Kuroda v. Jalandoni G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949 MORAN, C.J.: I. THE FACTS Co Kim Chan vs.

Valdez Tan Keh 75 PHIL 131 FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law. ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US Forces. HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good. All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign. Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and continue the proceedings. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque G.R. No. 173034; October 9, 2007 FACTS: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should

Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war. Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines. II. THE ISSUES Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional? III. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.] YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution. xxx xxx xxx Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional; Held: YES under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature Issue: Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with intl agreements MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR. Held: Sub-issue: Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS. No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary intl law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an intl rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by

most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of intl law. Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 FACTS: Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Respondent Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. ISSUE: Whether an international invalidated by our courts. agreement may be

HELD: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the affirmative by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order, or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act. A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws. Ichong vs. Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957 En Banc, Labrador (J), 8 concur FACTS: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." The main provisions of the Act, among others, are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among

others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and (2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business. Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; and (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him. ISSUES: (1) Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist; (2) Whether the law was enacted in interest of national economic survival and security; (3) Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws and the due process of law?; (4) Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?; (5) Whether there was a defect in the title of the law; (6) Whether there was a violation of international treaties and obligations. HELD: The Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected. Lastly, it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. Hence, the petition was denied, with costs against petitioner. HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted. RATIO: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency. While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State. The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency. In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985 Facts: Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils. Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar. Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the phils., for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils. Alih vs. Castro 151 SCRA 279; June 23, 1987 This case was in explaining Sec 3 of Art 2 of the 1987 Constitution regarding the supremacy of the civilians. Facts: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection.

Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated. The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor. Issue: Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them. Held: The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. The items seized, having been the fruits of the poisonous tree were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis). However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against selfincrimination, the court held that the prohibition against selfincrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000 -overturning 322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000) On January 13, 1977 P.D. 1069 was issued prescribing the Procedure of the Extradition of Persons who have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country. The Decree is founded on The Doctrine of Incorporation under the Constitution Art II, Sec 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. On November 13, 1994 Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of U.S.A. It was ratified by the Senate. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of U. S. a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States who are charged in the U.S. with the violation of the following: conspiracy, attempt to evade tax, false statement or entry, election contributions in the name of another. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jimenez, through a counsel, on July 1,1999, requested copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall received copies of the requested papers. Mark Jimenez

insisted the constitutional rights particularly the following:1. the right to be furnished the request and supporting papers;2. the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence is support of the opposition; The Depart of Justice Denied the request. On Aug 6, 1999 Mark Jimenez filed with the R.T.C against the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI for Mandamus (to compel them to furnish to Mark Jimenez the extradition documents.), Certiorari (to set aside the Sec. of Justice letter dated July 13, 1999), Prohibition (to restrain the Sec of Justice from considering the extradition request) By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of the US extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied that request. ISSUE: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? HELD: Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be provisionally arrested pending the submission of the request. Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable. Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right to procedural due process must override treaty obligations. When there is a conflict between international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail. Philip Morris, Inc v. Court of Appeals Held: the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of the international law over the national law in the municipal sphere. Clearly therefore, extradition treaty asdomestic law cannot be superior to the Constitution. In interpreting provisions of a treaty one cannot depart from the constraints and limitations of the Constitutionby saying, like in the case of extradition, that extradition rules are sui generis. Finally, the government should always bear in mind that the cherished libertiesguaranteed by the Constitution are non-negotiable rights. In the words of Justice Isagani Cruz, while authority and liberty must co-exist, the highest function of authority is to exalt liberty. In light of the recent Olalia case, this writer respectfully posits that the original ruling laid down in Lantion should be reinstated for beingin consonance with the libertarian principle of justice.

People v Lagman, et. Al 66 Phil. 13 Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information. The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and oneday of imprisonment, with the costs. In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused weresentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Held: Avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not allowed in the Philippines because of Section 4, Article IIThe state is the protector of the people and it is the prime duty of the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment of this duty, the State may call all citizens to render military or civil service. The Court held that The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.

Chavez vs. Romulo G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004 A mere license is always revocable FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property. Pursuant to PGMAs speech stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places, PNP Chief Ebdane issued the Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence. It revoked all existing Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), subject to renewal. Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. His request was denied. Thus, he went to court to challenge the constitutionality of the guidelines. ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right HELD: Petitioner cannot find Constitutional provision. solace to the above-quoted

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. xxx In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.

