ueryday Life.

Oxford:
Formal Ethicsif Values
ersity Press. '
r, and theEmotions:
:y Press.
'heory: Essayson Mind,
ress.
ansformation of
l: BasilBlackwell.
sek Philosophy and.LueraJ!ure..
ibridge: MIT Press.
ook at Metaphor."
r the Theory ifSocial Behaviour 2 I :4
852.5
__ ~ " ' A C ' of Positioning
HARRE AND LUK VAN LANGENHOVE
I. INTRODUCTION
CO]llCt:Pl of positioning can be used as a dynamic alternative to the more
'c concept of role. Talking of positions instead of roles fits within the
ework of an emerging body of new ideas about the ontology of social
omena. Hence before embarking upon a detailed presentation of the
ept of positioning, a few words have to be said about this new ontological
digm within the social sciences.
though there have always been many epistemological differences amongst
al scientists, there does seem to be a relative ontological consensus about
t the relevant social entities are that make up the subject matters of the
al sciences, the 'substances' of the social world, so to speak. In the standard
logy, three different levels of societal phenomena are usually considered:
Ie,institutions and societies. People tend to be treated as complex, causally
acting 'things'; institutions as groupings of people (the personnel or staff);
societies as higher order aggregates of people groups. As thing like
stances each ofthem can be located in the Newtonian-Euclidian space/time
ofthe natural world.just like natural entities and phenomena. This seems
obvious that it hardly receives any attention. However, by locating social
enomena within a natural world locations grid, the door is opened for the
.IIoticed transposing ofproperties ofthe natural world to the social realm. As a
ult, the social realm is all too often pictured as one in which causes are
terministic in a Humean sense and in which space and time are independent.
e Humean aspects of the social sciences have in recent years been much
ticized (e.g. Harre and Secord, 1972 and Manicas, 1987) and several
empts to formulate alternative ways oftheorizing and researching have been
394 Rom Harre and Luk van Langenhove
undertaken (e.g. ethnomethodology, ethogenics, structuration
on ... ). In most cases however, the Newtonian and Euclidian sp.ace:/tirrif'
has been left unquestioned as the framework in which social phenomena
be considered. This is however not as obvious as it seems to be at first glance
course, social phenomena are always located in a timet space grid but this
not necessarily have to imply that this is also the most adequate referential
in which to study them, particularly when questions about the
and identity of social entities and phenomena are raised. The complexf
linking material thing, property and process to places and momentli
Newtonian space/time may not be transferable to the social world. Besides,e\T
in the natural sciences that referential grid is no longer considered to be the tid
possible one: both on a cosmological and quantum physical scale the tim
space grid has proved to be inadequate and other grids have been constructed
which the independence of physical space from time vanishes. In Harre (lg8
it is argued that the time/space grid is equally inadequate for locating a
understanding social phenomena. As an alternative the persons/conversati6
referential grid is proposed to go along with a reassessment of assumpti6
about the 'substance' of social and psychological realities. If social ac
including speech acts are taken as the 'matter' ofsocial reality, a newgrid can
constructed in which people are seen as locations for social acts. As a
set of possible and actual locations, the array of persons is not
Euclidian. The grid of temporal locations, the time-aspect of human life,a
changes. The distinction between past, present and future does not go OY.
neatly into psychological time partly because the social and psychological p
is not fixed. The social future can influence the social past. The occurrences
acts are the moments ofsocial time.
Within such a persons/acts referential grid, the social realm can be picmre
as composed of three basic processes: conversations, institutional practices an
the uses ofsocietal rhetorics; all forms of discursive practice. Conversationsar
the most basic substance of the social realm. It is within conversations that t
social world is created, just as causality linked things with properties
constitute the natural world. Within conversations, social acts and societal ico
are generated and reproduced. This is achieved by two discursive proces
which we propose to call POSITIONING and RHETORICAL
latter can be understood as the discursive construction of stories abo
institutions and macrosocial events that make them intelligible as societal iC9
(Harre, 1975). The former will be discussed in the following paragraphs. No
that the elements of the standard ontology (people, institutions and societi
can be understood within the new ontology in terms of both positioning
rhetorical redescription.
