Civil Law

CIVREV DIGESTS MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO)
When laws become effective Tanada v. Tuvera Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera (in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing), to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 of the New Civil Code, however, does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The publication of laws has taken so vital significance when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Facts: The Hello Garci tapes came out.They allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. On June 8, 2005, House Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, setting in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by respondent House Committees. NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the House Committees seven alleged original tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. On August 3, 2005, the hearings were suspended indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. Garcillano then filed a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for a TRO (the first of the two petitions in this case), asking that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings. He also asked that they be stricken off the record of and that the House desist from further using the recordings. The House discussion and debates on the Garci case then stopped. Two years after, Sen. Lacson delivered a privilege speech reviving the issue. The speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security.The following day, in plenary session, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42001(An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire-Tapping) if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the Hello Garci tapes. However, she recommended a legislative
An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
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investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. The Court didnt issue the injunctive writ and Senate hearings took place. Issues: 1. WON Garcillanos petition for prohibition should be granted. 2. WON The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Held: 1. NO. 2. NO! (Its obvious with the way its phrased) Ratio: 1. Its already moot and academic. The recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the Hello Garci inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. 2. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. The Senate Rules simply state said Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. They dontexplicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. It cannot be presumed that the Rules would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. Also, publication of the rules via a booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page is insufficient to comply with the publication requirement. R.A. 8792 (The E-Commerce Act) considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations. The Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. GMA NETWORK G.R. No. 164026 FACTS On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA), a domestic corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC). The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000. Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00. On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without being deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term. The following month, the petitioner formally protested the assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term. The following year,
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the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioners Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner was formed. But GMA requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the assessment for application for extension of its corporate term. Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on April 18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment. Thusly, GMA appealed the ruling of the SEC to the Court of Appeals (CA), on the ground that ground that the assessment of filing fees for the petitioners application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law. ISSUE Whether the SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMAs application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term? RULING The SEC assailed the Decision dated February 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals which directed that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMA Network, Inc.s (GMAs) application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term. The appellate court agreed with the SECs submission that an extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as a juridical being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As such, it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of incorporation. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having been published in accordance with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according to the appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity. Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to property. The instant appeal is dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE: WON the additional obligation of 6k constituted usurious interest??? RULING: NO. Usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect. Judicial Decisions FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS v. CA Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA. On the last day of the 15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the CA. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration but this was also denied. Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion for extention to file a Motion for Reconsideration NO! Ratio: The CA correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the CA was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Exceptions to irretroactivity of laws LIAM LAW VS. OLYMPIC SAWMILL FACTS: Liam Law loaned 10k to Olympic Sawmill Corporation and Ellino Lee Chi. The loan became due but the debtors failed to pay and asked for an extension of 3 months instead. Law agreed but added an additional obligation of 6k to the principal amount. The debtors failed to pay again. Because of this, Law instituted a collection case against the debtors. The trial court ruled in favor of Law.
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Computation of Time Quiqui vs Boncaros Facts: (wont name who private respondents and petitioners are coz there are a lot) Private respondents obtained a free patent over a parcel of land. Petitioners contest this alleging that the land belongs to them because their late father purchased the same and that they continuously and actually possessed it. Petitioners filed a case for reconveyance against respondents on the ground that the patent was obtained through fraud. Answer was filed, pre trial commenced but no amicable settlement until trial was set. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On July 16, 1979 the trial court dismissed the complaint. Counsel for petitioners received copy of the decision on July 17, 1989. A motion for reconsideration was filed on August 17, 1979. Trial court denied the MR because it was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Issue: Whether MR was filed beyond the reglementary period? Held: YES! Under the rules enforced at the time of this case, an appeal may be taken within 30days from notice of the judgment of the trial court. In relation thereto, the New Civil Code states that in computing period, the 1st day shall be excluded and the last day included. In this case, counting 30days from July 17 (day petitioners counsel received copy of the judgment) excluding 1st day the 30th day would be August 16. Petitioners filed their MR one day late or on August 17. Because of this, the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint has become final and executor. marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together for 25 years and produced 3 children. Before Lorenzo died, he executed a will, which was pending before the probate court, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. After Lorenzo died, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over his estate in his favor. Alicia filed as well. RTC found that the divorce decree granted to Lorenzo is void and inapplicable in the Philippines therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia is void. CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce is valid. HELD: YES. In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., the court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the CC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to the concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. Furthermore, in the case of Quita v. CA, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him. For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the CA must be reversed. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. (The SC remand the case to the TC for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will is left to the TC.) Application of Chapter 2: Human Relations De Tavera vs PTS Petitioner is a doctor, specializing in treating tuberculosis. She was appointed as member of the Board Directors of defendant Phil. Tuberculosis Society. However, she was alleging that she was removed from her post without informing her of the lawful cause and thereafter, Romulo was appointed as her replacement. She was claiming that 4 members of the Board were not members of the Society and hence, they did not have the power to be appointed in the Board and to vote. She filed a case against them, claiming that they violated the Human Rights provisions of the Civil Code. Defendants were claiming that the position of petitioner is held at the pleasure of the Board and hence, she may be removed at anytime. ISSUE: Can she invoke the human relations provisions of the CC?
Nationality Principle Conflicts Rules Llorente vs. CA Nationality Principle: Conflicts Rules FACTS: Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo left for the US Navy while Paula stayed in their conjugal home in Camarines Sur. Lorenzo was admitted to US citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization was issued in his favor. When Lorenzo was allowed to visit his wife in the Philippines, he discovered his wife was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and the two drew a written agreement which essentially shows that Paula admitted her adulterous acts and that the couple agreed to separate. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce which was granted. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente. Alicia had no knowledge of the first
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SC: NO Petitioner cannot seek relief from the general provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations nor from the fundamental principles of the New Constitution on preservation of human dignity. While these provisions present some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability of social order, these are merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal provisions and definite contractual stipulations. In the case at bar, the Code of By-Laws of the Society contains a specific provision governing the term of office of petitioner. The same necessarily limits her rights under the New Civil Code and the New Constitution upon acceptance of the appointment. Moreover, the act of the Board in declaring her position as vacant is not only in accordance with the Code of By-Laws of the Society but also meets the exacting standards of honesty and good faith. pass wise and proper laws. For this kind of duty, no one individual could single himself out and assert that the duties are owed to him alone. The second kind covers those who perform duties to an individual by reason of their employment by a particular person to do some act for him in an official capacity. They usually receive their compensation from that particular individual. Ex. A sheriff in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording a deed or mortgage in favor of a private individual, a notary public in protesting a negotiable paper, etc. When what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual can have no cause of action for damages against the public officer. The exception to this is if the individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officers improper or non-performance. The principle may now translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. A public officer like Chato, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid admin regulations. Its a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire public who would be affected by such rule. Note that in CIR v. CA, the RMC was not declared unconstitutional for violating the due process requirement or the equal protection clause. Court only said that the RMC did not meet the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune relies heavily on that case as its cause of action. It shows therefore that it really has no cause of action for failing to show its allegation that Chato violated Art. 32. Fortune failed to show that it incurred some particular wrong or injury. Finally, Sec. 227 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 provides: Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. When an action is brought against any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the performance of official dutyany judgment, damages or costs recovered in such action shall be satisfied by the Commissioner. No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who has acted negligently or in bad faith, or with willful oppression. Because the respondents complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State. Duty to act with Justice, Observe Honesty and Good Faith Llorente v. Sandiganbayan Facts: Llorente, then municipal mayor of Zamboanga del Norte was charged with violation of Sec. 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. According to the information: he did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith refuse to sign and approve the
9. Chato v. Fortune Tobacco RA 7654 was passed in June 10, 1993. Prior to its enactment, cigarette brands Champion, Hope and More were considered local brands subjected to a lower ad valorem tax rate. 2 days before RA 7654 took effect, Chato issued RMC 37-93 which reclassified the same cigarette brands resulting to the imposition of a higher ad valorem rate. In effect, the RMC subjected the cigarette brands to the RA even before it took effect. In a separate case (CIR v. CA), RMC 37-93 was held to be not valid for having fallen short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune (the cigarette manufacturer) filed a complaint for damages against Chato in her private capacity. It contended that Chato violated Art. 32 of the CC by depriving it of its property without due process of the law and in violation of equal protection. To this, Chato argued that she issued the RMC in the performance of her official functions and within the scope of her authority so she cant be liable. She filed motion to dismiss. Via petition for certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss reached the SC. In its June 19, 2007 decision it ordered the trial court to proceed with the case. Chato moved for the reconsideration of that decision. Issue: w/n Chato can be held liable in her personal capacity for having issued the RMC NO Ruling: To determine whether a public officer is liable for improper or nonperformance of duty, it must be first determined what kind of duty is involved. There are 2 kinds of duties exercised by public officers. One is the duty owing to the public collectively and duty owing to particular individuals. The former pertains to officers who act for the public at large and are ordinarily paid out of the treasury. Ex. Governors duty to the public is to see to it that laws are properly executed, that competent officials are appointed by him, etc. Legislators owe a duty to the public to
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payrolls and vouchers representing the payments of the salaries and other emoluments of Leticia G. Fuertes, without just valid cause and without due process of law, thereby causing undue injury to the said Leticia G. Fuertes. While admitting some delays in the payment of the complainants claims, petitioner sought to prove the defense of good faith -- that the withholding of payment was due to her failure to submit the required money and property clearance, and to the Sangguniang Bayans delayed enactment of a supplemental budget to cover the claims. He adds that such delays did not result in undue injury to complainant. Respondent Court held that the delay or withholding of complainants salaries and emoluments was unreasonable and caused complainant undue injury. Being then the sole breadwinner in their family, the withholding of her salaries caused her difficulties in meeting her familys financial obligations like paying for the tuition fees of her four children. ISSUE Did petitioner not act in good faith in refusing to immediately sign the vouchers and implement the compromise agreement until the Sangguniang Bayan had enacted the appropriation ordinance and until Mrs. Fuertes submitted the clearance from the Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte? NO. PETITION IS GRANTED. HELD Respondent Court cannot shift the blame on the petitioner, when it was the complainant who failed to submit the required clearance. This requirement, which the complainant disregarded, was even printed at the back of the very vouchers sought to be approved. As assistant municipal treasurer, she ought to know that this is a condition for the payment of her claims. Also, given the lack of corresponding appropriation ordinance and certification of availability of funds for such purpose, petitioner had the duty not to sign the vouchers. As chief executive of the municipality Llorente could not have approved the voucher for the payment of complainants salaries under Sec. 344, Local Government Code of 1991. The petitioners failure to approve the complainants vouchers was due to some legal obstacles, and not entirely without reason. Thus, evident bad faith cannot be completely imputed to him. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. Actions for Breach of promise to marry Bunag v. CA Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said Bunag brought Cirilo to the house of his grandmother in Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days. Soon, Bunag and Cirilo filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. However, Bunag left Cirilo and soon filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. Cirilo claims that she was abducted and raped. One of the cases she filed was a suit for damages based on a breach of a promise to marry. The trial court decided in her favor. This was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Should damages be awarded based on a breach of a promise to marry? Decision: No. In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. In this case however, moral damages were awarded based on art. 21 of the Civil Code which states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. As such, the act of Bunag forcibly abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Thus, the damages awarded to Cirilo were proper.
