Section 8.

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents. Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG and other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated vs. HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR A "mass action" was undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations to "dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. The petition alleges in great detail the character and origins of those grievances as perceived by the petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate their correction. ISSUE: Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes? HELD: Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to selforganization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law. Public school teachers have the right to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances but NOT during class hours, for then this would be a strike, which is illegal for them.

GSIS v. Kapisanan Facts: A mass demonstration was held by the GSIS employees among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS ("KMG" or the "Union"), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees. Because of this, the manager of the GSIS Intervening Unit issued a memorandum directing the said participants to show cause why they should not be held administratively liable. The participants, through their counsel sought to annul this by stating that this was no longer needed as the workers had already returned to work. This was brushed aside, and thus an administrative suit was filed against the KMG union and non-union members who took part in the rally. KMG Union President filed suit, pending such, GSIS proceeded with the administrative cases, and resulting in the reprimand of 182 employees and suspension from 1 to 6 months. Thereafter, the CA issued a decision enjoining GSIS from executing the administrative reprimands. Issue: W/N the CA erred in enjoining GSIS from implementing the suspensions. Held: Yes. It should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS,9 or those created by special law. As such, employees of covered GOCCs are part of the civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters involving selforganization, strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions. In fact, policies established on public sector unionism and rules issued on mass action have been noted and cited by the Court in at least a case. Among these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316 which provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector. As stated in each of the formal charges, the employee's act of attending, joining, participating and taking part in the strike/rally is a transgression of the rules on strike in the public sector. Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national security. As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "in accordance with law." This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service" by stating that the Civil Service law

and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed. It bears to reiterate at this point that the GSIS employees concerned were proceeded against - and eventually either exonerated, reprimanded or meted a one-month suspension, as the case may be - not for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance, but for engaging in what appeared to be a prohibited concerted activity. Respondent no less admitted that its members and other GSIS employees might have disrupted public service. (As to contracts) The SC stressed the ff. portion of the Corporate Negotiation Agreement bet. KMG and GSIS: The GSIS Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to promote the principle of shared responsibility on all matters and decisions affecting the rights, benefits and interests of all GSIS employees . Accordingly, the parties also mutually agree that the KMG shall not declare a strike nor stage any concerted action which will disrupt public service and the GSIS management shall not lockout employees who are members of the KMG during the term of this agreement. GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the employees to air their sentiments through peaceful concerted activities during allowable hours, subject to reasonable office rules .... If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at someone for non-exhaustion of less confrontational remedies, it should be at the respondent union for spearheading a concerted mass action without resorting to available settlement mechanism. As it were, it was KMG, under Atty. Alberto Velasco, which opened fire first. That none of the parties bothered to avail of the grievance procedures under the GSISKMG CNA should not be taken against the GSIS. At best, both GSIS management and the Union should be considered as in pari delicto PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972] Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established: 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT. Occena vs. Commission on Elections [GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404] En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively. Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issue: Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited. In re Edillon (A.M. No. 1928; 84 SCRA 554 [1978]) Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." Issues: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues? Held: It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Ratio Decidendi: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the

1973 Constitution), from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. It is sufficient to state then that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

G.R. No. L-38354

June 30, 1989

BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGILIO V. DIONISIO, defendant-appellant.

This case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act on the ground that only questions of law are involved.

The antecedent facts are summarized in the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. Seventh Judicial District, Branch 20, Pasig, Rizal in Civil Case No. 16980 to wit:

On January 22, 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in the municipal court of Makati, Rizal, for the collection of the amount of P 2,100 plus penalty of 12% per annum and P 751.30 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The sum of P 2,100 represents the association dues assessed on the lot owned by the defendant as member of the plaintiff association. On February 16, 1972, defendant filed an answer traversing all the material allegations of the complaint and set up the following special defenses; 1) That there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; 2) that the collection of alleged dues from its members is in reality an unlawful exercise of the power of taxation which is beyond the corporate power of the plaintiff, 3) that the amount sought to be collected is unreasonable and oppressive, 4) that the assessment of the dues upon the defendant in so far as he has not voluntarily affiliated with plaintiff is illegal, immoral, contrary to law and public policy, and 5) that the acts of plaintiff in compelling the defendant to be a member is unconstitutional and outside the scope of its corporate power. Defendant therefore sets up the counterclaim of P 2,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. On May 19, 1972, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts and prayed for judgment to be rendered therein in accordance with said stipulation of facts:

