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Rural Tourism
Social Redefinition

by the win-win-win1 Perspective


in Less Developed Countries (L.D.C)

Case study : ETANAM, North West Greece


Wet land area “Amvrakikos Gulf”

Professor Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis , PhD

Director
School of Management and Economics

Technological Educational Institute


Kalamata/ Greece

2007

(1) worldwide known in the local development field as “Papakonstantinidis Model”


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Abstract
The paper deals with the possibility, rural tourism to be used as a methodological tool
for rural-local development, under globalization conditions, emphasising the
bargaining problem between three parts, i.e the tourism services providers, the
consumers of these services (tourists) and the Community, as the third or invisible
part of the bargain. The paper focuses on those forces in the bargain (rural tourism
bargain) which derive “conflicts”: It is proved that these forces, deriving pure
competition, could be transformed by the suggested win-win-win Model (and the
followed new types of bargaining behaviour) into a pure cooperation at local level,
thus maximizing the result for all the involved parts ( The Rural Tourism Providers-
The Tourists and the Community)
A case-study from the North-West Greece (Amvrakikos wet-land Area) is referred as
a typical win-win-win paradigm coming from a less developed and isolated place.

KEY-WORDS

Rural Tourism, Local Development, Sensitization, bargain, three- part negotiations, decision making,
policy planners, methodology: win-win-win model, utilities & shares

BIOSKETCH
Professor Dr. Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis, Local Government Department Head- Technological
Educational Institute, Antikalamos, 24.100 Kalamata, Greece. papakonstantinidis@teikal.gr
Economist, Mathematician, Lawyer with an excellent (9.29) M.Sc in the field of Regional
Development (I.P.A), M.A (credits) in Rural Development (Center for Development Studies- U.C.G-
IRL . He has obtained his Ph.D in the “Local Development” scientific field.
Member of the E.U Commission task force for the L.E.A.D.E.R E.U Initiative (1989-1991), General
Reporter of the “European Center of Public Enterprises (C.E.E.P)” ‘s Regional Affairs Committee
(1985-1990), member of the E.U Commission (DG X) “Green Team”, Head of the Agricultural Bank’s
“Local Development Office” (1991-2001). 41 mono-graphies, 94 published papers in authorised
scientific magazines and minutes of World Congresses, 3000 articles , having visited and studied more
than five thousand (5.000) small rural communities all over E.U (Greece, Ireland, U.K, Sweden etc)
for development reasons. Rural Development visitor professor in e-learning “Euracademy” (Leonardo
da Vinci II E.U Program) –Visby-Gotland University / SLU Sweden and also the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences’, Centre for Regional Studies(2003-2006). Member of the Editorial Board of the “Journal
of Applied Economics and Management”-India, Member of the International Sociological Association
(I.S.A)- (Research Committee –R.C 26), Member of the European Regionalist Association,(ERSA)
member of the Board of Agrotouristiki S.A (2001), member of the Board of “Evrytania S.A” (1996-
2001) etc Eleven (11) times awarded at the international level for research work –three times by the
U.N “North-South Co-operation Program”- in the field of local development.115 times awarded at
national level for personal contribution in developing small rural –and isolated – areas in Greece. He
has been characterised as the “father of Rural Tourism in Greece”: -G.T.P/6.92, Member of the Board
of the Greek Regionalists Association - Rural tourism teaching work: “Up-to-date” e-learning training
school Cyprus 2004, Professor in the National School of Local Administration (ESTA) (2007-),
Member of the International Advisory Committee of the Asian Journal of Tourism and Hospitality
Management (A.J.T.H.M) -Santo Tomas University Manila Philippines (2007-)

1. Introduction: The concept


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There are three (3) –at least- reasons, for which scientific fields from different
directions could be combined on rural tourism redefinition, towards its social
perspective:

1. Rural Tourism is mainly a business sector, deriving profit for


tourist accommodations and tourism services owners.
2. Rural tourism may be considered at the same time as a
methodological tool for local development planners and policy
makers.
3. Rural tourism could be concerned as a typical win-win-win
case-study, in the frame of the bargaining problem

