BINAY VS DOMINGO FACTS: On September 27, 1988,Petitioner Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60.

The resolution provided for a burial assistance program where qualified beneficiaries (to be given P500.00) are bereaved families whose gross monthly income does not exceed 2 thousand per month. It will be funded by the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. The municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. When it was referred to the COA it disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. Moreover, it is not for a public purpose. It only seeks to benefit a few individuals. The Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 243 which reaffirmed Res. No. 60. However, the program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause HELD: YES. RATIONALE: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein. "Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the

Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIO, JR.

FACTS: Private

respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8 Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10 In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional. In their Answer petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code. Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.21 Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.24

Respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. After trial, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance.
ISSUE: WON

the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power
HELD: YES.

RATIONALE: The

tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.37 Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.39 This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.40 The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.41 This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.42 The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.59 Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Means employed are constitutionally infirm The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently." It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property. Modality employed is unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.103 The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.104 In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the ErmitaMalate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv.

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion110 that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers. Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition.112 The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit. The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.114 The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. Conclusion All considered, the Ordinance invades fundameetal personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the

enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void. Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of itsthe judiciary virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guiseof due process and equal protection of laws of police power.

City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio

Police Power On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public

good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Facts: On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati. Issue: Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles. Held: Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments. Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

Parayno vs Jovellanos G.R. No. 148408 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Police power Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the

Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law. According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latters police powers HELD: The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code; The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Section 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a gas filling station.

As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.

Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either. Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.

On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended to build such buildings

after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.

Social Justice Society vs. Atienza Facts: The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 that was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies (the brief history of the Pandacan Oil Terminals is here). In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which period was extended up to 30 April 2003. This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7 March 2007 Decision. The SC ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. After the SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the decision. Intervention of the oil companies and the DOE allowed in the interest of justice Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. While the motions to intervene respectively filed by the oil companies and the DOE were filed out of time, these motions were granted because they presented novel issues and arguments. DOEs intervention was also allowed considering the transcendental importance of this case. Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly repeal Ordinance No. 8027 Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.

There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. The oil companies argue that the situation here falls under the first category. For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances. However, there was no legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. There is no conflict since both ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119). While it is true that both ordinances relate to the same subject matter, i.e., classification of the land use of the area where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be made to reconcile the ordinances so that both can be given effect. Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law. The special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision. Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it covers the entire city of Manila. Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in consideration of the separation of powers of the executive and judiciary. However, while it is true that Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative or executive departments of the government in the legitimate exercise of its powers, there is an exception to enforce mere ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer thereof. A writ of mandamus is the power to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or station. The oil companies also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to compel respondent to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, which was to seek relief from the President of the Philippines through the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the Presidents power of supervision over local government units. This suggested process, however, would be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently injurious to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its constituents whose welfare is sought to be protected. A party need not go first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance. Besides, the resort to an original action for mandamus before the SC is undeniably allowed by the Constitution. Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable. There is no showing that the Ordinance is unconstitutional. The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027

Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the city. This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city. The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of police power As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. It was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the

police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust. Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which amounts to taking without compensation According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits them from conducting operations in the City of Manila. However, the oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it established. The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they have invested billions of pesos in the depot, and the forced closure will result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities. This argument has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when the states power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence there is no compensable taking. In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone. Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code. An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all businesses and industries in the area it delineated. Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479

The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998). It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by Congress. However, a brief survey of decisions where the police power measure of the LGU clashed with national laws shows that the common dominator is that the national laws were clearly and expressly in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that there was no room for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to establish and administer programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources and to encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products. These powers can be exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Manila. The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under the Constitution. An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the Constitution. There is no showing how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction. The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is that Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the Presidents power over LGUs to one of general supervision. Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over them. The President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with RA 7924 and EO 72 The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be submitted to the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with its metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924 and Section 1 of E.O. 72. They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this review process, it is invalid. The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly formulated as the Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. CLUPs are the ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical framework plan and approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines and policies. Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification

are necessary, the oil companies did not present any evidence to show that these were not complied with. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed. Conclusion Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail. Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced. Just the same, the Court noted that it is not about to provoke a crisis by ordering the immediate relocation of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a decision, specially one with far-reaching consequences, should always be within the bounds of reason, in accordance with a comprehensive and wellcoordinated plan, and within a time-frame that complies with the letter and spirit of our resolution. To this end, the oil companies have no choice but to obey the law.