STIPULATION OF FACTS

COME NOW the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiff and the defendant in the above-entitled case, and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts:

1. That plaintiff was incorporated as corporation way back in August 25, 1957 for the purposes stated in its Articles of Incorporation, copy of which as amended is attached hereto as Annex 'A';

1963525 sq. meters x

P 0.30P 157.50

1964525 sq. meters x 2. That the By-laws of the association, copy of which as amended is attached hereto as Annex 'B', provides for automatic membership in the association for every owner and purchaser of lots located inside the Bel Air Village as defined and bounded in the Articles of Incorporation;

P 0.30P 157.50

1965525 sq. meters x

P 0.35P 183.75

1966525 sq. meters x 3. That without applying for membership in plaintiff association, defendant in this case, like the other members, automatically became a member because he is the registered owner of a lot located inside the Bel Air Village;

P 0.35P 183.75

1967525 sq. meters x

P 0.35P 183.75

4. That in accordance with the By-Laws of the plaintiff, the association is run and managed by a Board of Governors who (sic) exercises, among other things, the power to assess and collect against every owner of the lot inside the Bel Air Village, certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association;

1968525 sq. meters x

P 0.35P 183.75

1969525 sq. meters x

P 0.40P 210.00

5. That pursuant to the powers granted under the By-Laws, the Board of Governors have assessed the owners of the lots inside the Bel Air Village, a sum to be paid either quarterly, semi-annually or annually, computed on the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by every member as follows:

1970525 sq. meters x

P 0.40P 210.00

1971525 sq. meters x

P 0.40P 210.00

1972525 sq. meters x a. During the period from 1962-1964, the basis of the assessment is P 0.30 for every square meter of lot owned by the members inside the Bel Air Village compound; TOTAL--------P 2,100.00

P 0.50P 262.50

b. From l965-1968, the assessment was increased to P 0.35 for every square meter;

9. That the total amount of P 2,100 alleged in paragraph 4 of the complaint represents the assessments of the plaintiff on the defendant in accordance with the computation stated in paragraph 8 above;

c. From 1969-1971, the assessment was further increased to P 0.40 for every square meter; 10. That defendant protested the above assessments and refused to pay the same inspite of repeated demands: d. Starting 1972, the assessment was changed to P0.50 for every square meter of the lot owned by the members; 11. That as per Resolution No. 2-65 of the Board of Governors, copy hereof is attached as Annex 'C', all annual association dues not paid on or before September 30 are considered delinquent and imposed an interest of 12% per annum until fully paid;

6. That under the By-laws, the foregoing assessments if not paid when due, constitute a lien on the lots of the owners inside the Bel Air Village;

7. That defendant is the owner of a lot located inside the Bel Air Village with an area of 525 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;

12. That they are attaching to this stipulation as Annex 'D', the brochure of the association which embodies the deed of restriction and rules & regulations governing the lot owners inside the Bel Air Village.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered with the foregoing stipulation of facts. 8. That pursuant to the powers granted under the By-laws of the association, the Board of Governors has made the following assessment on defendant's property on the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by him as follows:

Manila for Makati, Rizal

1962525 sq. meters x

P 0.30P 157.50

May 18th, 1972.

(SGD.) FRANCISCO S. DIZON

(SGD.) F.R. ARGUELLES, JR.

and to pay plaintiff the amount of P 300.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit.

Counsel for Defendant

Counsel for Plaintiff SO ORDERED.

Suite 311 ABC Building

517 Federation Center Bldg. Appeal was perfected pursuant to Republic Act No. 6031.

Escolta, Manila

Binondo, Manila This Court after examining the pleadings doubted its appellate jurisdiction because issues not capable for pecuniary estimation were raised and decided in said inferior court. Upon suggestion of the Court the parties on May 30, 1973 agreed in a joint manifestation for this Court to decide the case in its original jurisdiction in order to cure the defect. They likewise agreed to submit the case for decision based on the stipulation of facts, heretofore quoted and the memoranda filed in the inferior court. Upon suggestion of the Court the plaintiff filed its supplemental memorandum on June 20, 1973." (At pp. 31-37, Rollo)

The parties submitted an addendum to stipulation of facts as follows:

ADDENDUM TO STIPULATION OF FACTS

DATED MAY 18, 1972 The decision of the Municipal Court of Makati was affirmed. COME NOW the undersigned attorneys for plaintiff and defendant in the above a title case, and to his Honorable Court hereby respectfully submit the following additional stipulation by incorporating to he Stipulation of Facts , dated May 18, 1972, the Bel Air Village Association, Inc. 1971 Annual Report, to be marked as Annex "E" and made an integral part thereof.

