Almost Always More Than Philosophy Proper

ROBERT BERNASCONI The University of Memphis

What is the future of phenomenology? What will become of it? Or, rather, what will it become? If phenomenology were a set of doctrines, one might ask about its current status and the challenges, philosophical and institutional, that await it on the horizon. The same would be true if phenomenology were a uniform method. But, as Herbert Spiegelberg explained, phenomenology is a movement. There is a common point of departure, but no homogeneity.1 Because phenomenology is a movement, it will come to an end, if it does, only after having been reduced to a set of doctrines. This was already Merleau-Pontys reasoning when in 1945 he began Phenomenology of Perception with the question What is phenomenology? but refused to oVer a de nitive answer.2 There is still no basis for de ning it. That much has not changed. A lot else has changed and will continue to change about phenomenology as it responds to the changing world and, perhaps, helps to set the agenda for philosophy more generally. In what follows I will not only oVer a few re ections on how phenomenology relates to the future in a general sense, but I will also stake out some possible futures for future phenomenologists. My concern is that until recently phenomenology has tended to restrict its possibilities by accepting the widespread identi cation of philosophy with Western philosophy. This identi cation is already under considerable pressure and some phenomenologists have already begun to criticize it. It is my conviction that, because phenomenology has never merely been one philosophical movement among others, it is particularly well placed to disturb prevailing views about philosophy. No living
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philosophy worthy of the name allows itself to be limited by what philosophy has been in the past. Still less should a philosophy be limited by the particular account of the history of philosophy that prevails at any given time. The outlines of the history of philosophy, the canon, is always open to revision retrospectively in the light of new philosophical developments. But because, as I shall argue, phenomenology is almost always more than philosophy proper, because it exceeds philosophy, future phenomenologists have at their disposal a way of thinking that has the resources not only to challenge the reigning conception of philosophy, but also to enrich philosophy from what for the moment at least is still considered outside it. The term phenomenology long ago lost the precision with which Husserl once invested it. The word has long since ceased to be his property. But instead of making the usual gesture and abandoning the hypostasized abstraction phenomenology in favor of a plurality of phenomenologies, I would prefer to say that there is no phenomenology, only phenomenologists. The names of these phenomenologists indicate paths of thought. Anticipating the tendency to think of phenomenology in terms of individual thinkers, Husserl apparently used to tell Heidegger in the early 1920s that the two of them were phenomenology.3 Husserl would soon come to the conclusion that he had been exaggerating, but there are few people today who would understand loyalty to Husserl as their criterion for phenomenology. The term phenomenology still recalls Husserl. It cannot be used without signaling the debt that those who came after him owe to him. But the excitement, the exhilaration, that, for example, Heidegger or Sartre experienced when they discovered Husserl is now found elsewhere. Phenomenology is not a synonym for Husserl, not even in the sense that deconstruction is for the moment still a synonym for Derrida. But, as Derrida himself knows full well, the vitality of such labels resides in their capacity to pass beyond the control of those who introduced them. Thus the term phenomenology comes to serve as a shorthand way of announcing a canon of readings, a shared lexicon, and perhaps above all, a readiness to be open to whatever kinds of evidence seem appropriate to the matter at hand. This last speci cation is necessary because there are sympathetic analytic readings of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, that are nevertheless not phenomenological. The diVerence is unmistakable and is based on the fact that within analytic philosophy only a narrow range of evidence counts. Although the impenetrability of phenomenology is exaggerated, most often by analytic philosophers who forget how much their own work is permeated by jargon, it is true that the diVerent kinds of evidence embraced by phenomenology call for a freer, more creative, relation to language. To analytic philosophers this appears to be a refusal of philosophys limits. Wittgensteins dictum What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence 4 has become Whatever cannot be translated into a familiar idiom is not worth saying. One

