JESSA F.

AUSTRIA 2010-100109 Ruling of Cases RULE 75: Production and Allowance of Will

Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico Special Proceedings

Spouses Ricardo and Consolacion Pascual vs. Court Of Appeals And Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino [G.R. NO. 115925. August 15, 1999.] It is provided for under Article 838 of the Civil Code that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Court, in this case, has interpreted this provision to mean, that until admitted to probate, a will has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder. Union Bank Of The Philippines vs. Edmund Santibaez And Florence Santibaez Ariola [G.R. NO. 149926. February 23, 2005.] The law of testate succession substantially provides that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will Rafael E. Maninang And Soledad L. Maninang vs. Court Of Appeals, Et Al. [G.R. NO. L-57848. June 19, 1982.] The probate of a Will is mandatory. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. The probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Remedios Nuguid vs. Felix Nuguid And Paz Salonga Nuguid [G.R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966.] In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will; the due execution thereof; the testatrix's testamentary capacity; and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed the by law. In the case at bar, the parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate.

They questioned the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before this Court on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. The result would be waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These practical considerations induce this Court to meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the will in question, there being a justiciable controversy awaiting solution. Constantino Acain vs. IAC, Et Al. [G.R. No. 72706. October 27, 1987.] Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned there in, or trough mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. As for the widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in the direct line. However, the same cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. Lourdes L. Dorotheo vs. Court Of Appeals, Nilda D. Quintana, Et Al. [G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999.] Due execution of a will includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court Testate Estate Of Hilarion Ramagosa, Et Al. vs. Saturnina Ramagosa, Et Al. [G.R. No. L-23135. December 26, 1967.] In petitions for the probate of a will, an alleged disposal by testator prior to his death of the properties involved in his will is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provision is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution. The court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions

presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. Ethel Grimm Roberts vs. Judge Tomas R. Leonidas, Et Al. [G.R. No. L-55509. April 27, 1984.] The respondent Judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying the motion to dismiss the petition for probate of Grimm's two wills. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills. The law on Civil Code and Rules of Court provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed. Hence, the probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases. RULE 76: Allowance and Disallowance of a Will Constantino Acain vs. IAC, Et Al. [G.R. No. 72706. October 27, 1987.] In a probate proceeding, a person may be allowed to intervene must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. The petitioner in this case is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee nor a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. He appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased. Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia vs. Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez [G.R. No. L-26808. May 23, 1969.] The Rules of Court is clear that for all clerical services in the allowance of will, the fees payable out of the estate shall be collected in accordance with the value of the property involved. The specific legal provision is this velar and unmistakable. It is the clerical service in the allowance of the will that has to be paid for. The docket fees exist for that purpose and must be collected at the outset. There is no exception according to the legal provision. Petitioner should have been aware that there is no escape from the payment of the corresponding docket fee, otherwise, the Court is not called upon to act on a complaint or petition. Nor does it suffice to vary the rule simply because there is only one decedent whose estate is thus to be disposed of by will that must first be probated. It is not farfetched or implausible that a decedent could have left various wills. Under such circumstances, there is nothing inherently objectionable in thus exacting the payment of a docket fee, every time a will is sought to be probated. Petitioner here could have sought the probate of the will presented by him in the same proceeding.

Apolonia Banayad Frianela vs. Servillano Banayad, Jr. [G.R. No. 169700. July 30, 2009.] Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed. In this case, the petition has no statement of the gross value of the estate. Thus, it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Cynthia C. Alaban, Et Al. vs. Court Of Appeals, Et Al. [G.R. No. 156021. September 23, 2005.] It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. Moreover, as parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory. The Heirs of Jesus Fran and Carmen Mejia Rodriguez vs. Hon. Bernardo Ll. Salas, Et Al. [G.R. No. 53546. June 25, 1992.] The Court already ruled that it is not necessary that the original of the will be attached to the petition. Annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the jurisdictional allegations before the court, by practice the jurisprudence have established that they should be made in the form of an application and filed with the original of the will attached thereto. It has been the practice in some courts to permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to the application, without prejudice to producing the original thereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has been adopted by some attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has taken place in certain cases.

Uy Kiao Eng S. Nixon Lee [G.R. No. 176831. January 15, 2010] The production of the original holographic will is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Respondent here has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. Cynthia C. Alaban, Et Al. vs. Court Of Appeals, Et Al. [G.R. No. 156021. September 23, 2005.] A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. Moreover, as parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory. The Heirs of Jesus Fran and Carmen Mejia Rodriguez vs. Hon. Bernardo Ll. Salas, Et Al. [G.R. No. 53546. June 25, 1992.] It is not necessary that the original of the will be attached to the petition. Annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the jurisdictional allegations before the court, by practice the jurisprudence have established that they should be made in the form of an application and filed with the original of the will attached thereto. It has been the practice in some courts to permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to the application, without prejudice to producing the original thereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has been adopted by some attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has taken place in certain cases.