12. Baksh vs. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115) Facts: Baksh, an Iranian citizen, courted respondent Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition that they will get married, so he promised her that he will marry her. Gonzales parents made preparations by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. Without getting married, Baksh and Gonzales lived together. Gonzales cherry got popped. Thereafter, Baksh began maltreating Gonzales and eventually told her that he no longer wanted to marry her and that he was already married to another woman. Gonzales filed a complaint for damages. Issue: W/N Article 21 of the New Civil Code is applicable such that damages may be awarded? Held: Yes! Article 21 applies! SC said that Article 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold moral
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wrongs which are impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Where a mans promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfil that promise thereafter become the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Unjust Enrichment at the expense of others 13. GARCIA V PHILIPPINE AIRLINES FACTS: Petitioners Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago are employees of PAL who have been dismissed after being caught in the act of sniffing shabu in the toolroom. Garcia et al filed an illegal dismissal case against PAL before the Labor Arbiter (LA). The LA ruled in favor of Garcia et al and ordered PAL to immediately reinstate petitioners. On appeal to the NLRC by PAL, the decision of the LA was reversed. Meanwhile, the LA issued a Notice of Garnishment the Writ of Execution for the reinstatement aspect of its decision. When PAL tried to enjoin the reinstatement and garnishment, NLRC affirmed such Notice and Writ but suspended and referred the action to the Rehabilitation Receiver of PAL which at that time was undergoing rehabilitation receivership. However, when PAL manifested that SEC had approved its exit from the rehabilitation, SC resolved to entertain the issue of whether PAL should pay backwages to the Garcia et al from the time the LA ordered their reinstatement up to the time the NLRC reversed the findings of the LA ISSUE: Whether or not compelling PAL to pay backwages despite the fact that the NLRC ruled in its favor on appeal constitutes unjust enrichment HELD: NO. the social justice principles of labor law outweigh or render inapplicable the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment. According to article 223 of the Labor Code, the order of reinstatement of the labor arbiter is immediately executor even pending appeal. The reinstatement may be actual or payroll reinstatement at the option of the employer. HOWEVER, in this case, PAL is excused from complying with the obligation to reinstate Garcia et al either actually or otherwise because while the case was before the LA and the NLRC, it was under rehabilitation. It is basic in corporate rehabilitation that all actions against a corporation undergoing rehabilitation is ipso jure suspended. This includes labor actions. True, the implementation of the reinstatement order is a ministerial duty of the LA unless it is restrained by a higher court. In this case, the injunction partook the nature of suspension of action by legislative fiat i.e. law on corporate rehabilitation. This is equally effective as when the injunction was issued by a higher court. Liability of public officers 14. Aberca v Ver (1988) Ver, et al, are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They conducted raids against the houses of the petitioners (Aberca, etc), claiming that they were communists. In doing so, Ver, et al, used spurious judicial search warrants. Ver, et al, took the personal belongings of the petitioners and even arrested some of them without warrants. Aberca, et al, sued for damages. Ver, et al, claim that they are immune from suit. Issue: Can Aberca recover damages? Held: Yes, under Art 32 of the Civil Code, public officials and private citizens can be held liable for damages for infringing upon the rights of others. Art 32 provides a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. No man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
15. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, Feb. 17 1997 Facts: Tabuena, Gen. Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), was instructed by Pres. Marcos to pay directly to the presidents office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. (PNCC) in the amount of P55 million. The order was done both through phone and through a Presidential Memorandum, received through Gimenez, Marcos private secretary. With the help of the Asst. Gen. Manager, Dabao, and Acting Manager of the Financial Services Department, Peralta (they were the ones authorized to make withdrawals), Tabuena was able to release the amount of P55 million by means of 3 withdrawals. The money was delivered to the presidents office through Gimenez. Cases were filed against Tabuena and Peralta in the Sandiganbayan, charging them of malversation (Dabao was still at large). SB convicted them, saying
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that MIAA did not have any outstanding obligations to the PNCC. Tabuena and Peralta appealed to the SC, alleging the defense of good faith. Issue: Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta criminally liable? Held: NO. The withdrawals were ordered by Pres. Marcos himself, first through phone, and then through a Pres. Memorandum. Even though Tabuena and Peralta had both thought that the disbursements were out of the ordinary and not based on normal procedures, they both had no choice but to follow such order. Marcos was undeniably their superior, being President of the Phil. who exercised control over government agencies like the MIAA and PNCC. Marcos has a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such as directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried out. As a recipient of such kind of directive coming from the highest official of the land, good faith should be read on their compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the Marcos Memorandum. They are entitled to the justifying circumstance of Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. However, Tabuena though acting in good faith, should still be administratively or civilly liable. The disbursements were made out of the ordinary and not based on normal procedures. True, the deviation was inevitable under the circumstances that Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures considering the fact that the Memorandum called for his immediate compliance. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such omission. Sandiganbayan decision REVERSED. Independent Civil Actions and Prejudicial Questions Abunado v. People FACTS: This case involves BIGAMY September, 1967 Abunado marries Narcisa 1988 Narcisa leaves for work in Japan 1992 Narcisa returns to the Philippines upon finding out that her husband is having an extra-marital affair and has left her conjugal home. She found out that her husband had contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Binas on January 1989. 1995 A bigamy case was filed against Abunado Abunados defense: petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999. ISSUE: Is the petition for annulment or declaration of nullity a prejudicial question? HELD: NO it is not. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
COJUANGCO vs. PALMA FACTS: The complainant Eduardo Cojuangco is a client of ACCRA, w h o a s s i g n e d t h e c a s e t o A t t y . P a l m a , t h e respondent. The f o r m e r h i r e d t h e l a t t e r a s h i s p e r s o n a l c o u n s e l f o r h i s business. Atty. Palma becomes very close to the family of Cojuangco, and he dines and goes with them abroad. He even tutored, complainants 22year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa). On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong without the knowledge of the complainant and despite the facts that the former is already m a r r i e d a n d w i t h t h r e e ( 3 ) c h i l d r e n . C o m p l a i n a n t s e n d s h i s t w o s o n s t o persuade Lisa to go home with them, which she did. In the celebration of respondents marriage with Lisa he misrepresented himself as a bachelor. On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage and which was granted. Subsequently complainant filed a disbarment complaint on the ground of grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. As he contends that complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyers oath. ISSUE: W O N r e s p o n d e n t s a c t s c o n s t i t u t e d e c e i t , m a l p r a c t i c e , gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer that would warrant his disbarment. YES!
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RULING: There is no question that respondent as a lawyer, is well versed in the law, fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa. For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed g r o s s l y i m m o r a l c o n d u c t and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years and which later lessen to one (1) year. According to IBP:At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotom y of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any tim e be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.P r o f e s s i o n a l c o m p e t e n c y a l o n e d o e s n o t m a k e a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement. T h e interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i s t h a t t h e y s h a l l n o t engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The DOJ filed the criminal case with the MTC. Later, however, DOJ uSec Merciditas Gutierrez ordered the withdrawal of the Informations. This decision was reversed by the DOJ Sec., thus the case proceeded. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, where he raised, among others, that the SEC case is a prejudicial question to the criminal case for falsification. CA denied certiorari thus criminal case proceeds. Issue: Is the SEC case a prejudicial question that has to be resolved before the criminal case for falsification may proceed? NO. Ruling: SC affirms CA. Case proceeds. A prejudicial question is defined as one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused; and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation in which a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. One of the issues taken in the SEC case is whether Pearlbank has outstanding loans with Wincorp. However, a finding that Pearlbank indeed has outstanding debts will not totally absolve Reyes of any criminal liability, in other words, its not an absolute defense. Since, what is determinative in the Falsification case is whether there really were falsified documents.
Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities - July 30, 2008 Facts: Reyes is the Vice-President of Wincorp, a corporation that arranges and brokers loans of its clients, one of whom is Pearlbank Securities. Sometime before this case, investors or lenders made demands on Pearlbank to pay several loans that were brokered by Wincorp. The investors alleged that they werent able to collect on their outstanding credits with Wincorp because Pearlbank didnt pay. Apparently, Pearlbank alleges that it did not have any outstanding loans that WINCORP brokered. Thus Pearlbank investigated on these alleged debts. Pearlbank demanded from Wincorp a full and accurate accounting of the identities and investments of the lenders and the alleged debts of Pearlbank with supporting records and documents. Wincorp did not respond to this demand. Pearlbank instituted a case with the SEC, now pending with the RTC (bec. of that law which transferred jurisdiction with the RTCs, for full and accurate accounting of investments and alleged loan obligations of Pearlbank. Pearlbank, through its treasurer, also filed complaints with the DOJ against officers of Wincorp, one of them was Reyes, for falsification of commercial and private documents.
PIMENTEL V PIMENTEL
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FACTS Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC QC. Petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC Antipolo, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC QC on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the case filed in RTC Antipolo would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC QC. The RTC QC held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question. Petitioner filed a MR. RTC QC denied the motion. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC. ISSUE W/N the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner? HELD The petition has no merit. Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. Thus, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled by RTC Antipolo, petitioner could still be held criminally liable, since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that there is a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned. Concept of Marriage In re: Bucana (ACTUAL CASE NO DIGEST KASI) FACTS: Acting upon the letter of Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar, Barangay Captain of Victories, Dumangas, Iloilo, dated February 26, 1976, respondent Notary Public Rufillo D. Bucana was required by this Court in its Resolution of March 23, 1976, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for having notarized on November 10, 1975 at Dumangas, Iloilo an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the aforementioned spouses agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them" and that the afore-mentioned Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement to allow each and everyone of them to remarry without objection or reservation ...", which affidavit is contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose. On April 21, 1976, respondent . submitted his explanation, admitting that he notarized the afore-mentioned document and that the Agreement is "immoral and against public policy", but in mitigation he asserted that the document in question was Prepared by his clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero without his previous knowledge; that when said document was presented to him for signature after it was signed by the parties, he vehemently refused to sign it and informed the parties that the document was immoral; that he placed the said document on his table among his files and more than a week later, he asked his clerk where the document was for the purpose of destroying it, but to his surprise he found that the same was notarized by him as per his file copies in the office; that he dispatched his clerk to get the copy from the parties, but the afore-mentioned parties could not be found in their respective residences; that he must have inadvertently notarized the same in view of the numerous documents on his table and at that time he was emotionally disturbed as his father (now deceased) was then seriously ill. The foregoing contentions of respondent were corroborated substantially by the separate sworn statements of his clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero and Angela Drilon Baltazar, both dated April 20, 1976. 1 There is no question that the afore-mentioned Agreement is contrary to law, morals and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and of society without which there could be neither civilization nor progress. 2 The contract, in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another man, without opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party to commit bigamy. 3 This is not only immoral but in effect abets the commission of a crime. A notary public, by virtue of the nature of his office, is required to exercise his duties with due care and with due regard to the provisions of existing law.
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As stressed by Justice Malcolm in Panganiban v. Borromeo, 4 "it is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his duties notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court even to the extent of disbarment." In the case at bar, respondent in effect pleads for clemency, claiming that the notarization of the questioned document was due to his negligence. We find, however, that the aforementioned document could not have been notarized if the respondent had only exercised the requisite care required by law in the exercise of his duties as notary public. WHEREFORE, We hold that respondent Rufillo D. Bucana is guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the office of not try public for a period of six (6) months, with the admonition that a repetition of the same or a similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. Legal Capacity Sex SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007. FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Rommel Silverio filed a petition to change his first name (to Mely) and sex (to female) in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. He alleges to be a male transsexual and that he has always identified more with girls since childhood. After undergoing breast augmentation, hormone treatment and psychological examination, on January 27, 2001, he finally underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok. The petition was granted by the trial court, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, and Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court allow petitioner to change his name and sex in his birth certificate. NO. RATIO: A persons first name cannot be changed because of sex reassignment. The State has an interest in the names carried by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification. Change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are thus controlled by statute. Art. 376 of the Civil Code 2 was amended by R.A. 9048.3 Section 1 of the said law provides: Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. Thus, the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar, assuming it could be legally done, instead of the trial court. Moreover, the petition has no merit as the use of his true and official name worked no prejudice towards him. R.A. 9048 provides for the following grounds for which a change of first name may be allowed: 1. First name or nickname ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2. First name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by petitioner and has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or 3. Change will avoid confusion.4 Here, Silverio failed to even allege any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true name. His basis in praying for the change of his first name was the sex reassignment to make his name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into. A change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. The law does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, granting the petition may only create complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Under R.A. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries correctable under Rule 108 and Art. 412 of the Civil Code are found in Articles 407 and 408 of the same Code. 5 No reasonable interpretation of the provisions can justify a conclusion that they cover correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error. To change means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
4 Section 4, Republic Act 9048. 5 Art. 407. Acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register. Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)acknowledgements; (10) naturalization; (11) loss or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
2 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority 3 Clerical Error Law
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that serves as a substitute. The birth certificate of Silverio contained no error. No correction is necessary. exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in her birth certificate from female to male. Prior existing marriage Lilia Wiegel v. Hon. Semio-Dy 143 SCRA 499 (1986) Facts: Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Wiegel (Petitioner LILIA) on the ground of LILIAs previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion. LILIA admitted the existence of her prior marriage to Maxion but claimed that their marriage was null and void because she and Maxion were allegedly forced to enter said marital union. During pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by LILIA and Karl Wiegel was the status of the first marriage (void or voidable?).