Defendant Dionisio then filed a petition for review of the Court of First Instance decision with the Court of Appeals. As stated earlier, the appellate court elevated the case to us the issues raised being purely questions of law.

Manila for Makati, Rizal

The resolution of the petition hinges on whether or not the respondent association can lawfully collect the questioned dues from the petitioner.

June 3, 1972.

The petitioner insists that he is not liable to pay the dues on the following grounds: (SGD.) F.R. ARGUELLES, JR. 1) The questioned assessment is a property tax outside the corporate power of respondent association to impose.

(SGD.) FRANCISCO DIZON

Counsel for Plaintiff

Counsel for PLaintiff 2) Respondent association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of privity of contract.

517 Federation Center Bldg.

517 Federation Center Bldg.

Binondo, Manila

Dasmarinas cor. Muelle de

3) The questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory.

Binondo, Manila

4) Respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.

The parties having filed their respective memoranda, the inferior court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1972 in favor of the plaintiff pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community. It is likewise not disputed that the provision on automatic membership was expressly annotated on the petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title and on the title of his predecessor-ininterest.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the principal amount of P 2,100.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% annually from the year 1962 until the aforesaid amount is fully paid

The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the petitioner is bound by such annotation.

Section 39 of Art. 496 (The Land Registration Act) states:

Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate ... (Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioner also objects to the assessment on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, oppressive and confiscatory. According to him the assessment is oppressive because the amount assessed is not based on benefits but on the size of the area of the lot, discriminatory and unreasonable because only the owners of the lots are required to pay the questioned assessment and not the residents who are only renting inside the village; and confiscatory because under the by-Laws of the respondent association, the latter holds a lien on the property assessed if the amount is not paid.

Thus, in the case of Tanchoco v. Aquino, (154 SCRA 1 [1987]), we ruled that purchasers of a registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. We stated:

We agree with the lower court's findings, to wit:

... that when petitioners purchased on April 6, 1964 from Rafael Viola an undivided (1/2) portion of Lot 314 and then on January 5, 1965 a 6/7 portion of the other half of Lot 314 there was at the back of TCT No. 11682 covering Lot 314 an annotation of a notice of lis pendens in favor of Donato Lajom, under Entry No. 19553/T-14707 (Rollo, p. 23), as follows:

The limitations upon the ownership of the defendant as clearly imposed in the annotations of TCT No. 81136 do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Since these limitations have been imposed upon the contract of sale as admitted in the stipulation of facts, it is obvious that the annotation of said lien and encumbrance that the defendant automatically becomes a member of the plaintiff association and subject to its rules, regulations or resolutions is valid, binding and enforceable.

Entry No. 19553/T-14707; Kind-Lis pendens in favor of Donato Lajom; Conditions-1/2 of the properties described in this title is the object of a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 8077 of the C.F.I. of N.E.; date of instrumentDec. 16, 1949; Date of Inscription-Jan. 11, 1950 at 2:00 p.m.

Petitioner Pastor Tanchoco who holds office as Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija (Rollo, p. 30) could not have missed the import of such annotation. It was an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. Since petitioners herein bought the land in question with the knowledge of the existing encumbrances thereon, they cannot invoke the right of purchasers in good faith, and they cannot likewise have acquired better rights than those of their predecessors in interest (Constantino v. Espiritu, 45 SCRA 557 [1972])"

The contention that this lien collides with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association is not tenable. The transaction between the defendants and the original seller (defendant's immediate predecessor) of the land covered by TCT No. 81136 is a sale and the conditions have been validly imposed by the said vendor/the same not being contrary to law, morals and good customs and public policy. The fact that it has been approved by the Land Registration Commission did not make it a governmental act subject to the constitutional restriction against infringement of the right of association. The constitutional proscription that no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his will applies only to government acts and not to private transactions like the one in question.

