New project management processes and supporting systems

J. Reilly
John Reilly Associates International ABSTRACT This paper presents an overview of management for complex infrastructure projects. It reviews industry problems and issues of concern and suggests that a more integrated management process, based on industrial process design (re-engineering) would improve results. Historical management approaches are addressed. Management support systems including Partnering, Team-Alignment, Alliancing, Disputes Resolution as well as Risk Identification and Mitigation are discussed. General considerations are presented.

1 INTRODUCTION More effective and efficient management of large, public-works underground design and construction projects is a clearly appreciated need in an era of reduced public funding and increasing expectations. For example, in the US, net investment in infrastructure, as a percent of gross national product dropped steadily, from 3.7% in 1963 to 2.5% in 1985 and has continued to decline. This reduction in infrastructure investment has been correlated with a decline in national productivity. Additionally, new political, societal and environmental requirements have added more process and complexity to decision making and have increased the time and cost of infrastructure programs. Decisions made in an engineering or technical context are being increasingly challenged in the media (Dawson 1995), with substantial impact to the ability, of public agency managers, engineers and contractors , t o p e r f o r m t o t h e p u b l i c s expectations. These concerns are not limited to infrastructure programs. Business and governments are also being challenged at fundamental levels (Champy 1995). Restructuring, downsizing and reinventing are now common words, indicating that change is now an expected environment. As engineers and contractors we are directly challenged in the public arena where politics, policy and environmental justice must be considered equally with engineering and construction.

2 PROJECT PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED An international survey, carried out by the author (Reilly & Thompson 2000) uncovered some interesting implications. Of a total of 1400 projects identified world-wide, 160 were selected, of which 40 were targeted for detailed information. It was found that specific, relevant information was very difficult to obtain. Once projects are completed the records related to the projects are either archived or dispersed among the project participants. Little objective history is left available for research or review - including findings which would lead to recommendations for improvement. Owners are not generally reliable in this regard and Associations, who might be interested and competent to interpret the data, do not always have the resources or ability to collect and reference it. Because of the difficulty in obtaining hard data, firm conclusions could not be drawn reliably, but areas for further study were identified, as follows:

There are significant cost and schedule overruns suggestive of poor management in at least 30% and possibly more than 50% of the projects It appears that the two factors that most commonly influence the success or failure of projects are 1) expertise and policies of the owners and 2) local procurement procedures and requirements The professional teams engaged were reported competent, by the owners, leading to the consideration that problems in poorly performing projects may lie primarily with the ability of the owner to lead and/or manage the project process

Data on key management issues and project characteristics should be summarized for review and research at the end of all major projects, on a uniform basis. This is the owner's responsibility, but guidelines should be available from National and International Associations. Partnering was used in a significant number of cases, but results were mixed Risk mitigation is not well understood or applied, even in elemental ways. This is an area for development and implementation with promising potential.

3.2 Industry needs To address these concerns, it is suggested that the following needs to be addressed:

A better understanding of complex infrastructure and underground projects on generalized geographic and cultural basis. A better understanding of policies, key issues and, specific conditions for these projects. A better understanding of critical functional and economic success factors for these projects. What should be changed, by project type or region, for better project performance

3 INDUSTRY CONCERNS Because a substantial number of infrastructure, underground and/or tunnel projects encounter serious problems in the form of cost overruns, time extensions and problems with quality, specific action needs to be taken. These problems hav e a secondary, but important, effect of reducing the credibility of project management, design and construction personnel in the eyes of the public and political officials, leading to the imposition of more restrictive rules and regulations which can further impact efficiency and effectiveness. Although the problems are clear, the specific reasons for failure are not always easily categorized or resolved. This is evident because projects continue to encounter major problems. Some reasons may be common to all projects but others will be specific to a particular project or a particular region. Professional Associations are interested in this question t h e i s s u e s h a v e b e e n r a i s e d i n International and National Associations with which the author is associated (Reilly, 2001). It is believed that a better understanding of the management of complex infrastructure and underground projects would improve research efforts and recommendations by such Associations. 3.1 Key Concerns:

