Mass Communication: Technology
Williams R 1981 Culture. Fontana, London
Winston B 1998 Media Technology and Society: A History:
From the Telegraph to the Internet. Routledge, London
B. Winston
Mass Killings and Genocide, Psychology
of
To understand and ultimately prevent mass violence,
like the Holocaust, the genocide of the Armenians, the
genocide in Rwanda, the ‘autogenocide’ in Cambodia,
the mass killing in Argentina and many others, the
social conditions, cultural characteristics, psychologi-
cal processes of groups and individuals that lead to it
must be identified. Important questions and issues
include: what are the motives of perpetrators, how do
these motives evolve, how do inhibitions against
killing decline? What are the usual starting points or
instigating conditions? What characteristics of cul-
tures and social processes contribute? What is the
psychology of perpetrators and bystanders? Intense
group violence is usually the outcome of an evolution:
how does this take place, how do individuals and
groups change along the way? An essential source of
groups turning against other groups is the human
proclivity to differentiate between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and
the tendency to devalue ‘them.’ How can this tendency
be mitigated? The passivity of bystanders, ranging
from individuals to nations, encourages perpetrators.
How can preventive responses be promoted? (The
conception of origins that follows is based primarily
on Staub 1989; of prevention on Staub 1999. See also
Charny 1999.)
1. Instigators of Collecti
e Violence
These are conditions in a society or in a group’s
relationship to another group that have great impact
on people. They give rise to psychological reactions in
individuals and whole groups of people, and actions
and events in a society or social group that lead the
group to turn against another group, often a subgroup
of the society.
1.1 Difficult Life Conditions
One starting point for mass violence is difficult
conditions in a society, such as severe economic
problems, great political conflicts, rapid social changes,
and their combinations. These have intense psycho-
logical impacts. They frustrate basic psychological
needs for security, for a positive identity, for feelings
of effectiveness and control, for positive connections
to people, and for a comprehension of reality.
9338
1.2 Group Conflict
One type of conflict involves ‘vital’ interests. Even
though these conflicts have objective elements, such as
some territory both sides need for living space, the
psychological elements (the territory is part of the
groups’ identity; mutual devaluation, distrust and fear;
unfulfilled basic needs) make the conflict especially
difficult to resolve. Another type of conflict is between
dominant and subordinate groups in a society. Fre-
quently, demands by the subordinate group for greater
rights start active violence between the groups that
may end in mass killing or genocide (Fein 1993).
Conflicts between groups also tend to frustrate basic
human needs. Dominant groups, faced by demands
from a subordinate group, often protect not only their
rights and privileges, but also their security and
identity, as well as their comprehension of reality,
which includes their view of the ‘right’ social arrange-
ments. Difficult life conditions often intensify the
impact of group conflict.
1.3 Self-interest
When a subgroup of society is greatly devalued (see
below), a superior group may engage in mass killing to
advance its interests. Mass killing or genocide of
indigenous peoples has often been in part due to the
desire to gain land or develop resources where these
groups have lived (Hitchcock and Twedt 1997).
2. Turning Against the Other
Groups could respond to instigating conditions by
cooperative efforts to improve conditions or by re-
solving conflict through negotiation and mutual
concessions. Instead, frequently a complex of psycho-
logical and social processes arise that turn the group
against another and ultimately lead to violence.
Individuals turn for identity and security to a group;
people elevate their group by devaluing or harming
others (Tajfel 1978); they scapegoat another group for
life problems or blame the other for the conflict;
ideologies are adopted that offer a vision of a better life
(nationalism, communism, Nazism, Hutu power in
Rwanda and so on), but also identify enemies who
must be ‘dealt with’ in order to fulfill the ideology.
3. The E
olution of Destructi
eness
The group and its members begin to take actions that
harm the other group and its members, which begins
an evolution. Individuals and whole groups ‘learn by
doing.’ As they harm others, perpetrators and the
whole society they are part of begin to change. Just
world thinking, the belief that the world is a just place
and those who suffer must have somehow deserved
their suffering, leads to greater devaluation of the

victims. In the end, perpetrators, and even bystanders,
exclude the victimized group and its members from the
moral realm, the realm in which moral values and
standards apply. They often replace moral values that
protect other people’s welfare with values such as
obedience to authority or loyalty to the group. As the
evolution progresses, individuals change, the norms of
group behavior change, new institutions are created to
serve violence (for example, paramilitary groups).
4. Contributing Cultural Characteristics
Certain characteristics of a culture make it more likely
that, in response to instigation, the psychological and
social processes that initiate group violence arise.
4.1 Cultural De
aluation
One of these is a history of devaluation of another
group or subgroup of society. Such devaluation can
vary in intensity: the other is lazy, of limited in-
telligence; the other is manipulative, morally bad,
dangerous, an enemy that intends to destroy one’s
own group. A devalued group that does relatively
well—its members have good jobs—is an especially
likely victim. Sometimes two groups develop intense,
mutual hostility, which has been referred to as an
ideology of antagonism (Staub 1989). Seeing the other
as their enemy, and themselves as an enemy of the
other, becomes part of their identity. This makes
group violence more likely.
