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Rural Tourism
Social Redefinition
Director
School of Management and Economics
2007
Abstract
The paper deals with the possibility, rural tourism to be used as a methodological tool
for rural-local development, under globalization conditions, emphasising the
bargaining problem between three parts, i.e the tourism services providers, the
consumers of these services (tourists) and the Community, as the third or invisible
part of the bargain. The paper focuses on those forces in the bargain (rural tourism
bargain) which derive “conflicts”: It is proved that these forces, deriving pure
competition, could be transformed by the suggested win-win-win Model (and the
followed new types of bargaining behaviour) into a pure cooperation at local level,
thus maximizing the result for all the involved parts ( The Rural Tourism Providers-
The Tourists and the Community)
A case-study from the North-West Greece (Amvrakikos wet-land Area) is referred as
a typical win-win-win paradigm coming from a less developed and isolated place.
KEY-WORDS
Rural Tourism, Local Development, Sensitization, bargain, three- part negotiations, decision making,
policy planners, methodology: win-win-win model, utilities & shares
BIOSKETCH
Professor Dr. Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis, Local Government Department Head- Technological
Educational Institute, Antikalamos, 24.100 Kalamata, Greece. papakonstantinidis@teikal.gr
Economist, Mathematician, Lawyer with an excellent (9.29) M.Sc in the field of Regional
Development (I.P.A), M.A (credits) in Rural Development (Center for Development Studies- U.C.G-
IRL . He has obtained his Ph.D in the “Local Development” scientific field.
Member of the E.U Commission task force for the L.E.A.D.E.R E.U Initiative (1989-1991), General
Reporter of the “European Center of Public Enterprises (C.E.E.P)” ‘s Regional Affairs Committee
(1985-1990), member of the E.U Commission (DG X) “Green Team”, Head of the Agricultural Bank’s
“Local Development Office” (1991-2001). 41 mono-graphies, 94 published papers in authorised
scientific magazines and minutes of World Congresses, 3000 articles , having visited and studied more
than five thousand (5.000) small rural communities all over E.U (Greece, Ireland, U.K, Sweden etc)
for development reasons. Rural Development visitor professor in e-learning “Euracademy” (Leonardo
da Vinci II E.U Program) –Visby-Gotland University / SLU Sweden and also the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences’, Centre for Regional Studies(2003-2006). Member of the Editorial Board of the “Journal
of Applied Economics and Management”-India, Member of the International Sociological Association
(I.S.A)- (Research Committee –R.C 26), Member of the European Regionalist Association,(ERSA)
member of the Board of Agrotouristiki S.A (2001), member of the Board of “Evrytania S.A” (1996-
2001) etc Eleven (11) times awarded at the international level for research work –three times by the
U.N “North-South Co-operation Program”- in the field of local development.115 times awarded at
national level for personal contribution in developing small rural –and isolated – areas in Greece. He
has been characterised as the “father of Rural Tourism in Greece”: -G.T.P/6.92, Member of the Board
of the Greek Regionalists Association - Rural tourism teaching work: “Up-to-date” e-learning training
school Cyprus 2004, Professor in the National School of Local Administration (ESTA) (2007-),
Member of the International Advisory Committee of the Asian Journal of Tourism and Hospitality
Management (A.J.T.H.M) -Santo Tomas University Manila Philippines (2007-)
There are three (3) –at least- reasons, for which scientific fields from different
directions could be combined on rural tourism redefinition, towards its social
perspective:
The point is “how Rural Tourism- a business activity- could provide the community
with social results, through its profit diffusion, among the people living in the
community, especially in those Less Developed Countries (L.D.C), during the
Globalization Age” , taking into account that:
• The main feature of globalization conditions consists of setback to real terms
of the development due to wealth concentration, regional and local
inequalities , the absolute poverty in large parts of the planet, lack of food and
medical care in these parts, increasingly children mortality, increasingly
economic migration trends, dramatic climate changes, due to human
activities, armed conflicts, terms confusion.