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should not, in any case, expect lucidity from the philosopher. Lucidity belongs only to those who know already what they want to say and know how to say it. Because phenomenology is always concerned with questions of access and particularly questions of gaining access to what is largely inaccessible, that retreats as we approach it, is almost always struggling with language. Phenomenology does not claim only for itself the right to express itself in the idiom of its own choosing. The diVerence between the analytic and phenomenological approaches in this regard is most evident in the way they both approach texts in the history of philosophy. Analytic philosophy wants to forever restate, re ne, improve upon the original argument, even to the point of formalization. By contrast, the phenomenologist tends to believe that one cannot distill the argument of a book without loss: the texture an original idea has on its conception cannot be subtracted without sacri cing the means by which we have access to what gave birth to it. To practice philosophy without direct reference to its history is in eVect to do philosophy blind. That is why one always has to return to what Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Kant actually wrote. Heidegger, who initiated the historical turn within phenomenology, argued that categories given to intuition as self-evident should be understood as sediment formed by forgotten originary experiences.5 This opened up another way of philosophizing. What appears to be self-evident is not the bedrock it seems. The task of the philosopher is not to seek out such rm ground on which to build something of his or her own. Self-evidence, far from being a guarantee of truth, was associated with loss of contact with the source. The foundations are not so much to be shaken as to be excavated for what lies below. Heideggers project of destructuring the tradition of Western philosophy meant that the concept of tradition became central. In opposition to the ossi ed tradition (Tradition), which represents the weight of the past, Heidegger recognized ones relation to the tradition as liberatory, opening up the future (berlieferung).6 The phenomenological movement can itself be understood as a tradition that opens the future and does not merely open onto the future. Phenomenology has from the outset been experienced as a breath of fresh air. One can still hear its power to invigorate in the call to go back to the things themselves that replaced the call of a previous generation to go back to Kant.7 To practice phenomenology by studying the great minds of the phenomenological movement is not a betrayal of the dictum back to the things themselves, but a way of gaining access to what motivates the movement.8 As a movement, phenomenology readily expands to include those who contest what were at one time taken as its central tenets. The litany of names is constantly growing so that one can always add to it: after Husserl, then Scheler, Heidegger, Fink, Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Fanon, Arendt, Henry, Irigaray, even Derrida. I write even Derrida, less because of his own relation to phenomenology, but because certain Husserlian phenomenologists

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profess to be scandalized by his treatment of Husserl. But almost everyone associated with the phenomenological movement after Husserl has had a problematic relation with the label phenomenology. Nevertheless, the phenomenological movement does not expel its heretics, those who attack it from the inside. It embraces them. This is not the equivalent of baptizing in dels just before they are burned at the stake so that, while they are consigned to earthly ames, they are thereby saved from eternal ames. The phenomenological movement is what in a religious context would be called a broad church. The emphasis is not on orthodoxy, but on inclusivity. This spirit of openness has its source in phenomenologys openness to the future. Philosophers tend to ght over what is and what is not philosophy. It is diVerent with phenomenology. For the most part, phenomenologists do not lay claim to the label. One sees this most clearly in the way Heidegger reclaimed the mantle of phenomenology at a time when it seemed to be over, at least as a school of thought. In 1963, in My Way to Phenomenology Heidegger suggested that phenomenology is nothing else than the possibility of thinking. It persists only because it is constantly changing. For that reason its possibility survives, whether the word does or not: If phenomenology is thus experienced and retained, it can disappear as a designation in favor of the matter of thinking whose manifestness remains a mystery.9 A passage in A Dialogue on Language clari es Heideggers meaning. He had dropped the name phenomenology, not to deny it, but to abandon my path of thinking to the nameless.10 The lack of names is a frequent theme in phenomenology.11 In Heidegger it refers to the lack of a word for Being that announces not only the end of philosophy but the opening onto another beginning. So Heidegger announces that the transformation of thinking occurs as a passage from the site of metaphysics to another site that he leaves without a name.12 Heidegger renounces the name phenomenology not to renounce phenomenology, but to open thinking to a future that is open. If phenomenology recognizes the openness of the future, then it can no longer seek to own that future by insisting on giving it its name. One should speak of the future of phenomenology in that sense, if at all, only with caution. What I am calling phenomenology is also often called in the English-speaking world Continental philosophy, which has proved a somewhat mysterious label to philosophers from continental Europe. As I understand it, Continental philosophy is both more and less than phenomenology. It is more in the banal sense that it includes more: critical theory, for example, is Continental philosophy, but it is not phenomenology. However, Continental philosophy is less than phenomenology insofar as the former is saturated by what one calls secondary literature. Often the division between primary literature and secondary literature is unclear, but the linguistic and geographical distance between Continental Europe and the English-speaking world has sometimes led

