LEONORA ESTOQUE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ELENA M. PAJIMULA, assisted by her husband CIRIACO PAJIMULA, defendants-appellees. G.R. No.

L-24419 July 15, 1968 FACTS: Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey of Rosario, was originally owned by the late spouses, Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were survived by her children, namely, Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On October 2 8 , 1 9 5 1 , C r i s p i n a P. Vd a . d e A q u i t a n i a s o l d h e r r i g h t a n d participation in Lot No. 802 consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters to Leonora Estoque. On October 29, 1951, a deed of extrajudicial settlement was entered into wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia P. Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and participation in Lot No. 802 to Crispina Perez. On December 30, 1959, Crispina Perez and her children Rosita Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula, the remaining 2/3 w estern portion of Lot No. 802 with an area of 958 square meters. Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a coowner of Lot No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an area of 640 square meters as evidenced by a deed of sale,which was executed on October 28, 1951 by Crispina Perez de Aquitania, one of the co-owners, in her favor. On the other hand, the defendant, who on December 30, 1959 acquired the other 2/3 portion of Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquita nia and her children, claimed that the plaintiff bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is definitely identified and segregated, hence there existed no co-ownership at the time and after said plaintiff bought the aforesaid portion, upon which right of legal redemption can be exercised or taken advantage of. Estoques stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative to convey the southeastern third of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding the

description in the deed itself, for the reason that the vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right to sell any definite portion of the land held in common but could only transmit her undivided share, since the specific portion corresponding to the selling co-owner is not known until partition takes place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528). From this premise, the appellant argues that the sale in her favor, although describing a definite area, should be construed as having conveyed only the undivided 1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at the time by the vendor, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania. Wherefore, when the next day said vendor acquired the 2/3 interest of her two other co-owners, Lot 802 became the common property of appellant and Crispina Pere z. Therefore, appellant argues, when Crispina sold the rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the former was selling an undivided 2/3 that appellant, as co-owner, was entitled to redeem, pursuant to Article 1620 of the New Civil Code. ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in commo The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by plaintiff Estoque was different from that of the defendants Pajimula; hence they never became co -owners, and the alleged right of legal redemption was not proper. Estoque appealed. ISSUE: WON right of redemption can be exercised by Estoque? HELD: NO. Appellant Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of lot 802

on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an undivided interest in lot 802. And when eight years later Crispina Perez sold to the appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds of the same lot, appellant did not acquire a right to redeem the property thus sold, since their respective portions were distinct and separate. (1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object sold as the southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of 840 square meters, more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could not have sold this pa rticular portion of the lot owned in common by her and her two brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that she intended to sell to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot forementioned. There is nothing in the deed of sale to justify such inference. That the seller could have validly sold her one third undivided interest to appellant is no proof that she did choose to sell the same. . (2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed, the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day (October 29, 1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners (Annex B) and thereby became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey (Llacer vs. Mun oz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly prescribes that . When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee." CA decision affirmed

DIVERSIFIED CREDIT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE ROSADO and LUZ JAYME ROSADO, defendants-appellants. Montalvo and Bernabe for plaintiff-appellee.Pedro D. Delfin for defendantsappellants. REYES, J.B.L.: This appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City, Negros Occidental (Civ. Case No. 7516 of that Court) was certified to us by the Court of Appeals (Second Division) because the same involves no questions of fact. The case had its origin in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, when the Diversified Credit Corporation filed an action to compel the spouses Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme Rosado to vacate and restore possession of a parcel of land in the City of Bacolod (Lot 62-B of Subdivision plan LRC-Psd-33823) that forms part of Lot No. 62 of the Bacolod Cadastre, and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27083 in the name of plaintiff. After answer, claiming that the lot was defendants' conjugal property, the Municipal Court ordered defendants to surrender and vacate the land in litigation; to pay P100. 00 a month from the filing of the complaint up to the actual vacating of the premises; to pay P500.00 attorneys' fees and costs. Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance, the case was submitted on the following stipulation of facts (Rec. on App., pp. 59-60): 1. That Lot No. 62-B of Bacolod Cadastre belong to the thirteen co-owners, including the wife of the defendant herein, who owns 1/13th part pro-indiviso; 2. That on May 11, 1964, Luz Jayme Rosado, wife of the defendant Felipe Rosado, signed a Deed of Sale together with the co-owners of the property to the plaintiff as shown by Exh. "A" for the plaintiff; 3 . T ha t o n t he l ot i n q u e s t i o n t he d e fe n d a n t Fe l i p e Ro s a do had built a house sometime in 1957 without the whole property having been previously partitioned among the thirteen (13) co-owners; 4. That the title of the property has already been transferred to the plaintiff upon