4 A THESIS - COMPLEX PROJECTS NEED STRATEGIC, INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT Complex projects involve many stakeholders, who often have conflicting objectives. Therefore it would seem logical that these projects should have a comprehensive strategic and well-integrated management approach. However, a fragmented, task-discrete approach is more normal in the design and construction industry (Prescott 1998). 4.1 Management as it was It is frequently said that management was easier in the past - we sometimes hear about the way it was implying that it was better in the old times. This nostalgia may perhaps refer to a simpler working relationship between the owner, engineer and contractor. Previously it was normal practice in many countries for the engineer to serve as both designer of record, responsible to incorporate the intent of the owner in the plans and specifications and then to act as mediator and arbitrator during the construction phase on behalf of the owner. This arrangement worked well and to the advantage of all - providing the owner, engineer and contractor understood their roles and responsibilities and were sufficiently knowledgeable to act prudently in the best interest of the project. This also meant the best interests of the owner, contractor and the u ltimate user generally the public. 4.2 Management as it is now Recently, it is found that the owner is often supplemented by management, oversight, financial, legal, media, audit, specialized technical, construction and program managers and is subject to a higher level of media scrutiny and political review

Ability to set realistic budget, schedule and quality requirements Ability to meet budget, schedule and quality requirements Public acceptance (buy-in) of the project Poor productivity of the construction industry Low profitability of the construction industry Lack of innovation, research and development

(Wallis 1995). The Engineer is more concerned with liability and litigation, which can, if it eventuates, threaten the very existence of the firm. 4.3 Separation of functions, fragmentation Additionally, the planning, design, procurement, construction management and construction are often treated as separate functions under the responsibility of virtually different organizations. Problems then can arise from inadequate team "integration" which is obviously the responsibility of the Owner. Good "integration" is understood as well defined roles, responsibilities, communications and working relationships, related to specific goals and objectives (Reilly 1996). Fragmentation of the project team can by driven by, among other factors, specialization of function, local procurement regulations and fear of litigation. This can be exacerbated by special interest groups who are now involved in many major, urban underground infrastructure projects. 4.4 Management a strategic approach A more strategic view of the management process will improve management of complex projects because the lack of such a strategy can, and often will, lead to major problems such as cost and schedule overruns (Arup 2000). What would a more strategic view mean? Such an approach might include:

5 ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

5.1 Current systems categorized Current, especially older, management systems tend to use hierarchical (vertically layered), authoritarian organizational structures, using bureaucratic procedures with many "checks and balances" and conservative approaches to risk. 5.2 Considering new management concepts If we consider the basis of organizational structures as related to our view of "how things work" we find, for most engineers at least, a mechanistic Newtonian view of events, leading to structured two dimensional hierarchies, work-element breakdown systems and, compartmentalized responsibilities. These systems can limit opportunity for correction of problems, innovation, identification of beneficial changes and the potential for added value. A different theoretical basis has been proposed by Margaret Wheatley in the book Leadership and the new Sciences (Wheatley 1992). In this approach, projects and organizations can be considered to function similarly to complex living systems, which are more aligned, for example, with quantum mechanics and chaos theory than Newtonian mechanics. Chaotic systems are stable and predictable within larger boundaries but are unpredictable, except in terms of probability theory, at smaller scales. 5.3 Application of this approach To consider how we might apply this analogy to management systems for complex projects we would need to define the specific boundaries of the project - starting point, necessary inputs, key goals and objecti v e s , f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s , f i n a l deliverables and measures of performance. Then we would need to create organizational structures (or the lack of them) such that participants have responsibility at both a local and a general level, are encouraged to work with flexibility and initiative, but are mindful of how their work and responsibilities fit into the larger picture, as related to overall performance goals, objectives, critical activities and final products (deliverables). For a more detailed treatment, the reader is referred to the referenced material for a discussion of change, c o m p l e x s y s t e m s , o p e n-participative work

A comprehensive, integrated process for planning, design and construction, directed to defined results and performance requirements An integrated project team, with well defined roles, responsibilities, communications and working relationships A process for continuous team alignment and work-process improvement A comprehensive risk identification and mitigation process.

