Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 9

G.R. No. 154878 March 16, 2007 CAROLYN M. GARCIA vs. RICA MARIE S.

THIO FACTS: Petitioner Garcia alleged that respondent Thio borrowed from her the amounts of US$100,000 and P500,000 at a monthly interest of 3% and 4% respectively. The amount of the loans were covered by crossed checks given by petitioner to respondent which were payable to the order of a certain Marilou Santiago. When respondent failed to pay the principal amounts of the loans when they fell due, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. On the other hand, Respondent denied that she contracted the two loans with petitioner and countered that it was Marilou Santiago to whom petitioner lent the money. Respondent claimed she was merely asked by petitioner to give the crossed checks to Santiago. Furthermore, respondent argued that the checks she issued in favor of petitioner in the amounts of P76,000 and P20,000 were not payments of interest but were meant to accommodate petitioners request that respondent use her own checks instead of Santiagos. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent is liable for the principal amounts of the loans 2. Whether or not respondent is liable for the 3% and 4% monthly interest for the US$100,000 andP500,000 loans respectively

RULING: 1. Upon the instruction of respondent, both checks were made payable to Santiago and were to be delivered to respondent so that she could deliver the same to Santiago. Under Article 1934 of the New Civil Code, an accepted promise to deliver something by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be perfected until the delivery of the object of the contract. Receipt of the money when checks are encashed constitutes a delivery of the object of the contract of loan, thus, the debtor acquires ownership of such money or loan proceeds and is bound to pay the creditor an equal amount. Although respondent did not physically receive the proceeds of the checks, these instruments were placed in her control and possession such that she had the choice to either forward them to Santiago, to retain them or to return them to petitioner. The checks issued by petitioner were only made payable to Santiago in order for respondent to re-lend the same amount to Santiago at a higher rate of 5% and realize a profit of 2%. 2. There was no written proof of the interest payable except for the verbal agreement that the loans would earn 3% and 4% interest per month. Article 1956 of the Civil Code provides that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. But while there can be no stipulated interest, there can be legal interest pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default. Hence, respondent is liable for the payment of legal interest per annum to be computed from the date when she received petitioners demand letter.

Notes: **Crossing a check has the following effects: (a) the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank; (b) the check may be negotiated only onceto one who has an account with the bank; (c) and the act of crossing the check serves as warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose, otherwise, he is not a holder in due course. **In the assessment of the testimonies of witnesses, this Court is guided by the rule that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the common experience of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.

G.R. No. 152609 June 29, 2005 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.

FACTS: Herein respondent American Express international is a foreign corporation and a registered VAT taxpayer operating in the Philippines. On April 13, 1999, respondent filed with the BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes in the amount of P3,751,067.04, which amount was arrived at after deducting from its total input VAT paid of P3,763,060.43 its applied output VAT liabilities only for the third and fourth quarters of 1997 amounting to P5,193.66 and P6,799.43, respectively. The CTA ruled in favor of the herein respondent holding that its services are subject to zero-rate pursuant to Section 108(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 and Section 4.102-2 (b)(2) of Revenue Regulations 5-96. The CA affirmed the decision of the CTA. ISSUE: Whether or not the company is subject to zero-rate tax pursuant to the Tax Reform Act of 1997. RULING: Respondent should be zero-rated. Services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines), when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP, are zerorated. Respondent is a VAT-registered person that facilitates the collection and payment of receivables belonging to its non-resident foreign client, for which it gets paid in acceptable foreign currency inwardly remitted and accounted for in conformity with BSP rules and regulations. It renders services which are not in the same category as processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods and should, therefore, be zero-rated. Service has been defined as the art of doing something useful for a person or company for a fee or useful labor or work rendered or to be rendered by one person to another. For facilitating in the Philippines the collection and payment of receivables belonging to its Hong Kong-based foreign client, and getting paid for it in duly accounted acceptable foreign currency, respondent renders service falling under the category of zero rating. Pursuant to the Tax Code, a VAT of zero percent should, therefore, be levied upon the supply of that service. As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated, while imports are taxed. For the supply of service to be zero-rated as an exception, the law merely requires that (1) the service is performed in the Philippines; (2) the service falls under any of the categories provided in Section 102(b) of the Tax Code; and (3) it is paid for in acceptable foreign currency that is accounted for in accordance with the regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. These 3 requirements for exemption from the destination principle are met by respondent. Its facilitation service is performed in the Philippines. It falls under the second category found in Section 102(b) of the Tax Code, because it is a service other than processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods as mentioned in the provision. Undisputed is the fact that such service meets the statutory condition that it be paid in acceptable foreign currency duly accounted for in accordance with BSP rules.

