Case Digest Laurel vs. Misa Topic: Treason ]Laurel vs. Misa 77 Phil.

856 FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered t o t h e e n e m y b y g i v i n g t h e l a t t e r a i d a n d comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims t h a t h e c a n n o t b e t r i e d u n d e r a c h a n g e o f s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r t h e c o u n t r y s i n c e h i s a c t s were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic. HELD / RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to hisg o v e r n m e n t o r s o v e r e i g n . N o t r a n s f e r o f sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the P h i l i p p i n e g o v e r n m e n t s t i l l h a d t h e p o w e r . Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either s u b s i s t i n g o r e l i m i n a t e d a n d r e p l a c e d . Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. T h u s , t h e r e i s n o s u s p e n d e d a l l e g i a n c e . Regarding thec h a n g e o f g o v e r n m e n t , t h e r e i s n o s u c h c h a n g e s i n c e t h e s o v e r e i g n t h e F i l i p i n o people is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines. DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippinesw e r e s u s p e n d e d . T h u s , t r e a s o n u n d e r t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e c a n n o t b e p u n i s h a b l e where the laws of the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasnt sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is now indeed sovereign.

CASE DIGEST OF MAGALLONA VS ERMITA

FACTS OF THE CASE: The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act 3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago.

RA 3046 stood unchallenged until 2009, when Congress amended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened one baseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. More so, it has identified the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands", generating their own maritime zones. The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. To their opinion, the law has effectively reduced the maritime territory of the country. With this, Article I of the 1987 Constitution will be violated. The petitioners also worried that that because of the suggested changes in the maritime baselines will allow for foreign aircrafts and vessels to traverse the Philippine territory freely. In effect, it steps on the states sovereignty and national security. Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in no way will the amendments affect any pertinent power of the state. It also deferred to agree that the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines claims over Sabah. Lastly, they have questioned the normative force of the notion that all the waters within the rectangular boundaries in the Treaty of Paris. Now, because this treaty still has undetermined controversies, the Congress believes that in the perspective of international law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor it. Thus, this case of prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is filed before the court, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. THE COURTS RULING: The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made it clear that it has merely demarcated the countrys maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III. Secondly, the Court found that the framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and the Scarborough. Third, the court reiterated that the claims over Sabah remained even with the adoption of the amendments. Further, the Court importantly stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories. With regard to the petitioners assertion that RA 9522 has converted the internal waters into archipelagic waters, the Court did not appear to be persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that the political branches of Government can pass domestic laws that will aid in the competent security measures and policies that will regulate innocent passage. Since the Court emphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary law, it also believes that no state can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a right acknowledged by modern states. In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III required the imposition of innocent passage as a concession in lieu of their right to claim the entire waters landward baseline. It also made it possible for archipelagic states to be recognized as a cohesive entity under the UNCLOS III.

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

The court resolved three issues: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments. In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Summary of ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-4663 May 30, 1951

FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners, vs. CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-4671 May 30, 1951

MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners, vs. CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents. Petitioners in their own behalf. Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro and Leonardo R. Lucena for respondents. FERIA, J.: These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners against the respondents General Court-Martials composed each of different members or officers of the

Philippine Army, in which it is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled because they are attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants. Said Section 17 reads as follows: SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. . . .. The only question for this Court to determine in these two cases is whether the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners. We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution. It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682). In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts. Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the following: Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no relation or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special provision of the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. an the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General, court-martial are

thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.) In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said: In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty. And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held: That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have in controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as untrammeled an exercise of their powers. And lastly, American Jurisprudence says: SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the right to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision extending that right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253) The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed. That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1, Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special courtmartial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines." Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following: In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the courtmartial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)

In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning, and none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.) Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held: If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgment of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; and restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory. Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of the framers of our Constitution in enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, it is obvious that there exist the same if not more reason for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem lex. Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in court-martial, the respondents did not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions formandamus in these two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

MONTEMAYOR, J.: I disqualify myself.