Testate Estate Of Jose B. Suntay, Et Al. vs. Federico C. Suntay [G.R. Nos. L-3087 & L-3088. July 31, 1954.] In an intestate proceeding, the widow and child of the testator are not estopped from asking for the probate of a lost will or of a foreign will just because of a lost will or of a foreign will just because of the transfer of assignment of their share, right, title and interest in the estate of the deceased. The validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in the probate proceeding which is concerned only with the probate of the will. Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost will must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. Moreover, where it appears that the proceedings in the court of a foreign country were held for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and the order of the probate court did not purport to allow the will, the proceedings cannot be deemed to be for the probate of a will, as it was not done in accordance with the basic fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country. Testate Estate of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap vs. Ildefonso Yap, Oppositor-Appellee. [G.R. No. L-12190. August 30, 1958.] The court held that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. Petition To Approve The Will Of Ricardo B. Bonilla vs. Amparo Aranza, Et Al. [G.R. No. L-58509. December 7, 1982.] In the probate of a will, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. But the Court ruled that perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court. Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court. In The Matter Of The Last Will And Testament Of Jose Vao vs. Paz Vao Vda. De Garces, Et Al. [G.R. No. L-6303. June 30, 1954.] Before the probate court can allow the will it must be satisfied upon the proof taken and filed, that the will was duly executed and that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence, or fraud. This issue may not be varied by the pleadings. Moreover, when the genuineness of the testator's signature is put in issue, his age, infirmity and state of health should be given due consideration. In this case, the testator at the time the contested will was made, was 78 years old and suffering from apparently advanced pulmonary tuberculosis and rheumatism, it is natural that his signature should lack the firmness, rhythm, effort and continuity of

motion that it had before he became quite ill and infirm. Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina Valmonte [G.R. No. 157451. December 16, 2005.] The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented. It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. Dy Yieng Seangio, Et Al. vs. Hon. Reyes, Et Al. [G.R. No. 140371-72. November 27, 2006.] A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended to be the last testamentary act and was executed in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect. Constantino Acain vs. Iac, Et Al. [G.R. No. 72706. October 27, 1987.] In this case, the universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The lower court should be allowed to rule on the intrinsic validity of a will before the will was probated. If the probate of the will is allowed when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved

Vicente B. Teotico vs. Ana Del Val Chan, Et Al. [G.R. No. L-18753. March 26, 1965.] Under our law, the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. Oppositor also has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. Moreover, the oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of the decedent.

Primitiva Paras vs. Ludovico Narciso [G.R. No. 10959. November 2, 1916.] Any person may intervene in proceedings for the probate of a will only if he had an interest in the will or the property affected thereby either as executor or otherwise, and strangers should not be permitted over the objection of the real parties in interest to embarrass the proceedings by meddling or intruding themselves in matters with which they have no concern. But, the mere fact that a stranger has been permitted to oppose or contest the probate of a will is not reversible error and does not invalidate the proceedings where no objection is interposed by any of the parties in interest. The judgment of the court in probate proceedings is not based on the fact that there is or is not opposition to the probate of the will, but upon the production of evidence which discloses that there are or are not sufficient grounds for the admission of the will to probate. Where competent, relevant, and material evidence admitted into the record in the course of probate proceedings sustains a judgment denying probate of the will, such judgment will not be reversed merely on the ground that all or any part of the evidence was submitted by a stranger to the proceedings unless it appears that timely objection was interposed to the introduction of such evidence at the hearing. Testate Estate Of Vito Borromeo vs. Crispin Borromeo, Et Al. [G.R. No. L-18498. March 30, 1967.] The condition and physical appearance of a questioned document is a factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the other. Hence, while it is true that the subscribing witnesses to contested will are regarded as the best witnesses in connection with its due execution, their testimony, in order to deserve full credit, must be reasonable and unbiased, and the same may be overcome by any other competent evidence.

Testate Estate Of Catalina De La Cruz vs. Pedro De La Cruz, Et Al. [G.R. No. L-24819. May 30, 1969.] Where a will is contested, the subscribing witnesses are generally regarded as the best qualified to

testify on its due execution. However, it is similarly recognized that for the testimony of such witnesses to be entitled to full credit, it must be reasonable and unbiased, and not overcome by competent evidence, direct or circumstantial. For it must be remembered that the law does not simply require the presence of three instrumental witnesses; it demands that the witnesses be credible. In this case, the contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of the witnesses and the notary, pointed out by the oppositors-appellants relate to unimportant details or to impressions of the witnesses about certain details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory, and which inconsistencies, by themselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the due execution of the will. Federico Azaola vs. Cesario Singson [G.R. No. L-14003. August 5, 1960.] Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided. The resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveals that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. In this case, since the authenticity of the holographic will was not contested, proponent was not required to produce more than one witness and even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, the Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.

Testate Estate Of The Late Adriana Maloto, Et Al. vs. Court Of Appeals, Et Al. [G.R. No. 76464. February 29, 1988.] The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. In this case, while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament.

Octavio S. Maloles Ii vs. Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips [G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000.] An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent. Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an heir of the testator. Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator's will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Hence,

the choice of the decedent to whom his property to be given is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes.