[G.R. No. 105582. July 19, 2000.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROLANDO CARDEL y DIZON, and ARNOLD CALUMPANG y VALERIO, accused-appellants. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. It appears that Cardel was never arrested in connection with the killing of Noel Rioflorido, Jr. He voluntarily surrendered to the Paso de Blas Police Station in Valenzuela, Metro Manila on the same day the stabbing incident happened on August 12, 1991.

(People v. Abueg, 145 SCRA 622, 634 [1986]) This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act. G.R. No. 114971. November 19, 1996.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDDIE ISLETA, accused-appellant. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim. [G.R. No. 134362. February 27, 2002.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMELITO SITCHON y TAYAG, accused-appellant. The Court, however, discerns no intention on the part of appellant to commit so grave a wrong against his victim. Appellant's intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill him. When appellant realized the horrible consequences of his felonious act,

he immediately brought the victim to the hospital. (P. vs. Ural) Sadly, his efforts were for naught. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, these elements must be established: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. It is sufficient that the surrender by "spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him.

[G.R. No. 164763. February 12, 2008.] ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. THE

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contains three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three difference penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty, the following rules, according to whether there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances: TCHcAE xxx xxx xxx

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances. (Underscoring supplied) Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, the prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, to be imposed in any of its periods. The new penalty has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 91 the maximum term could be ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision

mayor maximum, while the minimum term is again one degree lower 92 and could be four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum.

However, the CA correctly took into consideration the postmortem findings of the NBI medico-legal expert and his testimony that even with immediate and adequate medical attendance, the victim would not have survived due to the extensive nature of the hemorrhage suffered by the victim. The brute force employed by the petitioner contradicts the claim that he had no intention to kill the victim. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim.( People v. Isleta, 332 Phil. 410, 427-428 (1996). See People v. Francisco, 388 Phil. 94, 126 (2000); People v. Gonzales, Jr., 411 Phil. 893, 925 (2001).

[G.R. No. 155094. January 30, 2007.] MANUEL O. ORIENTE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. Thus, the CA is partly correct in modifying the penalty imposed by the RTC. The RTC imposed an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, while the CA adjusted the sentence upwards since no mitigating circumstances attended the crime, and imposed an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person found guilty of homicide shall be punished by reclusion temporal, i.e., twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower, which is prision mayor, i.e., anywhere between six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. The CA appropriately exercised its discretion when it imposed six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum term.

However, the CA erred in imposing twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. In the computation of the maximum term, the law prescribes that the attending circumstances should be considered. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the penalty that should be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law, 29 that is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.

Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 years of age.- When the offender is a minor under eighteen years of age and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period (Partly repealed by Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) [G.R. No. 149538. July 26, 2004.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, HENRY CHUA, appellant. vs. VINCENT

MINORITY; A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT WARRANTS THE REDUCTION OF THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY BY ONE OR TWO DEGREES. While under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, minority is a mitigating circumstance, this provision must be construed in relation to Article 68 thereof, which provides that minority is a privileged mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of the imposable penalty by one or two degrees, depending upon the age of the accused. The minority of the accused is not merely a generic mitigating

circumstance but is a privileged mitigating circumstance. Furthermore, in determining the penalty to be meted on the accused, the trial court must first consider any modifying circumstance attendant to the crime.

HOMICIDE G.R. No. 103613. February 23, 2001.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ELADIO C. TANGAN, respondents. [G.R. No. 105830. February 23, 2001.] ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Tangan should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, if the prescribed penalty is composed of three periods, and there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the medium period shall be applied. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which, in view of the attendant circumstances, may be properly imposed, which in this case is reclusion temporal medium with an imprisonment range of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be the next lower degree which is prision mayor with a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Hence, petitioner Tangan is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.