G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.: Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude of legal protection accorded to the offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed to minimally reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed, there is no critique on the plethora of rights enjoyed by the accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed the crime. Any margin of judicial error is further addressed by the grace of executive clemency. But, even before that, all convictions imposing the penalty of death are automatically reviewed by this Court. The cases at bar, involving two death sentences, apostrophize for the condemned the role of this ultimate judicial intervention. Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape: That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot Center, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mia Taha to her damage 1 and prejudice. In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention: That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a private individual, and being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of 17 years old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her liberty against her will and consent and 2 without legal justification, to the damage and prejudice of said Mia Taha. During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after the pre-trial was 3 terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court. According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS. When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed. Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked with her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived. She did not see where

appellant went after she left him at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything about the incident. The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble. Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind appellant, towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted. At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for three days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him. In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant. Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings: GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent Filipina. BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple. EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and minora, hymenal opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2 cm. length. INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2 fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix closed. CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance, presence of laceration, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening can admit an 4 average size penis in erection with laceration. Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a laceration, which shows that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could not say that there was force applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she was raped. During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"; that she never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he did to her; and that she did not notice if there were people near the boarding house of her cousin. She narrated that when appellant started to remove her panty, she was already lying down, and that even as appellant was doing this she could not shout because she was afraid. She could not remember with which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely silent from the time she was made to lie down, while her panty was being removed, and even until appellant was able to rape her.

When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but there was no threat made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked permission from them in her behalf and so they left the house with appellant walking ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid. However, she admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife at her. She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were other people inside. She likewise did not ask the appellant why he brought her there. Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of the courtroom which, even if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that there was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but she never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime she woke up, appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes. Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the morning of January 22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter merely kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant because she knew he was her teacher. However, when Mia and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan. When they could not find them there, she went to the house of appellant because she was already suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's wife told her that he did not come home. Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program where she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter. In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She testified that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point. Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later, supposedly because of what happened. The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired. According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan National School (PNS). Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I love you." What started as a joke later developed into a serious relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual intercourse as lovers. Appellant was then assigned at the Narra Pilot Elementary School at the poblacion because he was the coach of the Palawan delegation for chess. At around 5:00 P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she then decided to spend the night there with him. Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at the PNS, was looking inside the school building for her husband, who was a security guard of PNS, when she heard voices apparently coming from the Orchids Room. She went closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy holding hands. She asked them what they were doing there at such an unholy hour but the two, who were obviously caught by surprise, could not answer. She then hurriedly closed the door and left. According to this witness, complainant admitted to her that she was having an affair with appellant. Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed appellant's wife about it when the latter arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.

Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with the present case, but the same was not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was executed and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn statement, later marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha about the latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that she loves appellant very much. Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking for help with the monologue that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However, when he reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a bench near the road where there was a lighted electric post and they talked about the matter she had earlier asked him about. They stayed there for fifteen minutes, after which complainant returned to her boarding house just across the street while appellant headed for home some fifteen meters away. It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of Mia at PNS and who was then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant merely replied that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta watering the plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant and she noticed that they were quite intimate because they were holding hands. This made her suspect that the two could be having a relationship. She, therefore, told appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class and was already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go home. Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench. Filomena further testified that she had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife had a heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had likewise told complainant's grandmother about her activities. At the trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant appearing on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is familiar with the same because Mia was her former student. On cross-examination, Filomena clarified that when she saw the couple on the night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking naturally, she did not see Mia crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was pleading with her. In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the road near their house and she invited him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission from her mother for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a plastic bag and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained her things which she was bringing to her cousin's house. Appellant and Mia went to the poblacion where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store. Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available transportation, so she suggested that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was nothing wrong in that because they already had intimate relations, aside from the fact that Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon to stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged their registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the funds they had solicited. That evening, however, appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see a certain Bert Dalojo at the latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to Pulot. He did not bring complainant along because she had refused to go home. The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents and informed them that Mia spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would just fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and waited for them outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw while waiting near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the room was locked from the inside, Virey had to knock on the door until it was opened by her. Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely answered that what she was doing was of her own free will and that at that moment her father was not supposed to know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant did not know, however, was that appellant had already reported the matter to her parents, although he opted not to tell her because he did not want to add to her apprehensions. Isagani Virey further testified that when he saw appellant and complainant on January 23 and 24, 1994, the couple looked very happy. Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from January 22 to 24, 1994, because he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew that what they were

doing was wrong but he allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would commit suicide if he left her. Thus, according to appellant, on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to the house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the matter. Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask for assistance in procuring transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia were already looking for them and so they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City. Virey accompanied them to the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter refused to help because of the complicated situation appellant was in. Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against appellant and after finding out that there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house that same day and bared everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites but appellant refused because he was already married. It was eventually agreed that Naem would just mediate in behalf of appellant and make arrangements for a settlement with Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's house. The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to pay their hotel bills, the couple were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two days. They just walked along the national highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was only five hundred to seven hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio, as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the couple were very happy, they were intimate and sweet to each other, they always ate together, and it was very obvious that they were having a relationship. In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they were there, she would buy food at the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes watch television. When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose to go with appellant despite the fact the he was a married man, Mia told him that she really loved appellant. She never told him, and Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that she was supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later claimed. He also testified that several police officers lived within their neighborhood and if complainant had really been kidnapped and detained, she could have easily reported that fact to them. Mia was free to come and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never locked because the lock had been destroyed. On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of his; that it was Naem who went to the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's mother never went to his house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant from the lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall. Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision and informed him that complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house the next day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994, appellant was not able to talk to complainant's parents because they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to tell her that her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her. Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told her that within one hour he was be going to the police station at the municipal hall so that they could settle everything there. After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of January 27, 1994, appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for rape and kidnapping against him. During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different occasions two letters from complainant dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of desistance was reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims that he never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither did he request his mother to talk to complainants in order to settle the case. Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on January 21, 1994. However, he admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that was already on January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they never had sexual relations. Appellant was told, when complainant visited him in jail, that her

father would kill her if she refused to testify against him, although by the time she testified in court, her father had already died. Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he decided to have a relationship with her because he wanted to change her and that was what they had agreed upon. Appellant denied that, during the time when they were staying together, Mia had allegedly asked permission to leave several times but that he refused. On the contrary, he claimed that on January 27, 1994 when she told him that her parents wanted to see her, he readily gave her permission to go. He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on January 22, 1994, but which she left behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on January 27, 1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio. Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but the warrant for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit a counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes, it was no longer necessary since the complainants had already executed an affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed a "Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with these cases. On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to appellant when the latter was still detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-examination, that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she clarified that she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant. Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero regarding the incident at the Orchids Room because, according to her, the truth was that she was at the boarding house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise negated the claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on January 21, 1994 about her alleged relationship with appellant contending that she did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night of January 21, 1994. She vehemently disavowed that she and appellant were lovers, much less with intimate relations, since there never was a time that they became sweethearts. She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense witnesses: that she told appellant "iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered "wala kang pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about her relationship with appellant; that she was the one who registered them at Sunset Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left her at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani Virey came to their room and stayed there for five minutes, because the only other person who went there was the room boy who served their food; that they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting help for transportation; and that she was free to roam around or to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision. Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra, Palawan to have sex with him and claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still in Grade VI; that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo" when she allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him, since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that she threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since she never brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset Garden and at Edward's Subdivison, she was not being guarded by appellant. However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked as Exhibit "4" and admitted that the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on Exhibits "1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to her. On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to testify in these cases, identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in jail on February 27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that time, he asked her what she wanted and she said she would just visit appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him he had a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the visiting area which is around ten meters away from his post, and then he saw her hand over to appellant a letter which the latter immediately read. This witness declared that appellant never requested him to testify. Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed by Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already several passengers inside his jeepney. The two got off at the poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the Sunset Garden.

On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both 6 cases. By reason of the nature of the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review. The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention filed by Mia 9 Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point issued a resolution on February 4, 1994 finding the existence of a prima facie case against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen 10 Taha executed an affidavit of desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal detention. However, 11 pursuant to a joint resolution issued on March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges. Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the following assignment of errors: I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape despite the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in reviewing the evidence adduced in a prosecution for the crime of rape as cited in its decision reiterating the case of People vs. Calixto (193 SCRA 303). III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had consummated the crime of rape against private complainant. IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of the defense. V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and completely ignoring the testimonies of the defense witnesses. VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt on the part of the accused-appellant in view of the offer to compromise. VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified in the sum of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes committed. IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each of the crimes charged on the accused-appellant despite the fact that the crimes were allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of 12 Republic Act No. 7659. A. The Rape Case A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused and the accuser to humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to bear for the rest of their 13 lives. By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the 14 complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its occurrence. This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a 15 reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted. The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong 16 enough to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the accused may be convicted on
7 8

the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony is clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended 17 by the party accused, though innocent; (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two 18 persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the 19 weakness of the evidence for the defense. In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong. I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime of rape under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same was accomplished through force or intimidation. 1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January 21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation and contends that on said date and time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house. We find appellant's version more credible and sustained by the evidence presented and of record. According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering that she does not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never established nor even intimated by the prosecution. Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility that plagues it as regards the 20 setting of the supposed sexual assault. It will be noted that the place where the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence but a boarding house where several persons live and where people are expected to come and go. The prosecution did not even bother to elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the boarding house had remained closed for some time, in order that it could be safely assumed that nobody was expected to arrive at any given time. Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go inside the house because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house and talked. This testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding house, and that she even advised them to go home because it was already late and appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school building. On rebuttal, complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the 21 evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not 22 the natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of the woman he had raped, and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other things and circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth.

It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the scene of the crime are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a circumstance tending to identify the 23 appellant. Consequently, it is not in accord with human experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the 24 complainant immediately after he had allegedly raped her. It thus behooves this Court to reject the notion that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany complainant up to the gate of the house, considering its strategic location vis-a25 vis complainant's boarding house which is just across the street, and the PNS schoolbuilding which is only around thirty 26 meters away. Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her boarding house where she saw her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to corroborate the story of complainant, despite the fact that the former was the very first person she came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan boarding house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they supposedly did not talk, the landlady could at least have testified on complainant's physical appearance and to attest to the theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date and hour, possibly with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all. We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited him to the boarding house to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest. This is even consonant with her testimony that appellant fetched her the following day in order to solicit funds for her candidacy in that same school affair. In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first, she asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another version and said that when she reached the boarding house it was dark and there was nobody inside. The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or realign the same with her prior inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her testimony even on this single episode, thus: Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, do you remember where you were? A Yes, sir. Q Where were you? A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir. xxx xxx xxx Q Why were you there? A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir. COURT: Q Conversing with whom? A With my cousin, Your Honor. Q Your cousin's name? A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor. xxx xxx xxx PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will you please relate to this Honorable Court how that rape happened? A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening. COURT: Q Of what date? A January 21, 1994, Your Honor. xxx xxx xxx PROSECUTOR GUAYCO: Q Then what happened? A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I passed (through) the kitchen and then when I opened the door somebody grabbed me suddenly. xxx xxx xxx Q During that time were there other people present in that boarding house where you said Danny Godoy raped you? A None, Sir. COURT: Q So, the house was empty? A Yes, Your Honor. Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing? A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor. supplied.)
27

(Corrections and emphasis

2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by appellant against complainant on January 21, 1994. The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and already healed, and the conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a man on the date which she alleged, do not establish the supposed rape since the same findings and conclusion are likewise consistent with appellant's admission that coitus 28 took place with the consent of complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994. Further, rather than substantiating the prosecution's aforesaid theory and the supposed date of commission of rape, the finding that there were no evident signs of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more credence to appellant's claim of voluntary coition on a later date 29 and the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of physical force. In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we 30 repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by physical evidence showing use of force. Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-legal expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On further questioning, he gave a 31 straightforward answer that force was not applied. He also added that when he examined the patient bodily, he did not 32 see any sign of bruises. The absence of any sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an indication of 33 complainant's consent to the act. While the absence in the medical certificate of external signs of physical injuries on

the victim does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, the instant case is clearly an exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him. Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated complainant's assertion that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative evidence is not considered sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal element of the crime is 35 not corroborative proof of facts necessary to constitute another equally important element of the crime. Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was afraid of appellant. Again assuming that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we nevertheless strongly believe that her supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is evident that complainant did not use the manifest resistance expected of a woman 36 defending her honor and chastity. She failed to make any outcry when appellant allegedly grabbed her and dragged her inside the house. There is likewise no evidence on record that she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her to any force of whatever nature or form. Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and ruefully unconvincing to make this Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on her by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or objected at all to the involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of resistance 37 expected of a woman defending her virtue and honor. Her failure to do anything while allegedly being raped renders 38 doubtful her charge of rape, especially when we consider the actual mise-en-scene in the context of her asseverations. There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not be presented, as they 39 are not indispensable evidence to prove rape. We incline to the view, however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist other corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of the essential elements of the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause. II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a conviction for the offense of rape should even be sustained from the uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape was committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of the 40 case. Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents' house and asked permission from them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy. Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply that appellant was armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor intimidated by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the supposed threat previously made by appellant does not inspire belief since appellant was alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no showing of any opportunity for him to make good his threat, even assuming that he had really voiced any. On the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from her parents for her to accompany him. Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it was so strangely 41 normal as to be abnormal. It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon seeing the person who had allegedly raped her only 42 the day before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and disgust. Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the presence of her parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design. From her deportment, it does not appear that the alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the mind of complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the demeanor that would naturally be expected of a person who had just suffered the ultimate invasion 43 of her womanhood. III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be

34

overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, 44 judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of 45 witnesses will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would affect 46 the outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the victim had to testify to was that appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill her if she shouted and under these threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. The question then that confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's testimony is 47 credible. The technique in deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts of that testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire testimony. Everything stated 48 by the witness has to be considered in relation to what else has been stated. In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various 49 rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed. There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any other, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment of conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a 50 powerful compulsion towards reversal of said judgment. Thus: 1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset Garden and around three times at Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same allegations. If this were true, it is inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor could have overlooked these facts with their obvious legal implications and, instead, filed an information charging appellant with only one count of rape. The incredibility of complainant's representations is further magnified by the fact that even the trial court did not believe it, as may be inferred from its failure to consider this aspect of her testimony, unless we were to uncharitably assume that it was similarly befuddled. 2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape cases, this claim that complainant now advances appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge. 3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that she never noticed if appellant slept because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if she slept side by side with appellant, complainant 51 admitted that everytime she woke up, appellant was invariably in bed beside her. 4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it could not be opened from the inside. But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows: Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside? A No, Sir, it was locked. Q Can you describe the lock of that room? A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob. ATTY. EBOL:

Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask that the door be locked and opened from the inside. COURT: Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for yourself if you can open that door from the inside. CLERK OF COURT: Witness holding the doorknob. COURT: The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're were (sic) inside you can open it? A Yes, sir. Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you held? A There was, Your Honor. Q What is that? A The one that slides, Your Honor. Q And that is used when you are already inside? A Yes, Your Honor.
52

(Emphases ours.)