According to those perceptions on rural tourism activity, one should focus on


“relations” (economic, social, cultural etc) among the actors, i. e the “providers” of
rural tourism services, the “customers”/ clients of those services (tourists) and the
“Community” (local community) in which those accommodations are established or
rural tourism services are offered

The point is “how Rural Tourism- a business activity- could provide the community
with social results, through its profit diffusion, among the people living in the
community, especially in those Less Developed Countries (L.D.C), during the
Globalization Age” , taking into account that:
• The main feature of globalization conditions consists of setback to real terms
of the development due to wealth concentration, regional and local
inequalities , the absolute poverty in large parts of the planet, lack of food and
medical care in these parts, increasingly children mortality, increasingly
economic migration trends, dramatic climate changes, due to human
activities, armed conflicts, terms confusion.
• Over the second half of the 20th century, we have seen the continuous
transformation of the world's population from rural to urban, and this change
is likely to continue in decades to come. This phenomenon goes beyond
migration statistics.
• Rural Tourism may be concerned as a local action promoting both the
economic and the social dimension ( i.e local development, cultural,
environmental and political dimension etc) of a rural place
• Rural Tourism may contribute in maintaining the local people in rural places,
as well as in convincing young people, living in cities to come back and work
in rural places.
• It is –therefore- necessary, to redefine “rural tourism” term as a local activity
by both, the political-ideological and the strategic dimension thus meeting
the “market rules”, which paper focuses on: In particular it is necessary to
be proved that “rural tourism” social redefinition must be seen as a typical
win-win-win bargaining problem between “providers” the rural services, the
“consumers” or clients of those services and the community, in which each
part has to win. In this “bargain”, COMMUNITY may be concerned as the
“third” (or invisible) part of an hypothetic three-part negotiation taking part
at any time of the development process. For those social results to be
achieved, it is necessary local cohesion to be based on “information” coming
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from the sensitization process. From the other hand, “sensitization” may be
the result of “knowledge transformation” coming up from the combination of
two types of knowledge, i. e “sympathetic” and “systemic” By its turn, this
combination may lead to a “new” bargaining behavior , thus market rules (i.e
“pure competition” behavior) to be overcome.
• Rural Tourism is referred by both criteria as a “smooth” business activity and
a “smooth” rural places’ policy intervention, in respect with the natural,
cultural, social and political environment : These “Rural Places” (small rural
Communities in Less Developed Countries, far away from the Metropolitan
Centers) define a sub-spatial unity (community, society)
• This paper focuses on those “rural communities” or “rural societies”: These
societies have not any (alternative) opportunity for developing/ and/or
promoting their own resources (human, physical, cultural) waiting for a help/
and or/investments coming from outside. In the opposite, “Rural
Communities” must start the development process “from inside” (endogenous
rural/local development) based on their own human force.
• This may be a difficult objective during the “Globalization Age”. What it is
needed is “people who live in these areas to try alone for developing and
managing their own physical, cultural etc sources in order “rural places” to
gain their own “identity” and competitiveness in the world tourist market. But
how? To answer the question, it is necessary the “Territory-Community” term
to be redefined in terms of those “social” market “sides”, based on local
cohesion, local sensitization and solidarity: The paper highlights those
“hidden” sides of market (globalization), emphasizing the “bargaining
problem” among three “players” i.e the providers tourist services ( local
population of a destination)- letter A, the consumers of these services
(tourists)- letter B, and the Community,- letter C which form a triangle(A-B-
C) of success: Each “player”(A, B, C) may win in this bargain [ win-win-
win], by “reconstructing” his own “winning strategy” and/ or “behavior” in
the bargain, so the “territory-community” term should be redefined Rural
Tourism may be the suitable methodological “tool” letting the “players (A, B,
C) realize this win-win-win transformation.
• A sub-spatial unity (i.e society, community) may be redefined by the
bargaining instant reflections strategies or behaviors, in which this unity
[letter “C”] “participates” as the third or invisible part of negotiations
between two bargainers. This could be done in only one position, (or
equilibrium point), the limit-end of the sensitization process. “Territory-
Community” term should be defined on this limit; and Rural Tourism is the
Methodological Tool for sensitizing local population around a “flag theme”
or a “common theme” at local level, as the scheme”1”, below.