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Continental philosophers to treat French and German philosophers as enclosed objects of study. Continental philosophers might read Merleau-Pontys readings of psychology, but they would not think to read what Merleau-Ponty read, let alone try to keep in touch with recent developments in psychology, as a phenomenologist would. This has led to the accusation, quite common at one stage in the English-speaking world, that phenomenology is not philosophy proper. It is an accusation that might work against some Continental philosophy, but only to the extent that much that passes for philosophy in an academic setting is highly derivative. Analytic philosophys widespread refusal to take phenomenology seriously may have softened in recent years in some places, but the basic form of the prejudice still survives. Phenomenological ethics is said not to be ethics proper; it is Continental philosophy. Phenomenological metaphysics is said not to be metaphysics proper, it is Continental philosophy. And the credentials of phenomenological approaches to ancient philosophy are denied. One either attends to the arguments, as historians of philosophy with a training in analytic philosophy are presumed to do, or it is not philosophy. In short, to admit that one does phenomenology is to invite the response: Phenomenology is not philosophy proper. But, in spite of the fact that phenomenology has often explored the logic of the proper, the genuine, and the authentic, or perhaps because of it, this attempt to call its own appropriateness, its credentials, into question, is disingenuous. Still philosophy, phenomenology should, indeed almost always will, be more than philosophy proper. Phenomenology combats the increasingly restrictive de nition of philosophy that has tended to operate in the universities for various institutional and political reasons. Phenomenology does not try to be proper, does not restrict itself in advance. Phenomenology has sometimes appealed to the word thinking to diVerentiate itself from philosophy proper and to maintain its openness.13 It situates itself at the margins not just of philosophy, but of what can be thought and said at all. It exceeds the boundaries of what is recognized as philosophy. It embraces art, poetry, literature, the spiritual, the political, and much else. Phenomenology thus draws on whatever resources are available. MerleauPonty used Husserls letter to Levy-Bruhl to argue that Husserl recognized the indispensability of historical and ethnological facts for phenomenologys exploration of the possible.14 Now that we have access to the full text of Husserls letter, Merleau-Pontys claims about this letter seem at best to be exaggerated.15 But the essential point, however wrong Merleau-Ponty might have been about Husserls own practice, is that the need for these sources is recognized. The image of the philosopher as someone cut oV from the world should not mislead us from the fact that Thales fell into the well because he was looking at the heavens, not because he was self-absorbed.16