G.R. No. 115324 February 19, 2003 PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (now FIRST INTERNATIONAL BANK) vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FRANKLIN VIVES FACTS: Sometime in 1979, private respondent Franklin Vives, upon request of his friend Angeles Sanchez and relying on the assurance that he could withdraw his money within a months time, issued a check in the amount of P200,000 in favor of Sterela Marketing and Services owned by one Col. Arturo Doronilla. Subsequently, private respondent and his wife went to petitioner Producers Bank of the Philippines to verify if their money was still intact. They were informed that part of the amount had been withdrawn by Doronilla. Private respondent then filed an action for recovery of sum of money against Doronilla, Sanchez, the private secretary of Doronilla and petitioner. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondent which was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Petitioner contended that the transaction between private respondent and Doronilla is a simple loan (mutuum) since all the elements of a mutuum are present: first, what was delivered by private respondent to Doronilla was money, a consumable thing; and second, the transaction was onerous as Doronilla was obliged to pay interest. Hence, petitioner argues that it cannot be held liable because it is not privy to the transaction between the latter and Doronilla. Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that the transaction between him and Doronilla is not a mutuum but an accommodation, since he did not actually part with the ownership of his P200,000 but retained some degree of control over his money through his wife who was made a signatory to the savings account and in whose possession the savings account passbook was given. ISSUE: Whether or not transaction between private respondent and Doronilla is a simple loan (mutuum) since what was delivered by private respondent to Doronilla was money, a consumable thing and since the transaction was onerous as Doronilla was obliged to pay interest RULING: The contract is one of commodatum. Although in view of Article 1933 of the Civil Code, the object in commodatum is non-consumable, Article 1936 of the Civil Code provides that consumable goods may be the subject of commodatum if the purpose of the contract is not the consumption of the object, as when it is merely for exhibition. Thus, if consumable goods are loaned only for purposes of exhibition or when the intention of the parties is to lend consumable goods and to have the very same goods returned at the end of the period agreed upon, the loan is commodatum and not a mutuum. The evidence shows that private respondent agreed to deposit his money in the savings account of Sterela specifically for the purpose of making it appear "that said firm had sufficient capitalization for incorporation, with the promise that the amount shall be returned within 30 days. Private respondent merely "accommodated" Doronilla by lending his money without consideration, as a favor to his good friend Sanchez. It was however clear to the parties to the transaction that the money would not be removed from Sterelas savings account and would be returned to private respondent after thirty (30) days. Doronillas attempts to return to private respondent the amount of P200,000.00 which the latter deposited in Sterelas account together with an additional P12,000.00, allegedly representing interest on the mutuum, did not convert the transaction from a commodatum into a mutuum because such was not the intent of the parties and because the additional P12,000.00 corresponds to the fruits of the lending of the P200,000.00. Article 1935 of the Civil Code expressly states that "the bailee in commodatum acquires the use of the thing loaned but not its fruits." Hence, it was only proper for Doronilla to remit to private respondent the interest accruing to the latters money deposited with petitioner.