The idea of psychology as the study of discursive practices is the cent.
intuition in the methodological background to the argument of this pape
Many, ifnot most mental phenomena are produced discursively. By this wed
mean that discursive
''';oteDlce. Many mental p
nthe relevant discursive
und in the writings of
veniste: "It is in and
bject, because language
Benveniste, quoted in:
hilosophy ofpsychology,
psychological states is bas,
what fulfills them meet in
The concepts of 'position
theirorigins in the field of
strategies that allow one
(Ries & Trout, 1981). Thi
inthat sense a posi tion is a
the social sciences, the co
introduced by Hollway (I
in the area of heterosexu
discourses, Hollway spok
"Discourses make availab
in relation to other peop
women and men are pla
which a particular discoi
usageof these concepts is
Within the persons/cor
discursive construction
intelligible and relativel:
members ofthe conversat
location or 'position' is, \\
instantly recognized and
not immediately intelligil
person mean by that?), ;
1990 ) .
Aposition in a converse
to which a person's 'r
compendiously collected
powerful or powerless,
definitive or tentative an'
how a speaker's contribi
ructuration theo
l Euclidian space/ti
1 social
ems to be at first gla
net space grid butth
st adequate referenrl
ns about the individ
raised. The
) places and
esocial world. Besides
:er considered to be tIl
m physical scale the
idshave been construe]
e vanishes. In Har(I
iadequate for locatill
'e the persons/conversa
eassessment of assump
.al realities. If social
:ial reality, a new
Dr social acts. As a
f persons is not necessa.
ie-aspect of human life,
.nd future does not go
ocial and psychological
:ial past. The occurrell
social realm can be pictu
IS, institutional practices
practice. Conversations
vithin conversations thad
:l things with properties
i, social acts and societal iCD
by two discursive proc
rORICAL REDESCRIPTION.
instruction of stories abo
m intelligible as societal ic
e following paragraphs.
ile, institutions and
erms of both
rrsive practices is the
the argument of this
zeddiscursively. By this
Varieties oj Positioning 395
that discursive activities cause mental phenomena to come into
Many mental phenomena, like attitudes or emotions, are immanent
he relevant discursive activities themselves. Something of this idea can be
d in the writings of Bakhtin (1986). It is explicit in the work of E.
veniste: "It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a
bject, because language establishes the concept in ..."
envenis
te,
quoted in: SIlverman, 1983). Much of Wlttgenstem s (1953)
losophy of psychology, particularly his treatment offuture or other directed
chological states is based on his thought that, for example, expectations and
at fulfills them meet in language.
2. MODES OF POSITIONING
e concepts of 'position' and 'positioning' that we want to introduce have
eir origins in the field of marketing where a position refers to communication
rategies that allow one to 'place' a certain product amongst its competitors
ies& Trout, 19
81).
This usage is close to the military meaning ofa 'position':
that sense a position is always taken against the position of the enemy. Within
thesocial sciences, the concepts of 'position' and 'positioning' have been first
illtroduced by Hollway (1984) in her analysis of the construction of subjectivity
in the area of heterosexual relations. Focussing on gender differentiation in
discourses, Hollway spoke of 'positioning oneself and 'taking up positions':
"Discoursesmake available positions for subjects to take up. These positions are
in relation to other people. Like the subject and object of a sentence (...),
vomen and men are placed in relation to each other through the meanings
\'lhich a particular discourse makes available" (Hollway, 19
84,
p. 23
6
). Our
sageof these concepts is in line with how Hollway used them.
Within the persons/conversations grid, positioning can be understood as the
discursive construction of personal stories that make a person's actions
intelligible and relatively determinate as social acts and within which the
membersof the conversation have specific locations.]ust what a conversational
location or 'position' is, will be explained below. While some social actions are
instantly recognized and accepted as determinate acts, other actions are either
not immediately intelligible or their status as acts is questionable (what did the
person mean by that?), and may even be radically indeterminate (Tannen,
1990 ) .