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The dominance accorded to epistemology within much of twentieth-century philosophy has led philosophers to read back into the history of philosophy an obsession with epistemological issues that for the most part was foreign to it. This is, if one likes, another example of how the past can be reconstructed in the light of, and the better to support, a certain future. It is, however, a conception of philosophy that phenomenologists have tended to contest. Heidegger in Being and Time dismisses the epistemological problems that preoccupied modern philosophy with obvious disdain. Because Heidegger does not evade epistemology but confronts it head on, he can be taken up by analytic philosophers who do not see what is at stake in his thought. By contrast, Cornell West describes pragmatism as the American Evasion of Philosophy,17 by which he means that pragmatism is an evasion of the epistemology-centered philosophy that pervades modern philosophy. If phenomenology does not evade, but challenges directly the status of epistemologically-centered philosophy, there is a danger in privileging those parts of their writings that address those issues. One sees this still in the mainstream reception not just of Heidegger, but also of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, where what is most innovative and expansive in their conceptions of philosophy as a discipline remain marginalized. Phenomenology opens onto the excess beyond philosophy from which philosophy draws. DiVerent philosophers name that excess diVerently: experience, Being, the concrete, the ethical, the trace, and so on. Although I would readily oVer the Levinasian enigma as a counterexample, Jean-Luc Nancy is no doubt correct to identify in phenomenology and even in types of beyond-phenomenology a tendency to seek protection from that sense that exceeds the phenomenon in the phenomenon itself.18 Nevertheless, if phenomenology has often failed to open us up to the being or sense of appearing, it is not impossible to see that task as its vocation. If it has failed, it is because it has allowed itself to be constrained in its discourse by demands made on it from elsewhere. These demands are usually issued by philosophies that have established themselves as proper. The phrase philosophy proper serves one school of philosophy to claim possession of the eld. Philosophy is their property and so when they have the institutional power at their disposal to attack the place of other styles of philosophizing, they are inclined to use it. By contrast, phenomenology is a countermovement. It is anti-establishment of necessity. Or, rather, because it is aware of how certain forms of opposition serve, despite themselves, to sustain what they seek to contest, it is radical, revolutionary. Phenomenology cannot be passed down like a possession. It must always be reactivated, renewed. In the face of philosophy proper, phenomenology calls for the constant renewal of philosophy. Philosophy proper is, so far as the phenomenologist is concerned, impossible. Hence the phrase philosophy proper comes to have an

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ironic ring. A philosophy has lost touch with philosophizing when it becomes the established philosophy or, worse still, the philosophy of the establishment. Phenomenology contests philosophy proper. One form of phenomenologys confrontation with philosophy proper gives rise to the thought of the end of philosophy. In Heidegger this was not the abandonment of philosophy, but another beginning, which could be opened up only with reference to the rst beginning.19 Philosophy proper was what lay between the two beginnings, but that meant the restriction of philosophy to a uni ed Western metaphysical tradition that purportedly had began with Plato and ended with Nietzsche. Heidegger thus left behind as part of his legacy a highly derivative conception of the philosophical canon. The philosophical canon has not changed much since the end of the eighteenth century, which was when Western philosophy became inextricably tied to Europes selective memory of its cultural heritage. At that time, much that had previously been thought of as philosophy was relegated to religion. It was a process that was largely directed against the idea that there was philosophy outside Europe. Indeed, it was while con ning Indian philosophy to religion during his lectures on the history of philosophy that Hegel insisted, Die eigentliche Philosophie beginnt fr uns in Griechenland [For us philosophy proper begins in Greece].20 In the same spirit, Heidegger in the 1930s even explored the possibility of subtracting Christian philosophy from the history of Western philosophy, the better to show that all of philosophy could be traced back to its Greek beginnings. Heidegger, for his own purposes, thus performed on a larger scale the same operation that Carnap had performed on him. The term philosophy is overdetermined when it becomes a violent weapon of exclusion. Nevertheless, exclusion is an inevitable consequence of any attempt to establish a tradition. To have an identity at all, a tradition must be selective, partial. The problem arises when exclusive rights are claimed for any tradition. Heidegger did this when he declared that to say Western-European philosophy is a tautology because of its Greek origin.21 To my mind, Sartres recognition of the negritude movement and of Frantz Fanon as voices that must be heard in the West is more appropriate to the openness of phenomenology.22 But phenomenology has yet to face the challenge that faces all movements in philosophy that have grown up in the West in the last two centuries of whether it can open itself up to a plurality of traditions, the better to accommodate the resources oVered by all the world and not just Europe. However, there is reason for hope. Although one must beware of drawing parallels between feminist philosophy and, for example, African philosophy, simply because both have been excluded from the dominant discourse, there is a great deal of encouragement to be gained from the originality and vitality of feminist philosophy when written from a phenomenological perspective. Working within the phenomenological idiom, even while challenging some of its main proponents, Luce Irigaray draws

