Hazardous Materials

30
Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

30.1 Introduction and Signicance of Earthquake-Caused Hazardous Materials Incidents 30.2 The Loma Prieta Earthquake 30.3 The Northridge Earthquake 30.4 The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
Hazmat Storage Facilities Gasoline Stations LPG Leak Chemical Releases and Fires
30.5 Earthquake-Caused HAZMAT Incidents at Educational Institutions and Laboratories

The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake The 1948 Fukui Earthquake The 1964 Niigata Earthquake The 1968 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake The 1978 Santa Barbara Earthquake The 1978 Miyagiken-Oki Earthquake The 1983 Coalinga Earthquake The 1985 Chile Earthquake The 1987 Whittier-Narrows Earthquake The 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake The 1993 Kushiro-Oki Earthquake The 1994 Northridge Earthquake The 1994 Sanriku-Haruka-Oki Earthquake The 1995 Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake
30.6 Damage and Corrective Actions at Japanese Petroleum Facilities

The 1964 Niigata Earthquake The 1978 Miyagiken-Oki Earthquake The 1984 Nihonkai-Chubu Earthquake Effectiveness of Hazard Mitigation at Japanese Petroleum Facilities
30.7 Lessons Learned

Reluctance to Divulge Information Reportable Quantities Documentation Mitigation Works Laboratory Fires Storage Areas Laboratories Asbestos Biohazards Compressed Gas Cylinders
30.8 Mitigation Approaches

Inventory Reduction Separation of Incompatibles Anchoring of Storage Shelves and Cabinets Reagent Vessels and Containers Pressurized Gas Cylinders Pipes and Piping Connections Glass Education
Guna Selvaduray
San Jose State University San Jose, CA
2003 by CRC Press LLC
30.9 Problem Areas That Must Be Addressed 30.10 Conclusions Acknowledgments References
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Earthquake Engineering Handbook
30.1 Introduction and Signicance of Earthquake-Caused Hazardous Materials Incidents

This chapter deals with hazardous materials (HAZMAT) release due to earthquakes, and the mitigation of this problem. Reports of earthquake-caused damage have tended to focus primarily on structural collapse, and HAZMAT incidents that occur during earthquakes have been reported only when they have resulted in major conagrations, such as the petroleum res that followed the 1964 Niigata earthquake. This lack of recognition reected societys general lack of awareness of the importance of HAZMATrelated problems until recently, and it is noteworthy that the rst paper on HAZMAT incidents that occurred during earthquakes was not presented until 1982 [Reitherman, 1982]. The occurrence of HAZMAT incidents during earthquakes has special signicance due to a number of factors. First and foremost, from an earthquake-response perspective, it is desirable to reduce the number of incidents that require response after an earthquake. The agencies that are trained to respond to HAZMAT incidents are not equipped for (and do not expect) a large number of occurrences within a relatively small geographic region, and within a very narrow time frame. In the event of an earthquake, however, far more than the usual number of hazardous materials incidents can occur, not only within a small geographic region, but also within a very short time frame. Approximately 75% of HAZMAT releases after an earthquake are addressed by the facilities owners and contractors, rather than publicagency responders who are overloaded at such times. A reduction in the number of HAZMAT incidents during an earthquake can therefore be expected to reduce the strain on response agencies that already will be heavily burdened. The occurrence of HAZMAT incidents during earthquakes has resulted in damage to the environment. The uncontrolled release of hazardous materials, at any time, poses a threat to the environment. Perhaps the most notable earthquake-related environmental incident was the oil spill at the Tohoku Petroleum Renery outside Sendai, Japan, during the Miyagiken-oki earthquake of 1978. Approximately 770,000 gallons of petroleum owed out from the damaged storage tanks into the bay adjacent to the renery [Selvaduray, 1986]. Contamination of bodies of water also occurred during the Northridge and Kushirooki earthquakes. There is the potential for contamination not only of oceans and waterways but also of underground water sources and soils surrounding the facilities that contain the hazardous materials. There is an economic incentive for preventing the release of hazardous materials, especially when such a release can result in the contamination of the soil and underground and aboveground water sources. Cleanup efforts are extremely expensive; it is far more economical to prevent an uncontrolled release than to clean it up. The HAZMAT spill at the Coalinga High School chemistry laboratory resulted in cleanup costs of approximately $90,000 [Tierney, 1985]. A conservative estimate for the cleanup of the HAZMAT spill at the California State University, Northridge (CSUN) chemistry laboratories was between $5 and 7 million [Norton, 1997]. Implementation of hazard mitigation measures that could have prevented these spills would have cost signicantly less. Another motivating factor to reduce the occurrence of earthquake-caused hazardous materials incidents pertains to the nature of the industries that either handle or use hazardous materials. With the progress of science and technology, there is a rapid emergence of new chemicals and reagents that are being used. The potential consequences of incidents involving these reagents and chemicals are not always fully known prior to the occurrence of spills or incidents. In some cases, the incidents involve a number of different materials, with varying properties and characteristics, and posing different threats, thus making response rather difcult. Also, a number of facilities that either manufacture or handle hazardous materials were constructed prior to the establishment of regulations requiring adequate safety measures, and thus may be particularly vulnerable. A worldwide listing of HAZMAT incidents that have been reported for earthquakes prior to 1996 is contained in Table 30.1. It should be noted that there is a signicant disparity in the number of HAZMAT incidents between the Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes on the one hand, and all other earthquakes on the other hand. This is due to the fact that, for these two earthquakes, data pertaining to
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TABLE 30.1 Listing of Hazardous Materials Incidents That Have Occurred during Past Earthquakes
Earthquake Name Long Beach Fukui Kern County Alaska Niigata Tokachi-oki Santa Rosa San Fernando Nicaragua Izuhanto-oki Peru Tangshan, China Izuoshima-kinkai Miyagi-ken-oki Santa Barbara Imperial Valley Livermore Chibaken Chubu Greece Urakawa-oki Coalinga Nihonkai-Chubu Nemuro-hanto oki Morgan Hill Nagano-ken Seibu Chile Mexico City Palm Springs El Salvador New Zealand Ecuador Whittier-Narrows Chibaken Toho-oki Quebec Loma Prieta Costa Rica Kushiro-oki Hokkaido Nansei-oki Northridge Date Mar 33 Jun 48 Jul 52 Mar 64 Jun 64 May 68 Oct 69 Feb 71 Dec 72 May 74 Oct 74 Jul 76 Jan 78 Jun 78 Aug 78 Oct 79 Jan 80 Sep 80 Feb 81 Mar 82 May 83 May 83 Jun 83 Apr 84 Sep 84 Mar 85 Sep 85 Jul 86 Oct 86 Mar 87 Mar 87 Oct 87 Dec 87 Nov 88 Oct 89 Mar 90 Jan 93 Jul 93 Jan 94 M (magnitude) 6.3 7.3 7.7 8.0 7.5 7.9 5.6 6.4 6.3 6.8 7.5 7.8 7.0 7.4 5.1 6.6 5.8 6.1 6.7 7.9 6.7 7.7 7.4 6.2 6.8 7.8 8.1 5.9 5.4 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.7 6.0 7.1 6.9 7.5 7.8 6.7 Incidents (#) 13 4 4 30 30 17 1 29 1 1 2 1 1 23 2 6 8 1 1 2 26 67 1 1 1 5 2 2 2 1 3 20 11 3 490 1 5 11 387
HAZMAT releases were specically sought out; there were probably more HAZMAT releases during previous earthquakes, they simply were not recorded and reported. The Loma Prieta earthquake of October 1989 was the rst earthquake in the United States (and perhaps in the world) to be specically researched for HAZMAT releases and incidents. A total of 490 incidents were identied [Perkins and Wyatt, 1992]. The Northridge earthquake of January 1994 was also investigated for HAZMAT releases, and 387 HAZMAT incidents were identied [Selvaduray, 1997]. Urban earthquakes, such as the 1994 Northridge earthquake, have also caused res. In some cases there were major conagrations, some of which were associated with hazardous materials. The Four Corners pipeline break in the Northridge earthquake, at Huntington and Laurel Canyon Roads, resulted in petroleum vapors inltrating the area. When the vapors were ignited, a major conagration ensued, resulting in 14 automobiles and several homes being burned [LAFD, 1994]. In the chemistry laboratories of CSUN, three separate res were ignited, due to gas leaks and chemical reactions. The res destroyed,
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totally or in part, nine science laboratories, and burned for approximately 5 hours. One of the res reignited several times, and was fully extinguished only after approximately 15 hours [Kupfer, 1994]. The more recent earthquakes in Turkey and in Taiwan have also resulted in HAZMAT releases and res. In Turkey, the Tupras renery was set ablaze, with its 700,000 tons of oil, resulting in air pollution due to the smoke; the toxic waste dump at Petkim sustained large cracks with potential leaks; and a factory producing synthetic bers suffered chemical leaks [BBC, 1999]. The outbreak of several res across Taiwan in the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake was also reported [PBS, 1999]. The discussion of structural issues as they pertain to HAZMAT incidents is specically not covered in this chapter. If a failure occurs in a structure that contains hazardous materials (e.g., a building in which a chemical laboratory is located), then there is bound to be release of hazardous materials. The obvious solution to such a problem is to address the structural integrity of the building, which is the purview of the structural engineering community, which has taken admirable steps toward addressing this issue. The focus of this chapter, therefore, is on the release of hazardous materials when there is no contributing structural damage. The vast majority of failures that have resulted in HAZMAT releases during earthquakes can be summarized as follows [Perkins and Wyatt, 1990]: 1. 2. 3. 4. Failure of buildings and structures Dislodging of asbestos or encapsulated asbestos Breakage of underground pipelines due to soil movement Damage to aboveground pipelines, including process piping, due to: 4.1. Differential movement between pipes and structures or equipment 4.2. Impact from other structures or equipment 4.3. Damage from failing pipe supports 4.4. Damage/rupture at threaded connections Failure of cylindrical storage tanks due to: 5.1. Buckling of side walls 5.2. Sloshing 5.3. Corrosion Toppling of elevated tanks Shifting and overturning of horizontal tanks Sloshing from open tanks Falling containers and shelves, particularly in: 9.1. Hospitals 9.2. Laboratories 9.3. Retail stores 9.4. Storage warehouses Problems due to sliding, overturning, or internal failures of industrial equipment
5.
6. 7. 8. 9.
10.
Some examples of HAZMAT releases during past earthquakes are shown in Figures 30.1 through 30.5. In Sections 30.2 through 30.4 of this chapter, the occurrences of hazardous materials incidents during the Loma Prieta, Northridge, and Hanshin-Awaji earthquakes are described, as illustrations of the issues. These earthquakes are particularly important because they occurred in areas that are urban and industrialized. Section 30.5 describes the occurrence of earthquake-caused HAZMAT incidents at educational institutions. This topic is particularly relevant because the ndings from the Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes indicate that approximately 50% of HAZMAT incidents occur in laboratories. Section 30.6 provides a description of incidents that occurred at Japanese petroleum facilities during the 1964 Niigata and the 1978 Miyagiken-oki earthquakes, the corrective actions that were taken as a result of these earthquakes, and how these mitigation approaches were effective in preventing similar incidents during the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. Lessons learned (Section 30.7) and feasible mitigation approaches (Section 30.8) are then discussed, followed by a brief overview of problem areas requiring attention (Section 30.9).
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FIGURE 30.1 Chlorine cylinders in the process of being lled. Movement of the cylinders and subsequent rupture of pipe connections resulted in a chlorine leak during the Whittier-Narrows earthquake of 1987.
FIGURE 30.2 Photograph of chemicals storage area that burned during the Northridge earthquake of 1994. The re started as a result of mixture of incompatible chemicals.
FIGURE 30.3 Collapse of 5-gallon lubricating oil containers during the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of 1995 resulted in a spill of lubricating oils.
30.2 The Loma Prieta Earthquake