22. Republic v. Cagandahan Topic of SEX under Legal Capacity/ Doctrine: Change of Gender not a mere typographical or clerical error, hence subject to judicial order. Facts: In her petition, she alleged that she was born as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. Petitioner further alleges that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. (She has both male and female organs!) Court granted petition, to which the OSG countered, saying among others, that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male, and that the local civil registrar should be impleaded as an indispensable party . Issue: whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Held: Petition denied. Cagandahan wins. Ratio: Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by R.A. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. In short, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Further, the medical testimony proves that Cagandahan has this unique condition which makes her feel and appear like a man. In other words, the Court respects her congenital condition and her mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with her unordinary state and thus help make her life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case. As for her change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
LILIA contested validity of the pre-trial order and asked the court for an opportunity to present evidence that: (1) 1st marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and Maxion and (2) Maxion, at the time of their marriage, was already married to someone else. Hon. Sempio-Dy ruled against the presentation f evidence because the existence of force exerted on LILIA and Maxion had already been agreed upon. LILIA assailed Sempio-Dys Orders (compelling to submit the case for resolution based on agreed facts and denying motion to present evidence in her favor) through a Petition for Certiorari alleging GADALEJ.
Issue: Sempio-Dy guilty of GADALEJ? Held: No. Petition dismissed. There is no need for LILIA to prove that her 1st marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties, because even assuming this to be so, marriage WILL NOT BE VOID but merely voidable, and therefore VALID until annulled. Since there was no annulment yet, it is clear that when she married Karl Wiegel, she was still validly married to Maxion. Thus, her marriage to Karl is VOID. There is likewise no need to introduce evidence about the existing prior marriage of Maxion at the time he and LILIA were married, because even if their marriage was void, a judicial declaration of such fact is necessary. Without the judicial declaration, LILIA (for all legal intents and purposes) was still regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with Karl Wiegel. Thus, marriage to Karl would still be regarded as VOID under the law.
24. TY v. CA
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FACTS: Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila. On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979. Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982. The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly HELD: The provisions of the Family Code requiring judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before a subsequent marriage can be contracted is not applicable in the present case. In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid. Thus, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite private respondents deceit and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.
Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007 Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiance Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.
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After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall. He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant. Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala. Held: Lawyers oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he shall not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold. Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Authority of Solemnizing Officer Beso v. Daguman FACTS: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar. Judge Daguman is a municipal judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar. He solemnized the marriage of Beso in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar. ISSUE: Whether or not Daguman is liable for solemnizing marriage outside his area of jurisdiction. HELD: YES. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction. There are only 3 instances, as provided by Article 8 of the FC, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside of his chambers or at a place other than his sala, to wit: 1.when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death; 2.when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; 3.where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. In this case, there is no pretense that either Beso or his fianc Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to the Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage because Beso was an overseas worker. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisites laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
27 Aranes v Occiano Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law in a letter complaint because said judge solemnized her marriage (Feb. 17, 2000) with Dominador Orobia outside of his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage license. She and Orobia relying on the marriage lived together as husband and wife for many years but on his death she was deprived of inheriting from him because their marriage was a nullity. She was likewise deprived of receiving Orobias pension from the navy. In his comment, the Judge said that on Feb. 15, 2000, a Juan Arroyo asked him to solemnize the marriage between the parties on the assurance that all the necessary
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documents were complete.He agreed to conduct the wedding at Nabua because Orobia suffered from a stroke and couldnt travel to Balatan. On the day of the wedding, he noticed that no marriage license was presented and he informed the parties that their marriage will be a nullity and had wanted to move the date of the wedding but out of human compassion decided to continue because the visitors were already coming in, the delivery of provisions for the reception, the possibility of further aggravating Orobias condition (nastroke) and the parties assured him that they will give him the license the afternoon of the same day. No license was ever delivered. Aranes later desisted upon realization that it was her fault BUT the Office of the Court Administrator still found the judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction and was fined 5K. ISSUE: Whether the decision is correct? HELD: Tama! Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. Judge Occiano only had jurisdiction to solemnize marriages in Balatan and not Nabua and he should be held administratively liable for violating the law on marriage. He should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license because thats considered a gross ignorance of the law. The fact of desistance of Aranes doesnt exculpate him from liability. Disciplinary actions like this arent private matters, the Court has the power to discipline judges. Should he have solemnized the wedding to another of a married man on the basis of an affidavit of presumptive death? NO Did the judge have the authority to solemnize the other wedding outside his courts jurisdiction? NO Ratio: Summary Proceeding for Declaration of Presumptive Death Necessary For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the FC for the declaration of the death of the absentee. Absent this judicial declaration, the husband remains married to his first wife. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous marriage under Article 35, par. 4 (those bigamous marriage not falling under Art. 41). Authority of the Judge Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided under Art. 7. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while not affecting the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Marriage License Filipina Y. Sy v. CA Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married on 1973. They were blessed with 2 children. Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition, which was later on affirmed by the CA. MR was denied as well. Hence, this appeal by certiorari. Petitioner, for the first time, is raising the issue that there is an absence of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate is September 14, 1974, while the date of the celebration of the marriage is on November 15, 1973. Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony Held: Yes. The marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place. Therefore, the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Article 80 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, he purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Article 72-79 of the Civil Code. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is VOID from the beginning.
28. NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY Facts: Complainant Municipal Mayor Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Domagtoy for gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, he solemnized a wedding despite knowing that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Second, he performed another marriage ceremony outside his courts jurisdiction. His jurisdiction was Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, but he solemnized the wedding at his residence in Dapa. Judge Domagtoy seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the wedding of a married man because he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge confirming the fact that the husband has not seen his first wife for almost 7 years. Regarding the second charge, he did not violate Art. 7, par. 1 of the FC (marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction) and that Art.8 applies: The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the churchand not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote placesor where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement Issues:
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The issue on psychological incapacity is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized. criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause is the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. Marriages exempt from marriage license Ninal v. Badayog Note: This digest is for the exemption to marriage license doctrine. Case is also discussed under declaration of nullity. Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners(ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE, INGRID, ARCHIE & PEPITO NIAL, JR.) . Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After Pepitos death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect their successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. Judge Ferdinand Marcos of the RTC said the Family Code was silent, obscure and inefficient in resolving: a) petitioners cause of action, b) WON Pepitos second
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, Respondent. Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. Respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has failed on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. Trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child. ISSUES: First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second. Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
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marriage was null and void and c) WON the plaintiffs are stopped from assailing the validity of the 2nd marriage considering it was dissolved by Pepitos death. He ruled that the action should have been filed before Pepitos death. Issue: WON they Pepito Nial and Norma Badayog were exempt from a marriage license. Held: No. Not having met the marriagle license requirement, their marriage is null and void. Ratio: The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. There is no dispute that the marriage of Pepito to Norma Badayog was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period? Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. In this case, at the time of Pepito and Badayogs marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued an affidavit stating that they were both married however due to
incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They have lived together as husband and wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. ISSUE: Whether or not David Manzanos marriage with Payao is valid?
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RULING: For Article 34 of the Family Code (legal ratification of marital cohabitation) to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on March 22, 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself. David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated. Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. ISSUE: WON the falsity of the affidavit of marital cohabitation rendered the marriage void ab initio??? RULING: YES. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. Non-Essential Requirements: Marriage Certificate DELGADO V.RUSTIA
Anonuevo vs Intestate Estate of Rodolfo Jalandoni Facts: Rodolfo Jaladoni died intestate. Bernadino Jalandoni (Rodolfos brother) filed a petitioner for issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners and their siblings filed a manifestation that they were the children of Sylvia who in turn was the child of Isabel Blee with one John Desantis. Note however that Isabel Blee was allegedly legally married to Rodolfo Jalandoni at the time of the latters death (hence, petitioners are supposedly Rodolfos grandchildren). Petitioners presented 2 marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo and Sylvias birth certificate. Petitioners assert that these pieces of evidence are enough to establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo and as such, they are the lawful representatives. However, Bernardino begged to differ. Notably, the birth
REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married. Later on, Jose filed a complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham. There was no marriage ceremony; his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud; the affidavit of marital cohabitation was false. However, the petition was dismissed. The CA likewise affirmed. But then it changed its mind and ruled in favor of Jose.
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certificate of Sylvia stated that she was the legitimate child of Isabel and John Desantis which would negate the claim that Isabel was legally married to Rodolfo. The intestate court allowed the petitioners to intervene because it was convinced that the evidence adequately established Isabels status as Rodolfos wife. CA reversed this ruling of the trial court. Issue: whether the evidence was sufficient to establish Isabels marriage to Rodolfo? NO! Held: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage of ones parents. Here, the birth certificate of Sylvia serves as the competent evidence to prove Isabels marriage to John Desantis and not Rodolfo. The entry of being a legitimate child of Sylvia and John in the birth certificate is accorded prima facie weight and will be presumed to be true unless rebutted. Petitioners did not rebut this. They merely tried to explain that these were untruthful statements. This birth certificate shows that Isabel was previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, absent any proof that that such marriage was dissolved leads to the inescapable conclusion that Isabels marriage to Rodolfo was void ab initio. Note: important consideration in this case is the fact that the marriage certificate showed the marriage between Isabel and Rodolfo to have taken place in 1953while Sylvia was born in 1946. Thus, it would really appear that Isabel was originally married to John Desantis. No evidence was shown to prove that such marriage was terminated before the marriage to Rodolfo in 1953. Foreign Divorce Van Dorn v. Romillo Foreign Divorce FACTS: Petitioner, Alice Van Dorn is a Filipino citizen while private respondent, Richard Upton is a citizen of the U.S. They were married in Hongkong in 1972, but established their residence in the Philippines. In 1982, the parties were divorced in Nevada, U.S. and the petitioner has re-married also in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, Richard filed a suit against Alice in RTC, stating that Alices business (the Galleon Shop) is a conjugal property. He is asking for an accounting of the business to be rendered, and seeking to be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Alice moved to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court where Richard had acknowledged that he and Alice had no community property. The Court below denied the MTD on the ground that the property is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is the subject of this Certiorari proceeding. ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines? HELD: A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her American husband is binding on the American husband. The decree is therefore binding upon Richard, being a citizen of the U.S. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the CC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized here in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage. An American granted absolute divorce in his country with his Filipina wife is estopped from asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines as conjugal property. Pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as Alices husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard and still subject to a wifes obligation cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Petition is granted.
Garcia vs Recio Recio, a Filipino, married Samson, an Australian, here in the Philippines. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. A few years later, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. After a few years, Recio became an Australian citizen. He married a Garcia in Cabanatuan. However, they separated without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. Garcia filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy. She contends that Recios marriage with Samson was still subsisting when they got married.
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Garcia: based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the FC, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed. Issue: SC: case REMANDED in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, so that respondent can present evidence that he had the legal capacity to marry petitioner - Before a foreign judgment is given preseumptive evidentiary value, the document must be 1st presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. In this case, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the pertinent rules on evidence must be demonstrated6. But since Garcias counsel did not object to its admissibility, then the LC was correct in admitting the evidence of the divorce decree issued by the Australian court. Burden of Proving Australian Law: The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. But here, Recio has not presented any evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry Garcia. The divorce decree did not ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. 2 months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Merope, contending that she had a subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She also wanted damages, claiming that the marriage brought her embarrassment. RTC ruled for Felicitas. It declared the Orlando-Merope marriage null and void for being bigamous and awarded damaged to Felicitas. CA reversed. Issue: Does Felicitas have standing to question the nullity of the Orlando-Merope marriage? Ruling: This issue may not be resolved without first determining whether Felicitas and Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been divorced. Other than allegations in the complaint, records are bereft of evidence to prove their naturalization. Felicitas merely alleged in her complaint that they had acquired American citizenship and Orlando also only alleged their divorce. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Also, the kind of divorce obtained is important, since there is an absolute divorce (vincula matrimonii) which severs the marital ties, and a limited divorce (mensa et thoro), which leaves the bond in full force. Under the NCC which is the law in force at the time Orlando and Merope were married, and even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage. Only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now provides that only the husband or the wife may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of damages. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that Felicitas lacks legal personality to file the same.
38. Amor-Catalan v. CA Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 1950 in Pangasinan. They migrated to the US and became naturalized American citizens. They divorced in 1988.
