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A) INTERPRETATION: RESOLVED
IN THE RESOLUTION IS A REFLEXIVE VERB AND IT MEANS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE RESOLVED TO ESTABLISH A POLICY

MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 1996 [HTTP://DICTIONARY.REFERENCE.COM/SEARCH?Q=RESOLVED] 6. To change or convert by resolution or formal vote; -- used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole. B) VIOLATION: THE PLAN DOESNT FIAT A UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POLICY C) FIAT GOOD: 1. FAIRNESSFIATING
IMMEDIATE PASSAGE OF THE PLAN IS THE ONLY WAY TO GUARANTEE THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTUALLY DOES SOMETHING WHICH IS THE STARTING POINT FOR ALL NEGATIVE GROUND.

OUR DISAD UNIQUENESS AND LINKS AS WELL AS COUNTER-PLANS WHICH AFFECT THE POLITICAL PROCESS. BY THEM.

THIS IS KEY TO ALL THERE ARE ALSO

AN INFINITE NUMBER OF MOVEMENTS AND NO ONE WRITES CARDS ABOUT ACTIVISM AT A DEBATE TOURNAMENT ON THIS ISSUE

AT

A MINIMUM, IT DOUBLE THE GROUND WE HAVE TO RESEARCH BECAUSE NOW WE HAVE TO RESEARCH THE

EFFECTS OF THEIR POLICY AND ITS ADVANTAGES AS WELL AS WHETHER OR NOT THEIR ACTIVISM TO DO THAT POLICY IS GOOD.

2. EDUCATIONFIAT IS KEY TO BEING INFORMED CITIZENS, WITHOUT IT WE NEVER LEARN ABOUT THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND DONT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POSSIBLE BAD OUTCOMES OF OUR ACTIONS. SIMULATING POLICY SOLVES ALL THEIR OFFENSE, ALLOWING PEOPLE A SAFE SPACE TO TEST NEW IDEAS JOYNER, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 377, L/N]
AT

GEORGETOWN, 1999 [CHRISTOPHER C., TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW,

Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to
Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team.

debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States
These national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada

In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the
in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international

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relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain

greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense. 3. EXTRA-TOPICALITYTHE
THE DEBATE. AFFIRMATIVE ADDS NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTION TO THE RESOLUTION FROM WHICH THEY CLAIM ALL THEIR ADVANTAGES, A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF EXTRA-TOPICAL ACTION GIVING THEM A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE IN

EVEN

IF WHAT THEY DO IS PREDICTABLE, ITS INFINITELY REGRESSIVE AND JUSTIFIES OTHER EXTRA-TOPICAL

ACTIONS, AND PREDICTABILITY DOES NOT MAKE IT RIGHT.

THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT VOTING ISSUE.

D) IT A VOTING ISSUE: 1. SEVERING THEIR FRAMEWORK IS ILLEGIT, IT CREATES A MOVING TARGET AND FURTHER SKEWS OUR STRATEGY BY MAKING US DEBATE MULTIPLE WORLDS AND THEY GET TO SPEAK LAST SO WE WOULD NEVER WIN. 2. KEY TO OBJECTIVITYTHEIR FRAMEWORK DEMANDS A JUDGE INTERVENING WITH HER OR HIS PERSONAL POLITICS WHICH REFLECTS EVERYONES BIAS, MEANING DEBATE IS POINTLESS BECAUSE THE JUDGE WOULD ALREADY HAVE THEIR MINDS MADE UP. THE POINT OF FIAT IS TO SUSPEND OUR BIASES SO WE CAN THINK ABOUT AND DEBATE OTHER WORLDS 3. FAIRNESS, EDUCATION, AND JURISDICTION

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POLICY
DEBATERS BECOME POLICY MAKERSAND, EVEN IF WE DONT JOIN CONGRESS, SIMULATING POLICY ALLOWS US TO CHECK GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND PROMOTES PEACE

RAWLS, PROFESSOR EMERITUS AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 1999 [JOHN, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, P. 54-57] Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized , or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reason for pursuing or revising a people's foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance, Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples. THEIR
INTERPRETATION DESTROYS EDUCATION: IT LEADS TO USELESS PREACHING THAT PREVENTS A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE.

SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE IS EDUCATIONAL BECAUSE IT REJECTS THEIR APPROACH

JOYNER, PROF. OF INTL LAW AT GEORGETOWN, 1999 [CHRISTOPHER , 5 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 377, L/N]
For many international law courses taught from a political science perspective, the most sustained and most rewarding learning experience can

Teaching international law is not supposed to be a platform for the professor to pontificate or proselytize. Rather, it furnishes an opportunity for a community of persons to learn together, in effect, to use the classroom experience for shaping and testing new ideas after being exposed or basic
come from a collaborative process. philosophical concepts and general principles of international law. For collaborative learning experiences to be especially meaningful for political science students, it is essential that they reflect exposure to

hypothetical cases, if used as learning devices, should be constructed in such a manner that mirrors as truly as practicable real world events and real world circumstances. International law must function in a real world political environment, and simulation exercises should
various legal problems, hopefully set out in authentic setting with real world analogies. This means that reflect that fact.

to assign a series of topics for team debates before the classroom. This compels students on each debate side to conduct legal research on the merits of a particular issue, formulate proposed rationales for its lawfulness, follow the debate, and take questions from class members on the legal implications and merits of their respective positions. It combines individual responsibility with the necessity of collaborative intra-group learning.
One successful collaborative learning experience is Confronting international law in practice is critical to achievement of the course objectives, and this is effectively done through a series of debates in a course that I teach on International law and United States Foreign Policy. Students try to WIN the games by garnering support from the rest of the class based on the merits and suasion of their legal arguments, although past experience indicates that clear winners are not often produced. The degree of success this exercise enjoys depends on two key factors: first, the willingness of students to assume their adopted roles with energy and, second, the extent to which student participants in the debates can learn and relate how, where, and why international law is [*385] integrated into the United States foreign policy decision-making process and can demonstrate the tensions between national security

these two ingredients can produce a successful and unique learning experience that fosters a deeper understanding of the subject matter than would likely be attained through a lecture-format course.
considerations and international legal constraints in formulating United States foreign policy. Taken in tandem,

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TURN: NEUTRALITY PREVENTS DOMINATION. WE CAN DEBATE ISSUES THAT WE DONT FORUM, PROVIDING A SAFE SPACE WITH WHICH TO EXPERIMENT WITH DIFFERENT IDEAS
NECESSARILY BELIEVE IN THIS

MUIR, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS AT GEORGE MASON, 1993 [PHILOSOPHY & RHETORIC, V.26, N.4] The role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance
without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of

debaters are indeed exposed to a multivalued world both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions. <288>
tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes,

FRAMEWORK

COMES FIRSTRATIFYING A COMMON STARTING POINT FOR DEBATE IS THE ONLY WAY FOR ANY PRODUCTIVE

DISCUSSION TO OCCUR

SHIVELY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR PARTISAN POLITICS, P. 181-2]

OF

POLITICAL SCIENACE, TEXAS A&M, 2000 [RUTH LESSL, POLITICAL THEORY

AND

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" tothey

must reject and limitsome ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the
basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contestthat consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfectif there is nothing at all left to question or

We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications , and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain
contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument

There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target
ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no

contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in
one knows that it is a policy. In other words, must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words,

contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

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1. WE MEET: WE ENDORSE GOVERNMENT ACTION 2. COUNTER-INTERPRETATION: RESOLVED COMES BEFORE THE COLON WEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 1996, EVIDENCE GENDER PARAPHRASED [HTTP://DICTIONARY.REFERENCE.COM/SEARCH?Q=RESOLVED] To determine or decide in purpose; to make ready in mind; to fix; to settle; as, he [or she] was resolved by an unexpected event, 3. MIDDLE
TOPICAL GROUNDWE MUST DEFEND HOW

WE

GET POLICIES PAST, AS WELL AS THEIR OUTCOMETHE PLAN IS

100%

4. NET-BENEFITS A) SPECTATORSHIPTHEIR MODEL OF DEBATE IS OUTDATED AND PRIVILEGES ELITES BRUNS, 2008, MEDIA & COMMUNICATION, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES FACULTY, QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY [AXEL, LIFE BEYOND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: TOWARDS A NETWORKED MODEL FOR POLITICAL DELIBERATION, INFORMATION POLITY 13 (2008), P. 67-68] Many other Western nations are experiencing a similar decline of the mass-mediated public sphere as an accurate representation of public opinion, and a conduit for connecting state and society: in such countries, too, a variety of factors ranging from the
faltering revenue of print newspapers, increasing concentration in ownership, cuts in staff numbers and the subsequent amalgamation of newsrooms with commercial sections in the organisation,

