair of Pressurizer Heater Sleeves and BMI Nozzles, presented by B. Newton, PCI Energy Services (Paper 2B.2)

6-3

Mid-Wall Weld Repairs for Pressurizer Heater Sleeves, presented by P. Amador, Welding Services Inc. (Paper 2B.3)

6-4

The Embedded Flaw Process for Repair of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations, presented by W. Bamford, Westinghouse (Paper 2B.4)

6-6

Advances in Design and Implementation of Alloy 52 Structural Weld Overlay Repair Welding, presented by B. Newton, PCI Energy Services (Paper 2B.5)

6-7

Beneficial Application of Alloy 52M Filler Materials to Dissimilar Metal Weldments, presented by P. Amador, Welding Services Inc. (Paper 2B.6)

6-8

7 SESSION 3A: LABORATORY INVESTIGATIONS OF CRACKS

7-1

Laboratory Investigation of PWSCC of CRDM Nozzle 3 and its J-Groove Weld on the Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head, presented by S. Fyfitch, Framatome ANP (Paper 3A.1)

7-1

Laboratory Investigation of the Stainless Steel Cladding on the Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Head, presented by J. Hyres, BWXT Services (Paper 3A.2)

7-3

Laboratory Investigation of the Alloy 600 Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzle Samples and Weld Boat Sample from South Texas Project Unit 1, presented by A. McIlree, EPRI (Paper 3A.3)

7-4

Selection, Removal, Decontamination and NDE of North Anna 2 Retired Reactor Vessel Head CRDM Penetrations, presented by F. Cattant, EDF (Paper 3A.4)

7-7

Destructive Examination of North Anna 2 Retired Reactor Vessel Head CRDM Penetration No. 54 (Status Review), presented by G. Rao, Westinghouse (Paper

3A.5)

7-7

High-Resolution Analytical Electron Microscopy Characterization of Environment- Assisted Cracks in Alloy 182 Weldments, presented by S. Bruemmer, PNNL (Paper

3A.6)

7-8

8 SESSION 3B: FIELD EXPERIENCE—MITIGATION AND REPAIR

8-1

Mitigation of PWSCC on Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles by Waterjet Peening, presented by G. Elder, Westinghouse (Paper 3B.1)

8-1

Field Implementation Experience at Asco Unit 1 and 2 with Upper Head Temperature Reduction, presented by H. Lenz, Westinghouse (Paper 3B.2)

8-2

Alloy 52 Welding in Nuclear Applications: Performance Issues and Weldability Testing, presented by D. Waskey, Framatome ANP (Paper 3B.3)

8-3

Florida Power and Light Turkey Point 3 Reactor Vessel Closure Head Replacement, presented by M. Moran, FPL (Paper 3B.4)

8-4

Westinghouse Experience with Reactor Vessel Head Replacements, presented by J. Hydeman, Westinghouse (Paper 3B.5)

8-5

Pre-emptive Pressurizer Heater Sleeve Repairs at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, presented by P. Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates, for R. Meeden, APS (Paper 3B.6)

8-6

RPV Outlet Nozzle Repair (SAFEPLAY) for Ringhals Units 3 and 4, presented by B. Kroes, Westinghouse Electric Belgium (Paper 3B.7)

8-7

9 SESSION 4A: BORIC ACID CORROSION

9-1

Boric Acid Corrosion of the Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head, presented by S. Fyfitch, Framatome ANP (Paper 4A.1)

9-1

Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection Program for PWRs, presented by T. S. Sharma, American Electric Power (Paper 4A.2)

9-3

MRP Boric Acid Corrosion Testing Program Task 1 Static/RI and Task 3 Separate Effects/DEI, presented by A. McIlree, EPRI (Paper 4A.3)

9-4

Inspection Automation Software, presented by R. Pedersen, Real-Time Software (Paper 4A.4)

9-6

FLÜS: Leak Detection System, presented by D. Schemmel, Framatome ANP (Paper

4A.5)

9-6

Corrosion of Reactor Pressure Vessel Steel by an Impinging Jet of PWR Coolant, presented by J. Pongpuak, UNB (Paper 4A.6)

9-7

10 SESSION 4B: INSPECTION TECHNOLOGIES AND PLANNING

10-1

The Challenges of Compliance with ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, "Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems," presented by T. McAlister, SCE&G, for J. Lindberg, Framatome ANP (Paper 4B.1)

10-1

Development of MRP Inspection Plan for RPV Top Head Nozzles Part I—Nozzle Leakage, Ejection and Examination Volume Evaluations, presented by P. Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates (Paper 4B.2)

10-1

Development of a Comprehensive Inspection Program for RPV Top Head Nozzles:

Part II—Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, Wastage Evaluation, and Safety Assessment Report, presented by G. White, DEI (Paper 4B.3)

10-3

Advances in NDE of Alloy 182 Components, presented by C. King, EPRI, for F. Ammirato, EPRI (Paper 4B.4)

10-5

Experience in Reactor Head Nozzle and J Weld Inspections, presented by J. Lareau, Westinghouse (Paper 4B.5)

10-6

Thermal Imaging for the Detection of PWSCC in Alloy 82/182 Welds, presented by J. Lareau, Westinghouse (Paper 4B.6)

10-8

11 SESSION 5A: MITIGATION METHODS

11-1

Laser Peening: A Surface Stress Improvement Technique for Alloy 600 PWSCC Mitigation, presented by A. Demma, EPRI (Paper 5A.1)

11-1

Application of Surface Stress Improvement for the Mitigation of Alloy 600 PWSCC, presented by R. Payne, Framatome ANP (Paper 5A.2)

11-3

The Applicability of MSIP for Mitigating PWSCC in Pressurizer Nozzle to Safe-end Welds, presented by M. Badlani, AEA Technology Engineering Services, Inc. (Paper

5A.3)

11-5

Preemptive Weld Overlays—A Cost Effective Solution to PWSCC Concerns in PWR Piping System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds, presented by P. Riccardella, Structural Integrity Associates (Paper 5A.4)

11-13

Corrosion Resistant Barriers for Repair and Mitigation of Alloy 600 Cracking, presented by J. Lareau, Westinghouse (Paper 5A.5)

11-15

Effects of Dissolved H 2 , B/Li/pH and Zn on PWSCC of Alloy 600: Interim Report on MRP Testing, presented by P. Andresen, GE Global Research Center (Paper 5A.6)

11-16

Review of Primary Chemistry Effects on PWSCC, presented by J. Gorman, DEI (Paper 5A.7)

11-18

12 SESSION 5B: FIELD EXPERIENCE—INSPECTIONS

12-1

Situation of the Alloys 600 and 182 Issues in the Belgian Nuclear Power Plants, presented by R. Gérard, Tractebel Engineering (Paper 5B.1)

12-1

A Swedish Perspective on PWSCC of Alloy 182, presented by A. Jenssen, Studsvik Nuclear (Paper 5B.2)

12-3

Control Rod Drive Mechanism Examinations at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, presented by W. Jensen, NMC (Paper 5B.3)

12-4

Some Recent Experiences on Stress Corrosion Cracking in B/P-WR Environments and Remedies/Strategies from a Utility Point of View, presented by P. Efsing, Ringhals (Paper 5B.4)

12-6

Cracking of Alloy 600 Nozzles and Welds in PWRs: A Review of Cracking Events and Repair Service Experience, presented by W. Bamford, Westinghouse (Paper 5B.5)

12-7

BMI Cleaning and Inspection at PVNGS, presented by T. Wilfong, APS, for E. Fernandez, APS (Paper 5B.6)

12-9

13 SESSION 6: REGULATORY ISSUES

13-1

EPRI MRP Alloy 600 Issue Task Group Interaction with the NRC, presented by C. Harrington, TXU Energy (Paper 6.1)

13-1

Industry Management of Materials Degradation, presented by J. Riley, NEI (Paper

6.2)

13-3

Alloy 82/182 Piping Butt Welds: Developing Inspection Guidance, presented by C. King, EPRI (Paper 6.3)

13-5

Comparison of Leak Rates from Alloy 82/182 Butt Weld Cracks for Leak-Before- Break Assessment, presented by A. Nana, Framatome ANP (Paper 6.4)

13-7

Potential Cracking in Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Nozzles, presented by C. Morgan, Westinghouse (Paper 6.5)

13-9

Summary of NRC Funded Efforts Involving Alloy 600 Base Material and Weldments for Piping and CRDM Applications, presented by G. Wilkowski, Engineering Mechanics Corporation of Columbus (Paper 6.6)

13-10

APPENDIX A: AGENDA

A-1

APPENDIX B: ATTENDANCE LIST BY LAST NAME

B-1

APPENDIX C: ATTENDANCE LIST BY COMPANY

C-1

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 11-1 Mockup Details, Flaw/Repair Details and Residual Stress Measurements

11-6

1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1991, 1992, 1994, 1997, and 2000 Workshops

The first five EPRI workshops on PWSCC of non-steam generator Alloy 600 materials in PWR power plants were held in Charlotte, North Carolina, on October 9–11, 1991; in Orlando, Florida, on December 1–3, 1992; in Tampa, Florida, on November 15–17, 1994; in Daytona Beach, Florida on February 25–27, 1997; and in St. Pete Beach, Florida on February 14–16, 2000. The first workshop was directed towards the emerging problem of PWSCC in pressurizer instrument nozzles, pressurizer heater sleeves and hot leg instrument nozzles. The second workshop provided additional information on PWSCC in the above types of penetrations plus the results of initial findings regarding cracks in CRDM nozzles. Emphasis in the third workshop was primarily on cracking of CRDM nozzles. The fourth workshop was directed primarily towards the results of work performed in 1995 and 1996 to determine the causes and consequences of CRDM nozzle PWSCC. The fifth workshop continued to emphasize CRDM nozzle PWSCC with some experience also presented for other Alloy 600 J-groove penetrations, and the fifth workshop also reflected developments in inspection, repair, and mitigation technologies, predictive modeling, and laboratory investigations. Proceedings of these five workshops are published as EPRI reports TR-100852, TR-103345, TR-105406, TR-109138, and

1000873.

Overview of 2005 Workshop

Subsequent to the 2000 conference, considerable attention has been devoted in the U.S. and abroad to managing PWSCC of Alloy 600 components in PWRs. In reflection of the wide range of activities associated with PWSCC of Alloy 600 components (other than steam generator tubes), the conference used two parallel sessions during most of the meeting time, and 72 presentations, including four keynote addresses, were made in total during the 12 half-day sessions. The keynote speakers emphasized the need for proactive management of materials degradation issues, with utility, EPRI, and regulatory perspectives provided.

Presentations were made addressing the specific approaches to managing PWSCC applied in various countries, including inspection methods and crack evaluation criteria. In the U.S., the PWR industry has recently adopted generic guidance for comprehensive programs addressing all plant Alloy 600 components [1], and crack growth rate disposition curves have been developed for thick-wall Alloy 600 wrought material and for Alloy 82 and 182 weld materials. Other

1 Materials Reliability Program: Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management (MRP-126), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1009561.

Introduction and Summary

presentations addressed recent developments in inspection, repair, and mitigation technologies. Discussion in this area emphasized new repair options, improvements made in the weldability of Alloy 52/152 replacement weld materials, and advances in stress improvement remediation technologies. One session was devoted to cracking and reliability studies of Alloy 690 replacement materials including Alloy 52 and 152 weld metals. Work is ongoing to demonstrate the long-term resistance of these materials to cracking. Another session addressed recent laboratory state-of-the-art crack characterization studies and other destructive examination projects focused on the fundamental factors that promote PWSCC. Finally, one session was devoted to the related issue of boric acid corrosion of carbon and low-alloy steel components, which can potentially result from through-wall cracking and pressure boundary leakage. This session on boric acid corrosion included plant experience, results of laboratory testing, recommended generic inspection guidance, and one example of a local leak detection technology.

The rest of Section 1 below provides summaries of each of the 12 half-day sessions, beginning with the four keynote addresses. Sections 2 through 13 provide brief summaries of each presentation made along with questions/comments and responses from the question period at the end of each presentation:

Section 2

Keynote Addresses

Section 3

Session 1A: Crack Growth and Initiation

Section 4

Session 1B: Strategic Planning

Section 5

Session 2A: Cracking and Reliability Studies of Alloy 690

Section 6

Session 2B: Repair Methods and Technologies

Section 7

Session 3A: Laboratory Investigations of Cracks

Section 8

Session 3B: Field Experience - Mitigation and Repair

Section 9

Session 4A: Boric Acid Corrosion

Section 10

Session 4B: Inspection Technologies and Planning

Section 11

Session 5A: Mitigation Methods

Section 12

Session 5B: Field Experience – Inspections

Section 13

Session 6: Regulatory Issues

The presentation slides and in most cases extended abstracts written by the presenters and co- authors were compiled for each presentation. These materials are electronically linked to this proceedings report.

Keynote Speakers and Discussion Panel

Keynote addresses were given by four invited speakers. The speakers discussed current efforts to manage PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals, and also discussed programs to identify and address other potential materials degradation issues. These topics were discussed from the U.S. utility perspective, the U.S. regulator perspective, the EPRI perspective, and an

Introduction and Summary

international utility perspective. All of the keynote addresses emphasized the need for proactive approaches for dealing with PWSCC and also for anticipating and dealing with possible new materials degradation issues. It was emphasized that the Davis-Besse event has demonstrated that not taking such a proactive approach can lead to serious problems. Both the industry and regulatory speakers indicated that programs are now in place to prevent the future occurrence of similar events.

EPRI described the detailed program managed by the MRP that is underway to manage the PWSCC issue. There are five steps in this program. The first step is to characterize the degradation mechanism by defining the effects of stress, materials, and chemistry variables on the rate of PWSCC. The second is to determine all Alloy 600/82/182 locations in the RCS for all vendor designs and conduct generic operability and safety assessments assuming the occurrence of PWSCC at these locations. The third is to develop flaw inspection and evaluation technology and guidelines for all locations, starting with those for which the potential consequences of failure are most severe. The fourth is to evaluate available mitigation options and, if necessary, develop additional options. The fifth and final step is to evaluate available repair/replacement options and, where necessary, encourage the development of additional options. Work is underway, with significant progress being made, on all of these five steps. EPRI noted that, in the absence of a chemistry countermeasure for PWSCC, location-specific mitigation and repair measures will have to be used and are likely to have a significant effect on production.

