Alvarez v. Ramirez October 14, 2005, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Facts: Husband Maximo Alvarez went to sister-in-laws house and set the place on fire knowing that there were people inside (including his wife Esperanza). Esperanza testified against her husband but Alvarez petitioned to disqualify such testimony on the ground of marital disqualification. The RTC issued an order to disqualify the wifes testimony. Sister-in-law (Susan Ramirez) filed in the CA an application for preliminary injunction and TRO. CA nullified RTCs orders thereby anticipating husbands current appeal. Issue: WON the wifes testimony can be used against her husband. Held/Ratio: Yes. The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions for both civil and criminal actions. If marital relations are so strained that harmony and tranquility are disturbed, the identity of interests of both parties disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. In Ordono v. Daquigan, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute Obviously the offense of arson impairs the conjugal relation. It should be stressed that prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between the petitioner and his was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Evidence thus reveals that the preservation of such a marriage is no longer an interest that the State aims to protect. It was the latter himself who gave rise to the necessity. People v. Francisco.

Martinez vs Martinez Martinez vs Martinez GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005 FACTS: Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile. ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code. HELD: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed. Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.

Articles 150 and 151 Members of Family/Earnest Efforts to compromise HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006 FIRST DIVISION Facts: On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.4 On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed Orders denying the Motion to Dismiss. In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should be dismissed. Issue: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit. Held: The Court is not persuaded. Article 151 of the Family Code provides that No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the same family as respondent, may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code. Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Article 155 Family Home PERLA G. PATRICIO vs MARCELINO G. DARIO III G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006 FIRST DIVISION Facts: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or less. On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on August 11, 2003, hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19, 2005. , the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. Issue: Whether or not the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home Held: The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Petition GRANTED.

PATRICIO vs DARIO III DARIO IIIs mother and brother wanted to partition the house left by his father. DARIO III is saying that the subject property is a family home since a minor beneficiary is still living inside the house, DARIO IIIs 12 yr old son. - FC states that if there are beneficiaries who still survive and living in the family home, it will continue to be as such for 10 more years. ISSUE: Is DARIO IIIs son still considered as a beneficiary? HELD: NO. - Three requisites must be satisfied for a person to be considered as a beneficiary. o They must fall under the relationship contemplated in ART 154 FC. o They live in the family home. o They are dependent for legal support from the head of the family. - The 12 yr old grandchild does fall under the categories of the beneficiary under 154 FC. (Descendants includes grandchildren and great grandchildren) - The 12 yr old grandchild does live in the house. - BUT as for the third requisite, the grandchild does not satisfy because he cannot demand support from his paternal grandparents since HE HAS PARENTS capable of supporting him.

Article 155 Family Home SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006 FIRST DIVISION Facts: This case has its genesis from a loan transaction entered into by private respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh and a certain Dolores Ledesma, wherein the former granted a P1,000,000.00 loan to the latter. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a check for the same amount dated 10 February 1993 and promised to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-51142. The execution of the deed of real estate mortgage did not materialize, but Ledesma delivered the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT No. RT-51142 to private respondent. Thereafter, Ledesma sold the said house and lot to petitioners for P2,500,000.00. Petitioners paid LedesmaP1,000,000.00 as downpayment, with the remaining balance of P1,500,000.00 to be paid in monthly installments of P75,000.002 starting 15 March 1993. In keeping with the foregoing agreement, private respondent granted Ledesma an additional loan of P450,000.00. When private respondent presented Ledesma's check for payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was already closed. Subsequently, when private respondent presented for payment the check issued by petitioners, the said check was likewise dishonored because there was a stop payment order. With the dishonor of the checks and with Asiatrust's refusal to release the P2,000,000.00 loan of petitioners, private respondent came away empty-handed as she did not receive payment for the P1,500,000.00 loan she granted to Ledesma that was assumed by petitioners. As a result, private respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust before the RTC, Branch 217, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-16003. On 3 April 2000, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court, the latter granted the same in an Order dated 14 April 2000.

