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International Journal of Project Management 30 (2012) 117 126 www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

The role of inertia in explanations of project performance: A framework and evidence from project-based organizations
Audley Genus , Pushkar Jha
Newcastle University Business School, UK Received 8 February 2010; received in revised form 26 November 2010; accepted 7 December 2010

Abstract The paper argues that inertia governs the search for explanations of project performance in ways that potentially could impair the quality of feedback obtained about past performance, and thus jeopardise ongoing strategy-making. Based on a critique of relevant literature, the paper presents a novel three-stage framework for analysing connections among inertia and the search for explanations of performance in project-based organizations. This framework helps to show the significance of inertia for the adoption of alternative routes for such search. The framework is illustrated using case study vignettes. These are based on in-depth interviews with senior project management practitioners at two global organizations, about the explanation of project performance (i.e. the attainment or failure to achieve related objectives). Conjectures based on the framework and the vignettes are presented to stimulate further research on how organizations search for explanations of project performance, and on the implications of inertia for organizational and project level learning and strategy. 2010 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Ascription; Causality; Inertia; Learning; Project performance; Strategy

1. Introduction Inertia is defined as a continued commitment to questionable strategy (Schwenk and Tang, 1989). It manifests at individual, team, project and organizational levels. Inertia accumulates over time as a cognitive and behavioural orientation, and confines explanations of performance so that these compromise the quality of strategic decision making (Bielby, 2000). It is a function of rigidities that limit the search for possible explanations of performance, where performance refers to the attainment or failure to achieve strategic, project or operational objectives and goals (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Managing inertia successfully is a hallmark of ambidextrous organizations that do well at balancing continuity and change (Duncan, 1976; Miller and Chen, 1994; Tushman and O'Reilly,
Corresponding author. Newcastle University Business School, Room 23, 2nd floor, Armstrong Building, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK. Tel.: +44 191 222 5179. E-mail address: audley.genus@ncl.ac.uk (A. Genus).

1996; Genus, 2004). Arguably, these organizations counter rigidities effectively by creating an exploratory space conducive to searching in a more open-minded way for explanations of performance. How this occurs is a key theme of this paper. Further, the paper is concerned to examine how inertia governs the search for explanations of performance in ways that impair the quality of feedback obtained and jeopardise ongoing strategy making. The examples chosen to illustrate this phenomenon are ones featuring organizations which focus on projects as vehicles for realising business or corporate strategy. Projects are widely considered to moderate inertial tendencies (e.g. Lindkvist, 2008). However learning relevant to strategy is often impaired by rigidities about how to understand and explain project performance. A convergent organizational- or project-level mindset is typical of a lack of variety, which over time constrains exploration of different routes that could help explain project performance to the benefit of wider strategy (Miller, 1994). Past studies have looked at project failures and successes to identify explanatory factors. Such studies investigate the nature of organizational mindsets in relation to the exploration of

0263-7863/$36.00 - see front matter 2010 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002

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different ways in which to understand performance (e.g. Shore, 2008; Nguyen et al., 2004). However, none of these studies discuss the more fundamental question of why organizations are unable to search more deeply or extensively to explain and, by extension, to learn more effectively from past project performance. This paper is oriented towards the strategic management implications of projects (i.e. with the organization as the unit of analysis) rather than more narrowly to project management (where projects per se are the unit of analysis). It focuses on project performance by positing that there are different search routes that are taken to explore and to explain project performance. It presents a framework that can help practitioners to moderate myopic convergence towards particular search routes. Further, the framework contributes to a theoretical understanding of the implications of inertia for making sense of strategy and project performance. The paper has the following structure. First, the next section presents a review and critique of relevant literature, linking the effects of inertia with the construction, interpretation and rationalization of project performance. This underpins the novel three-stage framework outlined in the third section, which may facilitate analysis of connections among inertia and the search for explanations of project performance. The fourth section presents two case study vignettes concerning project performance in project-based organizations to illustrate this framework and the different search routes taken to explain such performance. The fifth and concluding section highlights implications of the paper for research and practice in the much-debated area of how to enable strategic learning about past organizational success or failure, particularly from projects. It focuses on the search process that underpins the acquisition of feedback necessary to facilitate such learning and the nature of blockages to more open-minded explanation of performance. 2. Inertia and the explanation of past performance What makes inertia of interest to researchers, students and practitioners of management? Well, one response from the mainstream strategy literature is that organizations operating in dynamic environments need to be adaptable if they are to remain competitive. On this view, successful firms will have been able to maintain a strategic fit through adaptive change. Easterby-Smith (1997) identifies several perspectives of learning from experience that can orient the search for explanations of resulting performance. In addition, managerial commitment and self-justification (Lant and Hurley, 1999) may lead to persistence with a certain strategy despite inferior performance. Furthermore, some elements tend to be ingrained as central to the functioning of businesses, for instance, best practices for project management, or even product attributes. This directs efforts at learning from past performance towards honing these aspects, whilst their centrality to business functioning is rarely put under the microscope. The point of departure for this paper is Kaplan and Norton's observation that underperformance of organizations' strategic and operational plans is caused by the breakdown of a firm's management system. They suggest a closed loop management

system to avoid such difficulty, Stage 4 of which is a tightening of the link between strategy and operations connected with the need for managers to monitor and learn from internal results and external datato see if the strategy is succeeding (Kaplan and Norton, 2008, p. 65). This manner of breakdown is explored below by invoking concepts related to inertia, and highlighting connections among inertia, strategy and operations, assessments of internal and external environments, past performance and required future actions. The role of inertia in the search for explanations of past performance is connected with characteristics of the top management team and strategic decision-making processes; initial and prevailing product-market strategy and performance; resource dependencies and ways in which managers enact and configure their environment (Bobocel and Meyer, 1994). Previous work also refers to the importance of causality for search (e.g. Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). Characteristics of the top management team have been associated with the phenomenon of creeping rationality (e.g. Frederickson and Iaquinto, 1989). Here, planning and information systems become increasingly specialized as the firm evolves and grows. Such continuity belies a stability that serves to shield the executive team from critical sources of information (in both senses of the word critical), making them rather insensitive to the need for change (Keck and Tushman, 1993). Another explanation of the phenomenon is in the idea of defensive avoidance (Janis and Mann, 1977). This includes a tendency to pass the buck rather than take responsibility for finding solutions to organizational difficulties, as well as continuing with failing strategy (bolstering) and procrastination (Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002). A number of studies have investigated connections between past and current strategy, organizational performance and inertia (e.g. Miller and Chen, 1994; c.f. Boeker, 1989). Past research has also examined how project organizations are affected by inertial processes (Keegan and Turner, 2001). Such manifestations of inertia are characterized by ill attention to intelligence gathering and processing, and failure to recognize or to adapt strategies to changed competitive conditions, for example (Miller, 1994). Contributions in the literature have drawn attention to, and are indeed distinguished between, knowledge inertia, learning inertia and experience inertia (Liao et al., 2008), to highlight the tendency to employ prior knowledge and experience to solve current problems, or to be unable or willing to learn new approaches (Staw and Ross, 1987). The resource dependency theory, as conceived by contributors such as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), asserts that most organizations need to develop stable links with others in order to provide the resources required to realize production of goods and services. Inertia in this context is the build up of routines around prevailing legacy arrangements (Nelson and Winter, 1982). It also directs attention to ways in which organizations search (or not) for improvements that may be made to inter- and intra-organizational repertoires of knowledge and experience, to attain a better alignment with the market environment or project requirements (Cyert and March, 1992; Holmqvist, 2009; Sauser, et al., 2008).

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One other branch of literature of relevance to the work of this paper is that connected to cognitive inertia. The notion of sensemaking developed by Karl Weick (1979, 1995), refers to a process that includes the construction and bracketing of cues that are interpreted, as well as the revision of those interpretations based on action and its consequences (Weick, 1995, p. 8). Sensemaking includes but is not limited to interpretation (Porac et al, 1989). Its significance for inertia lies in its attention to the processes by which managers enact or socially construct their environment and share interpretations of environmental cues and implications for performance and actions required.