EDF noted that, because of the large size and standardized nature of their PWR fleet, they take a generic and rigorous approach at dealing with material degradation issues such as PWSCC. This approach involves development and use of models based on laboratory tests, destructive examinations, and field NDE to assist in setting inspection intervals and component replacements, and has limited the impact of PWSCC problems on production.

During the keynote speaker panel discussion several important points were made, including:

The Materials Technical Advisory Group (MTAG) and the Materials Executive Oversight Group (MEOG) are expected to remain in operation for at least a few more years, thereby giving continued industry emphasis to management of materials degradation issues. These groups are also working to ensure that international experience is appropriately considered.

While the effects of temperature on occurrence of PWSCC in CRDMs have some times not been as strong as expected, the general situation is that temperature has a strong effect such that reactor vessel heads with higher temperatures are more likely to experience PWSCC of their CRDMs earlier than lower temperature heads.

Efforts are being made to ensure that lessons learned from materials degradation experience in currently operating plants is reflected in new plant designs.

The use of zinc additions to primary coolant to mitigate PWSCC shows considerable promise. However, additional work to quantify its effects on PWSCC initiation and growth rate is still required.

The ASME Code no longer requires hydrostatic tests to be performed during 10 year inservice inspections, but rather allows use of lower pressure tests. A concern was expressed that this might significantly reduce the likelihood of detecting cracks such as observed during

Introduction and Summary

the hydrostatic test of Bugey 3 during its ten year inspection. Discussion by those involved in the ASME decision indicated that the effect on leak detection involved with lowering the pressure was small, and that increased reliance on NDE makes the pressure test no longer required. The NRC indicated that effective NDE is of most importance, with leak detection during pressure tests limited to providing defense-in-depth support.

Session 1A: Crack Growth and Initiation

This session reviewed recent information concerning development of crack growth rate (CGR) disposition curves for Alloy 600 and its weld metals. There were several presentations regarding measurement of CGRs in Alloy 600 and its weld metals; the measured CGRs were generally consistent with the disposition curves. The effects of cyclic loading on CGR were also investigated and found to be minimal. This session also covered the use of finite element analyses (FEA) to quantify the stress intensity values needed for determining CGRs in components. In addition, this session reviewed a novel approach that is being examined in the laboratory of trying to use applied potentials to reduce the likelihood of PWSCC initiation and to slow crack growth rates. Highlights of this session were as follows:

A CGR disposition curve was issued in 2002 for wrought Alloy 600 base material via MRP-55 report [2]. The disposition curve established in that work has since been incorporated into the ASME Section XI Code for flaw evaluation. In 2004, the MRP completed a report (MRP-115) on the appropriate crack growth rate disposition curves for the Alloy 82/182/132 weld metals [3]. Both the MRP-55 and MRP-115 studies were extensively supported by the work of an international expert panel on PWSCC, organized by EPRI.

The MRP-115 study mentioned above included an assessment of the potential effect on CGR of the environment on the OD of a reactor vessel closure head nozzle following leakage of primary coolant into the annulus between the penetration nozzle and the vessel head. Based on this evaluation, the MRP recommended that a factor of 2 be conservatively applied to the MRP CGR curve for evaluation of postulated flaws in Alloy 600 RVH nozzle base metals that are in contact with a wetted annulus environment for leak rates up to 1 liter/h (0.004 gpm).

MRP-115 contains two separate CGR curves as a function of temperature and stress intensity factor for Alloys 82 and 182/132, including consideration of the effects of dendrite orientation. For stress intensity factors greater than 20 MPa m, the CGR curve for Alloy 182/132 weld metal in MRP-115 is nearly parallel to, and about four times higher than, the MRP-55 curve for Alloy 600 wrought material.

2 Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Thick-Wall Alloy 600 Materials (MRP-55NP) Revision 1, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2002. 1006695-NP. NRC ADAMS Accession No. ML023010510.

3 Materials Reliability Program Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 82, 182, and 132 Welds (MRP-115NP), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1006696-NP. NRC ADAMS Accession No. ML051450555.

Introduction and Summary

CGR tests were reported by Westinghouse for Alloy 52M and Alloy 182 weld metals in simulated primary coolant environments at 340°C (644°F). Tests were performed with the crack growth direction both parallel to and perpendicular to the weld dendrites. The measured CGRs for Alloy 182 weld metal were consistent with published literature for this alloy and slightly below the EPRI disposition curve. The CGR parallel to dendrites was about 2.5 times higher than the CGR perpendicular to the dendrites. No intergranular cracking was detected in Alloy 52M weld metal. A small amount of transgranular crack growth was observed, but this was attributed to corrosion fatigue associated with periodic unloading of the test specimens, and not to PWSCC. If the observed crack growth was nevertheless attributed to PWSCC, it would be about 20 times slower than the CGR observed with Alloy 182.

CGR tests were performed by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) of Alloy 600, Alloy 132, and Alloy 82 in simulated primary coolant environments at 340°C (644°F) and 360°C (680°F). Tests were performed with the crack growth direction both parallel to and perpendicular to the weld dendrites. The CGRs in Alloy 82 and 132 weld metals were nearly the same, and were about one order of magnitude faster than those of base metal Alloy 600. The CGRs of the base metals were less than 1/5 of the predicted curve from the MRP curve or the modified Scott model, while those of the weld metals were approximately 5 times larger than the predicted curve. The apparent activation energy for CGR was about 27 kcal/mol or 113 kJ/mol). The crack propagation direction in the weld metals was along the dendrite direction, even when the dendrite direction and the direction perpendicular to the peak tensile stress direction were different.

Classical strength of materials analysis methods and published fracture mechanics solutions can be used to estimate stresses and crack tip stress intensity factors for use in CGR calculations. However, these methods do not readily handle anomalies such as weld repairs, are based on linear superposition, and do not fully consider the effect of stress redistribution upon crack growth. Finite element analysis (FEA) methods are capable of handling factors not readily addressed by classical superposition methods. In addition, FEA models using parametric inputs permit different cases to be evaluated quickly. For these reasons, FEA methods should be used for important analyses, and as a check of classical superposition models for other analyses.

Crack initiation tests and CGR tests indicate that increasing the potential a relatively small amount could possibly inhibit both the initiation and growth of PWSCC cracks. A test program started in February 2005 that involves use of constant extension rate tests to determine the effects of increasing potential on PWSCC initiation, and to determine if increasing the potential can stop already initiated cracks.

CGR tests were performed at 289°C (552°F) and 325°C (617°F) of two heats of Alloy 600 base material in simulated primary water at high R ratios and using both static and cyclic loading. For the conditions and the materials tested, no systematic enhancing effect of cyclic loading was observed. This could be the result of the heats being too sensitive to SCC, i.e., increases in crack growth due to cyclic loading might occur for less sensitive heats with lower crack growth rates. Tests at the lower temperature resulted in lower crack growth rates

Introduction and Summary

consistent with an apparent activation energy found in the literature for constant load conditions.

Session 1B: Strategic Planning

This session reviewed the industry situation with regard to development and application of strategic plans for managing PWSCC of Alloys 600/182/82. The main conclusions from this session are that guidance for development of strategic plans was issued by EPRI MRP via MRP-126, and that the guidance of MRP-126 is in the process of being implemented by utilities, with the assistance of contractors. The session also provided examples of strategic plans for specific plants and specific components. Highlights of this session were as follows:

MRP-126 was issued in December 2004 to provide guidance regarding development of strategic plans for management of PWSCC. The objectives of the plans are to maintain plant safety, minimize the impact of PWSCC on plant availability, and to develop and execute long-term strategies for Alloy 600/182/82 management. MRP-126 provides a list of good practices for the management strategies.

Duke Energy has developed a programmatic approach for management of PWSCC at its seven PWRs that is consistent with the guidance in MRP-126. It ranks the risk for the different pressure boundary Alloy 600 parts considering temperature, stress, operating experience, failure consequences, and economic risks. Alloy 600 components attached to the pressurizer were found to have the highest risk ranking, with components attached to the reactor vessel being next highest. The rankings reflect the fact that steam generators and reactor vessel heads at all Duke units have been replaced with PWSCC resistant components. The models will be updated to reflect operating experience and economic analyses, and repair and contingency strategies will be developed.

Several contractors described generic methods for developing strategic plans for managing PWSCC of Alloys 600/182/82 components. These methods involve evaluation of the full scope of issues that need to be considered, e.g., safety impacts of the occurrence of PWSCC, dose rate consequences of inspections and repairs, economic and operational impacts of the occurrence of PWSCC and of the application of mitigating measures, practicality and effectiveness of available mitigation options, etc. The methods for developing strategic plans include: models to predict the probability of PWSCC affecting various components; probabilistic fracture mechanics to predict the probability of cracks growing to unacceptable sizes; evaluation of a range of inspection, repair, replacement, and water chemistry options; evaluation of dose rate effects; and economic models.

Application of a specific PWSCC evaluation methodology to the reactor vessel upper and lower heads of a two unit European plant was described. In addition, detailed results were described of the application of PWSCC evaluation methodologies to bottom mounted instrument nozzles and to dissimilar metal butt welds.

Introduction and Summary

Session 2A: Cracking and Reliability Studies of Alloy 690

This session reviewed the results of laboratory tests and service experience regarding the resistance of Alloy 690 and its weld metals to PWSCC. The main conclusion from this review is that Alloy 690 and its weld metals (all with ~30% chromium) are highly resistant to PWSCC, especially when processed in accordance with industry standards. Highlights of this session were as follows:

Current field experience around the world has been that no SCC has been detected in Alloy

690 components after 25 years of service in the case of SG tubes, over 20 years of service for

tube plugs, and over 10 years of service in the case of CRDM nozzles. Similarly, there has been no cracking detected in Alloy 690 type weld materials, with service times up to 10 years.

All of the many the laboratory tests that have been performed have demonstrated a very high resistance to SCC of Alloy 690 in PWR primary water. However, in a few cases, a limited susceptibility to PWSCC has been observed in laboratory tests for Alloy 690 with abnormal microstructures when subjected to severe loadings. This susceptibility is increased by local cold work. No SCC is expected for industrial products having the specified microstructure.

Investigations were performed of 19% Cr, 22%, 26% Cr and 30% Cr weld alloys that compared them with Alloy 182, which has about 15% Cr. SCC susceptibility in primary water at 360°C (680°F) was evaluated using constant load tests, RUB tests, and slow strain rate tests. A strong correlation was found to exist between SCC susceptibility in primary water at 360°C (680°F) and the chromium content, with neither crack initiation nor crack growth occurring for material containing more than 26% Cr. Hot cracks, which were frequently present in alloys containing 30% Cr, did not propagate during the stress corrosion tests.

EPRI guidelines for cold worked and annealed steam generator tube material were published in 1991 and 1999. However, there are no industry guidelines for hot finished thermally treated (TT) Alloy 690. To fill this gap, MHI has developed material specifications for hot finished TT Alloy 690 that, without causing deterioration of PWSCC resistance, result in material meeting mechanical property requirements. They require a mill anneal following the hot finishing operation, and control the carbon content and mill anneal temperature to obtain the desired microstructure and strength, and to achieve a grain size that is compatible with good examination by UT. USA personnel noted that satisfactory hot finished material can be obtained without a final mill anneal, since the hot working raises the materials temperature and, in effect, applies a mill anneal.

Report MRP-111 [4] evaluated existing field and laboratory test data regarding the behavior of Alloys 690/52/152 in order to demonstrate and quantify the margin of improvement of Alloys 690/52/152 over Alloys 600/82/182. The estimated factor of improvement for Alloy

690 relative to Alloy 600MA was about 27. However, some specific knowledge gaps were

identified in MRP-111. These include:

4 Materials Reliability Program: Resistance to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Alloys 690, 52, and 152 in Pressurized Water Reactors (MRP-111), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1009801.

Introduction and Summary

Insufficient testing of Alloy 52 and 152 weld metals.

The effects of different product forms on PWSCC behavior have not been definitively resolved.

Insufficient investigation of the effects of subtle changes in chemical composition, changes in thermo-mechanical processing, and surface finish on PWSCC resistance.

There is essentially no information regarding crack growth rates in base or weld metals if PWSCC should occur.

A potential concern regarding the susceptibility of the HAZ to PWSCC (by analogy with Alloy 600).

Corrosion fatigue behavior needs to be better defined (however, behavior similar to that of Alloy 600 is expected).

LTCP (low temperature crack propagation) has been shown by tests to be a possible concern.

Planned future work by the MRP regarding the PWSCC resistance of Alloy 690 and its weld metals includes continuing to follow the NDE of thick-walled Alloy 690 components (e.g. replacement RPV heads in France), revision of MRP-111 in 2006, addition of data from a WOG test program that compared Alloy 52M and 182 weld metals, and the possible addition of data from a long-term Japanese test program on Alloy 690 and its weld metals. An experimental program is currently being initiated to assess the PWSCC resistance of the HAZ in welded, thick-section material of Alloys 600 and 690. The results from MRP-111 and the additional test programs will be used, together with field inspection data, to develop and refine a less-stringent NDE program for thick-walled components made of Alloy 690.

MRP test results published in 2004 showed that Alloy 690 is not completely "immune" to PWSCC crack growth, but that the growth rates are low [4]. A follow-on program is evaluating crack growth rates in Alloys 690, 52 and 152 using sophisticated test techniques. In this regard, CGR tests in simulated primary water at 340–360°C (644–680°F) have been performed of cold worked Alloy 690 material. The cold work is intended to simulate residual strains present in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of welds. These tests indicate that slow crack growth appears to occur in some (but not all) cold worked Alloy 690 materials, even at constant K, but that fully intergranular crack propagation has not yet been demonstrated for Alloy 690 materials. Similar testing of Alloys 152 and 52 is now starting. Future work will also examine the possibility of increased PWSCC susceptibility in the HAZ of Alloy 690.