Implicit in a more strategic approach is an overall vision of the process - how it "all fits together" by key management and political sponsors, with an ability to reconsider and redirect activities when necessary. High-level personnel are necessary, since changes to long-established policies, procedures and ways of doing business may be required.

environments, the potential for improved results with less conflict and stress and, the characteristics of "learning organizations". There are several key questions:

6.2 Suggested process So, for complex underground and tunnel projects, how could we approach beneficial change? Perhaps the following sequence is a reasonable, if simplified, approach. ELEMENT 1. Define the final product and its characteristics, based on a value-engineered life cycle approach. 2. Define requirements for planning, design, construction, initial operations and subsequent maintenance needed to meet the product definition. 3. Define performance measures related to goals and objectives 4. Develop processes to meet product definitions and performance measures 5. Define resources required by the processes. 6. Integrate the processes and resources directed to final requirements and products (deliverables). 7. Develop organizational alternatives, including specific roles, responsibilities, communications and working relationships. 8. Develop risk identification and mitigation process 9. Develop best contractual approach considering allocation of risk and uncertainty 10. Maintain leadership, use an integrated team approach and use supporting systems such as: Partnering, Dispute Resolution, Risk Mitigation, plus, Continuous Improvement, Recognition and Reward. 7 LEADERS, LEADERSHIP AND CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE Given the troubled history of many projects, one factor that stands out as critical for success is competent leadership. Leadership involves a vision of the final product, the knowledge of the project and its processes, the confidence to make strategic changes. Leadership also includes a willingness and ability to explore options and better ways of doing business, create confidence and motivation by participants, foster open communications and build effective working relationships. Leaders constantly challenge existing ways of doing business (the old paradigm). They seek a better way - but they are dependent on the team and its "good alignment" to achieve results. Leadership and knowledge are the keys to project success. Knowledgeable leaders create teams that are all inclusive, fair, technically able, with vision and purpose and, which operate with high ethical

How to best implement such systems for complex, infrastructure programs How to demonstrate objectively that these systems improve performance How to transfer this knowledge to owners, engineers, contactors and suppliers

6 RE-ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT A PROCESS APPROACH As noted above, key project functions such as planning, design, procurement, construction and construction management are often managed separately and coordinated at defined interfaces or hand-off points. However, problems can arise from inadequate coordination, integration and management of the overall work flow and work processes. Additionally, management of these interface points takes time and expertise which may or may not be available within the Owners organization. 6.1 Re-engineering There are precedents for major change in technically complicated projects. Comparable industries have adopted "re-engineering" - a process that has led to significant improvements in efficiency, cost and quality. For example, six-sigma quality (equivalent to 3.4 defects per million) has been achieved in large, corporate management environments such as Motorola and General Electric. Re-engineering addresses all elements of the build process and the workflow required to produce the final and desired result. It is "total process" not a "task discrete" and looks at the work as an integrated stream from conception to finalization (Champy 1995). Re-engineering can achieve substantial increases in efficiency and effect iveness (op. cit.). For the purposes of this paper, the main principle to be considered is the comprehensive approach which includes all stakeholders and work processes to achieve results that meet criteria and expectations.

standards and principles (Katzenbach 1993) attributes which are central to Partnering and TeamAlignment principles. It is suggested that these attributes are not only essential to solve the complex problems of today's projects, but they are also required for a successful project, a safe working environment, to add value and, to minimize risk. Leaders with these attributes increase motivation and job satisfaction for project personnel, leading to safer projects with less risk and greater value for their clients (Drucker 1996) 8 DIFFICULTIES WITH CHANGE

8.4 Economic reasons inhibiting change include:

Investments by owners, consultants and contractors in existing methods Threats to share of revenue under existing agreements and work-allocations

9 MANAGEMENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS Partnering, Team-Alignment, Alliancing and similar team processes address how to achieve such changes (Katzenbach & Smith 1993). These processes have characteristics that work better with open, more flexible and interactive management systems, as suggested above. These processes seek to define, confirm and communicate a project's fundamental mission, to focus project participants on key goals, objectives and performance requirements and, to recognize individual and shared values in order to build mutual trust and respect between participants. The processes are geared to build teamwork, commitment and discipline and to create improved productivity in order to:

8.1 Difficulties in changing established systems The above suggestions mean changing longestablished systems. This is always problematic, for reasons which may be cultural, historical or economic. In particular, our ability to develop and understand new opportunities, to comprehend new ways of thinking, may be compromised by our experience and historical biases which are implicit in the paradigms by which we operate. Our paradigms (historical and cultural belief systems, experience, and precedents) affect is how we interpret information and also how we understand events and relationships. Sometimes a new paradigm must be developed in order that we can understand new phenomena - f or example quantum physics. In some cases it may be impossible to understand the need for change, let alone see new value and implement new concepts, until a new paradigm is developed and understood. (Barker 1992, Kuhn 1962) 8.2 Cultural reasons inhibiting change:

Reduce cost, improve schedule and performance Increase quality and efficiency Avoid or reduce conflict, disputes, claims and litigation

9.1 Partnering and Team-Alignment The initial Partnering initiative in the US was created between Fluor Daniel and DuPont some 30 years ago. It was a long-term strategic agreement to help each firm achieve key business and functional objectives over multiple, repetitive projects. Since that time, Partnering has been widely used, with many positive results. There have been some problems usually caused by lack of commitment or understanding by one of the partners. In general however, Partnering has produced increased value for owners at a relatively low cost In a survey of 280 US projects, a 90% improvement in total performance (cost, schedule, q u a l i t y , a v o i d litigation, customer satisfaction and, overall results) was reported (Larson 1995) for fully partnered projects compared to those with an adverse contractual environment. Team-Alignment is similar, and uses similar principles, to achieve alignment to project Goals and Objectives. However, it does not imply a relationship between Owner and Contractor as does Partnering.

Systems of cultural hierarchy - protocol and entitlement Fear of change - risks of the unknown Inability to grasp the value and viability of new concepts - "paradigm" effects Lack of capability to successfully implement the changes

8.3 Historical reasons inhibiting change:

Precedents, past ways of doing business, Not admitting past practices were ineffective

9.2 Alliancing Alliancing is a relatively new technique for infrastructure projects but the initial results have been very favourable (Ross 1999). The Alliancing process takes a significant step beyond Partnering and Team-Alignment by contractually defining the relationship and share of benefits (profits) and penalties (losses). It requires that clients, designers, contractors and suppliers work together as a single team, with contractually defined risk-reward (pain-gain) provisions. In one case, (Henderson, 1999) the Owner is actually part of the contractually defined team as one of the JointVenture partners. The impetus for adopting the Alliancing process, was the large cost incurred for North Sea offshore facilities in the 1980's with the corresponding impact to profitability - when oil extraction costs were compared with other locations, such as Saudi Arabia. It would seem that the same conditions are currently applicable to infrastructure and underground projects. Reported savings of up to 30% of target cost have been achieved as shown by the following table (NCE 2000).
Off-shore Oil Project All amounts in M Britinnia BE ETAP BP Andrew Interconnector Target Cost 1,500 926 373 316.5 Actual Cost 1,200 742 287.5 240 Cost Saving 300 85 85.5 76.5 Percent Saved 20% 9% 23% 24%

Express commitment to resolve issues within the Alliance without undue reliance on outside parties, allowing disputes to escalate or to use litigation 100% open book accounting for all parties requires development of trust, commitment and understanding Decisions of the Alliance board are binding and must be unanimous Project is managed by an integrated management team, members are chosen on the basis of best person for the responsibility from any of the Alliance partners. Participants develop and commit to a set of Alliance Principles, related to the key goals of the project