6 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
39. BAYOT V. COURT OF APPEALS
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Foreign Divorce FACTS: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in the Philippines. The marriage certificate stated that Rebecca was an American citizen. Later on, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings against her husband in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Court issued a decree ordering the dissolution of their marriage and joint custody and guardianship over their child. Over a year later, the court issued another decree settling the couples property relations. Less than a month from the issuance of said decrees, Rebecca filed with the Makati RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She later on withdrew said petition and filed another for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicentes psychological incapacity. She also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix (child). Vicente filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca insists on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ and that therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and granted Rebeccas application for support pendente lite. ISSUE Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects? YES, REBECCA WAS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AT THE TIME DIVORCE WAS RENDERED. SAID JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE WAS VALID. HELD There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. At the time of the divorce, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid. To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente. Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus: x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage. With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was expiring. Her passport stated her name as Maria Virginia Remo Rallonza (her given name, middle name, and husbands last name). Remo, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. This was denied by the DFA on the ground that the use of ones maiden name is allowed in passport applications only if the married name has not been used
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in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly define the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Remo contends that Art. 370 of the Civil Code states that the use of a husbands surname is permissive and thus she should be able to use her maiden name in her passport. The Office of the President, then the CA, however did not agree with her. Issue: Can Remo revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage? Decision: No. In its decision, the SC stated that a woman is not prevented from using their maiden name in their passport. In fact, one may opt to use her maiden name in initially obtaining a passport. However, once a married woman opts to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. In this case, Remos marriage to her husband subsists and she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. In justifying such strict requirements, the SC said that the issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give him/her aid and protection Held: No! Given the rationale and intent of the provision to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse only the Filipino spouse can invoke the 2nd paragraph of Article 26. The said provision bestows no rights in favor of aliens. However, the unavailability of the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 does not necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to the rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Corpuz, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. In other words, although an alien spouse cannot avail of the 2nd paragraph of Article 26, he/she can still avail of Section 48, Rule 39. Void and Voidable Marriages 42. CARLOS v SANDOVAL FACTS: The spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate leaving 6 parcels of land. In order to avoid to inheritance taxes, Felix, during his lifetime, transferred to his son, Teofilo, lots 1, 2 and 3 with the condition that Teofilo will transfer petitioner Carlos (another son of Felix) share. Parcel 4 was registered in the name of Carlos. Teofilo died intestate. Parcel 5 and 6 was registered in the name of the heirs of Teofilo including herein respondents Felicidad Sandoval who was his surviving spouse and son Teofilo Carlos II. Petitioner sues claiming that the marriage between Teofilo and Felicidad was null and void for lack of marriage license. Furthermore, petitioner contends that Teofilo Carlos II was neither an adoptive or natural son of Teofilo Carlos. Respondent submitted an affidavit of the justice of peace who solemnized marriage and the certificate of live birth of Teofilo Carlos II wherein it was stated that Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval are the parents. By virtue of these documents, respondents move for summary judgment. Petitioner also moved for summary judgment and presented as evidence the certificate of the civil registrar attesting to the fact there is no birth certificate of Teofilo II on record. ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment on nullity of marriage may be handed down in a summary judgment and without conducting a full dress trial Whether or not a person who is not a spouse may bring an action for nullity of marriage HELD: 1. According to AM 02-11-10-SC also known as the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, summary judgments and judgments on pleadings are not applicable in nullity
41. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas (GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010) Facts: Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship. He married respondent Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig. Shortly after the wedding, Corpuz went back to Canada for business. When he returned to the Philippines he found out that Sto. Tomas was having an affair (mga babae talagatsk, tsk, tsk). Corpuz went to Canada and got a divorce. He wanted to marry another Filipina so he registered the divorce decree with the Pasig City Civil Registry Office. Nevertheless, he was informed by a NSO official that his marriage with Sto. Tomas still subsists and that for the divorce decree to be enforceable, it must first be judicially recognized by Philippine courts. So Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage. The RTC ruled that he was not the proper party to institute the action because he was an alien; that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy provided in the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the New Civil Code. Issue: Can the alien spouse avail of the remedy in par. 2 of Article 26?
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or annulment cases. The reason behind this is that without a full dress trial, the state is deprived the opportunity to appear before the courts. The role of the prosecutor does not stop by the simple declaration that there was no collusion. The prosecutor must be given opportunity to appear before the trial in order to make sure that no evidence is fabricated. For marriages solemnized under the Old Civil Code, testate and intestate heirs may sue for nullity or annulment. However, AM 02-11-10-SC now vests this right exclusively on the spouses on the theory that since the spouses alone are the builders of marital life, they alone have the right put an end to it. However, the heirs are not entirely deprived of their right to sue for nullity or annulment. They can do so not on a proceeding for the nullity or marriage but on settlement of estate. In the case at bar, since the marriage between Teofilo and Felicidad was celebrated in 1962, the old civil code applies but since the old civil code does not specifically provide for who can sue, then we apply the real party in interest rule. In this case, petitioner is a real party in interest because as a collateral relative of Teofilo, he stands to succeed intestate when Teofilo II is declared not to be either a legitimate, illegitimate and adoptive son of Teofilo. Remember that the presence of legitimate, illegitimate ascendants/descedants preclude the succession of collaterals. The old Civil Code does not specify who can bring actions. However, this does not mean that anyone can just bring actions to declare absolute nullity. The plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in the Rules of Succession. However, petitioner must implead Leonila since there are some cases under the Civil Code wherein a marriage license was not needed for a valid marriage. She must be given a chance to say her side.
2.
43. Ablaza v Republic Can a person bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code? Facts: The petitioner alleged that the marriage between his brother Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated is void because there was no a marriage license at the time the marriage was celebrated (the license was given a week later). The marriage was in 1949. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest. He also claims that he can impugn the validity of the marriage because it was void, even if after the death of his brother. Issue: Does he have standing? Held: Yes. Issue: Whether or not The RULE is applicable to the case? The SC AM states that only the husband or the wife can bring an action for the nullity of the marriage. However, in Carlos v Sandoval, the Court said that this wont apply to: 1. those actions commenced before March 15, 2003 (when the rules came out) 2. those filed for marriages celebrated before March 15, 2003 The marriage between Cresence and Leonila was under the Civil Code. It was way back in 1949. The AM has no application to them. Held: NO. The Court ruled in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli that the coverage of the RULE extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the FC which took effect on Aug. 3, 1988. The Bolos marriage took place on Feb. 1980. The RULE, which was promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Sec. 1 of the same reads: 44. Bolos v. Bolos, Oct. 20, 2010 Facts: Danilo and Cynthia Bolos were married on Feb. 14, 1980. On July 2003, Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Art. 36 of the FC (psychological incapacity). RTC granted the petition. Danilo filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Sec. 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (The RULE) (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Danilo then filed for certiorari (Rule 65) in the CA seeking to annul the orders of the RTC. CA granted the petition and reversed the RTCs decision. CA stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in this case as the Bolos marriage was solemnized before the Family Code took effect. Cynthia then filed a petition (Rule 45) in the SC.
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Sec. 1. Scope This Rule govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. The categorical language of the RULE leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the FC. The RULE sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the FC and those solemnized under the Civil Code. CA decision AFFIRMED. Facts: Petitioner, Lolita D. Enrico, is the second wife of Eulogio Medinacili. They were married on August 24, 2004. This marriage was celebrated 4 months after Eulogios first wife died on May 2004. On February, 2005, or six months after his second marriage, Eulogio died. The respondents are Eulogios heirs and seek a declaration of nullity of the marriage of Petitioner Lolita and Eulogio on the ground that the marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage license. And that 5-year cohabitation exception could not apply since Eulogio was a bachelor for only 4 months. Petitioner answered the complaint and alleged that they have been living as husband and wife for 21 years as in fact they had 2 children. Further, petitioner contended that it is only the contracting parties while living can file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage. RTC dismissed the complaint but on reconsideration reinstated the case. Petitioner Enrico directly filed for Rule 65 in the SC. Issue: Do the heirs have standing to file the action for the declaration of nullity? NO. Ruling: SC grants the petition and dismisses the petition for declaration of nullity filed by the heirs. First, Void marriages solemnized under the Family Code are governed by the A.M. 02-11-10 of the SC, that is, marriages entered into on and after August 3, 1988. The A.M. of the SC provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. It is clear. Thus, the heirs have no standing. Case Dismissed! Second, as to the Ninal v. Badayog ruling that allows heirs to file a petition for declaration of nullity, this applies only to those marriages under the Civil Code. What is the remedy now of the heirs? Remember that a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, hence since they only seek to protect their property rights they can always impugn the legitimacy of the marriage of petitioner and their father in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their deceased faither. Void Marriages: Grounds Lack of essential/formal requirements REPUBLIC V CA FACTS Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court Judge of Pasay City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. Their marriage contract states that a marriage license was issued in the name of the contracting parties in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife. They decided to live together only when Castro discovered she was pregnant. Their cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. The baby was adopted by Castros brother, with the consent of Cardenas. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued
DINO V. DINO Difference of Void and Voidable: Necessity of Court Declaration 46. Weigel vs. Sempio-Diy Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon learning that Lilia had a subsisting marriage, filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Lilia contracted her first marriage with Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first marriage is not valid because they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to someone else at that time. ISSUE: WON Lilias first marriage is void? HELD: No. Its voidable. Petition dismissed. RATIO: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code). There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
Lolita D. Enrico v. Heirs of Eulogio B. Medinaceli - September 28, 2007
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to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila. Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage. The trial court denied her petition holding that the certification as inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed. ISSUE Is the marriage valid? HELD NO. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a secret marriage, ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of the contracting parties. At the time the marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code which provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. Declaration of Presumptive Death Republic vs. Nolasco (220 SCRA 20) FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Parker, a British, in a bar in Liverpool, England. Thereafter, she lived together with Nolasco on his ship for 6 months. When Nolascos contract expired, they returned to his hometown in Antique. In 1982, the couple got married. His contract was then renewed, thus, he had to leave his wife. In 1983, while working overseas, Nolasco got a letter from his mother informing him that Janet gave birth to their son and that she had left Antique. He asked permission from his employer to return home so that he can look for Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed a petition to declare Janet presumptively dead. He testified that he exerted every effort to look for her, but it proved to be fruitless. He even sent letters to the address of the bar where the couple first met, but they were all returned to him. He also inquired from their friends, but they had no news about Janet. He also alleged that he had no knowledge of Janets family background and that even after they were married, she still refused to disclose such information. Nolasco also testified that he did not report the incident to Philippine authorities. The RTC granted the petition. The CA affirmed. ISSUE: W/N Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. HELD/RATIO: NO. Thus, the declaration of Janets presumptive death is REVERSED, NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Art. 41 of the Family Code provides for 4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death, namely: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The SC, in reversing the CA, held that Nolasco did not comply with the third requirement as he failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a well-founded belief that she is dead. The investigation allegedly conducted by Nolasco in his attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of Janet is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. For instance, when he arrived in Antique, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London. His testimony showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around 350 km apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search. The Court also views Nolasco's claim that Janet declined to give any information as to her personal background even after marrying Nolasco as too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. Psychological Incapacity of Parties REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. (COURT OF APPEALS AND) MOLINA 268 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997. FACTS: On August 16, 1990, Roridel Molina filed a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo on the ground of the latters
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psychological incapacity. She presented signs of immaturity Reynaldo: preferred to spend dependent on his parents for familys finances.
alleges that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo and irresponsibility as both husband and father as time with, and spend money on, his friends; was aid, and; was always dishonest with her about the
CIVREV DIGESTS MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO) 7. Interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
8. Church in the Philippines, while not decisive, should be given great respect by the courts. Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed down without the Solicitor Generals issuance of a certificate, stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. Such certificate will be quoted in the decision. The certificate must be submitted within 15 days from the date the case is submitted for resolution.
Reynaldo had been terminated from employment in February 1986 and Rorida had been the sole breadwinner since. In March 1987, she resigned from her job and went to stay with her parents. Shortly thereafter, Reynaldo left her and their son, Andre, and had since abandoned their family. The trial court declared the marriage void and the Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: W/N Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated NO. The marriage subsists. RATIO: It has not been established that the defect spoken of is an incapacity. It is more of a difficulty, if not an outright refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. Roridels evidence simply showed that she and Reynaldo could not get along. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities are not tantamount to psychological incapacity. Rather than merely failing to meet marital obligations, it is necessary to show that said person is incapable of doing so because of a psychological illness. Psychological incapacity is the mental incapacity to the most serious of psychological disorders demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity is characterized by: gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability. (Art. 36 Guidelines laid down by the Court) 1. Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the plaintiff. Doubt is resolved in favor of the continuation of the marriage. 2. The root of psychological incapacity must be: a.) clinically identified; b.) alleged in the complaint; c.) proven by experts; and d.) clearly explained in the decision. The evidence should satisfy the court that either, or both, of the parties is mentally ill to the extent that s/he could not have known the obligation s/he was assuming; or knowing the obligations, could not validly assume them. 3. Incapacity must exist at the time the marriage was celebrated. Perception of a manifestation is unnecessary at the time of the celebration, but the illness must be proven to exist at such moment. 4. Incapacity must be shown to be incurable or permanent. 5. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 6. The essential obligations are those covered by Art. 68 to 71 of the Family Code, between spouses, and Art. 220, 221 and 225 as regards parents and their children.