G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004 COLITO T. PAJUYO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents. FACTS: In June 1979, herein petitioner Colito Pajuyo paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. He then constructed a house made on the lot and lived in the house with his family from 1979 to 1985. Petitioner and private respondent Eddie Guevarra executed an agreement wherein Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises upon Pajuyo's demand. In 1994, Guevarra refused to vacate the house despite the demand of Pajuyo and thus the latter filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the MTC. In his Answer, Guevarra asserted that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing. The MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo which was affirmed on appeal by the RTC. The CA, in reversing the decision of the RTC, declared that both Pajuyo and Guevarra were squatters and were illegally occupying the contested lot which was owned by the government. From the foregoing, it ruled that both of them were consequently in pari delicto and should be left where they are. Furthermore, the appellate court also ruled that the contract entered into by the parties was not lease but commodatum since the agreement was not for a price certain. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract entered into between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum RULING: NO. In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it. An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use. If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called a precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum. The agreement reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the agreement did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the agreement a contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the agreement are also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the lease. Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of commission, administration and commodatum.
Notes: **The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims 'ex dolo malo non eritur actio' and 'inpari delicto potior est conditio defedentis.' The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them. The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there are exceptions to its application. One of these exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established public policy. **Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are squatters. The determination of priority and superiority of possession is a serious and urgent matter that cannot be left to the squatters to decide. **Unlawful detainer involves the withholding by a person from another of the possession of real property to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession under a contract, express or implied. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.

G.R. No. L-17474 October 25, 1962 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE V. BAGTAS and FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS FACTS: Jose Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls (a Red Sindhi, a Bhagnari, and a Sahiniwal) for a period of one year from May 8, 1948 to May 7 1949 for breeding purposes subject to a breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the request of Jose, approved a renewal of the period of one bull for another year from May 8, 1949 to May 7, 1950 and requested the return of the other two. On March 25, 1950, Jose informed the Director of Animal Industry of his desire to buy the bulls but had unfortunately failed to pay the book value of the three bulls or to return them on or before October 31, 1950, as advised by the Director of Animals. The trial court, through an action commenced against Jose, ordered the latter to pay the total value of the three bulls plus the breeding fees with interest on both. Felicidad Bagtas, the surviving spouse of Jose and as administratrix, was notified of the writ of execution against her husbands estate. Felicidad, praying that the writ of execution be quashed, alleged that the two bulls Sindhi and Bhagnari were returned to the Bureau Animal of Industry and that the third bull died due to force majeure thus relieving her from the duty of returning the bull or paying its value. ISSUE: Whether or not Felicicdad should not be held liable for the bull that died due to force majeur since the Republic, by reason of the contract of commodatum, retained ownership or title to the bull and should therefore suffer its loss RULING: A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under Article 1671 of the Civil Code the Felicidad would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued possession of the bull even after the expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because Article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum is liable for loss of the thing, even if it should be through a fortuitous event if he keeps it longer than the period stipulated. Furthermore, it was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability. Thus, as the two bulls had already been returned, the estate of the late Jose Bagtas is only liable for the value of the bull which was killed.

G.R. No. 126490 March 31, 1998 ESTRELLA PALMARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and M.B. LENDING CORPORATION FACTS: Private respondent M.B. Lending Corporation extended a loan to the spouses Osmea and Merlyn Azarraga, together with petitioner Estrella Palmares, in the amount of P30,000 payable on or before May 12, 1990, with compounded interest at the rate of 6% per annum to be computed every 30 days from the date thereof. Petitioner and the Azarraga spouses were able to pay a total of P16,300, thereby leaving a balance of P13,700.00. No payments were made after the last payment on September 26, 1991. Consequently, on the basis of petitioner's solidary liability under the promissory note, respondent corporation filed a complaint against petitioner as the lone party-defendant, to the exclusion of the principal debtors, allegedly by reason of the insolvency of the latter. nd Petitioner argued, however, that although the 2 paragraph of the promissory note says that she is liable as a rd surety, the 3 paragraph defines the nature of her liability as that of a guarantor. Petitioner concludes that her liability should be deemed restricted by the clause in the third paragraph of the promissory note to be that of a guarantor. ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner is liable as a guarantor RULING: A contract of suretyship is that wherein one lends his credit by joining in the principal debtor's obligation, so as to render himself directly and primarily responsible with him, and without reference to the solvency of the principal. If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. In the case at bar, petitioner expressly bound herself to be jointly and severally or solidarily liable with the principal maker of the note. The terms of the contract are clear, explicit and unequivocal that petitioner's liability is that of a surety. A surety promises to pay the principal's debt if the principal will not pay, while a guarantor agrees that the creditor, after proceeding against the principal, may proceed against the guarantor if the principal is unable to pay. A surety binds himself to perform if the principal does not, without regard to his ability to do so. A guarantor, on the other hand, does not contract that the principal will pay, but simply that he is able to do so. The undertaking to pay upon default of the principal debtor does not automatically remove it from the ambit of a contract of suretyship. The second and third paragraphs of the promissory note do not contain any other condition for the enforcement of respondent corporation's right against petitioner. It has not been shown that respondent corporation agreed to proceed against herein petitioner only if and when the defaulting principal has become insolvent. Furthermore, a creditor's right to proceed against the surety exists independently of his right to proceed against the principal. Under Article 1216 of the Civil Code, the creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The rule, therefore, is that if the obligation is joint and several, the creditor has the right to proceed even against the surety alone.