• Over the second half of the 20th century, we have seen the continuous
transformation of the world's population from rural to urban, and this change
is likely to continue in decades to come. This phenomenon goes beyond
migration statistics.
• Rural Tourism may be concerned as a local action promoting both the
economic and the social dimension ( i.e local development, cultural,
environmental and political dimension etc) of a rural place
• Rural Tourism may contribute in maintaining the local people in rural places,
as well as in convincing young people, living in cities to come back and work
in rural places.
• It is –therefore- necessary, to redefine “rural tourism” term as a local activity
by both, the political-ideological and the strategic dimension thus meeting
the “market rules”, which paper focuses on: In particular it is necessary to
be proved that “rural tourism” social redefinition must be seen as a typical
win-win-win bargaining problem between “providers” the rural services, the
“consumers” or clients of those services and the community, in which each
part has to win. In this “bargain”, COMMUNITY may be concerned as the
“third” (or invisible) part of an hypothetic three-part negotiation taking part
at any time of the development process. For those social results to be
achieved, it is necessary local cohesion to be based on “information” coming
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from the sensitization process. From the other hand, “sensitization” may be
the result of “knowledge transformation” coming up from the combination of
two types of knowledge, i. e “sympathetic” and “systemic” By its turn, this
combination may lead to a “new” bargaining behavior , thus market rules (i.e
“pure competition” behavior) to be overcome.
• Rural Tourism is referred by both criteria as a “smooth” business activity and
a “smooth” rural places’ policy intervention, in respect with the natural,
cultural, social and political environment : These “Rural Places” (small rural
Communities in Less Developed Countries, far away from the Metropolitan
Centers) define a sub-spatial unity (community, society)
• This paper focuses on those “rural communities” or “rural societies”: These
societies have not any (alternative) opportunity for developing/ and/or
promoting their own resources (human, physical, cultural) waiting for a help/
and or/investments coming from outside. In the opposite, “Rural
Communities” must start the development process “from inside” (endogenous
rural/local development) based on their own human force.
• This may be a difficult objective during the “Globalization Age”. What it is
needed is “people who live in these areas to try alone for developing and
managing their own physical, cultural etc sources in order “rural places” to
gain their own “identity” and competitiveness in the world tourist market. But
how? To answer the question, it is necessary the “Territory-Community” term
to be redefined in terms of those “social” market “sides”, based on local
cohesion, local sensitization and solidarity: The paper highlights those
“hidden” sides of market (globalization), emphasizing the “bargaining
problem” among three “players” i.e the providers tourist services ( local
population of a destination)- letter A, the consumers of these services
(tourists)- letter B, and the Community,- letter C which form a triangle(A-B-
C) of success: Each “player”(A, B, C) may win in this bargain [ win-win-
win], by “reconstructing” his own “winning strategy” and/ or “behavior” in
the bargain, so the “territory-community” term should be redefined Rural
Tourism may be the suitable methodological “tool” letting the “players (A, B,
C) realize this win-win-win transformation.
• A sub-spatial unity (i.e society, community) may be redefined by the
bargaining instant reflections strategies or behaviors, in which this unity
[letter “C”] “participates” as the third or invisible part of negotiations
between two bargainers. This could be done in only one position, (or
equilibrium point), the limit-end of the sensitization process. “Territory-
Community” term should be defined on this limit; and Rural Tourism is the
Methodological Tool for sensitizing local population around a “flag theme”
or a “common theme” at local level, as the scheme”1”, below.