Noel Baccay v. Maribel Baccay Topic under Psychological Incapacity/ Doctrine: Unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage per se, must clearly establish true incapability to perform basic marital covenants. Facts: Noel and Maribel were college sweethearts. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. They immediately wed days after before RTC QC. After the marriage ceremony, both agreed to live with Noel's family in their house. During all the time she lived with Noel's family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased, She never contributed to the family's coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel's claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her! Trouble ensued and so Noel filed for declaration of nullity of the marriage, to which the Court granted, stating that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. CA reversed, hence this petition. Issue: Marriage null and void under Article 36? Psychological incapacity? (in short, will the personality disorder and no sexy-time merit the nullity of marriage?) Held: Petition denied! Totality of evidence by Noel fails to prove P.I. Ratio: First, Santos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Second, Republic v. CA laid down the guidelines to determine P.I. a) Burden of Proof on petitioner/ Resolved in favor of validity and continuity of marriage b) Must be alleged in complaint that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. c) Medically proven to be permanently incurable in terms of marital obligations (INCURABILITY)
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d) Grave enough illness to not assume the essential obligations of marriage (GRAVITY) e) the obligations are those expressly enumerated by law/ Interpretation of NAMT Church should be given great respect/ TC must order fiscal and Sol-Gen to appear as counsel for the State Lastly, he failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. allegedly wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. Lastly, PETITIONER maintained she took care of her sick son (who eventually died). RTC ordered city prosecutor and Solgen to investigate if collusion existed between the parties. Aside from his testimony, PETITIONER presented Certificate of True Copy of their Marriage Contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac. Dr. Patac: (1) PETITIONER psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage; (2) RESPONDENT failed to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage, manifesting inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time before their marriage; and (3) RESPONDENT suffers from a Personality Disorder.
Enrique Agraviador v. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010 Facts: PETITIONER (Enrique) met RESPONDENT (Erlinda) in 1971 at a beerhouse where RESPONDENT worked. PETITIONER, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while RESPONDENT was a 17-year old waitress. PETITIONER and RESPONDENT eventually became sweethearts. They soon entered into a common-law relationship. In 1973, PETITIONER and RESPONDENT married in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Reyes at a church in Tondo. PETITIONERs family was apprehensive because of the nature of RESPONDENTs work and because she comes from a broken family. Out of their union, they begot four children: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey. In 2001, PETITIONER filed with RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. PETITIONER alleged that RESPONDENT was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; didnt take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. PETITIONER further claimed RESPONDENT refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house (Enrique also discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times). RESPONDENT moved to dismiss petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically identified. RTC denied motion. In her answer, RESPONDENT denied engaging in extramarital affairs and maintained that PETITIONER refused to have sex with her. PETITIONER
Issue: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations? Held: No. Petition denied. 1. TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE presented failed to establish RESPONDENTs psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity under Art. 36 is not vitiation of consent; it does not affect the consent to the marriage. Summary of Jurisprudential Guidelines:
2.
a. Santos v. Court of Appeals: psychological incapacity is a mental

incapacity (not physical capacity) that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Thus, it is must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is characterized by: i. Gravity; ii. Juridical antecedence; and iii. Incurability.
b. Molina Doctrine (Republic v. Court of Appeals): Guidelines in

interpreting Art. 36 of the Family Code: i. Burden of Proof belongs to the Plaintiff. Doubt should be resolved in favor of existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. ii. Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified; (b) alleged in the complaint; (c) sufficiently proven by the experts; and (d) clearly explained in the decision. iii. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage (exchanged I dos).
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iv. Incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolute against everyone of the same sex. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of the marriage; it should not be merely a refusal, neglect, difficulty, or ill will. Ergo, the natal/supervening disability effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to the marriage. Essential marital obligations = Arts. 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife & Arts. 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code w/ respect to the children Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling, should be given great respect by the courts. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the SolGen to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the SolGen issues a certification stating his reasons for agreeing or opposing the petition. SolGen shall discharge the equivalent function of defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. Petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he mention that the respondents malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept her fault, does not want to change, and refused to reform are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. b. Psychiatric Evaluation Report: fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent. We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case. In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondents condition by stating that the respondent manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior before marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage the respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. This is an area where independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the respondent, could prove useful. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the
v.
vi. vii.
viii.
c. Marcos v. Marcos: clarified that there is no requirement that

defendant/respondent should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of marriage based on psychologically incapacity. Introduction of expert opinion in a petition under Art. 36 of the Family Code no longer necessary if the totality of evidence shows psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
d. Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: rigid rules are in appropriate in resolving all cases of

psychological incapacity (PI) such as those set out it Molina. This case put into question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in Manila.
e. Ting v. Velez-Ting & Suazo v. Suazo: clarified that Ngo Te did not
abandon Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on PI. 3. Summary of Evidence a. Petitioners testimony: Petitioners theory that the respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological
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respondents so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at the time of the marriage. Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. At best, the personality flaws mentioned in the Report, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had no definite treatment. It did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that the respondents condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation Reports failure to support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis. The standards used in Court to assess the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame. It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona. During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan. In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs of Ramona. Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. One of the evidence presented is the testimony of psychiatrist, who reached the conclusion that respondent (Bona)was suffering from histrionic personality disorder. The RTC granted the nullity of marriage, but the CA reversed the decision of RTC. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. HELD: NO. After a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence. Also, the psychiatric report of Dr. RondainregardingBonas psychological condition was gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. Contrary to Joses assertion, Bona had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.
OCHOSA v. ALANO G.R. NO. 167459, JANUARY 26, 2011 Soldier love story FACTS: It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college dropout. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste AlanoOchosa. During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days. Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
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In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage. We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Declaration of Nullity Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 March 14, 2000 Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa on September 26, 1974. On April 24, 1985, he shot and killed her. 20 months thereafter, he remarried Norma Badayog, the respondent herewith. After Pepito died, his heirs by his first marriage filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the marriage of their father with Norma Badayog on the ground of lack of marriage license. Norma Badayog contends that the ground have no legal basis for her marriage to Pepito according to Article 34 of the Family Code no marriage license is necessary for person who have cohabited for atl east five years. The respondent also contends that petitioners are not among those allowed by the law to file a suit for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Pepito. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent on the ground that indeed the Family Code is silent as to situation. The Petition should have been filed before the death of Pepito and not after his death. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: (1) Whether or not the respondent is right to contend that no need of marriage license was necessary for Pepito and her have cohabited for at least five years. (2)Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito valid. Held: Pepito and Norma could not have possibly be legally cohabited for at least five years since Pepito was still married to Teodulfa counting backwards from the time he and Norma celebrated their marriage. A period of cohabitation is characterized by exclusivity and continuity. There should be no legal impediment on either party to marry. Pepitos previous marriage to Teodulfa is a legal impediment disqualifying him to the exception of a marriage license. Thus, his second marriage should have a marriage license to be valid. In this case, the marriage of Pepito and Norma lacking the formal requisite of a marriage licese is therefore void. against Atty. Leo Palma alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct. Cojuangco and Palma met sometime in the 70s . Cojjuangco was a client of ACCRA and Palma was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Consequently, Palmas relationship with Cojuangcos family became intimate. He traveled and dined with them abroad. He frequented their house and even tutored Cojuangcos 22-year old daughter, Maria Luisa, then a student of Assumption Convent. Without the knowledge of Cojuangco, Palma married Lisa in H.K. It was only the next day that Conjuangco was informed and Palma assured him that everything is legal. Cojuangco was shocked, knowing fully well that Palma is a married man and has 3 children. ISSUE: Whether or not Palma should be held liable. HELD: YES. Palma married LIsa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. Undoubtedly, Palmas act constitute grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment. He made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. Moreover, he availed of Cojuangcos resources by securing a plane ticket from Cojuangcos office in order to marry his daughter in H.K. without his consent. Palmas culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was 22 and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. Palma is disbarred from the practice of law.
56 De Castro v De Castro Declaration of Nullity FACTS: Reilen and Annabelle De Castro applied for a marriage license which however expired so instead they executed an affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for five years and got married in a civil rite with a judge. They in fact became sweethearts during 1991 and only started engaging in sex in October 1994. They executed the affidavit on March 1995. Annabelle gave birth to Reinna and is now asking for support from Reilen as his wife and for their child. He says that their marriage was void ab initio because they executed a fake affidavit; that he was just asked to sign the marriage contract because she wanted to be saved from embarrassment because she was pregnant and he didnt obtain the necessary parental advice. He avers that they never lived as husband and wife and he never acknowledged the child. Trial Court: No valid marriage because no marriage license but as father of child need to give support.
Cojuango v. Palma FACTS: Eduardo Cojuangco filed with the court the instant complaint for disbarment
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CA: Since the presumption is marriage is valid until declared null and void then child is presumed his and he must give support and TC is wrong in declaring the marriage a nullity when the action was for support. ISSUE: 1. W/N TC had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage? 2. W/N child is the daughter of Reilen? HELD: 1. YES! The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. In Ninal v Bayadog, the Court said that other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. In this case, they had no marriage license and had a false affidavit. The falsity of which Annabelle admitted upon cross-examination so under the Family Code the absence of any of the essential and formal requisites renders the marriage void. 2. Yes! Reinna is his illegitimate daughter and is entitled to support, he admitted so in his affidavit for tax exemption. Declaration of Nullity and Bigamy 57. JARILLO v. PEOPLE (MR) Facts: Victoria Jarillo was convicted for bigamy, which was affirmed by the CA and SC. She is now moving for reconsideration arguing that since her marriages were entered into before the FC took effect, the applicable law is Sec. 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613) instead of Art. 40 of the FC, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. Background: In the original case kase, she got married twice to two different guys. Her second husband filed an annulment case against her which ended up with her conviction of bigamy. But during the proceedings, she instituted an annulment case against her first husband. The RTC declared her first marriage null and void because of psychological incapacity. She filed an MR with the CA on her bigamy case using this subsequent declaration as a defense. But the CA and the SC did not allow it because a judicial declaration of nullity is needed before a person can enter into a subsequent marriage (Art. 40). Issue: Should the FC apply? - YES Ratio: As far back as 1995, the SC made the declaration that Art. 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Art. 256 of the FC itself provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does nor prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general law, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, Victorias clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of her first marriage and thereafter to invoke the very same judgment to prevent her prosecution for bigamy. She cannot have her cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Art. 40 of the FC, contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy (the original case said that for bigamy to exist, it is enough that the first marriage subsisted when the second marriage was entered into).
