Finding common ground is essential to pursuing the use of underground space

J.B.M. Admiraal Netherlands Centre for Underground Construction COB H.J.C. Oud Netherlands Centre for Underground Construction COB ABSTRACT: This paper will look into ways of finding common ground to build on, based on the belief that this is the only way forward when executing large and complex projects. Cases are taken from both international projects and projects from within the Netherlands. Common ground requires involvement of all parties in the project to be undertaken. Extensive analysis of the project social environment is required. On top of this the project design and project culture must be aligned with the idea of finding common ground. Given the difficulties associated with this, the question could be asked whether its all worth it. The real question in this respect seems to be, is there an alternative? 1 INTRODUCTION The development of underground space is fast becoming a world -wide issue. One of the most common viewpo ints is to exploit underground space as an asset, which is available when trying to solve the complex issue of balancing space requirements within urban areas. This implies that in a lot of cases underground space projects are carried out within c o m p l e x p roject social environments. The complexity of this environment is not only caused by external factors i.e. political and community considerations, but also by internal considerations often stemming from the innovative technical approach required. Given this complexity projects often find themselves becoming interdependent with others in indirect but consequential ways (Grey 1988). It is this interdependence which requires projects to find new ways forward in project relations management. To find common ground it is essential to involve all parties that constitute the social environment within which the project is undertaken. Seeking common ground requires an awareness within the project that several issues need to be considered. Traditionally one of the issues is to convince the project sponsors of the soundness of the project. It is our belief that standard appraisal methods fall short in the case of underground space projects because they fail to look at a broader picture. When considering the feasibility o f underground space projects, an integral approach is required, as is the need for introducing life cycle costing principles. All these techniques illustrate however, is the economic soundness of a project. Further considerations need to be made in order to come up with sound financial proposals. And again in the case of underground space projects the broader picture needs to be looked at when considering the financing of such projects. The second main consideration is the project organisational design. The authors firmly believe that the project organisational design should take into full consideration the interdependence of the project and its social environment. To do this it helps to distinguish between internal factors and external factors influencing the project (Hoeboer, unpubl.). First a closer look will be taken at the decision making processes governing projects after which the implications for the project design will be discussed. 2 2.1 DECISION MAKING PROCESSES Integral Decision Making

The decision-making process for large infrastructure projects knows many constituents as many parties feel they are part of the project social environment. The complexity of this environment is not only formed by the amount of parties involved, but also by the simple fact that all these parties have their own interests at stake. This often leads to strategic actions or to non cooperation. The following case illustrates this clearly. In the Amsterdam area traffic congestion is causing serious problems each morning and evening as people living in the reclaimed polders try to reach the area. This called for a public private study into the possibilities of a new motorway linking the existing A6 and A9 motorways. The projected route went right past the Naardermeer, a lake o f outstanding natural beauty and the sole reason why

the Society for the Protection of Nature Monuments (Natuurmonumenten) was started in 1905. The protests from this NGO led to the plan being adjusted to include a 13 km long road tunnel near the lake. Natuurmonumenten again objected to this solution because the effects of construction and use of the tunnel in relation to the underground water flow into and from the lake is not known and therefore potentially threatening. All this opposition was played out in the media and the political arena as the project initiators did not include this NGO in the preliminary study. Parties involved can consist of politicians, national government, provincial government, local government, non-governmental organisations, architects, contractors, and project developers, to name but a few. In a report for the Netherlands Scientific Council on Government Policy it was shown that decision making processes for large (infrastructure) projects can be characterised as taking a long time, being uncertain as to the outcome, are seemingly uncontrollable and often have chaotic process phasing. This inevitably leads to cost and time overruns and deliverables that were not expected. The report argues that this need not be the case if decision making was based on an integral process taking into account all aspects and all parties involved (Bruning 1994). We therefore need to design the processes to include the different parties that have a stake in the issue (Gray 1989). Such an integral decision-making process would call for: Sharing information at an early stage with all those parties impacted by the project; Identifying and acknowledging parties involved in the decision making process and designing the process in such a way that all participants are seen as joint problem-solvers rather than as adversaries; Phasing the project in such a way that it leads to a structured approach with realistic time lines set for each stage of the process; Pursuing an open dialogue which includes discuss ing world values and enables participants to question perceptions and the stereotyping of others thereby promoting mutual trust, respect and a favourable ongoing relationship. 2.2 Integral Decision Making Framework

making framework calls for the identification of all economic cost and benefits as well as the social cost and benefits relevant to a certain solution. This is the only way in which solutions can be judged equal and decisions can be made, based on all relevant considerations. In practice one of the major obstacles is to find a methodically sound approach which considers all relevant aspects. The urge to be complete and use representative parameters needs to be balanced with the usability of figures and the way in which the end result is presented. A second aspect to take into consideration is the distribution of the projects cost and benefits over time. Underground space projects, given their longer lifetime, can span generations. The way in which cost and benefits are distributed for these projects can easily lead to underestimating the actual economic and social benefits, which will occur in the long term. The main problem however is that the cost always occur in the short term. To cope with these problems, an integral decision making framework needs to take all these considerations into account. For certain infrastructure projects in the Netherlands this framework was used as a basis for the decision making process as is illustrated by the following case. A major railway line linking Amsterdam and Rotterdam divides the City of Delft. The need to upgrade the capacity of this line has led to years of discussion about the best possible solution. Figure 1 shows the cost of three different solutions when taking into account the construction cost, life cycle cost (inspection, maintenance, etc.) as well as the cost of demolishing existing buildings. Every train passing through generates income. From figure 1 it i s c learly illustrated that in this approach the traditional viaduct is the most economic option.
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The integral decision making process can on ly be successful if the framework within which decisions are taken is in itself based on an integral vision. The main obstacle to decisions on underground construction in the Netherlands has always been the early dismissal of this type of solutions as unrealistic or too costly. An integral decision

Figure 1: traditional approach When however we use a integral approach (figure 2) the picture changes rapidly. Environmental impact and public nuisance were added as cost and the effect of multiple space usage through utilising

underground space as income. A bored tunnel by far became the most sensible solution all things considered.
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Figure 2: integral approach In essence, an integral decision making framework: Uses quick-scan analysis methods in the early stages of the decision making process to identify worthwhile problem solving directions; Takes into account the long term effects especially from a sustainability perspective; Uses accepted methods to value aspects as noise pollution, landscape aesthetics, etc.; Takes into account the distribution of effects of decisions made for parties concerned including questioning who will compensate negative effects financially or otherwise; Considers the methodical validity of the approach used. An integral approach as discussed above calls for more than just an integral framework for decision making. It also calls for information sharing with all parties being impacted by the project. This says a lot about the attitude required towards all the constituents making up the project social environment. Project organisational design and project culture are both affected in a major way. 3 PROJECT ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN

itself has changed. The world has become a show me world in which it no longer suffices for governments or companies to say trust me (Van der Veer 1999). In The Netherlands large projects from the 'Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier' in the 1970's till the recent large rail projects (High Speed Rail Link and the Betuwe Rail Cargo Link) have avidly illustrated this. However, not all projects require the same approach. Using the parameters discussed above, four types of projects can be distinguished as is illustrated in figure 3. As underground space projects are often carried out in urban areas, we feel that in most cases these projects can be characterised as being executed in complex social environments using innovative technical approaches (type C). In this case the relationship with the project social environment should not only be taken into consideration when designing th e project organisation, it should be leading when managing the project. This notion is in itself not unique. Within organisational theory Burns and Stalker, Woodward and Lawrence, and Lorsch can be seen as the founders for what is now known as the multiple constituency approach. This approach learns that for a company to survive, it must adapt to the environment relevant for that company. The above extends this principle to projects needing to adapt to their environments. In order to do so, it is necessary to understand the complexity of the project social environment and how to cope with this complexity.

Mill. Guilders

A. Innovative Simple, stable project environment Innovative, multidiscipline project C. Active Participation by others Complex, dynamic project environment Innovative, multidiscipline project

B. Status Quo Simple, stable project environment Traditional, prove n technology project D. Active Relations Management Complex, dynamic project environment Traditional, proven technology project

The way in which projects are organised varies across projects (Hoeboer, unpubl.). This can be explained by looking at internal and external parameters. The internal parameters complexity and innovation are linked to the type of project, i.e. a traditional project using contemporary technology versus an innovative project with new, sometimes experimental technology involved. The external parameters complexity and dynamics are linked to the project social environment, which is a simple phrase for what in all reality often is a complex set of multiple constituents. As we have already seen, modern day projects are interdependent with the social environment. A social environment that in

Figure 3 (adapted by authors from Hoeboer, unpubl.) 4 4.1 THE PROJECT SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT Stakeholders and other Constituents

As stated earlier, the project environment consists of an often complex set of multiple constituents. The need to identify the constituents is evident. When analysing the project environment however, it is inevitable that the term 'stakeholder' is introduced. In many ways this is a misleading term when used to describe all constituents involved. In this paper we ask the following two, fundamental questions . Are all parties who constitute the project environment

really stakeholders in the sense that they hold a stake in the project? Or are there also constituents who do not hold a stake in the project but rather find their interests at stake? These questions are fundamental because more often than not vital constituents are overlooked because the term stakeholder is taken to literally as was illustrated by the Naardermeer case at the beginning of this paper. When charting the project social environment it can be helpful to specifically distinguish between these two groups, i.e. those that hold a stake in the project (stakeholders: financial sponsors, management, personnel and their families, customers, government) and those that find their interests at stake (other constituents: local communities and non-governmental organisations). The Royal Dutch/Shell group carried out an appraisal and exploration campaign during 19961999 in the lower Urubamba region of upper Amazonia, some 500-km due east of Lima, the capital of Peru (Hartog, undated). The Peruvian government gave the license but Shell realised that issues relating to the indigenous people, the rainforests, bio-diversity and Amazonia, as well as general concerns with oil industry practice, could spell disaster for the project and the company if not taken into account. Shell immediately set out to involve a large group of constituents including local c o m m u n i t i e s a n d s e v e r a l n o n-government organisations (NGOs). One of the lessons learned by shell during the Brent Spar affair was the importance of involving NGOs. The NGOs are a good illustration of the category other constituents as they often represent what can be called civic societys concern in general. NGOs can be powerful allies for projects but sometimes become worthy opponents when adversarial behaviour is the only approach left to protect their interest (Carpenter & Kennedy 1988). In this case, Shell eventually had to pull out. They had heavily invested in community relation programmes providing for social capital. They had tried to find solutions for all issues related to introducing gas from the region into the Peruvian market. In the end the time frame permitted under the contract with the Peruvian government was too short. The efforts t aken by shell to cope with a complex and dynamic project environment are illustrated below. 4.2 The Camisea Case

Safety and Environment Management System) and HSE plans.

Figure 4: Helicopter Logistic Support The critical issue was to be seen to be operating within commitments. This was approached through a policy of openness and transparency with stakeholders. In particular, inspections and visits by local communities and NGOs were facilitated. Of importance was the unique arrangement between Shell Prospecting and Development Peru (SPDP) and the Peruvian Environmental Network (RAP) to undertake quarterly independent monitoring. During each visit at least two members of the network linked with two community members to visit locations and have access to all information. At least half the visit was spent inside communities sensing attitudes and concerns. Reports were made public. The agreement between the RAP and SPDP called for SPDP to meet all expenses and to make a small donation to the RAP for internal use. Upon the decision to close operations a closure plan was put in place to remove all facilities from the well sites (except well heads), to fully landscape and, finally, to re-vegetate the sites. The completion of these actions, and the assurance that commitments to communities had been met, was verified by an external due diligence audit. Figure 4 above shows the use of helicopters to get the drilling equipment on site. This not only proved to be a cost effective method but also minimised the projects impact on the indigenous people and their environment. Figure 5 shows the indigenous people of the region. Following a stakeholder identification study, a commitment was made to deliver net benefit to community stakeholders in the region. The community programme became the centrepiece

Following a public hearing in July 1996 an approval was received for the construction of a supply base and the drilling of up to four appraisal wells. Field operations were then undertaken within a commitment to highest standards within a framework established by an HSE MS (Health,

of the consultation effort, involving more than 40 communities on a regional basis and some 29 native communities close to the project.

environmental impact of the project. In the case of the road design the end users were represented by the Netherlands Cyclist Union, the tunnel being mainly used by so-called slow traffic. The role of the project advisory group was to basically comment on the plans drawn up by the project group. This led to a dialogue that in many cases led to adaptations of project plans. The High Speed Rail Link South is a major project consisting of an approximately 100 km high speed rail link within the Netherlands to link Amsterdam with Paris due to be completed in 2005. The project organisation was adapted to the environment by appointing a project relations manager. The PR managers sole task was to identify and maintain the relations with all constituents by using various instruments, ranging from ad-hoc consultations of pressure groups to more institutionalised forms as described above in the Second Heinenoord Tunnel case. The importance of this appointment being that for the first time a project executive was solely responsible for environment relations. His position within the project organisation was as such that he could influence major decisions and make the project respond to the environment. This can even be taken further by totally integrating project relations in the project as was applied in the case of the Northside Storage Tunnel Project. The benefit of having total integration of the design, construction, environmental, community liaison and safety personnel in an alliance agreement led to innovative solutions to the many challenges on this project (Henderson 2001). Community liaison was one of the benchmarks used to assess performance to determine the risk/reward status of that project during the various stages. 4.4 Lessons Learned What all these cases show is that adapting the organisation to the project social environment requires more effort than drawing a new organisational chart. Every member of the project needs to realise that the project is moving forward in a new direction as opposed to more traditional approaches. This means that a project culture is required in which the relationship with the project environment is seen as essential for the project to be completed. Project values will need to be re-aligned. This way the project can obtain what can only be described as social credit. The value of social credit is considerable. Basically, given sufficient credit, projects can even fail to deliver in certain

Figure 5: Community Relations 4.3 Further Cases

The above cas e clearly illustrates not only the need to identify all constituents and involve them with the project, but the fact that the project organisation must be adapted to its project environment. Current practice shows there are many ways to achieve this. During the environmental impact analysis for the Netherlands part of the High Speed Rail Link between Amsterdam and Paris, extensive consultations were held with environmental protection groups in the Netherlands. This resulted in one of the major groups supporting the project on account of the fact that the existence of such a rail link would mean a considerable reduction in short haul air traffic from which the environment overall would significantly benefit. Had the project not held the consultations with these NGOs, opposition would have been fierce against another infrastructure project further damaging local communities in particular and the environment in general. In this case the project adopted the slogan Flying without wings which had evolved from these consultations to further promote their cause. In the case of the Second Heinenoord Tunnel project, the first TBM bored tunnel in the Netherlands and completed in 1999, a specific approach was used. For various aspects of the project, i.e. communications, obtaining licences and permits and for the road design, project groups where assembled within the project. These project groups consisted of the project resources needed to address the specific work package. Each group was mirrored to the project environment by convening so -called project advisory groups consisting of the constituents related to the work package. In the case of obtaining licenses and permits the project advisory group consisted of representatives of the various authorities involve d a s w e l l a s environmental groups concerned with the

cases without being hampered by interventions from the project environment. In the case of the Second Heinenoord Tunnel, major setbacks were presented as opportunities to learn and the relations with the public remained positive in every respect. The High Speed Rail Link project has invested enormously to gain social credit. The result is that this project has received far less protests or interventions than other major projects that used a more traditional approach. Shell formulated the following lessons learned from their project in Peru as detailed below. They feel that these lessons transcend the project and are applicable to operations in general (Fig. 5).
Consultation must be a part of all operations and start early in project planning; Stakeholder involvement must be open and transparent; Operations must be accountable to established standards; Social and bio-diversity baselines must be a part of design and operation; Local, regional and national benefits of operations must be clearly defined and delivered Benefits to communities are required and can be provided at an effective price for the business.

project. The relationship with NGOs has other needs than the relationship with local communities, as the Shell Peru case showed. When looking closer at these relationships it becomes clear that the interdependency between constituents and the project is based on uncertainty. Without further actions the constituents are unclear about the projects intentions and vice versa. This often results in interventions from the constituents to reduce the amount of uncertainty. Protests are one way of achieving this. Project environment relations management therefore calls for reducing uncertainties b y p r o v i d i n g f o r e x c h a n g e o f information as was already discussed. Constituents as we have seen, need to be involved in the project. The question is whether this means that constituents also get involved in taking decisions about the project. Often this is a pitfall that causes uncertainty and anxiety when talking about involving parties from outside the project inside the project. That this need not be the case can be seen by looking closer at Shells policy in this respect. 5.2 To D-A-D or to D-D-D Shells policy (Van der Veer 1999) used to be based on a strategy known as D-A-D, Decide - Announce - Defend. It is the classical way in which both government and the private sector force projects on civic society. At the height of the Brent Spar affair, Shell defended their actions by placing full-page adverts in newspapers in Europe, which detailed their decisions. The result was a slump in petrol sales. Exact the opposite of what Shell had hoped to achieve. The lessons learned by Shell were that in modern society companies cannot pursue their goals by simply stating 'trust me'. Societal trust or social credit needs to be obtained before projects are started. This resulted in a new strategy that Shell has dubbed D-D-D or Dialogue - Decide - Deliver. What it means is that before a project is undertaken dialogue with the project social environment needs to be pursued. On basis of this, the project can then decide on the way forward and deliver on basis of agreement reached during the dialogue. In the end the decision on how to move forward is taken by the project, but only after extensive consultations. 5.3 The Paradox of Change In many ways infrastructure projects can severely disrupt and change the social environment within which they are executed. Seen from this perspective the impact is often the same as when trying to change organisations. The so-called Paradox of change (Fig. 6) shows us that the resistance against change can be overcome when people are involved

Figure 5: Shell in Camisea Lessons Learned Given the cases described above, the authors agree with the general applicability of these lessons learned, which is especially true in the case of underground space projects within complex and dynamic project environments. 5 5.1 THE ART OF FINDING COMMON GROUND Managing Project Relations

The presented cases and the lessons learned show that the relationship between the project and its social environment needs to be managed. The art of finding common ground therewith lies in the ability of the project to: Identify constituents and their interdependency with the project; Acknowledge the interdependencies within their specific context; Maintain and expand relationships for the duration of the project. The ability to identify constituents is often severely hampered as sometimes constituents present themselves to the project completely unexpected. It is of paramount importance that efforts are made to identify all constituents. Moreover, once constituents are identified their needs need to be recognised as well as the specific relations they have with the

at a time when it really matters instead of when all decisions are already made. The concept of DDD involves people from the early stages of a project.
Amount (n)