This is further exacerbated by overt political pressure by proprietors and politicians, as well as journalistic self-censorship in anticipation of such pressure, as they have been evident for example in the systemic failure of mainstream journalism in many nations to question the reasons for the invasion of Iraq (see e.g. [4]), and to provide independent coverage of its aftermath. (Veteran New York Times journalist John F. Burns openly admitted that we
have led to a marked and continuing decline in journalistic standards for some time now (see e.g. [13,15]). failed the American public by being insufficiently critical about elements of the administrations plan to go to war, for example; see e.g. [25]) Such developments remain somewhat less pronounced in a number of European countries where journalism has traditionally operated in the presence of a strong public service broadcasting ethos, but (as the Hutton enquiry into the BBC has shown) even here, persistent political interference has increasingly served to undermine citizens trust in the independence of the mediated public sphere (see e.g. [18]). As a result, many such nations have seen the emergence of a debate about the reinvention of representative democracy for an age in which the cultural norms of deference, distance and distrust are in decline, as Coleman notes. The extent to which that decline is reversible depends to a considerable extent upon the capacity of e-democracy to nourish a more inclusive, connected, and collaborative democratic sphere with e-democracy therefore understood here in its widest possible sense, not simply as a shift to providing e-government services [11, p.137].

It is no accident that this challenge to the continued existence of the public sphere as an independent, intermediary system between state and society has emerged precisely at a time that the fundamental framework for mass-mediated communication itself is tested and undermined by the arrival of networked, many-to-many media as an alternative to the traditional mass
media model of the industrial age. The state public spheresociety model maps immediately on the producerdistributorconsumer model of the industrial economy, best formulated in the

in keeping with the dominant media structures of the industrial age, none of these models provide for strong mechanisms allowing feedback from the consumers or end users in the chain back to its starting points communication remains largely unidirectional except for an occasional, limited opportunity for consumers and citizens to express their preferences through their purchasing (or voting) decisions. Conventional political systems of the mass media age, then, by necessity embrace a model in which mediated political communication is carried on by an elite [17, p. 416] on the virtual stage provided by journalism, acted out in front of an audience of largely passive spectators whose own views are represented on the virtual stage only to the extent that journalists make the effort to seek them out . Traditionally, the privilege of forming part of the Fourth Estate (especially where it is coupled with access to scarce public resources, such as the broadcast spectra of radio and television) has compelled and obliged journalists to act in the citizenrys best interests by seeking out public opinion as noted earlier , recent experience suggests, however, that for a variety of commercial, institutional, and ideological reasons such efforts to fairly and comprehensively represent society on the virtual stage are in
context of political mass media perhaps as politicians journalists citizens;

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decline. Instead, mass media journalism in many Western nations now forms an increasingly closed system an echo chamber for the views of politicians, journalists, and pundits that operates at a growing distance from public opinion itself, or which at best carefully orchestrates the presentation of citizen views in radio call-in shows and televised town hall meetings to support conventional journalistic cliches of public opinion (in the Australian context, see e.g. [22,36]). The public, meanwhile, are rapidly developing their own, alternative media citizen journalism sites, news blogs, and other spaces for user-led content creation (see [6,7]) within which they conduct engaged and lively political discussion and deliberation away from the perceived spin of journalisms punditariat.
1. Beyond the public sphere In such spaces, the formation of public opinion(s) continues even in spite of the casual collapse of industrial journalism; as the role of the traditional, society-wide public sphere in enabling

a wide variety of new, conceptually localised public spheres has thus emerged, focussing on specific topics which are of interest to their particular constituencies of users and participants. Such issue publics no longer rely on the presence of specific entities in the journalism industry to provide their information, but are engaged in a communal process of gatewatching in which bloggers and citizen journalists identify and link to or directly cite relevant materials as they become available (see [6]). Through such processes, content is reappropriated and reinserted into the public debate beyond the conventional spaces of the virtual, mass media stage; discussion and deliberation are no longer staged by proxies acting in front of a relatively passive audience, but now directly involve citizens as active participants. In such environments, in other words, the virtual stage is altered and even dissolved, and citizens themselves become actors in the play of political engagement; rather than merely watching the struggle between a small number of political positions (in common journalistic practice represented often by no more than the two standard views espoused by the left and right of party politics), they now directly contribute their own opinions and ideas to the debate, alongside politicians, journalists, and pundits, leading to the emergence of a vastly more multiperspectival debate.
citizens to form their views declines,