A total of 490 HAZMAT incidents of all sorts were found to have occurred during the MW 7.1 Loma Prieta earthquake, which occurred on October 17, 1989. This total number does not include natural gas leaks in the gas distribution system, for which data were not available. An important observation is that
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FIGURE 30.4 A major re engulfed portions of this building as a result of ruptured gas lines during the HanshinAwaji earthquake of 1995.
FIGURE 30.5 Photograph of gas distribution line that ruptured at a welded joint during the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of 1995. The gas pressure blew out the ground around the point of rupture.
46.1% (226) of the incidents involved spills in laboratories. Many of these laboratories were not in the category of permitted facilities and had quantities below the threshold quantities that requires permits. The next highest rate of occurrence was release of asbestos, which accounted for 16.5% or 81 incidents. Other major occurrences involved releases from tanks, releases due to sloshing, releases from other containers, and releases from pipes. The data are summarized in Table 30.2. Of the 490 events, 43 were identied as being particularly large occurrences, i.e., these incidents resulted in the release of relatively large quantities of hazardous materials. The major problem was sloshing, with 19 events. Other causes for the large releases were releases from tanks, pipes, containers, and equipment.
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TABLE 30.2 Hazardous Materials Releases during the Loma Prieta Earthquake
Type of Problem Laboratory Asbestos Tank Sloshing Container Pipe Equipment Cylinder Valve Indirect Transportation TOTAL Number 226 81 49 40 39 36 8 4 3 3 1 490 Percentage 46.1 16.5 10.0 8.2 8.0 7.4 1.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.2 100.0
TABLE 30.3 Types of Hazardous Materials Released during the Loma Prieta Earthquake
Material Miscellaneous lab chemicals Asbestos Miscellaneous liquids Propane Plating solutions Fuels and petroleum products Acids Ammonia Pesticides Formaldehyde Paint Biohazards Solvents Other/unknown Percentage of Total Number of Releases 41.6 16.1 11.1 6.9 5.6 5.6 3.0 2.4 2.2 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.8
The incidents were also classied in terms of the specic chemicals released, and the data are shown in Table 30.3. Laboratory chemicals were the materials most frequently released, followed by asbestos. This is not surprising given the nding that close to one half of the incidents occurred in laboratories. The next largest releases involved miscellaneous liquids, propane, plating solutions, fuel and petroleum products, and acids. It was possible to obtain information on containment of the releases for only 331, or 67.7%, of the releases. Of this total number, 188 (57%) were contained, 52 (15.7%) were partially contained, and 90 (27.3%) were not contained. Most of the gaseous releases went into the atmosphere. Some of the liquid releases ended up in the drains or directly into soil, although some evaporated into the atmosphere. When hazardous materials are released, they must be cleaned up. The majority of the cleanup effort was undertaken in-house; this accounted for 70.4% of the incidents. The local health departments were involved in 24.6% of the cases and the local re departments in another 11.2%. Only in 19.6% of the cases was the cleanup performed by a private contractor. For a large proportion of the releases, there were two or more responding parties. Despite the relatively large number of releases that were identied and documented, there were no major HAZMAT-caused conagrations or contamination of bodies of water.
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TABLE 30.4 Hazardous Materials Releases during the Northridge Earthquake

Type of Problem Laboratory Asbestos Containers Pipe Sloshing Tanks Equipment Transportation Valves Indirect damage Cause unknown TOTAL Number of Occurrences 232 4 21 9 7 4 2 2 1 9 96 387 Percentage 59.95 1.03 5.43 2.33 1.81 1.03 0.52 0.52 0.26 2.33 24.81 100
TABLE 30.5 Types of Hazardous Materials Released during the Loma Prieta Earthquake
Material Asbestosa Acids Medical/biological Crude oil Paint Petroleum Mercury Insecticides/fertilizers Organic gases Contaminated water Household agents Plating chemicals Various/mixed Miscellaneousb Unknown TOTAL
a
Number of Occurrences 4 30 17 12 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 3 194 27 53 387
Percentage 1.03 7.75 4.39 3.10 2.58 2.33 2.07 1.81 1.55 1.03 0.78 0.78 50.13 6.98 13.70 100
A total of 48 asbestos releases were documented. However, only 4 of these were cases where only asbestos was involved. The other 44 involved incidents where asbestos release was combined with the release of other materials as well. b This category involves materials whose identities are known, but do not t within one of the other categories.
30.3 The Northridge Earthquake

The MW 6.7 Northridge earthquake of January 17, 1994 resulted in 387 hazardous materials incidents, not including those related to natural gas. The data were collected from Los Angeles and Ventura counties. The type of problem that led to the releases is summarized in Table 30.4, and the hazardous materials involved in each of these incidents is summarized in Table 30.5. In most cases, the material involved in the incident was identiable; however, this was not possible for 53 (14%) of the incidents. In 50% of the incidents, more than one hazardous material was involved. In the case of incidents where only one material was involved, the most frequently released material was
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TABLE 30.6 Major HAZMAT Incidents That Occurred during the Northridge Earthquake
Company Name HASA CSU Northridge Union Oil Southern Pacic Railroad ARCO Pumping Station Caltico Oil Co. Hillside Oil Partners Shell Oil Southern California Gas Co. ARCO (Four Corners Pipeline) Sylmar Convertor Station Material Released Hydrochloric acid Sodium hypochlorite Various Crude oil Sulfuric acid Crude oil Crude oil Crude oil Gasoline Crude oil Crude oil Quantity (gal) 1,000 500 Substantial 700 8,000 214,000 1,100 1,000 2,000 8,000 21,500 68,800 5,000 Cause of Release Cleanup Organization HASA funded Numerous Sloshing Train derailment Pipeline rupture Pipe shear failure Tank rupture Tank rupture Tank collision Pipeline rupture Pipeline rupture during pressure check Transformer valve failure Contractor, Cal-EPA In-house Contractor Contractor In-house Contractor Contractor Contractor LADWP HAZMAT Team
Mineral oil
acids, followed by medical/biological materials, crude oil, paint, and petroleum. There were also a total of 48 incidents where asbestos was released. Only four of these incidents involved the release of asbestos only; in the other 44 incidents, asbestos was released in addition to other hazardous materials. The most frequent releases of hazardous materials occurred at laboratories, primarily laboratories in educational institutions. Of the 387 total, 232 (60%) occurred in laboratories. It was also found that a total of 100 gas cylinders had failed in one manner or another, with all of these occurring in educational institutions. Two locations, namely CSUN and the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), had the largest number of occurrences, a total of 226 or 58%. There were 92 sites that had occurrences of single incidents, and 14 sites that had two incidents. The 387 incidents occurred at a total of 116 sites. While the total number of HAZMAT incidents identied is relatively large, not all of them had severe consequences. Several HAZMAT incidents that were called in entailed minor quantities, for example, of mercury from thermometers that had broken. However, there were several large incidents, and these are summarized in Table 30.6. Description of the incidents that occurred at educational institutions during the Northridge earthquake is covered in Section 30.5, which discusses earthquake-caused HAZMAT incidents at educational institutions and laboratories. There were several leaks from pipelines that convey petroleum products from the production sites to Los Angeles Harbor. The Four Corners pipeline no. 1 sprung a leak at a failed weld, and released 3500 barrels of crude oil, which owed into Santa Clara Creek. Another Four Corners pipeline break, at Huntington and Laurel Canyon, resulted in a major conagration. In this case, the leak resulted in petroleum vapors inltrating the area and the re subsequently started when the vapors were ignited. Several houses and 14 cars in this area were burned as a result of the re. Overall, at least seven leaks from pipelines owned by Four Corners Pipeline were reported at various locations. Another major incident occurred when a Southern Pacic Railroad train was affected by the earthquake. Six cars containing sulfuric acid derailed. One of these cars leaked approximately 8000 gallons of sulfuric acid. One car containing ethylene glycol and one car containing petroleum wax also derailed, but there were no leaks. There was also a leak of approximately 400 gallons of diesel fuel from the locomotive engine that overturned. All of the spills were conned to the railroad right-of-way. A large variety of incidents occurred at several businesses and industries: release of acids from tanks, oil spills from ruptured tanks, asbestos releases, propane tank releases, and plating chemicals releases. Cleanup cost estimates, provided by the Los Angeles County Health Department HazMat Division, indicate that for incidents within the county, the cost was approximately $1.5 million. However, this number is most probably signicantly lower than the actual cost involved.
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30.4 The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

Despite its magnitude and the fact that it occurred in an urban industrial area, the MW 6.9 HanshinAwaji earthquake (January 17, 1995) was relatively devoid of HAZMAT releases. There was one major incident that involved the release of liquid propane gas (LPG) with the potential for a major conagration; however, this was handled very capably by the re departments involved. Despite the presence of a very large number of petroleum storage tanks, there were no major releases, as may have been anticipated. This is one of the success stories that this earthquake provided. Another success story was the effectiveness of the concrete block rewalls that are built around gasoline stations; despite the extensive res that raged in the greater Kobe region, no gasoline station was affected by the res because of the presence of these rewalls. This earthquake also showed the vulnerability of rack storage systems. The HAZMAT releases and res that occurred during and immediately after the earthquake are described in Sections 30.4.1 through 30.4.4.
30.4.1 Hazmat Storage Facilities

In the four prefectures (Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, and Kagawa) affected by the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, there were a total of 60,259 facilities that handle hazardous materials, including 968 production facilities, 9,528 indoor storage facilities, 2,177 outdoor storage facilities 30,029 tank storage facilities, 8,804 gas stations, and 17,557 other HAZMAT handling facilities. In Hyogo Prefecture itself, there were a total of 21,953 facilities, including 3,085 indoor storage facilities, 967 outdoor storage facilities, and 2,945 gas stations. Of the total number of facilities in all four prefectures, there were 1,258 facilities that had damage due to the earthquake, including 7 res and 157 leaks. Of the total, 1,172 or 93% of the damaged facilities were located within Hyogo Prefecture, which bore the brunt of the earthquake. Five of the seven res and 75% of the leaks occurred within Hyogo Prefecture, a large proportion of the damage occurring in Kobe City. While there were seven res at HAZMAT facilities, they were ignited by post-earthquake res that spread, resulting in these facilities catching re. Of the 157 leaks that occurred, 96 (61%) were at indoor storage facilities, followed by 16 (10%) at outdoor tank storage facilities, and 15 (9.5%) at general handling facilities. There were also 12 (7.5%) leaks at underground tank storage facilities. The primary cause of leaks in indoor storage facilities was damage to containers when they fell from storage racks and released their contents upon impact with the oor. Of the 16 leaks that occurred at outdoor storage facilities, none of them occurred at tanks constructed under the new design criteria that came into effect in 1977. There were seven cases of leaks due to sloshing, with minimal amounts leaked. Six leaks were due to damage to piping, two were due to damage to valves, and one leak was due to sidewall buckling. The largest leak resulted in a release of 40 kl. Many storage facilities sustained a variety of damage, including uneven settlement of tanks, buckling of sidewalls, damage to secondary containment walls, etc. What is noteworthy is that, unlike in the past, there were no major releases of petroleum and petroleum products during the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, despite the close proximity of these facilities to the epicenter and the severe ground shaking that these facilities experienced. The problem area that remains to be addressed pertains to indoor storage, where 61% of the leaks occurred. At these facilities, drums, pails, and cans are stacked on pallets, racks, or organized in other ways, with no restraints. The storage mode is inherently vulnerable to ground shaking, and it is not surprising that damage to containers and leaks ensued. This damage pattern has been observed during prior earthquakes as well, in both Japan and the United States. Furthermore, this damage pattern is not unique to HAZMAT storage facilities but is common to all storage facilities that resemble warehouses. Rather than consider this problem as a situation that is unique to indoor HAZMAT storage facilities, it must be recognized that all indoor storage facilities, especially warehouses, are extremely vulnerable, and a broad-based solution that can have wide applicability must be developed. It is also interesting to note that the estimated damage cost for spills and releases was U.S. $26,537 million, indicating that the economic consequence due to spills and releases was quite severe. These data
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represent direct damage to physical facilities and do not include opportunity costs associated with business losses, which can further increase the total.
30.4.2 Gasoline Stations

Of the total of 8,804 gas stations in the four prefectures, 383 sustained damage. Within Hyogo Prefecture, there were 2,945 gas stations, 357 (12%) of which sustained damage. Again, it is important to note that there were no res, and only four cases of leaks, all minor. The damage was primarily to the structures and equipment. The leaks were due primarily to cracks or damage in the piping connected to the tanks, and were in the range of 5 to 20 liters. Current code requires construction of a rewall around gas stations, except on the side where it is open to the street. Even in areas of Kobe where conagrations spread, the rewalls were very effective in stopping the spread of re. There were several cases where the res burned up to the rewall, but did not spread into the gas station. If the rewalls had not been constructed, a scenario where escaping vapors from underground storage tanks at gas stations fueled res is conceivable. The Hanshin-Awaji earthquake occurred at 5:46 a.m., a time when the gas stations were closed. If the earthquake had occurred during normal business hours, it is conceivable that there would have been more releases. However, when one takes into account the manner in which gas stations are constructed, this scenario is not very likely.
30.4.3 LPG Leak

The only HAZMAT release that could have had major consequences occurred at MMC Terminal in Kobe. A 20,000-ton LPG tank sprang a leak at the ange of the main valve. Because the leaking ange was on the tank side of the valve, the leak could not be shut off. The leak was detected shortly after the earthquake, and the employees who detected it made the rst attempts to stop the leak by covering the ange with blankets and pouring water in an attempt to freeze it, thus stopping the leak. However, aftershocks and gradual settlement of the pipeline leading away from the tank resulted in the leak becoming worse. The secondary containment walls also had been damaged, thus increasing the risk posed. The Kobe Fire Department was informed of the leak at around 10:00 a.m. on January 17. In view of the possibility of a major conagration, and even explosion, an evacuation warning was issued at 6:00 a.m. on January 18 (i.e., approximately 24 hours after the earthquake and leak). This affected approximately 70,000 residents, who had difculty nding alternate housing in the post-disaster environment. All re departments that were capable of responding to this incident did so. This facility had three 20,000-ton LPG tanks; fortunately, only one was damaged. Further, one of the neighboring tanks was practically empty so that the contents of the leaking tank could be transferred, a process that was completed on January 30 (i.e., approximately 2 weeks later). Despite being a hazardous material, LPG is regulated in Japan by MITI rather than the Fire Defense Agency. After the earthquake, a detailed analysis of the factors that contributed to the leak was undertaken and new design criteria developed. These include improved attachment of the main valve to the sidewall of the tank, and improved seismic design criteria for pipelines and secondary containment walls. Reconstruction of the damaged LPG tank began in July 1995 and was completed in December 1996, with product shipment beginning in April 1997. There was signicant damage to this particular site, although there was only one release. The total cost for repair to physical plant facilities was estimated at U.S. $100 million. The opportunity cost associated with the inability to ship LPG for 27 months was estimated at approximately U.S. $750 million. Even after shipment began, between 10 and 15% of the pre-earthquake customers were permanently lost.
30.4.4 Chemical Releases and Fires

A total of six res related to chemicals were identied. Four of the six occurred at educational institutions, two at universities and two at secondary schools. These are described in greater detail in Section 30.5. One re started at a rubber shoe company and another at a government laboratory. All of these res are reported to have started shortly after the earthquake.
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The re that began at the rubber shoe company become a major conagration, resulting in 76,000 m2 being burned. This included 434 structures that were totally burned, 2 that were half burned, and 6 that were partially burned. It is suspected that the natural gas leak that followed the earthquake was ignited by some means. The real estate cost of this re was estimated at U.S. $23 million. Equipment costs and business losses were not estimated. The re at the government laboratory, located on the fourth oor, was due to mixing of chemicals, resulting in 133 m2 being burned. This re did not spread, and the cost of the re was estimated at U.S. $14,000, the cost to repair the space.
30.5 Earthquake-Caused HAZMAT Incidents at Educational Institutions and Laboratories

Based on the foregoing discussion, several past earthquakes have shown that signicant damage can occur in laboratories, especially chemical laboratories, during earthquakes. The uniqueness of laboratories arises from the fact that they are locations where new ideas are developed and tested. Equipment layout and arrangements are generally semipermanent, at best. In addition, laboratories at educational institutions are designed to demonstrate a very wide variety of ideas and concepts, and therefore must maintain exibility to the constantly changing needs of the research and education community. In addition to exibility, laboratories are also locations where a large number of highly reactive and toxic materials, albeit in small quantities, are stored and used. This is especially true of chemical laboratories. Damage to a laboratory can thus result not only in signicant economic loss, but can also be a serious threat to life safety. Educational institutions also face the unique problem of having a transitory population, i.e., students. Laboratories are used by large numbers of students, with each group residing in the laboratory for relatively short periods of 3 hours or less. Students use the laboratories but do not necessarily have ownership of the facilities, which can result in poor housekeeping practices. Also, while many educational institutions have courses covering chemical safety, this component generally does not cover earthquake safety. The occurrence of HAZMAT incidents at educational institutions is not restricted to the United States. There also have been a signicant number of incidents that have occurred at Japanese educational institutions during earthquakes. The remainder of this section contains a summary of HAZMAT incidents in educational institutions in Japan and the United States that have occurred as a result of earthquakes.
30.5.1 The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake

The chemical spills that occurred during this earthquake and the res that resulted from these spills have been studied by several researchers and were recently summarized by Tadao Yoshida [Yoshida et al., 1994]. The schools and universities that are reported to have had major chemical res, i.e., res that ensued as a result of chemical spills, include the Tokyo Imperial University, Waseda University, Keio Medical University, Tokyo Technical College, Yokohama Technical College, the Military Academy Preparatory College, Japan Dental and Medical College, Meiji Pharmacological College, and Gakushuin University. The chemicals that were reported to have been involved include white phosphorus, sodium, sodium peroxide, volatile organics, and concentrated acids, among others.
30.5.2 The 1948 Fukui Earthquake

A total of six elementary schools, ve middle schools, and one high school were reported to have been burned down within Fukui Prefecture, due to chemical res (Yoshida et al., 1994). Within Fukui City, a re thought to have been started by chemicals in the science room of Haruyama Elementary School, resulted in a conagration leading to 100 casualties. In a separate incident, a chemical re occurred in a laboratory of Fukui Technical College but was extinguished before it spread.
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30.5.3 The 1964 Niigata Earthquake

A re broke out in the science room of the Higashi-Niigata Middle School, Niigata City, due to containers of phosphorus, metallic sodium, metallic magnesium, concentrated sulfuric acid, and other chemicals falling off their shelves and mixing with each other. Although desks started to burn, the teachers and pupils extinguished the re within 30 minutes [Yoshida et al., 1994].
30.5.4 The 1968 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake

There were two reported incidents of res caused by chemical spills at high schools [Takayama, 1969]. At Misawa Shogyo High School, a re started from the physics and chemistry preparation rooms, located on the second oor. During the ground shaking, the chemicals fell from the shelves onto the concrete oor, mixed, and resulted in the re. There were medical supplies in the same room but because the shelves had been anchored to the wall, none of those chemicals fell. The re was extinguished by the staff, who used dry-chemical re extinguishers. At the Hachinohe-kita High School, there was an explosion inside the chemicals storage room 1 minute after the earthquake. The door of the storage room blew out and the gases released ignited, resulting in the re. The chemicals had been stored on ve-high shelves. Metallic sodium, which was on the third shelf, fell down and mixed together with hydrochloric acid and sulfuric acid, resulting in the explosion and re. Ether and acetone that had been stored volatilized and also were ignited. The shelves had no restraints, and between 10 and 20% of the chemicals fell. This re too was subsequently extinguished with dry-powder re extinguishers before it could spread and become a major conagration.
30.5.5 The 1978 Santa Barbara Earthquake