[G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972] THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH VIII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, MAJOR WILFREDO CRUZ, MAJOR ANTONIO G. RELLEVE, AND CAPTAIN PEDRO S. NAVARRO OF THE CONSTABULARY OFFSHORE ACTION CENTER (COSAC), RESPONDENTS. DECISION
TEEHANKEE, J.: An original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent judge's refusal to quash a search warrant issued by him at the instance of respondents COSAC (Constabulary Offshore Action Center) officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of petitioner official of the WHO (World Health Organization) notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the executive branch of the Philippine Government and to prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings in the matter. Upon filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 6, 1972 a restraining order enjoining respondents from executing the search warrant in question. Respondents COSAC officers filed their answer joining issue against petitioners and seeking to justify their act of applying for and securing from respondent judge the warrant for the search and seizure of ten crates consigned to petitioner Verstuyft and stored at the Eternit Corporation warehouse on the ground that they "contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods" beyond the official needs of said petitioner "and the only lawful way to reach these articles and effects for purposes of taxation is through a search warrant."[1] The Court thereafter called for the parties' memoranda in lieu of oral argument, which were filed on August 3, 1972 by respondents and on August 21, 1972 by petitioners, and the case was thereafter deemed submitted for decision. It is undisputed in the record that petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, who was assigned on December 6, 1971 by the WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization. Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability of the official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation and customs duties. When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed free entry from duties and taxes. The crates were directly stored at the Eternit Corporation's warehouse at Mandaluyong, Rizal, "pending his relocation into permanent quarters upon the offer of Mr. Berg Vice President of Eternit who was once a patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the Congo."[2] Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge issued, on March 3, 1972 upon application on the same date of respondents COSAC officers search warrant No. 72-138 for alleged violation of Republic Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code[3] directing the search and seizure of the dutiable items in said crates. Upon protest of March 6, 1972 of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific with station in Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo personally wired on the same date

respondent judge advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect of his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions" pursuant to the Host Agreement and requesting suspension of the search warrant order "pending clarification of the matter from the ASAC." Respondent judge set the Foreign Secretary's request for hearing and heard the same on March 16, 1972, but notwithstanding the official plea of diplomatic immunity interposed by a duly authorized representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs who furnished the respondent judge with a list of the articles brought in by petitioner Verstuyft, respondent judge issued his order of the same date maintaining the effectivity of the search warrant issued by him, unless restrained by a higher court.[4] Petitioner Verstuyft's special appearance on March 24, 1972 for the limited purpose of pleading his diplomatic immunity and motion to quash search warrant of April 12, 1972 failed to move respondent judge. At the hearing thereof held on May 8, 1972, the Office of the Solicitor General appeared and filed an extended comment stating the official position of the executive branch of the Philippine Government that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, he did not abuse his diplomatic immunity,[5] and that court proceedings in the receiving or host State are not the proper remedy in the case of abuse of diplomatic immunity.[6] The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft's prayer for the quashal of the search warrant. Respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied quashal of the search warrant per his order of May 9, 1972 "for the same reasons already stated in (his) aforesaid order of March 16, 1972" disregarding Foreign Secretary Romulo's plea of diplomatic immunity on behalf of Dr. Verstuyft. Hence, the petition at bar. Petitioner Verstuyft has in this Court been joined by the World Health Organization (WHO) itself in full assertion of petitioner Verstuyft's being entitled "to all privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law" under section 24 of the Host Agreement. The writs of certiorari and prohibition should issue as prayed for. 1. The executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly recognized that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine court summons without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine Government" and asked for the quashal of the search warrant, since his personal effects and baggages after having been allowed free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not be baselessly claimed to have been "unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and customs code us claimed by respondents COSAC officers. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the Government,[7] likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,[8] and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.[9] Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."[10]