B) BUREAUCRACYROLEPLAYING AUTHORIZES SADISTIC VIOLENCE, MASKING DOMINATION IN NEUTRALITY REED ET AL, DIRECTOR OF COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP STUDIES, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, 2005 [PROFESSOR GEORGE E., GUY B. ADAMS, PROFESSOR, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, DANNY L. BALFOUR, PROFESSOR, PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT ADMINISTRATION, GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY, PUTTING CRUELTY FIRST: ABU GHRAIB, ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL AND MORAL INVERSION, PAPER PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION TO ETHICS AND INTEGRITY OF GOVERNANCE: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE, LEUVEN, BELGIUM, JUNE 2-5, 2005 HTTP://SOC.KULEUVEN.BE/IO/ETHICS/PAPER/PAPER %20WS5_PDF/GUY%20ADAMS.PDF, 24-28]
Total guard aggression increased daily, even after prisoners had ceased any resistance and deterioration was visible. Prisoner rights were redefined as privileges, to be earned by obedient behavior. The experiment was planned for two weeks, but was terminated after six days. Five prisoners were released because of extreme emotional depression, crying, rage and/or acute anxiety. Guards forced the prisoners to chant filthy songs, to defecate in buckets that were not emptied, and to clean toilets with their bare hands. They acted as if the prisoners were less than human and

At the end of only six days we had to close down our mock prison because what we saw was frightening. It was no longer apparent to us or most of the subjects where they ended and their roles began. The majority had indeed become "prisoners or "guards," no longer able to clearly differentiate between role-playing and self. There were dramatic changes in virtually every aspect of their behavior, thinking and feeling. In less that a week, the experience of imprisonment undid (temporarily) a lifetime of learning; human values were suspended, self-concepts were challenged, and the ugliest, most base, pathological side of human nature surfaced. We were horrified because we saw some boys ("guards") treat other boys as if they were despicable animals, taking pleasure in cruelty, while other boys ("prisoners") became servile, dehumanized robots who thought only of escape, of their own individual survival, and of their mounting hatred of the guards. This experiment suggests that group and organizational roles and social structures play a far more powerful part in everyday human behavior than most of us would consider. And we can see clearly how individual morality and ethics can be swallowed and effectively erased by social roles and structures . One is rarely confronted with a clear, up-or-down decision on an ethical issue; rather, a series of small, usually
so did the prisoners (Haney, Banks and Zimbardo, 1973, p.94):

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ambiguous choices are made, and the weight of commitments and of habit drives out morality. One does not have to be morally degenerate to become caught in a web of wrongdoing that may even cross the line into evil. The skids are further greased if the situation is defined or presented as technical, or calling for expert judgment, or is legitimated, either tacitly or explicitly, by organizational authority, as we shall see below. It becomes an even easier choice if the immoral behavior has itself been masked, redefined through a moral inversion as the "good" or "right" thing to do. Administrative Evil and Dehumanization The Stanford prison experiment provides a fairly powerful explanation for at least some of what happened at Abu Ghraib. But it also does not fully fit the specifics of the situation. Unlike the Stanford experiments, the
guards did not act in an isolated and controlled environment, but were part of a larger organizational structure and political environment. They interacted regularly with all sorts of personnel, both directly and indirectly involved with the prisoners. They were in a remarkably chaotic environment, were by and large poorly prepared and trained for their roles, and were faced with both enormous danger and ambiguity. However, like the Stanford Prison Experiment, tacit permission was available to those who chose to accept it. In his ground-breaking book, The Destruction of

a consensus for and the practice of mass murder coalesced among German bureaucrats in a manner that (Hilberg, 1985, p.55), was not so much a product of laws and commands as it was a matter of spirit, of shared
the European Jews, Raul Hilberg observed that comprehension, of consonance and synchronization. In another study of mid-level bureaucrats and the Holocaust, Christopher Browning describes this process in some detail as he also found that direct orders were not needed for key functionaries to understand the direction that policy was to take (Browning, 1992, pp. 141-142): Instead, new signals and directions were given at the center, and with a ripple effect, these new signals set in motions waves that radiated outward with the situations they found themselves in and the contacts they made, these three bureaucrats could not help but feel the ripples and be affected by the changing atmosphere and course of events. These were not stupid or inept people; they could read the signals, perceive what was expected of them, and adjust their behavior accordingly It was their receptivity to such signals, and the speed with which they aligned themselves to the new policy, that allowed the Final