2.1. Causality Interpretations of organizational-level performance have been researched previously with reference to the concept of causality. One of two dimensions of causality is complexity; the other is ascription. The complexity dimension refers to the multiplicity of factors to which performance may be attributed. Prior research suggests that given its greater comprehensiveness high complexity is better for informing change than low complexity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). While heterogeneity of causal factors provides a rich pool of interlinked causes with which to inform explanations of performance, the complex inter-linkages sometimes make it difficult to make sense of the reasons underlying performance. On the other hand, low complexity or homogeneity of factors provides an apparently more straightforward basis for the diagnosis of causality. However, from a learning perspective this does not necessarily mean that homogeneity of causal factors makes for simpler or more effective diagnosis of causality than heterogeneity (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). The assertion of effectiveness is open to challenge when the risk to managers is less contingent on finding the right reasons with which to explain performance and more contingent on being able to assign acceptable reasons quickly. The second dimension of causality connected with explaining performance is ascription, wherein external or internal factors are considered to have affected performance. Ascription has been examined in the context of downturns in organizational performance and strategic events in organizational life (e.g. Hedberg et al, 1976; Goncalo, 2003). It is contingent on perceptions about control, legitimacy concerns, and the nature of performance all closely associated with institutional and business characteristics (Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Bobbitt and Ford, 1980). The importance of causality is magnified in the case of project organizations. This is because resources compete for alternative projects within the organization, putting managerial performance under close scrutiny, for example in relation to the managers' ability to meet often ambitious targets and expectations associated with the unique and transient ventures that projects are (Cheng et al., 2005; Olsson, 2006). Recent work on multi-project organization(s) suggests that resource allocation issues should be seen as an expression of deeper problems connected with the management of a portfolio of inter-dependent projects, relations among different tiers of

managers, or dysfunction management control systems (Engwall and Jerbrant, 2003). Counteracting inertia requires institutionalization of a cognitive infrastructure (Lindkvist, 2008) that, in treating projects and project organization(s) as opportunities for experiment, could create new mindsets, for example with regard to the explanation of performance, or to new rules of the game for managing projects. How this may be achieved and the problems involved in doing so are just two examples of the type of work proposed by those who wish to broaden the scope of research on projects. Such literature suggests to take into the analysis wider organizational and managerial factors, and to engage with mainstream management research to move beyond a narrowoften technicalfocus on the individual project (Dahlgren and Soderlund, 2010; Soderlund, 2004a,b). 3. Research framework: the search process The literature discussed above may be synthesized to connect inertia with explanations of project performance in organizations, understood as the overall extent to which projects in an organization's portfolio meet their stipulated objectives. In so doing, it provides the foundations for the analytic framework proposed here. The framework comprises three elements: risks associated with the search for explanations of performance; scoping of search; and ascription for project performance. Fig. 1 shows this as a three-stage search framework that delineates eight possible routes, which might be employed to seek explanations of performance. Whether organizations stick to one route for searching, or explore more than one possible route is indicative of the strength or weakness of inertia on influencing search. The first stage of this framework relates to the nature of risks associated with search. This entails a trade-off between search for the right reasons to control for the risk of downturn in project performance, and the risk that is associated with not being able to assign an acceptable reason to project

Fig. 1. Search routes for explaining project performance.