Antone v. Beronilla Facts: Antone executed a complaint for bigamy against Beronilla, alleging that her marriage with respondent had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with Maguillo. Beronilla moved to quash the information because his marriage with Antone was declared null and void by the RTC. Absent a first marriage, he cannot be charged with bigamy. The court quashed the information. MR denied. CA dismissed the case as well. Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it sustained the motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information Held: Yes A motion to quash an information is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information. The court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted, or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the information. It considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding
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the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information, and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case. Case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Voidable Marriages: Grounds MANUEL G. ALMELOR versus THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PINAS CITY Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. Their union bore three children.Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pinas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida. Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuels peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child). She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. ISSUE: Whether not the marriage could be annulled based on homosexuality? NO. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se. Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him. The trial court declared that Leonidas petition for nullity had no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code. It went further by citing Republic v. Molina: Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity. If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuels homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals. She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage. Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment. Procedure and Effects of Termination of Marriage Tuason v. CA Facts: In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason (Maria) filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason (Tuason) on the ground of psychological incapacity. Tuasons defense was that he and Maria initially had a normal relationship but that this changed in 1982 when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata. After Maria rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of Tuasons evidence. Two days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June. The court reset the hearing. But on the new date, Tuason failed to appear. On Marias oral motion, the court declared Tuason to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
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The RTC declared the marriage null and void and awarded custody of the children to Maria on the ground of Tuasons psychological incapacity. The judgment was said to be without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment as provided for under Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines. While his counsel received a copy of the decision, Tuason did not file any appeal. Afterwards, Tuason filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties." Maria opposed the motion. Also on the same day, Tuason, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the decision of nullity. The RTC denied the relief from judgment. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs order. Issues: 1. WON the relief of judgment should be granted. 2. WON the prosecurtor is required to intervene in all cases for annulment or declaration of nullity. Held:1. No! 2. No! Ratio:1. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 38, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside, and relief from judgment granted, on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. In the case at bar, the decision had already become final and executory when Tuason failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Tuason however contends he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for Maria. He justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reasons." The records, however, show that the former counsel of Tuason did not inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client. Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of Tuasons confinement and medical resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Pias, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Tuason has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. 2. Because of the danger of collusion, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, Tuason was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Tuason filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by Maria. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private Respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Tuasons vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by Tuason that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA 424 SCRA 725 FACTS Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio. Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
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ISSUE Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid? HELD NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion, says the Court. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default. The Supreme Court reiterates: The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such other matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." (Emphasis and underscoring added) By Erics filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After the CA subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for Eric to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded. Legal separation: Procedure ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE, EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete in 1938 in Cotabato. In 1948, Pacete contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato which Alanis only learned of in 1979. During Alanis marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles and placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other dummies. The defendants were each served with summons on November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an answer. The court granted the motion. The defendants filed a second motion for an extension of another 30 days which was granted but reduced to 20 days. The Order of the court (reducing the extension) was mailed to defendants' counsel but it appears that the defendants were unaware of this so they again filed another motion for an extension of 15 days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, the court denied this last motion on the ground that it was filed after the 20-day extension had expired. The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then directed to present her evidence. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation, and declared the properties as conjugal properties of the plaintiff and defendant halfand-half. The subsequent marriage between Pacete and Conception was also declared void ab initio. Defendants filed a special civil action of certiorari. Issue: WON defendants were improperly placed in default YES! Ruling: Art. 101 of the Civil Code provides: No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-
YU VS. YU FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA, alleging that his estranged wife, Caroline Tanchay-Yu, unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child, Bianca Yu. The petition included a prayer for the award to him of the custody of Bianca. Eric also filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and the dissolution of absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC. The petition also included a prayer for the award to him of the custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the CA of his petition for habeas corpus. Because of this, the CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus, having been rendered moot and academic. ISSUE: WON the Pasig RTC acquired jurisdiction over the custody issue??? RULING: YES. Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. x x x It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)17 Art. 50. x x x x
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appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation, is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made to depend upon the parties themselves. (Brown v. Yambao) Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. Also, Sec.6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements. Liquidation: Effect of Death of One of the Parties Carmen Lapuz Sy (represented by Macario Lapuz) vs Eufemio S. Eufemio (alias Eufemio Sy Uy) Facts: Carmen Lapuz filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio. It was alleged that they were married, they had no child and that they acquired properties during their marriage. She discovered that Eufemio was cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok. Eufemio counter-claimed that his marriage with Carmen Lapuz was void ab initio on the ground that he had a prior and subsisting marriage under Chinese laws and customes with one Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, Carmen Lapuz died in a vehicular accident. The court was notified. Counsel for Carmen also moved that Macario Lapuz substitute his daughter Carmen. Eufemio then moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on the ground that the death of Carmen abated the action. The court issued an order dismissing the case. Notably, even if Eufemio filed counterclaims (for nullity of the marriage), he no longer pursued this after the case was dismissed. Issue: Does the death of a plaintiff (before final decree) in an action for legal separation abate the action? Held: An action for legal separation which involves just a physical separation of the spouses is purely personal. Thus, being purely personal in character it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. The resulting property relations would also appear to be the sole effect of the decree of legal separation issued. Thus, the property rights cannot also survive the death of the plaintiff. A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of the decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence. As to the action of Eufemio to declare his marriage with Carmen as void ab initio, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic after Carmen died because such death automatically dissolved the union. Their property rights should be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition.
Antionio Macadangdang vs. CA, Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang Effect of death of one of the parties Antonio and Filomena got married in 1946 after living together for 2 years. Their business grew from a humble buy-and-sell business and sari-sari store operation into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill businesses, abaca stripping, real estate, and others. They have 6 children. While their financial stabilized, their marriage became shaky up to 1965 when they split up and the wife, Filomena, left for Cebu. When she returned to Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband and she decided to file a complaint for legal separation. The judgment was rendered ordering the legal separation of the spouses. Since there is no complete list of the community property which has to be divided, pending the dissolution of the conjugal property, Antonio was ordered to pay P10k as support for the wife and the children. Filomena filed a motion for the appointment of an administrator and urging favorable action to impede unlawful sequestration of some conjugal assets and clandestine transfers by Antonio. Several motions objecting to this were filed by Antonio but were denied by the court. Antonio then appealed to CA, which dismissed the case. Hence, the case was brought to SC. Pending appeal, Antonio died. Counsel for Antonio informed the court and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case is already moot and academic as a consequence of the death of petitioner. Filomena agreed. ISSUE: WON the death of the petitioner rendered the case moot and academic? HELD: No. Legal problems do not cease simply because one of the parties dies and in view of the significant issues raised, this Court resolved to meet said issues frontally.
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In this case, Antonio had averred that the CA gravely erred in holding that respondent Judges incomplete decision of January 4, 1973 (which declared them legally separated) had become final and executor; and that the same Court committed an error in holding that the appointment of an administrator in the case was proper. It is important to note that the TC had resolved only the issue of legal separation and reserved for supplemental decision the division of the conjugal properties. A supplement decision on the division of property is a mere incident of the decree of legal separation the latter being the main judgment. We do not find merit in petitioners submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains of the absolute community of property as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. A decree of legal separation, which does not yet include an order of division of property is not an incomplete judgment and if not appealed, becomes final and executory. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree and are mandated by Art. 106 of the Old Civil Code. Moreover, American jurisprudence held that the provisions of the decree of legal separation should definitely and finally determine the property rights and interests of the parties. Considering that the decree of legal separation of the parties had long become final and executory, the only issue left is the division of the conjugal property. By reason of the final decree of legal separation, however, conjugal partnership of gains had been automatically dissolved. The law clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under the provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation became final. Side note.. Due to the death of the petitioner, the law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner. Petition is dismissed. Effects of Legal Separation Pendente Lite Lerma vs CA Lerma and Diaz were married. However, Lerma filed a case against his wife Diaz and a certain Ramirez for adultery. While this case was pending, Diaz likewise filed a complaint for legal separation against Lerma based on 2 grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life. During the pendency of the legal separation case, Diaz moved for and was granted support pendente lite. Lerma opposed, saying that the pending adultery case against her is a sufficient basis to deny the motion for support pendente lite. (it must be noted that later on, Diaz was found guilty of adultery by the trial court) ISSUE: Is the pending adultery case valid ground to deny the other spouse support pendente lite? SC: YES Jurisprudence provides that adultery is a good defense. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation."
67. Sabalones v. CA Petitioner Samson Sabalones was a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties. He left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios, the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years. When Samson retired as an ambassador, he came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and kids. 4 years later, he sought judicial authorization to sell a lot and building in Greenhills. It belonged to the conjugal partnership, but he claimed that he was 68 y.o, then, very sick and living alone without any income. He needed his share of the proceeds to defray his hospitalization costs. Remedios filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the property in Greenhills was being occupied by her and her 6 kids and that they merely depended on support from the rentals earned by another conjugal property in Forbes Park. She also alleged that Samson was living with another woman, Thelma, and their 3 kids. She wanted a decree of legal separation and to order the liquidation of their properties, and that her husbands share be forfeited because of his adultery. It was found out in trial that Samson contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma. Court granted legal separation and forfeiture of Samsons shares in the conjugal properties.
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On appeal to the CA by Samson, Remedios filed for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering with the administration of their properties. She alleged that he harassed the tenant of the Forbes Park property and that he disposed of their valuable conjugal property in U.S in favor of his paramour. CA granted the preliminary injunction. Samson now assails the order of the CA arguing that the law provides no injunctive relief in such a case, since the law provides for joint administration of conjugal properties. He cites Art 124 of the FC. Issue: w/n it was proper for the CA to issue injunctive relief YES Ruling: The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as provided in Art. 124. However, Art. 61 states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, it was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was approved by the CA when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction. The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. It may issue to prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated. The Court noted that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost 19 years now without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. In her motion for the preliminary injunction, the wife alleged that the petitioner's harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom. She also testified the numerous properties they owned - dollar accounts, houses in QC and Cebu and a Benz. Remedios also complained that Samson executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate family. These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife, Remedios has a right to a share of the conjugal estate. There is also enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said 68. SIOCHI V. GOZON Effects of Legal Separation Pendente Lite/After Finality Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the name of the Spouses Gozon. Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the land excluded from the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was the exclusive property of Alfredo. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million. Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira. IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. ISSUE Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO. Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal separation? NO. estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. Inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management. Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.
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HELD This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn. We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of Alfredo in the conjugal partnership was already forfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property. Exercise of Profession Go v CA Facts: The Ong spouses contracted the services of Alex and Nancy Go to provide video coverage of their (Ong spouses) wedding. Three times thereafter, the Ongs tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon the return of the Ong spouses. When the Ongs came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that the tape had been erased and therefore, could no longer be delivered. They sued the Go spouses for damages. The lower court and CA ruled in favor of the Ongs. The SC ruled in favor of the Ongs and held that the Gos are solidarily liable. However, Alex Go contended that his wife, Nancy Go should be the only one liable as when his wife entered into the contract with the Ongs, she was acting alone for her sole interest. Issue: Are the Go spouses solidarily liable to the Ong spouses? Decision: No, only Nancy is liable. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the contract with the Ongs. Thus, she is solely liable for the damages awarded, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them CPG: Exclusive Properties 70. Sarmiento vs. IAC (153 SCRA 104) Facts: 2 cases. First was an action for support filed by Norma Sarmiento against Cesar Sarmiento. Court granted, awarding P500/month support in favor of Norma. Second case was an action filed by Norma asking for a declaration from the court that the retirement benefits of Cesar from PNB is part of the conjugal property, 50% of which should be given to her. Cesar failed to appear during the pre-trial. Eventually, the court ruled in favor of Norma and ordered PNB to refrain from releasing to Cesar all his retirement benefits and to deliver thereof to Norma. Issue: Is Norma entitled to of the retirement benefits of Cesar?
Held: No! The order of the lower court violated Section 26 of CA186 (GSIS Charter) which prohibits the attachment, garnishment or freezing of any benefit granted by the Act. The order was in effect, a freeze order. The directive to deliver of the retirement benefits to Norma makes the default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be treated as separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are
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given gratis by the government because of previous work (like the retirement pay of a provincial auditor in Mendoza vs. Dizon, L-387, October 25, 1956) or that of a Justice of the Peace (Elcar vs. Eclar, CA-40 O.G. 12th Supp. No. 18, p. 86), this is a gratuity and should be considered separate property (Art. 148, Civil Code). 2. NB. See the comment in page 144 of the reviewer, differentiating contributory and non-contributory retirement plans. The latter forms part of the separate property while the former, which is given by most private companies where EEs contribute to their own retirement plans, should form part of the conjugal partnership. Charges upon the Obligations of Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership 71. WONG V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FACTS: Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda were married. During their marriage Romarico bought a parcel of land from his father using money borrowed from an officemate. Most of the time, the spouses were living separately; Romarico stayed in Angeles while Katrina was in Manila. One time, while Katrina was in Hong Kong, pieces of jewelry were consigned to her by Anita Chan. Katrina issued a check for 55,000 as payment for the jewelry but was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, Anitan Chan, assisted by her husband Ricky Wong , filed a complaint for estafa. However the lower court dismissed the complaint on the theory that estafa cannot be committed when the issuance of the check was for the payment of a preexisting obligation. Hence, the liability was only civil. Thus, petitioners filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered that the property of the spouses Romarico and Katrina be levied upon. Take note that during the hearing only Katrina was represented by counsel. Romarico assails the levy of the parcel of lands belonging to him saying that (1) he was deprived of his day in court and (2) he had nothing to do with the transaction. Lower court sustained this contention. The CA sustained the decision of the lower court saying that the parcel of lands levied were not conjugal properties but was exclusive capital of Romarico bought using his own funds; that even assuming it was conjugal property, it cannot be proceeded against because the debt of Katrina was not consented to by Romarico neither was it for the daily expenses of the family nor did it redound to the benefit of the family. In fact, there was no evidence to the effect that administration of the property was transferred to Katrina. ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land levied upon form part of the conjugal property YES Whether or not the obligation incurred by Katrina is chargeable against the conjugal property NO HELD: 1. The presumption is that a property is conjugal unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, while it may be true that the 72. Ayala Investments v CA Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision? Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a P50.3M loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation. As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan, Ayala sued, and the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Spouses filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the court to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. Ayala won the auction. HOWEVER, the trial court declared the sale on execution null and void. On appeal to the CA, the court stated that the debt incurred by husband Ching did not incur to the benefit of the conjugal partnership, hence, it could not be levied upon. Ayala claims that the provisions of Civil Code and the Family Code are different and that jurisprudence is on their side. Issue: Did it redound to the benefit of the spouses? SC: We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms redounded to the benefit of or benefited from on the one hand; and for the benefit of on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term for the benefit of. On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the money used to buy the land was loaned from an officemate by Romarico, no evidence was shown as to where the repayment of that loan came. If it came from Romaricos salary, the land is conjugal property Under the old civil code only the following are chargeable to the conjugal property: (1) debts incurred for the necessary support of the family (2) when the administration of the conjugal property was transferred to the wife by the court or by the husband (3) when moderate gifts of charity are given. There was not showing that the instant case falls in any of these.