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on the experience of being a woman and has the freedom to be inventive with language as she seeks to say more than philosophy, as hitherto constituted, has been able to say. Indeed, Franz Fanon was already doing something similar when he gave his account of the lived experience of the Black. Stretching almost to breaking-point the language he had taken over from Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, Fanon brought to bear the language of the negritude poets, especially Aim Csaire. Fanons challenge to the Western ontological tradition, as also to psychoanalysis, was that it too readily expressed itself in the form of universal claims without inquiring beyond itself. He wrote: Jean-Paul Sartre forgot that the Negro suVers in his body diVerently than the White.23 It is insofar as phenomenology seeks the universal while not renouncing the singular, the concrete, that it surpasses philosophy as it has come to be conceived. Phenomenologists have tended to take seriously what claims thinking corporeality, language, history, experience without immediately identifying these things as limitations or as cause for worries about relativism. Yet phenomenology aspires to be more than the thoughts of an embodied human being belonging to a speci c culture, fed by unique experiences, expressing him or herself in a speci c language. This internal tension is perhaps the meaning of metontology.24 The Appendix on fundamental ontology in which metontology is introduced as the turnaround of fundamental ontology is governed by the task of preparing new originations. Metontology is the name given to the recognition that the metaphysical ontic is irreducible. The recognition is already operative in the second division of Being and Time in a particularly interesting form. The analytic of Dasein, undertaken in preparation for fundamental ontology, excludes at its very outset the possibility that it might be guided by a concrete ideal of existence. The philosopher in his or her concreteness undermines philosophys scienti c pretensions, but freed from these expectations, philosophy becomes open for identities. In Heideggers case this becomes German philosophy, an ominous choice in the context of the 1930s. But the restoration of an acknowledged association between a philosophy and the culture that gave rise to it opened phenomenology to pluralism and a new relation to the nonphilosophical sources from which it arises. One sees this possibility most clearly in the relation between Emmanuel Levinas readings of the Talmud and his philosophical works. Levinas warned against the title Jewish thinker in part because he does not appeal to religious texts as evidence, but also, one suspects, because he understood the label as an attempt to limit or deny the universal pretensions of all thought.25 However, once it is recognized that it is part of the strength of a thinking that it is rooted in a language, a culture, and a tradition, however hybrid or nomadic, then these labels can be heard diVerently. But then it would be more than philosophy proper, at least as that label has come to be understood.

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It would be nave to suppose that the future of phenomenology will be decided exclusively, or even mainly, on its philosophical merits. The philosophy that attracts the most institutional support does so as much because it seems safe at times of political crisis, or because it is not threatening, as for reasons of intellectual vigor or merit. What counts as good philosophy is subject to institutional pressures. But it is in no small measure because institutions matter that the ownership of the word philosophy matters. It would be easy for phenomenologists to renounce the term philosophy in the face of the polemic directed against their attempt to lay claim to a piece of the discipline. However, the debate over whether there is, for example, a speci cally African philosophy serves as a useful reminder as to what is at stake. Indeed, it is because phenomenologists have played their part in denying that there is African, Indian, and Chinese philosophy proper, that those philosophies will challenge, shape, and give birth to future phenomenologies.26 To believe that one can predict the future of phenomenology on the basis of its past would be to ignore phenomenologys own insight into the new as a radical excess over what has preceded. Similarly, to suppose that the past is given and cannot be changed after the fact would be to forget that what is to come changes the meaning of the past. In other words, the past continually undergoes a process of reinterpretation, rediscovery, and radical revision. This means that it is the future that will decide and redecide the meaning and contours of twentieth century phenomenology. This general law is particularly tting in the case of phenomenology because phenomenologists have been most adept at providing an account of temporality that does justice to the openness of the future. However, if in what has gone before, I have not always left the future open, but have set down possible directions it might take, this does not represent a contradiction. There is nothing wrong in wanting to have a voice in trying to determine phenomenologys future, even if to say it means going beyond what is proper.