Scheme (1)- Flow Diagram)


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Rural Tourism: How business is transformed in a local development tool

win – win – win Model

A B

Provider
Rural Tourism Tourists (B)
Rural Tourism as Business
Services (A) (competitiveness)

Rural Tourism as
Methodological Tool
(sensitization-
cohesion solidarity)

C
COMMUNITY
(territory-community
term as the limit of
sensitization process)

2. Literature related to the subject


It is, therefore, necessary to start with the “new trends in regional development
policy” / The “New Innovation Theory” (N. I. T) – (M. M Fischer, 2000).
N. I. T provides us with useful methodological tools, like knowledge creation and
knowledge transfer. Using these tools in the “bargaining problem”, it is necessary to
analyze pure individual winning strategies (Nash “Non-cooperative Game Theory”-
win-win model) in the bargain. Information may be the “link” between knowledge
creation and bargaining process. In particular, “Information” is a power factor in pure
individuals winning strategies. The more information, the more possibilities for
someone to “win” in the bargain Redefinition of the “territory-community” term is
achieved by what we call Integrated Information; it is a “combination” of answers
given to each of participants in the bargain, meeting three different questions in the
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same person, especially, “what is the best for me, in relation with the best of the other
AND the best of this sub-spatial unity/ “community” (as the third-invisible part of
the bargain) – “the 3-person information” (or the win-win-win model). Each of the
participants, using the integrated, or 3-person information in the bargain, then, a
new bargaining behavior (the win-win-win behavior) may be created: It seems to be
closer to “pure cooperation”, than competitiveness . The last one may be concerned as
a survival need: “During next decades, climate conditions may be proved to be the
only one “enemy” or competitor against human activities” (U. S Environmental
Committee Report, February 2004).On this limit-point “territory-community” term
redefinition meets fluent situation /evolution in the post-industrial period, as the
outcome of this win-win-win process. The concept, based on the Modern Innovation
Theory, analyses the decision making under the prism of the sensitization process,
developing in the bargain, in order to “produce” social cohesion and solidarity which
are the pillars of the “territory-community” term. “Territory-community” term has
therefore to be redefined, in a “new term” by the limit-end of the integrated
information through the sensitization process, leading to “social behavior”

3. The new (proposed) approach , step by step

• Negotiation may be concerned as the base of our economic and


social life. Each of us actively participates in thousand of
“negotiations” even no obviously: Driving his car in traffic,
actively participating in the market (buyer/sellers) relations
between husbands-wives, or even the “love game” may be
concerned as forms or types of negotiation, / or “game”, according
to Non Cooperative Games Theory.(J.F. Nash, 1950)
• Each of us, starting negotiations with another expects to gain a
profit (economic, social etc)
• Each of us knows the rules of the negotiation; otherwise he she/ has
no interest to participate as negotiator in negotiations/ or “game”
Each of us is a “player” according to Games Theory. He (she)
knows a priori that the other part (or player) is as clever as he is.
He has to respect that the other person may be as clever as he is.
• Each of us does not regret for his/her choice
• Each of us, participating in a negotiation has to take a decision (or
to make a choice) in relation with the other negotiator’s decision,
or reacting to the other’s choice He/she has to decide according to
his/her expectations, as well as to instant reflection In real terms,
he/she has to make and follow a strategy: [We need to trust each-
other (see at “Contract Social” J. J Rousseau) Nowadays
conditions overcame State Rules; therefore we must analyze the
bargaining problem, in terms of reacting, (instant reflections
strategies) recognising “competitors” instead of people who will
to cooperate.
• It is obvious that individual choices (strategies) may be
characterized by interdependence as well as by interaction to
other’s choices during the bargaining problem. In its math
expression (Nash 1951) “An n –person game is a set of n players
or positions, each with an associate finite set of pure strategies and
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corresponding to each player I a payoff function pi which maps the


set of all n-tuples of pure strategies into the real numbers. Each of
“negotiators” has, therefore to double think (2-person anticipation)
according to his & the other’s expectations so both to win,
maximising the outcome of negotiation (win-win)
• A two 2–person anticipation is based on utilities. According to
Nash Theory a unique solution exists that maximises the product of
the participants utilities. There is, therefore an interaction between
“utilities” and “strategies” In particular, “utility” expresses
individual choices based on individual necessities (real or fantastic)
“Strategies” express choices + will in personal level, taking into
account the interaction factor (the other’s choices) Utility is the
subjective factor and strategy is the objective factor of the same
anticipation.
• Negotiation may lead either in “agreement” or disagreement Utility
expresses the constraint or the “fear factor” of disagreement for
whom needs the agreement more than the other negotiator. Who
needs more, negotiation to be led in agreement expects more utility,
but –probably he has to loose in terms of “shares”, due to risk lack
In the opposite, who is indifferent about “agreement” or expects no
more utility /per unit he has- to win in “shares” under the dogma
“the more risk, the more profit”
• (In math terms (Utility Theory): If A & B represent two individual
alternative anticipations and small letters (a & b)represent real
numbers then the utility function will satisfy the following
properties u(A)>u(B) is equivalent to “A is more desirable than B”
If 0<p<1, then u [p A+(1-p)B= p u A+(1-p)u B If u1 , u2 are
utility functions for two individuals and c (S) represents the
solution point in a set “S’ and pi are payoff functions for each
player I, and (&) are strategies then for every player Pi(&)= max
[pi(&), ri.. (ri=the each player desirable outcome)

ð Lim Pi(&)Qi(&)=max PiQi (1)


ià ∞
ð Ua =x , Ub = (100-x)k ,k= is the key fact (2)
ð f’ = [x (100-x)k ]’= 0 so that Ua + Ub=max

• The (1) expresses utilities/strategies, as the interaction between


two negotiators and (2) expresses the utility function- as a
shares/utility combination The bargaining problem is bringing
up to decision making during negotiations of A & B. (Table 1)
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TABLE 1
Random Sharing between “A” and “B”

Share Α Share Β Utility Α Utility Β Utility AXB


(%) (%)
100 0 71 0 0
90 10 70 1 70
80 20 68 5 340
70 30 64 10 960
60 40 60 16 960
50 50 52 23 1196
40 60 40 31 1240
(max)
30 70 24 40 960
20 80 12 50 600
10 90 4 61 244
0 100 0 80 0
J.F. Nash highlighted the “payoffs” of the bargain, out of “personal expectations”

Note:
Utility is a personal matter: Utility “units” are not compared. B) Utility “units”
expresse the “fear of disagreement” (no shares for anyone).c) If “A” needs more the
“agreement” than the payoff, then he should be ready to accept any form of
agreement. d) If “A” has decided not to accept the agreement, then he risks more but
–at the same time- wins more from the agreement if it is realized e)The “utility range”
expresses the optimist instant reflection for each part

UTILITY FUNCTION:

Suppose that “winning strategies” [ Pi, Qi] are corresponded 1-1 with the players’
(bargainers’) UTILITY ( linear function: corresponds 1-1 to bargainers’ Utility
Function), under the dogma “the more decisive to break the contract down, the more
satisfied from the bargain leading to the contract
That is true: Bargainers expectations are 1-1 to expected Utilities for each of them,
coming from the bargain. From the other hand, the more information, the more
uncertainty (Ch Nikolaides, 1999) . Bargain gets its own rules out of cooperation
People operate in a competitive base rather, than co-operative: Winning strategies are
led by bargaining rules (pure competition rules). Nash has described the “bargaining
problem” not by expectations, but, directly, by the results (pay-off of the bargain)
In a math form (as below):
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Pi x Qi→ Ua + Ub = max
If
Ua = x, Ub = (100-x)k
Then
Ua+Ub=max → [ x(100-x)k]΄ = 0
Then
x’ (100-x) + x [ (100-x)k]’ = 0
then
1(100-x) + x k (100-x)k-1 = 0
then
xk (100-x)k-1= - 1(100-x)k
then
x k (100-x)k-1 = - 1 (100-x)k-1 (100-x)1
then
xk = (100-x)1 (100-x)10k-1 : [- 1 (100-x)k-1]
if (100-x) # 0, then
xk = 100-x
xk + x =100
then
x(k+1) = 100

in real terms, x(k+1) = -100


[the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers]
Finally:

x = 100 /
(k+1)
Cases:

If k=0 , then each of a, b may win the 100% of pay-offs /the other “nothing”=0
If k=1 , then each of them (a and b) my win the 50%
If k>1 then “a” may win a percentage >50%
If k<1, then “b” may win a percentage >50%

In our example, the crucial point [ the max] is 1240 (40x31) : this is the point of
final agreement led in by the bargain. On that point the shares are: 40% for “A” and
60% for “B”. On that point, personal satisfaction or utility units are 40 units for A
and 31 units for B : That’s the point of agreement, expressed “fear of breaking down
the agreement for “player” “A” and risk of breaking down the agreement for the
player B

In an 2-person anticipation, each of two (2) bargainers may ask themselves one
question, as the result of “good strategies” [instant reflection thinking] in the bargain
What should be the best for me, taking into account that the
other person (bargainer in a negotiation) should try for the best
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for himself –thus recognizing that the other person may be as


clever as I am.

The following methodology is adopted(Papakonstantinidis):


knowledge creation⇒ creating a “non conflict” behavior ⇒ inserting sensitization⇒
integrated information creation⇒ uncertainty due to negative entropy⇒ thus,
smoothing potential conflicts⇒closing differences in the competitive
bargain⇒payoff-utilities & shares, influencing behavior in the bargain /individual
winning strategies influencing by a “new behavior ⇒in the opposite, the more
decisive, the more risk ,should derive more profit in a globalizing world but ⇒
inserting sensitization in the bargain⇒thus smoothing the conflict strategies taking
into account the “C” factor ⇒ converting a bilateral “conflict” into a 3-part
negotiation ⇒ leading to a “new” social perception , the win-win-win perception,
including a real cooperation

4.Information as bargaining strength factor


• in the Age of Information (2007) the information factor is the
most important: The more information, the more preparation in
negotiation, the more strength in the bargain
• But information has to be formed by knowledge conversion
• According to the “New Innovation Theory” , knowledge
conversion is introduced corresponds [1-1] to a specific type of
information, Possible cases/orders, between “tacit” and
“codified” knowledge produce the four (4) major processes of
knowledge conversion, leading to types of behavior (see
below):

Scheme: Knowledge Creation/ Information/ Types of Behavior

tacit tacit Sympathetic Socializatio

tacit Codified Conceptual Externalization

Codifie tacit procedura Internalization

Codifie codified Systemi Networking

Sympathetic Systemi Conceptual Sensitizatio

Systemic Systemic Procedural Strategic


Papakonstantinidis
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• Introducing the sensitisation process in suggested Model we have more