4.2 O
erly Strong Respect for Authority in a
Society
This makes it especially difficult to deal with in-
stigating conditions. Accustomed to being led, people
are more likely to turn to leaders and ideological
groups. They are unlikely to oppose it when the group
increasingly harms another group. They are also more
likely to follow direct orders to engage in violence.
4.3 Monolithic (and Autocratic)
s. Pluralistic (and
Democratic) Societies
The more varied are the values in a society, the greater
the extent that all groups can participate in societal
processes, the less likely is the evolution towards mass
violence. People will be more likely to oppose harmful,
violent policies and practices. Democracies (Rummel
1994), especially mature ones (Staub 1999) that are
pluralistic and have a well-developed civic culture, are
unlikely to engage in genocide.
Mass Killings and Genocide, Psychology of
4.4 Unhealed Wounds of a Group Due to Past
Victimization or Suffering
Without healing from past victimization, the group
and its members will feel diminished, vulnerable, and
see the world as a very dangerous place. At times of
difficulty or in the face of conflict, they may engage in
what they think of as necessary self-defense. But,
instead, this could be the perpetration of violence on
others (Staub 1998).
4.5 Other Cultural Characteristics
A history of aggression as a means of resolving
conflict, as well as certain group self-concepts—a sense
of vulnerability, or a feeling of superiority that is
frustrated by events, or the combination of the
two—make violence also more likely.
5. The Role of Bystanders
The passivity of bystanders greatly encourages perpe-
trators. It helps them believe that what they are doing
is right. Unfortunately, bystanders are often passive.
Sometimes they support and help perpetrators
(Barnett 1999, Charny 1999, Staub 1989, 1999).
Internal bystanders, members of the population,
often go along with or participate in discrimination,
and ignore violence against victims. As a result, just
like perpetrators, they change. Like the perpetrators,
bystanders, as members of the same society, have also
learned to devalue the victims. They are also affected
by instigating conditions. It is difficult for them to
oppose their group, especially in difficult times and in
an authority-oriented society. To reduce their guilt,
and their empathy, which makes them suffer, by-
standers often distance themselves from victims. Over
time, some become perpetrators.
External bystanders, outside groups, and other
nations, also usually remain passive, continue with
business as usual, or even support perpetrators.
Nations do not see themselves as moral agents. They
use national interest, defined as wealth, power, and
influence, as their guiding value. When they have ties
to another country, they tend to support the leaders,
not a persecuted group.
6. The Role of Leaders
It is the inclinations of a population, the result of the
joining of culture and instigating conditions, that to a
substantial degree create the possibility and likelihood
of mass murder. To some degree, the people select
leaders who respond to their inclinations and fulfill
their needs.
9339
Mass Killings and Genocide, Psychology of
Still, leaders and the elite have an important role in
shaping and influencing events. They scapegoat and
offer destructive ideologies, and use propaganda to
intensify negative images and hostility. They create
institutions, such as media and paramilitary groups
that promote or serve violence. Often such leaders are
seen as acting only to gain support or enhance their
power. But leaders are also members of their society,
impacted by life conditions and group conflict, and, at
least in part, act out of the motives and inclinations
described above.
7. Other Influences
One additional influence is a sudden shift in govern-
ment, combined with ‘state failure,’ the new govern-
ment failing to deal effectively with problems that face
the society. An ongoing war, especially a civil war, also
adds to the probability of mass killing or genocide.
Economic interconnections between a country and
other countries make genocide and mass killing less
likely (Harff 1996, Melson 1992).
8. Halting Persecution and Violence
Once violence against a group has become intense,
halting it requires action by nations and the com-
munity of nations. Early warning is important, but not
enough. Usually, as in the case of the genocide in
Rwanda in 1994 (des Forges 1999), when information
about impending violence is available, the interna-
tional community does not respond. For this to change
requires changes in values, and actions by citizens to
bring them about. It also requires institutions to
activate and execute responses by the community of
nations. Interconnected institutions within the UN,
regional organizations, and national governments are
needed.
Appropriate actions include diplomatic efforts: to
warn perpetrators, as well as to offer mediation and
incentives to stop violence. Such efforts must be
accompanied or followed, as needed, by withholding
aid, by sanctions and boycotts—ideally designed to
affect leaders and elites—and the use of force, if
necessary. But early actions, especially preventive
actions, are likely to reduce the need for force
(Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly
Conflict 1997, Staub 1999).
