PETCHIE ROSE ESPERA 1. FELICIDAD ANZALDO, vs. JACOBO C.

CLAVE FACTS: Doctor Anzaldo finished the pharmacy course in 1950 in the College of Pharmacy, University of the Philippines. She obtained from the Centro Escolar University the degree of Master of Science in Pharmacy in 1962 and in 1965 the degree of Doctor of Pharmacy. Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist and supervisor (unassembled). On the other hand, Doctor Venzon finished the medical course in the University of Santo Tomas in 1957. She started working in the NIST in 1960. She has been working in that agency for more than twenty-one (21) years. Doctor Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service. Both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon were holding similar positions in the Medical Research Department: that of Scientist Research Associate IV with an annual compensation of P12,013 per annum. Both were next-in-rank to the vacant position. Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. Effective January 5, 1978, he appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position. The appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to Jacobo C. Clave, appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The appeal was forwarded to the NIST Anzaldo to the contested position The appealprotest was later sent to the Civil Service Commission. Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service Commission. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, Doctor Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Presidential Executive Assistant Clave (who was concurrently Chairman of the Civil Service Commission) revoked Doctor Anzaldo's appointment and

ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Doctor Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Doctor Venzon's protest. Hence, this instant special civil action of certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was accorded due process of law. HELD: Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines. Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment. In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently and satisfactorily discharged the duties of the contested position for more than four (4) years now and that she is qualified for that position, her appointment should be upheld. Doctor Venzon's protest should be dismissed.

2. Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA

regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) underArticle38oftheLaborCode

Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to

other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

3. BAGCAL v. VILLARAZA FACTS: BAGCAL was arrested on Feb 28,1982, by the Philippine Constabulary. The arrest waswithout warrant. He has been detained at Camp Alagar,Cagayan de Oro City, since his arrest to the present On Aug 6, the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an information for murder against petitioner Bagcal with the MTC of Cagayan de Oro presided by herein respondent JudgeRolando VILLARAZA. Said information was accompanied by the several affidavits from different persons. However, said affidavits were not subscribed before Judge VILLARAZA who did not ask theaffiants to ratify their oaths nor did he ask them searching questions Also, the information submitted before the MTC has no certification by the City Fiscal that he had conducted a preliminary investigation Indeed, if preliminary investigation was duly conducted, theinformation should have been filed in the CFI (not MTC)which had jurisdiction to try the case on its merits. From the forgoing, it is quite obvious that theinformation was filed with Judge VILLARAZA so that hewould conduct the preliminary examination andthereafter issue a warrant of arrest. Ultimately, Judge VILLARAZA issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioner BAGCAL. As a result of the issuance of said warrant of arrest, taken together with BAGCALs actuations in response thereto,Executive Judge Rosete (tasked to hear BAGCALs petition for release pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus previously issued) was constrained to rule that BAGCAL should remain in custody pending hearing and resolution for bail.

BAGCAL now questions the legality of such warrant under the attendant circumstances. ISSUE: WON issuance of warrant of arrest cured the illegality of hisprevious warrantless arrest meriting his immediate release from detention HELD/RATIO: No. At the outset, it must be stressed that herein respondent Judge VILLARAZA should not have issued the subject warrant of arrest to begin with. Judge Rosete and BAGCAL are in agreement, and now, the Court as well, on this point. As provided in the records, it was never refuted that Judge VILLARAZA did not personally examine the witnesses of the prosecution before issuing the questioned warrant of arrest. This is a glaring mark of the irregularity in Judge VILLARAZAs actuations. But does this mean that, under the attendant circumstances, BAGCAL should be released? NO. The above discussion notwithstanding, the denial of BAGCALs petition for release is hereby UPHELD. As provided in Judge Rosetes decision in the petition for release (pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued), although the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it was cured when petitioner submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a memorandum in support thereof, and filing a motion for reconsideration when his application was denied. 4. Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No L-64261 December 26, 1984 Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items. Held: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant. As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations. Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

5.VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL. G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor. Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the

Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

6. Mabanag vs Lopez Vito Facts: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)* which has been considered as an **enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. Petitioners pray that the said resolution be prevented. Respondents argue that the same can no longer be prevented as entered in the Journals. The Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts. *this is in contrast to Art 15 of the Constitution as well ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.

HELD: If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification. On the other hand, as far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. **Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

7. Araneta v Dinglasan G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949 Facts:

1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.

2. EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3. EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4. EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect HELD: YES.

1. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session after it. 2. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.

9. Velasco vs. Villegas G.R. No. L-24153 (120 SCRA), February 14, 1983] Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association. This is an appeal from the lower court's(LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory relief. They are challenging the constitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They contend that it amounts to deprivation of properties and their means of livelihood without due process of law.

The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional and such is just an exercise of the state's inherent power (police power).

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the petitioner's right to property and their means of livelihood. Held: Ordinance affirmed. is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC decision

Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of Police Power. The objectives of the Ordinance are:

(1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the business of massage clinics, and;

(2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from the construction of a separate room for massaging customers.