Work needs to be done to further develop the Alliancing process for more general application to infrastructure and underground construction. It is of course possible that initial applications of Alliancing have been implemented by talented leaders owners, engineers and contactors - and that, as the process is more widely implemented, less promising results will be obtained and negative impacts will arise. Never the less, the process is extremely promising, initial indications are very positive and additionally, Alliancing seems to avoid some of the problems that have been reported with the Partnering Process. For a very good overview with much detail see (Ross 2000). 9.4 Seeds of disputes, claims and litigation The planning, design and construction of major, urban infrastructure and underground projects has become increasingly more complex and conflictual leading to frequent disputes, claims and litigation. Owners and their engineers react with detailed contract specifications, attempting to reallocate or re-assign risk and sometimes define "means and methods" - which are normally best left to the contractor. Contractors, in defense, react with exceptions to the terms and conditions and prepare to recover their losses and, if fortunate, perhaps their profit, by claims and litigation. Disputes, claims and litigation therefore become more likely as parties to the contracts use legalistic maneuvering in an attempt to limit cost, deal with schedule issues and control risk. Complex contracts increase the opportunity for disputes, claims and litigation. But, neither owners nor contractors want litigation - consequently, most contracts have provisions for resolution of disputes

Of note is the high level of satisfaction, to date, by the owners, relative to the performance of the Alliancing team in control of costs, resolution of problems, improved relationships with adjacent communities etc. some of the areas of concern noted at the beginning of this paper. While cost savings statistics are yet not well estab lished for infrastructure contracts (there are few of them at this point) dramatic savings have been achieved for the offshore oil exploration programs as noted in the NCE Reference. 9.3 Characteristics of alliance contracts

Parties are bound by one (sometimes brief) agreement related to the prime goals of the procurement Obligations are stated collectively (The Alliance participants shall) Reimbursement involves meeting performance goals (pain-gain structure)

by some other means - such as negotiation, mediation or arbitration. 9.5 Dispute Resolution Dispute Review Boards (DRBs) are one process to resolve disputes quickly in order to reduce claims and litigation. DRBs usually consist of three senior professionals, experienced in management, construction and contracting, selected jointly by the owner and the contractor. They regularly review project progress and details of construction and are kept informed of issues and potential problems. Early review of problems, followed by the recommendation of an impartial DRB, has the potential to resolve issues and disputes quickly, to maintain open communications and to "clear the air". A caution - the DRB process is not fully accepted by some owners and some have modified the selection process for DRB members. There is some discussion about this in the industry and the specifics of a particular project and contractual environment need to be considered. The experience of some owners should be reviewed when decisions are being made on the make-up and use of DRBs. 10 RISK MITIGATION Risk always exists in the design, procurement, construction and operation of large, complex projects, particularly those involving underground conditions (Bielecki 1997). A significant number of projects have overrun their budgets and schedules through what managers might call unforeseen events an excuse frequently given to Owners or Agency Boards of Directors when additional time and/or money are required. The obvious question is why were these events not foreseen?. The answer is often that time or expertise or resources were not available which implies that they could have been foreseen if such resources were available. It is more likely that the process of risk identification was not understood, appreciated or even considered. Perhaps all that is really missing is an awareness, early in the planning, design and construction of projects, that there are relatively simple risk identification and analysis tools that can be used without significant cost, with high potential cost/benefit and which could identify significant

risks for early attention and reasonable action (Anderson 1997). For most of the so -identified risks, it would be concluded that their probability or threat level was not sufficient to employ mitigation measures. However, if the risk event does occur, management is then in the much stronger position to say that they did use a process to consider such a risk and reasonably concluded that mitigation was not justified under the circumstances. Risk identification and mitigation is not specifically intended to reduce cost or accelerate schedule although it may have this effect. It is essentially a low cost insurance policy with potentially results and return on investment. Risk reduction through identification, analysis, mitigation and contingency planning is therefore a prudent and necessary management task. 10.1 Risks for complex underground projects Infrastructure and underground projects are inherently complex projects with many variables including uncertain and variable ground conditions. The type of risks that should be addressed for such projects include: Risk of injury or catastrophic failure with the potential for loss of life, and personal injury, extensive material and economic damage and, loss of credibility for those involved Risks of significant increase of project and support costs Risks of a significant delay to project completion and start of revenue operations Risk of not meeting functional design, operational, maintainability and quality standards

10.2 Seeds of risk Where do risk events come from? This is a complex question (Reason, 1990). Risk events do not just occur in the construction phase, their seeds are sown by many directly and indirectly associated events, perhaps early in the planning and design phases. For example, when we chose or approve construction methods, especially for complex equipment such as TBMs, we introduce the seeds of future risk events. There can be different categories of risk, as outlined in the following Table (after Reilly).