G.R. No. 173526 August 28, 2008 BENJAMIN BITANGA vs. PYRAMID CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CORPORATION

FACTS: Respondent Pyramid Construction Engineering Corporation entered into an agreement with Macrogen Realty, of which petitioner Benjamin Bitanga is the President, to construct for the latter the Shoppers Gold Building. However, Macrogen Realty failed to settle respondents progress billings. Upon respondents institution of a case for arbitration against Macrogen Realty with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), petitioner guaranteed the obligations of Macrogen Realty under a Compromise Agreement by executing a Contract of Guaranty in favor of respondent, by virtue of which he irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed the full and complete payment of the principal amount of liability of Macrogen Realty in the sum of P6,000,000. Unfortunately, Macrogen Realty failed and refused to pay all the monthly instalments prompting respondent to demand on petitioner, as guarantor of Macrogen Realty, to pay or to point out available properties of the Macrogen Realty within the Philippines sufficient to cover the obligation guaranteed. On September 7, 2000, respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Macrogen Realty, which the CIAC granted. But the sheriff filed a return stating that he was unable to locate any property of Macrogen Realty, except its bank deposit of P20,242.33, with the Planters Bank. Petitioner argued that he could not be held liable as guarantor since the benefit of excussion was still available to him and since respondent failed to exhaust all legal remedies to collect from Macrogen Realty. ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the benefit of excussion

RULING: Petitioner cannot avail himself of the benefit of excussion. Under Article 2060, in order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the creditor upon the latters demand for payment from him, and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt. Despite having been served a demand letter at his office, petitioner still failed to point out to the respondent properties of Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as required under Article 2060 of the Civil Code. Such failure on petitioners part forecloses his right to set up the defense of excussion. Petitioner had not genuinely controverted the return made by the Sheriff, who affirmed that, after exerting diligent efforts, he was not able to locate any property belonging to the Macrogen Realty, except for a bank deposit with the Planters Bank. It is axiomatic that the liability of the guarantor arises when the insolvency or inability of the debtor to pay the amount of debt is proven by the return of the writ of execution that had not been unsatisfied.

G.R. No. 151060. August 31, 2005 JN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and SPS. RODRIGO and LEONOR STA. ANA vs. PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION FACTS: Traders Royal Bank (TRB) extended to JN Development Corporation (JN) an Export Packing Credit Line for P2,000,000. The loan was covered by a real estate mortgage and a letter of guarantee from respondent Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PhilGuarantee). Upon JNs failure to pay the loan when it matured, PhilGuarantee, upon TRBs request to make good its guarantee, paid the latter. Subsequently, PhilGuarantee made several demands on JN, but the latter proposed to settle the obligation by way of development and sale of the mortgaged property instead, which PhilGuarantee rejected. PhilGuarantee thus filed a complaint for collection of money and damages against herein petitioners. The RTC ruled that since TRB was able to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by JN the obligation was extinguished and thus the latter is not liable to reimburse PhilGuarantee. In addition, the RTC held that since the guarantee was good for only one year, which was not renewed after the expiry of said period, PhilGuarantee had no more legal duty to pay TRB. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs decision. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not PhilGuarantees payment to TRB amounts to a waiver of its right under Article 2058 of the Civil Code 2. Whether or not PhilGuarantee had no obligation to pay TRB because of the alleged expiration of contract of guarantee