Issues: Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from execution. Held: The trial court criticized petitioner's claim that the subject property was their family home. The court opined that the claim was never substantiated by petitioners aside from the fact that they asserted this defense only after two years since the auction sale has transpired. It added that if not for the private respondent's Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola filed on 5 August 2002, petitioners would not have raised the issue of family home before the said court. Article 153 of the Family Code provides:The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Petition DENIED. Judgment of the Court of Appeals, for lack of merit, AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

VERSOLA vs CA Dolores Ledesma secured a P1m loan from Dra Oh. Ledesma sold the house and lot to petitioners Eduardo and Elsa Versola for 2.5m with a downpayment of 1m. Ledesma asked for the rest of the payment. Petitioners were only able to give 50k. Petitioners secured a loan from Asiatrust Bank to pay for their remaining balance. Bank settled an agreement between parties that Dr. Oh will give another 450k to Ledesma making her debt 1.45m. Spouses should execute a mortgage to secure a loan of 2m. When Asiatrust tried to register the mortgage of the spouses, it discovered a notice of levy of execution on the title in connection with another of Ledesmas to Miladays Jewels, Inc. Asiatrust refused to grant 2m loan to the spouses. Dra Oh filed case against Asiatrust, petitioners, and Ledesma. RTC favoured Dra Oh and sheriff auctioned the said house. The petitioners objected to this auction saying that the house is their family home and should not be subject to execution.

HELD: The house is not exempted from execution. - It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. The claim must be proved to the Sheriff. - The records in the case do not disclose that petitioners proved that the property to be sold was FH. They simply alleged it, and presupposed that the sheriff already knew of such. - They rigorously asserted such exemption only 2 years after the date of the auction sale. - Their assertion for exemption, therefore, is a mere afterthought, a sheer artifice to deprive private respondent of the fruits of the verdict of her case.

Arriola v. Arriola, 542 SCRA 666 (2008)

Petitioner: Vilma G. Arriola, Anthony Ronald Arriola Respondent: John Nabor Arriola FACTS: Family Love: Fidel Arriola Victoria Calabia (first wife) = John Fidel Arriola Vilma G. Arriola (second wife) = Anthony When Fidel Arriola died, he left a parcel of land. RTC ordered the partition thereof among Vilma, Anthony, and John, in equal shares of 1/3 each. The said parties failed to agree on how to partition the land, thus, respondent John sought its sale through a public auction. Petitioners, Vilma and Anthony, opposed to include the house standing on the subject land. ISSUE: W/N the public auction should include the subject house. HELD: NO. Examining the NATURE of the subject house: Petitioners claim that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Art. 153, FC: The Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence xxx [it] is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Art. 159, FC: The Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses xxx for a period of 10 years xxx. Thus, the Family Home consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of the parties, herein. Fidel Arriola died on March 10, 2003. Thus for 10 years from said date (until March 10, 2013), or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, MUCH LESS when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.

ARRIOLA vs ARRIOLA - Fidel had two wives and had a child from both marriages. - Fidel died and left a parcel of land. - The 2nd wife, the son from the first M, and the son from the 2nd M did not agree on how to partition the land left by Fidel. - The son from the first M then sought to sell the land through public auction. - The 2nd W and son from 2nd M are challenging the validity of the sale, saying that a house (which is constituted as a family home) is erected on the land. ISSUE: WoN the auction should include the house erected. HELD: NO - The family home is deemed to have been constituted by the time the family sets in the house and continues to be so 10 years after the death of the head of the family or until a beneficiary who is a minor is still residing in the famly home. - In this case, Fidel died March 10, 2003, the house cannot be auctioned up until March 10 2013. - The house cannot be auctioned moreover if they cannot give compelling reasons for the court to think otherwise and ISSUE a partition of the property.

Manacop vs CA Manacop vs. CA GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992 FACTS: Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment. ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment. HELD: The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment. The petition was dismissed by SC.