possibilities to “create” a new form of information, called the “integrated
information” in the bargain
• “Integrated Information” is the new term introduced to the suggested model
which leads to a “new social existence” i.e the socialization. The introduced
information (+) may by “sensitization” thus creating a new behavior type.
This type “socialization” let me introduce the factor “C” (Community, World
Values, social cohesion, solidarity, may GOD) in the bargain, as the third or
invisible part of negotiation. Thus “Sensitization” may be proved to be a
useful planning tool, especially, in the most of rural areas.
• By introducing the “C factor” in the bargain it is succeeded a bilateral relation
to be transformed into a “three part” relation (A & B competitors and the “C”
part- the “invisible part”), thus smoothing the conflicts -the 2-poles
perception in negotiation, at local (at least) level.
• Each of two (2) bargainers may ask him/her self two(2) questions:
What should be the best for me, taking into account that the other person
(bargainer in a negotiation) should try the best for himself –thus recognizing
that the other person may be as clever as I am, AND taking [at the same time]
into account that “Community”- as the third or invisible part of negotiations
between two (2) also participates and also tries to do the best for itself (or win-
win-win)?
• Concluding,
local development planners may find the proposed “win-win-win approach” as a
useful methodological tool in local development planning, by introducing the
sensitization process in local people, thus succeeding “social cohesion and local
solidarity in the community. Therefore, “territory-community” may be “self-defined”
by social cohesion and solidarity developing by introducing the “sensitization
process” in the “bargain” –under globalization conditions- in local level, thus
transferring a pure competitiveness into a pure cooperation among local people
• [The win-win-win perception] converting a bilateral bargain to a 3-part
negotiations including the “Community” as the third/ invisible part[scheme 1]

Scheme 1
A

Β C
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Suppose that the more Information,→ the more uncertainty for the Future → the
more need for cooperation, according to the modeling factor, (APPENDIX) as well
as :
• Pi(&) :Sum of all the “winning strategies”(&)[pick-points] coming from
the choices of the bargainer “A”, based on information given while reaching
the ∞
• Qi(&):Set of all the “winning strategies”(&)[pick-points] coming from the
choices of the bargainer “B”, based on information given while reaching
the ∞
• Ri(&): Set of all the “winning strategies”(&)[pick-points] coming from the
choices of the bargainer “C”, [ the “Community” , concerned as the “third”
or “invisible” partner] based on information given while reaching the ∞
• There is a “link” between “utilities” and “individual winning strategies”
that means , ƒ(u) ⇔ƒ(&), where, “&” is a set of good individual
strategies
Max PQR = max of payoffs PQR
THEN:
limPi(&)Qi(&)Ri(&)=maxPQR
i→∞
(see the schemes (1) and (2) at the end of the paper
• The “new” system (the equilibrium point, according to Nash Theory) could
lead to a pure cooperation situation, between the 2 involved parts in the
bargain (individuals and the “Community” – which could be seen as the
“third-invisible” part in a two-persons bargain) ; this could occur as the
result of an “instant individual reaction” due to given information (transferred
knowledge). From this point of view, I think that my suggestion facilitate
competitors to understand each-other’s situation, thus improving the quality of
the bargain, as a “new social existence” in the globalizing world.
• Otherwise, a 3-person non cooperative bargaining game may form in its limit
pure cooperation conditions between the involved parts, as integrated
information let them create a 3-band codified knowledge, at the same time i.e
• Rural community is the “weak partner” in the bargaining game, in the world
market but this situation should be conversed, in terms of «collective choice».

4.The Suggesting “win-win-win” Sharing vs Nash Sharing


TABLE 2 (PAPAKONSTANTINIDIS PROPOSAL)
The Suggesting Sharing between “A , “B” and “C”

Share Α Share Β Utility Α Utility Β Utility Share C Utility C Utility


(%) (%) AXB (%) AXBXC
90 4 71 1 71 6 1 71
80 13 70 2 140 7 2 280
70 22 68 5 340 8 3 1020
60 31 64 10 640 9 4 2560
50 40 60 16 960 10 5 4800
max
41 50 52 23 1196 9 4 4784
32 60 40 31 1240 8 3 3720
13

23 70 24 40 960 7 2 1920
14 80 12 50 600 6 1 600

Note:
1. “C” is the Community , as the “third” invisible part in the bargain- &
2. The less shares for A+B the more share for the “invisible” bargainer “C”