A B
Provider
Rural Tourism Tourists (B)
Rural Tourism as Business
Services (A) (competitiveness)
Rural Tourism as
Methodological Tool
(sensitization-
cohesion solidarity)
C
COMMUNITY
(territory-community
term as the limit of
sensitization process)
same person, especially, “what is the best for me, in relation with the best of the other
AND the best of this sub-spatial unity/ “community” (as the third-invisible part of
the bargain) – “the 3-person information” (or the win-win-win model). Each of the
participants, using the integrated, or 3-person information in the bargain, then, a
new bargaining behavior (the win-win-win behavior) may be created: It seems to be
closer to “pure cooperation”, than competitiveness . The last one may be concerned as
a survival need: “During next decades, climate conditions may be proved to be the
only one “enemy” or competitor against human activities” (U. S Environmental
Committee Report, February 2004).On this limit-point “territory-community” term
redefinition meets fluent situation /evolution in the post-industrial period, as the
outcome of this win-win-win process. The concept, based on the Modern Innovation
Theory, analyses the decision making under the prism of the sensitization process,
developing in the bargain, in order to “produce” social cohesion and solidarity which
are the pillars of the “territory-community” term. “Territory-community” term has
therefore to be redefined, in a “new term” by the limit-end of the integrated
information through the sensitization process, leading to “social behavior”
TABLE 1
Random Sharing between “A” and “B”
Note:
Utility is a personal matter: Utility “units” are not compared. B) Utility “units”
expresse the “fear of disagreement” (no shares for anyone).c) If “A” needs more the
“agreement” than the payoff, then he should be ready to accept any form of
agreement. d) If “A” has decided not to accept the agreement, then he risks more but
–at the same time- wins more from the agreement if it is realized e)The “utility range”
expresses the optimist instant reflection for each part
UTILITY FUNCTION:
Suppose that “winning strategies” [ Pi, Qi] are corresponded 1-1 with the players’
(bargainers’) UTILITY ( linear function: corresponds 1-1 to bargainers’ Utility
Function), under the dogma “the more decisive to break the contract down, the more
satisfied from the bargain leading to the contract
That is true: Bargainers expectations are 1-1 to expected Utilities for each of them,
coming from the bargain. From the other hand, the more information, the more
uncertainty (Ch Nikolaides, 1999) . Bargain gets its own rules out of cooperation
People operate in a competitive base rather, than co-operative: Winning strategies are
led by bargaining rules (pure competition rules). Nash has described the “bargaining
problem” not by expectations, but, directly, by the results (pay-off of the bargain)
In a math form (as below):
9
Pi x Qi→ Ua + Ub = max
If
Ua = x, Ub = (100-x)k
Then
Ua+Ub=max → [ x(100-x)k]΄ = 0
Then
x’ (100-x) + x [ (100-x)k]’ = 0
then
1(100-x) + x k (100-x)k-1 = 0
then
xk (100-x)k-1= - 1(100-x)k
then
x k (100-x)k-1 = - 1 (100-x)k-1 (100-x)1
then
xk = (100-x)1 (100-x)10k-1 : [- 1 (100-x)k-1]
if (100-x) # 0, then
xk = 100-x
xk + x =100
then
x(k+1) = 100
x = 100 /
(k+1)
Cases:
If k=0 , then each of a, b may win the 100% of pay-offs /the other “nothing”=0
If k=1 , then each of them (a and b) my win the 50%
If k>1 then “a” may win a percentage >50%
If k<1, then “b” may win a percentage >50%
In our example, the crucial point [ the max] is 1240 (40x31) : this is the point of
final agreement led in by the bargain. On that point the shares are: 40% for “A” and
60% for “B”. On that point, personal satisfaction or utility units are 40 units for A
and 31 units for B : That’s the point of agreement, expressed “fear of breaking down
the agreement for “player” “A” and risk of breaking down the agreement for the
player B
In an 2-person anticipation, each of two (2) bargainers may ask themselves one
question, as the result of “good strategies” [instant reflection thinking] in the bargain
What should be the best for me, taking into account that the
other person (bargainer in a negotiation) should try for the best
