Republic vs Vda.

De Castellvi Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaintagainst the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the dateof the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the justcompensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of thecomplaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domainwas filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract. Amigable vs Cuenca Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, thegovernment used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote thePresident of

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legalprocess of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the governmentappears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to thegovernment, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking. People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958 J. B. L . Reyes Facts: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to the mayor. After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon. He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view. He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinances constitutionality. Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Held: No, petition granted. Ratio: The ordinance doesnt state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment. Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states: SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers: xxx xxx xxx (c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund. Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)

Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking. National Power Corporation v Judge Jocson 206 SCRA 520 (1992) expropriation case amt. for just compensation in dispute judge held in abeyance the write of possession order due to petitioner while increasing outright provisional value of land without hearing. Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by respondent judge in violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation process. However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The petitioner, in

Amigable vs Cuenca Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of

compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank. Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not the petitioner was deprived of due process of law. Held: The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court. The respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order and directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders. There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation: 1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. 2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners whose findings are deemed to be final.