A THREE-PART BARGAIN SUGGESTION: (Papakonstantinidis)


Introducing “C” = Community, as he third or “invisible” part of negotiations
between TWO
Let, a, b the bargainers and “c” the “invisible part
Then, let us to define utilities:
Ua = x
Uc = lx, when l = is a factor of the “x” proportion
Ub = (100-x-lx)k
It is obvious –according to example 1- that :

Ua + Ub = Uc = max → x [ (100-x-lx) k ]’ = 0
then
x’ (100-x-lx) + x [(100-x-lx)k]’ = 0
k

then
1(100-x-lx) + xk (100-x-lx)k-1= 0
k

then
xk (100-x-lx) + 1(100-x-lx) k = 0
k-1

then
xk (100-x-lx)k-1 + 1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx) = 0
then
xk (100-x-lx)k-1 = -[1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx)]
if (100-x-lx) # 0, then
xk = -[ (100-x-lx)]
then
xk +x +lx = 100 .... (really ...= -100)
[the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers]
x(k+1+l) = 100
finally

X = 100 /
(k+1+l)

Cases

If k=0 , l = 0, then each of a, b, c “bargainers” may win the 100% of “bargaining


result” (output)
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If k=1 , l=0 then each of the a and c may win the 50% and the bargainer “b” nothing
at all

If k=1 , l=1 then each of the a, b and c “bargainers” may win the 33.33 % (equal
portions) : This is the equilibrium point (equality of shares)

If k>1, l>1 then “a” and “b” may win a percentage >33.33%, but there is a “portion”
for the Community- “C”
(as the third-or “invisible” part of the “bargain between TWO”)
If k<1, l<1 then “c” may win a percentage >50%

At any case, introducing the Community “C” , as the third or “invisible” part in any
bargain between TWO (2), there is the possibility of reforming the world perception:
EXAMPLE
Introducing the “Environmental Protection” (the “C” factor) in any oil dealing procedure between
TWO bargainers (i.e oil producer country and TEXACO Company), -in the form of SENSITIZATION-
Then, the result may be quite different than existing, in terms of human & environmental approach!!

6. Rural Tourism in L. D. C as a typical bargaining case

Let’s see “Rural Tourism” as a typical case of the bargain: The sellers (or providers)
rural tourism services – tour operators included- try to offer their services in a higher
price and low cost so to maximize their net profit
In the opposite, the buyers (tourists) of rural tourism services try to enjoy the
maximum quality of those services in the lowest price, so that to maximize their
utility coming from rural tourism, in a low cost. This is a typical case of bargain.
It is not obvious in the most “famous” -and developed- tourist destinations: These
tourist destinations are rather incorporated in wider tourist networks (ie hotel chains
etc). There aren’t opportunities, in these places for developing a “new” pattern or a
“new” identity in the world tourist market. These areas are out of scientific interest.
The paper focuses on Less Developed Countries (L. D. C) and the rural areas, which
have no “tourist identity” even they have tourist sources. These places have survival
problems in the world (tourist) market. They are needed to be helped to overcome
their survival problems, by innovative methodological approaches: Rural Tourism
may be proved to be a “good practice” toward this direction.

Suppose, now, that rural tourism services providers decide to adopt a “new” strategy
in order to attract more tourists in their place: They decide to co-operation instead of
acting alone [first instant reflections in the (rural tourism) bargain] as for example,
creating those well-known “Local Quality Contracts” This decision is respected to
work positive for tourist choices [ second instant reflections in the bargain] as tourists
understand that the “providers decision” should improve the quality of tourism
services offered. So they “accept” to pay a price for these services above the
minimum cost. At the same time, rural tourism providers accept to offer better quality
services to tourists, beyond market rules (cost/benefit analysis).
From the other hand, rural pace’s local authorities “understand the new dynamic” for
the Community by the “new” bargaining behavior. They have to claim a “better
share” for the Community, from both, “providers” and “tourists”, in terms of
economic and social “respect”. (The third instant reflections in the bargain, coming
from the third/ and/ or/ invisible part of rural tourism negotiations).
15