5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond supposedly offering token or futile resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry, no attempt to flee or attract attention to her 53 plight. In her own declaration, complainant mentioned that when they checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier at the information counter where appellant registered. She did not do anything, despite the fact that appellant at that time was admittedly not armed. She likewise stated that a room boy usually went to their room and brought them food. If indeed she was bent on fleeing from appellant, she could have grabbed every possible opportunity to escape. Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's failure to present these two people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or corroborated complainant's story. 6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the house together and walked in going to the highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated that appellant went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if appellant really had evil motives, that he would be that careless. It is likewise beyond comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling such fear in complainant that she could not dare take advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity of appellant, and run as far away from him as possible despite all the chances therefor. 7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case, complainant was dropped from school and was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support and commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear that the school authorities were heartless people who turned their backs on her and considered her an outcast. That would be adding insult to injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia and her parents were never heard to complain about this apparent injustice. Such complacency cannot but make one think and conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid justification for the drastic action taken by the school and the docile submission thereto by the Taha family. On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete with sweeping statements and generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of appellant's testimony, declared them to be preposterous and abnormal, and then hastened to conclude that appellant is indeed guilty. The court in effect rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of that of the defense, which is

totally repugnant to the elementary and time-honored rule that conviction should be made on the basis of strong, clear 54 and compelling evidence of the prosecution. IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant. Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several witnesses for the defense, viz.: 1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and the couple were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant. 2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision, testified that he asked 55 Mia why she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia answered that she really loves him. He 56 57 heard her call appellant "Papa". The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other. 3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that he asked Mia if she knew what she getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she really loved Sir Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative. When he was trying to give counsel to appellant, complainant announced that if appellant left her, she would 58 59 commit suicide. He could see that the couple were happy together. 4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he worked was located within the premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple and that when he was advising appellant that what he was doing is wrong because he is married and Mia is his student, complainant reacted by saying that no matter what 60 happened she would not leave Godoy, and that if she went home her father would kill her. He also observed that they 61 were happy. 5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape incident, inside one of the classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang 62 63 iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." She tried to dissuade complainant from continuing with her relationship with appellant. The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with complainant, which were substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed assertions of 64 appellant. Mere denials are self-serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the 65 declarations of credible disinterested witnesses. Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were replete with details which could 66 have been known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability thereto. His assertions are more logical, probable and bear the earmarks of truth. This is not to say that the testimony of appellant should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must have colored his account, even on the assumption that he could be trusted to stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless, there is much in his version that does not strain the limits of credulity. More to the point, there is enough to 67 raise doubts that do appear to have some basis in reality. Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous, nonsensical and incredible is highly uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not mandatory. It is not a positive rule of law and is not 68 an inflexible one. It does not apply where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony and the 69 supposed inconsistencies arise merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself although not completely. Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the defense, the most telling of which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. For analysis and emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full: 27 Feb. 94

Dane, Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit. Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong mahal mo ako gagawa kang paraan na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one week. pinapainom nila ako ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot sinasaktan nila ako. Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at huwag kang tatapat ng bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna. alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko hahaluan nila. Please sir . . . (Sgd.) Mia Taha 3/1/94 Dane, I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo nagawa ko lang naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong superentende sa Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi sa kanila na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman dahil gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong iniisip mong minahal lang kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon ang hangarin ko sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang magagawa ko kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa may guardiya pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi makakain maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may masama akong hangarin sa iyo. Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi mo. hindi ko matiyak kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si Rowena ay inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng bahay sa tulong niya. Love you (Sgd.) Mia 71 Taha There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It was complainant's handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other defense witnesses identified the
70

handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers of complainant and highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and refusing to give any probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert was presented to analyze and evaluate the same. Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly called handwriting experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing 72 handwriting. This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said section further provides that evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against 73 whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the examination papers submitted to them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters with the standard writing appearing on the test papers as specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions of the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one and the same person. More importantly, complainant herself categorically admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her. It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to turn a deaf ear to this conclusive portion of complainant's testimony: ATTY. EBOL: Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero and Filomena Pielago were your teachers? A Yes, sir. Q And they have been your teachers for several months before this incident of January 21, 1994, am I not correct? A That is true, sir. Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they have been your teachers you took examinations in their classes in their particular subject(s)? A Yes, sir. Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of your teachers, am I correct? A Yes, sir. Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit "4", it appears to be your test paper and with your signature and the alphabet appears in this exhibit appears to be that of Mia Taha, please examine this and tell the Honorable Court if that is your test paper? A Yes, sir. Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your signature? A Yes, sir. Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this Exhibit "4-A" and tell this Honorable Court if you are familiar with that.

A What subject is that? Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that. A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir. Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar with that signature? A That is min(e), sir. Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in Math, are you familiar with that signature? A Yes, sir. Q That is your signature? A Yes, sir. Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own handwriting? A Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature? xxx xxx xxx Q You will deny that this is your handwriting? A That is my handwriting, sir. Q Also Exhibit "2"? A Yes, sir.
74

While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of complainant to herein appellant, the witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was the guard on duty at the provincial jail at that time, testified of his own accord because he knew that what Casantosan said was a blatant lie. Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor requested him to testify for the defense, as related by the witness himself. Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony of witness Pasion to the effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what turned out to be the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for the defense. V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his 75 guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his

mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never 76 present in any of said meetings. It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such 77 offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, 78 Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties. VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts as to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's explanation about the filing of criminal 79 charges. In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of desperation and exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape. The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any 80 breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama. Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration, that is not always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose too many instances of false charges of 81 rape. While this Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed the judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape charges, especially where the offended parties were very young and presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a story just to secure indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction and acquitted the accused when there are strong indications pointing to the possibility that the rape charges were merely 82 motivated by some factors except the truth as to their commission. This is a case in point. The Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took advantage of complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her teacher, he should have acted as adviser and 83 counselor to complainant and helped her develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting her. Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in a prison as an instrument of human justice, he remains in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a measure of divine retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do not rule out such other legal options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law. VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise. It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 84 doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.

The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise: In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the complaining witness, on the theory that she will not choose to accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and indignities her accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to speak up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also irreparably sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind that she did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be the object of lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor was defiled, relating every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her purity has been lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation rather than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason why, if a woman decides instead to come out openly and point to her assailant, courts 85 are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . . . The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant 86 committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be 87 acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is 88 possible to do so. On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the overwhelming evidence in favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding that the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must prevail in this particular indictment. B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to 89 deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant, as hereunder explained: To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents' house the day after the alleged rape incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked her parents to permit her to help him solicit contributions for her candidacy. When they left the house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It is difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from these normal and innocuous arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious circumstances as described by complainant. Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag which later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and consent of her parents who passively looked on without comment. Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they occupied, whether at Sunset Garden or at Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door from the inside. We must, however, recall that when she was asked on cross-examination about the kind of lock that was used, she pointed to the doorknob of the courtroom. The court then ordered that the door of the courtroom be locked and then asked complainant to open it from the inside. She was easily able to do so and, in fact, she admitted that the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could also be opened from the inside in the same manner. This demonstrably undeniable fact was never assailed by the

prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that the room which was occupied by the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the lock thereof was broken. When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national highway in broad daylight. Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help of other people and free herself from appellant 90 if it were true that she was forcibly kidnapped and abused by the latter. In fact, several opportunities to do so had presented themselves from the time they left complainant's home and during their extended stay in the hotel and in the lodging house. According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to Sunset Garden to inform them that Mia spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor impugned by Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On the other hand, the allegation of Helen Taha that she made a report to the police about her missing daughter was not supported by any corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was the police officer to whom she allegedly reported the incident ever identified or presented in court. We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part for the commission of the crime charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint of a motive 91 for the crime. It is true that, as a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and, not being an 92 element of a crime, it does not have to be proved. Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of the accused becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in 93 order. Nowhere in the testimony of either the complainant or her mother can any ill motive of a criminal nature be reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst, immoral though it may be. As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag of clothes belonging to complainant which was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its announced supposition that the clothes could have easily been bought from a department store. Such preposterous reasoning founded on a mere surmise or speculation, aside from the fact that on rebuttal the prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or clarification from complainant about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces our impression of an apparently whimsical exercise of discretion by the court below. Matters which could have been easily verified were thus cavalierly dismissed and supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn by said court. We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of this Court against the practice of excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial court: It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether the testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the materials before it necessary to 94 make a correct judgment. At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient and substantial evidence which warrant and demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto, we take this opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and experience of mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment. Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the death penalty on certain heinous crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its publication in the December 16, 1993

issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal, sometimes misinterpreted.

95

and not on January 1, 1994 as is

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant Danny Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of the Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be released forthwith, unless he is otherwise detained for any other valid cause. SO ORDERED. THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117217. December 2, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GENER DE GUZMAN y SICO, accused-appellant. DECISION DAVIDE, JR., J.: On 1 April 1992, complainant Gilda Ambray filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, a [1] complaint charging accused Gener de Guzman y Sico with the crime of rape allegedly committed at 9:00 p.m. of 31 March 1992 in Meadow Wood, Executive Village, Barangay Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite. On even date, Gener de Guzman was arrested and detained at the Municipal Jail of Bacoor, Cavite, but was released on 14 April 1992 upon the filing and [2] approval of his bail bond. Gener de Guzman did not submit any counter-affidavit as required in the subpoena issued by the MTC on 14 April 1992. Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, the MTC forwarded the record of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the necessary information with the appropriate [4] court. On 14 July 1992, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of [5] Bacoor, Cavite, Branch 19, an information charging accused Gener de Guzman with the crime of rape, allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 31st day of March 1992 at around 9:00 oclock in the evening at Meadow Wood Subd., Executive Village, Barangay Panapaan, Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Gilda B. Ambray, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said Gilda B. Ambray. Contrary to law. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. B-92-216. Upon arraignment on 10 August 1992, accused Gener de Guzman entered a plea of not guilty. thereafter ensued and the prosecution moved for the cancellation of the bail bond.
[6] [3]

Trial on the merits

On 9 December 1992, after complainant Gilda Ambray, Police Officer Efren Bautista, and Dr. Valentin Bernales of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), completed their testimony as witnesses for the prosecution, the trial court [7] cancelled the bail bond of Gener de Guzman on the ground that the evidence of his guilt was strong. He was re[8] arrested, and on 22 January 1993, his motion for reconsideration of the order cancelling his bail bond was denied by the trial court for lack of merit as he was charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of [9] his guilt was strong. Two other witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, a kumadre of the accused, and Aquilino Flores Ambray, the husband of the complainant. The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established the following facts:

Homeward bound on 31 March 1992 from Anson Department Store where she worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda Ambray, the 32-year old wife of Aquilino Flores Ambray and a mother of two children, was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision, Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite, at about 8:45 p.m. waiting for a tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some questions. He answered in a stammering manner. The complainant recognized the accused very well because it was summertime and the [10] gate of the subdivision was well-lit. After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different route. She got scared but managed [11] not to show it. The accused would once in a while stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition. When they reached Phase II of the same subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered her mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried to shout but the accused threatened her. The accused then dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished house. She attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill her if she made noise. She fought to free herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to raise her T-shirt while holding her neck tightly. He shouted and commanded her to raise her T-shirt, which she obligingly followed because of fear. He removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted Saklolo! Tulungan ninyo ako, but the accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that she could hardly breathe. He held her hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He unzipped her pants and pulled it down her knees. She struggled to liberate herself, but to no avail. The accused then tried to insert his penis into her, but failed to do so because she struggled and fought back, then slapped him while covering her vagina with her hand. When she tried to stand, he pushed her down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her pants and underwear. She pleaded to him to have mercy on her and told him that she had two children. He warned her: Huwag kang sisigaw, papatayin kita. The accused again tried to insert his penis into her, but she prevented him from doing so. The accused took her hand and let her hold his penis to make it stiff. As Gilda became too weak to struggle against the accuseds sexual advances, the accused was able to finally consummate his dastardly desire. He then pulled out his penis and fingered her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not to tell anybody, otherwise, he [12] would kill her and all members of her family. He told her that she was his third victim but the two did not complain. He [13] then dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking back. When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that she was raped by the [14] accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon not to by Gildas mother. At almost midnight of 31 March 1992, Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners Association and President of the National Press Club. Antonio radioed the Bacoor Police Station to send an investigator. PO3 Efren Bautista and Sgt. Saguisame responded to the alarm immediately. Upon their arrival at the house of Antonio, PO3 Bautista saw Gilda with her mother. Gilda, who was crying, related to PO3 Bautista that she [15] was raped and described to him her assailant as a tricycle driver, tall, strong, with curly hair and in army cut. Gilda also gave PO3 Bautista a vivid description of the accuseds tricycle, viz., blue in color with the name Dimple at the [16] back. The policemen left and went to the house of the accused. PO3 Bautista invited the accused to go with him because the Mayor wanted to talk to him. The accused, together with P03 Bautista, went to the residence of Antonio. When the accused entered the house of Antonio, Gilda Ambray cried hysterically while pointing to the accused as her [17] rapist. The accused was then brought to the municipal jail. Gilda Ambray was medically examined at the Las Pias Hospital and issued a medical certificate. She then proceeded to the NBI for a medico-legal examination. Dr. Valentin Bernales, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted [19] the examination on Gilda. His findings, contained in his medico-legal report, were as follows: I. Physical Injuries: Abrasion, brownish; lips, upper, left side, mucosal, 2.0 x 1.5 cm.; elbow, right, postero-lateral aspect, 2.0 x 1.5 cm. and postero-medial aspect, multi-linear, with brown scab formation, 3.0 x 1.0 cm. Contusion, reddish; back, right, scapular area, 7.0 x 5 .0 cm. and left, 15.0 x 8.0 cm. Contused abrasion, reddish black, scapular area, left, medial aspect, 3.0 x 2.0 cm. II. Genital Examination:
[18]

Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax. Vestibulae, pinkish, smooth. Hymen, reduced to carunculae myrtiformis. Vaginal orifice, admits a tube, 3.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal wall, lax. Rugosities, obliterated. III. Conclusions: 1. 2. The above physical injuries were noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination. Medical evidence indicative of recent sexual intercourse with man on or about the alleged date of examination.

IV. Remarks: Laboratory Report S-92-94

[20]

shows positive result for the presence of human spermatozoa.