registration of the Deed of Sale in June, 1964, with the Office of the Register of Deeds; 5. That demand was made by the plaintiff upon the defendant Felipe Rosado and his wife Luz Jayme Rosado on October 19, 1964, but until now the defendant Felipe Rosado has refused to vacate the premises or to remove his house thereon as shown by Exh. "B" for the plaintiff, on the grounds as he alleged in his answer that he had built on the lot in question a conjugal house worth P8,000.00 which necessarily makes the lot on which it stands subject to Article 158 of the Civil Code and on the point of view of equity that the wi fe of the defendant Felipe Rosado received an aliquot share of P2,400.00 only from the share and if the house were demolished the defendant would suffer damage in the amount of P8,000.00; 6. That the portion of the lot on which the house stands, would earn a monthly rental of P50.00; 7. That Felipe Rosado, husband of Luz Jayme, did not give his conformity to the Deed of Sale, Exh. "A". 8. That on October 31, 1964, the defendant Felipe Rosado requested the plaintiff in the letter, Exh. "C" for the plaintiff, for a period of six (6) months within which to vacate the premises. 9. That the letter was not answered by the plaintiff and they did not accept the offer, and on November 25, 1964, they filed a complaint before the Municipal Court which proves that plaintiff neglected the offer; The Court of First Instance in its decision rejected the claim of ownership advanced by Rosado, based upon the construction of a house on the disputed lot by the conjugal partnership of the Rosado spouses, which allegedly converted the land into conjugal property under Article 158, paragraph 2 of the present Civil Code of the Philippines; further held that defendants were in estoppel to claim title in view of the letter Exhibit C requesting for six (6) months within whi ch to vacate the premises, and affirmed the decision of the Inferior Court. Defendant Felipe Rosado resorted

to the Court of Appeals, and his appeal (CA-G.R. No. 37398-R) is the one now before us. He assigns four alleged errors: (a) The lower court erred in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void, since upon the construction of the conjugal dwelling thereon, the conjugal partnership of the defendant-appellant Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme became the owner of the share of Luz Jayme in Lot No. 62-B, Bacolod Cadastre; (b) The trial court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to vacate Lot No. 62-B and in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void because as the legal usufructuary of the share of Luz Jayme Rosado in Lot 62 -B, Bacolod Cadastre, the conjugal partnership, managed and administered by the defendant-appellant Felipe Rosado can not be deprived of its usufructuary rights by any contract between Luz Jayme and the plaintiff-appellee; (c) The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant -appellant should be reimbursed the value of the conjugal house constructed on Lot 62-B; and (d) The lower court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to pay attorneys' fees in the amount of five hundred (P500.00) pesos. It can be seen that the key question is whether by the construction of a house on the lot owned in common by the Jaymes, and sold by them to the appellant corporation, the land in question or a 1/13th part of it became conjugal property. Appellant, husband of vendor Luz Jayme, claims the affirmative invoking the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing that: ART. 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership. Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. Rosado further contends that as the building of the house at the expense of the conjugal partnership converted the 1/13 undivided share on his wife in Lot 62-B into

property of the community, the deed of sale of May 11, 1964 in favor of the appellee corporation was void in so far as said 1/13 share is concerned, because his wife, Luz Jayme, had ceased to own such share from and after the building of the house; and Rosado, as manager of the conjugal partnership, had not participated in the sale, nor subsequently ratified the same. We find appellant's thesis legally untenable. For it is a basic principle in the law of coownership, both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889, that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal , or abstract, quota or proportionate share in the entire thin g owned in common by all the co -owners. The principle is emphasized by the rulings of this Court. In Lopez vs. Ilustre , 5 Phil. 567, it was held that while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, he has no right to sell a divided part of the real estate owned in common. "If he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has the right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds." The doctrine was reiterated in Mercado vs. Liwanag , L-14429, June 20, 1962, holding that a co-owner may not convey a physical portion of the land owned in common. And in Santos vs. Buenconsejo , L-20136, June 23, 1965, it was ruled that a co-owner may not even adjudicate to himself any determinate portion of land owned in common. Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, it cannot be validly claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on land belonging to her, and Article 158 of the Civil Code can not apply. Certainly,