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marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably. Petitioners further claim that the husband as head of the family and as administrator of the conjugal partnership is presumed to have contracted obligations for the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership (Cobb-Perez). They are wrong. The court derived the following rules from jurisprudence: a. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. b. If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. Here, Ching signed as surety. Ayala should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. But it could be argued that even in such kind of contract of accommodation, a benefit for the family may also result, when the guarantee is in favor of the husbands employer. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. There must be the requisite showing x x x of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses or benefits to his family or that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the family. Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many months or years; and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of stock appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of the Ching family. The CA correctly applied the provisions of the Family Code to this case. These provisions highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husbands duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it. This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnerships liability is to the extent that the family is benefited. These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal property. Thus, when Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then on, definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the family home) and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation. The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require the signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that being a surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted for the conjugal partnership. Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family.
73. Ching v. CA, Feb. 23, 2004 Facts: The Phil. Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9M from the Allied Banking Corp. (ABC). By virtue of the loan, PBMCI executed a promissory note through Alfredo Ching (Alfredo), its EVP. As added security, Alfredo, together with 2 others, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding them to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all PBMCIs obligations owing to ABC to the extent of P38M. After a year, PBMCI contracted another loan with ABC for P13M. Thereafter, PBMCI defaulted in the payment of its loans. ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against PBMCI to collect the amounts due to it, impleading as co-defendants Alfredo and the 2 others in their capacity as sureties of PBMCI. The court granted ABCs application for a writ of preliminary attachment. In this regard, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo. Encarnacion Ching (Encarnacion), assisted by Alfredo, her husband, filed a motion to set aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied by the deputy sheriff were acquired by her and Alfredo during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty contract executed by Alfredo for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Likewise, she alleged that being the wife of Alfredo, she was third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties. ABC filed a comment alleging mainly that Encarnacion has no personality to file any motion, not a being a party to the case. RTC granted the motion, lifting the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks. CA reversed such order, citing the same reasons given by ABC.
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Issue: Whether or not Encarnacion has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on shares of stocks? Held: YES. In Ong v. Tating, Court held that the sheriff may attach only those properties of the defendant against whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the property of a third person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest, the superior authority of the court which has authorized the execution may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same case. Art. 160 of the New Civil Code (NCC) provides that all properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In this case, although the shares of stocks appeared in the books of Citycorp as belonging only to the husband, the fact that these were acquired during the marriage makes them presumably conjugal property. ABC failed to adduce evidence that Alfredo acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. He who claims that property acquired by the spouses during their marriage is exclusive property of one of the spouses is burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to purchase the same. In addition, the Court held that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with ABC for the payment of PBMCIs loans, Alfredo was not in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business. The conjugal partnership is not liable for the account of PBMCI under Art. 161 (1) of the NCC which states: Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: 1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. In Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. CA, the Court held that the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty. that they asked Munoz for a loan of P602,000 pesos. Munoz agreed but gave them P200,000 only and promised to give the P402,000 after they cancel the GSIS mortgage. The spouses cancelled the GSIS mortgage and turned the TCT over to Munoz but he refused to give the balance. He also had the TCT of the spouses cancelled and a new one issued for himself depriving the spouses of their property. The spouses claim that the results of an NBI examination show that the signatures of Eliseo on the purported deed of sale are all forgeries. Munoz claims that even though these signatures are forged, they would be immaterial because the property was the parphernal property of Erlinda and therefore, the consent of Eliseo, manifested by his signature, was immaterial. The CA applied art. 158 of the CIVIL CODE, and ruled that since improvements were made over the parcel of land using conjugal funds, the parcel of land was converted from paraphernal to conjugal therefore the consent of Eliseo was needed in order to validate the sale. Issue: W/N the parcel of land is conjugal? W/N the sale with right to repurchase is an equitable mortgage? 1. The land is paraphernal. The CA erred in applying the Civil Code because what properly applies in this case is art. 120 of the FAMILY CODE that states that if the improvements made with conjugal funds have a higher value than the paraphernal property, the paraphernal property will become part of the conjugal partnership subject to reimbursement in favor of the spouse who lost property. In this case, the house had a value less than the lot. Because of this, the property remained parphernal. The signatures of Eliseo are therefore immaterial. 2. It was an equitable mortgage. Ownership, Administration and Disposition of ACP/CPG: Presumption of Ownership/Effect of Registration in name of one of the spouses MAGALLON V. MONTEJO
Munoz v. Ramirez, G.R. 156125, August 23, 2010. Facts: This case involves a dispute of ownership over a parcel of land between Munoz and the spouses Erlinda Ramirez and Eliseo Carlos. 1989: Eliseo Carlos obtained a P136,500 housing loan and constructed a 2 story residential house over the subject parcel of land. This was secured by a real estate mortgage over the land. 1993: The land was purportedly sold to Munoz via deed of absolute sale for the total consideration of P602,000. Munoz claims that under the said sale, the spouses were given a chance to repurchase the lot within 1 year but they failed to do so. The spouses allege that the deed of sale is void for being falsified because what they entered into was a mortgage contract and not a deed of sale. They claim
Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 627 January 27, 1997 Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy arose. Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents here. Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina. Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming that they own 9/10 of the land.
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The RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share in the intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the amendment of the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%. Both parties appealed. The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10 or 10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%. Issue: Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the deceased Santiago Whats the real share of Estonina and Atayan? 10% and 90%, respectively. Ruling: SC affirms CA in toto. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title which was issued during the marriage. The TCT does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property. Acquisition of property and registration of title are two different acts. Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago and when he died leaving 10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot. Hence, what the Estonino spouses purchased in the public auction was merely the rights of Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot. On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private respondents, received demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the new owners of the property. Private respondents responded by filing an action before the RTC of Pasig seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale executed by Gertrudes Isidro. The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. It held that the land was conjugal property, no fraud attended the execution of the contracts, and that the petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry of Property. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE W/N the petitioners acquired ownership over the land? HELD It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the property owned in common. Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system." It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership. Petitioners are the owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the same within the one-year period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title.
CRUZ V LEIS FACTS Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro were married on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the DANR a parcel of land in Marikina. The Deed of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow. Thereafter, TCT No. 43100 was issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a widow. On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan was secured by a mortgage over the property. On March 11 1986, due to her inability to pay her outstanding obligation when the debt became due and demandable, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of the petitioners. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan," a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property. For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in favor of the petitioners.
Anno v. Anno G.R. No. 163743 (480 SCRA 419) Facts: Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno (Dolores) and respondent Albert Anno (Albert) were married in 1963. Dolores claims that during their marriage, they acquired a 4-hectare agricultural land in La Trinidad, Benguet. In 1974, the land was
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declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband, respondent Albert. Dolores further claims that without her knowledge, Albert executed two documents of transfer covering the subject land: 1) Affidavit of Waiver where Albert waived and quitclaimed in favor of Dolores first cousin, respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights over a portion of the land; 2) Deed of sale where Albert conveyed to Suanding the remainder of the land more than a year later. In both documents, Albert declared that he is the lawful owner and possessor of the land. Thus, the documents of transfer did not bear the signature and written consent of Dolores as the wife of the vendor. The land was transferred by Suanding to third persons, Myrna Nazarro and Silardo Bested. Dolores filed a case against Albert and Suanding for Cancellation of the Waiver of Rights, Deed of Sale and Transfer Tax Declarations, and Damages. She alleged the land belongs to their conjugal partnership and thus could not have been validly conveyed by Albert to Suanding without her written consent as spouse. Suanding testified that Albert represented to him that the land was his exclusive property as the land was part of his inheritance and he had been in possession thereof prior to his marriage to petitioner. MTC ruled in favor of Dolores. RTC reversed the MTC. CA affirmed the RTC. Issue: whether the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without the consent of the other. Held and Ratio: Land belongs to Albert not to the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses. All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. However, a careful examination of the records shows that Dolores evidence (their marriage contract and the initial 1974 tax declaration over the property) failed to prove that the subject land belongs to their conjugal partnership. Moreover, since it is Dolores allegation that the land belongs to their conjugal partnership of gains, then she has the burden of proof to substantiate, by preponderance of evidence, that the land was conjugal in nature. This she failed to do (i.e. Dolores failed to identify when she and Albert, first occupied and possessed the land). While the initial tax declaration she presented was dated 1974, it cannot be automatically deduced therefrom that occupation of the subject land was likewise done in the same year. To so conclude will amount to speculation or conjecture on the part of the court. Declaration of a land for taxation purposes cannot be equated with its acquisition for, in the ordinary course of things, occupation of a piece of land usually comes prior to the act of declaring it for tax purposes. More importantly, the 1974 tax declaration presented by Dolores cannot be made a basis to prove its conjugal nature as the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband, Albert, who sold the land as his exclusive property. Tax declarations, especially of untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership and are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner. Since the circumstances do not show when the property was acquired by spouses Anno, the presumption of the conjugal nature of the property allegedly acquired by the spouses Anno during the subsistence of their marriage cannot be applied. Consequently, the land is the exclusive property of Albert which he could validly dispose of without the consent of his wife. Sole/Transfer of Administration REYES v. ALEJANDRO (RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF ABSENCE) 141 SCRA 65, G.R. No. L-32026. January 16, 1986. Doctrine: It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for administration FACTS: On October 25, 1969, Erlinda Reynoso Reyes filed a petition praying for the declaration of her husband, Roberto L. Reyes, as an absentee. Erlinda and Roberto were married on March 2, 1960. In April 1962, Roberto left due to a misunderstanding, and Erlinda alleges that: (1) she has not heard from him since; (2) they have not acquired property during the marriage; (3) they have no outstanding obligations; and (4) her purpose for filing the petition is to establish the absence of Roberto. She invokes Article 384 of the Civil Code and Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court. The lower court dismissed the petition because Roberto left no properties, stating that the sole purpose for the declaration of absence is to enable the taking of necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of absentee. ISSUE: W/N a judicial declaration of absence is proper when the absentee spouse left no properties NO. RATIO: The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is: (1) when he has properties which have to be taken care of or administered by a Court-appointed representative; (2) the spouse present is seeking a separation of property, or the spouse is asking that the administration of the conjugal property be transferred to her. The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal property in the hands of the wife may be combined and heard in the same proceeding.
Uy v. CA Topic under Joint Administration; Sole/Transfer of Administration Doctrine: Incapacitated spouse warrants Judicial Guardianship under Rules of Court, not under the Family Code.