In effect, the petitioner's contention that he has no privity of contract with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all encumbrances except notations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association.

The defendant cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the plaintiff association. After all, it is not imposed upon him personally but upon his ownership of the property. The limitation and restriction is a limitation that follows the land whoever is its owner. It does not inhere in the person of the defendant.

One of the obligations of a member of the respondent association is to pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association which is being collected by the Board of Governors. The dues collected are intended for garbage collection, salary of security guards, cleaning and maintenance of streets and street lights and establishments of parks. The amount to be paid by each lot owner is computed on the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by every member.

The Court therefore holds that the lien or encumbrance or limitation imposed upon TCT No. 81136 is valid.

The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicate that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is assessed according to the value of the property (Philippine Transit Association v. Treasurer of the City of Manila, et al. 83 Phil. 722 [1949]) but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The basis appears reasonable. The dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required to pay as his contribution to the expenses incurred by the respondent association in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid, and reasonable for the particular community involved.

The second question has reference to the reasonableness of the resolution assessing the monthly dues in question upon the defendant. The exhibits annexed to the stipulation of facts describe the purpose or goals for which these monthly dues assessed upon the members of the plaintiff including the defendant are to be disbursed. They are intended for garbage collection, salary of security guards, cleaning and maintenance of streets, establishment of parks, etc. Living in this modern, complex society has raised complex problems of security, sanitation, communitarian comfort and convenience and it is now a recognized necessity that members of the community must organize themselves for the successful solution of these problems. Goals intended for the promotion of their safety and security, peace, comfort, and general welfare cannot be categorized as unreasonable. Indeed, the essence of community life is association and cooperation for without these such broader welfare goals cannot be attained. It is for these reasons that modem subdivisions are imposing encumbrance upon titles of prospective lot buyers a limitation upon ownership of the said buyers that they automatically

become members of homeowners' association living within the community of the subdivision.

1) whether or not the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees and 2) whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, 8 of the Constitution. RULING: 1) YES. The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set by those above them. They are not mere functionaries with simple oversight functions but business administrators in their own right.

Even assuming that defendant's ownership and enjoyment of the lot covered by TCT No. 81136 is limited because of the burden of being a member of plaintiff association the goals and objectives of the association are far greater because they apply to and affect the community at large. It can be justified on legal grounds that a person's enjoyment of ownership may be restricted and limited if to do so the welfare of the community of which he is a member is promoted and attained. These benefits in which the defendant participates more than offset the burden and inconvenience that he may suffer.

It is contended that the dues are assessed not only upon owners who have residences and houses on their lots but even upon those owners whose lots are vacant or are being leased to others. It is therefore argued that this is discriminatory. The Court disagrees. When the defendant bought the lot in question, it is assumed that he is going to reside in this place. The limitation or encumbrance assailed in the case at bar is for the assurance that the buyer of the lot will bird his house and live in the Bel Air Village. Otherwise, the defendant can just speculate and sell his lot a higher price and defeat the very purposes for which the encumbrance is imposed.

supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment." Thus, their only power is to recommend. Certainly, the route managers in this case more than merely recommend effective management action. They perform operational, human resource, financial and marketing functions for the company, all of which involve the laying down of operating policies for themselves and their teams The term "manager" generally refers to "anyone who is responsible for subordinates and other organizational resources." Managers constitute three levels of a pyramid:

The Court holds that the limitation or lien imposed upon TCT No. 811136 is reasonable. (pp.. 38-42, Rollo)

FIRST-LINE MANAGERS: The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management. First-line managers direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other managers MIDDLE MANAGERS: Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle managers' principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their organizations' policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their subordinates TOP MANAGERS: Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. It establishes operating policies and guides the organization's interactions with its environment In the Case, entitled Worker's Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., decided on November 13, 1991, the Secretary of Labor found: we find that only those employees occupying the position of route manager and accounting manager are managerial employees. 2) NO. The real intent of Art. III, 8 is evident in Lerums proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees, and security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers.

The lower court states that the defendant has occupied the lot for ten years up to the time of the rendition of judgement. On grounds of equity alone, he should contribute his share in the community expenses for security, street lights, maintenance of streets, and other services.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU), vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA

FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides: Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, 8 of the Constitution which provides: The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. ISSUES:

Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus: The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. 32