Session 2B: Repair Methods and Technologies

This session reviewed recent developments in repair methods for Alloy 600/82/182 components. The first presentation covered recent developments with the Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA) device, in particular the new MNSA-2 design. The other five presentations addressed the range of weld repair methods applicable CRDM nozzles, pressurizer heater sleeves, BMI nozzles, and Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds. The weld repair options covered were weld pad

Introduction and Summary

nozzle repair, mid-wall nozzle repair, embedded flaw repair, and weld overlay of piping butt welds. Brief summaries of the presentations in this session are as follows:

The Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA) device provides both sealing and structural support for small-bore nozzle connections. It was developed starting in 1993 as an alternative to weld repair for leaks in J-groove welds of Alloy 600 instrumentation nozzles, and it can also prevent potential leakage at susceptible nozzle sites. MNSA installation is faster than welded repairs, can be installed with water in the vessel (core offload is not required), and no NDE (PT or UT) is required as part of the repair operation. MNSAs have been installed at more than 10 plants in the U.S. since 1998. The presentation on the MNSA technology included a description of the plant-specific engineering analysis required, along with licensing issues, installation tooling descriptions, process steps, and schedule durations for a typical MNSA-2 installation.

One vendor described improvements to its conventional weld repair process for Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves and reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles. The basic improvement to this permanent repair option is the use of an integrated ("small") pad design that reduces installation time and cost, reduces manual intervention by eliminating any J-groove weld, and improves volumetric NDE coverage. The presentation on the "small pad" weld repair option discussed the repair equipment and the automated repair process, including comparisons with other repair options.

Another vendor described recent developments in its welded repair options for pressurizer heater sleeves including the new mid-wall repair option. The mid-wall repair option is intended to further reduce repair time beyond the advances realized for OD weld pad repairs. This presentation reviewed the mid-wall repair method including procedures, the licensing process, the status of its first implementation at Waterford 3, and other potential applications such as reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles. The presentation also briefly covered the experience with weld pad repairs at Palo Verde Unit 2 and 3 in fall 2003 and fall 2004, respectively.

The embedded flaw repair for reactor vessel head penetrations (such as CRDM nozzles) was developed in 1993, and first implemented at DC Cook 2 in 1996. The process was adopted for OD weld repairs subsequent to the initial work in the early 1990s for CRDM nozzle ID surfaces. The process has been given generic approval by the U.S. NRC including for J-groove weld surfaces through issuance of Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs). Inspections required by the July 3, 2003, SER are consistent with those for a structural weld, with both UT and surface examinations required in most cases.

One weld repair vendor discussed its development of structural weld overlay designs for PWR piping, including a recent Alloy 52 weld development program. This program, which addressed the key issues of welding sequence, welding equipment design, and process parameters, resulted in the process improvements necessary for high quality (i.e., reduced oxides, artifacts, and inclusions) weld overlays to be produced using orbital progression. The improvements to the orbital progression process were achieved through improved process controls and use of advanced welding equipment. The engineering design of the weld overlays was coordinated with field inspection capabilities.

Introduction and Summary

The authors of the final presentation in Session 2B have worked together to evaluate the use of Alloy 52 and 52M materials for weld overlays (particularly for ambient temper bead applications) and for pressurizer mid-wall heater sleeve repairs. Their presentation described the experiments and testing conducted, using field-simulated geometries, to evaluate the weldability of Alloy 52M. Significant advantages were observed in the Alloy 52M weld deposits that improved the dye penetrant surface examinations and the ultrasonic volumetric examinations. Results also suggest that Alloy 52M has a greater tolerance to variations in welding parameters that avoid cracking in the weld (both hot and cold cracking). In addition, the metallurgical evaluations confirmed a significant reduction in the presence of oxides and small microfissures dispersed throughout the weld deposit. The program concluded that high quality welds can be made reliably using Alloy 52M filler material, and that the probability for making successful welds is very high.

Session 3A: Laboratory Investigations of Cracks

This session reviewed the results of laboratory investigations of cracked Alloy 600/82/182 parts removed from plants. These investigations show that the PWSCC induced cracking is intergranular and/or interdendritic. Cracked base materials typically had "highly susceptible" microstructures, with many intragranular carbides and few intergranular carbides. No special microstructural features were identified of the Alloy 182 weld materials that correlate with high susceptibility. Weld flaws appear to have been involved in the cracking of the STP bottom mounted instrument nozzle weldment, but were not involved in the Ringhals and Davis-Besse welds that were examined. Highlights of the session were as follows:

Laboratory examinations were performed of an Alloy 600 nozzle and its attached Alloy 182 J-groove weld that had been removed from the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head. Cracks in the nozzle and weld were believed to be the cause of the leaks that resulted in the development of the large cavity in the head. Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of intergranular/interdendritic cracks in the nozzle and weld with morphologies consistent with PWSCC. The microstructures of the nozzle and weld material were found to be typical of those seen in the industry. There were several axial cracks in the nozzle, with two of them through wall. One of the cracks had initiated at the nozzle ID surface, propagated through the wall and through the adjacent weld, and was the source of the leak that caused the large cavity. A cluster of shallow circumferential cracks was found on the bottom J-groove weld surface that had been exposed to normal primary coolant, and another cluster of shallow circumferential cracks was found on the top weld surface where it had been exposed to the concentrated boric acid slurry inside the cavity.

Examination was performed of the Type 308 stainless steel cladding that was located at the bottom of the large cavity in the Davis-Besse head. The cladding thickness was above the specified minimum value. There were numerous shallow cracks in the top surface of the cladding that were attributed to exposure to the concentrated boric acid in the cavity. The minimum remaining uncracked thickness of the cladding was 0.139 in. (3.5 mm). NRC/ORNL estimated that the additional operating time that would have led to cladding failure was 2 to 13 months (these were 5% and 95% percentile estimates). These estimates

Introduction and Summary

were based on the rate of opening up of the cavity rather than on crack propagation in the cladding.

Laboratory examination was performed of a small boat sample removed from the nozzle to J-groove juncture of a leaking bottom mounted instrument (BMI) nozzle of STP Unit 1. The nozzle base material was also examined using a full diameter sample of the nozzle removed from the below the weld. The nozzle base material was found to have a susceptible microstructure and to have high cold work at the nozzle ID surface. The cracks in the nozzle and weld material were intergranular and consistent with PWSCC. The cracks intersected cavities located at the nozzle to weld juncture; these cavities are attributed to entrapment of weld flux (which was found to be present in one of the cavities). Within the boat sample material, the main crack appeared to have grown outward, in the nozzle ID to OD direction. This is contrary to conclusions based on NDE, which indicated that the cracks had initiated at the OD and were growing toward the nozzle ID. There are two main hypotheses regarding the nature of the cracking in the BMI as discussed below; it was concluded that a definitive answer as to which is correct will never be developed:

One hypothesis is that the cracks initiated at the top OD weld surface, probably as the result of a cavity just below the weld surface, and grew in a complex fashion such that the main crack grew outward in the small region included in the boat sample. This hypothesis is largely based on results of NDE, including a helium leak test. UT indicated the presence of several cracks in the affected nozzle and in a second nozzle that were part wall with no penetration to the nozzle ID. The helium leak test indicated that there was no ID to OD leak path, but rather that the leak went from the nozzle OD in the annulus below the weld up to the top surface of the weld, e.g., along the heat affected zone and/or nozzle to weld interface.

The second hypothesis, which was emphasized in the presentation made at the meeting, is that the main crack initiated in the cold worked material at the nozzle ID and grew outward. The main bases for this hypothesis are the presence of a susceptible microstructure in the nozzle, the presence of a severely cold worked layer at the nozzle ID, and the outward direction of crack growth deduced from examination of the boat sample.

CRDM nozzles and welds have been removed from the retired North Anna 2 reactor vessel head. Standard and developmental NDE has been performed for use in later comparisons with the results of the destructive examination, which are still in process. Silastic molds of the ID surface have been taken and are being examined using laser profilometry. One nozzle (#54) is being destructively examined by Westinghouse, and two have been provided to the NRC for destructive examination at PNNL. Examination to date of nozzle #54 indicates that there was no accumulation of boric acid in the annulus above the weld, nor any wastage of the low alloy steel.

Cracks in Alloy 182 weld material from Ringhals 3 and 4 outlet nozzles and a Davis-Besse CRDM J-groove weld were examined using scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and analytical transmission electron microscopy (ATEM). The goal of this work was to investigate the causes of the cracking in these welds. SEM observations showed that the cracks occurred along grain boundaries, and not along interdendritic boundaries. X-ray

Introduction and Summary

mapping revealed there to be a cored weld structure with segregated Mn and coincident Nb carbide precipitates. In the Davis-Besse material, MnS inclusions were also common. High- resolution ATEM showed no segregation along the grain boundaries ahead of the cracks in the Ringhals welds, and few intergranular carbide particles. In contrast, the grain boundaries in the Davis-Besse material were highly decorated by both MC and M 23 C 6 -type carbides. The weld materials contained high densities of dislocations, apparently caused by welding strains. Detailed ATEM examinations of the cracks and crack tips revealed microstructures consistent with stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) in primary water. Corrosion products in the cracks included fine-grained, Cr-rich spinel oxide often with adjacent Ni-rich metal, as well as spinel containing high Nb. In addition, the weld materials showed a distinctive structure consisting of oxide-filled corrosion tunnels in the weld metal up to the leading edges of cracks. The corrosion products and crack-tip microstructures indicate that the cracks were fully penetrated by primary water. No evidence of solidification hot cracking was found.

Session 3B: Field Experience - Mitigation and Repair

This session concentrated on the plant experience for a range of mitigation and repair options, although some process development work was also described during the session. The mitigation methods covered during two of the presentations were water jet peening of BMI nozzles and temperature reduction for reactor vessel closure heads. Three presentations were made on weld repair options that can also be used as preventive measures for components such as pressurizer heater sleeves and large-diameter piping butt welds. Two presentations covered practical experience with replacement of reactor vessel closure heads including one utility perspective. Brief summaries of the presentations in this session are as follows:

The leakage discovered at South Texas Project in 2003 has shown that reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) penetrations may be susceptible to PWSCC. One vendor discussed a water jet peening process that can be used to impart a compressive stress to the inside diameter of the BMI nozzle and also to the wetted surface of the J-groove weld and nozzle outside diameter near the weld to eliminate susceptibility to PWSCC. This process has been implemented at seven PWRs in Japan to date. Even though the probability of PWSCC leading to leakage of these nozzles is low due to their reduced temperature, the water jet peening process can provide additional margin which may be particularly important for plants employing license extension.

One vendor described a strategy for upper head temperature reduction (UHTR) as an effective program to reduce the propensity for cracking of reactor vessel head nozzles and J-groove welds. Different processes for UHTR implementation are available based on the particular plant design configuration. A field modification program of reactor upper and lower internals components was developed to provide additional bypass flow to the upper head region of the reactor vessel, lowering the bulk fluid temperature in contact with the closure head, and thus the head penetration temperature, to cold-leg temperature levels. The UHTR also provides a benefit in terms of increased margin for LOCA safety analyses.

One welding vendor addressed the performance and weldability issues specific to Alloy 52 GTAW weld filler material, which is being used as a substitute for Alloy 82. Weldability

Introduction and Summary

issues for Alloy 52 have significantly delayed plant repair schedules in some cases. Welding tests such as the "Chabenat" weldability test in combination with application specific mockups are being used by this vendor to substantiate field weldability performance. Several case studies were presented, and an ongoing filler material evaluation/selection program was described.

The reactor vessel closure head at Turkey Point Unit 3 was replaced in fall 2004 because of the generic susceptibility to PWSCC of the original Alloy 600 CRDM nozzles. An FPL evaluation considered ongoing inspection and repair costs versus replacement or application of mitigation techniques. The conclusion of this evaluation favored replacement, and FPL chose an extensive replacement project including other associated components.

One presentation discussed a vendor's experience with replacement of reactor vessel closure heads. At the time of the conference, three head replacements had been performed by this vendor, including head package upgrades accompanying two of these replacements. Head replacement removes the Alloy 600 nozzles that are susceptible to PWSCC and addresses head inspectability issues. This vendor has completed a total of five simplified head upgrades, which provide both critical path time and worker exposure savings during future refueling activities. This vendor is applying lessons learned to current projects, and installation times, worker exposure, and safety events are showing decreasing trends.

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station described its process for management and replacement of Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves. The overall management process was presented including repair/replacement study results, recommendations to plant management, the selected repair alternative, and net present value economic study results. The management process has led to replacement of all pressurizer heater sleeves in Palo Verde Units 2 and 3. Replacement of the heater sleeves in Palo Verde Unit 1 was scheduled for fall 2005. The past replacements used a pad weld repair approach, but the mid-wall repair option is under consideration for Unit 1.

The final presentation of Session 3B discussed the repair/mitigation technique applied to the Alloy 182 reactor vessel outlet nozzle to safe end welds at Ringhals Units 3 and 4 in Sweden. Axially oriented PWSCC indications were discovered in these units at this location in 2000 and 2001. In response, a repair system was developed capable of restoring the full structural capacity of the nozzle and the normal 10-year ISI interval by (1) weld repair of the boat sample divots and (2) application of a corrosion resistant ID overlay onto the existing Alloy

182

safe end weld. This overlay precludes future PWSCC cracking by removing the Alloy

182

material from the primary water environment. Based on risk, cost, and schedule

evaluations, an ID repair method was preferred as compared to the safe end replacement option previously implemented at the VC Summer station. For this repair method, the plant is configured to allow dry access to the inside of the reactor vessel outlet nozzles via the top of the reactor vessel.

Introduction and Summary

Session 4A: Boric Acid Corrosion

This session reviewed work underway to better define the causes and rates of boric acid corrosion, how best to inspect for it, and ways to detect precursor primary coolant leaks. Highlights presented regarding these topics include:

Detailed evaluation in the laboratory has been completed of the cavity in the Davis-Besse head that occurred as the result of a small leak in an adjacent CRDM nozzle. The evaluation confirmed that a large volume of low alloy steel had been corroded away (~260 in. 3 (~4261 cm 3 )), exposing a large area of cladding (~16.5 in. 2 (106 cm 2 )). Examination of the cavity did not reveal the detailed mechanisms involved in the corrosion, but did indicate that flow effects were not important to the final stages of the corrosion (based on absence of directionality of the surface features). Some preferential attack, probably due to galvanic effects, was observed at the low alloy steel to stainless steel clad interface. There appeared to be some correlation between the rate of corrosion of the low alloy steel and bands of inclusions in the steel; however this was not very strong and may not be significant.