2. The unfortunate fact that respondent judge chose to rely on the suspicion of respondents COSAC officers "that the other remaining crates unopened contain contraband items"[11] rather than on the categorical assurance of the Solicitor-General that petitioner Verstuyft did not abuse his diplomatic immunity,[12] which was based in turn on the official positions taken by the highest executive officials with competence and authority to act on the matter, namely, the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance, could not justify respondent judge's denial of the quashal of the search warrant. As already stated above, and brought to respondent court's attention,[13] the Philippine Government is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of the convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations[14] for consultations between the Host State and the United Nations agency concerned to determine in the first instance the fact of occurrence of the abuse alleged, and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs and for other recourses. This is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the force and effect of law. Hence, even assuming arguendo as against the categorical assurance of the executive branch of government that respondent judge had some ground to prefer respondents COSAC officers' suspicion that there had been an abuse of diplomatic immunity, the continuation of the search warrant proceedings before him was not the proper remedy. He should, nevertheless, in deference to the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of the executive branch of government to act on the matter, have acceded to the quashal of the search warrant, and forwarded his findings or grounds to believe that there had been such abuse of diplomatic immunity to the Department of Foreign Affairs for it to deal with in accordance with the aforementioned Convention, if so warranted. 3. Finally, the Court has noted with concern the apparent lack of coordination between the various departments involved in the subject-matter of the case at bar, which made it possible for a small unit, the COSAC, to which respondents officers belong, seemingly to disregard and go against the authoritative determination and pronouncements of both the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, as confirmed by the Solicitor-General as the principal law officer of the Government. Such executive determination properly implemented should have normally constrained respondents officers themselves to obtain the quashal of the search warrant secured by them rather than oppose such quashal up to this Court, to the embarrassment of said department heads, if not of the Philippine Government itself vis-a-vis the petitioners.[15] The seriousness of the matter is underscored when the provisions of Republic Act 75 enacted since October 21, 1946 to safeguard the jurisdictional immunity of diplomatic officials in the Philippines are taken into account. Said Act declares as null and void writs or processes sued out or prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of an ambassador or public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a penal offense for "every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or process.[16] The Court, therefore, holds that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. ACCORDINGLY , the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are hereby granted, and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued against execution or enforcement of the questioned search warrant, which is hereby declared null and void, is hereby made permanent. The respondent court is hereby commanded to desist from further proceedings in the matter. No costs, none having been prayed for. The clerk of court is hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision to the Secretary of Justice for such action as he may find appropriate with regard to the matters mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof.

SO ORDERED. Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, andEsguerra, JJ., concur. Castro, J., reserves his vote.

This penal provision of the tariff & customs code imposes a penalty of a fine of not less than P600.00 nor more than P500.00 and imprisonment for not less than 6 months nor more than two years for unlawful importation and illegal possession of goods imported contrary to law, upon "Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or assist in so doing, any article, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law," and states that "(W)hen, upon trial for a violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of the article in question, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court. * * *"
[4]

[3]

Respondent judge's justification in his said order reads in part as follows:

"* * * From the reply submitted by Captains Pedro S. Navarro and Antonio G. Relleve of the COSAC, it appears that the articles contained in the two baggages allegedly belonging to Dr. Verstuyft so far opened by them, are 120 bottles of assorted foreign wine and 15 tins of PX goods which are said to be dutiable under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. The two COSAC officers further manifested that they positively believe that there are more contraband items in the nine other huge crates which are still unopened. * * * The articles so far found in the two crates opened by Capt. Navarro and Relieve are not mentioned in the list of articles brought in by Dr. Verstuyft and are highly dutiable under the Customs and Tariff Code and according to said officers they have strong reasons to believe that the other remaining crates unopened contain contraband items. The Court is certain that the World Health Organization would not tolerate violations of local laws by its officials and/or representatives under a claim of immunity granted to them by the host agreement. Since the right of immunity invoked by the Department of Foreign Affairs is admittedly relative and not absolute, and there are strong and positive indications of violation of local laws, the Court declines to suspend the effectivity of the search warrant issued in the case at bar. * * *"
[5]

Aside from the Foreign Affairs Department's certification that the importation of 120 bottles of wine is "ordinary in diplomatic practice," the Solicitor General took pains to inform the lower court that the packing of Dr. Verstuyft's baggages and personal effects was done "by a packing company in Taipei . . . (and) Dr. Verstuyft had no hand in the preparation of the packing list of his personal effects which has been assailed by ASAC agents. Also implicit from the foregoing is the fact that Dr. Verstuyft had no intention to violate Philippine laws by selling the 120 bottles of foreign wine and 15 tins of PX goods in the Philippines. Otherwise, he need not have stored the same at the Eternit Corporation where they may be subject to the probing eyes of government agents."
[6]

The Solicitor General cites that the Convention on the Privileges and Immunites of the Specialized Agencies of the U.N. adopted on Nov. 21, 1947, and made applicable by ratification to the WHO contains Article VII on abuse of privilege, calling for consultations between the Host State and the U.N. agency concerned and in case no satisfactory result is reached for submittal to the International Court of Justice for determination whether "such an abuse has occurred," and providing for the customary procedure of requiring the offending official's departure in certain instances.
[14]

This Convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 21, 1947; it was concurred in by the Philippine Senate under Sen. Resolution No. 21, May 17, 1949; and the Philippine Instrument of