[21]

Dr. Bernales opined that the physical injuries sustained by Gilda Ambray resulted from force applied to her, [22] presence of human spermatozoa in Gildas genitals indicated recent sexual intercourse.

while the

On 3 April 1992, Bebey and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the accuseds kumadre, to beg for Gildas forgiveness for the accuseds sake. The following day, Resurreccion [23] accompanied the accuseds parents, wife, children and sister-in-law to Gildas house. Gilda met them, but to their plea [24] for forgiveness, she told them that should not be tolerated. Gilda further testified that she suffered moral damages, had to resign from her job due to shame, and had [25] spent P28,500.00 for attorneys fees. Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi and presented Alfredo Fernandez and Teotimo Camagong as his witnesses. According to Gener de Guzman, on 31 March 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., he was about to go home and was at the corner of Meadow Wood Subdivision coming from Justineville Subdivision. On his way home on his tricycle, he saw Gilda Ambray, who flagged him down and boarded his tricycle. After traveling about half a kilometer, his tricycle malfunctioned. He told her that she better walk home because her house was already near. He pushed his tricycle home, and on his way, one Alfredo Fernandez approached him and inquired what was wrong with his tricycle. Alfredo helped him push the tricycle towards his (accuseds) home, and upon arrival thereat, he told Alfredo not to leave at once. At around 9:10 p.m., they started to drink liquor until 11:00 p.m., and after their drinking spree, he cleaned their mess and slept. Then at around 12:50 a.m. of 1 April 1992, PO3 Efren Bautista fetched and apprised him that he was accused of rape by a certain Gilda Ambray. Thereafter, an investigation was conducted and he was brought to the Bacoor Police Station. Alfredo L. Fernandez, 37 years old, jobless, and a resident of Justineville Subdivision, corroborated Geners story [26] about the malfunctioning tricycle and the drinking session. Teotimo Camagong testified that he was present when the accused was investigated at the residence of Tony Antonio [27] and that the complainant did not pinpoint and identify the accused as her alleged molester. In its Decision dated 30 June 1994 and promulgated on 25 July 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged, and rendered judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused GENER SICO DE GUZMAN is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He should suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua and indemnify herein private complainant Gilda Ambray the following: actual damages representing her lost monthly salary when she resigned from her office due to shame for being a rape victim, in the sum of P30,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00, exemplary damages of P10,000.00, litigation expenses of P5,000.00, and attorneys fee[s] including appearance fees for the private prosecutor in the sum of P28,500.00. It gave full gave weight to the testimony of Gilda Ambray because [w]ithout doubt, the complainant had endured the rigors of recalling her harrowing ordeal and had vividly, credibly and candidly portrayed in detail how she was raped by the [29] accused. As to whether sexual intercourse was consummated against the will or consent of the offended party, the trial court said:
[28]

No less than NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Valentin Bernales had corroborated the stance of herein private complainant that she was raped by the accused. The victim had sustained contusions and abrasions at her body that indicated that she struggled against the sexual advances of the accused. As a result of the doctors examination on the victim, he confirmed the occurrence of a recent sexual intercourse and presence in her private part of human spermatozoa as denoted in his Medico Legal Report (Exh. F) and Laboratory Report (Exh. [30] D). Likewise it ruled that since the accused was drunk, he was more aggressive and sexually capable. Finally, it considered [32] as evidence of the accuseds guilt the plea of his parents, wife and relatives for forgiveness and compromise. The accused seasonably appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction, and in urging us to acquit him, interposes the following assignment of errors in his Appellants Brief: 1. 2. 3. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED HAS INDUBITABLY EMPLOYED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION IN THE RAPE OF THE VICTIM. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE VICTIM. THE COURT ERRED IN STRESSING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS DRUNK AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF RAPE.
[31]

In the Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with the accused and prays that we affirm in toto the appealed decision. The first and second assigned errors may be taken up together. The upshot of the accuseds stance in these alleged errors is that he was not positively identified and that neither force nor intimidation was proven. As to the latter he cites these facts: (a) Gildas assailant had three acts of sexual intercourse with her; (b) the physical examination showed that she suffered injuries on the dorsal portion only, and none was found on her neck; (c) her personal belongings -- bra, pants, T-shirt and underwear -- were completely intact; and (d) no signs of physical violence were discernible on both the persons of the accused and Gilda Ambray. Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and secluded places away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and [33] conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the Peoples single witness of the actual occurrence. In the review of rape cases, therefore, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility: it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its on merits, and [34] cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The resolution then of the first two assigned errors and the determination of the guilt of the accused depend primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and the accused witnessed the incident when it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would render the accuseds conviction inevitable. A meticulous assessment of Gildas testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her story, which she narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Further strengthening her credibility in recounting her ordeal at the hands of the accused was her conduct immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home without looking back, and upon her arrival she reported the rape to her husband and her mother at once. Immediately thereafter, she reported it to Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners Association and President of the National Press Club, who then sought police assistance. When the policemen arrived at Antonios residence in response to the latters call, Gilda narrated the rape to the policemen and gave them the description of the assailant. When the policemen brought the accused to the residence of Antonio, Gilda forthwith pointed to the accused as the person who raped her. Gilda voluntarily submitted herself to a medical examination at the Las Pias Hospital and then to an examination of her private [35] parts by Dr. Bernales of the NBI. The following day she submitted herself to an investigation by the PNP of Bacoor, Cavite, and filed on the same day a complaint for rape against the accused with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite. All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within twenty-four hours after the commission of the crime. The quickness and spontaneity of these deeds manifested the natural reactions of a virtuous woman who had just undergone sexual [36] molestation against herself, and evinced nothing more than her instant resolve to denounce the beast who criminally abused and ravished her, and to protect her honor. Moreover, she rejected the plea for forgiveness sought by the accuseds parents, wife, and children, then suffered the travails of a public trial which necessarily exposed her to humiliation and embarrassment by unraveling the details of the rape and enduring a cross-examination which sought to discredit her. What Gilda endured could only come from one whose obsession was to bring to justice the person who had abused her and vindicate her honor, even if such vindication would never erase from her memory that excruciatingly painful

chapter in her life which left her psychologically and emotionally scarred forever. This Court has repeatedly held that no complainant would admit that she has been raped, make public the offense, allow the examination of her private parts, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she had not in [37] fact been raped. We likewise agree with the trial court that the accused used force and intimidation upon Gilda. Another established rule in rape cases is that the force need not be irresistible; all that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient to consummate his evil purpose, or that it was successfully used. It need not be so great [38] or of such character that it could not be repelled. Intimidation, on the other hand, must be viewed in light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is enough that it produces fear -- fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to [39] her at that moment, or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she would report the incident. In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from behind, held her neck tightly, and covered her mouth. As she struggled to free herself, she sustained her injuries. Dr. Bernales confirmed the use of force, and according to him, the abrasions and contusions on Gildas body were due to force applied on her. Moreover, the accused also threatened Gilda with death if she would not yield to his bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted intimidation. The accuseds contention that it was highly incredible that there was force or intimidation since the assailant committed three acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Gilda explained in her re-direct examination that the three hours mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the time which elapsed from the moment she was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the incident to Tony [40] Antonio. The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the party who has called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the testimony given on cross-examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during crossexamination. The re-direct examination serves the purpose of completing the answer of a witness, or of adding a new [41] matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible misinterpretation of testimony. In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda categorically declared that the accused tried to thrice insert his penis into her vagina. He failed in the first and second attempts because she struggled, but succeeded on the third because she was already weak. While it may be true that on cross-examination she testified that she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination she said that she was raped three times, no inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion as to the legal qualifications of the three separate acts, i.e., Gildas answers were conclusions of law. A witness is not permitted to testify as to a conclusion of law, among which, legal responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be asked or permitted to testify as to whether or not a party is responsible to the law. Law in the [42] sense here used embraces whatever conclusions belonging properly to the court. What is clear to us is that there were, at least, two acts of attempted rape and one consummated rape, committed in light of the testimony of Gilda. The information, however, charged the accused with only one act of rape; hence, consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against [43] him, he cannot be held liable for more than what he was charged. There can only be one conviction for rape if the [44] information charges only one offense, even if the evidence shows three separate acts of sexual intercourse. Neither are we persuaded by the claim that Gilda was not able to positively identify the accused. He was familiar to Gilda one or two weeks before the incident because she saw him driving a tricycle and had, in fact, been once a passenger of his. She saw him clearly at the guardhouse before the incident because the guardhouse was well-lit; she was his passenger that evening until he stopped his tricycle near the unfinished house; and she had ample opportunity to see and recognize him during the assault. Then, Gilda did not hesitate to point to and identify the accused as her rapist when the latter was brought by the policemen to the house of Tony Antonio. The accuseds defense of alibi, which is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and fabricate, cannot [45] prevail over his positive identification by Gilda. Moreover, any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was dissolved by the overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise, the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an error and his Appellants Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an [46] offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel

resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon (an offender). [48] People vs. Calimquim, we stated: The fact that appellants mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazons father is an indication of guilt. (See People vs. Olmedillo, L-42660, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 193).

[47]

In

The accused may be correct in the third assigned error because no testimony of a witness established that the accused was in a state of drunkenness when he sexually assaulted Gilda. The trial court may have formed its conclusion that the accused was drunk from his testimony that he and Alfredo Fernandez were drinking liquor in his house from 9:00 to 11:00 p.m. of 31 March 1992. In any event, that erroneous conclusion is innocuous. We do not then hesitate to conclude that the accused, having had carnal knowledge of complainant Gilda Ambray through the use of force and intimidation, committed the crime of rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty being reclusion perpetua. The damages awarded by the trial court stand modification. No damage for loss of income due to Gildas resignation from her employment should have been awarded, the resignation being unnecessary. Conformably however with the current jurisprudence, she is entitled to indemnity of P50,000.00. For her shame, as well as mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation which rape necessarily brings to the offended [49] party, she is entitled to recover moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Article 2217 of the Civil Code. However, since no aggravating circumstance had been proved, exemplary damages may not be awarded. In Article 2230 of the Civil Code, such damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of 30 June 1994 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. B-92-216 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification on the civil liabilities, and as so modified, the awards of P30,000.00 as actual damages for loss of monthly salary and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages are deleted, and accused-appellant Gener de Guzman y Sico is further ordered to pay the complainant Gilda Ambray the sum ofP50,000.00 as indemnity. The awards for moral damages, litigation expenses and attorneys fees stand. Costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 117702. February 10, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE, accused-appellant. DECISION PUNO, J.: Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads as follows: "That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a hunting knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Rosita Bacaling, [1] against her will." The prosecution established that Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00 in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, Rosita was cooking porridge for the spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine months old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two children asleep. He approached Rosita and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her skin disease. Rosita was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly contracted from one of the children. Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, Rosita took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her

face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. Rosita cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach. A few minutes later, Rosita woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood and changed her clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the incident to her parents. Appellant then [2] left the house. Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio Cagangohan. Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock. She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions such as dressing herself. In short, Rosita became helpless. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer by her mother for examination. On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and unable to talk. She conducted a physical examination and also found that: "x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings; Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact; Internal examination -- admits one finger; Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist. x x x."
[3]

Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation and [4] treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped by appellant. Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the alleged rape he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in the morning, and worked straight until 8:00 in [5] the evening. He never left the fish stall until after 8:00 in the evening because of his many customers. The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to indemnify Rosita Bacaling P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, thus: "WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds accused Crispin Yparraguirre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Correspondingly, the court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer and undergo the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs. Accused Crispin Yparraguirre is also ordered to indemnify the victim Rosita Bacaling the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus payment of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED."
[6]

In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that: I "THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE; II THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITNESS MARY ANN YPARRAGUIRRE WENT TO THE MOTHER [7] OF THE ACCUSED ON NOVEMBER 23, 1990 TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE DROPPING OF THE CASE." The appeal has no merit. After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution evidence, which rests mainly on the testimony of Rosita Bacaling, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are [8] minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived. The question of whether Rosita contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not important. The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave her tablets for treatment of the disease. Appellant's allegation that Rosita should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened Rosita and prevented [9] her from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts. The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect [10] Rosita's credibility. She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was filed three months after Rosita told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too long a period to file a complaint for rape. Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner of the [11] family. It is hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to public trial and place her

family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all. Rosita suffered [13] psychologically from the incident. Before the rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months and the [14] spouses actually found her to be a good worker. When Rosita returned to her family, however, she lost her speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric treatment. Indeed, Rosita's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and fabrication. Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her [15] from filing the complaint. When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos [16] (P25,000.00). Still Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann [17] herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money. An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence [18] against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The public market was merely a ten-minute walk from [20] [21] their rented room and during work breaks, appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to his children. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated May 10, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo, Davao is affirmed. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendantsappellants.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]

[12]

ANTONIO, J.: This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch VII, Pasay City finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them as follows: WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, ,Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario Comayas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4) aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00, representing the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the amount of P12,000.00. and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to law. During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on August 16, 1970, and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed on August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is limited to appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the

crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one "Rammy, " another Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and one John Doe." chanrobles virtual law library When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-6"). The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was investigating Melecio Cudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the commission of the crime. According to him, said appellants "just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and said nothing." Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to confront the accused Melecio Cudillan with the other suspects'? chanrobles virtual law library A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. When you said there was a confrontation between the accused Melecio Cudillan and other suspects whom do you refer to as other suspects? chanrobles virtual law library A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere and Mario. There was another person Eduardo Comayas. He was also one of those suspects but Melecio Cudillan failed to point to him as his companion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by Melecio Cudillan in the Police Department of Pasay City as his companions? chanrobles virtual law library A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario Comayas. chanrobles virtual law library Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons what did these three persons do? chanrobles virtual law library A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing of October 28, 1966). According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously and not merely kept their silence." chanrobles virtual law library

Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted to him that they took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the deceased, viz.: ATTY. DEPASUCAT: chanrobles virtual law library Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre? chanrobles virtual law library A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please point him out? chanrobles virtual law library INTERPRETER: chanrobles virtual law library Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth from the left who, upon being asked, gave his name as Ramiro Alegre.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ATTY. DEPASUCAT: chanrobles virtual law library Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre? chanrobles virtual law library A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. Where? chanrobles virtual law library A. In the city jail because our cells are also near each other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about? chanrobles virtual law library A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has also anticipated in the commission of the killing of Adelina Sajo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more or less? chanrobles virtual law library A. About the middle of June.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any? chanrobles virtual law library A. That he was also inside the room when they killed Adelina Sajo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus Medalla, when did that take place, more or less? chanrobles virtual law library A. About that month also of June, about the middle of June. chanrobles virtual law library Q. What year? chanrobles virtual law library A. 1967.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas? chanrobles virtual law library A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. Why do you know him? chanrobles virtual law library A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other. Q. If he is inside the courtroom, will you please point him out? chanrobles virtual law library

INTERPRETER: Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name as Mario Comayas. ATTY. DEPASUCAT: chanrobles virtual law library Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the accused Mario Comayas? chanrobles virtual law library A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. When was that, more or less? chanrobles virtual law library A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of June.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. And what did you talk about? chanrobles virtual law library A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he admitted to me that he was one of those who planned and killed Adelina Sajo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any? chanrobles virtual law library A. That while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to by the door.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. How about the other accused Melencio Cudillan, do you know him?chanrobles virtual law library A. Yes, sir. chanrobles virtual law library Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out? chanrobles virtual law library INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name as Melecio Cudillan. ATTY. DEPASUCAT: chanrobles virtual law library Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan? chanrobles virtual law library A. Because he is with me in one cell.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan? chanrobles virtual law library A. Most of the time because we used to talk about our case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan, more or less? chanrobles virtual law library A. Three days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up to about the first week of June, 1967.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell you about this case?chanrobles virtual law library ATTY. RAMIREZ: Objection, Your Honor, leading. COURT:

Witness may answer, there is already a basis. A. That they were the ones who planned and killed Adelina Sajo. (t.s.n., pp. 286-289, Hearing of July 21, 1967). However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at the time of the incident in question. they were attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote. According to Jesus Medalla, he and his companions left the Maravilla compound at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and proceeded directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas confirmed that he and Jesus Medalla were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote in the morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when he returned to the bakery where he was employed to resume his work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus, Urbano Villanueva testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project of David M. Consunji at the Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro Alegre began working at the construction as a welder on July 13, 1966, and that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Alegre worked in the project and that he knew this because he is the foreman and timekeeper in the project. He Identified the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning up to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the number of hours he actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel construction project.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged "Silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and credence to the testimony of an inmate of the Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted to him their participation in the crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library I chanrobles virtual law library The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-2"), on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res 1 2 inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value 3 against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library II chanrobles virtual law library The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in the face of statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the crime, could be considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be 4 5 taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be 6 7 illusory. The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona held that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was the view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent, as being the 8 safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament. Other courts have held that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime calls for a

reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him indicate 9 that he is free to answer if he chooses. chanrobles virtual law library We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against self-incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those' suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may 10 lead a private life." chanrobles virtual law library In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals:
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... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court;' it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand - with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will. It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws governing the rights of an accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees, all officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn to uphold the rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under investigation for the commission of an offense, to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the course of one's detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained in 12 violation of the foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. The 1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there is this categorical mandate: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." chanrobles virtual law library This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such 13 silence. chanrobles virtual law library This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando, now Chief 14 justice, in Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, thus: The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: 'The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt.' Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant 'to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand - with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.' Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual explained that the privilege against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to its detriment." chanrobles virtual law library

We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody, in the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which they are charged. Their immediate release from detention is ordered, unless they or any one of them is otherwise held for some other lawful cause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused. SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:p The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused Amado Ponce, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Agapito Gambalan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, and the 1 amount of P1,500.00 representing the value of the stolen revolver. The Raquel brothers now plead for their absolution in this appellate review. In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused were indicted for robbery with homicide 2 before the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 16, allegedly committed on July 4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the Municipality of Kabacan. Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and before 3 he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by the evidence of record and with page references to the transcripts of the court hearings, are summarized by the Solicitor General in the appellee's brief: At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN, January 25, 1988) Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic) while a man took her husband's gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.) She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.) George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7, TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, March 21, 1988)

Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.) Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.) Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, April 2, 1991)
4

Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts which are presented in their brief in this wise: Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his parents he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sisterin-law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities accompanied by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard the name of accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in Paatan. On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are located in the same Barangay. Before July 4, he entertained no grudge against victim Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April 2, 1991, pp. 2-20). Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel told him that he was going to Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his house, looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to Tungol where they arrested his son Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp. 3-26). T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned in the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas Raquel 5 was under his division then, and was on duty on July 4, 1986. (TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp. 2-20). On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty 6 beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly. Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they were 7 appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. The lower court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case 8 to the Court of Appeals. In view of the penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals properly forwarded the same to 9 us. Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime. We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged. The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. In her testimony on direct examination in court she declared as follows: Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you see any when you pip (sic) at the window? A; Yes, sir. Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?