based more on a common understanding than upon direct orders, it should not be difficult to imagine how abuse of detainees in Iraq and elsewhere occurred, with otherwise unacceptable behaviors substituting for ambiguous, standard operating procedures. While the Nazi Holocaust was far, far worse than anything that has happened during the American occupation of Iraq, it has been amply demonstrated that Americans are not immune to the types of social and organizational conditions that make it possible and seemingly permissible to violate the boundaries
Solution to emerge with so little internal friction and so little formal coordination If something as horrific and systematic as the Holocaust could be perpetrated of morality and human decency, in at least some cases, without believing that they were doing anything wrong. It would be nave to assume that the few bad apples acted alone, and that others in the system did not share and support the abuses as they went about their routines and did their jobs. Before and surrounding overt acts of evil, there are many more and much less obviously evil administrative activities that lead to and support the worst forms of human behavior. Moreover, without these instances of masked evil, the more overt and unmasked acts are less likely to occur (Staub, 1992, pp. 20-21). The apparent willingness and comfort level with taking photos and to be photographed while abusing prisoners seems to reflect the normalcy of the acts within the context of at least the night shift on Tiers 1A and 1B at Abu Ghraib (and is hauntingly similar to photos of atrocities sent home by SS personnel in World War II). In the camps and prisons run by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, orders and professional standards forbidding the abuse of prisoners and defining the boundaries of acceptable behavior for prison guards could be found in at least some locations posted on some walls, but were widely ignored by the perpetrators. Instead, we find a high stress situation, in which the expectation was to It would be nave to assume that the few bad apples acted alone, and that others in the system did not share and support the abuses as they went about their routines and did their jobs. Before and surrounding overt acts of evil, there are many more and much less obviously evil administrative activities that lead to and support the worst forms of human behavior. Moreover, without these instances of masked evil, the more overt and unmasked acts are less likely to occur (Staub, 1992, pp. 20-21). The apparent willingness and comfort level with taking photos and to be photographed while abusing prisoners seems to reflect the normalcy of the acts within the context of at least the night shift on Tiers 1A and 1B at Abu Ghraib (and is hauntingly similar to photos of atrocities sent home by SS personnel in World War II). In the camps and prisons run by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, orders and professional standards forbidding the abuse of prisoners and defining the boundaries of acceptable behavior for prison guards could be found in at least some locations posted on some walls, but were widely ignored by the perpetrators. Instead, we find a high stress situation, in which the expectation was to extract usable intelligence from detainees in order to help their comrades suppress a growing insurgency, find weapons of mass destruction, and prevent acts of terrorism. In this context, the power of group dynamics, social structures, and organizational ambiguities is readily seen. The normal inhibitions that might have prevented those who perpetrated the abuses from doing these evil deeds may have been further weakened by the shared belief that the prisoners were somehow less than human, and that getting information out of them was more important than protecting their rights and dignity as human beings. For example, in an interview with the BBC on June 15, 2004, Brig. General Janis Karpinski stated that she was told by General Geoffrey Miller later placed in charge of Iraqi prisons and former commander at Guantanamo Bay that the Iraqi prisoners, are like dogs and if you allow them to believe at any point that they are more than a dog then youve lost control of them. Just as anti-Semitism was central to the attitudes of those who implemented the policy of mass murder in the Holocaust,

at Abu Ghraib may have been facilitated by an atmosphere that dehumanized the detainees. In effect, these detainees, with their ambiguous legal status, could be seen as a surplus population, living outside the protections of civilized society (Rubenstein, 1983). And when organizational dynamics combine with a tendency to dehumanize and/or demonize a vulnerable group, the stage is set for the mask of administrative evil.
the abuses

C) EDUCATIONCITIZEN ENGAGEMENT IS KEY TO EFFECTIVE POLITICAL CHANGECROSS-APPLY SOLVENCY 4. THEIR INTERPRETATION IS WORSE: A) RESOLUTION CHECKS LIMITS: PROVIDES BUILT IN A GROUND B) PREDICTABILITY IS A PRACTICE: CRITICAL AFFS HAVE EXISTED FOR DECADES, IGNORANCE IS A CHOICE C) NO GROUND LOSSWE WONT SPIKE ARGUMENTS, RUN YOUR DISADS, WELL DEFEND PLAN PASSAGE 5. FIAT
IS AN EXTRA-TOPICAL CONSTRUCTNO RESOLUTIONAL MANDATE, AT BEST IT MEANS FRAMEWORK IS NOT A

VOTING ISSUE