Several EPRI sponsored tests regarding the mechanisms and rates of boric acid corrosion are underway. These include four phases of testing: stagnant low flow tests, flow impingement tests, separate effects tests, and full scale mockup tests. Tests results to date indicate:

Corrosion rates in deaerated primary coolant are less than 0.001 in. (40 m) per year.

Corrosion rates in extreme concentrated conditions can be as high as 6 in./year (150 mm/year).

Corrosion rates are highest at intermediate temperatures and boric acid concentrations. In these conditions the presence of lithium strongly reduces corrosion rates, galvanic effects are not significant, and the absence of oxygen reduces corrosion rates by no more than a factor of two.

In jet impingement conditions, higher leak rates and higher velocities increase the rate of corrosion, and the effect of heat flux appears to be important. Tests to quantify the effects of heat flux are planned.

Generic guidance for boric acid corrosion control programs has recently been issued by Revision 1 to WCAP-15988 [5]. The guidance was developed by the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) for the MRP. Based on NEI, NRC and INPO concerns, Revision 1 added binding "executive muscle" to direct utilities to implement its requirements. It falls within the scope NEI-03-08, the NEI Materials Implementation Protocol, and thus must be addressed by all PWRs. Revision 1 incorporates enhanced or new requirements regarding personnel training, documentation, pump and valve screening, gap analysis vs. INPO guidance, and implementation.

Software has been developed that allows boric acid control program inspection data to be entered into handheld devices that automatically transfer the data to a plant's central

5

G. Rao, T. S. Sharma, and S. S. Barshay, Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection Program for Pressurized Water Reactors, Westinghouse, Pittsburgh, PA: 2005. WCAP-15988-NP.

Introduction and Summary

computer system. The software has been tailored to make data entry easy and to ensure that all required data are obtained. Use of the software is reported to reduce the time and radiation exposure involved with boric acid control inspections. The software is currently in use at the Cook station, with good results.

A leak detection system called "FLÜS" is available that can be installed in areas such as the top reactor vessel head or the bottom reactor vessel head to monitor for leaks. Twelve such systems have been installed worldwide since 1994. The system works by measuring the humidity in small samples of air withdrawn from the monitored area. It is reported to be sensitive to leaks as low as 0.005 gpm (1 liter/hour). Its lead application in the USA is at the lower reactor vessel head of Davis-Besse.

Session 4B: Inspection Technologies and Planning

This session discussed developments in inspection technology and experience for Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds and CRDM nozzles and for the U.S. industry's Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI). A two-part presentation addressed the U.S. industry's development of a comprehensive inspection program for reactor vessel closure head penetrations including deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. Brief summaries of the presentations in this session are as follows:

The presentation of one NDE service vendor gave its perspective of the challenges associated with complying with the ultrasonic examination performance demonstration process for examinations performed on PWRs. Work on the various supplements of the Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) process is in various stages of completion. PDI addresses the requirements for ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, "Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems." The EPRI NDE Center maintains detailed information on the status of the various PDI programs.

The MRP has developed a comprehensive inspection program for reactor vessel closure heads in U.S. PWRs to address PWSCC of Alloy 600 head penetrations, which has led to cracking and leakage in a number of plants. The inspection program is based on a safety assessment that addressed all safety-related concerns that could develop as a consequence of PWSCC in the closure heads. The main safety concerns are the potential for nozzle ejection as a result of circumferential cracking of the nozzles above the attachment welds to the vessel, and severe wastage of the closure head that could develop as a result of significant leakage occurring over an extended period without corrective action. Specific elements of this work discussed in a two-part presentation included the following:

Weibull analysis for expected frequency of nozzle leakage versus time

Probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) model predicting the probability of a circumferential crack growing to a significant size that could potentially lead to nozzle ejection

Examination coverage requirements for both visual and volumetric/surface examinations to ensure that the inspections address the entire region in which PWSCC may reasonably be expected to occur

Introduction and Summary

Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)

Deterministic and probabilistic wastage evaluations

Summary of the industry inspection plan document (MRP-117)

Under the Materials Initiative of the U.S. nuclear power industry, programs are now in place to accelerate the development, qualification, and implementation of innovative NDE devices and techniques. EPRI described the NDE developments sponsored by the Materials Initiative with particular attention to NDE of nickel-based materials and weldments. The Materials Initiative is a new major initiative to comprehensively and aggressively address materials degradation issues.

One NDE services vendor presented its inspection technology and experience for PWR reactor vessel upper and lower head penetrations. An average of one inspection has been performed each month by this vendor since the time that the NRC order on upper heads was issued. Several types of probes are used to perform volumetric and surface examinations from the ID and OD/weld surfaces, and three basic systems are available for inspection of bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles in reactor vessel lower heads. Leak path inspections are not applicable to the BMI nozzles because these nozzles have a nominal clearance fit, rather than the interference fit for CRDM nozzles. Repair technology, including a robotically delivered remote fluorescent dye penetrant testing (FPT) system, is integrated with the inspection systems.

A thermal imaging inspection technique that has not yet been applied to the commercial nuclear power industry is under development. The technique is a non-contact technique that detects surface breaking discontinuities on the basis of a discontinuity causing an asymmetry in the temperature response to a laser spot. The technique may be used to complement eddy current techniques for complex geometries where tooling becomes an issue. The system has the advantage that flaws that tend to go subsurface along parts of their lengths can still be detected.

Session 5A: Mitigation Methods

This session reviewed work completed or underway to identify and qualify methods for mitigating the occurrence of PWSCC in Alloy 600/82/132/182 parts in PWRs. In this regard, some mitigation measures have been applied to a limited extent in several plants, including two that were originally developed and applied in BWRs, and work is continuing on further development and qualification of these and other mitigation measures. Highlights in this regard include:

Several types of peening processes have been developed that can be applied to the wetted surfaces of Alloy 600/82/132/182. These processes are also known as "stress improvement" (SI) processes. These SI processes result in a thin compressive surface layer on the wetted surface that is expected to inhibit crack initiation, and that may also inhibit growth of undetected small cracks that are shallower than the peening-induced compressive layer. The status of development of these processes is as follows:

Introduction and Summary

Abrasive water jet conditioning has been used in conjunction with repairs and is thus ready for use as a mitigation method, although it has not as yet been applied solely as a mitigation method. Fiber laser peening has been applied as a mitigation method by Toshiba in Japan in BWRs and at the nozzle ID of BMIs in one PWR, and thus is ready for use as a mitigation method. Laser peening, in air, is also judged to be a possible mitigation method, but has not as yet been applied in PWRs for this purpose. Cavitation peening is under development and appears promising.

Testing is underway of laser peening, fiber laser peening, and cavitation peening to better determine the residual stresses and the SCC resistance of treated areas.

Even though the growth of small cracks on peened surfaces may be inhibited by development of the compressive layer developed by peening, it is preferable to ensure that there are no cracks remaining on the wetted surface before application of the peening. One of the peening processes, abrasive water jet conditioning, removes about 0.03 in. (0.8 mm) of the treated surface, and thus can remove small cracks. Other methods for removing thin surface layers before application of peening are under review, such as flapper wheel polishing.

Some questions remain regarding the long term effectiveness of peening processes on mitigation of PWSCC. These include (1) the issue of pre-existing undetected small flaws as discussed above, (2) concerns about possible "shakeout" (reduction of the induced compressive stresses) due to cyclic stresses that may reduce the effectiveness of peening over the long term, (3) the ability to reliably apply peening to complex geometries such as J-grove welds, and (4) ensuring that all susceptible wetted surfaces are effectively peened.

A "mechanical stress improvement process™" (MSIP™) is available that involves mechanically compressing areas such as butt welds to develop deep seated compressive stresses on the ID wetted surface. Since 1986 it has been applied to over 1300 BWR welds, including safe end welds, with no problems reported. It has been qualified by analyses and tests for use on PWR welds, and is expected to be ready for implementation on PWR pressurizer nozzle welds by June 2005. The process is available from AEA Technology Engineering Services, Inc./Westinghouse.

Weld overlays (WOLs) have been used successfully for many years in BWRs, and have been used in several cases as a repair method for PWSCC affected nozzles in PWRs. Qualification of preventive weld overlay repairs (PWOL) as a mitigation method for non- cracked Alloy 600/82/182 welds is underway. Use of PWOLs is intended to result in relief from augmented inservice inspection requirements. Design and analysis in support of use of PWOL as a mitigation method are complete for pressurizer nozzles, and an MRP project has been initiated to confirm residual stresses and inspectability using a mockup. A patent covering use of weld overlays on a preventive basis has been applied for, with rights to be assigned to EPRI. The PWOL process is available from Structural Integrity Associates.

A process for applying coatings to areas such as the wetted surface of a dissimilar metal butt weld is under development. The process is called "supersonically induced mechanical alloy technology" (SIMAT) and involves development of a protective layer or coating (e.g., of nickel) by impingement with a high velocity flow stream of particles. SCC tests of pre-

Introduction and Summary

cracked and then coated specimens indicated that the coating prevented growth of pre- existing flaws as well as initiation of new flaws. Plans for development include further optimization of the process and completion of bond strength and corrosion testing, development of field tooling, and NRC licensing.

With regard to use of water chemistry changes as a PWSCC mitigation method, the situation is as follows:

Tests indicate that that changes in the B/Li/pH regime have little effect on PWSCC growth rates, and it is considered unlikely that strategies for modifying B/Li/pH regimes to mitigate PWSCC will be developed.

Tests indicate the control of hydrogen concentration in the upper end of the currently allowed 25–50 cc/kg range, or even higher, may result in reduced crack growth rates, with the benefit depending on the temperature, the alloy, and change in hydrogen concentration that can be achieved. Testing in this area is continuing.

Tests of the effect of zinc on PWSCC initiation indicate that use of zinc strongly inhibits initiation, and several PWRs are currently adding zinc for this purpose. However, crack growth rate tests do not show consistent benefits, and tests of the effects of zinc on crack growth rate are continuing. Service experience at Diablo Canyon is encouraging cracks but not conclusive with regard to the effects of zinc inhibiting both PWSCC initiation and growth; a project to analyze the Diablo Canyon data is underway and is expected to provide firmer conclusions during the summer of 2005.

Session 5B: Field Experience - Inspections

This session discussed plant experience with surface and volumetric examinations (NDE) for PWSCC indications, as well as for visual inspections for evidence of primary coolant leakage due to PWSCC. One presentation was a general review of PWSCC experience, especially but not exclusively for U.S. plants. Two presentations addressed experience and practices in Sweden, including the development of a crack growth rate disposition curve. Another presentation covered the detailed experience for the PWR units operating in Belgium. Finally, two presentations gave perspectives of two multiple unit PWR stations in the U.S. One plant described its detailed experience with inspection of CRDM nozzles including an unexpected repair operation, and a second described its development of a robotic system to remove coatings from BMI penetrations that may interfere with effective visual examinations for evidence of boric acid deposit accumulations. Brief summaries of the presentations in this session are as follows:

An overview of PWSCC practices and experience was presented for the seven PWR units operating in Belgium. Information and data were presented regarding inspections and analyses performed and the general strategy applied for Alloy 600 reactor vessel closure head nozzles, Alloy 182 piping butt welds, reactor vessel safety injection nozzles, and Alloy 600 reactor vessel bottom head penetrations. The only case of significant CRDM nozzle cracking was at Tihange 1, where a long axial through-wall crack extending below the weld all the way down to the bottom of the penetration was detected in one penetration in 1998. A small

Introduction and Summary

axial indication was detected in October 2002 at the inside surface of the Alloy 182 pressurizer nozzle to surge line transition weld of Tihange 2. This indication is located close to a fabrication repair on the outside surface, but repeated inspections have not shown any growth.

In Sweden, a bounding bi-linear crack growth rate expression has been developed in order to disposition PWSCC in Alloy 182 welds. A review of available worldwide data for crack growth rate testing using controlled Alloy 182 weld fracture mechanics samples was used to develop the disposition curve. Data from a series of crack growth rate tests performed by Studsvik in Sweden supports the bi-linear Ringhals disposition curve, although the plateau level suggested by the laboratory data is three times lower than the disposition line.

In 2001, the Nuclear Management Company (NMC) embarked on an effort to ensure that the latest automated ultrasonic (AUT) techniques would be used during the upcoming CRDM nozzle examinations at Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP). Point Beach described the experience and lessons learned from the inspections performed in 2002, 2003, and 2004 at this two-unit station for the relatively small head size associated with Westinghouse-design two-loop PWRs. An unexpected nozzle repair was performed for Nozzle 26 of Unit 1 in spring 2004 due to faint spiderlike indications on the J-groove weld surface of this nozzle. The steep angle of this nozzle on the head necessitated a repair in which the new Alloy 52 weld material overlapped with the existing Alloy 182 J-groove weld. To address this weld overlap issue, a crack growth analysis was performed that conservatively assumed Alloy 52 to be subject to the same crack growth rate as Alloy 600.

Ringhals AB discussed its experience with SCC at the Ringhals and Barsebäck stations in Sweden, including both PWR and BWR experience, as well as the approach taken to inspection, repair, and replacement at these plants. The utility estimates that an average production loss of 20 days per year has resulted due to SCC at these stations over the preceding 10 years. Indications have been found in Alloy 600 wrought material and Alloy 82/182 weld metals in such different locations as heavy section pipe welds in both BWR and PWR, small-bore instrumentation nozzle welds, brackets to piping systems in reactor vessel internals in BWR, and reactor vessel upper head penetrations of the PWRs.

Additional Alloy 600/182/82 components have now experienced cracking in PWRs, including steam-space pressurizer butt welds, reactor vessel bottom head nozzles, and steam generator bowl drains. In addition, circumferential indications (but located inside the pressure boundary) have been reported for Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves at one plant. More than 600 CRDM penetration J-groove welds have now been inspected in the U.S., and significant differences have been observed for these inspections on the basis of vessel fabricator. No indications of PWSCC have been found in reactor vessel bottom mounted instrumentation (BMI) nozzles since the leakage detected at South Texas Project.