Apositionin a conversation then is a metaphorical concept through reference
to which a person's 'moral' and personal attributes as a speaker are
compendiously collected. One can position oneself or be positioned as e.g.
powerful or powerless, confident or apologetic, dominant or submissive,
definitive or tentative and so on. A "position" can be specified by reference to
how a speaker's contributions are hearable with respect to these and other
396 RomHarreandLuk vanLangenhove
polarities of character, and sometimes even of role. Positioned as
one's cry of pain is hearable as a plea for help. But positioned as uo:mUlan
similar cry can be heard as a protest or even as a reprimand. It can easuv ho
that illocutionary force and position mutually determine one
Conversations have story-lines and the positions people take in a
will be linked to these story-lines. Someone can be seen as acting like a lea.Cll'eri
the way his/her talk takes on a familiar form: the story-line ofinstruction
,
goings-on in the classroom. Living out in one's speech and actions one
pedagogical story-lines involves adopting such and such a position, and
same time it makes one's sayings and doings relatively determinate as
of instruction, correction, reprimand, congratulation and so on.
Thus in positioning, selves are located in conversations "as observably
subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story-lines" (Davies
Harre, 1990). The structure of such conversations is tri-polar it
positions, story-lines and relatively determinate speech acts. Several anal"tical
distinctions can be introduced regarding positioning which together will
the possible forms in which positioning can occur as a discursive practice.
a. First andsecond order positioning
The most basic distinction is that between first and second order
First order positioning refers to the way persons locate themselves and
within an essentially moral space by using several categories and story-lines.
instance, ifJones says to Smith: "Please, iron my shirts", then both Smith
Jones are positioned by that utterance. Jones as somebody who has the
right (or as someone who thinks he has the moral right) to command Smith,
Smith as someone who can be commanded by Jones. When such a positioning
occurs, two things can happen. Smith can indeed do Jones' ironing (in that case
Smith is perhaps Jones' servant) and the story-line will evolve without
questioning of the positioning. E.g., Smith can continue the conversation
saying: "Yes of course, which one do you need immediately?" But Smith
also object to what J ones said and answer something like "Why should
YOUR ironing? I'm not your maid". We can imagine that in this case Smith
instance Jones's wife. At this moment a second order positioning
which the first order positioning is questioned and has to be negotiated.
will have to make a case why he - who always pays lip-service to fenlinisml--+
wants his wife to do his ironing. The story-line then will shift from its
subject to the story itself In other words, second order positioning occurs
the first order positioning is not taken for granted by one ofthe persons involved
in the discussion. Note that it is an essential feature of rituals that second
positioning is impossible. Ifone tries to impose a second order positioning
ritual, then the person trying to do so will be said to "break" the ritual.
A somewhat sir
performative an
position themselj
thus made deter!
order or I
revISIlJn, it can t
vosinonings can
case discuss
conver:,ation. Bo
both involve ta
accountive posit:
outside 1
vos:itiomng. Sud
involve other pe
instance, Jones c
Smith concernii
positioned as a r
Of course, in telli
again involved i
story about the:
theevent. Jones 1
c. Moral andpets
People can be pc
social actions. It
given moral ordi
intelligible and t
to make his bed,
weknow that Sr
order positioninj
heasked her to c
frommoral to P'
canno longer rei
story that accou
roles. Such a stc
E.g.: "I am sorr
just received thi:
morally, they ca
particularities.
ofrole. Positioned ascle
lp. But positioned as do
, a reprimand. It can easil
rtually determine one-
ions people take in a
.nbe seen as acting like a tg
the story-line ofinstructio
ae's speech and actions 0
ch and such a position, all
datively determinate
atulation and so on.
conversations "as observab
produced story-lines" (Da\Ti
ersations is tri -polar it cOIlS
late speech acts. Several anal
.itioning which together will
occur as a discursive practic
first and second order positi
rsons locate themselves and 0
veral categories and story-lin
n my shirts", then both Smi
es as somebody who has the
.oral right) to command Smith
by]ones. When such a positi
deed do]ones' ironing (in tha
story-line will evolve withou
can continue the conversati
reed immediately?" But Smit!i
something like "Why should
imagine that in this case Smith,i
iecond order positioning OCC1.1
led and has to be negotiated.
vays pays lip-service to feminis
.line then will shift from its ori
cond order positioning occurs
anted by one of the persons inv
I feature of ri tuals that second
Jose a second order positionin
be said to "break" the ritual.