9. Pre
enting Mass Violence
Preventive actions by bystanders or ‘third parties’ are
important when conditions exist that are likely to lead
to mass violence. Helping previously victimized
groups heal, making sure that the truth about what
happened in a case of prior collective violence is
established, helping perpetrators heal—who are
wounded, at the very least, by their own violent
9340
actions—reduce the likelihood of new or renewed
violence. Healing furthers the possibility of reconcili-
ation. Creating positive connections between groups,
shared efforts on behalf of joint goals, help people
overcome past devaluation and hostility. Coming to
understand the other’s history and culture is also
important. Assumptions of responsibility and expres-
sions of regret by perpetrators (or mutually, when
violence was mutual), can further healing, forgiveness,
and reconciliation. The punishment of especially
responsible perpetrators (but not revenge on a whole
group) is important (Staub 1999).
In the long run, the economic development of a
country can diminish the likelihood of violence. This is
especially so if there is also democratization, which
creates pluralism, moderates respect for authority,
and lessens differences in power and privilege. The
positive socialization of children, the development of
inclusive caring, caring that extends beyond the group,
is also essential.
10. Future Directions
This article has reviewed influences that lead to varied
forms of mass violence. Further research ought to
consider whether specific forms of violence, such as
government persecution, conquest, revolution, civil
war, and others, which may ultimately lead to mass
killing, also have specific or unique determinants
(Totten et al. 1997). Testing our capacity to predict
group violence is important. So is the development of
techniques to help groups heal and reconcile (Agger
and Jensen 1996, Staub 2000). Creating positive
bystandership by nations and nongovernmental or-
ganizations is essential for prevention. Citizen in-
volvement is required for this. When this happens,
the effects of different types of bystander behavior
need to be assessed. To create a less violent world,
the development of knowledge in this realm and
its application has to go hand in hand.
See also: Ethnic Cleansing, History of; Ethnic Conflict,
Geography of; Ethnic Conflicts and Ancient Hatreds:
Cultural Concerns; Genocide: Anthropological As-
pects; Genocide: Historical Aspects; Holocaust, The;
Violence, History of; Violence in Anthropology
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Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights reserved.
Mass Media and Cultural Identity
The term ‘mass media’ refers to media of communi-
cation such as the printed press, cinema, radio, and
television which have characteristically addressed
large and diverse audiences. The term ‘cultural ident-
ity’ refers to the attribution of a given set of qualities to
a particular population. A cultural identity is not
static and eternal but rather changes through time.
Cultural collectivities commonly think of their identi-
ties in terms of how they differ from others. Distin-
guishing ‘us’ from ‘them’ is therefore central to groups’
cultural self-identification. In this article, the relation-
ship between mass media and debates about cultural
identity is examined.
1. How Mass Media Relate to Cultural Identity
Throughout the history of mass communication, there
has been a continuing interest in the relationships
between mass media and cultural identities. This has
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
Mass Media and Cultural Identity
been driven by the general, underlying assumption
that different media variously form, influence, or shape
collective identities as such. How mass media might, at
various times, specifically affect the formation and
maintenance of national cultures and identities has
occupied center stage in this continuing discussion.
National identities normally embrace a range of
cultural identities based on ethnic, religious, and
linguistic diversity. Nationalists, however, often wish
to portray national identity as based in a single culture.
Nation-states remain, for the most part, the political
frameworks in which claims about cultural diversity
and expressions of cultural identity within a given
society are pursued. Nevertheless, cultural identities
may transcend the state system, as for instance in the
case of systems of belief that unite members of the
world religions. Diasporic communities also share
cultural identities despite belonging to different
nations and holding diverse citizenships (Schlesinger
1991, Hall and du Gay 1996).
1.1 Mass Media and National Identities
From a historical perspective, mass media have been
an important part of the nation-building process.
Successively, the press, the cinema, radio, and tele-
vision have been invoked as shapers of collective
consciousness, as the bearers of a collectivity’s culture,
or as objects of policy for shaping collective identities.
To the extent that the mass media have contributed to
the construction of national cultures, they have also
necessarily played a role in the creation of national
identities, which are still the most important forms of
modern cultural identity in the new millennium.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the
development of a popular press, nationally distributed
magazines, and news agencies making use of the
telegraph reinforced the creation of national com-
munication systems in countries such as the USA, the
UK, and France. Mass communication developed
intensively within the boundaries of national states
and through widespread, cross-class consumption, it
contributed to the creation of common space for
public debate, a shared political agenda, and that
sense of collective belonging that characterizes
national identities (Carey 1989). Mass communication
has therefore played an increasingly central part in the
formation of national political cultures. The latter
part of the nineteenth century also saw the first major
steps in the development of what would come to be a
worldwide communications capacity carried through
the spread of telegraphy and subsequently telephony
in part in line with European imperial expansion.
These nineteenth-century beginnings have proved to
be the foundation stones of the developing global
communications infrastructure which has become
steadily more relevant for debate about the devel-
9341
ISBN: 0-08-043076-7