Ratification was signed by the President of the Republic on Feb. 21, 1959 applying the Convention to the WHO. See 45 O.G. 3187 (1949) and Vol. 1, Phil. Treaty Series, p. 621.
[15]

In their answer to petition, respondents COSAC officers insist on their "belief and contention" that the 120 bottles of foreign wine found by them "are far in excess, considered by any reasonable standard of taste and elegance in the diplomatic world of the official mission and needs of a diplomat, much more of the status of (petitioner), hence, they should be taxed" and on their "conviction that the articles and effects * * * are not in fact and in truth personal effects * * * so as to be comprehended within the privileges and immunities accorded representatives of (WHO)." Rollo, pp. 138-139.
[16]

The pertinent section of Rep. Act 75, entitled "An act to penalize acts which would impair the proper observance by the Republic and inhabitants of the Philippines of the immunities, rights and privileges of duly accredited foreign diplomatic and consular agents in the Philippines," reads: "Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of the Republic of the Philippines, or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or public minister of any foreign State, authorized and received as such by the President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed void and every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos in the discretion of the court." (Section 4, italics supplied) As to whether this Act may be invoked on behalf of petitioner (who does not pertain to the foreign diplomatic corps), quaere.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 82631 February 23, 1995 SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and YONG CHAN KIM, respondents.

QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission, (NLRC) dated August 20, 1987 and February 15, 1988 respectively, in RAB Case No. 0093-83.

We grant the petition. On June 10, 1983, private respondent Yong Chan Kim (Yong) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC). On June 16, 1986, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner ". . . to reinstate complainant [respondent Yong] to his former position . . . with full back wages . . . and to pay complainant moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 (Rollo, p. 65). Petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC. Respondent Yong likewise filed a partial appeal wherein he sought to increase the award of moral damages to P200, 000.00. On August 20, 1987, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but increased the moral damages to P200,000.00, added P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and awarded ten percent of the total monetary awards as attorney's fees (Rollo, p. 84). The motion for reconsideration was denied by NLRC in its Resolution dated February 15, 1988, which prompted petitioner to elevate the matter to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari. (Rollo, pp. 119-153). On May 9, 1988, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order restraining NLRC from issuing a writ of execution in connection with its August 20, 1987 Decision. In a resolution dated May 12, 1988, this Court, without giving due course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order. On July 12, 1989, we resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. On February 14, 1992, this Court, in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department v.National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 283 (1992) held that NLRC had no jurisdiction over petitioner, the latter being "an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agencies of the Philippine Government." By reason of this Court's pronouncement in the aforementioned case, petitioner filed a supplemental petition on May 16, 1992, raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the part of NLRC to hear and decide the case. In opposition to the supplemental petition, private respondent Yong argued that petitioner was precluded from raising the issue of jurisdiction in view of the latter's failure to do so before the Labor Arbiter or even before the Commission. In support of his argument, he invoked the doctrine of estoppel in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968), which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction. The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) was established by the Government of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam. The Philippines was a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC (Lacanilao v. de Leon, 147 SCRA 286 [1987]).

The purpose of establishing said international organization is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments of the Center, and governments external to the Center (Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1). In Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department v. Danilo Acosta, Resolution, 226 SCRA 49 (1993), we reiterated our rulings in Southeast Asia Center, supra, and Lacanilao v. de Leon, 147 SCRA 286 (1987) that SEAFDEC, as an international agency, enjoys diplomatic immunity. In Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984, the Minister of Justice explained the concept of the immunity of international organizations from the jurisdiction of local courts, thus: 4. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the court where it is found. (See Jenks; Id., pp. 37-44) The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially, on behalf of its member-states. In the case at bar, for instance, the entertainment by the National Labor Relations Commission of Mr. Madamba's reinstatement cases would amount to interference by the Philippine Government in the management decisions of the SEARCA governing board; even worse, it could compromise the desired impartiality of the organization since it will have to suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law, which may not necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. It is precisely to forestall these possibilities that in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations, (jurisdictional immunity, is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations) jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first accorded. (See Jenks, Id; See Bowett. The Law of International Institutions, pp. 284-285). Private respondent Yong's invocation of estoppel is unavailing. The issue of estoppel on the part of petitioner to timely raise the question of jurisdiction has been squarely passed upon in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 283 (1992). In said case, we reiterated the general rule that estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. As we explained in, Calimlim v. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399 (1982), there were exceptional circumstances involved in the Tijam case which justified the exception to the general rule enunciated therein. In the Tijam case, a complaint for the collection of P1,908.00 was filed on July 19, 1948 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu when under the Judiciary Act of 1948, it was the Municipal Court that had jurisdiction thereof. It was only in 1963 or long after the decision of the trial court had become final and executory that a motion to dismiss the complaint was filed. At any rate, we rule that the Tijam case applies only to ordinary litigants and not to parties which enjoy sovereign or diplomatic immunity. With respect to foreign states and international organizations, the immunity from suit or the jurisdiction of local courts can only be waived expressly by said entities and not by the employees or agents (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 114115 [5th ed.]; Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law 118 [5th ed.]). WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The restraining order is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED. Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force." public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