A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pump and I saw again two (2) persons who were running away, sir. Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump and two (2) persons running away? xxx xxx xxx Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump, who is this person? A: I do not know sir. I have known that he was Amado Ponce when the Police 10 arrived. (emphasis ours.) On cross-examination she further testified: Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where were you? A: I was at the Veranda sir and I started shouting while going to our room. Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one person who was mask(ed) and got the gun of your husband because he was mask(ed), is that not right? A: Yes, sir. Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to your house and got this gun? A: Yes, sir. Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who have got this gun inside? FISCAL DIZON: Already answered. She was not able to identify, your Honor. Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was presented to you by the police, is that right? A: Yes, sir.
11

xxx xxx xxx Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie after you shouted for help and you saw two (2) person(s) running, is that right? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that not right? A: I saw them running sir going around. Q: These two (2) persons were running going around? A: They were running towards the road. ATTY. DIVINO:

Going to the road. Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running towards the road? A: No, sir.
12

(Emphases supplied.)

Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito Gambalan. In fact, in his sworn statement executed in the Investigation Section of the Kabacan Police Station on July 5, 1986, he declared that: 19Q: By the way, when you saw three persons passing about 5 meters away from where you were then drinking, what have you noticed about them, if you ever noticed any? A: I noticed that one of the men ha(d) long firearm which was partly covered by a maong jacket. The other one wore a hat locally known as "kipis" meaning a hat made of cloth with leaves protruding above the forehead and seemed to be holding something which I failed to recognize. The other one wore a shortpant with a somewhat white T-shirt with markings and there was a white T-shirt covering his head and a part of his face as he was head-down during that time. 20Q: Did you recognized any of these men? A: No. Because they walked fast.
13

(Emphasis supplied.)

A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his coperpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then. The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on 14 the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar. Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his 15 confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal. The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his coaccused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or 16 conduct be used as evidence against him. Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, 7 those exceptions do not however apply to the present case. Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel 18 was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente, was negated 19 by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no person by the name of Danny Clemente. Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the chief of the intelligence and investigation section of their police station:
1

Q: During the investigation did you inform him (of) his constitutional right while on the process of investigation? A: No sir, because my purpose was only to get the information from him . . . And after that I checked the information that he gave. Q: Of course, you know very well that the accused should be assisted by counsel? A: What I know is if when a person is under investigation you have in mind to investigate as to against (sic) him, and you have to inform his constitutional right but if the purpose is to interrogate him to acquire information which will lead to the identity of the other accused we do not need to inform him. Q: Don't you know that under the case of PP vs. Galit; the accused should be (re)presented by counsel that is the ruling of the Supreme Court? A: I do not know if it is actually the same as this case. Q: But it is a fact that you did not even inform him (of) his right? A: No sir. Q: At the time when you asked him he has no counsel. A: No counsel, Sir.
20

Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver 21 must be made with the assistance of counsel. These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed. A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt. Without the positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of 23 innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them. While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in substance and evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In 24 fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution's evidence is weak. It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither met nor were the standards therefor fulfilled. WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 175603 February 13, 2009
22

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. RENATO ESPAOL, Appellant. D E CI S I O N CORONA, J.:

This is an appeal of the November 30, 2005 decision and June 29, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 1375 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42 convicting appellant of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. Appellant Renato Espaol was charged with killing his wife, Gloria Pascua Espaol, in an Information that read: That on or about the 2nd day of February, 2000, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RENATO ESPAOL @ Atong, being then legally married to one GLORIA ESPAOL, with intent to kill the latter, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by shooting her, hitting her on vital part of her body, thereby causing her death shortly thereafter due to "Hypovolemic shock, hemorrhage, massive, due to multiple gunshot wound" as per Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Benjamin Marcial Bautista, Rural Health Physician, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased, GLORIA ESPAOL, in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, and other consequential damages. Contrary to Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
3

When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and defense agreed on the following stipulations and admissions: 1. That the appellant under detention and named in the information was the accused who had been arraigned; 2. That the victim, Gloria Pascua Espaol, was the legal wife of appellant; 3. That Gloria and appellant were living together as husband and wife prior to February 2, 2000 and that she was shot to death at the early dawn of February 2, 2000 at Pantal, Dagupan City; 4. That before the victim was shot, appellant borrowed the tricycle of Federico Ferrer and drove said tricycle with his wife inside the cab thereof from their house towards the house of Felicidad Ferrer, sister of the victim; 5. That appellant and the victim lived in their own house with their four children. Thereafter, trial ensued. The factual antecedents follow. At about 2:00 a.m. of February 2, 2000, Domingo Petilla was waiting for his companions at Pantal Road, Dagupan City. They were on their way to Manila. All of a sudden, he heard two successive gunshots. A few moments later, a yellow tricycle sped past him along Pantal Road headed towards Sitio Guibang, Dagupan City. The tricycle was driven by a man 5 wearing a dark-colored long-sleeved shirt. Petillas companions arrived shortly thereafter on board a van. As they started loading their things, they saw, through the lights of their vehicle, a person lying on the pavement along Pantal Road. Upon closer scrutiny, they discovered the 6 lifeless body of Gloria Espaol. They immediately reported the matter to the police. The gunshots were also heard by Harold Villanueva, a boatman working at the Pantal River, while he was waiting for passengers at the dock about 100 meters away from the crime scene. The shots were followed by the sound of a motorcycles revving engine. He then saw a speeding yellow tricycle. The tricycle bore the name "Rina" in front of its cab. Its driver was wearing a dark jacket and blue pants. The boatman was later told by a tricycle driver that there was a dead 8 body nearby. Out of curiosity, he (the boatman) went there and recognized the victim as one of his regular passengers. Felicidad Pascua Ferrer, sister of the victim, was told by the police and neighbors that her sister was dead. She immediately proceeded to the place. Upon confirming that it was indeed her sister, she asked bystanders to inform 9 appellant about the death of his wife. A few minutes later, appellant arrived. Even before he saw his dead wife, he shouted "She is my wife, she is my wife. Who killed her? Vulva of your mother! She was held up." Appellant stepped across the body and saluted the police investigator. He told the police that he brought the victim to the place where she was found and that she could have been robbed of 10 the P2,000 he had earlier given her.
7 4

Meanwhile, Villanueva noticed that the appellant seemed to be wearing the same clothes as those worn by the driver of 11 the speeding tricycle he saw along Pantal Road right after he heard the gunshots. At around 3:00 a.m., appellant went to the house of Mateo Pascua, brother of Gloria, to inform him that Gloria was held up and killed. They then proceeded to the scene of the crime using the yellow tricycle of their brother-in-law, Federico Ferrer. The tricycle had the name "Rina" emblazoned in front. On the way, Mateo noticed that the seats and floor of the tricycle 12 were wet. When asked about it, appellant did not answer. Thereafter, at the morgue, appellant refused to look at the body and preferred to stay outside. following results: EXTERNAL FINDINGS CADAVER WAS IN RIGOR MORTIS AND REGULAR BUILT. GUNSHOT WOUND, POE, 0.7 CM, MID FRONTAL AREA, LEVEL 5 CM ABOVE THE EYEBROW, COLLAR ABRASION, NO GUNPOWDER BURN, PENETRATING, SKULL FRACTURE, BRAIN TISSUE. POEx: NONE GUNSHOT WOUND, POE, 1.5 CM, RIGHT MID AXILLIARY LINE, LEVEL 2 CM BELOW THE RIGHT NIPPLE, LESS DENSE, GUNPOWDER BURN PERIPHERY, COLLAR ABRASION, SKIN ABRASION POSTERIOR, PENETRATING. POEx: NONE CONTUSION HEMATOMA AT THE RIGHT EYE AREA. INTERNAL FINDINGS INTRACRANIAL HEMORRHAGE, MODERATE PENETRATING PERFORATING BRAIN TISSUE INTRATHORACIC RIGHT, HEMORRHAGE MASSIVE PENETRATING AND PERFORATING THRU AND THRU RIGHT [LUNG] AND HEART. 6th [RIB] FRACTURE, 2.5 CM, LEFT MID CLAVICULAR LINE, MEDIAL SLUG FOUND ABOVE THE 6th [RIB], WITHIN THE MUSCLES, LEFT THORACIC AREA.
14 13

The autopsy yielded the

Disturbed by appellants actuations, Felicidad asked the police to interrogate her brother-in-law. At the police station, while appellant was being investigated, he requested Senior Police Officer (SPO)1 Isagani Ico if he could talk privately with 15 Felicidad. During their talk, appellant begged Felicidads forgiveness and asked that he be spared from imprisonment. During the victims wake in their house, appellant hardly looked at his wifes remains. He chose to remain secluded at the second floor. He repeatedly asked for Felicidads forgiveness during the first night of the wake. At one point, Delfin Hernandez, a nephew of the victim, approached appellant and asked why the latter killed his aunt. Appellant just kept 16 silent. It was also disclosed by Norma Pascua Hernandez, Glorias other sister, that Gloria confided to her appellants illicit relationship with a woman named Eva Seragas. Gloria went to Evas house and confronted her about the adulterous relationship but appellant came to Evas defense and forcibly dragged Gloria away. Later, Gloria had another heated 17 argument with Eva. Norma pacified her sister and brought her home. After the presentation of the prosecutions evidence in-chief, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence. The RTC denied 18 the demurrer in an order dated August 21, 2000.

For his defense, appellant testified that he had been an employee of the Dagupan City Water District since 1990. In the early morning of February 2, 2000, he and his wife were on their way to downtown Dagupan City on board a tricycle driven by him to buy binuburan (fermented cooked rice), a local medication for his ulcer. However, upon reaching Quimosing Alley along Pantal Road, Gloria decided to alight and wake up her sister Felicidad who lived nearby. Gloria 19 and Felicidad were engaged in the trading of fish in Dagupan City. After saying their goodbyes, appellant proceeded to the city proper alone. He bought binuburan and other ulcer medications and went home. Around 2:30 a.m., a passing tricycle driver informed him that the water engine of the 20 Dagupan Water District was creating too much noise. He decided to verify the information. On his way there, appellant noticed a commotion along Pantal Road. An unidentified man later told him, "Espaol, come here. Your wife is dead." He immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime. As he was about to embrace the dead body of his wife, someone tapped him on the shoulder and said "No, dont touch her, she is still to be investigated." At the morgue, he noticed that his wife had a bruise above her right elbow and that her zipper was partially opened. After a few 21 minutes, he asked to be excused for he could not bear the pain and sorrow. He denied that he asked forgiveness from his sister-in-law Felicidad for killing his wife; that he was barely around during his wifes wake and that he did not respond to his nephews accusation. He likewise denied having an adulterous 22 relationship with Eva Seragas. Rachel and Richwell Espaol, appellants children, corroborated their fathers story and maintained that he was at their house resting at the time of the commission of the crime. They insisted that he was always beside the coffin of their mother during the wake and that he had no other woman. Rachel testified that she and her mother were close. If it were true that her father had illicit relations with another woman, her mother would have confided in her.1avvphi1 On February 19, 2001, the RTC convicted appellant: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RENATO ESPAOL alias "Atong" is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE as defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by R.A. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law. Under the latter law, the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death and there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the information, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition, the death his wife has to be indemnified by him in the amount of P50,000.00 and is further ordered to pay to Felicidad Ferrer the amount of P20,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages. No moral damages is awarded for the reason stated above. SO ORDERED. Aggrieved, appellant filed an appeal in this Court which we referred to the CA in accordance with People v. Mateo. The CA affirmed the RTC in a decision promulgated on November 30, 2005. It denied reconsideration in a resolution dated June 29, 2006. Hence this appeal. The issue for our resolution is whether appellant is guilty of the crime of parricide. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, parricide is the killing of ones legitimate or illegitimate father, mother, child, any ascendant, descendant or spouse and is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: Article 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death. In convicting the appellant, the RTC and CA found that the following circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of parricide: 1. appellant admitted that he was the one who brought his wife to the scene of the crime minutes before the latters body was discovered. In other words, appellant was with the victim around the time she was shot and killed.
23

2. the tricycle which he used in transporting his wife was seen by Harold Villanueva and Domingo Petilla traveling at a high speed coming from the direction where the gunshots were heard. 3. appellant, immediately after the incident, was wearing the same dark jacket and blue jeans worn by the driver of the speeding tricycle. 4. appellant asserted that his wife was robbed, even before the investigation had started. However, the victims purse and other belongings were all found intact. 5. appellant did not respond to his brother-in-laws query as to why the tricycles sidecar which appellant had used in transporting his wife was wet. 6. appellant isolated himself during the nine-day wake of his wife. 7. appellant repeatedly asked to be forgiven by Felicidad and spared from imprisonment during the investigation of the case, which was corroborated by SPO1 Ico, and during the first night of the wake. 8. appellant had a paramour, a certain Eva Seragas. A month prior to the killing, the victim confided to her sister, Norma Fernandez, that she had a confrontation with her husbands paramour at the latters home, but appellant 24 dragged and pulled her away. A few days after, the two crossed paths again and quarreled. We agree with the CA. These circumstances are proven facts. We are convinced that at around 2:00 a.m. of February 2, 2000, appellant shot his wife twice on the head and breast, causing her death. Though there is no direct evidence, we have previously ruled that direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can 25 adequately establish his or her guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a 26 conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial as it is, conviction based thereon can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is of a nature identical to direct evidence. It is equally direct evidence of minor facts of such a nature that the mind is led, intuitively or by a conscious process of reasoning, to a conclusion from which some other fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond 27 reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that accused-appellant committed it. None of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual killing of the victim by appellant. However, their separate and detailed 28 accounts of the surrounding circumstances reveal only one conclusion: that it was appellant who killed his wife. Appellant argues that the lower courts should not have given weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses 29 because they were incredible and illogical. We disagree. Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is accorded great respect in the absence of proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily or that the trial court overlooked material facts. The rationale behind this rule is that the credibility of a witness can best be determined by the trial court since it has the direct opportunity to 30 observe the candor and demeanor of the witnesses at the witness stand and detect if they are telling the truth or not. We will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Appellants bare denial that he did not kill his wife is a negative and self-serving assertion which merits no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative 31 matters. The prosecution witnesses were not shown to have any ill-motive to fabricate the charge of parricide against appellant nor to falsely testify against him.1avvphi1

Appellants defense of alibi is likewise weak. He alleged that he went home after he went downtown to buy his medications. His children attested that he was with them in their house at the time of the commission of the crime. However, [alibi] is easy to fabricate but difficult to prove. xxx We have held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place (or distance) must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible 32 for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its commission. Appellants house was merely minutes away from the place where the crime took place. Assuming that the children actually knew that appellant was home when their mother was killed, this did not prove that he was not guilty. It was easy for him to hurry home right after the crime. In fact, this is a reasonable conclusion from the circumstantial evidence gathered. Another piece of evidence against appellant was his silence when his wifes nephew asked him why he killed his wife. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: Section 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. In addition, appellants act of pleading for his sister-in-laws forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to 33 compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission of guilt under Section 27, Rule 130: Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. xxx xxx xxx In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. xxx xxx xxx In sum, the guilt of appellant was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence. Reclusion perpetua was correctly 34 imposed considering that there was neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present. The heirs of the victim are entitled to a civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000, which is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and 35 the culpability of the accused for the death. Likewise, moral damages in the amount of P50,000 should be awarded even in the absence of allegation and proof of the emotional suffering by the victims heirs. Although appellants two children sided with him in his defense, this did not 36 negate the fact that the family suffered emotional pain brought about by the death of their mother. We also award them exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000 considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this 37 being a case of parricide. WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 1375 finding the appellant, Renato Espaol, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Gloria Espaol, in the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P20,000 as actual damages, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents.