on her 1/13 ideal or abstract undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily, the claim of conversion of the wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in character as a result of the construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis. It is the logical consequence of the foregoing ruling that the lower court did not err in holding that the appellant was bound to vacate the land without reimbursement, since he knew that the land occupied by the house did not belong exclusively to his wife, but to the other owners as well, and there is no proof on record that the house occupied only 1/13 of the total area. The construction was not done in good faith. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. Costs against appellant Felipe Rosado. PNB vs CA Case Digest PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO TAN, respondents April 02, 1996 G.R. No. 108630 256 SCRA 44 FACTS: Private respondent Loreto Tan is the owner of a parcel of land in Bacolod City. Expropriation proceedings were instituted by the government against private respondent Tan and other property owners before a trial court in Negros Occidental. Tan filed a motion requesting issuance of an order for the release to him of the expropriation price of P32,480.00. The trial court required petitioner PNB-Bacolod Branch to release to Tan the amount of P32,480.00 deposited with it by the government. Through its Assistant Branch Manager Juan Tagamolila, PNB issued a manager's check for P32,480.00 and delivered the same to one Sonia Gonzaga without Tan's knowledge, consent or authority. Sonia Gonzaga deposited it in her account with Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) and later on withdrew the said amount. Private respondent Tan subsequently demanded payment in the amount of P32,480.00 from petitioner, but the same was refused on the ground that petitioner had already paid and delivered the amount to Sonia Gonzaga on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) allegedly executed in her favor by Tan. When he failed to recover the amount from PNB, private respondent filed a motion with the court to require PNB to pay the same to him. Petitioner filed an opposition contending that Sonia Gonzaga presented to it a copy of the May 22,

1978 order and a special power of attorney by virtue of which petitioner delivered the check to her. The petitioner was directed by the court to produce the said special power of attorney thereat. However, petitioner failed to do so. The court decided that there was need for the matter to be ventilated in a separate civil action and thus private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City against petitioner and Juan Tagamolila, PNB's Assistant Branch Manager, to recover the said amount. In its defense, petitioner contended that private respondent had duly authorized Sonia Gonzaga to act as his agent. Tagamolila, in his answer, stated that Sonia Gonzaga presented a Special Power of Attorney to him but borrowed it later with the promise to return it, claiming that she needed it to encash the check. The petitioner likewise filed a third-party complaint against the spouses Nilo and Sonia Gonzaga praying that they be ordered to pay private respondent the amount of P32,480.00. However, for failure of petitioner to have the summons served on the Gonzagas despite opportunities given to it, the third-party complaint was dismissed. The trial court rendered judgment ordering petitioner and Tagamolila to pay private respondent jointly and severally the amount of P32,480.00 with legal interest, damages and attorney's fees. Both petitioner and Tagamolila appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court dismissed Tagamolila's appeal for failure to pay the docket fee within the reglementary period. The appellate court subsequently affirmed the trial courts decision. ISSUE: Whether or not payment was made to Loreto Tan. RULING: There is no question that no payment had ever been made to private respondent as the check was never delivered to him. When the court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the amount of P32,480.00, it had the obligation to deliver the same to him. Under Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, a debt shall not be understood to have been paid unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists has been completely delivered or rendered, as the case may be. The burden of proof of such payment lies with the debtor. In the instant case, neither the SPA nor the check issued by petitioner was ever presented in court. The testimonies of petitioner's own witnesses regarding the check were conflicting. Tagamolila testified that the check was issued to the order of "Sonia Gonzaga as attorney-in-fact of Loreto Tan," while Elvira Tibon, assistant cashier of PNB, stated that the check was issued to the order of "Loreto Tan." Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's contention that all that is needed to be proved is the existence of the SPA, it is also necessary for evidence to be presented regarding the nature and extent of the alleged powers and authority granted to Sonia Gonzaga; more specifically, to determine whether the document indeed authorized her to receive payment intended for private respondent.