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Scheme 1
A
Β C
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Suppose that the more Information,→ the more uncertainty for the Future → the
more need for cooperation, according to the modeling factor, (APPENDIX) as well
as :
• Pi(&) :Sum of all the “winning strategies”(&)[pick-points] coming from
the choices of the bargainer “A”, based on information given while reaching
the ∞
• Qi(&):Set of all the “winning strategies”(&)[pick-points] coming from the
choices of the bargainer “B”, based on information given while reaching
the ∞
• Ri(&): Set of all the “winning strategies”(&)[pick-points] coming from the
choices of the bargainer “C”, [ the “Community” , concerned as the “third”
or “invisible” partner] based on information given while reaching the ∞
• There is a “link” between “utilities” and “individual winning strategies”
that means , ƒ(u) ⇔ƒ(&), where, “&” is a set of good individual
strategies
Max PQR = max of payoffs PQR
THEN:
limPi(&)Qi(&)Ri(&)=maxPQR
i→∞
(see the schemes (1) and (2) at the end of the paper
• The “new” system (the equilibrium point, according to Nash Theory) could
lead to a pure cooperation situation, between the 2 involved parts in the
bargain (individuals and the “Community” – which could be seen as the
“third-invisible” part in a two-persons bargain) ; this could occur as the
result of an “instant individual reaction” due to given information (transferred
knowledge). From this point of view, I think that my suggestion facilitate
competitors to understand each-other’s situation, thus improving the quality of
the bargain, as a “new social existence” in the globalizing world.
• Otherwise, a 3-person non cooperative bargaining game may form in its limit
pure cooperation conditions between the involved parts, as integrated
information let them create a 3-band codified knowledge, at the same time i.e
• Rural community is the “weak partner” in the bargaining game, in the world
market but this situation should be conversed, in terms of «collective choice».
23 70 24 40 960 7 2 1920
14 80 12 50 600 6 1 600
Note:
1. “C” is the Community , as the “third” invisible part in the bargain- &
2. The less shares for A+B the more share for the “invisible” bargainer “C”
Ua + Ub = Uc = max → x [ (100-x-lx) k ]’ = 0
then
x’ (100-x-lx) + x [(100-x-lx)k]’ = 0
k
then
1(100-x-lx) + xk (100-x-lx)k-1= 0
k
then
xk (100-x-lx) + 1(100-x-lx) k = 0
k-1
then
xk (100-x-lx)k-1 + 1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx) = 0
then
xk (100-x-lx)k-1 = -[1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx)]
if (100-x-lx) # 0, then
xk = -[ (100-x-lx)]
then
xk +x +lx = 100 .... (really ...= -100)
[the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers]
x(k+1+l) = 100
finally
X = 100 /
(k+1+l)
Cases
If k=1 , l=0 then each of the a and c may win the 50% and the bargainer “b” nothing
at all
If k=1 , l=1 then each of the a, b and c “bargainers” may win the 33.33 % (equal
portions) : This is the equilibrium point (equality of shares)
If k>1, l>1 then “a” and “b” may win a percentage >33.33%, but there is a “portion”
for the Community- “C”
(as the third-or “invisible” part of the “bargain between TWO”)
If k<1, l<1 then “c” may win a percentage >50%
At any case, introducing the Community “C” , as the third or “invisible” part in any
bargain between TWO (2), there is the possibility of reforming the world perception:
EXAMPLE
Introducing the “Environmental Protection” (the “C” factor) in any oil dealing procedure between
TWO bargainers (i.e oil producer country and TEXACO Company), -in the form of SENSITIZATION-
Then, the result may be quite different than existing, in terms of human & environmental approach!!
Let’s see “Rural Tourism” as a typical case of the bargain: The sellers (or providers)
rural tourism services – tour operators included- try to offer their services in a higher
price and low cost so to maximize their net profit
In the opposite, the buyers (tourists) of rural tourism services try to enjoy the
maximum quality of those services in the lowest price, so that to maximize their
utility coming from rural tourism, in a low cost. This is a typical case of bargain.