At the University of California, Santa Barbara, there were numerous chemical spills in the laboratories in the Science Building [Reitherman, 1982]. Further details on these spills have not been available.
30.5.6 The 1978 Miyagiken-Oki Earthquake

Several HAZMAT incidents occurred as a result of this earthquake, and have been documented by several researchers [Yoshida et al., 1994; Ikegami, 1979; Sakurai, 1978; Ogino, 1978]. The most serious incidents occurred at Tohoku University, where there were several spills and res. In addition, there were also incidents at the Tohoku Pharmacological University and a technical high school. 30.5.6.1 Tohoku University Spills and res occurred in the science, engineering, and medical science buildings. In the science building, three rooms were destroyed by re, primarily due to failure of the re extinguishing system at the beginning of the earthquake. In Room 403 (fourth oor), a bottle containing metallic sodium in ether, which had been placed on the lower level of the reagent shelf, slid off and fell onto the oor. Reagent jars from the higher shelves also fell, breaking the bottle containing the metallic sodium and releasing the sodium, which reacted with the moisture present, generating heat. This ignited the solvent vapors from the other broken jars, resulting in a re that expanded rapidly. This re spread to the adjacent room (Room 401) as well. A similar incident occurred in another room on the fourth oor, Room 410, where metallic sodium also reacted with water, resulting in a re. This re was initially extinguished by the students present, who closed the doors and windows and left. When the reghters arrived and opened a window to evaluate the scene, the re reignited, but was subsequently suppressed. On the seventh oor (Room 705), an experiment on distillation of diisopropyl benzyl alcohol, using an oil bath, was in progress when the earthquake occurred. The vibration caused the oil bath to tip and ignite the ether, benzene, and methanol that had been released from other reagent jars that fell and broke. This re also spread to the adjacent room, Room 703.
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The science building was constructed of reinforced concrete, and damage to the rst three oors was not too severe, but from the fourth oor upwards all laboratories were badly damaged. The chains restraining many compressed gas cylinders were broken. The horizontal acceleration on the fourth oor was reported as being 405 gal, and it was 710 gal on the seventh oor. Approximately 85% of all reagents on the seventh oor, 65% on the fourth oor, and 30% on the third oor fell from the shelves [Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 1986]. In the medical science building, there were two incidents of chromium trioxide spills, with ensuing res. In one incident, the chromium trioxide mixed with other spilled reagents and ignited; the re was extinguished by personnel present at the scene. In another incident, a restrained shelf fell, due to failure of the restraint, and chromium trioxide reacted with the oor tiles, resulting in a re. This re too was quickly extinguished by the personnel present at the scene. Two other incidents of reactive metal res, one involving sodium and another involving lithium, also occurred. In both cases, the reactive metals lost their protective containment, reacted with moisture present, and ignited. There were also numerous spills on the fth and sixth oors of the engineering building, where reagent jars fell from shelves, were broken, and their contents spilled. However, there were no ensuing res. 30.5.6.2 Tohoku Pharmacological University Two laboratories in this university had res that followed spills. In the environmental laboratory, chemicals fell from a shelf that had 1-cm-high lips installed. A seminar was in progress at the time of the earthquake, and the professor immediately tried to support the shelf containing the chemicals to prevent it from falling. However, the reagent jars fell around the professors feet, ignited, and caused him injury. In the organic chemistry laboratory, a solvent bottle fell and broke, and the vapors were ignited by a gas burner that was in use, resulting in the laboratory being burned. Approximately 60% of the reagent jars on the fourth oor fell from their shelves. It is reported that the horizontal acceleration on the fourth oor was 820 gal and on the fth oor, it was 1050 gal [Tokyo Fire Department, 1985]. 30.5.6.3 Prefectural Technical High School In the analytical chemistry laboratory, acid containers stored in wooden cabinets fell and spilled the acid, which owed onto the oor. The steel cabinets in the organic chemistry laboratory did not tip over but the reagent jars inside the cabinets did shatter, releasing their contents. All reagent jars and equipment on laboratory countertops also fell and were damaged or broke [Tokyo Fire Department, 1985]. 30.5.6.4 Miyagi Prefectural Environmental Health Research Laboratories In the chemistry laboratories of this prefectural facility, practically all of the reagent shelves tipped over and fell, with resulting chemical reactions and release of toxic fumes. There were also res as a result of chemical reactions among incompatible reagents. Practically all foam re extinguishers were damaged and could not be used. Fire extinguishment was problematic because access to the origin of the res was difcult, due to the presence of fallen objects or hazardous fumes. While most of the equipment and shelving that had not been anchored fell, there was practically no damage to equipment that was anchored to laboratory benches or structural walls. Numerous pressurized gas cylinders were knocked down. Piping connections were found to be weak spots. In the case of plastic pipes, practically every joint and bend cracked, loosened, or was displaced.
30.5.7 The 1983 Coalinga Earthquake

Chemical spills occurred at the Coalinga high school and also at the community college. In the high school chemistry laboratory store room, 1-gal glass jugs containing sulfuric acid fell to the oor, broke, and spilled their contents, which corroded through the oor of the laboratory, located on the rst oor, and dripped on the oor of the basement. This resulted in the generation of hydrogen sulde and other fumes [Scawthorn and Donelan, 1984]. The laboratory spill caused extensive damage, and the costs of cleaning up and restoring the laboratory totalled approximately $90,000 [Tierney, 1985]. At the community college, there was also a spill in the store room adjoining the chemistry laboratory. Despite 1-in.-high shelf lips
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having been installed, reagent jars fell, causing a spill, which was cleaned up by the re departments HAZMAT team. After the earthquake, the college installed an additional wire restraint at a height of approximately 3 in. above the shelf. In the high school chemistry laboratory, large glass jars containing reagents crashed onto the oor, spilling their contents. In the Coalinga Water Filtration Plant, many of the chemical containers on the testing laboratory shelves and benches toppled, spilling their contents [Isenberg and Escalante, 1985].
30.5.8 The 1985 Chile Earthquake

The Oxiquim Chemical Plant, located in the northeastern part of Vina del Mar, had a re in a laboratory due to chemical reagents falling off shelves, spilling, and mixing. The re died due to lack of oxygen but started up again three separate times when the door to the laboratory was opened [Wyllie et al., 1986].
30.5.9 The 1987 Whittier-Narrows Earthquake

Chemicals and supplies stored on the sixth, seventh, and eighth oors of the physical sciences building at California State University, Los Angeles were dislodged, with some of them reacting with each other. The spilled chemicals resulted in a re in a laboratory on the eighth oor [SCEPP, 1987]. The cause of the re is thought to have been organic solvent vapors ignited by potassium metal reacting with moisture. Though the re was extinguished by the responding re department, all the laboratory equipment was destroyed, and approximately one quarter of the eighth oor had smoke damage. Asbestos contamination on the eighth oor and penthouse of the building also was found to be at unacceptably high levels, forcing closure of both oors until repairs were completed. A re, due to leaking toluene that was ignited either by an electric furnace or from the reaction of metallic sodium, in a laboratory at the University of California was also reported [Yoshida et al., 1994].
30.5.10 The 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake

A total of 135, or 27.6%, of the incidents during this earthquake occurred at educational institutions and involved laboratory chemicals and asbestos release and contamination. Fortunately, there were no major spills or conagrations. The incidents occurred at all levels of the educational establishment, including middle schools, high schools, junior colleges, and universities. In most cases, the HAZMAT (chemicals) spills occurred due to reagent jars falling from the shelves and impacting with the oor. It is interesting to note that at many educational institutions, shelf restraints had been installed prior to the earthquake, despite which reagent jars fell off the shelves. At some institutions, the shelf restraints were found to be effective, with reagent jars only falling off shelves that had no restraints. One re, at the University of California, Santa Cruz, occurred due to a Bunsen burner that was in use. A near-re occurred at San Jose State University, where a custodian discovered smoke coming from one of the rooms in the old science building and contacted the university police, who in turn contacted the San Jose Fire Department. A heating unit that was being used to heat dimethylpolyroxane (Dow-Corning 200 Fluid) had been left on, causing the material to smoke. The largest number of incidents occurred at Stanford University (81 incidents), followed by San Jose State University (30 incidents). As stated earlier, all of these were relatively minor spills, and there were no major incidents.
30.5.11 The 1993 Kushiro-Oki Earthquake

A re occurred in one of the laboratories of the Obihiro Veterinary University and was investigated in detail by the Obihiro Fire Department. Total losses were estimated at 7 million [Obihiro Fire Department, 1993]. This re occurred due to mixing of incompatible chemicals and the subsequent ignition of a container of n-pentane. The reagents had been stored on shelves that were anchored to the wall, and
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also had 3-cm-high shelf lips. Furthermore, the reagents also had been separated with a divider, in terms of incompatibles. The investigation report concludes that the reagents fell from the shelves onto the oor, despite the shelf lips. The chemicals thus released mixed, generating heat and igniting. A container of npentane in a corrugated box had been placed in front of the shelf. The re burned the corrugated box, which in turn ignited the n-pentane, and thus the re spread.
30.5.12 The 1994 Northridge Earthquake