Considering that the contents of the SPA are also in issue here, the best evidence rule applies. Hence, only the original document, which has not been presented at all, is the best evidence of the fact as to whether or not private respondent indeed authorized Sonia Gonzaga to receive the check from petitioner. In the absence of such document, petitioner's arguments regarding due payment must fail. Decision affirmed with the modification that the award by the trial court of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees is reinstated. SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH XXX, PASAY CITY and AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY, respondents. (G.R. No. L52361 April 27, 1981)

Facts: The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporationis a condominium corporation within the meaning of Republic Act No. 4726 in relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which said petitioner is the Management Body holding title to all the common and limited common areas. The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship owned and operated by the spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, Solana, in the Sunset View Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial, Incorporated, as assignor. The La Perla Commercial, Incorporated bought the Solana unit on installment from the Tower Builders, Inc. The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection of assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares Realty. The private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action: (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject or nature other action; and (3) that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. The petitioner filed its opposition. The motion to dismiss was granted by the respondent Judge, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, a holder of a separate interest and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium corporation; and that the case should be properly filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission which has exclusive original jurisdiction on controversies arising between shareholders of the corporation. the motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, the petitioner, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge,

filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that the said orders be set aside. ISSUE: Whether the CFI or the City Courts have jurisdiction over the claims filed by Sunset View, the condominium corporation.

Held: Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder in the corporation. The Mater Deed determines when ownership of the unit and participation in the corporation vests in the purchaser. The City Court and the CFI have jurisdiction. The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon full payment of the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit and consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred only upon full payment of the purchase price. Private respondents have not yet fully paid the purchase price, hence they are not shareholders and the SEC has no jurisdiction over the claims. *now, special courts handle intra-corporate disputes

CAPITLE V. VDA. DE GABAN LILIAN CAPITLE, SOFRONIO CORREJADO, ARTEMIO CORREJADO, VICENTE CORREJADO, CECILIA CORREJADO, GLORIA VDA. DE BEDUNA, ROGELIA CORREJADO, MANUEL CORREJADO, RODOLFO CORREJADO, TERESITA C. AMARANTE, JUANITA CORREJADO AND JULIETA C. PEREGRINO, PETITIONERS, VS. JULIETA VDA. DE GABAN, JULIA CORREJADO AND HERMINIGILDO CORREJADO, RESPONDENTS. DECISION CARPIO-MORALES, J.: Fabian Correjado (Fabian) inherited from his father Santos Correjado two parcels of land subject of the case at bar, Lot No. 1782-B of the Pontevedra Cadastre and Lot No. 952 of the Hinigaran Cadastre containing 26,728 sq. m. and 55,591 sq. m., respectively. Fabian died intestate in 1919. He was survived by four children, namely: Julian, Zacarias, Francisco and Manuel, all surnamed Correjado. After Fabians death in 1919, his son Julian occupied and cultivated the two subject parcels of land (the property) until his death in 1950. He was survived by three children, namely, herein respondents Julieta vda. de Gaban (Julieta), Julia Correjado (Julia) and Hermegildo Correjado. Julians brother Francisco died in 1960. He was survived by herein petitioners Manuel Correjado, Teresita C. Amarante, Juanita Correjado, Rodolfo Correjado, and Jileta Peregrino. Julians brother Zacarias died in 1984. He was survived by the other petitioners herein, Aurora P. vda. de Correjado, Lilia Capitle, Artemio Correjado, Cecilia Correjado, Rogelia Correjado (Rogelia), Sofronio Correjado, Vicente Correjado and Gloria vda. de Beduna. On November 26, 1986, petitioners filed a complaint[1] for partition of the property and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Carlota City against respondents, alleging that Fabian contracted two marriages, the first with Brigida Salenda who was the mother of Julian, and the subsequent one with Maria Catahay (Maria) who was the mother of Zacarias, Manuel and Francisco; that the property remained undivided even after the death of Julian in 1950, his children-herein respondents having arrogated unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the property, to the exclusion of petitioners; and that respondents refused to deliver petitioners share in the property despite demands therefor and for partition. To the Complaint respondents countered in their Answer[2] that in the proceedings in the intestate estate of their great grandfather Santos Correjado, petitioners were not adjudicated any share in the property, for Maria, the mother of petitioners respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias, was just a mistress of

