Corpus v. Paje (1969) Capistrano, J Facts: 1. Dec. 23, 1956 Collision bet Victory Liner bus, driven by res.

Felardo Paje and a Jeep driven Clemente Marcia. Clemente died. 2. Information FILED against Paje: Homicde and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Heirs of Clemente (Pet.) reserved their right to independent civil action for damages. 3. CFI Pampanga held Paje to be Guilty. He appealed with the CA. 4. Nov. 21, 1961While on appeal in the CA, Pet. FILED: with CFI Rizal, a separate civil action for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Paje and Victory Liner. 5. However CA: reversed CFI Pampanga and acquitted Paje. 6. Defendants therefore filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal by the CA. The motion was denied. 7. CFI: still dismissed but based on the prescription of the action of QD. Appealed directly to CA. Issue: w/n the civil case should be dismissed. Decision: YES, it should be dismissed. 1. The acquittal was a bar to the civil action for damages that was based on the criminal negligence (RPC 100 action). 2. Art 33 is not applicable since Crim Negligence, Reckless Imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Art 33. There is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with the said offense. a. Art 33 only mentions Defamation, Fraud (estafa), and physical injuries (includes homicide1). b. BUT the charge against Paje was reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. NOT for Homicide and physical injuries. c. People v. Buan2 - Ciminal Negligence under RPC 365 penalizes the negligent act not the results thereof. d. Rules of Court 111 3 the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon the same act. 3. Assuming arguendo that civil case for damages was based on QD it has already prescribed. Since QD must be instituted within 4yrs, and Dec 1956Nov 1961 is more than 4yrs. PREMISES CONSIDERED order AFFIRMED. Case dismissed. -Czarina Dee FOOTNOTES (since they are long and they seem to be cited everywhere) Opinion of Ponente Capistrano Footnote 1: Dyogi et al v. Yatco that physical injuries in Art33 includes murder is contrary to the spirit of the law. He recalls that in the deliberation:
1 2

Opinion of Ponente when he was a member of the Code Commission G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968.

a. US injured party in crime has the initiative to file a civil action. BUT in Phil the offended party has to rely on the fiscal to demand damages. b. Art 32 and 34 as drafter, was intended to teach Filipinos the American way by going immediately to the courts to file civil action for damages in vindication of his consti rights and liberties. Footnote 2: 1. Heirs correctly reserved their right to institute separate civil action. However the civil action was prematurely institute since Rule111 3 provides that after a criminal action has been commenced no civil action arising from the same offense may be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. 2. In this case the criminal action was not final, it was on appeal. Therefore the CA acquitting Paje, extinguished the civil action for damages filed against him in accordance with Rule 111 3(c) which provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might not arise and did not exist 3. Chantangco v. Abaroa Rule 111 2 is defective and imperfect in many ways. It provides: a. Independent Civil Action - In the cases provided for in Art 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought b. FIRST Prob: Art 31 does not provide for an independent civil action. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act of omission complained of as a felony, such civil action is not an independent civil action within the meaning of Art 32, 33, and 34. (I understood this as, its an action it itself not based on any criminal act) c. SECOND Prob: CC 2177 also does not provide for an independent civil action in crime. The article precisely distinguishes a QD from criminal negligence and authorizes the institution of a civil action based not on the criminal negligence (delict) but based on the QD. d. THIRD Prob: Rule 111 2 in relation to Art 32, 33, and 34 were enacted specifically as exceptions to the Gen Rule in Rule 111 1. The rule may also be viewed as an unauthorized amendment (made by the SC) on the Civil Code.