Varieties ofPositioning 397
erformative andaccountive positioning
mewhat similar though not identical distinction is the one between
ormative and accountive positioning. In first order positioning people
ition themselves and others within an on-going and lived story-line. The acts
s made determinate have immediate perlocutionary effect. As this is unlike
nd order or reflexive positioning when such acts are subject to challenge or
ision, it can therefore also be called performative positioning. First order
can be questioned in two ways: either within the conversation (as in
case discussed above) or within another conversation about the first
Ilversation. Both cases can be seen as forms of accountive positioning as they
th involve talk about talk. Second order positioning thus amounts to
countive positioning within an ongoing discussion. Ifaccountive positioning
curs outside the initial discussion, then this can be called third order
sitioning. Such third order positioning can, but does not necessarily have to,
volveother persons than the ones performing in the original discussion. For
tance,]ones can talk to Adams about the conversation he had with his wife
rnith concerning the ironing. A story is then created in which Smith is
ositioned as a radical feminist because she would not even do]ones' ironing.
fcourse, in telling that story and replying to it, both]ones and Adams are also
gain involved in first order positioning of themselves. And what is more, the
tory about the ironing-conversation will also be a rhetorical redescription of
eevent.]ones will not reiterate to Adams all that was said by him and his wife.
Moral andpersonal positioning
eoplecan be positioned with regard to the moral orders in which they perform
cial actions. It is often sufficient to refer to the roles people occupy within a
ivenmoral order or to certain institutional aspects of social life to make actions
htelligible and to understand the positions that people take. IfSmith asks]ones
t()make his bed, then this first order positioning can be perfectly understood if
ve know that Smith is a patient and]ones a nurse. But if we consider a second
order positioning in which Smith asks]ones why she has not made his bed yet as
heasked her to do, then the story-line between Smith and]ones is likely to shift
from moral to personal positioning. In order to answer Smith's question, Jones
n no longer reply by referring to her role as a nurse. She will have to bring in a
ory that accounts for the 'deviance' ofwhat was expected from her in terms of
les. Such a story is likely to contain references to individual particularities.
"I am sorry I forgot to make your bed, but I ama bit confused today as I
'ust received this letter in which ...". Thus, people can not only be positioned
orally, they can also be positioned in terms of their individual properties and
larticlilarities. Such personal positioning can range from rather general, using
39
8
RomHarreandLuk van Langenhove
very broad categories (e.g. "Jones is a nice nurse"), to very detailed
several elements of the person's characteristics including the ute-histo-t
brought in (e.g.: "I once had an incredible nurse who was actually the daug
of. .."). When people are positioned or position themselves, this will ai\
include both a moral and a personal positioning. The more a person's atti
cannot be made intelligible by references to roles, the more prominent
personal positioning will be.
d. Self andother positioning
Positioning is a discursive practice. As already indicated above, withi
conversation each of the participants always positions the other \V
simultaneously positioning him or herself. Whenever somebody positions h
herself, this discursive act always implies a positioning of the one who
addressed. And similarly, when somebody positions somebody else, that alw<l.
implies a positioning of the person him/herself. In any discursive practi
positioning constitutes the Self and the others in certain ways and at the sa.
time it is a resource through which all persons involved can negotiate
positions.
e. Tacit andintentional positioning
Most first order positioning will be of a tacit kind: the people involved
position themselves or others in an intentional or even conscious way. But whe
a person is acting in a 'machiavellian' way, or on occasions where (s)he is lyi
or teasing, the first order positioning can be intentional. E.g. Smith can say
Jones "Iron my shirt", not because he really needs a clean shirt but in order
demonstrate or test his dominance ofJones. Second and third order positioniri
must always be intentional. But while an intentional second order positioning']
going on, a tacit first order positioning will have occurred as well.
The above analytical discussions allow us to distinguish between three typic
kinds of positioning talk. First, there are the discursive practices in which peop
position themselves, position others and are positioned by them. This kind
talk comprises first order acts of positioning, mostly of a tacit nature. SuS
performative positioning talk takes place within an evolving story-line. .T
perlocutionary effects ofsuch talk include constraints on and openings for ki
ofillocutionary acts available to speakers as so and so positioned. This folIo
directly since a position is just a set of 'locations' on a variety of polar pairs
moral attributes.