Fabian, hence, Francisco and Zacarias (as well as Manuel) were illegitimate who were not entitled to inherit under the old Civil Code (Spanish Civil Code of 1889). By Decision of December 29, 1992,[3] Branch 63 of the La Carlota City RTC dismissed the complaint upon the grounds of prescription and laches. On appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein petitioners raised as sole error of the trial court its dismissal of the complaint without basis in fact and in law, the appellate court, by Decision of August 29, 2000,[4] dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. In affirming the decision of the trial court, appellant passed upon the issue of legitimacy of the brothers Francisco and Zacarias (as well as of their brother Manuel) in order to determine whether they co-owned the property with Julian, illegitimate children not being entitled to inherit under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889[5] which was in force when the brothers father Fabian died in 1919. The appellate court found that respondents failed to discharge the onus of proving that Francisco and Zacarias were illegitimate. But it too found that petitioners also failed to prove that Zacarias and Francisco were legitimate. Upon the disputable presumption, however, that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,[6] the appellate court presumed that Fabian and Maria were lawfully married, hence, their children Zacarias and Francisco (as well as Manuel)predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were legitimate children and, therefore, they co-owned with Julian the property. Its finding of co-ownership of the property by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties notwithstanding, the appellate court held that, as did the trial court, prescription and laches had set in, ratiocinating as follows: It is a hornbook doctrine that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them so much so that each co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the common property and that this implies that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Salvador vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 23; De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). While the right of action to demand partition does not prescribe, acquisitive prescription may set in where one of the co-owners openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, 102 Phil. 1182; Heirs of Segunda Manungding vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601), The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857). The elements constituting adverse possession by a co-owner against another coowner or cestui que trust are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (ii) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui

que trust or the other co-owners; and (iii) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing (Salvador vs. Court of Appeals, supra). ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION I WHETHER OR NOT RELIANCE ON ART. 19 OF THE CIVIL CODE ISMISPLACED. II WHETHER IN RESOLVING CASES, THE ISSUE OF MORALITY OF THE ACT DOES NOT COME INTO PLAY. III WHETHER OR NOT LACHES IS APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.[11] Petitioners contend that [t]here is such a thing as morality that comes into play, as after all, the appellate court found the parties to be first cousins and, therefore, following Art. 19 of the Civil Code, petitioners should get their share in the property. Petitioners further contend that laches is not strictly applied when it comes to close relations, citing Gallardo v. IAC, 155 SCRA 248. The petition fails. Article 19 of the Civil Code in Chapter 2 on Human Relations is a statement of principle that supplements but does not supplant a specific provision of law. With respect to rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity on August 30, 1950 of the Civil Code like Fabian who died in 1919: Art. 2263, New Civil Code ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. x x x ART. 807, Spanish Civil Code of 1889 ART 807. The following are forced heirs: 1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; 2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; The widower or widow, natural children legally acknowledged, and the father or

the mother of the latter, in the manner and to the extent established by Articles 834, 835, 836, 837, 840, 841, 842, and 846. ART. 939, Spanish Civil Code of 1889, ART. 939. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, the natural children legally acknowledged and those legitimated by royal concession shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. With respect to prescription: Art. 1134, New Civil Code ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. Art. 1137, New Civil Code ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. Assuming arguendo that petitioners respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias were legitimate and, therefore, were co-owners of the property: From the moment co-owner Julian occupied in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute and exclusive owner of the property and denied his brothers any share therein up to the time of his death in 1950, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership in which case imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked. The adverse possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest- herein respondents as exclusive owner of the property having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the filing of the case at bar in 1986, ownership by prescription had vested in them.[12] As for estoppel by laches which is a creation of equity,[13] since laches cannot interfere with the running of the period of prescription, absent any conduct of the parties operating as estoppel,[14] in light of the prescription of petitioners action, discussion thereof is dispensed with. Suffice it to state that while laches may not be strictly applied between near relatives, under the facts and circumstances of the case, especially the uncontroverted claim of respondents that their father Julian, and the documented claim of respondent Julieta, had paid realty taxes on the property as exclusive owner, as well as the admission of petitioner Rogelia that, as quoted above, she and her co-petitioners never benefited or were deprived of any benefits from the property since 1919 up to the time of the filing of the case in 1986 before the RTC or for a period of 67 years, despite demands therefor, even an extremely liberal application of laches would bar the filing of the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.