NOTES
1. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus NijhoV, 1982), 12. 2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phnomnologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), xvi; translated by Colin Smith, under the title Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 1962), xxi. 3. Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink (The Hague: Martinus NijhoV, 1976), 9. 4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1961), 151. 5. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tbingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967), 2122; translated by Joan

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ROBERT BERNASCONI Stambaugh, under the title Being and Time (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 1920. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 383; Being and Time, 351. See also Robert Bernasconi, Heidegger and the Invention of the Western Philosophical Tradition, Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology 26, no. 3 (October 1995): esp. 24344. Wir wollen auf die Sachen selbst zurckgehen: Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. II/1, part 1 (Tbingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), 6; translated by J. N. Findlay, under the title Logical Investigations, vol. I (London: Routledge, 1970), 252. Compare Also muss auf Kant zurckgegangen werden! Otto Liebmann, Kant und die Epigonen (Stuttgart: Carl Schober, 1865), 110, 156, and 203; see also 10, 139, and 215. For interpretations of this phrase, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Die phnomenologische Bewegung, in Gesammelte Werke (Tbingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1987), 3:11718; translated by David E. Linge, under the title Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 14445. Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tbingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969), 90; translated by Joan Stambaugh, under the title On Time and Being (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 82. Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, vol. 12 of Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1985), 114; translated by Peter D. Herz, under the title On the Way to Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 29. Translation modi ed. See already Edmund Husserl, Zur Phnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (18931917), Husserliana 10 (The Hague: Martinus NijhoV, 1966), 371; translated by John Brough, under the title On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), 382. Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 130; On the Way to Language, 42. Martin Heidegger, Was heisst Denken? (Tbingen: Niemeyer, 1954); translated by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, under the title What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978). Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Les sciences de lhomme et la phnomnologie (Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire, n.d.), 5052; translated by John Wild, under the title Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man, in The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays, ed. James Elie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 9091. Edmund Husserl, An Lvy-Bruhl, 11.III.1935, in vol. 7 of Briefwechsel, ed. Karl Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 16164. Plato, Theaetetus 174a. Cornell West, The American Evasion of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). Jean-Luc Nancy, Le sens du monde (Paris: ditions Galile, 1993), 35; translated by JeVrey S. Librett, under the title The Sense of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 17. See, for example, Martin Heidegger, Einfhrung in die Metaphysik (Tbingen: Niemeyer, 1966), 29; translated by R. Manheim, under the title An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 29. On the logic of another beginning, see Robert Bernasconi, The Transformation of Language at Another Beginning, in Heidegger in Question (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1993), 190210. G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Gesichichte der Philosophie Teil 1, vol. 6 of Vorlesungen, ed. Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994), 347. M. Heidegger, Was ist das die Philosophie? (Pfullingen: Neske, 1956), 13; translated by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde, under the title What is Philosophy? (London: Vision Press, 1958), 31. Jean-Paul Sartre, Orphe Noir, in Anthologie de la nouvelle posie ngre et malgache, ed. Lopold Sdar-Senghor (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), ixxlv; translated by John MacCombie, under the title Black Orpheus, in What is Literature? And Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 291330. Jean-Paul Sartre, Prface, to Les damns de la

6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21.

22.

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23.

24.

25. 26.

terre, (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 3761; translated by Constance Farrington, as Preface, to The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 731. Frantz Fanon, Lexprience vcue du Noir, Esprit 19, no. 179 (May 1951): 677; translated by Valentine Moulard, under the title The Lived Experience of the Black, in Race, ed. R. Bernasconi (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming). M. Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde der Logik, vol. 26 of Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), 196202; translated by Michael Heim, under the title The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 15459. Emmanuel Levinas, Entretiens, in Franois Poiri, Emmanuel Levinas. Qui tes-vous? (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1987), 11011. See Robert Bernasconi, African Philosophys Challenge to Continental Philosophy, in Postcolonial African Philosophy, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 18396.