Of the total 387 incidents identied, 232 (60%) occurred in laboratories, not all at educational institutions. Hazardous materials incidents occurred at a variety of institutions, including K12, junior colleges, and universities. While a large number of incidents occurred at K12 institutions, they were all very minor. There was one relatively major incident at a junior college. Of the universities, CSUN and UCLA had a large number of occurrences. The incidents at CSUN were by far the most severe, and included three res as a result of the hazardous chemical spills. 30.5.12.1 Junior Colleges Los Angeles Valley College and College of the Canyons both had chemical spills. At the College of the Canyons, despite shelf lips having been installed, the extensive vertical movement caused reagent jars to tip or topple over the shelf lips. This incident occurred in a three-story laboratory building that housed facilities for art, biology, and chemistry. 30.5.12.2 University of California, Los Angeles There were several spills, which occurred in 14 different buildings on this campus. Some of the spills were signicant enough to require cleanup by HAZMAT teams. 30.5.12.3 California State University, Northridge This campus experienced perhaps the largest number of earthquake-caused HAZMAT incidents ever, probably due to its close proximity to the earthquake epicenter. The information here is summarized from a report written by William Kupfer to the California Chemical Emergency Planning and Response Commission [Kupfer, 1994]. Three separate res were ignited, probably by gas leaks or chemical reactions, near the time of the earthquake. The res burned until 9:30 a.m. and destroyed, totally or in part, nine science laboratories. One of the res reignited several times and was not fully extinguished until later in the day. Approximately 100 compressed gas cylinders were damaged or exploded in the res. After the res were extinguished, there were 53 cylinders that had been badly damaged but were unexploded, and the gases contained in them could not be readily identied. A company that specializes in evacuating damaged cylinders and identifying and recontainerizing dangerous gases was retained for this task. Chemical spills occurred widely over the campus, at over 200 locations. Virtually every laboratory containing chemicals had some degree of spillage. Only one of the spills contained a chemical in excess of its reportable quantity, namely 800 g of bromine, which was dissipated to the air. While some of the spills occurred in isolated locations and it was possible to determine the material and quantity spilled, there also were many spills that were intermixed, with the result that labeling was lost. The cleanup crews, which consisted of a cleanup contractor, hazardous waste consultant, and in-house physical plant staff, operated for about 3 weeks. Over 30 buildings were contaminated with asbestos, as a result of the shaking. Asbestos contamination came from three primary sources: (1) structural reproong, (2) thermal and acoustic insulation on utilities and ceilings, and (3) oor and ceiling tiles. The engineering building and the main library presented the most signicant problems here. Every room in the engineering building had to be cleaned, including several utility rooms. The entire fourth oor was so badly damaged that it required complete asbestos abatement. The main library required cleaning of approximately 200,000 books per oor. One particular difculty encountered was with one of the science buildings, which contained human pathogens used for research and teaching. Due to the potential threat to human health, the entire building was rst sealed completely, and imminent hazards in adjacent buildings abated. The oor on which the
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human pathogens were kept was then sealed separately, under negative pressure, and the exhaust ltered with a HEPA lter. A contracting epidemiologist was the rst person to enter and assess the situation. After conrming that the pathogens had not been released, the chemical cleanup crews then entered and abated the chemical hazards in the building. Similar steps also were taken to survey and ensure that no radioactive materials had been released.
30.5.13 The 1994 Sanriku-Haruka-Oki Earthquake

Spills occurred during this earthquake at Kitazato University and Misawa Commercial High School. At Kitazato University, there were six separate spills, involving a wide variety of chemicals including acetonitrile, in the laboratories of the Veterinary Sciences Department. In ve of the six cases, chemicals that had been stored on shelves fell to the oor, broke upon impact, and spilled their contents. In one case which involved used chemicals, the bottles containing these chemicals had been placed on the oor. The glass containers collided with each other as a result of the ground shaking, and broke. As a result of this incident, the university now disposes of used chemicals immediately. The cleanup of the spills was done by university personnel, including graduate students. Total cost of the damage was estimated at 2.6 million. The spill at Misawa Commercial High School was similar in nature, i.e., spills due to reagent jars falling from shelves and breaking upon impact. After the earthquake, the school replaced all of the older wooden cabinets with steel cabinets that are anchored to the wall and oor. At Mutsudo High School, there were no spills due to some of the mitigation measures taken ahead of time. Containers with more hazardous reagents were placed on shelves, in sand, and sulfuric acid containers were provided with double containment.
30.5.14 The 1995 Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake

While this earthquake had a major impact on the Kansai region of Japan, there were relatively few reports of HAZMAT incident occurrence at educational institutions and laboratories. 30.5.14.1 Universities There were several chemical spills in the School of Science at Osaka University but details of the spills are not available. Spills, including tipping over of shelves, were reported in laboratories and rooms where mitigation measures were not taken, such as anchoring of shelves and cabinets, and storage of hazardous materials in appropriate containers and cabinets [Umezaki, 1996]. However, in areas where mitigation measures had been taken, the damage was relatively light, though no mention of the extent of spills was made. A similar observation was made regarding compressed gas cylinders. Those that had not been adequately restrained, or had been placed in holders on the oor, tipped over, resulting in damage to the pressure regulator valves or adjacent equipment. At Kansei Gakuin University, metallic sodium reacted with water and resulted in a re, which was extinguished by the re department. Total damage cost was estimated at 8.5 million. At the university, there were two separate res, in the chemistry lab and the biology lab on the seventh oor. The re in the chemistry lab started shortly after the earthquake, while the re in the biology lab started after 7:00 p.m. on January 17, 1995. The re in the chemistry lab was conned to two rooms, and the re doors and concrete walls were found to be effective in containing the re. The re department did not respond to this earlier re. The re in the biology lab, which started after 7:00 p.m., is thought to have been an electrical re. Laboratory equipment had fallen on top of electrical wires, damaging them, resulting in short circuits when the power was turned on later. The cost for repairs to the building, due to re damage, was approximately U.S. $1.5 million. The cost for replacement equipment was approximately U.S. $4.2 million, and the cost for equipment repair was approximately U.S. $6 million, bringing the total damage to the Faculty of Science to approximately U.S. $11.7 million.
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30.5.14.2 Secondary Schools Hazardous materials incidents at ve high schools were identied. In all cases, reagent jars in laboratories fell from their shelves and broke, resulting in spills. At two high schools, the cabinets and shelves on which the reagent jars had been stored fell and the jars broke. One of the ve incidents resulted in a re, due to mixing of incompatible chemicals, which was extinguished by the re department. The damage cost at this location was estimated at 38.5 million. In the case of the junior high school, the variety of reagents stored was actually quite minimal, despite which mixing of incompatibles appears to have occurred, resulting in a re in a second-oor laboratory. This re was left to burn itself out, primarily due to the lack of water for reghting and the local re department being overwhelmed with the total number of res. A total of 1016 m2 of oor space was burned, including the gymnasium located on the third oor above. The building where the re occurred also had structural damage. The total cost of the damage was estimated at U.S. $5.95 million. The cost for recovery and reconstruction of the building was estimated at U.S. $8.64 million. At the high school, where there was a relatively large inventory of chemicals that were used, the re began in the chemistry laboratory storage room, located on the second oor. There was an explosion at some time after the re began. In this case, too, the re was left to burn itself out, due to lack of water supply. The re burned a total area of 2359 m2, and the total building damage cost was estimated at U.S. $3.6 million. The cost of reagents, chemicals, and equipment was estimated at approximately U.S. $400,000. It is estimated that spills occurred at a large number of laboratories, both at educational institutions and otherwise. An exhaustive survey of chemical spills at laboratories has not been undertaken so far. At this time, there appears to be no reporting requirements in Japan for chemical spills if hazardous materials according to the Japanese denition are not involved. In some cases, chemicals, reagents, corrosives, toxics, etc., are not regulated by the re agencies, but rather by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Only if the release of chemicals results in a re does it enter the re department databases, and thus become available to researchers. Surveys conducted by this author and others indicate that spills were widespread in laboratories of high schools located in Kobe and other cities close to the epicenter. In all cases, it appears that school personnel did the cleanup themselves, typically washing away the spilled reagents with water.
30.6 Damage and Corrective Actions at Japanese Petroleum Facilities

As was mentioned earlier, the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake was notable in its lack of spills and releases from petroleum storage tanks, despite the large number of tanks in the region that were affected. The lack of damage to petroleum storage tanks in Japan was rst noted by this author when conducting postearthquake studies following the January 15, 1993 Kushiro-oki earthquake. A tank farm containing approximately 150 cylindrical petroleum storage tanks of varying sizes had no spills or damage. Interestingly, this tank farm had been newly constructed approximately 10 years prior to the earthquake. An older tank farm was demolished. The Japanese authorities have been very proactive in developing standards and regulations to minimize damage to petroleum storage and processing facilities, and the results of these efforts were apparent after the Kushiro-oki and the Hanshin-Awaji earthquakes. The damage to petroleum storage facilities during the Niigata, Miyagiken-oki, and Nihonkai-chubu earthquakes are described next, followed by the corrective actions taken.
30.6.1 The 1964 Niigata Earthquake

Two res occurred as a result of this earthquake. Based on the cause and time of ignition, these have been named primary and secondary res. The primary re occurred at 1:03 p.m., immediately after the earthquake, at Showa Petroleums new processing facility, which only had been completed in 1963. The conagration was eventually extinguished at 5 a.m. on July 1, 1964, after it had burned for more than
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14 days. By the time the re burned out, it had consumed three 30,000-liter crude oil tanks, two 45,000liter crude oil tanks (total crude lost was 122 million liters), and a portion of the processing equipment in the new 40,000 barrels per day multipurpose plant. Investigation of the cause of this re led to the conclusion that friction and impact between the oating roof and sidewall of the storage tank led to sparking. The seal material between the roof and the sidewall was metallic, and it actually was the seal that led to sparking when it scraped against the side wall. These sparks ignited the petroleum vapors contained inside the tank, leading to a major conagration. Five hours after the occurrence of the earthquake, at approximately 6:00 p.m. on June 16, 1964, another re broke out at the site where a 5000 barrels per day line was operating. This secondary re was caused by sparks carried over from a re at another factory in the vicinity. Totally destroyed were 144 tanks containing a total of 32 million liters of assorted petroleum liquids and 69 structures having a total oor area of 13,828 m2, and the equipment contained therein. This re was eventually extinguished at approximately 5 p.m. on June 20, 1964, i.e., 4 days later.
30.6.2 The 1978 Miyagiken-Oki Earthquake

At the time of this earthquake, the Tohoku Petroleum plant had been shut down for planned maintenance, and only one package boiler was operating. As a consequence of this shutdown, all the storage tanks were lled to capacity. Five storage tanks, having a combined total capacity of 139 million liters, were damaged, and about 68 million liters of heavy oil were released. In all ve cases, the bottom section of the tank was damaged, and in three of the ve cases the bottom plate broke. The oil spill was not successfully contained within the dikes; some of it overowed the dikes and some passed through under the dikes. The pipes running under the dikes were displaced sufciently to create an underground passage through which the spilled oil passed. Approximately 2.9 million liters of oil actually found its way into Sendai Port via storm drains, despite shutting dampers and sandbagging. Fortunately, the oil spill was not ignited, and no res resulted.
30.6.3 The 1984 Nihonkai-Chubu Earthquake

The damage to petroleum facilities during this earthquake was primarily to storage tanks, with sloshing as the main problem. It was storage tanks with oating rather than xed roofs that had sloshing problems. The tanks themselves, their foundations, and oil dikes were not damaged. Weather seals, foam dams, rolling rudders, and gage balls were also damaged. In particular, the tanks where sloshing occurred had natural frequencies (of the liquid) of 8 to 10 seconds.
30.6.4 Effectiveness of Hazard Mitigation at Japanese Petroleum Facilities