Palo Verde has developed a process for cleaning and inspecting BMI nozzles to allow sensitive bare metal visual inspections to be performed in the case that pre-existing conditions such as coating remnants, stains, and other obstructions are present at the intersection of the nozzle and outer head surface. The process uses a robot that delivers CO 2 "dry ice" media to clean a localized area on each penetration. The process works by freezing

Introduction and Summary

the target coating, which is subsequently blown off by the expanding CO 2 . Palo Verde is currently in the process of completing this cleaning operation for the 61 BMI nozzles in each of its three units.

Session 6: Regulatory Issues

The presentations in this session discussed efforts in the U.S. to address materials degradation issues including regulatory interactions. The first two presentations gave overviews of the high- level efforts of the U.S. industry to proactively manage material degradation including PWSCC of Alloy 600. Two presentations gave status reports on efforts specific to PWSCC of Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds and Alloy 600 reactor vessel bottom mounted nozzles (i.e., BMI nozzles). Subsequent to the conference, the U.S. industry issued guidance for inspection and evaluation of Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds. Another presentation described the crack leak rate modeling work being sponsored by the U.S. industry to support evaluations of piping systems covered by leak-before-break (LBB) assessments given the potential for PWSCC of Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds. The final presentation covered some of the work sponsored by the U.S. NRC in the Alloy 600 area, including analytical work for CRDM nozzles and assessments of the risk of piping LOCAs. Brief summaries of the presentations in this session are as follows:

The Materials Reliability Program (MRP) is a utility-directed oversight structure with a mission to proactively address and resolve, on a consistent industry-wide basis, existing and emerging performance, safety, reliability, operational, and regulatory PWR material-related issues. The MRP is directed by the PWR utilities and managed by EPRI. The Alloy 600 Issue Task Group (ITG) within the MRP has within its scope all Alloy 600 base material (with the exception of steam generator tubing) and Alloy 82/182 weld metal locations in PWR primary systems. The unexpected cracking detected at North Anna Unit 2 in fall 2002 led to a significant reassessment within the Alloy 600 ITG to ensure that the approaches taken in the Alloy 600 area are sufficiently proactive to anticipate potential crack locations or geometries that have not yet been observed in the field.

In August 2002, the U.S. industry initiated a self-assessment process to determine the activities needed to ensure that the industry "gets ahead" of materials degradation issues. The scope covered a broad range of PWR and BWR materials. The self-assessment process resulted in a series of recommendations including that the formal NEI Initiative Process be used and that a Materials Initiative be established. The objective of the Materials Initiative is to assure safe, reliable, and efficient operation of U.S. nuclear power plants in the management of materials issues. Under the Materials Initiative, the U.S. industry is developing proactive tools for the management of material degradation such as the Degradation Matrix and the Issues Management Table.

EPRI discussed the process being used by the MRP to develop inspection guidance for Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds in U.S. PWR plants. Subsequent to the conference, this inspection guidance was finalized and issued to U.S. utilities as report MRP-139. The presentation also discussed the effect of PWSCC on piping butt welds classified as leak-before-break (LBB) locations. Considered in development of the inspection guidance was BWR experience,

Introduction and Summary

Alloy 82/182 piping butt weld plant experience, and NDE capabilities for dissimilar metal welds.

Past leak-before-break (LBB) submittals have not considered PWSCC cracks in Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds or Alloy 600 base metals, and the leak rate calculations have only considered the conventional fatigue crack morphology. Based on the best fit to a sensitivity study of five example LBB piping systems, the KRAKFLO leak rate code predicts a 37% increase in the crack length resulting in a leak rate of 10 gpm when considering an SCC morphology over the conventional fatigue morphology. A safety factor of 10 on the detectable leak rate is maintained to account for the uncertainties in geometry, materials, and loading.

The U.S. industry is currently in the process of addressing the issues associated with potential cracking in reactor vessel bottom mounted nozzles (BMNs, also known as BMI nozzles), and the impacts of leakage or failure of one or more BMNs. The work is being performed as a cooperative effort of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), B&W Owners Group (B&WOG), and EPRI/MRP, and the coordinated response of the U.S. PWR industry is being performed under NEI Initiative 03-08. EPRI/MRP will produce an overall industry report addressing the overall risk associated with cracking of BMNs and will provide inspection and repair guidance. Volumetric examinations have been performed of BMNs in more than 25 units to date worldwide, with only two penetrations at South Texas Project Unit 1 showing cracks or leaks.

The U.S. NRC continues to fund activities related to PWSCC of Alloy 600 CRDM nozzles and Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds. A probabilistic computer code is being developed for LOCA predictions. This new code will incorporate the results of recent and future deterministic analyses for residual stress fields, leak rate, and fracture. A key goal of the new code is to predict crack growth and multiple initiation sites for SCC mechanisms more realistically than any existing piping probabilistic fracture mechanics code. Other work is investigating the effect of weld repairs and the potential concern of long circumferential surface cracks for Alloy 82/182 piping butt welds. In the CRDM nozzle area, the effect of the residual stress field on the growth of axial CRDM nozzle cracks was investigated using a matrix of 37 fracture mechanics FEA cases in which the distribution of stress intensity factors along the crack front was calculated. These CRDM nozzle results are being used to provide comments on ASME Code Case N-694-1.

2

KEYNOTE ADDRESSES

Following brief introductory remarks, keynote addresses were given by four invited speakers. Viewpoints were given of the current state of efforts to address PWSCC of Alloy 600 and other materials degradation issues from the U.S. utility perspective, the U.S. regulator perspective, the EPRI perspective, and an international utility perspective. The keynote speakers emphasized the need for proactive management of materials degradation issues

U.S. Utility Keynote, address by David Mauldin, Arizona Public Service (Keynote K.1)

This initial keynote address was given by Mr. David Mauldin, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Support, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Arizona Public Service. Mr. Mauldin is former Chairman of the Materials Technical Advisory Group (MTAG) and also a member of the Materials Executive Oversight Group (MEOG). Mr. Mauldin described current initiatives in the materials integrity area that have been taken by the U.S. industry to address PWSCC and other materials degradation issues, and he discussed some of the main conclusions and objectives developed by this program, as summarized below.

Maintaining and ensuring materials integrity is the single greatest challenge to the long-term operability of currently operating nuclear power plants, and addressing the problems posed by materials integrity issues in a proactive manner is essential to achieving the goal of maintaining long-term operability. In this regard, many utilities still have a "wait and see" mentality regarding materials integrity issues. One of the objectives of this conference is to urge the attendees to bring to their management's attention the need for a proactive approach, including active participation in Issue Task Groups and other EPRI meetings. Another aspect of this needed proactive approach is to ensure that younger personnel in the utilities develop the required expertise to address materials integrity issues, and are trained as to how to make proper decisions.

The MTAG deals with all materials degradation and chemistry issues, not just PWSCC, with the other issues including topics such as fuel clad issues and nondestructive inspection technology. The MTAG provides strategic direction, and in some cases funding, for some of the large materials research and development activity that is now ongoing in the PWSCC and other materials integrity areas. Under the MTAG, a strategic plan for dealing with all materials degradation issues is being developed. The Strategic Plan shows where U.S. utilities are going, and covers the long term as well as the past and current situations. As part of this effort, a Degradation Matrix is being developed that addresses each degradation mechanism and, for each

Keynote Addresses

mechanism, shows what is currently being done and what needs to be investigated in the future.

A road map will be issued to support utilities in the management of materials degradation issues.

The MTAG is providing oversight to the Issue Programs solving materials degradation problems and is developing a tool kit for use in this area. It is important that utilities be aware of this tool kit and use it for the full range of materials management activities: assessment and evaluation of problems, inspections, application of mitigation methods, and repair/replacement. These programs are needed for license extension and for life cycle management.

The primary responsibility of the nuclear power industry is to ensure nuclear safety. A main element in addressing this responsibility is ensuring that pressure boundary integrity of the reactor coolant system is maintained with high assurance. The industry has learned lessons from past experience that failure to address this responsibility leads to long outages and costly repairs. The industry is aware that there is a great deal of research and development still required, such as regarding how to ensure the continued integrity of reactor internals.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Keynote, address by Allen Hiser, U.S. NRC (Keynote K.2)

This keynote address was given by Dr. Allen Hiser who is Chief, Materials Integrity Branch, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He has served

as the technical leader for development of most of the NRC's generic communications regarding PWSCC of upper vessel head penetrations for the past five years.

The industry and NRC have learned many lessons from the Davis-Besse event, where a football size cavity was identified in the upper reactor vessel head caused by boric acid corrosion that had resulted from through-wall PWSCC cracks in a CRDM penetration. Although the cavity was identified in March 2002, investigation of the event showed that there had been many prior indications of something unacceptable occurring on top of the Davis-Besse head, but that these indications were either ignored or not recognized as serious in nature. A significant event was avoided by the slimmest of margins, provided by the ability of the stainless steel cladding to resist rupture and the plant having shut down when it did.

The NRC believes that there will never be another vessel head corrosion event like that identified

at Davis-Besse. This is due to the increased awareness and sensitivity developed by the industry

and at the NRC. The challenge for the future is transferring the vigilance that everyone involved now has for reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage to produce an attitude or culture where the incentive for identifying and resolving other potential safety issues is no less than that for achieving or exceeding operational or outage expectations.

As the regulator, the NRC has a unique role to play in handling emergent issues of degradation in reactor pressure boundary materials. In developing a regulatory response, the NRC has to deal with several aspects that must be kept in a balance. First and most critically, the safety aspects of the issue must be considered. In addition, concerns such as long term health and environmental quality need to be considered.

Keynote Addresses

The lessons learned from the investigation into the causes of the Columbia shuttle failure provide insights as to how failures can occur and the approaches needed to preclude them. Similar to Davis-Besse, there were multiple indications of potential precursor events over a period of time, a failure to recognize the significance of the indications, and a failure by managers to ask the needed hard questions. There were also “production” issues and schedules to be met. The physical cause of the accident was determined to be from debris—in this case, foam from the external fuel tank—striking insulation tile attached to the leading edge of the left wing, and penetrating it during the launch, thus allowing superheated gasses to enter the wing structure during reentry, causing the destruction of the orbiter. Precursors to this event had occurred, including cases where failure had been avoided by only slim margins, but the lessons from these precursors were not properly taken into account. Reliance was placed on past success (absence of serious failure) as a substitute for sound engineering practices such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements. This is an example of individuals having been "conditioned by success," very similar to the prevailing thought prior to Davis-Besse that the operational history of boric acid leaks demonstrated that conditions conducive to significant wastage of the reactor pressure vessel head could not exist.

With regard to the future of materials degradation in the nuclear industry, it is unlikely that we can prevent all forms of cracking from occurring in nuclear power plant components. For example, regarding PWSCC, there are to date, no consensus environmental changes that can be used to eliminate cracking. However, component replacement with more resistant materials, stress improvement or weld overlays, and the implementation of effective inspection approaches at a sufficient frequency, can provide robust management schemes that give high assurance against reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage, and prevent the cracking from challenging safety.

For degradation mechanisms or locations currently not anticipated, the industry’s materials degradation matrix and the NRC’s Proactive Materials Degradation Assessment are shedding light on areas that may demand attention in the future. Gathering information on the rate of degradation, how it may manifest itself and approaches for effective detection will arm us with the tools necessary to handle future degradation, should it occur.

In summary with regard to the NRC’s approach to addressing materials issues facing commercial nuclear power plants, the NRC will continue to consider all approaches—preventive approaches, mitigative approaches, and “maintenance or inspection based” approaches. Each will be evaluated based on sound engineering principles and data. Risk assessments and insights will continue to be used in our decision-making. NRC will be conservative in its decision-making, and will strive to be realistically conservative.

EPRI Keynote, address by Robin Jones, EPRI (Keynote K.3)

This keynote address was given by Dr. Robin L. Jones, Technical Executive, Materials, EPRI. He has been involved for many years in management and technical positions at EPRI, and has dealt extensively with materials degradation issues.

Keynote Addresses

EPRI's perspective on the Alloy 600/82/182 cracking issue in PWRs is that, while PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals is a serious degradation issue, significant progress is being made towards the development and implementation of an effective issue management program. The PWSCC issue has been identified as “the single biggest challenge facing the PWR industry”. This level of concern is based on the fact that issues of this type can be very costly to manage and thus could make operating PWRs significantly less cost competitive with other forms of power generation than they are today. In response to this concern, a comprehensive approach is underway to address the problem.

The experience with IGSCC at BWRs provides useful insights regarding management of PWSCC at PWRs. Management of IGSCC at butt welds in BWR stainless steel piping resulted in significant reductions in capacity factors for many years, largely due to the need to apply mitigation measures to the welds on an individual component basis. Management of IGSCC of BWR reactor internals has had a much reduced impact, largely as a result of the application of a water chemistry remedy, noble metal chemical addition, which addresses all components at one time. In summary, the BWR experience with IGSCC adjacent to welds in stainless steel piping and internals suggests that implementing the actions needed to address the Alloy 600/82/182 cracking issue in PWRs could potentially reduce PWR capacity factors significantly for several years, particularly if “one-location-at-a-time” mitigation and repair methods are the principal basis of the issue management approach.

The occurrences of PWSCC of Alloy 600 vessel penetrations and Alloy 82/182 weldments have raised concerns regarding the structural integrity of reactor coolant systems in PWRs. There is a need to address these concerns and to assure that the practices and techniques used in managing PWSCC are consistent industry-wide and are adequate to maintain plant safety, minimize leakage events and permit optimum asset utilization. An industry-wide program, lead by EPRI’s Materials Reliability Program (MRP), is in progress to address these needs. The program has 3 main objectives. The first objective is to develop a standard management protocol for plants to use in developing their plant-specific Alloy 600 management plans that provides short- and long- term guidance for inspection, evaluation and management of all Alloy 600/82/182 applications in the PWR primary system other than steam generator tubing. The second objective is to provide the supporting technical/regulatory basis for the standard protocol. The final objective is to reach, as soon as practicable, the point at which this issue is fully under control and is regarded by the U.S. licensees and the USNRC as an example of highly-effective materials degradation management.