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performance. This acceptability refers to what is conventionally associated with performance on the type of projects that an organization undertakes, is convincing or recognizable cognitively, or works best to allay legitimacy issues. The next stage concerns the scoping of the search process. This could be very narrow, limiting search to a few factors that are routinely associated with project performance. In other cases, an organization could break free from this ingrained behaviour of looking for the usual suspects to examine a broader spectrum of potential reasons to explain project performance. The final stage is that of ascription. This could be either internal or

external to the organization. In the case of the former, organizations search for factors inside the organization to explain project performance, and for the latter, they look at external factors to rationalize project performance. The extent to which the orientation of the search is influenced by inertia is indicated by the extent to which organizations confine themselves to a search trajectory across the three stages, or alternatively, explore more than one route to seek explanations of project performance. Fig. 1 presents such potential search routes. This is complemented by Table 1, which describes these search routes in the context of different organizational

Table 1 Conjectures about potential routes for explanations of project performance. (References to search routes are based on those identified in Fig. 1). Route 1: RR-LS-IA There is a perception of high risk in not finding the right reasons for project performance. These reasons are perceived to be located in a narrow set of possibilities that point to internal, and by extension, relatively more controllable factors. Typically, such organizations have considerable experience in doing long term projects, and believe that they can pin down reasons underlying project performance based on their traditional understanding of what is crucial for such performance. This sense of control makes internal ascription a more favoured approach. There is a perception of high risk in not finding the right reasons for project performance. These reasons are perceived to be located in a narrow set of possibilities that are external to the organization, and hence are not as controllable as internal factors. Organizations following this search route are likely to have an emphasis on short term projects for external clients. Given that securing successive assignments with the same client and with others in the industry is contingent on prompt rationalizations about project performance, managers tend to assign reasons to external factors in the event of poor project performance. Alternatively, in the case of superior project performance, the organization is likely to share credit with the client for relationship building reasons. There is a perception of high risk in not finding the right reasons for project performance. This sees the organization engage in an exploratory search inside the organization. This is somewhat typical of organizations that are engaged in critical internal change projects like ERP implementation or post merger integration. Such projects are unique not only by the standard definition of a project, but also because they are fine grained in the unique settings of change that the organization is experiencing. Internal ascription is thus usually a favoured route for weeding out issues in designing and executing change, and for acceptability of change. There is a perception of high risk in not finding the right reasons for project performance. Such organizations are typically involved in projects where external factors are important. One example is a product launch in an overseas market. Arguably, the high investment in such a project and its high visibility within a firm's portfolio of projects may make it important to search for scapegoats, or alternatively, stars inside the organization. However, more often than not, the existence of significant external contingencies will focus attention on the unknowns that affect performance. In such cases external ascription is a natural consequence of the combination of organizational and project characteristics. There is a perception of high risk about not being able to assign an acceptable reason to performance. This can be due to legitimacy issues as it is for many organizations in the public sector. The scope of search is limited due to a need to establish clear accountability. This is most likely to be the chosen search route in the case of highly politicised organizations in the public sector, and where project performance has traditionally been sub-optimal. A scapegoating phenomenon may also take hold because when resourcing of failed projects needs to be accounted for, factions in the organization tend to use this need for accountability to justify their actions. Limited search and internal ascription constitute the search process under such a scenario. There is a perception of high risk about not being able to assign an acceptable reason for project performance usually due to legitimacy issues. The search for explanations of project performance in this case is limited to a few factors external to the organization. More often than not such factors would have helped to explain performance in the past, and thus appear to be convincing. The case is typical of an organization with a mutual protection environment a close knit project organization. Organizations in the public and not for profit sector that use public money to resource projects are likely to be favourably disposed towards this route. However, other public sector organizations may not typically fall in this category given their tendency to be highly politicised, in which case internal ascription is favoured. There is a perception of high risk about not being able to assign an acceptable reason for project performance. This leads to an exploration of potential internal reasons, or those within the control of a focal organization. This route could be manifested in nascent organizations where roles and responsibilities across hierarchical levels are not clearly delineated. In these organizations structures and systems are in a state of flux, and project leadership and organizational leadership roles are also not well delineated. Assigning reasons to internal factors is crucial for confidence in, and development of, nascent systems and processes. This disposition may also be found in more mature organizations, for instance if middle-level project managers have relatively low control over how projects are managed, whilst also being held accountable for project performance. A perspective of what can we do to improve future performance is likely to appeal to top management. This could also be leveraged by project practitioners to pitch for increasing the commitment of organizational resources for projects in case of superior project performance. There is a perception of high risk about not being able to assign an acceptable reason for project performance. This results in scoping the search as widely as possible, but at the same time, externally to the organization. This is typical of organizations that engage in prestige projects. Being able to justify performance and adopting an exploratory search approach are both necessary given that such projects are under close public scrutiny. However, the search is likely to point to reasons beyond the control of the organization. This is because in such cases it becomes crucial for organizational reputation that downturns in performance be explained by events and situations outside of their control. Furthermore, such projects are usually delivered by more than one organization i.e. a consortium or alliance, and in case of successful delivery, external ascription allows sharing of credit for superior performance. In essence, external ascription is usually customised in relation to how it is defined to suit project failure and project success respectively. In the case of the former, ascription points to factors that are external not only to the organization but also to the consortium/alliance. In the case of the latter, it works to allow sharing of credit as mutual back slapping by partners.