The credit for the lack of major petroleum spills from storage tanks during the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake goes to the Japanese authorities who have investigated past releases in detail, and have instituted code changes to ensure improved safety during subsequent earthquakes. The fact that the effort to minimize spills, releases, and res from petroleum storage tanks has been so far successful was proven by the lack of major incidents during the Hanshin-Awaji and the Kushiro-oki earthquakes. Some of the code and practice changes that have been implemented in Japan, beginning from 1964 right after the Niigata earthquake, include the following: 1. Plant and equipment design criteria emphasize choice of materials that are corrosion-, impact-, and re-resistant for construction of equipment and tanks. 2. Plant and equipment layouts emphasize minimization of re spread. 3. Storm drain shutoff valves were installed at all points from which water is discharged to prevent occurrences similar to what happened after the Miyagiken-oki earthquake. 4. A perimeter water curtain was installed to prevent spreading of res to surrounding regions. Pumps were provided with standby generators in case of power failures.
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FIGURE 30.6 Photograph showing effectiveness of improved foundation construction and exible pipes in preventing petroleum spills. (Courtesy Professor K. Suzuki, Tokyo Metropolitan University)
5. Sand piles were required for storage tanks to counteract effects of soil liquefaction. 6. Spill prevention techniques were instituted, including installation of level indicators, limit on upper uid level to prevent sloshing losses, installation of equipment for recovery of oil in waste waters, and primary and secondary containment walls. 7. Periodic inspections of storage tanks for weld failure and corrosion. Tanks above a certain capacity are emptied out periodically and inspected by competent authorities. 8. Synthetic rubber weather seals are used instead of metallic seals on oating roof tanks to prevent sparking. 9. Reduction of piping failure potential by addition of loops at suitable distances, redesign of pipecontainment wall joints, and installation of exible pipe connections where piping is connected to equipment or storage tanks. One notable success story that was possible to document after the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake was the lack of damage due to the improved tank foundation construction practice and the requirement to use exible pipe connections, as shown in Figure 30.6. Notwithstanding this, since February 1998 Japanese authorities have required petroleum storage tanks with capacities greater than 10,000 kl to be tted with emergency shutoff valves on all incoming and outgoing pipes to further reduce the possibility of leaks from ruptured pipelines. The design criteria for tanks having a capacity greater than 500 kl but less than 1000 kl have also been improved, in a direction toward greater assurance that even if the tanks were damaged, the probability of a spill or release can be minimized. These undoubtedly are further steps toward minimizing the possibility of leaks from petroleum storage tanks.
30.7 Lessons Learned

In looking back at the types of hazardous materials releases that have occurred during previous earthquakes, and the challenges faced in collecting the data necessary to analyze these incidents adequately, a number of lessons have been learned. These are reviewed here very briey.
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30.7.1 Reluctance to Divulge Information

There is a great reluctance to divulge information on the part of the owners of facilities where such incidents have occurred. The individuals willing to share the information have been the exception rather than the rule. There is a perception that if the occurrence of a HAZMAT incident is known, then the facility could be dragged into a bureaucratic nightmare, and owners and managers of facilities are eager to avoid this. This problem must somehow be solved, so that we can continue to learn from past mistakes, and at least make sure that we do not repeat the same mistakes in the future.
30.7.2 Reportable Quantities

A large number of the incidents that have occurred have involved HAZMAT quantities below the reportable quantities set by regulatory agencies, such as the re departments, as threshold quantities. Only spills involving material quantities greater than the designated quantities must be reported to local and state authorities. As a result, a large number of occurrences have tended to go unreported. After the Northridge earthquake, the Los Angeles Fire Department was most willing to share the information that it had about 65 reported HAZMAT incidents. Yet, by pursuing a strategy of directly contacting facilities that were thought to be high-risk areas, the author and his research team were able to identify a large number of incidents that occurred but had not been reported because they were below the reportable quantities. HAZMAT threshold quantities, above which a permit would be required, have generally been set with industries and other hazardous materials handlers in mind. Educational facilities and laboratories generally tend to use or store, at any one given site, a large variety of chemicals and reagents in relatively small quantities. Therefore, it is possible that the quantity for any one given chemical is below the threshold quantity, and does not require permitting. On the other hand, if the permitting process becomes too detailed, university personnel can be burdened with an inordinate amount of paperwork, which can easily become unmanageable. This issue is a double-edged sword, and a workable compromise must be developed.
30.7.3 Documentation
Of the published records examined, it was noted that Japanese records are generally far more detailed than U.S. records. If past damage examples are to be utilized for improvement of earthquake safety in laboratories, then survey methodologies of damage must be improved, with the compiling of sufciently detailed information that will be more directly useful in planning hazard reduction. The information thus gathered can also be disseminated to the safety and research communities, or at least be easily accessible by them.
30.7.4 Mitigation Works

It was repeatedly found that the most damage occurred at locations where implementation of mitigation measures was insufcient or totally lacking. As can be seen from the various examples described in this chapter, whenever mitigation steps had been taken prior to the earthquake, damage was minimized or totally avoided. This was clearly the case with the petroleum storage tanks and gasoline stations in the greater Kobe area. There were at least two laboratories where HAZMAT incidents would most probably have occurred at the time of the Northridge earthquake, had not inventory reduction been practiced in advance. In both of these cases, the laboratory management had already contracted with cleanup companies to remove unwanted chemicals. At the time of the earthquake, the unwanted chemicals already had been removed from the shelves and packed in containers awaiting disposal. This timely action averted possible releases. Figures 30.7A and B are photographs that were taken at adjacent laboratories, one where compressed gas cylinders were not adequately restrained, and another where compressed gas cylinders had been properly stored in racks.
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(A)
(B)
FIGURE 30.7 (A) Photograph of compressed gas cylinders that fell due to inability of clamps to restrain the cylinders during the Northridge earthquake of 1995. (B) Compressed gas cylinders stored in well-secured racks did not fall during the Northridge earthquake of 1995.
Mitigation techniques that are appropriate for reducing the risk of HAZMAT releases during earthquakes are described in Section 30.8.
30.7.5 Laboratory Fires

Two major causes of laboratory res are (1) ignition due to mixing of incompatible chemicals and (2) ignition due to the presence of reactive metals such as sodium, magnesium, or lithium. It has been reported that when proper storage practices have been followed, especially in terms of separating incompatible chemicals, res have not ensued, even when there have been spills. This was the case at several corporate facilities. When reactive metals have been involved in re ignition, the cause of the ignition has been contact between the reactive metal and water or moisture. In several cases, res that started in one room have spread to adjoining rooms. In some cases, the spreading has been even wider, with signicant portions of the entire building being affected. Incidents of res that were thought to have been extinguished reigniting, due to the reintroduction of oxygen when re suppression personnel entered the area at a later time, have also been reported.
30.7.6 Storage Areas

More incidents appear to have occurred in storage areas than in laboratories or processing plants. While this may appear counterintuitive, if one takes into account the actual time spans over which chemicals are used in laboratories, such a nding is not very surprising. Most laboratories are used for perhaps 6 hours or so during the day, 5 days a week. If proper housekeeping practice is followed, the chemicals and reagents are cleaned up and put away in storage areas, where they reside 24 hours a day, 7 days a
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week. If an earthquake occurs during times when a laboratory is not in session, then in theory at least, there would be no chemicals in the laboratory area to cause spills, whereas there are always chemicals in the storage areas. In the 1983 Coalinga earthquake, high school personnel indicated that the laboratories had chemicals on their shelves dating back many years, whose existence in many cases had literally been forgotten [Scawthorn, personal communication]. The post-earthquake investigation of the HanshinAwaji earthquake also revealed that the largest number of HAZMAT releases occurred in indoor storage areas, with large numbers of 55- and 5-gal containers damaged. Chemical and hazardous materials storage areas have thus been found to be high hazard areas, and it is important to implement appropriate hazard mitigation measures.
30.7.7 Laboratories
The major cause of chemical spills in laboratories is reagent jars falling off shelves, impacting the oor, and releasing their contents. Almost invariably the reagent jars that break tend to be glass containers. Alternative containers must be considered. Some reagents, notably hydrouoric acid, are shipped in polymeric containers, which are more impact resistant. In some cases, one has a choice between glass containers and polymeric containers. Where glass containers are unavoidable, it is possible to obtain glass containers with a protective polymeric coating, albeit at a higher cost. Although shelf lips are effective in reducing the potential for reagent jars to fall off shelves, there are several incidents where the bottles have fallen off despite the shelf lips. There is a need to critically assess the required height of shelf lips, and also to develop other, more positive means of restraint that would prevent reagent jars from falling off the shelves on which they have been placed. Even when reagent jars do not fall out of cabinets or off shelves, it has been found that collision between jars can also result in breakage and spills. While placing reagent jars in appropriate cabinets with secondary containment does reduce the risk of release, it must not be thought of as a guarantee that spills will not occur.
30.7.8 Asbestos
Data from recent earthquakes have shown that asbestos release has become a major problem. While this does not result in an immediate threat to life safety, the monetary cost of subsequent cleanup and abatement procedures is extremely high. The rst time asbestos was identied as a problem was after the 1987 Whittier-Narrows earthquake. There were no reports of asbestos releases from prior earthquakes because asbestos was not considered a hazardous material until approximately the mid-1970s. As society continues to evaluate the vast number of materials that are used, it is very likely that materials once thought benign will emerge as being hazardous.
30.7.9 Biohazards
While there have been no recorded incidents of release of biohazards, this is an item that deserves special attention because any such release can have major consequences. With research in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals on the increase, hazard mitigation procedures far more stringent than for regular chemicals is perhaps called for, in order to avoid a major incident during future earthquakes.
30.7.10 Compressed Gas Cylinders

There have been numerous reports of damage to compressed gas cylinders during all of the earthquakes that this author has investigated, beginning with the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. Fortunately, there have been no reports of a HAZMAT release directly due to the failure of these cylinders. However, the potential for such a release exists, especially where particularly toxic gases such as arsine, phosgene, chlorine, etc., are used. Proper securing of compressed gas cylinders must be addressed at all locations where they are used. Floor mounts and straps anchoring cylinders to laboratory countertops with clamps
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have been generally found not to be very effective. Properly designed steel frames, such as those shown in Figure 30.7B, which in turn are anchored to the oor or the wall, have been found to be effective in restraining these cylinders during ground shaking.
30.8 Mitigation Approaches