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Facts: Ernesto Jardeleza suffered stroke, so his son Teodoro filed a petition for guardianship of his father. Son averred that there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to save his fathers properties and assets, and further added that in the meantime, no properties shall be alienated or mortgaged to third persons. Ernestos wife then filed petition declaring Ernestos incapacity and assumption of powers as sole administrator of conjugal properties, and prayed to Court that she be granted permission to dispose of a land for the medical expenses of her husband. Court granted. Teodoro opposed, saying that such assumption as sole admin is in effect a petition for guardianship over person and properties of Ernesto, and should be covered by Special Proceedings under the ROC. Also, Ernesto already acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner and thus cannot be impaired without consent. He also averred that the CPG has sufficient assets to cover the medical expenses! Nonetheless, Ernestos wife still sold land to her daughter Glenda Uy. TC affirms, but CA reverses, ordering sale of land void. Issue: Comatose condition of husband warrants the assuming of sole power of administration over properties and dispose of land with court approval? Held: Petition denied. Ratio: the condition of her husband makes the Rule on Art. 124 of CC inapplicable (covers only absence, separation in fact, abandonment, or withheld consent). And so Rule 93 of the Rules of Court 1964 applies, as this covers a non-consenting spouse due to incapacity or incompetence to give consent. As such, ernestos wife should observe procedure for sale of wards estate required of judicial guardians under the Rules of Court, not the summary proceedings under the Family Code. In the case at bar, RTC failed to comply with procedures of the ROC, and even FC (no notice to incapacitated spouse and to show cause why petition should not be granted). Dispositions/Donations SIOCHI V. GOZON Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the name of the Spouses Gozon. Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the land excluded from the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was the exclusive property of Alfredo. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million. Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira. IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. ISSUE Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO. Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal separation? NO. HELD This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn. We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of Alfredo in the conjugal partnership was already forfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the
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effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property. Issue: Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed Held: No, the action has not yet prescribed. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mothers (his wifes) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action. Ownership, Administration and Disposition of Separate/Exclusive Properties Manotoc Realty Inc. v. CA FACTS: Felipe Madlangawa had been occupying a part of the land owned by Clara Tambunting as the latters paraphernal property, with the understanding that he would eventually buy the lot. Clara died and her estate was placed under custodia legis. Felipe then made a downpayment to the husband of Clara, Vicente Legarda, as part of the purchase price of the property he occupied. Around 3 months later, the court appointed Vicente as a special administrator of the estate. ISSUE: WON the sale by Vicente to Felipe was valid. HELD: NO. Under Arts. 136-137 of the old CC, the wife retains ownership of paraphernal property, and the only way that the husband shall have administration over it is if the wife delivers the same to the husband by means of a public instrument, recorded in the Registry of Property, empowering the latter to administer such property. There is nothing in the records that will show that Vicente was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Clara during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was entered into by Felipe and Vicente had its inception before the death of Clara and was entered into by the former for and on behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after her death. Vicente, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Clara.
Fuentes v. Roca Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, ZamboangaCity. In 1982, she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They later signed an agreement to sell prepared by one Atty. Plagata dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months. The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 orP160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards. Eight years later, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses with the RTC- Zamboanga City. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. RTC dimissed the action. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
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It is also undisputed that the probate court appointed Vicente as administrator of the estate only 3 months after the sale had taken place. The inevitable conclusion is, therefore, that the sale between Vicente and Felipe is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, after the appointment of Vicente as administrator of the estate of Clara, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of Felipe. If the probate court approved the request, then Vicente would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the Felipe. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure, nor on that of Felipe to protect his interests. Dissolution of ACP/CPG: Grounds 85 Partosa-jo v C.A. FACTS: Jose Jo admits to cohabiting with 3 women and fathering 15 children. (wow) Prima Jo is allegedly the legal wife who has a daughter named Monina. Prima filed for separation of conjugal property and support. The TC ruled in favor of Prima in the support case but failed to render a decision on the separation of property. Jose appealed, CA affirmed support but dismissed the separation of property for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Did the CA err in saying that (1) the judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code and (2) no such separation was decreed by the TC- Jose says since the TC decision became final sorry nalang si Prima HELD: The Court decided (2) first so even if Jose is correct in saying that the decision of the TC failed to state the separation the Court cant let technicality prevail over substantive issues so the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment have become final. On (1) -The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. It held that an agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only remedy available to her was legal separation which will result in the termination of the conjugal partnership. Prima contends that CA misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She says that the agreement was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement ended in 1942, when she returned to him and he refused to accept her. Art. 128 which superseded Art. 178 states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without providing for one's family although able to do so. The acts of Jose in denying entry to the conjugal home to his wife as early as 1942 and consistently refusing to give support from 1968 constitutes abandonment. Since Jose had abandoned her and their child she is entitled to ask for the dissolution of their property regime. Jose used a dummy to keep the properties from Prima but the Court said that these properties that should now be divided between them, on the assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. The division must include such properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law. Separation with Dissolution Effects 86. TODA v. CA Facts: Benigno Toda and Rose Marie Tuason were married in 1951 and were married and blessed with 2 children. But because of individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, Rose Marie filed a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds. To avoid further disagreeable proceedings, the parties filed a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Art. 191 of the CC. This petition embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the civil case filed by Rose Marie. The compromise agreement was incorporated in the petition for dissolution, which was approved by the court. Ironically, the said agreement failed to fully subserve the intended amicable settlement of all the disputes. Instead of terminating a litigation, it spawned two new petitions. The parties are now arguing on the award of cash dividends, which depends on the date of the effectivity of the compromise agreement. Rose Marie said that it became effective only after judicial approval and not upon its execution. Issue: Whether the compromise agreement became effective only after judicial approval - YES Ratio: Under Art. 190 of the CC, in the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by
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the decree of the court approving the same. Furthermore, Art. 192 explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property. Other issue: Benigno deducted P360k from the P2M supposed to be paid to Rose Marie. It is not clear from the records where it came from. The CA presumed it to be in the nature of cash dividends declared prior to the approval of the compromise agreement and held that it is conjugal and therefore, belongs to Benigno. While no sufficient proof was adduced to conclusively explain such deduction, there exists the legal presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership absent any proof that it is the exclusive property of either spouse. Since Rose Marie failed to prove that the amount forms pat of the paraphernal property, it is presumed to be conjugal property. Liquidation of ACP/CPG Assets and Liabilities: Two or more marriages Dael v. IAC Facts: Cabutihan married Bienvenida Durana, their marriage produced 5 children Less than a year after Bienvenidas death, Cabutihan married Vitorina Durana, the sister of his first wife (no kids) Cesario Cabutihan died 5 years later, Victorina died as well The brother and sister of Victorina are claiming 2/3 of the estate, while the mother of Bienvenida and the other sister of Victorina are claiming 1/3 Issue: How should the estate of Victorina be partitioned? Held: When Bienvenida died, the first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved. That conjugal partnership was then converted into an implied ordinary coownership. It was also at this point of time that the inheritance was transmitted to the heirs of Bienvenida (5 children). The heirs will receive of the conjugal partnership property which pertained to Binevenida. The other half belongs to Cesario. Due to the marriage of Cesario and Victorina, the fruits and income of Cesarios share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his conjugal share in the property of the first conjugal partnership would form part of the conjugal partnership of properties of he second marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired through these properties would also be conjugal in nature. The problem is how to apportion the properties involved between the two conjugal partnerships. According to the Civil Code, whenever the liquidation of the partnership of 2 or more marriages contracted by the same person should be carried out at the same time and there is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal property belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the total mass of the partnership property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective spouses. Property Relations of Union without Marriage: Either not Capacitated to marry or not living together exclusively TUMLOS V. TUMLOS
Homeowners Bank v. Miguela Dailo Facts: Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, they purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife, Miguel. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo's house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from Homeowners. The house and lot served as the security for the Real Estate Mortgage. Miguela had no knowledge of the SPA and of the REM. The loan was not paid and the house and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings followed. At the sale, Homeowners ended up being the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued to Homeowners. A year passed and the property wasnt redeemed so Homeowners consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. Marcelino died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that Homeowners had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her Ford sedan was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire in the compound Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, Miguela filed a case with the RTC for declaration of nullity of the mortgage and its subsequent sale, and for reconveyance. The RTC nullified the mortgage and the sale. It also instructed Homeowners to pay Miguela 40,000 for her Ford Sedan. The CA affirmed. Issues: 1. WON the mortgage constituted by Marcelino on the subject property as coowner is valid as to his undivided share. 2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan, because it redounded to the benefit of the family. Held: 1. NO! Co-ownership doesnt even apply here. Without the other spouses consent any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. 2. NO! This assertion wasnt proven. Ratio: 1. In Guiang v. Court of Appeals it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
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the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. There is no legal basis to construe Article 493 (co-ownership provision) of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code. Miguela and the late Marcelino were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of Miguela and Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. 2. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, '[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Homeowner's sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner's bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. Facts: Petitioner John Abing and respondent Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a 2-storey residential house. Later on, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. While there, she would still send money to John who deposited the same in their joint account In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store. In 1995, she went back from Korea and lived with John. She also managed the sari-sari store. However, their relationship did not last. They decided to partition their properties. In the Memorandum of Agreement, they both settled that while John should leave his share of the properties, Juliet should pay him the amount of P428,870.00 which she failed to pay fully. Hence, John demanded that Juliet vacate the annex structure. When she refused, John instituted an ejectment case. The two lower courts ruled in favor of the petitioner, saying that the construction of the said structure solely came from his exclusive funds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided on the contrary stating that the property is owned in common by both of them. Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner, John. Ruling: No. Art 147 of the Family Code reads: When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common in equal shares. John and Juliet lived together as husband and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit of marriage, and it was within this period that they acquired the property and constructed the annex structure.
Abing vs. Waeyan
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In the instant case, petitioner failed to prove that the property came from his exclusive funds. Hence, the property is owned by the parties in common. Being coowner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom. penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage." Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held: To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. Co-ownership MAXEY V. CA
SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS FACTS: Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages. Felicisimo married Virginia Sulit but she died [6 children]. Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin but divorced later on [one son]. Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis but this time, Felicisimo died [no children]. Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate before the RTC. However, one of the children of Felicisimo in the first marriage, Rodolfo San Luis, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Felicidad has no legal personality since she was just a mistress of Felicisimo, the latter being legally married to Merry Lee. The RTC ruled in favor of Rodolfo. However, CA reversed. ISSUE: WON Felicidad has the legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration??? RULING: YES. Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus: In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799: "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
Cario vs Cario
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Facts: Santiagio Carino contracted 2 marriages during his liftetime. The 1st was with Susan Nicdao and the 2nd was with Susan Yee (hindi sya mahilig sa mga Susan eh noh? Haha). When Santiago died, both Susan Nicdao and Susan Yee filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from the offices in which Santiago worked for (he was a police). Susan Yee filed a case for the collection of a sum of money against Susan Nicdao for some benefits she received. Susan Nicdao did not file her answer and was declared in default. Susan Yee admits that her marriage to Santiago took place without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity on the marriage of Santiago to Susan Nicdao. However, Susan Yee argued that the 1st marriage was void ab initio because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. She presented the marriage certificate of Santiago and Susan Nicdao which bears no marriage license number. In addition, a certification from the local civil registrar showed that they had no record of the marriage license. Issue: Whether Susan Yee is entitled to the monetary benefits she is claiming from Susan Nicdao? Held: 1) In this case, the marriage of Susan Nicdao and Santiago does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. Despite this however, the records reveal that their marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. As such, their marriage is void ab initio. However, this does not automatically mean that the 2nd marriage is already valid. Under art40 of the family code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage. Even though the 1 st marriage is void, the parties will still have to wait for the declaration otherwise the 2 nd marriage will also be void. Hence, since Susan Yees marriage to Santiago was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the earlier marriage void, theirs is also void ab initio. 2) One of the effects of the declaration of nullity is the separation of property of the spouses. Considering that the 2 marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime wont be absolute community nor conjugal partnership. The marriages are governed by Art147 and 148 of the FC on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. Under art. 148 refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships...etc. Under this regime, the property acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Considering that the marriage of Susan Yee and Santiago is bigamous having been solemnized during the subsistence of another marriage which is presumed to be valid, article 148 applies. The disputed claims in this case are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies by the deceased as a police officer. Unless proof to the contrary is shown, it cannot be said that Susan Yee contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common they belong to the deceased alone and Susan Yee has no right to claim them. By intestate succession, these death benefits shall pass to the legal heirs. But since Susan yee is not legal wife, she is not a legal heir. 3) Article 147 govern the property regime of Santiago and Susan Nicdao (1st null marriage). This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to marry but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons. Under this article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute. Thus, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by Santiago alone, art147 creates a co-ownership entitling Susan Nicdao to share thereof.
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Civil Law

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