People Decisions taken involved

virtual learning communities (VLC). VLC make use of Internet technology to enable people to meet and exchange information independent of time and place. Although still in the pilot stages, indications are that VLC are a promising way to stimulate dialogue both within and outside the professional community. They can most certainly be used as effective ways in which to stimulate and facilitate dialogues as described above. The COB is exploring further ways for stimulating a persevering dialogue about utilising un derground space. The communication strategy hinges on the premise that in order to promote the use of underground space, three basic requirements need to be fulfilled. Firstly constituents are needed who are willing to undertake and sponsor the projects. Secondly expertise is needed to execute these projects. Thirdly the public must be willing to support the projects. 6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Time (t)

Figure 6: Paradox of Change That this is an effective approach was discovered by Lewin in the 1940s. During WWII there was a need in the US to reduce civilian consumption of rationed foods. Lewin identified the housewife as being the gatekeeper for solving this problem. He then set up a comparative experiment. An expert nutritionist lectured housewives on what they should do a traditional, reasoned exhortation to change. Women in the comparison groups were given the facts and invited to decide together what to do. With 20/20 hindsight its easy to guess what happened. Groups that reached consensus through discussion changed their food habits much more than those given expert advise. Lewin had found a core principle: we are likely to modify our own behaviour when we participate in problem analysis and solution and likely to carry out decisions we have helped to make. (Weisbord 1987). As we have seen when discussing integral decision making processes, there is an absolute need to involve the project environment with the project. This involvement can take many forms but in all essence it takes into account the basis human needs of being recognised and acknowledged. When constituents feel that they are respected, that they are listened to and that their involvement has made a difference there will be no need for action against the project. 5.4 The Persevering Dialogue Up to now the focus has been on a project and its environment. Furthering the cause for utilising underground space however requires finding common ground in a bigger perspective. It means that commitment is required to the solution as such, before projects are even considered. Within the communication strategy of the Netherlands Centre for Underground Construction (COB) this has been recognised by introducing the concept of the persevering dialogue. The COB follows a dynamic, approach through the concept of

In this paper the authors have tried to show that there are new ways forward to build not only in the ground but to build on relationships with the project social environment. Finding common ground should make it easier to pursue innovative projects in complex and dynamic environments. The art of finding common ground lies in the fact that we have to change our habits and actively involve the constituents making up the project social environment. We have to acknowledge that a new approach requires the humility to admit that multiple heads are better than one. From 100 years of experience, repeating the same pattern over and over again, we can predict social consequences for any improvement project: the less involvement of those affected, the less likely will be an implementable solution. (Weisbord 1987). Modern society challenges us to find new ways and master the art of finding common ground to build in. We must learn to organise and execute our projects in such a way that they are seen not only as technological achievements but as a social achievement in their own right. REFERENCES Bruning, A.J.F. Large Projects in the Netherlands: an Analysis into Time Spend on Twenty Decision Making Processes. WRR Report W77, The Hague, 1988 (in Dutch). Carpenter, S.L, and Kennedy W.J.D. Managing Public Disputes: A Practical Guide to Handling Conflict and Reaching Agreements. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988.

 Gray, Barbara. Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989. Hartog, Jan. Shell in Camisea: Raising Standards and Learning New Lessons in a Sensitive Rainforest Environment. International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) (available at their web site http://www.ipieca.org/publications/sens_envir_c ase_studs/shell_camisea/shell_in_camisea.html ) Henderson, A. D. The Northside Storage Tunnel Project. In: Proceedings of the AITES-ITA 2001 World Tunnel Congress, Milan, 2001. Hoeboer, R.M. Stakeholder Management of Construction Industry Projects. Research as part of a MBA Programme at TSM Business School, Enschede, unpubl. (in Dutch). Veer, Jeroen van der. Profits and Principles, the Experience of an Industry Leader. Speech at the Greenport 99 conference. World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Geneva 1999 (available at their web site as PDF document http://www.wbcsd.org/newscenter/library.htm ). Weisbord, Marvin R. Productive Workplaces: Organizing and Managing for Dignity, Meaning and Community. Jossey -Bass Publishers, San Francisco 1987.