Route 2: RR-LS-EA

Route 3: RR-ES-IA

Route 4: RR-ES-EA

Route 5: RA-LS-IA

Route 6: RA-LS-EA

Route 7: RA-ES-IA

Route 8: RA-ES-EA

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characteristics. These assertions in Table 1 are conjectures that provide the conceptual moorings of the framework by highlighting structural and contextual rigidities having the potential to orient search towards one route rather than to others. The paper now presents two case study vignettes to illustrate search routes for explaining project performance in two projectbased organizations. The first case study illustrates how inertia may confine such search to a single route. The second case study concerns a more ambidextrous organization, which moderates the influence of inertia and is able to pursue multiple search routes, seeking non-routine explanations of project performance. 4. Development of project-based vignettes Organizations vary in how they choose to support and control strategically significant projects. This denotes the project orientation of organizations, and is a function of both the business area and type of projects in which organizations are involved (Lampel and Jha, 2004a). The management of major projects is also shaped by more subtle issues to do with experience of such ventures. The two case study vignettes are related to how two global organizations seek explanations of project performance. These vignettes have been constructed from in-depth interviews with senior project managers at the two firms conducted as part of an Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) research project Project Based Learning in Organizations, involving the participation of a total of seven organizations. The aim of this research project was to examine organizational approaches to modifying the way that projects are managed based on what they learned from past projects. Table 1 is informed by the interviews and discussions with senior project managers at these seven firms at four workshops, held in 20022003. 5. Case study vignettes 5.1. Justifying performance: the business of poverty alleviation To maintain anonymity the focal organization central to the first case study is labelled Rapid. This organization has classified its area of business as poverty alleviation. Project narratives at this organization are an interesting expression of how feedback about project performance translates into rich yet often ignored narratives of performance. The need to account for public funding received by Rapid is a concern, and traditionally the business of poverty alleviation has been a tough domain in which to operate. A frequently cited reason for this, in policy and sector circles, is the influence of an immense range of cultural and social factors impinging on various activities. The challenge for Rapid to structure projects to suit conditions across diverse regions is considerable; equally pressing however is the need to satisfy policy makers and justify public spending to ensure continued funding in this not-for-profit sector. Ascription is often directed at governments, local authorities and community leaders particularly when performance is poor. Furthermore, whilst in the business of poverty alleviation performance is less than that aimed for, there is a need to share credit with others even when