The approach being used by the MRP to pursue these three objectives consists of five steps. The first step is to characterize the degradation mechanism by defining the effects of stress, materials, and chemistry variables on the rate of PWSCC. The second is to determine all Alloy 600/82/182 locations in the RCS for all vendor designs and conduct generic operability and safety assessments assuming the occurrence of PWSCC at these locations. The third is to develop flaw inspection and evaluation technology and guidelines for all locations, starting with those for which the potential consequences of failure are most severe. The fourth is to evaluate available mitigation options and, if necessary, develop additional options. The fifth and final step is to evaluate available repair/replacement options and, where necessary, encourage the development

Keynote Addresses

of additional options. Work is underway, with significant progress being made, on all of these five steps.

In the absence of a chemistry countermeasure for PWSCC, potentially more costly, location- specific mitigation and repair measures will have to be used when existing cracks are found. A considerable number of such measures are being developed. In addition, alternative materials have been identified for use in repair and replacement efforts. While these materials (which include Alloy 690 and its weld metals as well as stainless steels) are not immune to cracking, they are much more resistant to PWSCC than Alloy 600 and its weld metals. These more resistant materials also can be used for potentially cost-effective pre-emptive replacements that reduce the number of susceptible locations (for example, a reactor vessel head replacement can eliminate all of the susceptible CRDM penetrations at once).

Regulatory acceptance obviously is one of the keys to success of any issue-management program and is being pursued here by the industry via NEI. Regular informal meetings are held to communicate program results and status and some joint R&D activities have been started between NRC Research and EPRI-MRP.

Cost-effectively managing this material degradation issue for the remaining life of the existing U.S. PWRs will be a significant challenge and a well-coordinated, multi-year effort is needed, involving all U.S. PWR licensees together with EPRI, the NSSS Vendors and Owner’s Groups, NEI and INPO. The “Industry Initiative on Management of Materials Issues” has established the type of proactive, industry-wide program needed for success but much work remains to be done on this issue. PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals can be effectively managed via the 5-step process discussed above but the implementation of remedies, repairs and replacements may have a significant adverse impact on PWR capacity factors and power production costs during the next five to ten years unless the industry can identify, develop and deploy an effective chemistry countermeasure.

International Utility Keynote, address by François Cattant, EDF (Keynote

K.4)

This keynote address was given by Dr. François Cattant, Materials Program Manager at the research laboratories of Electricité de France (EDF). He has been involved for many years in the evaluation of materials degradation issues, both at EDF and at EPRI.

Because EDF operates a large fleet of standardized PWRs and because it relies heavily on the PWR fleet for electricity production (88% in 2004), it treats material degradation issues, including PWSCC, on a rigorous and generic basis. The approach used relies heavily on models of the degradation that are developed to manage the issues. These models for the progression of the degradation are continuously validated using results of destructive examinations of removed parts and nondestructive examinations of parts in operating plants. The modeling effort is also supported by a large in-house laboratory based research and development program.

The first occurrence of non-steam generator tube PWSCC in EDF plants affected nozzles in pressurizers of the 20 four loop plants. Destructive examination showed that all of the Alloy 600

Keynote Addresses

nozzles of the four loop plants had to be replaced, which was accomplished with limited impact on plant availability.

The next non-steam generator PWSCC event was the detection of cracks in a CRDM nozzle at Bugey 3 during a 10 year hydrostatic test. Destructive examination showed that leak was due to through wall PWSCC, that wastage of the head material was minimal, but that OD PWSCC had occurred of the Alloy 600 base material. In subsequent years, EDF conducted destructive examinations of 25 additional reactor vessel head penetrations. Data from these examinations was used to benchmark the field NDE and to confirm the absence of circumferential cracks.

Destructive examinations were performed of the "triple point" in several retired steam generators. The "triple point" is the location where the tubesheet, divider plate and channel head meet. In some cases the examinations showed the presence of shallow PWSCC.

EDF laboratories have performed both crack initiation and crack growth rate tests of Alloy 600 and Alloy 182. In addition, a PWSCC susceptibility index has been developed. The models have been improved over time to consider factors such as surface states. EDF maintenance policies rely heavily on the PWSCC initiation and susceptibility index models, e.g., regarding the life expectation of Alloys 600TT and 182 vs. Alloy 600MA. Crack propagation models are used to set inspection intervals and optimize vessel head replacement schedules. The laboratory studies together with field inspections have minimized the need for extensive repairs and prevented further leakage incidents.

Keynote Speaker Panel Discussion

Following the four keynote addresses, the keynote speakers participated in a panel discussion with the audience. Mr. Robin Dyle of Southern Nuclear substituted for Mr. David Mauldin during the panel discussion. Questions/comments and responses were as follows:

Question (C. King): The MEOG–MTAG organization was established in response to NEI 03-08 (Guideline for the Management of Materials Issues). How long is this organization expected to remain in place? Please describe the role of this organization.

Response (R. Dyle):

The MEOG and MTAG are expected to last for several years. They

are a single focus point for all materials issues, which did not exist before establishment of

the MEOG and MTAG. They have a coordination and integration function, and do not take the place of the Issues Groups, which carry out the detailed management of technical work.

Question (G. Turluer): Temperature is known to be a key parameter governing PWSCC crack initiation. Referring to the French experience, it seems that the temperature effect on field data has been overestimated. Hence this question to the US keynote speakers: What is the current appraisal in the USA of the temperature effect on field data, as compared to laboratory data? Response (F. Cattant): This is a point of controversy. It is true that the time to cracking of the French cold head and hot head plants overlap. Speculatively, this could be due to the assumed temperatures of the two groups of plants not being correct, such that the difference

Keynote Addresses

is only 10–15 C rather than the expected 40 C. Nevertheless, the time-temperature model for PWSCC is quite well supported by laboratory and plant experience. Response (A. Hiser): Plant experience is that higher ranked plants (a higher ranking reflects a higher head temperature) are generally the first to crack. However, it is possible that the lower susceptibility plants will eventually crack. Comment (C. King): By 2008 the RVH nozzles of all US PWRs will have been inspected. Comment (G. Rao): Regarding the temperature effect, EDF plotted all of their inspection results for cold and hot heads on one chart. As a result of the large spread in the data, the data for the two types of heads overlapped, and EDF concluded that there was less significance to the temperature effect than expected based on laboratory results. However, I have re-examined the data by carefully separating the data for the different material conditions (conditions A, B and C) of the EDF penetrations. I found a clear and significant effect of the temperature on the cracking. As many are aware, the EDF penetration materials have large variations in microstructure, varying from full grain boundary coverage to nil grain boundary coverage depending on the heat type, i.e., A, B or C.

Question (V. Nilekani): Alloy 600 work related to PWSCC in PWRs is going on in France, Japan and the US. Unlike the situation for BWRs in the US, where there is only one NSSS, for PWRs in the US there are many NSSS designs and multiple vendors. Is there any global coordination to get consensus on issue resolution and to avoid duplication and conflicting conclusions and positions? Response (R. Jones): The MEOG and MTAG coordinate and integrate efforts by the USA NSSSs and also, to the extent practical, efforts by international organizations. This is a reason for the MEOG and MTAG staying in operation for a long time. In this regard, international input is being sought on the strategic plan that is being developed for addressing materials issues. This current meeting is another example of an effort being made to achieve international input and coordination. Response (R. Dyle): The utility Chief Nuclear Officers (CNOs) want more focus on international experience, and the Issues Groups are expected to do this, i.e., to place increased emphasis on staying cognizant of international experience, and appropriately reflecting this experience in their work.

Question (U. Ehrnsten): As part of this new proactive approach to dealing with materials issues, is attention being systematically given to problems that might develop in newly constructed plants? Response (R. Dyle): It is recognized that there is a need to look at the potential for degradation to occur as the result of changes in environments and materials in either new plants or new parts in older plants. Response (R. Jones): We (EPRI) had an internal seminar last week that discussed this topic, i.e., regarding whether we have appropriately addressed materials requirements for new alloys. This topic will be addressed this year. Followup Question: Does this reply also apply to advanced reactors? Response (R. Jones): This has been briefly discussed, but not in detail. Response (F. Cattant): For the new EPR design, EDF experience is being directly used.

Question (R. Jacko): The presentation by R. Jones pointed to the potential benefit involved with a beneficial water chemistry change. From that point of view, I would think that zinc

Keynote Addresses

addition should be looked at by most PWRs. By my estimate about 9 US PWRs are currently adding zinc. In your estimation, what additional activities are needed to endorse zinc addition at other PWRs to help mitigate PWSCC? Response (R. Jones): The issues involved with use of zinc depend on the concentration of zinc that is used, with high levels of zinc leading to fuel issues that take time and money to resolve. There is a need to sort out the possible side effects of zinc on other components. Comment (J. Hickling): It should be noted that EPRI (C. King, MRP) and K. Fruzzetti (Chemistry) hosted a very successful workshop on zinc addition to PWR primary water in 2004 (now published as an EPRI report). With regard to the extent that zinc addition at an appropriate level can help to mitigate PWSCC of Alloy 600, there is a good deal of consent that it will definitely improve resistance to crack initiation. Unfortunately, the data are less conclusive with regard to crack propagation and the MRP has work ongoing in this area since existing Alloy 600 or 182/82 components may well have passed the initiation phase. In other words, in the field it is necessary to assume that these materials already contain "microcracks" below NDE detection levels. Comment (unidentified attendee): Zinc was tested at Halden before use at Farley, and has been used at Farley for over ten years. A lot of work has been performed to evaluate possible side effects, with positive results. For example, use of zinc has not caused problems with pump seals or with valve sealing or wear. Response (R. Jones): My point was that the long term effects of zinc on PWSCC initiation and crack growth rate have not as yet been fully investigated—more work remains to be done.

Question (C. Castelao): Several leaks were detected in France when performing hydrostatic tests. What are the parameters of the hydrostatic tests in France (pressure, temperature, time)? Hydrostatic tests are no longer required according to Section XI of the ASME Code for Class 1 and 2 components. Based on the French experience, shouldn't use of hydrostatic tests be again required in order to detect flaws in Alloy 600/82/182 components? What is the US view on this question? Response (F. Cattant): In France we use a higher pressure for the 10 year inservice inspection pressure test, about 3000 psi (20.7 MPa), or about 1.2 times the design pressure. In the US, pressure tests are performed at about 1.0 times the temperature-adjusted normal operating pressure, i.e., at about 2475 psi (17.1 MPa), which equals 1.1 times the non- temperature-adjusted normal operating pressure. We are not certain that the Bugey CRDM crack that was discovered during a hydrostatic test in 1991 would have been discovered if the lower pressure used in the USA had been applied. Response (R. Dyle): This question has been thoroughly investigated from a Code perspective. The ability to detect leaks is not strongly affected by the increase in pressure from 1.1 times normal operating pressure to 1.2 times design pressure, but the difficulty of performing the test is very strongly increased, such that it was judged not worth requiring the higher pressure. Comment (P. Riccardella): I was a member of the Section 11 Committee when we changed the test requirement from 1.1 times operating pressure to a range of 1.1 to 1.02 times operating pressure (depending on test temperature). Our thinking at the time was that this 10% reduction in test pressure would not make a significant difference on whether a through- wall crack will leak or not. The Committee felt that the leakage detectability (i.e., how

Keynote Addresses

thorough a visual test is performed) is more important than a minor decrease in test pressure, which makes the test much easier to conduct. Comment (W. Bamford): The main concern was the increased radiation exposure to personnel involved when applying the higher pressure. An additional consideration is that, while use of high hydrostatic test pressures was appropriate when it was the main method used to assure pressure boundary integrity, now that the main reliance is on NDE, the high pressure test is no longer required. Comment (A. Hiser): Plant Technical Specifications permit no reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage. Effective inspection programs of sufficient frequency and high reliability can be successful in identifying degradation before Code margins are exceeded, which would thereby preclude or minimize the occurrence of through-wall breaks. Therefore, the role of leakage detections would be as a defense-in-depth approach.

Session K: Keynote Speakers

U.S. Utility Keynote David Mauldin, Arizona Public Service

This initial keynote address was given by Mr. David Mauldin, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Support, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Arizona Public Service. Mr. Mauldin is former Chairman of the Materials Technical Advisory Group (MTAG) and also a member of the Materials Executive Oversight Group (MEOG). Mr. Mauldin described current initiatives in the materials integrity area that have been taken by the U.S. industry to address PWSCC and other materials degradation issues, and he discussed some of the main conclusions and objectives developed by this program, as summarized below.

Maintaining and ensuring materials integrity is the single greatest challenge to the long-term operability of currently operating nuclear power plants, and addressing the problems posed by materials integrity issues in a proactive manner is essential to achieving the goal of maintaining long-term operability. In this regard, many utilities still have a "wait and see" mentality regarding materials integrity issues. One of the objectives of this conference is to urge the attendees to bring to their management's attention the need for a proactive approach, including active participation in Issue Task Groups and other EPRI meetings. Another aspect of this needed proactive approach is to ensure that younger personnel in the utilities develop the required expertise to address materials integrity issues, and are trained as to how to make proper decisions.

The MTAG deals with all materials degradation and chemistry issues, not just PWSCC, with the other issues including topics such as fuel clad issues and nondestructive inspection technology. The MTAG provides strategic direction, and in some cases funding, for some of the large materials research and development activity that is now ongoing in the PWSCC and other materials integrity areas. Under the MTAG, a strategic plan for dealing with all materials degradation issues is being developed. The Strategic Plan shows where U.S. utilities are going, and covers the long term as well as the past and current situations. As part of this effort, a Degradation Matrix is being developed that addresses each degradation mechanism and, for each mechanism, shows what is currently being done and what needs to be investigated in the future. A road map will be issued to support utilities in the management of materials degradation issues.

The MTAG is providing oversight to the Issue Programs solving materials degradation problems and is developing a tool kit for use in this area. It is important that utilities be aware of this tool kit and use it for the full range of materials management activities: assessment and evaluation of problems, inspections, application of mitigation methods, and repair/replacement. These programs are needed for license extension and for life cycle management.

The primary responsibility of the nuclear power industry is to ensure nuclear safety. A main element in addressing this responsibility is ensuring that pressure boundary integrity of the reactor coolant system is maintained with high assurance. The industry has learned lessons from past experience that failure to address this responsibility leads to long outages and costly repairs. The industry is aware that there is a great deal of research and development still required, such as regarding how to ensure the continued integrity of reactor internals.

Session K: Keynote Speakers

A REGULATOR’S APPROACH TO ADDRESSING MATERIALS ISSUES

by

Allen L. Hiser, Jr., and Terence L. Chan

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

EPRI/NRC PWSCC Conference Santa Ana Pueblo, New Mexico March 7, 2005

Good morning - it is my pleasure to be here with you today. Normally an address like this would be given by a senior manager in the NRC. However, this meeting coincides with the Regulatory Information Conference in Rockville and all of our senior managers are tied up at that conference. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Terence Chan, my co-author on this presentation. This is the result of a true collaborative effort.

This morning, I’d like to share with you my view of a regulator’s approach to addressing materials issues. As many of you are aware, I have some familiarity with the issues related to materials degradation and primary water stress corrosion cracking on components containing Alloy 600, having served as the technical leader for the development of most of the generic communications on this issue related to upper vessel head penetrations, from Bulletin 2001-01 through the issuance of Order EA-03-009.

In March 2002, a discovery was made that eventually commanded the attention of a number of people - Congress, the regulated community, the regulator, local politicians, and the public. In fact, the three year anniversary of this discovery was just two days ago, last Saturday. Two

words describe it all - Davis-Besse. Davis-Besse is one of those events so significant that I can remember where I was when I first heard about it. The Davis-Besse plant identified a football- sized cavity in its upper reactor vessel head, caused directly by boric acid corrosion that resulted from through-wall cracks in the control rod drive mechanism penetrations in the head. Although the cavity in the Davis-Besse head was identified in March 2002 we now know that the events that lead to the development of the cavity were likely many years in the making. As a result of inspections and investigations, some of which continue to this day, we know that there were many indications of something unacceptable occurring on top of the Davis-Besse head, but that these indications were either ignored or not recognized at the time as serious in

nature.

of a problem.

filters, upward unidentified leakage trends, and containment air coolers clogging with boron

deposits. We also know that we were very,

weren’t for the stainless steel cladding and if the plant didn’t shut down when it did, there could have been a significant accident. How would the plant have responded? What state would the nuclear industry be in now? While I don’t want to belabor the lessons learned from the events

at Davis-Besse, as stated by Chairman Diaz, there will never be another vessel head corrosion event like that identified at Davis-Besse. This is due to the increased awareness and sensitivity developed by everyone involved in the industry and at the NRC – from plant personnel, licensee engineering staff, contractors, plant management, and industry groups such as EPRI and INPO, to NRC headquarters and regional staff, and NRC management - in part, due to renewed respect for corrosion by boric acid. The difficulty is taking the vigilance that everyone involved

There were photographs and other documentary information that were clear indications

There were numerous indirect signs of a problem, from clogged radiation monitor

very,

lucky. By the slimmest of margins, if it

Session K: Keynote Speakers

now has for reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage on the reactor vessel upper head, and hopefully other locations, and transferring that vigilance and insights that come from it to produce an attitude - a culture if you will, where the incentive for identifying and resolving potential safety issues is no less than that for achieving or exceeding operational or outage expectations. That is the challenge that we face in securing a safe future for nuclear power.

As the regulator, the NRC has a unique role to play in handling emergent issues of degradation in reactor pressure boundary materials. In developing a regulatory response, the NRC has to deal with several aspects that must kept in a balance. First and most critically, the safety aspects of the issue must be considered. Should it be possible to demonstrate that the risk from a particular problem exceeds some level of assurance of safety, then the need for a certain type of response by the NRC is readily apparent. NRC has many stakeholders, and each group may have a different definition of an adequate level of assurance. The perspective on an issue by plant and licensee personnel may differ substantially from that of a resident near the plant or that of an elected representative whose constituents may or may not be supportive of the plant’s presence. Concerns such as local employment and quality of life issues - in particular things like long term health and environmental quality - help shape the way an issue is viewed by the public. The NRC is entrusted with the responsibility to assure adequate protection to the public and the environment, and as such, NRC’s response will do that, while being cognizant of the factors I just mentioned.

So what is the NRC’s approach to addressing materials issues facing commercial nuclear power plants? Before I get into that I’d like to share with you some insights gained from another recent event that received a lot of public attention. This event, like Davis-Besse, garnered immense Congressional scrutiny, resulted in lessons-learned introspection by the responsible agency, and resulted in operational changes. Also, like Davis-Besse, there were multiple indications of potential precursor events over a period of time, a failure to recognize the significance of the indications, and a failure by managers to ask the hard questions. There were also “production” issues and schedules to be met. However, unlike Davis-Besse, this event resulted in loss of life, in a very public way.

On February 1, 2003, nearly one year after the Davis-Besse head was identified with a corrosion cavity, the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated upon its reentry into earth’s atmosphere, claiming the lives of all seven of its crew. Like Davis-Besse, where I was when I first heard of, and saw, this event on television is etched in my mind. As a member of the public, I wondered how anything like that could have happened, given the Challenger accident in 1986 and the Apollo 1 launchpad fire in January 1967. The physical cause of the accident was determined to be from debris - in this case, foam from the external fuel tank - striking insulation tile attached to the leading edge of the left wing, and penetrating it during the launch, thus allowing superheated gasses to enter the wing structure during reentry, causing the destruction of the orbiter.

Shortly after the accident, the Columbia Accident Investigative Board was formed, and after six months it issued its report. Many of the observations by the Board are enlightening regarding the development of cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety. These include - reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements), organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion, lack of integrated management across program elements, and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes

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Session K: Keynote Speakers

that operated outside the organization’s rules. The Board also made an observation that many investigations stop at identifying a technical cause of an incident as some variant of “operator error” - once corrections are implemented lead, there is a mistaken belief that the problem is solved.

The entire report is nearly 230 pages long, so let me give you a very condensed summary of some of their findings and conclusions.

The following is an example of what is termed “Conditioned by Success” where the occurrence of an observed safety-significant problem over time morphed into what the nuclear community would term a “nonsafety” issue.

The space shuttle program had a design requirement that “no debris shall emanate from the critical zone of the external fuel tank on the launch pad or during ascent.” Yet foam strikes were observed on virtually all shuttle flights - in particular such strikes were a specific topic of management concern at the time of the Challenger accident in 1986.

However, with each successful landing, NASA engineers and managers increasingly regarded foam-shedding as inevitable, and as either unlikely to jeopardize safety or simply an acceptable risk.

The issue of foam strikes, which was originally considered a serious threat to the orbiter, came to be treated as “in-family” - a reportable problem that was within the known experience base, was believed to be understood and was not regarded as a safety-of- flight issue.

A serious foam strike two missions before Columbia was not classified as a more

serious threat, and for the next flight managers accepted a flight rationale that it was safe to fly with foam losses. An “action” (and not a more serious “in-flight anomaly”) was identified to determine the root cause of the foam loss and to propose corrective action - however, this report and resolution were delayed until after the Columbia launch.

Even after it was clear from launch videos that foam had struck the Columbia orbiter in a manner never before seen, Space Shuttle program managers were not unduly alarmed. “They could not imagine why anyone would want a photo of something that could be

fixed after landing.” By this time, foam strikes were being seen as a maintenance issue. This is a clear example of individuals having been “conditioned by success,” very similar

to the prevailing thought prior to Davis-Besse that the operational history of boric acid

leaks clearly demonstrated that conditions conducive to significant wastage of the

reactor pressure vessel head could not exist.

The report found that schedule pressures contributed to the actions of the Shuttle managers leading up to the Columbia launch.

There was a timeliness aspect of the space shuttle program at this time. With a delay in the flight before Columbia, a launch date related to the International Space Station would not have been met, creating a public relations and political problem for NASA. To stress the importance of meeting the Space Station milestones, NASA distributed a screen saver with a countdown to the flight critical to the space station. This schedule

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Session K: Keynote Speakers

was on the minds of shuttle managers in a manner that may not be very different to the effect that an end-of-refueling outage countdown clock has on plant management.

How about the use of risk tools? Surely the use of sophisticated Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Failure Modes and Effects Analyses would provide some quantitative measure of risk, and by extension, safety. Here is what the Board reported, in part.

Some of the logic used to not disrupt the flight schedule was that the probability of loss of foam was no higher/no lower than previous flights - with no engineering analysis, past success was used as justification for future flights.

However, the Board identified that the calculations of foam not being shed from the

same area was a ”sleight of hand” effort that made the probability appear low rather than

a serious grappling with the issue. The Board characterized this as rooted in an attitude

of “what you don’t see won’t hurt you.” Conversely, actual sampling over all flights with

imagery would have given a different picture with a much higher incidence rate.

How about organization issues and the presence of a questioning attitude? This is what the Board found.

A flight in 1988 was a precursor to the Columbia accident. In 1988, the Atlantis was

described as looking like it had been blasted by a shotgun. In the case of Atlantis, one of the heat-deflecting tiles was completely knocked off, exposing the orbiter’s skin to the heat of re-entry. Post-flight analysis concluded that structural damage was confined to this area, and burn-through prevented, only because of a thick aluminum plate at this location - that sounds like NASA’s version of stainless steel cladding.

With the later foam strike just two flights prior to the Columbia flight, shuttle program management did not request a detailed examination of the orbiter for damage, in spite of the experience from 1988. The Board concluded that the lack of institutional memory indicated that NASA was not functioning as a learning organization.

The Board concluded that shuttle program managers appear to have confused the notion of foam posing an “accepted risk” with foam not being a “safety of flight issue.” The Board drew comparisons with the Challenger accident, where continued problems with erosion of solid rocket booster O-rings fell outside of design requirements. However, the continued success of the O-rings led to a false belief in the lack of a challenge from O-ring erosion.

After the realization that Columbia had suffered a foam strike, engineers at NASA found themselves in the position of having to prove that the situation was unsafe, a reversal of the usual requirement to prove that a situation is safe. In addition, some experts stated that foam strike damage was only a maintenance-level concern and on-orbit imaging of possible wing damage was not necessary. Finally, the Board concluded that mission management welcomed this opinion and sought no others, and further that this constant reinforcement of manager’s pre-existing beliefs added another block to the wall between decision-makers and concerned engineers.

Over all, the Columbia Accident Investigative Board paints a picture of organizational “mis- evolution” that can be destructive to an engineering organization functioning as intended.

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Session K: Keynote Speakers

What does the future hold for materials degradation in the nuclear industry? It is unlikely that

we can prevent any form of cracking from occurring in nuclear power plant components.

primary water stress corrosion cracking, there are to date, no consensus environmental changes that can be used to eliminate cracking. Component replacement with a more resistant material - such as with the upper heads and pressurizer heater sleeves at many of the plants in the US - is the most likely approach to prevent cracking. Other approaches may include stress improvement or weld overlays as preventative or mitigative measures. Alternatively, the implementation of effective inspection approaches at a sufficient frequency can provide a robust management scheme that gives a high assurance against reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage, and prevents the cracking from challenging safety.

With

For degradation mechanisms or locations currently not anticipated, the industry’s materials degradation matrix and the NRC’s Proactive Materials Degradation Assessment are shedding light on areas that may demand attention in the future. Gathering information on the rate of degradation, how it may manifest itself and approaches for effective detection will arm us with the tools necessary to handle future degradation, should it occur.

So getting back to the original question - What is the NRC’s approach to addressing materials issues facing commercial nuclear power plants? The NRC will continue to consider all approaches - preventive approaches, mitigative approaches, and “maintenance or inspection- based” approaches. Each will be evaluated based on sound engineering principles and data. Risk assessments and insights will continue to be used in our decision-making. NRC will be conservative in its decision-making, and will strive to be realistically conservative.

As I’ve tried to illuminate, there are many causal similarities between the Davis-Besse event and the Columbia accident. We must strive to learn from past experiences, not only from within our industry, but from outside it as well, and to put into practice what we have learned. We must guard against complacency and remain inquisitive because we are so adept at convincing ourselves that we have adequately resolved an issue - and in some cases, we may have. By the slimmest of margins, Davis-Besse did not become an accident. Unfortunately, by the slimmest of margins, Columbia was only minutes from a safe touchdown. Man may know more than it ever has, and we may have available more tools and information than we ever have had, but the future will always show our knowledge to be temporary and incomplete.

In closing, my experience with the way primary water stress corrosion cracking has been addressed in the past reminds me of something the 19 th century German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer, once said, “Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized. In the first, it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, and in the third it is regarded as self-evident.” More recent efforts within the industry, most notably activities related to the development of inspection requirements for upper vessel head penetrations and Alloy 600 weld locations, have been quite comprehensive, and your contributions are recognized. Industry’s efforts to be proactive in the management of materials issues should pay dividends in the future. But our collective efforts in this area will not lead to long term success unless we periodically assess the reasons for our successes to the causes of our past failures. The challenge before us in securing a safe future for nuclear power is to maintain continued vigilance in identifying and addressing both direct and indirect indications of materials degradation.

Thank you very much. I wish you all a very successful conference.

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Session K: Keynote Speakers

PWSCC of Alloys 600/82/182: An EPRI Perspective

Robin L. Jones Technical Executive, Materials, EPRI

This presentation is intended to provide an EPRI perspective on the Alloy 600/82/182 cracking issue in PWRs but it is likely that some of the author’s personal biases also will become clear. The main point that the presentation attempts to communicate is that, while PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals is certainly a serious degradation issue, a lot of progress is being made towards the development and implementation of an effective issue management program.

Concerns about the vulnerability of the existing U.S. nuclear plants to a variety of materials degradation and aging issues have prompted the CNOs to launch an Industry Materials Initiative, which became effective at the beginning of last year. One of the first activities undertaken within this Initiative was the preparation of a Strategic Plan identifying the U.S. nuclear industry’s highest priority materials degradation issues. The Alloy 600/82/182 cracking issue showed up at the top of the PWR list in the Strategic Plan where it was characterized as “the single biggest challenge facing the PWR industry”. This level of concern is based on the fact that issues of this type can be very costly to manage and thus could make the existing PWRs significantly less cost competitive with other forms of power generation than they are today.

Apart from hydroelectric power, nuclear power is currently the lowest cost electricity source in the U.S. in terms of average production costs, virtually tied with coal and well below natural gas and oil, both of which have been losing ground recently as fuel prices have soared to record levels. Nuclear production costs have declined steadily since about 1988. In part, this reflects a concurrent improvement in nuclear plant capacity factors which have climbed from around 60% in the early 1980s to near 90% today. To learn what it will take to maintain future nuclear power production costs at low levels, it’s useful to review why capacity factors were so much lower in the 1980s than they are today.

Although there were other problems involved in the low capacity factors observed in the 1980s, materials degradation problems, particularly due to corrosion, were certainly a significant contributor. Corrosion-related capacity factor losses in U.S. BWRs peaked in 1984 at over 18% and one corrosion issue, IGSCC adjacent to butt welds in stainless steel reactor coolant system piping, was dominant throughout most of the decade. This issue had a number of similarities to today’s Alloy 600 PWSCC problem and can teach us some important lessons.

The BWR pipe-cracking problem actually surfaced during the 1970’s and the large losses of capacity factor during the 1980’s reflect the impact of the implementation of remedies (mainly aimed at the reduction of inside-surface tensile residual stresses adjacent to the welds) and repairs (mainly weld overlay repairs using IGSCC-resistant materials) of cracked pipes found by inspection, and of other apparently uncracked but potentially-susceptible locations. These high-impact measures were used to manage the pipe-cracking issue because the development of an effective water chemistry remedy for BWR pipe cracking (which would have been much less expensive to implement) proved to be difficult and time-consuming.

However, IGSCC mitigation via water chemistry changes came into its own in BWRs when the cracking of stainless steel RPV internals emerged as a BWR issue in the early 1990s. Access limitations made other countermeasures very difficult to apply, so major emphasis was placed on the development of a chemistry countermeasure. The result was the Noble Metal Chemical Addition or NMCA process which has been widely used and which, to date, has proved to be very effective.

The internals cracking issue has had much less impact on BWR capacity factors than the pipe-cracking issue which preceded it. This difference illustrates two of the important lessons that can be learned from the past, namely that generic materials degradation and aging problems can have large impacts on nuclear plant capacity factors and that mitigation via water chemistry changes often can minimize those impacts. This is because water chemistry remedies mitigate all the susceptible locations in the coolant system at once whereas other types of remedies and repairs must be applied one location at a time. However, mitigation via water chemistry changes is much more difficult to qualify than stress reduction and repair techniques.

Session K: Keynote Speakers

The coolant contacts many components in the RCS so a change in RCS coolant chemistry to solve a particular materials degradation problem may promote a new degradation problem in other RCS components made from different materials, or result in a fuel cladding performance problem, or cause an undesirable redistribution of radioactive materials within the system. Consequently, proper qualification of chemistry remedies involves extensive and time-consuming testing and demonstration programs. Furthermore, implementation of a chemistry change often requires plant-specific optimization because of plant-to-plant differences in materials and equipment.

In summary, the BWR experience with IGSCC adjacent to welds in stainless steel piping and internals suggests that implementing the actions needed to address the Alloy 600/82/182 cracking issue in PWRs could potentially reduce PWR capacity factors significantly for several years, particularly if “one-location-at-a-time” mitigation and repair methods are the principal basis of the issue management approach.

The susceptibility of Alloy 600 to SCC in pure water was demonstrated in the laboratory some 50 years ago and Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of mill annealed Alloy 600 steam generator tubes was one of the degradation mechanisms responsible for the replacement of the majority of the original steam generators in U.S. PWRs. During the 1980s and 1990s there were also several cases of PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals in other primary system components. Nevertheless, the increased frequency and severity of cracking seen in the U.S. PWRs during the early years of the new millennium did come as something of a surprise.

During the past few years, PWSCC of Alloy 600 vessel penetrations and Alloy 82/182 weldments in U.S. PWRs has resulted in unexpected leakage in main coolant piping at one plant and in vessel penetrations at several other plants. These events have raised concerns regarding the structural integrity of reactor coolant piping systems and vessel penetrations in existing U.S. PWRs. There is a need to address these concerns and to assure that the practices and techniques used in managing PWSCC are consistent industry-wide and are adequate to maintain plant safety, minimize leakage events and permit optimum asset utilization. An industry-wide program, lead by EPRI’s Materials Reliability Program (MRP), is in progress to address these needs.

MRP’s Alloy 600/82/182 Degradation Management Program has 3 main objectives. The first objective is to develop a standard management protocol for plants to use in developing their plant-specific Alloy 600 management plans that provides short- and long-term guidance for inspection, evaluation and management of all Alloy 600/82/182 applications in the PWR primary system other than steam generator tubing. The second objective is to provide the supporting technical/regulatory basis for the standard protocol. The final objective is to reach, as soon as practicable, the point at which this issue is fully under control and is regarded by the U.S. licensees and the USNRC as an example of highly-effective materials degradation management.

The approach being used by the MRP to pursue these three objectives is based on the approach recommended in the Industry Initiative’s Strategic Plan and consists of five steps. The first step is to characterize the degradation mechanism by defining the effects of stress, materials, and chemistry variables on the rate of PWSCC. The second is to determine all Alloy 600/82/182 locations in the RCS for all vendor designs and conduct generic operability and safety assessments assuming the occurrence of PWSCC at these locations. The third is to develop flaw inspection and evaluation technology and guidelines for all locations, starting with those for which the potential consequences of failure are most severe. The fourth is to evaluate available mitigation options and, if necessary develop additional options and the fifth and final step is to evaluate available repair/ replacement options and, where necessary, encourage the development of additional options.

Although there is no agreement yet on the mechanistic details of the PWSCC degradation process, a good deal is known about the effects of stress and chemistry variables. However, test data under nominally the same conditions of stress and environment show a high degree of scatter, apparently due to micro-structural variables which, at this point, are not well understood. This is an area of much current research and some improvements can be anticipated during the next few years.

The second step of the program is to define all the plant locations that are susceptible to this form of damage and to assess the consequences if PWSCC does occur at those locations. Generic assessments of where Alloy 600 and its weld metals are used in the PWR primary system have been completed and the resulting location maps show that there are many potentially vulnerable locations in all U.S. PWRs, irrespective of the NSSS vendor or the plant

Session K: Keynote Speakers

vintage. Of course, we don’t have standard plants in the U.S. so the generic location maps have to be supplemented by plant-specific studies, which will be completed by 2006.

In the meantime, safety and operability assessments are underway which assume the occurrence of PWSCC at the generic locations. These assessments are essentially complete for CRDM nozzles and butt welds and indicate that the consequences of undetected cracking are likely to be easily detectable leakage well in advance of any possibility of a LOCA. The assessments will be extended to bottom-mounted nozzles and other components during 2005/6.

It would, of course, be desirable to detect and deal with cracking well in advance of any leakage and work is in progress to develop and qualify the required non-destructive inspection methods. Good progress is being made in this area but the work cannot be completed until after the plant-specific information about potential cracking locations is available in 2006 because some plant-specific geometries may be found that cannot be covered by the inspection methods now under development.

The third step of the MRP’s program plan also requires the industry to develop the technology needed to evaluate the significance of any cracks found and sized by NDE. First-generation disposition curves have been developed for use in such evaluations. However, the laboratory data on which the current curves are based show a lot of scatter (mostly because of the poorly-understood materials variables mentioned earlier) and additional testing is underway to allow the development of more solidly-based second-generation curves.

The fourth and fifth steps in the program address the availability of options for mitigation, repair and replacement and an initial evaluation of the current situation has recently been completed. Given the large number of susceptible locations (many of which are difficult to access) mitigation of PWSCC via a primary water chemistry change obviously would be a very attractive option. However, a fully qualified, effective chemistry countermeasure has not yet been developed. Zinc addition appears to be the most promising possibility identified to date but laboratory data suggest that zinc addition is more effective in preventing initiation than in slowing the growth of existing cracks. Additional work in this area is needed, including further laboratory tests on the effects of zinc addition and, if warranted based on the results of these tests, an in-plant demonstration of the costs and benefits of zinc addition under plant operating conditions should be considered.

In the absence of a chemistry countermeasure for PWSCC, potentially more costly, location-specific mitigation and repair measures will have to be used when existing cracks are found. A considerable number of such measures (some of which are based on the BWR pipe-cracking remedies mentioned earlier) are being developed. In addition, alternative materials have been identified for use in repair and replacement efforts. While these materials (which include Alloy 690 and its weld metals as well as stainless steels) are not immune to cracking, they are much more resistant to PWSCC than Alloy 600 and its weld metals. These more resistant materials also can be used for potentially cost-effective pre-emptive replacements that reduce the number of susceptible locations (for example, a reactor vessel head replacement can eliminate all of the susceptible CRDM penetrations at once).

Regulatory acceptance obviously is one of the keys to success of any issue-management program and is being pursued here by the industry via NEI. Regular, informal meetings are held to communicate program results and status and some joint R&D activities have been started between NRC Research and EPRI-MRP.

Cost-effectively managing this material degradation issue for the remaining life of the existing U.S. PWRs will be a significant challenge and to get “ahead of the curve” a well-coordinated, multi-year RD&D effort is needed, involving all U.S. PWR licensees together with EPRI, the NSSS Vendors and Owner’s Groups, NEI and INPO. The “Industry Initiative on Management of Materials Issues” has established the type of proactive, industry-wide program needed for success but much work remains to be done on this issue. PWSCC of Alloy 600 and its weld metals can be effectively managed via the 5-step process outlined earlier but the implementation of remedies, repairs and replacements may have a significant adverse impact on PWR capacity factors and power production costs during the next five to ten years unless the industry can identify, develop and deploy an effective chemistry countermeasure.

Session K: Keynote Speakers

Session K: Keynote Speakers PWSCC of Alloys 600/82/182: An EPRI Perspective Robin L. Jones Technical Executive,

PWSCC of Alloys 600/82/182: An EPRI Perspective

Robin L. Jones Technical Executive, Materials EPRI, USA

March 7, 2005

Technical Executive, Materials EPRI, USA March 7, 2005 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied

EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or distributed without written authorization from EPRI

7, 2005 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization
7, 2005 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization

Introduction

Session K: Keynote Speakers

• In May 2003, the U.S. Chief Nuclear Officers unanimously approved the “Industry Initiative on Management of Materials Issues” and the associated “Guideline for the Management of Materials Issues”, NEI 03-08.

• One of the requirements of NEI 03-08, which became effective January 2, 2004, is the preparation and annual updating of a strategic plan that identifies the U.S. nuclear industry’s high priority materials degradation issues.

• Rev. 0 of the “Integrated Materials Issues Strategic Plan”, which was issued in March 2004, identifies PWSCC of Alloy 600/82/182 as the “single biggest challenge facing the PWR industry”.

the “single biggest challenge facing the PWR industry”. 2 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be

2 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or distributed without written authorization from EPRI

2 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization from
2 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization from

Session K: Keynote Speakers

U.S. Electricity Production Costs (1981-2002) in 2002 cents per kilowatt-hour

12.0 Nuclear 1.71 10.0 Coal 1.85 Gas 4.06 8.0 Oil 4.41 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0
12.0
Nuclear 1.71
10.0
Coal 1.85
Gas 4.06
8.0
Oil 4.41
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
0.0 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Source: RDI /EUCG .

Source: RDI /EUCG . Converted to 2002 dollars by NEI – Updated 8/03

3 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or distributed without written authorization from EPRI

8/03 3 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization
8/03 3 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization

Session K: Keynote Speakers

U.S. Nuclear Industry Is Achieving Record Levels of Performance

95 89.6 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 80 81 82 83 84
95
89.6
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Capacity Factor (%)
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 Capacity Factor (%)

Source: NRC – Updated 02/04

4 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or distributed without written authorization from EPRI

4 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization from
4 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization from

Session K: Keynote Speakers

Corrosion-Related Capacity Factor Losses in BWRs

20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% NSSS Piping Reactor Internals
20%
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
NSSS Piping
Reactor Internals
All Other Causes
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Capacity Factor Loss (%)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Capacity Factor Loss (%) 5 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION –

5 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or distributed without written authorization from EPRI

(%) 5 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization
(%) 5 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization

Session K: Keynote Speakers

Major BWR RPV Internal Components

Session K: Keynote Speakers Major BWR RPV Internal Components Steam Dryer Feedwater Top guide Sparger Core
Steam Dryer Feedwater Top guide Sparger Core Core Spray shroud Barbara will put the graphic
Steam
Dryer
Feedwater
Top guide
Sparger
Core
Core Spray
shroud
Barbara will put the graphic
Sparger
ICM guide
here
if you like
Core
tube
Plate
P/SLC
Jet pump
piping

6 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or distributed without written authorization from EPRI

6 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization from
6 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization from

Session K: Keynote Speakers

Corrosion-Related Capacity Factor Losses in BWRs

Capacity Factor Loss (%)

ThroughThrough DecemberDecember 31,31, 19981998

(%) Through Through December December 31, 31, 1998 1998 20 18 16 14 12 10 8

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

All Other Causes Reactor Internals NSSS Piping
All Other Causes
Reactor Internals
NSSS Piping

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

7 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or distributed without written authorization from EPRI

1998 7 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization
1998 7 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization

LWR Chemistry Optimization

Materials Degradation Water Fuel Radiation Chemistry Performance Exposure Guidelines Chemistry Control Issues
Materials
Degradation
Water
Fuel
Radiation
Chemistry
Performance
Exposure
Guidelines
Chemistry
Control Issues

Session K: Keynote Speakers

Chemistry Control Issues Session K: Keynote Speakers 8 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied

8 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or distributed without written authorization from EPRI

8 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization from
8 EPRI CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION – Not to be copied or di stributed without written authorization from

Session K: Keynote Speakers

U.S. Nuclear Industry Is Achieving Record Levels of Performance

95 89.6 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 80 81 82 83 84
95
89.6
90
85
80
75
70