This section provides a brief review of some practical hazard reduction measures that can be implemented at reasonable cost. A detailed treatise on mitigation approaches is too extensive to be covered here.
30.8.1 Inventory Reduction

Probably the best means of avoiding the occurrence of HAZMAT releases is to have on hand the minimum quantities necessary. Most laboratories tend to have chemicals that are not currently being used but can nevertheless pose a hazard if released from containment. Periodic reviews of the materials and quantities needed must be carried out, and excess chemicals and reagents sent away for proper disposal.
30.8.2 Separation of Incompatibles

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from past damage examples is that storage methods play a major role in determining whether or not a HAZMAT release will occur. Incompatible chemicals or reagents must not be stored in close proximity in laboratories; they must be divided into individual categories, such as ammables or corrosives, and stored appropriately so that they will not mix if a release occurs. The interaction between them, if containment is lost, must be determined rst, and storage sites determined accordingly. Special reagent cabinets, especially for ammables and explosives, are highly recommended. Incompatible chemicals can be divided into two major categories: those that liberate gases upon mixing, and those that react exothermically, i.e., release heat. Chemicals that form gases upon mixing can be divided into groups, depending upon the toxicity of the gases released. For example, cyanide-bearing solutions when mixed with oxidizing acids will release cyanide gas, which is extremely toxic and life-threatening. Ethanol when mixed with nitric acid releases nitrous oxide, which by itself is not highly toxic. However, if this mixture occurs in a closed container, then the buildup of gas pressure can result in an explosion. A very good source of information regarding incompatible chemicals is the Materials Safety Data Sheets available from the manufacturers of individual reagents. Another reliable source is Manual 491M, published by the National Fire Protection Association [NFPA, 1986]. In the event that such information is not available, and there is reason to conclude that toxic gases may be released, it is strongly recommended that tests be performed according to standard procedures to determine the gases released, along with the quantity released. Large containers of liquid reagents, such as gallon jugs of acids or solvents, and heavy items, are best placed on the bottom-most shelves of cabinets because the acceleration experienced at higher shelves is generally greater. Cabinets in which liquid reagents are stored can be provided with secondary containment so that spills that may arise from breakage can be contained. This can be done by either constructing barriers or providing sandboxes on the bottom-most shelf.
31.8.3 Anchoring of Storage Shelves and Cabinets

Cabinets, shelves, and racks in which chemicals and other hazardous materials are stored must be sturdy and well secured to structural members. The effectiveness of this approach has been proven several times during past earthquakes. It is impossible to prevent damage to reagent containers if the cabinets or shelves in which they are stored are themselves damaged. Properly designed hardware must be utilized to anchor these to the oor and walls or ceiling, as appropriate. Especially in the case of shelves with high aspect ratios (height greater than two times the
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smaller of the base dimensions), it is important to restrain the top of the shelf as well. Anchoring only at the base is effective in preventing the shelf from sliding but it may not be sufcient to prevent the top of the shelf from swaying. As far as possible, placing cabinets one on top of another (double decking) must be avoided. If this is unavoidable, the two cabinets must be connected with properly designed hardware so that they will perform as one unit. The cabinets must then be adequately anchored at the oor and wall. On open shelving, restraints must be provided to prevent reagent containers from falling out. This can easily be implemented by a variety of methods. One very common method is to use a lightweight, high modulus wire, such as piano wire, stretched across the shelf with coil springs at either end. The height of the restraining wire above each individual shelf is dependent on the size (height) of the jars, and must be determined accordingly in each case. Another approach is to install a lip on the shelf board. Lips can also be installed on laboratory counters and benches. If the lips are installed in a manner such that they are leakproof, then they will also serve the purpose of containing spills. In most laboratory furniture, the individual shelf boards are generally supported by cabinet walls but are not attached to them. The vertical component of earthquake-induced ground shaking can dislodge boards thus supported, resulting in damage to the reagents. Shelf boards must therefore be rmly attached to cabinet walls. Angle brackets and wood screws, both of which are available from hardware stores, are generally sufcient for this task. Another factor that frequently contributes to reagent spills is doors that do not lock positively. Cabinet doors must therefore be tted with locks that do not permit the doors to open during an earthquake. When purchasing new laboratory furniture, cabinets with positive locks must be specied for minimal additional cost. In the case of retrotting, there are several varieties available, such as touch latches, that can be installed at very little cost.
30.8.4 Reagent Vessels and Containers

Reagents that are contained in glass jars are especially susceptible to loss of containment due to fracture of the glass. Where possible, it is best to use impact-resistant, plastic containers. Most acids and bases can be contained in plastic containers rather than glass. Plastic containers are also less likely to be damaged by falling objects. In cases where glass containers are mandatory, as might be the case with some solvents, it is advisable to coat the glass with a plastic material that is resistant to the solvent contained therein. Most of the major laboratory equipment suppliers have plastic-coated glass bottles, as an off-the-shelf item. However, when converting to plastic containers, it must be borne in mind that these are less resistant to heat than are glass containers. It is also important to prevent glass jars from impacting each other inside the cabinet. Where possible, storage areas inside the cabinet can be divided so that the jars in storage do not impact each other during an earthquake. Reagent containers must also be inspected periodically for cracks or other forms of damage. Cracked glass jars, for example, are more prone to disintegrate altogether when subjected to even minor impact.
30.8.5 Pressurized Gas Cylinders

Use of pressurized gas cylinders in laboratories is extremely common. They are frequently strapped to laboratory benches, and gas lines are commonly made of polymeric materials. Damage to gas cylinders and their piping invariably results in gas leaks. If the cylinder contains hazardous gases such as chlorine, carbon tetrachloride, etc., the consequences can be disastrous. Where possible, it is preferable to store gas cylinders outside, and pipe the gas in. If there is damage to gas cylinders and a leak develops, the gas will be dispersed outdoors rather than contained indoors. It is important, in this case, to make sure that there are no ventilation intakes located adjacent to gas cylinder storage sites. The cylinders themselves must be restrained adequately. The most common method is to restrain them with chains or straps. Gas cylinders must be restrained at two locations along their vertical axis,
30-26
one in the top one third of the cylinder, and another in the bottom one third of the cylinder. Restraining must be done to either a structural wall or the studs. Anchoring gas cylinders to dry wall is insufcient to prevent damage. When it is not possible to anchor gas cylinders to a structural wall, a properly designed rack with adequate structural strength must rst be anchored to the oor, and the gas cylinders subsequently restrained to this rack. When securing gas cylinders, it must also be borne in mind that earthquakes have a vertical component, and possible vertical motion of the gas cylinder must be taken into account. Installation of automatic shutoff valves at the main valve of cylinders is usually the best means of shutting off supply when a leak develops. When selecting such shutoff valves, it is imperative to rst ascertain that the materials of construction of the valve are compatible with the gas that is being piped. It is also very good practice to shut off the main valve when gases from a particular cylinder are not being used, both during the workday and during nonworking hours.
30.8.6 Pipes and Piping Connections

Piping within laboratories must be installed according to existing standards. In the event that applicable standards are not available, adequate care must be taken to prevent leaks. Piping containing particularly hazardous liquids and gases must be provided with double containment. In the event of liquids that do not vaporize, a trough directly beneath the pipe may be sufcient. However, in the event of liquids that tend to vaporize, such as anhydrous ammonia, the pipeline must be covered completely with another pipe. One of the most common causes of pipeline failure is due to differential motion between the pipe and equipment to which it is connected. The use of exible connections reduces the probability of such a failure. The effectiveness of this approach was documented during the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, as shown in Figure 30.6. When the supply source is far away from the point of usage, and gases or liquids are being piped in, it is prudent to install a shutoff valve just outside the point of usage, in a location that would be easily accessible. In the event of a leak, this valve can be used to shut off supply.
30.8.7 Glass
Another part of laboratories that can be damaged during earthquakes are windows and glass panes. Fracture of glass panes must be prevented for the simple reason that shards ying out can cause injury. Glass panes are also used to isolate one area from another. For instance, in a typical building, the windowpanes isolate the building from the outside environment, making it possible to have a comfortable work environment inside. In the case of a cleanroom environment, damage to glass panes can result in signicant losses, with major cleanup requirements to remove microcontamination. Glass used for interior partitions can be replaced with other transparent, shatter-resistant materials such as polycarbonate. Where other materials cannot replace the glass, transparent adhesive lms can be applied on the surface. Though these adhesive lms will not prevent glass breakage, they will prevent the fragments from ying out. The lm can also be effective in preventing microcontamination by atmospheric intrusion. In the case of new construction, use of wired glass can achieve the same effect, but wired glass is generally more expensive than sheet glass, and it is not effective in preventing microcontamination.
30.8.8 Education
The most important factor in implementing safety measures is, beyond a doubt, people. It is extremely important that not only the related safety personnel but also the researchers and other laboratory personnel be provided adequate education in safety measures. Most researchers nd safety measures a necessary evil that they have to live with. It is true that many safety measures result in procedures taking longer than they would otherwise require. Nevertheless, it is important that researchers realize that without adequate safety measures, the loss could be greater in
30-27
terms of time, morale, and life safety. The best hazard-reduction program is undoubtedly one that is implemented by the laboratory personnel themselves, rather than one that is imposed upon laboratory personnel by safety personnel. While most universities conduct classes on safe procedures of handling chemicals, it has been found that the earthquake threat is generally not an integral part of such training. Especially in areas prone to earthquakes, such as the western United States, it is imperative that earthquake safety is included in any class on safety training. There is a critical need for educational institutions to accept the fact that they are located within earthquake zones, and educate not only their personnel but also their students in an appropriate manner.
30.9 Problem Areas That Must Be Addressed