performance exceeds targets, due to the political benefits such ascription brings. Rapid has an ambitious organizational goal to alleviate poverty by 2050. There, narratives emerge at the project implementation level about what did not go well? There is also a belief on the part of those who have had field level implementation experience that exploration of alternatives to the existing way in which things are done happens in discussions in the back of Land Rovers and stays there (i.e. remains at field level). Because of this, explanations of project performance at field level fail to influence wider project and organizational strategy. In addition, there is at Rapid a tendency towards external ascription since this mode of rationalization deflects attention from the failings of senior management. This tendency also has the effect of maintaining the credibility of senior management, which is crucial for retaining public funding. As mentioned above, the explanation of project performance at Rapid tends towards external ascription. The scope of search is narrow and is informed by experience of how well justifications for spending public money appear to have worked before. This may be in terms of the acceptability of explanations within the organization and their external legitimacy vis-a-vis public funders. Conventional explanations, such as lack of community involvement, poor support from local authorities, and so on, tend to dominate. Such rationalizations are reinforced by the relatively favourable image of Rapid's management they convey rather than being based on relevant and available internal information for more critical feedback. Thus the need to look for the right reasons underlying project performance to inform design and delivery of future projects tends to be frustrated. This is largely due to perceived risks in questioning the fundamental assumptions underpinning the existing project strategy. The value of and merit in those discussions that happen in the back of Land Rovers are thus ignored, save for the making of tactical adjustments. Within Rapid the perception seems to be that any kind of critique of fundamentals is likely to conflict with the dominant organizational sense of what is good for credibility and associated funds flow necessary for the organization's continued functioning. In case of a few outlier successes the need to highlight the contribution of stakeholders external to Rapid dominates. The figure that follows summarizes the search routes adopted to explain project performance at Rapid (Fig. 2). The mental models of project practitioners at the implementation level and those at higher levels of strategy making remain inconsistent at Rapid. The former seeks to improve project performance and provide feedback that could help project strategy. However, the latter appears to have one dominating premise, that of continuity (aside from minor tactical adjustments). Here change in project strategy is likely to upset the resource cart (i.e. public funding), and has consequences for how the capability of strategy makers is viewed. 5.2. Integration of project practices as post-merger activity The second case study vignette is grounded in observations made during post-merger integration of project management practices in an organization labeled here as Pharmaplus a

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Fig. 2. Explaining project performance at Rapid.

pseudonym for a large global pharmaceutical company. An aim of the merger was to create an enriched, integrated and widely applied set of project practices and position it as an agreed, common, consistent way of working (Lampel and Jha, 2004b). The project was initiated by constituting a top management team comprising of members from both of the pre-existing legacy systems. This team was called the Reds to indicate the significance of the change project and was constituted primarily for the purpose of countering biases in the top management team about how projects were done in the past. The task was to select and distil from available legacy and industry practices. This was based on this team's understanding of the link between practices and project performance, and the need to find the right reasons for project performance that could be associated with erstwhile legacy practices. Given the platform to create a new, refined set of practices, there was also an opportunity to explore beyond the scope of the two legacy systems, and so examine projects in the industry that were marked as pathbreaking success stories. Another dimension of this project management standards integration project was the diffusion of such best practices. The study found that more experienced senior managers (not all of these were part of the Reds team) were more resistant to the adoption of new practices than middle

level managers, being influenced by biases and preferences from experience. Workshops for interaction and experience sharing were conducted at Pharmaplus, partly because practitioners were coming from two different legacy systems neither of which concurred completely with the new set of project practices. Aligning the designers' mental models with the users' mental models was a felt need of the integration process. Despite constituting a team specifically for the purpose, top management's sensitivity to strategic redirection and biases from project experiences were inevitable influences on the integration measures. The study of Pharmaplus reveals a negotiated compliance model (Lampel and Jha, 2004b). A key factor shaping this negotiation is the need to allow for an iterative implementation-feedback process, as different project sites implement elements from within the generic standards at an incremental rate over time. This is contingent on feedback about how conducive the proposed practices to the requirement of projects are, and how much change can be absorbed at the field level without compromising project performance. Such iterative feedback and the incremental nature of the process moderate risks associated with change. As mentioned, the scoping of search is based largely on erstwhile legacy practices. It is partly focused on examining the association of practices in use with performance, and at the same time, it is exploratory by looking at practices from the wider pool that the two legacy systems offer. As captured in a comment from a senior project manager at Pharmaplus: we do not believe in best practices but in good practicesyou never know what other people [meaning improved practices] may get to the table (Lampel and Jha, 2004b). Hence, the mandate and opportunity to create or adopt new project practices allows for some exploration outside the ambit of the two legacies i.e. for drawing from industry wide practices. Finally, ascription is both internal and external helped by the negotiated compliance approach, and the range of sources from which the practices were derived. This not only encourages seeking good practices from outside the legacy systems, and evaluates the in use configuration of practices, but also motivates project practitioners to engage in iterative feedback about project performance. Such feedback is crucial for consistency in mental models across the project organization. The figure that follows summarizes the search routes for explaining project performance at Pharmaplus (Fig. 3). 6. Discussion It is suggested here that a high level of complexity concerning factors affecting performance is associated with projects at Rapid. In addition, the need to legitimize public spending has situated sense making about project performance in what can be termed as a defensive avoidance mode (Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002). Examining and presenting performance differently is seen as high risk and especially so if ascription is not externalized. In a scenario where performance has traditionally been sub-optimal, this is likely to be