Lim vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002Facts: FACTS: Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the Balikatan is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDTs objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm. On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory. Issue: Whether Balikatan 02-1 activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement? Ruling: Petition is dismissed. To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .activities arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nations marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that .Balikatan 02-1, a mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise, falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. ALMEDA VS. HONORABLE COURTOF APPEALS and GONZALES G.R. No. L-43800 July 29, 1977 FACTS: Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, Susana,Maria, Sebastian, Rufina, Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all surnamed Angeles, on their 46,529-square land situated in Tanauan, Batangas, and devoted to sugar cane and coconuts.September 30, 1968 - the landowners sold the property to petitioners-spouses Leonila Laurel Almeda and Venancio Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. Thedocument of sale was registered with theRegister of Deeds of Tanauan, BatangasMarch 27, 1969 - The document of sale was registered with the R egister of Deeds of Tanauan,BatangasMarch 27, 1971 Respondent-tenant seeks the redemption of the land in a complaint filed,pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, with the Court of Agrarian Relations at Lipa City.May 29, 1973 At the hearing, the parties waived their right to present evidence and, instead,agreed to file simultaneous memoranda upon which the decision of the court would be based.October 10, 1973 the Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent-tenant,Eulogio Gonzales, to redeem the tenanted land for P24,000.00, the said amount to be depositedby him with the Clerk of Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision January 30, 1976 - the Appellate Court, however, affirmed the decision of the Agrarian Court.Denied of their motions for reconsideration, petitioners- spouses instituted the present petitionfor review. ISSUES: 1. Is there a tenant's right of redemption in sugar and coconut lands2. Is prior tender or judicial consignation of the redemption price a condition precedent for the valid exercise of the right of redemption3. Does the Court of Agrarian Relations have jurisdiction over complaints for redemption of sugar and coconut land. RULING We find the appeal to be impressed with merits. 1. Prior to the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code R. A 3844), no right of preference in the sale of the land under cultivation was enjoyed by the tenant-farmer.2. Nevertheless, while the Code secures to the tenant-farmer this right of redemption, inparticular, the exercise thereof must be in accordance with law in order to be valid. "Thetimely exercise of the right of legal redemption," said the Court inBasbas v. Entena."requires either tender of the price or valid consignation thereof."3.Reliance cannot be placed upon the case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo as excuse for thefailure to make the requisite tender or consignation in court,because the Court did not rule therein that prior tender or judicial consignation of the redemption price is notrequired for the valid exercise of the right of redemption.4. As a consequence, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over suits for redemption, like the present case, of sugar and coconut lands. Section 154 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended, states: "The Court of Agrarian Relations shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over (1) all cases or actions involving matters, controversies, disputes, or money claims arising fro magrarian relations..."

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed andset aside. Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is hereby held not to have validly exercised his right of redemption over his tenanted agricultural land. Estrella OndoY vsVirgilio Ignacio Art II Sec 10 of the Constitution of the Philippines : The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. Facts: Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. Therefore, Estrella was asking for compensation from the death of her son while in the respondents employ. However, the statement given by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and therefore dismissed the claim for lack of merit. Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was also denied by the Secretary of Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is social justice applicable in this case? Ruling: Yes. Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It merely disregarded the statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court recognized the right of the petitioner to the claim of compensation because her son was shown to have died while in the actual performance of his work. To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, The Court quoted another case as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the stricter compliance. Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil 726 Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people. The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the

Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice. Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." Salonga vs. Farrales 105 SCRA 459 Section 10, Article II states that The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. Facts: 1. 2. Farrales was the titled owner of a parcel of residential land that was leased. Prior to the acquisition by Farrales of the aforesaid land, Salonga was already a lessee of some portion of the land. She had built a house and paid rentals thereon. Sometime prior to November 1968, Farrales filed an ejectment case (one of the old forms of action for recovery of the possession of real property) for non-

3.

payment of rentals against Salonga. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Farrales and ordered Salonga and the other lessees (Pascual et al.) to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears, attorneys fees and costs. 4. Even before the rendition of the decision of the lower court, Farrales sold to Pascual et al. (the other lessees of Farrales) the areas occupied by them. Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales the portion of land that Salonga was leasing. Farrales persistently refused the offer and insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case. Hence if Salongas offer to purchase was persistently refused by Farrales, it is obvious that no meeting of the minds took place and no contract was ever perfected between them. It was revealed that Farrales wanted the payment of the portion of land under consideration to be in cash but Salonga did not have any money for that purpose that is why Farrales persistently refused to sell the portion of the leased land to the lessee.