This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. And for that reason, the petitioners rights were not violated and they are not deprived of the due process of law. 10.EYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY [395 SCRA 494; GR NO. 147511; 20 JAN 2003] Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied.

Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose. Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use." In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice. 11. Republic vs. La Orden De PP. Benedictinos De Filipinas,G.R. No. L-12792, February 28, 1961 Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Governmentdrew plans to extend Azcarraga St. (now Recto) from its junction with Mendiola St., up tothe Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry

out this plan it offered to buy a portionof approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden situatedon Mendiola St. Not having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner,the Government instituted an expropriation proceeding. On May 27, 1957the trial court valued the property in question at P270,000.00 and authorized appellant to take immediate possession upon depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid. In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds that: (1) the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education. The trial court granted the motion, holding that the expropriation was not of extreme necessity. Hence this present petition. Issue: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain. Held: It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefor. It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic of Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also up on other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of evidence. The parties should have been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved, namely, the

need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve thet raffic congestion on Legarda street.

12. JAVIER vs. COMELEC 144SCRA194 G.R.Nos.L-68379-81 September 22, 1986 Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latters men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party. It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondents proclamation, the petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Comelec en banc as required by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Comelec authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election. Held: Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution provides that: The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.

13. People vs. Beriales [No. L-39962 April 7, 1976]

Facts: Ricardo Beriales, Benedicto Custodio and Pablito Custodio were convicted of the crime of murder by CFI of Leyte. They have allegedly murdered one Saturnina Gonzales Porcadilla on September 14, 1974. Upon the hearing, appellants counsel moved for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. Trial court postponed hearing until December 17 and 18, 1974. The fiscal filed a motion to defer the hearing until such time as the reinvestigation shall have terminated. The trial court, however, motu proprio cancelled the Dec. 17 & 18 hearing and reset the arraignment and trial to December 10 and 11, 1974. At the December 10 hearing, counsel of appellants manifested to the court that the city fiscal had set the reinvestigation on December 12, 1974 and had already sent subpoenas to the witnesses. The court nevertheless proceeded to hearing the next day, December 11. Upon appellants counsels insistence, the court relying on constitutional mandate of the right to a speedy trial, re-scheduled the hearing to December 13. On the day of the trial, counsel asked to the court to wait for the City Fiscal to appear since the Fiscal might be able to report on the reinvestigation. However, the court insisted on arraigning the appellants. Appelants refused to give a plea because they are waiting for the fiscal, the trial court entered a plea of Not Guilty for each of them. Appellants counsel manifested that they could not go to trial without the City Fiscal. For the same reason, counsel refused to cross-examine the witnesses presented. Counsel reiterated that they do not agree with the trial when defense was called to present evidence. Trial court considered the case to be submitted for decision and announced promulgation of the decision on December 17.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the trial court should hold the trial until after the reinvestigation (2) Whether or not appellants were denied due process (3) Whether or not the fiscal should be present during proceedings

Held:

(1) After the trial court granted the appellants motion for reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the result of such reinvestigation. (2) When the trial court ignored the appellants manifestations objecting to the arraignment and trial of the case, it committed a serious irregularity which nullifies the proceedings because such procedure is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. (3) Although fiscal turns over active conduct of trial to private prosecutor, he should be present during the proceedings. While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present during the proceeding.

14. TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY FACTS: Spouses Tijam filed a civil case for recovery of a sum of money and corresponding interests against Sopuses Sibonghanoy in the CFI of Cebu. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Defendants after being duly served with summons filed an answer with a counterclaim. CFI rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. A writ of execution was issued against defendants, however it was unsatisfied. Spouses Tijam then moved for a writ of execution against the Surety, but the Surety opposed on the ground that no prior demand was made and that there was failure to prosecute. CFI denied this motion on the ground that no previous demand had been made on the Surety. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. Surety motioned for extension to filed an answer, which was granted. However, upon its failure to file such answer, CFI granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.

Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing, but CFI denied the motion. Surety appealed to the CA, which affirmed the orders appealed from. It then filed a motion asking for extension to file a MR, which was granted, but instead of filing a MR it filed a Motion To Dismiss on the ground that the CFI had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case as in false under the jurisdiction of the Inferior Courts as per RA 296. CA required Spouses Tijan to answer the motion to dismiss but failed to do so. CA then resolved to set aside its decision and certified the case to SC. ISSUE: Does failure to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction for a considerable length of time bar a motion to dismiss the case? YES. HELD: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasiparty on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the

proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting. In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court. 15. DLI JUD MAKITA NKU SA NET. 16. Moncado v. People's Court (80 phil 1) ABANDONED DOCTRINE. WLA AVAILABLE NA COPY SA CASE SA NET.AKOA PJUD NI XA TAN-AWON LIBRARY?I THINK DLI NA XA SENSIBLE PA BASAHON NATO NA DOCTRINE KAY DLI NA XA APLLICABLE.PLS TEXT ME NLNG ABOUT ANYTHING REGARDING THIS CASES...

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