It is not obvious in the most “famous” -and developed- tourist destinations: These
tourist destinations are rather incorporated in wider tourist networks (ie hotel chains
etc). There aren’t opportunities, in these places for developing a “new” pattern or a
“new” identity in the world tourist market. These areas are out of scientific interest.
The paper focuses on Less Developed Countries (L. D. C) and the rural areas, which
have no “tourist identity” even they have tourist sources. These places have survival
problems in the world (tourist) market. They are needed to be helped to overcome
their survival problems, by innovative methodological approaches: Rural Tourism
may be proved to be a “good practice” toward this direction.
Suppose, now, that rural tourism services providers decide to adopt a “new” strategy
in order to attract more tourists in their place: They decide to co-operation instead of
acting alone [first instant reflections in the (rural tourism) bargain] as for example,
creating those well-known “Local Quality Contracts” This decision is respected to
work positive for tourist choices [ second instant reflections in the bargain] as tourists
understand that the “providers decision” should improve the quality of tourism
services offered. So they “accept” to pay a price for these services above the
minimum cost. At the same time, rural tourism providers accept to offer better quality
services to tourists, beyond market rules (cost/benefit analysis).
From the other hand, rural pace’s local authorities “understand the new dynamic” for
the Community by the “new” bargaining behavior. They have to claim a “better
share” for the Community, from both, “providers” and “tourists”, in terms of
economic and social “respect”. (The third instant reflections in the bargain, coming
from the third/ and/ or/ invisible part of rural tourism negotiations).
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Rural Tourism services Providers (letter “A”) as well as tourists (letter “B”)
understand that they have the obligation to satisfy the conditions put by the
Community (Local Authorities- letter “C”) and even to participate in rural place
development process ( the last instant reflection in the bargain) It’s obvious, that:
1. a bilateral pure economic relation is transported in a three-part relation,
included the Community
2. Community (the “C” factor) –as the third or invisible part of rural tourism
negotiation- claims its own share from the bargain between “Providers” and
“Customers” (Tourists) ; and this claim is been accepted by those “real
bargainers” (A + B)
3. The “equilibrium point” –i.e the agreement - may be succeeded in what point
the Rural Tourism Services Providers’ Utility(Ua) AND Tourists’ Utility (Ub)
coming from the services offered AND the Community Utility (Uc) coming
both from quality services offered improvement and satisfied tourists number
increase become MAX [ in math, Ua+Ub+Uc = max], so that each of the
THREE participants to win: This point (the equilibrium point)may be
concerned as the limit-end point of a continuous sensitization process in the
proposed (new) win-win-win methodological bargaining approach (rural
tourism as a local development methodological “tool”.
♦
Case study:ETANAM N-W Greece-Wet land area “Amvrakikos Gulf”
Indeed, since 1992, Amvrakikos Gulf -with a wonderful landscape including both a
wet-land and α mountain area- had a limited tourist activity, due to its isolation, as it
was away from the metropolitan centers. Fishing was the main local population
employment. Age average was 65+ as young people leaved their place, looking for a
better income as well better living conditions in the nearest urban centers.
In 1992 –a year after L. E. A. D. E. R, European Union Initiative (Program)
application in Greece- a Local Action Group named ETANAM (from the initial letters
of Greek works “Etairia ANaptyxis AMvrakikou” / i.e Amvrakikos Development
Company ) in the form of an Anonymous Society (S.A) has been appeared in this
area, by some young educated people, who had come back to their place (In real
terms, ETANAM was there before Leader E.U Program, as a branch of the
Agricultural Bank of Greece, with a limited responsibility in the local development
process)
ETANAM S.A was the result of a continuous sensitization process among local
people : It was an “agreement”/ a compromise between local authorities, rural
cooperatives, tourist accommodations owners’ Association, etc, who decided, to joint
their own forces - instead of acting alone and each-other competitive (win-win
relations between rural tourism providers ) by offering higher quality rural tourism
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♦
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Prof. Papakonstantinidis
May, 2007