Rural Tourism services Providers (letter “A”) as well as tourists (letter “B”)
understand that they have the obligation to satisfy the conditions put by the
Community (Local Authorities- letter “C”) and even to participate in rural place
development process ( the last instant reflection in the bargain) It’s obvious, that:
1. a bilateral pure economic relation is transported in a three-part relation,
included the Community
2. Community (the “C” factor) –as the third or invisible part of rural tourism
negotiation- claims its own share from the bargain between “Providers” and
“Customers” (Tourists) ; and this claim is been accepted by those “real
bargainers” (A + B)
3. The “equilibrium point” –i.e the agreement - may be succeeded in what point
the Rural Tourism Services Providers’ Utility(Ua) AND Tourists’ Utility (Ub)
coming from the services offered AND the Community Utility (Uc) coming
both from quality services offered improvement and satisfied tourists number
increase become MAX [ in math, Ua+Ub+Uc = max], so that each of the
THREE participants to win: This point (the equilibrium point)may be
concerned as the limit-end point of a continuous sensitization process in the
proposed (new) win-win-win methodological bargaining approach (rural
tourism as a local development methodological “tool”.


Case study:ETANAM N-W Greece-Wet land area “Amvrakikos Gulf”

“Amvrakikos Gulf “, in North-West Greece may be an excellent paradigm of a win-


win-win Rural Tourism: Rural Tourism services Providers, and tourists and the
Community (Preveza) have succeeded to win, or to get profit, through Rural Tourism
activities, due to “Leader” EU Application in this area, even if it was less developed
and isolated, far away from the metropolitan centers.

Indeed, since 1992, Amvrakikos Gulf -with a wonderful landscape including both a
wet-land and α mountain area- had a limited tourist activity, due to its isolation, as it
was away from the metropolitan centers. Fishing was the main local population
employment. Age average was 65+ as young people leaved their place, looking for a
better income as well better living conditions in the nearest urban centers.
In 1992 –a year after L. E. A. D. E. R, European Union Initiative (Program)
application in Greece- a Local Action Group named ETANAM (from the initial letters
of Greek works “Etairia ANaptyxis AMvrakikou” / i.e Amvrakikos Development
Company ) in the form of an Anonymous Society (S.A) has been appeared in this
area, by some young educated people, who had come back to their place (In real
terms, ETANAM was there before Leader E.U Program, as a branch of the
Agricultural Bank of Greece, with a limited responsibility in the local development
process)
ETANAM S.A was the result of a continuous sensitization process among local
people : It was an “agreement”/ a compromise between local authorities, rural
cooperatives, tourist accommodations owners’ Association, etc, who decided, to joint
their own forces - instead of acting alone and each-other competitive (win-win
relations between rural tourism providers ) by offering higher quality rural tourism
16

services- under the “umbrella” of Leader EU Program. [win-win relations between


tourism providers and consumers(tourists)]
As Local Authorities (Municipality of Preveza and other small villages around
Preveza) decided to actively participate in this “central forum” i.e the Local Action
Group named ETANAM S.A then it was obvious that they had also to coordinate the
rural tourism system as well as to claim profit for themselves, coming from rural
tourism activity in Amvrakikos Gulf Area- the third “win” (the win-win-win model)
ETANAM S.A succeeded to change the route in Amvrakikos Wet-land Area: From
less developed and isolated rural place, Amvrakikos changed in a developed tourist
place, with thousands of tourists per year. Local income has improved 2 or 3 times
above Young people came back to work in rural tourism services An observatory has
been made for tourists, in order to see the wonderful birds to put their eggs in the
sound Nowadays, Amvrakikos Gulf is a famous tourist destination , combining sea,
wet-land and mountain landscape: it is a simple but wonderful win-win-win example
of an endogenous local development based on a pure cooperation, instead competition


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Prof. Papakonstantinidis
May, 2007

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