[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent. RESOLUTION PUNO, J.: For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001. In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds: I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI, SECTION 3 (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THEREON. II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING WOULD VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS. III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY. V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT TO ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INCUMBENT OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED CAPACITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION. In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues: 1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED AS OF JANUARY 20, 2001; 2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA; 3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY RULE; 4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONERS CONSIDERING SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION; and INABILITY TO GOVERN

5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL. We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit. I

Prejudicial Publicity on the Court

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are well-established and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up the irresistible

pressure for the petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expose of Governor Luis Chavit Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the I accuse speech of then Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation of the speech of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach the petitioner in the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin demanding petitioners resignation; (7) a similar demand by the Catholic Bishops conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioners resignation by former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to resign; (10) the resignation of the members of petitioners Council of Senior Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the Department of Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioners Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission of the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator Drilon as Senate President and of Representative Villar as Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the prosecutors motion to open the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a secret bank account under the name of Jose Velarde; (17) the prosecutors walkout and resignation; (18) the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the House of Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine and its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of support of then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services; (21) the same withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP, General Panfilo Lacson, and the major service commanders; (22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs; (23) petitioners agreement to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope. All these prior events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false. We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo. We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence. We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the oathtaking of respondent Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the petitioner containing his final statement which was issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioners issuance of the press release and his abandonemnt of Malacaang Palace confirmed his [1] resignation. These are overt acts which leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned. In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury 20, 2001, the claim that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on. We also reject the contention that petitioners resignation was due to duress and an involuntary resignation is no resignation at all. x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action. The three-part test for such duress has been stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. The view has also been expressed that a resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employers conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employees purely subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives for example, resignation or facing disciplinary charges

does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only alternative to resignation is facing possible termination for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that a resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion without procedural view if the employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice posed. Futhermore, a resignation by an officer charged with misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has already determined that the officers alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the officers employment under the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any measure authorized by law and the circumstances of [2] the case. In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the Congress a written declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was forced to resign because immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis na ba ako? which implies that he still had a choice of whether or not to leave. To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners resignation. The Malacaang ground was then fully protected by the Presidential Security Guard armed with tanks and high-powered weapons. The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers were in Malacaang to assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch, was suffered by the petitioner, the members of his family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours. Petitioners entourage was even able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his followers before finally going to his residence in Polk Street, Greenhills. The only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing between a small group of pro and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled through the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign. II

Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence. We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their [3] pleadings. The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply [4] Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001, and the third part, published on [5] February 6, 2001. It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so. Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe [6] hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and [7] credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of [8] the oath. Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay [9] evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity. The emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows: x x x On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons accounts of what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted because no objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although volumes have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one

advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states have added to their rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra). Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted): The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be influenced by the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not conceive of hearsay in that manner. Prejudice refers to the jurys use of evidence for inferences other than those for which the evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate inference to be drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because a witness was particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt as to the usurpation of the jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of photographs of a victims final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jurys function by usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type of information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives. Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only altenative to a general rule of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More important, the assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay seem insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent with accepted notions of the function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should be abolished. Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available which is, however, derived from simulations that suggests that admitting hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount the value of hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991). Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether the benefits outweigh the cost: The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It also includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the court salaries, administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by the public. As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools, students spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous academic resources are expended on the rule. Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, [10] Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992). A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 [11] provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions are not covered by the hearsay [12] rule:

Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the probative value of any other persons asssertion, argued that it had a special value when offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the partys statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross examine himself. Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion. (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154, McCormick) According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath. A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583). The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the fiveday period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go. We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted. It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or [13] implied by the other person. Jones explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that [14] arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made. To use the [15] blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common sense. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an [16] admission by him. Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have [17] been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still are.) This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na [18] bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?) Secretary Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.

Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal [19] (petitioner). Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence against such [20] principal. Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the [21] facts in issue. The second class includes the following: a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions; b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like; c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter; d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness. Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by the prohibition against [22] hearsay evidence: 1088. Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of comon issues, forming a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is as of course. For example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person. Where his acts or statements are against his interest, they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against interest. And even where not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue as to constitute one of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity. As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law on evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur. Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence were violated in our Decision, viz: The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence, such as the rule on authentication of private writings xxx A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law provides that before any private writing offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. xxx B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed

Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary. It is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or duplicate original of the diary. The Best Evidence Rule should have been applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry. The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no [23] evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows: Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents. Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry. (b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals. (c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that: Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by [24] requiring production. x x x In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it. (empahsis supplied) Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor, viz: Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of exclusion might have successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection had been taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the admission of secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper season that is, whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that which is

offered and before the secondary evidence has been admitted. The objection itself should be sufficiently definite to [25] present a tangible question for the courts consideration. He adds: Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception. In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz: Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that: A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263, and others) However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa [27] 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835). Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro, which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is a significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar. In the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had been given an opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof. III
[28] [26]

Temporary Inability

Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution in that congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when majority of the Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress that his inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet. It is also urged that the presidents judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review. We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the submission in G.R. No. 146738 that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable [29] of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII. We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels aggrieved by the mannerCongress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress itself. The power is conceded by the petitioner to

be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is significant that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern and the members of the international community had extended their recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and it has a constitutional duty of fealty to the supreme will of the people x x x. This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before a court of justice. Needles to state, the doctrine of separation of power constitutes aninseparable bar against this courts interposition of its power of judicial review to review the judgment of Congress rejecting petitioners claim that he is still the President, albeit on leave and that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President. Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress has the ultimate authority to determine his inability to govern, and whose determination is a political question by now arguing that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question. Petitioners change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does not at all impress. The cases at bar do not present the general issue of whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de facto President. Specific issues were raised to the Court for resolution and we ruled on an issue by issue basis. On the issue of resignation under section 8, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the issue is legal and ruled that petitioner has resigned from office before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. On the issue of inability to govern under section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress has the ultimate authority to determine the question as opined by the petitioner himself and that the determination of Congress is a political judgment which this Court cannot review. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question. Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru resolutions which brushed off his temporary inability to govern and President-on-leave argument. He asserts that these acts of Congress should not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they are post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied. We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes the presidency. In the cases at bar, special consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. To be sure, however, the petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, recognized respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency post facto. Petitioner himself states that his letter alleging his inability to govern was received by the Office of the Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30 A.M. and the Office of the Senate at 9 [30] P.M. of the same day. Respondent took her oath of office a few minutes past 12 oclock in the afternoon of January 20. Before the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement [31] which states: Joint Statement of Support and Recognition from the Senate President and the Speaker Of the House of Representatives We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are called upon to address the constitutional crisis affecting the authority of the President to effectively govern our distressed nation. We understand that the Supreme Court at that time is issuing an en banc resolution recognizing this political reality. While we may differ on the means to effect a change of leadership, we however, cannot be indifferent and must act resolutely. Thus, in line with our sworn duty to represent our people and in pursuit of our goals for peace and prosperity to all, we, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, hereby declare our support and recognition to the constitutional successor to the Presidency. We similarly call on all sectors to close ranks despite our political differences. May God bless our nation in this period of new beginnings. Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino. (Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR. Senate President (Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA Speaker of the House of Representatives

This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency was followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this recognition. Thus, Resolution No. 176 expressed x x x the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the [32] attainment of the nations goal under the Constitution. Resolution No. 82 of the Senate and Resolution No. 178 of the [33] House of Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as Vice-President. It [34] also passed Resolution No. 83 declaring the impeachment court functus officio. Both Houses sent bills to respondent [35] Arroyo to be signed by her into law as President of the Philippines. These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic. Petitioners insistence that respondent Arroyo is just a de facto President because said acts of Congress x x x are mere circumstances of acquiescence calculated to induce people to submit to respondents exercise of the powers [36] of the presidency is a guesswork far divorced from reality to deserve further discussion. Similarly way off the mark is petitioners point that while the Constitution has made Congress the national board of canvassers for presidential and vice-presidential elections, this Honorable Court nonetheless remains the sole judge in [37] [38] presidential and vice presidential contests. He thus postulates that such constitutional provision is indicative of the desire of the sovereign people to keep out of the hands of Congress questions as to the legality of a persons claim to the [39] presidential office. Suffice to state that the inference is illogical. Indeed, there is no room to resort to inference. The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies and election contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus,section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a) the President-elect fails to qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may arise from the contingency. In case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this Court sitting en banc. In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court. In light of these clear provisions of the Constitution, it is inappropriate, to say the least, for petitioner to make inferences that simply distort their meanings.

IV

Impeachment and Absolute Immunity

Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution which provides: (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally prosecuted. A plain reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion. The provision conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify petitioners non sequitur submission that the provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from the impeachment proceedings should be considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the [40] Senate is equivalent to acquittal. He explains failure to prosecute as the failure of the prosecution to prove the [41] case, hence dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits. He then concludes that dismissal of a case for [42] failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy.

Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject petitioners submission. The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of the impeachment cases when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The next day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to the Speaker of the House tendering their resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief Justice Davide, Jr. Before the House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January 20, 2001, petitioner relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic. Thus, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio. Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express [43] consent of the accused. Assuming arguendo that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Petitioners claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court. At best, his claim of previous acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute. As Bernas points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution to prove the case. Hence, [44] dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits. This Court held in Esmea v. Pogoy
[45]

, viz:

If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecutions motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently fails to prove the defendants guilt, the court upon defendants motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissall amounting to an acquittal of the defendant. In a more recent case, this Court held: It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been [46] violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against him. Even assuming arguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not every invocation of an accuseds right to speedy trial is meritorious. While the Court accords due importance to an accuseds right to a speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be invoked loosely. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial [47] for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are apropos: Rule 115, Section 1(h). Rights of accused at the trial. -- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: (h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial. Rule 119, Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for good cause. The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment proceedings was unjustified, much less that it was for an unreasonable length of time. Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001, the impeachment

proceeding was suspended until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue on the resignation of the public prosecutors. This was justified and understandable for an impeachment proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment process. However, three (3) days from the suspension or January 20, 2001, petitioners resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of events, the impeachment court became functus officio and the proceedings were therefore terminated. By no stretch of the imagination can the four-day period from the time the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the day petitioner resigned, constitute an unreasonable period of delay violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial. Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused. We reiterate that the impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned from the presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination of the impeachmment case against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment proceedings. We have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or [48] termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double jeopardy. Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioners rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President. Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz: Mr. Suarez. Thank you. The last question is with reference to the Committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily? Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit. Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here. Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things. Mr. Suarez; On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President. I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.
[49]

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter [50] than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Indeed, petitioners stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at bar were filed not really for petitioner to reclaim the presidency but just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency and thus, derail the investigation of the criminal cases pending against him in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair trial have been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. In our Decision, we held that there is not enough evidence to sustain petitioners claim of prejudicial publicity. Unconvinced, petitioner alleges that the vivid narration of events in our Decision itself proves the pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity. He then posits the thesis that doubtless, the national fixation with the probable guilt of petitioner fueled by the hate campaign launched by some high circulation newspaper and by the bully pulpit of priests and bishops left indelible impression on all sectors of the citizenry and all regions, so harsh and so pervasive that the [51] prosecution and the judiciary can no longer assure petitioner a sporting chance. To be sure, petitioner engages in exageration when he alleges that all sectors of the citizenry and all regions have been irrevocably influenced by this barrage of prejudicial publicity. This exaggeration collides with petitioners claim that he still enjoys the support of the majority of our people, especially the masses. Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the transaction speaks for itself) to support his argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a [52] plaintiffs prima faciecase, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. It is not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence and to thereby place on the [53] defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied only in tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity. We again stress that the issue before us is whether the alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the petitioner has prejudiced the minds of the members of the panel of investigators. We reiterate the test [54] we laid down in People v. Teehankee, to resolve this issue, viz: We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as hey happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lost their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and oncamera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. InMartelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove how the impartiality of the panel of investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman has been infected by it. As we held before and we hold it again, petitioner has completely failed to adduce any proof of actual prejudice developed by the members of the Panel of Investigators. This fact must be established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to loose

surmises and conjectures. In fact, petitioner did not even identify the members of the Panel of Investigators. We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur as suggested by the petitioner. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the burden to the panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity. Such a rule will overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The cases are not wanting where an [55] accused has been acquitted despite pervasive publicity. For this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for petitioner to conjure possibility of prejudice but must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to sustain his plea. It is plain that petitioner has failed to do so. Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period to allow passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die down. We regret not to acquiesce to the proposal. There is no assurance that the so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. The investigation of the petitioner is a natural media event. It is the first time in our history that a President will be investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged commission of heinous crimes while a sitting President. His investigation will even be monitored by the foreign press all over the world in view of its legal and historic significance. In other words, petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity. But what is important for the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are not violated in the process of investigation. For this reason, we have warned the respondent Ombudsman in our Decision to conduct petitioners preliminary investigation in a circus-free atmosphere. Petitioner is represented by brilliant legal minds who can protect his right as an accused.

VI

Recusation

Finally, petitioner prays that the members of this Honorable Court who went to EDSA put on record who they were and consider recusing or inhibiting themselves, particularly those who had ex-parte contacts with those exerting pressure on this Honorable Court, as mentioned in our Motion of March 9, 2001, given the need for the cold neutrality of impartial [56] judges. We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12) members of the Court who merely accepted the invitation of the respondent Arroyo to attend her oath taking. As mere spectators of a historic event, said members of the Court did not prejudge the legal basis of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her oath. Indeed, the Court in its en banc resolution on January 22, 2001, the first working day after respondent Arroyo took her oath as President, held in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit: A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take Her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001. This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party. The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the Court. It should be clear from the resolution that the Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a case but as an administrative matter. If it were considered as a case, then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the letter as an administrative matter and emphasized that it was without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party. In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issuedanother resolution to inform the parties and the public that it xxx did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution. Thus, there is no reason for petitioner to request for the said twelve (12) justices to recuse themselves. To be sure, a motion to inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect and is regarded with general disfavor. Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a

deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the [57] deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it [58] cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 are DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-7973 April 27, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., defendants. DOMINGO CADIANG, SANTIAGO YUMUL and FILEMON CENZON, defendants-appellants. First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres for appellee. Santos, Valencia and Cenzon for appellants. PADILLA, J.: Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga finding them and their co-defendants, who did not appeal, guilty of murder for the death of Pablo Navarro and sentencing them to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay indemnity and the proportionate share in the costs (Criminal Case No. 1262). In the evening of 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes then gathered at the sala of the house of the first in the barrio of Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga, that Pablo Navarro had been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre, and for that reason he manifested to them his desire and plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio Serrano instructed them to wait for Navarro in the town of Bacolor, lure him to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. After disclosing to them his plan, Eulogio Serrano told them to go to sleep at the post of the civilian guards near his house. In pursuance of the plan, the next day (17 October), Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes waited for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where he used to hang around. Navarro did not show up that day. The following day (18 October), the group waited for him at the same places. This time Navarro showed up at the gambling casino and Cenon Serrano alias Piping promptly invited him to a drink but Navarro declined saying that he was going somewhere. On 19 October, the group again waited for their quarry at the same places but failed to make contact with him as he did not show up. At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 20 October, the group waited for Navarro in the same places. Navarro arrived at the gambling casino between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Cenon Serrano alias Piping asked him for some drinks. Navarro ordered some drinks and all in the group except Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank. After drinking the contents of six bottles of Black Dog gin, Orange Wine and Sy Hoc Tong wine, Navarro asked Cenon Serrano alias Piping whether what they had drunk was enough, and the latter answered "No, look for some more." Navarro left the gambling casino, went to the market place about 20 meters away and came back accompanied by Simplicio Manguerra bringing four bottles of Orange wine and Sy Hoc Tong wine. Simplicio Manguerra joined the party and all except Cenon Serranoalias Piping drank the four bottles of wine. While the spree was going on, Cenon Serrano alias Piping suggested to Pablo Navarro that they should go to San Fernando for a "good time," to which suggestion Navarro agreed. Cenon Serrano alias Piping sent out Domingo Cadiang to look for a jeep, and Cading returned with an auto calesa jeep driven by Marcelino Sicate. After drinking the four bottles of wine, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon, Pablo Navarro, Simplicio Manguerra and Anastacio Reyes boarded the jeep, the first and the last sitting at the front with the driver and the rest inside. From the gambling casino the party repaired to Don Q gasoline station to refuel and proceeded to San Fernando. But before reaching San Fernando, Cenon Serrano aliasPiping remarked that "there is no use having a good time" in San Fernando and suggested that they should proceed to Angeles for the "good time" which suggestion Navarro approved. On the way to Angeles Cenon Serrano alias Piping ordered the driver to stop at Tony's Place in San Fernando to buy some more wine. After buying another jar of San Miguel gin, part of which Navarro who was already drunk was made to drink, the party resumed their trip; but upon reaching a small road near the schoolhouse of barrio San Isidro, Cenon Serrano alias Piping told the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores, Bacolor, where they arrived at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. There Cenon Serrano aliasPiping dismissed the driver of the jeep. At barrio Dolores, the group passed by the

house of Simeon Dizon, the barrio lieutenant, told him to come down and ordered him to call for some temporary policemen. Upon seeing Benjamin Tolentino at the house of Dizon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping beckoned and ordered Tolentino to tie Navarro's hands with rope. Upon Cenon Serrano's order Felipe Garcia, a civilian guard who came with Simeon Dizon, pointed a gun at Navarro. The latter asked Cenon Serrano alias Piping why he was being tied and Cenon Serrano alias Piping answered "You deserve to be tied up because you are against us." Navarro was brought to the stockade of the civilian guards where he was questioned and accused Cenon Serrano alias Piping of bringing witnesses to the house of Senator Pablo Angeles David to testify on the Maliwalu massacre. As Navarro denied the charge, Cenon Serrano aliasPiping hit Navarro with his fist, struck him with the butt of his .45 caliber pistol and ordered Domingo Cadiang to beat up Navarro. Cadiang did as he was ordered by beating up Navarro with a piece of bamboo about 4 inches in diameter and less than a meter long. As a result of the beating Navarro fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping kicked him and ordered him to rise, and as Navarro was rising Cadiang hit him on the back, so Navarro again fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping then told Filemon Cenzon to beat up Navarro and Cenzon with the same piece of bamboo struck Navarro on his back about the waistline as he made an effort to stand up. Cenon Serrano alias Piping returned to where the jeep was parked and ordered Felipe Garcia to tie the hands of Simplicio Manguerra. Upon hearing the order of Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Simplicio Manguerra asked whether he was to be killed. Cenon Serrano answered "I will also have you killed, you son of a whole." Manguerra clung to Anastacio Reyes begging for mercy but the latter disengaged himself from him. Cenon Serrano alias Piping pushed Manguerra and ordered Santiago Yumul to beat him up. Santiago Yumul hit Manguerra with a pestle on the back. Manguerra fell to the ground. Then Cenon Serrano aliasPiping ordered Domingo Cadian and Felipe Garcia to bring Manguerra to the post behind the stockade. At this juncture Basilio de Guzman arrived and was ordered by Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill Manguerra. De Guzman and Garcia brought Manguerra to a field in Dolores where De Guzman dug a pit while Garcia stood guard; and after digging the pit De Guzman shot Manguerra twice and shoved Manguerra's body in the pit and covered it with earth. Afterwards, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes repaired to the house of Eulogio Serrano in barrio Potrero to report to him that the two victims were already in barrio Dolores, arriving at barrio Potrero at past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As Eulogio Serrano was not in his house when Cenon Serrano alias Piping arrived, the latter boarded the jeep of the late Maximino Serrano and drove on it to the town of Bacolor together with Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes. Upon reaching the second bridge at barrio San Antonio on the way to Bacolor, Santiago Yumul alighted. The rest resumed driving to town and met Eulogio Serrano that the two men were already in barrio Dolores. Eulogio told Cenon that he would go to Dolores. Domingo Cadiang was left in the barrio of San Antonio while Filemon Cenzon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes proceeded to the town of Bacolor. In the afternoon of 20 October 1950, while Emiliano Manalo known also as Isaias, a civilian guard, was in his house at barrio Dolores, Bacolor, Pampanga, Benjamin Tolentino came and asked him to help him dig a pit at Sitio Castilang Malati, barrio Dolores, to bury a dead horse of Atilano Gopez. He acceded to his request and helped Tolentino did it. After digging the pit he went home and then proceeded to his post in Sitio Pigulut Mauli, barrio Dolores. Upon reaching his post he was called by Eulogio Serrano who was outside the stockade together with Atilano Gopez, Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino talking with another person inside the stockade who he later on learned was Pablo Navarro. He heard Eulogio Serrano ask "Ambo, are you the one bringing those people from Maliwalu to Don Pablo? Navarro answered that he was not the one. Eulogio Serrano then told Atilano Gopez to take Pablo Navarro out of the stockade and to bring him along with them (Eulogio Serrano, Atilano Gopez, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra and Emiliano Manalo) to barrio Potrero. When they reached sitio Castilang Malati Eulogio Serrano ordered Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino to shoot Pablo Navarro from behind. Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino fired one shot each simultaneously. Navarro fell down dead. Eulogio Serrano ordered them to bring the dead body of Pablo Navarro to the pit that Benjamin Tolentino and Emiliano Manalo had dug and to cover it with earth. Afterwards, they walked back to barrio Dolores. Sometime after the elections in November 1951, Atilano Gopez ordered Emiliano Manalo and Benjamin Tolentino to exhume the bones of the late Pablo Navarro, put them in a sack and threw them into a creek. On 6 December 1951 the chief of police of Bacolor, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Eulogio Serrano and Emiliano Manalo, accompanied by Constabulary soldiers, exhumed the bones of the late Pablo Navarro. On 17 December 1951, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes were charged with illegal detention with murder for the death of Pablo Navarro in an information filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga. On 12 February 1952, upon motion of the assistant provincial fiscal, the Court ordered the discharge of Anastacio Reyes from the information to testify as witness for the prosecution. Eulogio Serrano was charged with the same crime in criminal case No. 1819 but has not yet been apprehended. Cenon Serrano alias Piping charged with the same crime was also at large but later on arrested and brought to trial with his co-defendants in both criminal cases for the death of Pablo Navarro (case No. 1262) and for the death of Simplicio Manguerra (case No. 1263). The evidence for the prosecution heard against his co-defendants before his arrest and arraignment was again presented to afford him the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses. After a joint trial with criminal case No. 1263 for the death of Simplicio Manguerra, the Court found.

. . . Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 1262 (for the death of Pablo Navarro) and, appreciating No aggravating or mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also sentenced to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Pablo Navarro in the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs. Only Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon have appealed. The appellants deny having been in the house of Eulogio Serrano at barrio Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga, in the evening of 16 October 1950, when Eulogio Serrano told them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and to kill him there. Domingo Cadiang claims that on 16 October 1950 he was at the farm of Paquito Liongson in the barrio of San Antonio helping his in-laws thresh palay that they had promised and agreed to do; and that on 17, 18 and 19 October he was in the yard of his house cutting kapok trees for fuel. Filemon Cenzon claims that on 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock in the evening, he was on the market place of Bacolor; that on 17 October up to the early morning of 18 October, he was at Bagac Bay hauling lumber; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 18 October he was already in Bacolor where he refilled the tank of his truck with petrol and thereafter he together with Juanito Bognot proceeded to Dagupan to deliver lumber for his employer, Manuel Joseph, to the Liberty Lumber; and that he returned to Bacolor at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of the next day, 19 October, and brought his truck to the garage of the company and went home. Santiago Yumul, claims that from 16 to 19 October 1950 he was working as laborer for Martin Tuason and Martin Yumul, claims that from 16 to 19 October 1950 he was working as laborer for Martin Tuason to remove a railroad track of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company leading to Magalang, Pampanga; and from that reason he could not have been with Eulogio Serrano, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang and Filemon Cenzon in the evening of 16 October at the house of Eulogio Serrano, and from 17 to 19 October in the town of Bacolor waiting for Pablo Navarro to carry out the plan of luring him to barrio Dolores and there kill him. And although they admit to have been in the company of Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes, who they claim brought Pablo Navarro and Simplicio Manguerra to barrio Dolores in the jeep driven by Marcelino Sicat on 20 October 1950, yet they disclaim any knowledge of the plot to kill them, and that if they ever took a hand in maltreating the victims it was out of fear to Anastacio Reyes and Cenon Serrano alias Piping, the latter ordering them to inflict injury upon the victims at the point of a gun. The weak defense of alibi put up by the appellants to disprove complicity in the murder of Pablo Navarro cannot overcome the clear and positive testimony of Anastacio Reyes that they were at the house of Eulogio Serrano in the evening of 16 October 1950 when the latter told them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and there kill him; and that they were together on 17, 18 and 19 October waiting for Pablo Navarro in the town of Bacolor to lure him to barrio Dolores, and on 20 October when they finally succeeded in luring him to barrio Dolores where they killed him. It is difficult to believe that a man who had made up his mind to kill another would bring along with him other persons who know nothing about the plan just to witness the commission of the crime. If they were not in the know, as they contend, they also would have been done away with right then and there, in the same way Simplicio Manguerra, who was not to be killed, had been done away with, to prevent him from reporting to the authorities or from testifying against them in Court; or they also would have been sent away upon arriving at barrio Dolores, in the same way that Marcelino Sicat, the driver of the jeep on which they rode in going to the said barrio, was sent away. The way the appellants were seated in the jeep in going to barrio DoloresAnastacio Reyes and Cenon Serrano alias Piping at the front seat with the driver and the three appellants on the two parallel seats inside the jeep-belies the assertion that they were prevented by Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes from running away upon learning that criminal act was to be committed. The assertion that Cenon Serrano alias Piping pointed his gun at them at the gasoline station, where they stopped to refuel, to prevent them from deserting, is unbelievable, because the gasoline station is located in the heart of the town of Bacolor, in a busy street where the slightest commotion or any sign of distress would easily draw the attention of the nearby traffic officer directing the traffic. The fact that in the evening of 16 October 1950, the three appellants and their co-defendants were gathered at the house of Eulogio Serrano, over-all commander of the civilian guard and temporary police organizations, who ordered them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and to kill him there, because he had been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David to inform him about and to testify on the Maliwalu massacre; that pursuant to the plan laid out by Eulogio Serrano, from 17 to 20 October 1950 the appellants joined Cenon Serranoalias Piping and Anastacio Reyes in waiting for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where he used to frequent; that they were actually with Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes when Pablo Navarro was lured to go to Dolores on the pretext of going to San Fernando and then to Angeles for a "good time" after a drinking spree in bacolor; that they took turns in manhandling the victim as he was hogtied and rendered helpless; and the fact that the appellants went into hiding after the incident together with Cenon Serrano aliasPiping in the barrio of Escribania, show that they were in league with Eulogio Serrano and Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill Pablo Navarro. Each of them is, therefore, guilty as co-principal.

The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as there is nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy has been established and in convicting the appellants based upon the lone testimony of their co-conspirator. The contention does not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is 1 shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to 2 testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and 3 competent. The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants. For lack of sufficient number of votes to impose the death penalty, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the proportionate costs against the appellants. G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman, City Attorney Pedro R. Revilla and Assistant City Attorney Julian E. Lustre for petitioner. Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and Rufino Navarro for respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter, according to the transcript, the following remarks were made: FISCAL LUSTRE: May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as against the accused Consunji himself? COURT: That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9 The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made. Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him. SEC. 14. Confession. The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his coaccused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such. The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that: The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; Peoplevs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985). Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy. It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marcella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1). We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded. Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817: In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions

should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment. There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal. Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this opinion. Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.

DIGEST ONLY R. G. No. 9221, not published. EN BANC[G.R. No. 1284. November 10, 1905.] THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JACINTO DEL ROSARIO, defendant-appellant. SYLLABUS 1. ACTION; DISMISSAL; ERROR. The defendant is entitled to have the case dismissed where theplaintiff fails to establish the allegations in the complaint; and an order overruling such motion is erroneous. 2. REALTY; POSSESSION; EVIDENCE. Where one derives title to real estate from another, thedeclaration act, or omission of the latter to the property is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title. (Sec. 278, Code of Civil Procedure.) 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION; PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP. A possessory informationrecorded in the property register is prima facie evidence of the fact that the person who instituted the proceedings holds the property as owner; and the presumption, under article 448 of the Civil Code, is that his title is good unless the contrary is shown. DECISION MAPA, J p: This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots describe in the complaint, located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the defendant. The court below entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for possession and damages in the sum of $2,500, United States currency, and costs. At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. This motion was overruled by the court, to which ruling the defendant duly excepted. The question thus raised puts in issue the trial court's finding that the plaintiff was entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question. We accordingly hold that this point is impliedly involved in the third and fourth assignments of error. Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony of John R. Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The first witness testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city (p. 11 of the bill of exceptions).The next witness testified that the land included in

Calles Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs (pp. 12 and 13 of the bill of exceptions)). It must be borne in mind that this witness referred to the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, and not to the lots described in the complaint. These lots abut upon the streets referred to, but do not form a part of either. According to the complaint, they are building lots. The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his testimony is at variance with that of the preceding witness, who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government. Villega's testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to. Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned between the municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the Central Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on which the property abuts (bill of exceptions, pp. 15 and 16). The fourth witness (Sotera Roco) testified merely that Lorenzo del Rosario had paid 100 pesos to her brother Cipriano Roco for the purpose of instituting a possessory information as to the property abutting on Calle Clavel. It appears that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from Cipriano Roco and sold it to his brother Jacinto del Rosario, the defendant in this case. Notwithstanding this, and assuming that the hearsay testimony of Sotera Roco is admissible, we do not see how it can be inferred from her testimony that the plaintiff is the real owner of the property. The witness Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the ownership of the land. They simply testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary evidence introduced by the plaintiff. Of these documents the most important of all is the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the "mayor of the city of manila" on the 26th of September, 1891, and the letter written by him on the 9thof October, 1901, to the Municipal Board of Manila. Lorenzo del Rosario in his testimony, admitted the authenticity of both documents which contain an offer to the municipality of Manila to purchase the land on Calle Clavel. Lorenzo del Rosario admitted also that he signed the first document under the misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had been subsequently informed by some of the city officials that the land did not belong to the municipality, but to Cipriano Roco y Vera. He stated that he signed the second document because the President of the Municipal Board, Seor Herrera, advised him to do so in order to avoid litigation with the city. His testimony in this respect was not contradicted. We accordingly hold that the provisions of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the case at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is not admissible in evidence. Again, Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after he had transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had it registered, as the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the complaint), on the 23d of February, 1893. If this is so, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in the documents mentioned, they are not binding upon the defendant, because, under section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "where one derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title." The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of Manila. This map is not before us. It is sufficient to say, in order to show that it has no value as evidence, that the reliability of the map was not proven at the trial. The only witness examined with regard to it was the city attorney. He was unable to say who made it or who caused it to be made, or when it was made. He said only that he believed the map had been drawn in the month of July, 1880, or prior to May, 1893. Neither this nor his statement that the map was found among the archives of the city of Manila is of itself sufficient to show that the map is authentic. No one appears to certify as to its correctness. The map identified by the witness John R. Wilson was introduced by the plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the location of the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in establishing the right of possession claimed by the plaintiff. On the other hand, the two public instruments executed on March 7, 1900, between the defendant and Telesfora Apostol y Perea, also introduced in evidence by the plaintiff, show that the defendant was in possession of the land under a good title and with the status of owner of the land. In the first instrument if is stated so many words that the defendant is the owner in fee

simple of the land, he having repurchased it from Liberio de Aurteneche y Menchacatorre, whose title had been recorded in the property register. From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff does not prove its claim of title to the land in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by the plaintiff nor the documentary evidence introduced show that the city of Manila is the owner of the land, nor that it has a right to its possession as claimed in the complaint. Some of the documents introduced, as well as the two public instruments referred to as having been executed in 1900, tended to support the contentions of the defendant rather than those of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff itself admits in the complaint that the defendant's possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March,1901, and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893. This shows that the defendant had been in the adverse possession of the land. According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be presumed to hold under a just title, unless the contrary is shown. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court overruling the motion of the defendant to dismiss and the judgment appealed from are hereby reversed. Let the case be remanded to the court of its origin for action in accordance herewith. The plaintiff shall pay the costs of the Court of First Instance. No special order is made as to the costs on appeal. After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in conformity herewith. So ordered. Torres, Johnson, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur

G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990 BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all surnamed, GEVERO,petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. Carlito B. Somido for petitioners. Benjamin N. Tabios for private respondent.