Risk Category Stable and known processes Chaotic systems, highly variable but within certain boundaries Chain-of-events, linkage

Description If this, then that If this, maybe that, and also that is possible Because of this, associated with that, then that Directed threats

workshops. The process (PMI 2002) is for key personnel to meet and jointly: Identify potential threats Identify measures which can reduce or eliminate these threats Quantify the cost and benefits of these measures Rank priorities and decide a prudent course of action

Events caused by intent

Reasons to investigate risk events early in the project life include: To reduce the risk to project goals and objectives including safety, schedule, budget and quality T o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t o p ti o n s w e r e comprehensively and rationally evaluated The process will reveal useful information even if threats do not eventuate Will clarify project goals, objectives, priorities, responsibilities and working relationships

Risk workshops can be valuable in mobilizing a project team to address risk at any point in the project but they are more valuable early in the schedule since more options are open at that time. They also have a secondary benefit of getting the project team to think about potential problems and ways to better achieve their goals and objectives. The structure of a facilitated one or two day workshop follows the following sequence (PMI 2000). Identify as many potential threats to the project as possible - examine the basis of the threats, related linkages and causal drivers Quantify the impact of such threats, if they should occur Evaluate the probability of the threats occurring Determine risk which is the product of impact and probability Rank risks for action (i.e. determine priorities) Determine action plans to mitigate the topranked risks Determine cost and cost/benefit for action plans Decide which plans to implement Document the workshop recommendations

10.3 Risk mitigation models Analytical methods have been developed to address risk for complex, underground and infrastructure programs. These methods, when applied with compatible management and procurement approaches, can significantly assist the project by reducing uncertainty and improving our ability to plan, design and construct at lower risk. These methods are covered in associated papers listed in the References (Isaksson 1998; Einstein 1998; Reilly et al. 1999). The methods also enable comparisons between different construction or tunneling methods and can consider different geological factors which impact productivity (Grasso et al. 2002). All risk events with their probabilities and consequences for different methods can and should be considered. The methods can also consider extreme events i.e. events with very low probability but very high consequences, such as a TBM getting stuck in squeezing rock with no way to construct an access shaft. By using such methods it is also possible to better define probable completion time, probable costs and to evaluate the most promising alternatives for the project. 10.4 Risk workshops The logic for risk reduction is reasonably simple and can be applied by project personnel in risk

Such risk workshops allow the project team to quickly identify, quantify and evaluate potential threats, develop possible mitigation or risk reduction strategies, determine cost/benefits for these strategies and to decide a prudent course of action. Sometimes a risk workshop, engaging the project team, will uncover more fundamental project issues such as inadequate resources in key areas, conflicting direction, an unrealistic schedule or unknown cost risks.

11 CONSIDERATIONS In this summary paper some industry concerns regarding management for complex infrastructure and underground projects have been discussed, with suggestions of new ways to think about management systems and related processes. Many conclusions could be drawn, however this paper is intended to fame a context for discussion and, therefore, perhaps only general considerations are appropriate. 1. There is good potential for significant and consistent reduction in the final cost and schedule of major, complex infrastructure and underground projects. This can be done through a more comprehensive, and strategic management approach, including a more integrated approach to planning, design, procurement and construction. C o n s i d e r a p p l i c a t i o n o f r e-engineering principles to the planning, design and construction process. Use management support systems such as Partnering, Team-Alignment, Disputes Review and use of a structured Risk Identification, Evaluation and Mitigation process. Adopt these processes early in the initial planning, design and procurement phases. New forms of contract such as Alliancing, with a more integrated, shared contractual approach should be seriously considered for key projects. Management should consider the needs of a broader number of "stakeholders" than is current practice in many locations. Stakeholders include users, politicians, communities, environmental groups, designers, contractors, equipment suppliers and public users.

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