FACTS: This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery." Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. ISSUEs:

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American sovereignty Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel

HELD:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. "From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks." DECISION: To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

World Health Organization v. Aquino 48 SCRA 243

Facts: Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for

the search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive branch of the government. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.

Issue: Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Ruling: The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

EDU v ERICTA 35 SCRA 481FERNANDO; October 24, 1970

NATURE

Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS: -Galo, on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. -This he followed on May 28, 1970with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. -On May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order. -Sol. Gen. filed MFR-On June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 is invalid for being contrary to the principle of nondelegation of legislative power? HELD: No. -It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. -What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitutionto make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. -To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed tothe scope and definiteness of themeasure enacted. The legislaturedoes not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

-A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercise under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. -The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. -To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which Implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. -The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearlythe legislative objective is publicsafety. -Justice Laurel: The principle of non-delegation has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts."

-Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the makingof laws is a nondelegableactivity that correspondsexclusively to Congress,nevertheless the latter mayconstitutionally de legateauthority to promulgate rulesand regulations to implement agiven legislation and effectuateits policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible)to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes... "

-Chief Justice, Concepcion: "It is one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." -The Reflector Law, construed together with the Land Transportation Code, Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the powerof petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo. Disposition Petition is granted. The constitutionality of the Reflector Law and the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof are sustained.

FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN G.R. No. L-55963, February 27, 1991 Petitioners: Spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla Respondents: Hon. Inocencio D. Maliaman and National Irrigation Administration (NIA) FACTS: On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIAs driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay the petitioners the amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim; P3,389 for hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral damages; P8,000 as exemplary damages, and attorneys fees of 20% of the total award. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1990. NIA believes this bases this on: PD 552 amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)

The case of Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat River Workers Union Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions. The Angat dissenting opinion: Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract. ISSUE Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent HELD: YES. Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides: Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for emphasis). Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that: (b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy; to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof; Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on

the land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. ... The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees, is still another thing. The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent.

Government of Philippine Islands VS Monte de Piedad G. R. No. L-9959 Facts: In 1863, the inhabitants of the Spanish dominions contributed funds for the relief of the damages done by an earthquake that hit the Philippine Islands. Part of the funds, $80,000 was turned over to Monte de Piedad, to be held at the disposal of a relief board. When the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands was empowered to bring suit against Monte de Piedad to recover the said amount, through Act 2019 passed by the Philippine Legislature effective on January 30 1912, Monte de Piedad refused to give the money back. The Court of First Instance sided with the plaintiff (Government of Philippine Islands) and ordered the return of the $80, 000 in gold coin or the equivalent thereof. The defendant (Monte de Piedad) appealed and argued that there were errors (ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS Ref: p. 730-731) with the decision of the court. Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Court sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros To reimburse/return the Philippine Government in the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin,

or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation, with legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit, should be overturned. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the previous court judgment being appealed was affirmed, With costs against the appellant. (NOTE: Please look for these in original text..paraphrase..haha) It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to the United States "all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the$80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. We will not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for the reason that we have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take property without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief board. Therefore, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature.

In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969of the Civil Code. While on the other hand, the AttorneyGeneral contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.

Ratio : 1. Parens patriae (state as guardian of the people) : It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined. (Ref. P. 748) 2. Transfer of sovereignty (Ref: p. 742-745)

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO (G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS: 1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. 2. 2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: 1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; 2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and 3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982 (En Banc), J. Makasiar Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president. Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion. After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?

Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant (58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974) Facts: Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughters minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invokingthe terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy. Issue: Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased. Ruling: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the

supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to aconstitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."