5.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of Salonga on the ground that no legal contract exists between Farrales and Salonga. Held: Contracts are only enforceable from the moment of perfection. In the case at bar, Farrales rejected and did not accept the offer of Salonga to buy the land in question. There being no consent there is, therefore, no contract to sell to speak of. In the case of the other lessees (Pascual et al.) who were able to buy the portion of land that they occupy, there was an existing contract between them and Farrales, unlike Salonga who does not have the right to buy the land in question because the contract between her and Farrales is non-existent. Section 10, Article II states that The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. The aforementioned provision is applicable to the case at bar. The social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who are also entitled for protection under our Constitution. The social justice consecrated in our Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. The plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts. Supreme Courts Decision: The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit and the judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.

On May 25, 1920, Robert T. Meyer, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School, a one-room schoolhouse in Hampton, Nebraska, taught the subject of reading in the German language to 10-year-old Raymond Parpart, a fourth-grader, the Hamilton County Attorney entered the classroom and discovered Parpart reading from the Bible in German. He charged Meyer with violating the Siman Act.[3] Meyer was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton county, Nebraska, and fined $25. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his conviction by a vote of 4 to 2. The majority thought the law a proper response to "the baneful effects" of allowing immigrants to educate their children in their mother tongue, with results "inimical to our own safety." The dissent called the Siman Act the work of "crowd psychology."[3] Meyer appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. His lead attorney was Arthur Mullen, an Irish Catholic and a prominent Democrat, who had earlier failed in his attempt to obtain an injunction against enforcement of the Siman Act from the Nebraska State Supreme Court. Oral arguments expressed conflicting interpretations of the World War I experience. Mullen attributed the law to "hatred, national bigotry and racial prejudice engendered by the World War." Opposing counsel countered that "it is the ambition of the State to have its entire population 100 per cent. American."[4] Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state. The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful. Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate. Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary restraining order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send their children to public school. Appellants appealed the order. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parents or guardians right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. States may not usurp this right when the questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest. Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.

Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923) Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislation that restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state objective. Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control? Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state. The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children. Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are educated MELCHORA CABANAS vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL (58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974) Facts: Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughters minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy. Issue: Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased Ruling: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendantappellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger

case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00." PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997 FACTS: This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T. Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that she was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work. Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action. Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed from work. ISSUES: Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatory Whether or not Graces act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed HELD: There was discrimination Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by

that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRCs decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work. Grace attained regular status as an employee Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. There was illegal dismissal As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. On Stipulation against Marriage In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&Ts policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. Petition dismissed.

concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. The right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is fundamental, constitutionalised, self-executing and judicially enforceable. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their generation and for succeeding generations as the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. Significance of the case This case has been widely-cited in jurisprudence worldwide, particularly in cases relating to forest/timber licensing. However, the approach of the Philippino Supreme Court to economic, social and cultural rights has proved somewhat inconsistent, with some judgments resulting in the enforcement of such rights (e.g., Del Rosario v Bangzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989); Manila Prince Hotel v Government Service Insurance System, G. R. No. 122156 (3 February, 1997) but at least one instance in which the Court made a statement that economic, social and cultural rights are not real rights (see, Brigido Simon v Commission on Human Rights, G. R. No. 100150, 5 January 1994). Timber License Agreements C&M Timber Corp. v. Angel C. Alcala et. al G.R. No. 111088 June 13, 1997 FACTS: TLA No. 106 was issued to petitioner C&M in 1972. In 1983, TLA No. 106 was cancelled because of a presidential directive imposing a log ban. In 1984, TLA 360 covering the same area was issued to FLDC. In 1986, TLA No. 360 was cancelled because of violation by FLDC of its terms. Upon learning of this cancellation, Petitioner sought the revalidation of TLA No. 106. Secretary Factoran Jr. ruled that TLA No. 106 was of no force and effect. HELD: There is no merit in petitioners contention that the cancellation of the TLA impaired contractual obligations. A TLA is a mere privilege granted by the State and does not vest in the grantee a permanent or irrevocable right to the concession area. TLAs are not contracts and may therefore be amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require.

Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R. No. 101083) Nature of the case Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of timber licence agreements which allegedly infringed the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16); non-impairment of contracts; Environmental law; judicial review and the political question doctrine; inter-generational responsibility; Remedial law: cause of action and standing; Directive principles; Negative obligation on State Summary An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing timber license agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they represented others of their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter: [it]

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