There are a number of issues that are still outstanding, the resolution of which will contribute toward further lowering the risk of HAZMAT releases and associated res during earthquakes. The rst such issue is one pertaining to regulations. Hazardous materials are regulated by myriad regulations, and navigating the eld of HAZMAT-related regulations can sometimes be extremely nerve wracking, especially for the regulatory novice. Nevertheless, current regulations do contribute signicantly toward the safe handling and usage of hazardous materials. Regulations that specically address the issue of earthquake safety of hazardous materials, however, are still lacking. The Japanese have shown, by the example of how they have regulated petroleum storage tank design and construction, that regulations aimed specically at earthquake safety can be very effective. The U.S. bodies that write codes must follow this excellent example set by our Japanese colleagues. As was mentioned previously, there continues to be tremendous reluctance on the part of facilities owners who experience HAZMAT releases during earthquakes to even admit that there was a release. The tendency is for the owners to clean up the incident as quickly as possible and then carry on with business as usual. Even internal documentation of the incident is frequently lacking. An effort is needed to assure facilities owners and cleanup companies that providing such data to researchers will in no way jeopardize their operations. Too much data have been lost thus far; we may not be able to afford such losses in the future. The Japanese, on the other hand, have been extremely thorough in their data collection methods, and these data have been used for the benet of society as a whole. There is also an associated problem with reporting requirements. Hazardous materials releases are required to be reported to the local re department only if threshold quantities are exceeded. If the quantity released is below the threshold, the reporting of such an incident is voluntary, and they are generally not reported, especially by industries and businesses. There is a need to dissociate the reporting requirements from the threshold quantities that are utilized in the permitting process. This can result in better information becoming available. The challenge in data collection lies in identifying the damage mechanism that led to the incident rather than just identifying the occurrence of an incident. In many cases the release is cleaned up, and no detailed records are kept. This is in sharp contrast to the case in Japan, where company and institutional personnel have maintained detailed records of incidents that occurred. The cost effectiveness of mitigation is very intuitive to those who believe in it. However, there is still a severe lack of implementation of mitigation, especially if codes or regulations do not require it. While a signicant body of data on cost effectiveness is coming into existence, the data are still insufcient. Particularly lacking are data on cleanup costs, without which reliable cost-effectiveness calculations cannot be performed.
30.10 Conclusions
At the present time, the technology and know-how necessary for mitigating the potential for HAZMAT releases and associated res exist for the most part. What appears to be lacking is the awareness that
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mitigation is effective, and in some cases the will to implement is also lacking. The cost savings, especially when one takes into account the expenses necessary for cleanup after the fact, will more than pay for the hazard mitigation. The 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake provided us not only with lessons learned but also with success stories. The efforts that the Japanese regulatory agencies put into developing appropriate design guidelines for HAZMAT storage and handling facilities bore fruit during that earthquake. Thanks to this effort, there were no major spills from petroleum storage tanks, especially outdoor storage tanks. These efforts are continuing in the wake of the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, and further design improvements are now being implemented, based on lessons learned. An area deserving greater attention is the earthquake safety of indoor storage facilities. The damage pattern seen here is identical to that seen in warehouses in general, and has been observed in earthquakes throughout the world. Solutions for this area must be developed so that the safety of all indoor storage facilities, not just HAZMAT facilities, can be improved. The documentation and analysis of chemical spills and releases also needs to be undertaken with greater earnestness. Chemical spills have occurred during earthquakes since the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake. Recently, several of these have resulted in res. Though the damage has not been extensive thus far, the potential for such incidents to result in casualties is extremely high, especially if the earthquake occurs during normal working hours.
Acknowledgments
A large number of individuals and organizations, too numerous to mention individually, have provided invaluable help and assistance during the course of the numerous investigations that have led to the information summarized in this chapter. The author wishes to acknowledge a select few who have been especially critical to his efforts: The National Science Foundation, which provided several grants; Dr. William Anderson, formerly of the National Science Foundation, for his continued support; Ms. Jeanne Perkins of the Association of Bay Area Governments, Oakland, CA; Professor Osamu Hiroi of Tokyo University; Professor Y. Kumagai of Tsukuba University; and Professor K. Suzuki of Tokyo Metropolitan University.
References
BBC (British Broadcasting Company) News Online Network. August 19, 1999. Earthquake Safety for Facilities Utilizing Chemicals (in Japanese). February 1982. Shizuoka Prefecture, Environmental Health Division. Ikegami, Y. 1979. Chemical Laboratories and Earthquakes: Case Studies from the Miyagiken-oki Earthquake, Kagaku to Kogyo (Chemistry and Industry), 31, 558. Isenberg, J. and Escalante, L.E. 1984. Damage to Lifelines, in Coalinga, California, Earthquake of May 2, 1983: Reconnaissance Report, EERI report No. 8403, January, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Oakland, CA, p. 230. Kupfer, W.R. 1994. Letter Report Written to the California Chemical Emergency Planning and Response Commission. LAFD (Los Angeles County Fire Department). 1994. HazMat Emergency Incident Report, log # 940227, and Memo from Erlinda MacAlintal to Chief Jim Ryland, Los Angeles County Fire Department, January 24. NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 1986. NFPA 491M Manual of Hazardous Chemical Reactions., National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. Norton, R. 1997. Director, Ofce of Environmental Health and Occupational Safety, California State University, Northridge, personal communication to Richard Staley, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, San Jose State University, January 6.
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Obihiro Fire Department. 1993. Report on the Fire That Occurred at Obihiro Veterinary University during the 1993 Kushiro-oki Earthquake, Unpublished report provided to author by the Obihiro Fire Department via the Kushiro Fire Department. Ogino, H. 1978. The Miyagiken-oki earthquake and chemistry laboratories, Bunseki (Analysis), 1978(9), 86. PBS (Public Broadcasting System) Online News. September 21, 1999. Perkins, J.B. and Wyatt, E.G. 1992. Hazardous Materials Problems in the Loma Prieta Earthquake, in National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program report to the U.S. Congress: The Loma Prieta, California, earthquake of October 17, 1989, part of the chapter Fire, Police, Transportation and Hazardous Materials. Perkins, J.B. and Wyatt, E. 1990. Hazardous Materials Problems in Earthquakes: Background Materials, Association of Bay Area Governments, Oakland, CA, September. Reitherman, R.K. 1982. Earthquake-Caused Hazardous Materials Releases, Proceedings of the Hazardous Materials Spills Conference, Milwaukee, WI. Rihal, S. 1984. Architectural (Nonstructural) Component Damage Caused by Coalinga Earthquake
of May 2, 1983, in Coalinga, California, Earthquake of May 2, 1983: Reconnaissance Report, EERI report no. 8403, January, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Oakland, CA, p. 206.
Sakurai, H. 1978. Earthquakes and Chemical Laboratories at Tohoku University: Damage and Lessons Learned from the Miyagiken-oki Earthquake, Kagaku (Science), 48, 568. Scawthorn, C. and Donelan, J. 1984. Fire-Related Aspects of the Coalinga Earthquake, in Coalinga, California, Earthquake of May 2, 1983: Reconnaissance Report, EERI report no. 8403, January, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Oakland, CA, pp. 273276. SCEPP (Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project). 1987. The Los Angeles-Whittier Narrows Earthquake of October 1, 1987: Federal/State Hazard Mitigation Survey Team Report, Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project, Los Angeles, CA, p. 12. Selvaduray, G. 1986. Earthquake Hazard Reduction Techniques at Petroleum Facilities in Japan, in Proc. Third U.S. Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Charleston, SC, August, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Oakland, CA. Selvaduray, G. 1997. Occurrence of Hazardous Materials Incidents during the Northridge Earthquake of January 17, 1994, in Proc. Northridge Earthquake Research Conference, August 2022, Consortium of Universities for Research in Earthquake Engineering (CUREE), Richmond, CA. Takayama, H. 1969. Report on the Mechanism of Fire Outbreak during the 1968 Tokachi-oki Earthquake, Tokyo Disaster Prevention Council, Tokyo. Tierney, K.J. 1985. Report on the Coalinga Earthquake of May 2, 1983, Report no. SSC 8501, Seismic Safety Commission, Sacramento, CA, p. 25. Tokyo Fire Department. 1985. Unpublished data provided to author. Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 1986. The Planning of Disaster Prevention in Tokyo, Report prepared by the Department of Urban Planning, June, Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Umezaki. 1996. Lessons from the Hanshin Earthquake: Record of Damage in Osaka Universitys School of Science Rooms, Gendai Kagaku (Modern Chemistry), (February), 2730. Wyllie, L.A. et al. 1986. The Chile Earthquake of March 3, 1985: Industrial Facilities, Earthquake Spectra, 2(2), 373390. Yoshida, T., Wada, Y., and Foster, N. 1994. Safety of Reactive Chemicals and Pyrotechnics, Pre-publication manuscript, Tokyo, Japan.

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30

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

30.5 Earthquake-Caused HAZMAT Incidents at Educational Institutions and Laboratories

30.6 Damage and Corrective Actions at Japanese Petroleum Facilities

30.7 Lessons Learned

30.8 Mitigation Approaches

Earthquake Engineering Handbook

30.1 Introduction and Signicance of Earthquake-Caused Hazardous Materials Incidents

2003 by CRC Press LLC

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

Earthquake Engineering Handbook

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

30.2 The Loma Prieta Earthquake

Earthquake Engineering Handbook

2003 by CRC Press LLC

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

2003 by CRC Press LLC

Earthquake Engineering Handbook

TABLE 30.4 Hazardous Materials Releases during the Northridge Earthquake

Number of Occurrences 4 30 17 12 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 3 194 27 53 387

30.3 The Northridge Earthquake

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

2003 by CRC Press LLC

Earthquake Engineering Handbook

30.4 The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

30.4.1 Hazmat Storage Facilities

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

30.4.2 Gasoline Stations

30.4.3 LPG Leak

30.4.4 Chemical Releases and Fires

Earthquake Engineering Handbook

30.5 Earthquake-Caused HAZMAT Incidents at Educational Institutions and Laboratories

30.5.1 The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake

30.5.2 The 1948 Fukui Earthquake

2003 by CRC Press LLC

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

30.5.3 The 1964 Niigata Earthquake

30.5.4 The 1968 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake

30.5.5 The 1978 Santa Barbara Earthquake

30.5.6 The 1978 Miyagiken-Oki Earthquake

2003 by CRC Press LLC

Earthquake Engineering Handbook

30.5.7 The 1983 Coalinga Earthquake

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

30.5.8 The 1985 Chile Earthquake

30.5.9 The 1987 Whittier-Narrows Earthquake

30.5.10 The 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake

30.5.11 The 1993 Kushiro-Oki Earthquake

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Earthquake Engineering Handbook

30.5.12 The 1994 Northridge Earthquake

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

30.5.13 The 1994 Sanriku-Haruka-Oki Earthquake

30.5.14 The 1995 Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake

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Earthquake Engineering Handbook

30.6 Damage and Corrective Actions at Japanese Petroleum Facilities

30.6.1 The 1964 Niigata Earthquake

Hazardous Materials: Earthquake-Caused Incidents and Mitigation Approaches

30.6.2 The 1978 Miyagiken-Oki Earthquake

30.6.3 The 1984 Nihonkai-Chubu Earthquake

30.6.4 Effectiveness of Hazard Mitigation at Japanese Petroleum Facilities

Earthquake Engineering Handbook

30.7 Lessons Learned