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Fig. 3. Explaining project performance at Pharmaplus.

detrimental to the credibility accorded to the strategy making capabilities of senior management at Rapid. This approach embeds a narrow view or a creeping rationality perspective of how performance should be examined a simplicity trap of sorts referring to inflexibility in the way an organization seeks explanations of project performance (Frederickson and Iaquinto, 1989; Miller and Chen, 1994). In contrast, Pharmaplus seeks the right reasons for project performance explicitly connected to future performance, since subsequent projects would deploy the reshaped and integrated project management standards. This in turn leads to a detailed and focused exploration of erstwhile legacy and industry practices, and their association with performance. Similarly, the negotiated compliance model at Pharmaplus entails shared ascription, drawing on practices that are brought in from outside, erstwhile legacies, and linkages between the strategic apex that guides distillation of the wider body of knowledge on practice and middle level managers that organize iterative feedback about project performance and their link with project practices (Fig. 3).

Getting different managerial levels and legacy groups to subscribe to the new set of project practices, and the need for understanding the extent of applicability of the new practices, are central to the post-merger integration project at Pharmaplus. The role of the strategic apex in facilitating such contextual ambidexterity (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994) through the negotiated compliance model is visible at Pharmaplus (Lampel and Jha, 2004b). The use of different management levels in dual structures, i.e. in iterative feedback based design and shaping of practices, and in deployment of new project practices, also indicates structural ambidexterity (Duncan, 1976; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) in sharp contrast to the case of Rapid. Deliberate efforts to guide a shared dominant logic at Pharmaplus differentiate it from Rapid (c.f. Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Lampel and Shamsie, 2000). Pharmaplus pursues multiple routes to inform the search for explanations of project performance. This occurs on the basis of the need to avoid risks associated with not finding the right reasons e.g. the likelihood of generating an inferior pool of project practices compared

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with what can be acquired from both internal and external sources (Route 1 to Route 4 of Fig. 1). In contrast, legitimacy concerns lead the sense making that conditions search at Rapid. Here, defensive avoidance to protect the status-quo, reputation, and to sustain funding levels narrows focus to just one route (Route 6 of Fig. 1). In the case of Rapid the opportunity to incorporate field level insights to improve project strategy could have allowed for both options to be invoked inducing a search for right reasons, while keeping a tab on explanations that also satisfy legitimacy concerns. However, an overt perception of high risk, and reluctance to break the mould of how explanations of project performance are sought and presented, appear to prevent this. Some caveats need to be made about comparing the two vignettes. For instance, the need to implement a merger successfully was a rather important factor in setting the scene at Pharmaplus, with the need for strategic redirection being a crucial catalyst. On the other hand, the prevalence of suboptimal project performance in Rapid, together with its dependence on public funding seem to feed the perception that change in project strategy is risky arguably a self-created paradox stemming from divergent notions about the nature of project performance itself. Thus the discussion has presented two very different settings in which the two case study organizations seek explanations of project performance. This, in conjunction with recognition of the organization-specific nuances presented in the vignettes, needs to shape the authors reflections on the analytic framework at the core of the paper, and on the state and future of research in the fields reviewed. 7. Conclusions Performance is probably the most popular dependent variable in management and contemporary strategy research. The construction of performance determinants and their effects is flawed, however, in that it omits analysis of structures, experience, beliefs and perceptions (March and Sutton, 1977) which condition definitions, assessments and explanations of performance. In examining the role of inertia in shaping the search for explanations of project performance, the paper has provided a framework for understanding what might be called the architecture of search employed in organizations to explain project performance. This framework goes some way to address the aforementioned flaws, based on a critical reading of relevant literature on ecological, organizational process, and cognition research. This points to the influence of inertia not due to management's lack of capacity to evaluate performance, but to the tendency to underrate the potential value of searching beyond routine explanations of performance (c.f. Kaplan and Norton, 2008). This myopic orientation also stems from an interpretative bias which rationalizes performance comfortably and/or safely, in a manner that does not serve well the strategic remit of performance explanations (Fromm, 1995; Keck and Tushman, 1993; Menzies, 1975). The paper presented two case study vignettes to illustrate the aforementioned framework of potential search routes for