The Concept of the State

PVTA vs. CIR July 25, 1975 Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Court of Industrial Relations. Ponente: Fernando

Facts: Appeal by certiorari. This case is concerned with the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility toprovide for the general welfare. Dec. 20, 1966, private respondentsfiled a petition wherein they are seeking relief for their allegedovertime services (in excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act. No.444. Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of actionand lack of jurisdiction. Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez issued anorder, directing petitioner to pay the same (minus what was already paid). Hence, respondents filed a petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue:

Whether the PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from CA No. 444.

Held: RA No. 2265 also provides a distinction between constituent andministrant functions which the Chief Just ice points out, is irrelevantconsidering the needs of the present time: The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete. The court affirms that the motion for reconsideration be denied. The contention of petitioner that the 8 Hour Labor Law does not apply to them does not deserveanyconsideration.

Romualdez-Yap v. CSC Facts:

Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the PNB as special assistant with the r a n k o f S e c o n d Assistant Manager assigned to the office of the PNB President. Afters e v e r a l p r o m o t i o n s , s h e w a s a p p o i n t e d S e n i o r V P a s s i g n e d t o t h e F u n d T r a n s f e r Department.R o m u a l d e z Y a p f i l e d s e v e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r l e a v e o f a b s e n c e ( d u e t o m e d i c a l reasons) which were duly approved. While she was on leave, Executive Order No. 80( R e v i s e d C h a r t e r o f t h e P N B ) w a s a p p r o v e d . S a i d e x e c u t i v e o r d e r a u t h o r i z e d t h e restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant to the reorganization plan,t h e F u n d T r a n s f e r D e p a r t m e n t w a s a b o l i s h e d a n d i t s f u n c t i o n s t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e International Department. Consequently, Romualdez-Yap was notified of her separationfrom the service. Yap's appealed to the Civil Service Commission questioning her separation. CSCChairman Samilo N. Barlongay upheld the validity of her separation from the service. Yapfiled an MR but was denied. It cited that Sec. 33 of E.O. 80 or the Revised Charter of thePNB which provides for the authority of the bank to effect a reorganization. It also citedDario vs. Mison wherein it held that reorganizations are regarded as valid provided theyare pursued in good faith. As a general rule, reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, nodismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.Issue:W h e t h e r t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s e f f e c t e d w i t h b a d f a i t h i n v i e w o f t h e r u l i n g i n Dario v. MisonHeld:No. Bad faith has been defined as a state of mind affirmatively operating withfurtive design or with some motive of self interest or ill will or for an ulterior purpose. It isthe performance of an act with the knowledge that the actor is violating the fundamentall a w o r right, even without willful intent to injure or purposive malice to perpetrate

a damnifying harm.P N B ' s r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , w a s b y v i r t u e o f a v a l i d l a w , i . e . E . O . 8 0 . A t t h e t i m e o f reorganization, due to the critical financial situation of the bank, departments, positionsand functions were abolished or merged. The abolition of the Fund Transfer Departmentwas deemed necessary. This was a management prerogative exercised pursuant to abusiness judgment.Issue:W h e t h e r t h e C A e r r e d i n a p p l y i n g t h e o n e y e a r p r e s c r i p t i v e p e r i o d f o r q u o warrantoHeld:No. The prayer in the petition at bar seeks petitioner's immediate reinstatement toher former position as senior vice president and head of the Fund Transfer Department,or reappointment to a position of comparable or equivalent rank without loss of seniorityrights and pay, etc., under the bank's new staffing pattern.

G.R. No. 143377. February 20,2001 SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES FACTS: October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of land. Lots No. 1 and 4were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale. Then Mamaril et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Unknown to the latest owner, the CIR of La Union issued an Order in Land Registration Case No. N361 declaring the deed of sale between Galvez and Mamaril, et. al. (OCT No.0381) null and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein petitioner Shipside Inc. Lots No.1 and 4. Twenty-four years after, the lots have never been executed. Consequently, a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles was filed by the OSG. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of judgment herein despite the issue of prescription. HELD: NO. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic

to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs. Parenthetically, petitioner was not a party to the original suit for cancellation of titlecommenced by the Republic twentysevenyears for which it is now being made toanswer, nay, being made to suffer financiallosses.It should also be noted that petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and for value, having acquired the property in 1963, or5 years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third transferee. If only not to do violence and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens System, petitioner must be afforded some measure of protection.