Sf'conoly, there are the di
rst kind become a topic or
bout, the on-going story-li
IUmby someone else's discu:
positioning. The perlocutio
block or accept the perlocui
We could call the discursiv.
ctsare accomplished secor
Thirdly, there are discur
topic the first or second on
practice than the current (
practice, namely that of w
first and second order. It mi
drawingthe attention of Spl
oftheir habitual discursive
confined to the writing pra,
aswhensomeone spells out
certain remark was patron
3- SITUAT
positioning always takes F
speaking. What Jones can
rights, duties and obligati
process occurs. In other
positioningare unequally
an intentional positioning
positioningrelates to mora
remaining part of this pap
possible moral order conte
be identified relative to
situations of deliberate sel
(iii) situations of delibera
positioning of others. Th
products of the performat
insection I (see table I).
discussed below. Of cours
merely analytic and th
positioning occur simulta
focus on one pregnant as]
se"), to very detailed
; including the
:who was actually
on themselves, this wi
Ig. The more a nPror,n','
roles, the more PfiDIliliIlI
ady indicated above,
ays positions the
enever somebody pClsitiorls
positioning of the
itions somebody else,
self In any discursive
in certain ways and at
ons involved can negotiate
cind: the people involved
l or even conscious way.
r on occasions where (s)he
intentional. E.g. Smith
needs a clean shirt but in
.econd and third order
ntional second order positionii
lave occurred as well.
odistinguish between three
liscursive practices in which
: positioned by them. This
Ig, mostly of a tacit
vithin an evolving otr,nT_I11np.
nstraints on and openings
; so and so positioned.
tions' on a variety of polar
Varieties ofPositioning 399
there are the discursive practices in which acts of positioning of the
become a topic or target. Such positioning-talk occurs within, but is
t the on-going story-line. Thus for someone to refuse a positioning laid on
by someone else's discursive practices is to act relative to that original act of
sitioning. The perlocutionary effect of such accountive practices is to delete,
ckor accept the perlocutionary effect of discursive practices ofthe first type.
can the discursive practices by which these second order positioning
are accomplished second order practices.
hirdly, there are discursive practices in which the positioning-talk has as a
ic the first or second order positioning that occurred in another discursive
actice than the current one. This paper is itself the product of a discursive
actice, namely that of writing about discursive positioning practices of the
st and second order. It might have all sorts ofperlocutionary effects, including
awingthe attention ofspeakers to the nature ofwhat they have said, the effect
their habitual discursive practices etc. Such third order accountive talk is not
nfinedto the writing practices ofsociolinguists. It also occurs in everyday life,
whensomeone spells out what that interlocutor has said. An accusation that a
rtain remark was patronizing would be a case in point.
g. SITUATIONS FOR LNTENTIONAL POSITIONING
ositioning always takes place within the context of a specific moral order of
eaking. What Jones can say to Smith and about Smith is relative to Jones'
ghts, duties and obligations within the moral order in which the discursive
rocess occurs. In other words, the rights for self-positioning and other-
sitioning are unequally distributed and not all situations allow for or call for
intentional positioning the participants. The subtle way in which tacit
sitioning relates to moralities is discussed in Davies and Harre (1990). In the
ternainingpart of this paper, we will focus on intentional positioning. Across all
possible moral order contexts, four distinct forms of intentional positioning can
be identified relative to the discursive situations in which they occur: (i)
tuations of deliberate self-positioning; (ii) situations offorced self-positioning,
ii) situations of deliberate positioning of others and (iv) situations of forced
sitioning of others. These four types of positioning can be understood as
oducts of the perforrnative/accountive and self/other dimensions introduced
section I (see table I). Each of these types ofintentional positioning will be
uscussed below. Of course it should be noted that again these distinctions are
analytic and that whenever positioning occurs, several forms of
lositio:niulg occur simultaneously. In the discussion below, we will each time
on one pregnant aspect of positioning talk.