explanations of project performance. In addition, reflection on the case studies allowed the paper to provide conjectures regarding the favoured search routes of organizations in different contexts (Table 1). These conjectures could inform future research aiming to understand the implications of inertia for explanation of project performance and thence to strategy making. Analysis of the architecture of search entails identification of predispositions, which culminate in adherence to one search route rather than the others defined in Fig. 1. Such analysis could provide valuable leads for improving organizational strategy making informed by this insight about potentially inertial tendencies implicated in cognitive infrastructures, for example (Lindkvist, 2008). It could help strategists reflect on potential connections between inertia and impairments to the search for and reception of relevant feedback about project performance. It is also important as it deals with the impact of inertia in performance of projects, the reason being that projects are typically oriented to counter rigidities that constrain organizational foresight about how resource configurations and processes can be improved to meet changing environments. It is useful to note that in contrast with Rapid, the context of change at Pharmaplus offers an opportunity to explore factors underpinning project performance beyond the constraints of such rigidities (Burnes, 2004). To the extent that the organization is able to do so, it will moderate the tendency to focus on bad operations at the expense of good strategy. Arguably, a more effective and efficient disposition may favour refining, narrowing and fine-tuning the search process for faster, acceptable and more stable outputs representing the reasons underlying project performance. However, such an approach may fall prey to the simplicity trap the nemesis of specialized and narrow business rationalities (Miller and Chen, 1994). Different organizational, project, and contextual business environment-related factors tend to predispose an organization towards one of the routes that comprise the framework presented in Fig. 1 and explicated in Table 1. However, if an organization can coherently pursue more than one route at one or more stages of the framework, this could loosen constraints on the search for explanations of project performance, thus opening up a process by which strategy making is otherwise unduly influenced by inertial tendencies. With regard to the specification of future research agenda the paper agrees with contributions suggesting the need to further investigate how organizations might encourage systematic learning and reflection about underlying assumptions affecting inferences and cause and effect explanations of (project) performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 2000). It also concurs with the view that greater attention needs to be paid to nonfinancial factors and wider organizational and managerial factors affecting the conduct and explanation of project performance (Kaplan and Norton, 2007). Such work may be informed better by correspondence with research lying beyond the conventional boundaries of project management research and extension of the project management research agenda (Dahlgren and Soderlund, 2010; Soderlund, 2004a,b). Finally, it is important to recognize and to examine the paradoxical nature

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of projects as instruments for enabling organizational change. As the case study of Rapid presented above attests such efforts do not occur in a vacuum and are partly structured by prevailing practice and characterized by heterogeneity regarding the nature and purpose of projects and the firm, and concerning the explanation of project performance. This paradox, which may affect interpretation of the success of projects as change and whether and how they should be modified, presents a promising avenue for future research. Acknowledgements This paper draws on workshop discussions and in-depth interviews with senior project practitioners in two global organizations. They were undertaken as part of an EPSRCfunded project: Project based Organizational Learning (PROBOL 2003, project reference number GR/R12473/02). The authors wish to thank the participants for their contribution to the study and the EPSRC for supporting it. The authors also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Any remaining errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors. References
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