RULING: 1. Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfil the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be indemnified by the latter. Under Article 2058, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor (benefit of excussion). The creditor must first obtain a judgment against the principal debtor before assuming to run after the alleged guarantor since the exhaustion of the principals property cannot begin to take place before judgment has been obtained. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the creditor upon the latters demand for payment and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within the Philippines sufficient to cover the amount of the debt. Excussion is a right granted to the guarantor by law and as such he may opt to make use of it or waive it. PhilGuarantees waiver of the right of excussion cannot prevent it from demanding reimbursement from petitioners. While a guarantor enjoys the benefit of excussion, nothing prevents him from paying the obligation once demand is made on him. The law clearly requires the debtor to indemnify the guarantor what the latter has paid. 2. The guarantee was only up to December 17, 1980. JNs obligation with TRB fell due on June 30, 1980, and demand on PhilGuarantee was made by TRB on October 8, 1980. That payment was actually made only on March 10, 1981 does not take it out of the terms of the guarantee. What is controlling is that default and demand on PhilGuarantee had taken place while the guarantee was still in force. The benefit of excussion, as well as the requirement of consent to extensions of payment, is a protective device pertaining to and conferred on the guarantor. These may be invoked by the guarantor against the creditor as defenses to bar the unwarranted enforcement of the guarantee. However, PhilGuarantee did not avail of these defenses when it paid its obligation once demand was made on it.

G.R. No. 142381 October 15, 2003 PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS, INC., and ALFREDO CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TRADERS ROYAL BANK FACTS: Ching was the Senior Vice President of Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM). In his personal capacity and not as a corporate officer, Ching signed a Deed of Suretyship dated July 21, 1977 binding himself to be jointly and severally liable to pay Traders Royal Bank (TRB). PBM defaulted in its payment and since Chings obligation was solidary, the trial court ruled that TRB could proceed against Ching as surety upon default of the principal debtor PBM. On appeal, the trial courts decision was affirmed. Ching asserted that the Deed of Suretyship dated July 21, 1977 could not answer for obligations not yet in existence at the time of its execution. He further contended that no accessory contract of suretyship could arise without an existing principal contract of loan. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Alfredo Ching is liable for the obligations contracted by PBM long after the execution of the deed of suretyship RULING: Ching can be sued separately to enforce his liability as surety for PBM, as expressly provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code. Ching is liable for credit obligations contracted by PBM against TRB before and after the execution of the July21, 1977 Deed of Suretyship. This is evident from the tenor of the deed itself, referring to amounts PBM "may now be indebted or may hereafter become indebted" to TRB. The law expressly allows a suretyship for "future debts". Article 2053 of the Civil Code provides that a guaranty may also be given as security for future debts, the amount of which is not yet known; there can be no claim against the guarantor until the debt is liquidated. This is the basis for contracts denominated as continuing guaranty or suretyship. A continuing guaranty is one which is not limited to a single transaction, but which contemplates a future course of dealing, covering a series of transactions, generally for an indefinite time or until revoked. It is prospective in its operation and is generally intended to provide security with respect to future transactions within certain limits, and contemplates a succession of liabilities, for which, as they accrue, the guarantor becomes liable. Otherwise stated, a continuing guaranty is one which covers all transactions, including those arising in the future, which are within the description or contemplation of the contract of guaranty, until the expiration or termination thereof. A guaranty shall be construed as continuing when by the terms thereof it is evident that the object is to give a standing credit to the principal debtor to be used from time to time either indefinitely or until a certain period; especially if the right to recall the guaranty is expressly reserved. Hence, where the contract states that the guaranty is to secure advances to be made "from time to time," it will be construed to be a continuing one.