PARAS, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del Monte Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. 2 affirming the decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters more or less. As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows: The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha 1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.
1

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476. Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the same to be intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero all of which were found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good faith and for value, occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property. (Rollo, p. 23) After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878) square meters, more or less. The other portions of Lot No. 2476 are hereby adjudicated as follows: Lot No. 2476 B to the heirs of Elena Gevero; Lot No. 2476 C to the heirs of Restituto Gevero; Lot No. 2476 E to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres and Francisca Aquino; Lot No. 2476 F to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and Emilia Merida Rumohf ; Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 G to defendant spouses Enrique Abada and Lilia Alvarez Abada. No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A considering that the said lot is the subject of a civil case between the Heirs of Maria Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel Borkingkito and Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which case is now pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs, SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22) From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed from. Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28) but was denied on April 21, 1986. Hence, the present petition. This petition is devoid of merit. Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether or not the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid; 2) in the affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the deed of sale; and 3) whether or not the private respondents' action is barred by laches.

Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the signature of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation"; 3) Ricardo's children remained in the property notwithstanding the sale to Lancero; 4) the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the correct number being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the share of Eustaquio Gevero without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated the area of 20,119 square meters from the bigger area (OCT No. 7616) without the consent of the other co-owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952 Subdivision survey without the consent of the Geveros' to bring about the segregation of the 20,119 square meters lot from the mother lot 2476 which brought about the issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR's title T4320, both of which were illegally issued; and 8) the area sold as per document is 20,649 square meters whereas the segregated area covered by TCT No. T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square meters (Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78). As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in favor of Lancero was forged without Ricardo's knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March 13, 1989). In fact it has long been settled that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521 [1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10, 1985). Likewise, petitioners allegation of absence of consideration of the deed was not substantiated. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven. As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation" (Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964. Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstanding the alleged sale by Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo, p. 71) involves a question of fact already raised and passed upon by both the trial and appellate courts. Said the Court of Appeals: Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court found that Luis Lancero had taken possession of the land upon proper investigation by plaintiff the latter learned that it was indeed Luis Lancero who was the owner and possessor of Lot 2476 D. . . . (Decision, C.A., p. 6). As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282 [1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54 [1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of America, 33 SCRA 737 [1970]; Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v. C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]). Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners which allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have not been raised before the trial court nor before the appellate court. It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development Corporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282, July 5, 1989). Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to Ricardos' proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was deceased at the time it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).

The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]). Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale. Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excluded in the sale considering that a paragraph of the aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of Ricardo and Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68). It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to the different provisions thereof (Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA 203 [1970]), to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract, its entirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, 34 SCRA 83 [1970]). The interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners, by citing only one paragraph of the deed of sale, would not only create contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at naught the entire provisions thereof. Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the petitioners have remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at present (Rollo, p. 17). An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public instrument (Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742). The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing (Art. 1498, 1st Par., Civil Code) and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property (Buencamino v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108 Phil. 900 [1960]; Phil. Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63 SCRA 397 (1975]). Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v. C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the property is a registered land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws (Mallorca v. De Ocampo, No. L26852, March 25, 1970; Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v. CA-G.R. No. 77427, March 13, 1989). Under the established principles of land registration law, the person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez vs. CA., G.R. No. 49739, January 20, 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612 [1989]). This notwithstanding, DELCOR did more than that. It did not only rely on the certificate of title. The Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in question. Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches. The main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the other issues appear unnecessary. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, vs. HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL,Accused-Appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the metropolis of Manila or its environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet. Perhaps they thought they were in a veritable paradise, beyond the reach of worldly distractions and trouble when in the early morning of 27 August 91, in the, sanctity of their own home, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victimsformer houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the That illusion was shattered ghastly crime. As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the information for robbery 1 with homicide and serious physical injuries filed on 19 November 1991 with Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet. Only Richard Malig was arrested On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the prosecution filed a 2 motion to amend the information to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol because the evaluation Of the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity in the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor further asked that accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation 3 of the evidence disclosed no sufficient evidence against him. The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued. 4 Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail. He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Informations with only Salvamante and Maqueda as the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows: That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi; Upper Tadiangan Municipality of Tuba, Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the, above-named accused, Conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, armed with lead pipes, and with intent of gain and against the will and consent of the owners thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of Spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM HORACE BARKER and with violence against and intimidation of the persons therein ransack the place and take and carry away the following articles, to ,it: [An enumeration and description of the articles follow] all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to, the said Teresita and William Horace Barker; that on the occasion and by reason of the said robbery; both accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly strike Teresita Barker and William Horace Barker with lead pipes on the different Parts of their body, leading to the death of William Horace Barker and inflicting various physical injuries on the former which required medical attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and have likewise incapacitated her from the performance of her, customary labor for the same period of time. Contrary to Law. Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded entered a plea of not guilty 6 on 22 April 1992. In its decision Promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical Injuries and sentenced him to Suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of William Horace Barker, court found accused Hector P41,681,00 representing actual expenses, P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs."
7 5

The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SP03 Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Accused Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness. The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary thereof, is as follows: Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as washer wont, the main doors of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted. At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of the toilet and switched. on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her chores. Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and she saw a faircomplexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house. Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with 'his right hand brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, She pointed to, accused Maqueda as the man she saw then. (She got scared and immediately closed the door. Since the door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for help. The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room, leaving behind her husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs and proceeded t, the dining room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly the two rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion. Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at theback of her right hand. She fell to the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the car. After a few seconds, ,he went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs. At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men bearded it, Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he bearded it. In the Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man. At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the room where they had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the garage. In the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to

seek help. After requesting Janet to call the police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier. They just stayed near the road. Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio City Police Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the City Health Department, also arrived. The team conducted an initial investigation only because it found out that the scene of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police Station, which, however, was difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr. Barker inside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its location.' They went around the house and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-shirt (Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe (Exhibit "BB") at the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two househelps who provided him with descriptions of the assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard. Cambod prepared a report of his initial investigation (Exhibit "KK"). Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of jewelry scattered on the floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the house, particularly at the riprap wall, and observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone had passed through and created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba, Benguet. Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker house to secure the premises. Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival. At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at theBarker house to conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the Barker house. The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the Baguio City Police were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, and then to the court. The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, MunicipalHealth Officer of Tuba, Benguet. H, found in it twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument, determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits "P," "O," and "R"). The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center where she was treated and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr. Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerations primarily an the left side of the occipital area, bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was paralyzed. She regained consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been left unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to bleeding or hemorrhagic shock. On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons who had assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for them to conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness. Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double vision. On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged from the hospital and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery. She requested Glen Enriquez to get back the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The aggregate value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these missing items (Exhibit "X.). Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that she sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. she then sought treatment at the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful operation. She likewise received treatment at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M"). On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the, whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante. In

Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in September 1991; however, they already left the place. On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanie Mendoza, and three others went back to Guinyangan to find out whether Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain Requeron that the two had not, Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once Salvamante or "Putol" returned to Guinyangan, On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol," who is none other than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with another policeman, Proceeded to Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail. Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the. headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991. On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-6"). He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteeringto be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II"). In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead pipe providedhim by Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry. Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked toward the road where they Saw two persons from whom they asked directions, and when a passenger jeepney stopped and they were informed by the two Persons that it was bound for Baguio City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a 8 bus for Manila. Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. Hi, testimony is summarized by the trial court in this wise: Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that O" August 27, 1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot 1, Block 21 Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was employed as a caretaker Since July 5, 1991 and he worked continuously there up to August 27, 1991, It was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who found him the job as caretaker. A, caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the employees in the factory and whenever his employer was not around, he was in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees all Sleep inside the factory. On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that day. He slept inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was teaching the new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron. On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as it was his vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at work after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, Quezon, he saw accused Rene Salvamante. He knows accused

Salvamante as they were childhood playmates, having gone to the same elementary school. He had no chance to talk to him that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each other. He again saw accused Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside their (Salvamante) house. Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam around. He agreed to go as he also wanted to visit his brother, Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos, Calauag, Quezon. When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him /Salvamante) in selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. Accused Maqueda knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. They were able to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal and then went to visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that occasion, he never saw accused Salvamante again. After his Christmas vacation, he went back to work a the polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his co-workers Roselyn Merca, who was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she was hard up in her work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Rosely home to Guinyangan, Quezon. He was supposed to report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he was not able to as he was arrested by members of the CAGFU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he brought her home. He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail, then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There he was told to cooperate with the police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. He was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he could also become a state witness: He told them that he could attest to the fact that he accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder. On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet where he has 9 remained under detention up to the present. The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience and SP03 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked, testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and 10 freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. It stated thus: Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution pinpointing accused Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial evidence? In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantia1 evidence, the following requisites must be present: 1) there must be more than One circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 678). There must be an unbroken chain of circamstances which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of all Others, as the author of the crime (People vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569). The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the accused are: 1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer any objection shows that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could well and easily grip a lead pipe and strike a cement post with such force that it produced a resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to conclude that accused Maqueda could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death. 2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the company of accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only prosecution witness who noticed the defective hands of the accused. As they had to ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they were strangers to the place 3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they from the same town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established that he Salvamante are close friends to the point

that they went out together during the Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied Salvamante in selling the black radio cassette recorder. 4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement that he is willing and volunteering to be State witness in the above-entitled case, it the accused in appearing that he is the least guilty along This in effect, supports his extrajudicial confession trade to the police at Although he claims that he did not his signature would lean his as he was just told that release from detention, this is a flimsy excuse which cannot Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could have easily asked his sister and brotherin-law what it meant seeing that their signatures up already affixed on the motion. 5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house that fateful morning and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean Salvosa as to what he actually did can be considered as another circumstance to already bloster the increasing circumstances against the accused. 6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to be given credence, it must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247). This defense easily crumbles down as Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity of the crime scene. The combination of all these circumstances plus extrajudicial confession produce the needed proof 11 beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the crime. The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested. Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that we acquit him because the trial court committed this lone error: . . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE 12 CRIME CHARGED. Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments which are anchored on his alibi that at the time the crime Was committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, ad the failure of the star witnesses for the Prosecution to identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the hospital, Pointed to Richard Malig as the companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a description of Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard Malig. We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing. The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were not able to positively identify Magueda, The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have focused his attention and arguments on these. From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession the Sinumpaang Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between. the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as follows: Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to 13 commit the offense with which he is charged. Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows: A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the 14 ultimate fact of guilt. And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already benefited in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Hence, Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution providing as follows: Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. is not applicable, i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a custodial investigation." It heavily 16 relied on People vs. Ayson where this Court elucidated on the rights of a person under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial court went on to state: At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had 17 already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him. As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said: In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay (People vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, 18 February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA 652). While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused "no longer Has] the right to remain silent End to counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution, The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that
15

stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . . The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination reading: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 constitution was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the united States 19 Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. In that case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state its ruling: Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted 20 with an attorney and thereafter consents to a questioned. It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned Section 20, the wordcustudial, which was used in Miranda with reference to the investigation, was excluded. In view thereof, in Galman 21 vs. Pamaran, this Court aptly observed: The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" and "investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by making it applicable 22 to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in custody. Accordingly, as so formulated, the 23 second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted in People vs. Jose that the rights of the accused only begin 24 upon arraignment, Applying the second paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule inMorales vs, Enrile: 7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the reason for the arrest and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means that a case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of Section 20 are available to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense. This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the present Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel. Thus, Section 12(2), Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by 26 himself and counsel." In People vs. Holgado, this Court emphatically declared: One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be-held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de officio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the warrant 27 to the issuing judge, and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer Or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which reads: (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights.. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken away 28 by government and that government has the duty to protect; or restriction on the power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine 29 that governmental power is not unlimited. They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary 30 power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental 31 liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals.
25

Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the former 32 Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs; People, this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions. To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly .stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The following circumstances were duly proved in this case: (1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in question was committed there; (2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime; (3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends; (4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in September 1991; (5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and (6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least guilty." Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other 33 hypothesis except that of guilty. We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case. This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its 34 commission. Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7

October 1991, thereby belying his, testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991. WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision Of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case, No.91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL. SO ORDERED, January 22, 1918 G.R. No. L-12858 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SANTIAGO PINEDA, defendant-appellant. Francisco and Lualhati for appellant. Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee. Malcolm, J.: This appeal requires a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law. Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Nos. 442, 444, Calle Santo Cristo, city of Manila. One Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription read "clorato de potasa 120 gramos en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda Clorato potasa 120.00 en seis papeles para caballo Sto. Cristo 442, 444, Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Pea and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of poisoning. Four assignments of error are made. The first is that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which substance proved on analysis to be barium chlorate. What the appellant is here relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. (See 10 R. C. L., pp. 938, 940.) The United States Supreme Court has held that: On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150 U. S., 57.)

The second assignment of error is that the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos on the 22d of June, 1916, was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate. The proof demonstrates the contrary. The third and fourth assignments of error that the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of Act No. 597, section 17, as amended. The third assignment contains the points we should consider, including, we may remark, a somewhat difficult question concerning which the briefs have given little assistance. The Pharmacy Law was first enacted as Act No. 597, was later amended by Act Nos. 1921, 2236, and 2382, and is now found as Chapter 30 of the Administrative Code. The law provides for a board of pharmaceutical examiners, and the examination and registration of pharmacists, and finally contains sundry provisions relative to the practice of pharmacy. High qualification for applicants for the pharmaceutical; examination are established. The program of subjects for the examination is wide. Responsibility for the quality of drugs is fixed by section 17 of the Pharmacy Law, as amended (now Administrative Code [1917], section 751), in the following term: Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold or offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of this section if it differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia. The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following penal provision: "Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollar." The Administrative Code, section 2676, changes the penalty somewhat by providing that: Any person engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands contrary to any provision of the Pharmacy Law or violating any provisions of said law for which no specific penalty s provided shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court Lvk68FJ. These are the provisions of law, pursuant to which prosecution has been initiated and which it is now incumbent upon us to construe. Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the one word "fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective? Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant vigorously insists upon, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law Xf0pLI3p. The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a special high degree," "the highest degree of care known to practical men." Even under the first conservative expression, "ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has said must be held to signify "the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, in order that human life may not be constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine." (Tombari vs. Connors [1912], 85 Conn., 235. See also Willson vs. Faxon, Williams and Faxon [1913], 208 N. Y., 108; Knoefel vs. Atkins [1907], 81 N. E., 600.) The "skill" required of a druggist is denominated as "high" or "ample." (Peters vs. Jackson [1902], 50 W. Va., 644; 57 L. R. A., 428.) In other words, the care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.

Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider are civil in nature, the question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. In a decision which stands alone, the Supreme Court of Kentucky said: As applicable to the owners of drug stores, or persons engaged in vending drugs and medicines by retail, the legal maxim should be reversed. Instead of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor. That is to say, let him be certain that he does not sell to a purchaser or send to a patient one drug for another, as arsenic for calomel, cantharides for or mixed with snakeroot and Peruvian bark, or even one innocent drug, calculated to produce a certain effect, in place of another sent for and designed to produce a different effect. If he does these things, he cannot escape civil responsibility, upon the alleged pretext that it was an accidental or an innocent mistake; that he had been very careful and particular, and had used extraordinary care and diligence in preparing or compounding the medicines as required, etc. Such excuses will not avail him. (Fleet vs. Hollenkemp [1852], 56 Am. Dec., 563.) Under the other conception, in which the proof of negligence is considered as material, where a customer calls upon a druggist for a harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the druggist is prima facie negligence, placing the burden on him to show that the mistake was under the circumstances consistent with the exercise of due care. (See Knoefel vs. Atkins, supra,) The druggist cannot, for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium chlorate give instead to the customer barium chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package labeled "potassium chlorate," and expect to escape responsibility on plea of mistake. His mistake, under the most favorable aspect for himself, was negligence. So in a case where a druggist filled an order for calomel tablets with morphine and placed the morphine in a box labeled calomel, it was said: It is not suggested, nor can we apprehend that it is in any wise probable, that the act of furnishing the wrong drug in this case was willful. If it was furnished by the clerk, it was undoubtedly a mistake and unintentional. However, it was a mistake of the gravest kind, and of the most disastrous effect. We cannot say that one holding himself out as competent to handle such drugs, and who does so, having rightful access to them, and relied upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and care called for by the peculiarly dangerous nature of this business, can be heard to say that his mistakes by which he furnishes a customer the most deadly of drugs for those comparatively harmless is not, in and of itself, gross negligence, and that of an aggravated form. (Smith's Admrx. vs. Middleton [1902], 56 L. R. A., 484.) The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar leaning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for W6VMezLpO. In civil cases, the druggist is made liable for any injury approximately resulting from his negligence. If B negligently sells poison under the guise of a beneficial drug to A, he is liable for the injury done to A. In a case, which has repeatedly been termed the leading case on the subject and which has been followed by the United States Supreme Court, it was said, "Pharmacists or apothecaries who compound or sell medicines, if they carelessly label a poison as a harmless medicine, and sent it so labeled into the market, are liable to all persons who, without fault on their part, are injured by using it as such medicine, in consequence of the false label; the rule being that the liability in such a case arises not out of any contract or direct privity between the wrong-doer and the person injured, but out of the duty which the law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others." (Nat. Savings Bank vs. Ward [1879], 100 U. S., 195, following Thomas vs. Winchester [1852], 2 Seld. [N. Y.], 387.) In reality, for the druggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense. Throughout the criminal law, run the same rigorous rules. For example, apothecaries or apothecary clerks, who are guilty of negligence in the sale of medicine when death ensues in consequence, have been held guilty of manslaughter. (See Tessymond's Case [1828], 1 Lewin, C. C., 169.) Bearing these general principles in mind, and remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of druggist, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne out by Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsify, deception, and injury must be present-but not scienter.

In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake ixPP7cUc. The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-45179

March 30, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN IRANG, ET AL., defendants. BENJAMIN IRANG, appellant. Conrado V. Sanchez for appellant. Undersecretary of Justice Melencio for appellee. VILLA-REAL, J.: The accused Benjamin Irang appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime robbery with homicide, the robbery having been committed in the house of Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Melocotones, and sentencing him to the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500, with the proportionate part of the costs of the trial. In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as having been committed by the court a quoin its decision in question, to wit: 1. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant Benjamin Irang had been sufficiently identified beyond reasonable doubt, and in not giving due weight to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense. 2. The lower court erred in not acquitting the defendant Benjamin Irang on the ground of reasonable doubt. The following undisputed facts have been established during the trial, to wit: Between 7 and 8 o'clock of the night of November 9, 1935, seven individuals with white stripes upon their faces, two of whom were armed with guns and two with bolos, went to the house of the spouses Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente, where three lights were burning, one at the balcony, another in the room and another on a table. Some of said individuals went up and others remained on guard downstairs. Those who went up approached Perfecto Melocotones immediately and ordered him to bring his money. Melocotones answered in the affirmative but before he could do what was ordered him he was attacked with bolos until he fell to the floor. Later another armed with a gun went up and approaching Maximiana Vicente, wife of Perfecto Melocotones, struck herein the face with the butt of his gun, making her lose consciousness momentarily. When she regained consciousness he saw her husband already dead. One of the assailants then said to her: "Bring out the money and jewelry." Maximiniana Vicente turned over to the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun P70 in cash and jewelry valued at P200, which she has kept in a trunk. During the short space of time that she was turning over the money and jewelry, she looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was assaulted by malefactors who had been firing shots before arriving at and going up the house. All of them had white stripe upon their faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in amaong-colored suit. It was he who opened her trunk. After the malefactors had left Perfecto Melocotones house, the latter's son Toribio Melocotones, who had seen the assailants arrive but without recognizing them, immediately reported the matter to the municipal authorities and to the constabulary, who went to the scene of the crime without loss of time. Maximiniana Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman Alejandre of the Constabulary that the person who had struck her with the butt of his gun and taken her money and jewelry was a man of regular statute, with a lean body and pockmarked face. With this description, said lieutenant went in search of said individual. Having arrested a group of persons, he brought them to Maximiniana Vicente's house so that the latter might identify among them the one who struck her with the butt of his gun, but she did not find such man. Later

another group was presented to her and in it she identified the herein accused-appellant Benjamin Irang as the one who had struck her with the butt of his gun and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. He was likewise the same man arrested by Lieutenant Alejandre at midnight on November 9, 1935, in the barrio of Tampac which is five or seven kilometers from Maturanoc to which he was taken and brought to the house of the deceased. Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang, through his pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who had gone up to her house that same night. Once under arrest, the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang made an affidavit in Tagalog (Exhibit B), stating that while he was in the barrio of Tampac, municipality of Guimba. Province of Nueva Ecija, on November 9, 1935 at about 7 o'clock in the evening, Fidel Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian arrived; that Fidel Estrella invited him to go to the house of Ignacio Sebastian's brother-in-law named Angel Talens because Estrella had something to tell him; that upon arriving at Angel Talens' house, Fidel Estrella invited him to go to Maturanoc to look for business; that the appellant asked Fidel Estrella why he wanted to bring him in the latter told him to stop asking questions otherwise he would slash him with his bolo; that Fidel Estrella carried a bolo and Ignacio Sebastian an unlicensed firearms; that they went to the house of Perfecto Melocotones in the barrio of Maturanoc, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and upon arriving there Fidel Estrella, who acted as the ringleader, assigned to each and every one of them his corresponding place, designating those who should assault that of Ursula Cabigon; that Benjamin Irang was in the group formed by Fidel Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian, which assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones, having been assigned to stand guard on the stairs of said house; that Fidel Estrella, once inside the house, slashed Perfecto Melocotones thrice with his bolo; that Fidel Estrella later told him that they had succeeded in taking money and the shotgun; and that after the assault they dispersed, each returning to his own home. This affidavit (Exhibit B) was sworn to by Benjamin Irang before the deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija , in the presence of Graciano Pigol, the constabulary soldier who accompanied him. Before Irang affixed his thumbmark and took his oath, the deputy clerk of court asked him if he understood Tagalog and when he answered in the affirmative said deputy clerk read the contends of the document to him. Asked whether he had any thing else to add thereto, the appellant answered that he had nothing more to say. The defense of the accused-appellant is an alibi to the effect that in the afternoon of the day of the commission of the crime, he was in his rice field washing a fishing basket. There he met Roberto Alcantara. Later he went to the house of Buenaventura Javier to return the fishing basket in question and to exercise on the rings (jugar a las arogallas) with the latter's son Pedro, and two unmarried sons of the appellant's uncle, in the presence of several persons, returning home at 8 o'clock that night. When he was arrested the constabulary soldiers opened his box but found nothing in it. They later took him in a jitney to the victims house in the barrio of Maturanoc and upon being brought face to face with the widow Maximiniana Vicente, Lieutenant Alejandre told the widow: "this is the one who slashed your husband and punctured your face." The widow answered saying: "Is it that man, sir." As Benjamin Irang answered that he had not left his house, the lieutenant gave him a blow which made him lose consciousness. Then the lieutenant said to the widow: "He is the same man. It was he to whom you delivered the money and jewelry. Look at him well. Identify him well." In the constabulary barracks in Cabanatuan the soldiers and a sergeant manhandled him from the night of November 9, 1935, until 4 o'clock in the morning of the 11th of said month and year, for having denied all knowledge of the crime, making him lose his breath and punching him in the stomach. When he could no longer bear the maltreatment, he agreed to tell what they wanted him to tell. Upon being taken for investigation, the constabulary soldiers told him to agree to all that the clerk of court might read to him, otherwise they would again manhandle him at the barracks. He was not present when the affidavit Exhibit B was prepared. Neither are the contents thereof true. He merely affixed his thumbmark upon said document for fear of the soldiers. Lieutenant Alejandre as well as Sergeant Lubrico denied that the accused had been maltreated in the least. The only question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang was identified as one of those who assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones, killed him and robbed his wife Maximiniana Vicente of money and jewelry. Maximiniana Vicente, whom the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang struck in the face with the butt of his gun and of whom he demanded delivery of her money and jewelry scrutinized the latter's face and notice that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. When on that same night of the assault Lieutenant Alejandre, guided by the description given him by Maximiniana Vicente, went in search of the person who might have maltreated the latter and robbed her of her money and jewelry and presented a group of persons to said Maximiniana Vicente, she said that the man who had maltreated her was not among those who composed that first group. Said lieutenant later presented another group to her but neither did the widow find in it the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun. In the third group presented to her, she immediately pointed at one who turned out to be the herein accused-appellant. The man pointed at protested but when she told him that it was he who had struck her in the face with the butt of his gun, the appellant became silent. The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about one hundred meters from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a maong-colored suit, who later

turned out to be the herein accused-appellant, opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the man of the same description was the open who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein accused-appellant. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime (16, C. J., 610, 611, sec. 1196). Maximiniana Vicente's identification of the herein accused-appellant is likewise corroborated by the latter's own admission invited to assault the house of Perfecto Melocotones which they in fact the lower court of the appellant's admission under oath upon the assumption that it was not made voluntarily, is erroneous, inasmuch as the only evidence that it was not voluntarily is the accused-appellant's own testimony that he had been manhandled by the constabulary soldiers and threatened with further maltreatment if he did not testify as they wished. This imputation of fortune was categorically denied by Lieutenant Alejandre and Sergeant Lubrico of the Constabulary, before whom the accused-appellant made the admission and who caused it to be put in writing. The imputation is likewise contradicted by the deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija before whom the accused-appellant swore to his admission and who testified that before he administered oath to said accused-appellant, he asked him whether he understood Tagalog and, having been answered in the affirmative, he read said document to him and asked him whether he had anything to add, the appellant affixing his thumbmark upon it after answering that he had nothing more to say (U. S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil., 308). There is no doubt that an admission made under oath under such circumstances cannot be considered involuntary and therefore is admissible against the person making it. This court is of the opinion, therefore, that the accused-appellant identity as one of those who assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones and robbed Maximiniana Vicente of her money and jewelry, is established conclusively beyond reasonable doubt. The defense of the accused is an alibi and has for its purpose to show that he could both have been at the scene of the crime between 7 and 8 o'clock at night because he was in another place about seven kilometers away at that time. This defense of alibi is contradicted by the above-stated testimony of Juana de la Cruz and by the accused-appellant's own admission under oath Exhibit B. The facts established at the trial as committed by the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt constitute the complex crime of robbery with homicide defined in article 293, in connection with article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, and punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial judge is in accordance with the evidence and with law. It is not so, however, with the pecuniary liability because, taking into account the gravity of the offense, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased should be P1,000 and that for the stolen goods not restored P390. Wherefore, with the sole modification that the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang is sentenced further to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to restore to Maximiniana Vicente the sum of P70 and the stolen jewelry and gun, or to reimburse the value thereof in the amount of P390, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of this instance to the appellant. So ordered. G.R. No. 28871 September 19, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLEMENTE BABIERA, JUSTO BABIERA and DOMINGA BORES, defendants-appellants. Zulueta and Cordova and Jesus Trinidad for appellants. Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee. VILLA-REAL, J.: This is an appeal taken by Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding them guilty of the crime of murder, the first as principal, and the last two as accomplices, sentencing the former to life imprisonment with the accessories of article 54 of the Penal Code, and each of the latter to fourteen years, eight months and one day cadena temporal, with the accessories of article 54 and 59 of the Penal Code, respectively, and all three to indemnify the family of the deceased Severino Haro in the sum of P1,000 jointly and

severally, and each of them to pay one-third of the costs of the action in the justice of the peace court and the Court of First Instance. The six alleged errors assigned by the accused as committed by the trial court in its judgment may be shifted down to the following propositions: 1. That the evidence adduced at the trial by the prosecution has not established the guilt of the defendants-appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. The Exhibit I of the prosecution is not an ante-mortem declaration and is therefore inadmissible as evidence. 3. That the offended party's quarrelsome disposition can be proved in the trial to determine who began the attack. Before discussing the evidence adduced by both parties and determining its weight and probatory value, it is well to decide the questions raised by the appellants on the admissibility of evidence. The first question of this nature refers to the character of the document Exhibit I, which is a statement made by Severino Haro in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo on the morning after the crime was committed. Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as an ante-mortem declaration, inasmuch as there is nothing to show that at the time he made it Severino Haro knew or firmly believed that he was at the point of death, nevertheless, having ratified its contents a week later when he was near death as a result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible as a part of that which he made ante-mortem "A statement made under circumstances which would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes admissible as such, it is held, if approved or repeated by the declarant after he had abandoned all hope of recovery." (30 Corpus Juris, 257.) Passing now to a consideration of the evidence, the prosecution tried to proved the following facts: Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands. On October 19, 1922 Justo Babiera executed a contract of sale with the right of repurchase in favor of Basilio Copreros whereby he sold the two parcels of land to the latter for the sum of P124 with the condition that if the vendor did not repurchase them on or before August 1, 1923, the sale would become absolute and irrevocable (Exhibit F). The period for repurchase having expired, Basilio Copreros took possession of said two parcels of land, and on March 24, 1927, made application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of Iloilo for the registration of the consolidation of his title to said parcels. On the 26th of the said month, Basilio Copreros leased said parcels to Severino Haro, municipal president of Oton (Exhibit G and G-1). In view of this, on March 31, 1927, Justo Babiera filed a complaint against Basilio Copreros in the justice of the peace court of Oton for the recovery of the possession of said two parcels of land. The complaint having been dismissed on April 19, 1927 on the ground that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, Justo Babiera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Exhibit M). Later on, said Justo Babiera asked for the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer and filed another one for the recovery of property (Exhibit F). Inasmuch as Severino Haro was already in possession of the aforesaid two parcels of land as lessee, he bore all the expenses in the case of unlawful detainer as well as in that for recovery of the property. Fermin Bruces was Severino Haro's copartner on shares in said lands. About the month of May, 1927, Justo Babiera accompanied by his copartner on shares, Rosendo Paycol, went to where Fermin Bruces was plowing and asked the latter: "Who told you to plow here?" Fermin Bruces replied: "Severino Haro." Then Justo Babiera asked him: "If this Severino tells you to kill yourself, will you do it?" "Of course not," answered Fermin Bruces. After this interchange of words Justo Babiera told Fermin Bruces to stop plowing and to tell his master, Severino Haro, to come and plow himself. Fermin Bruces informed Severino Haro of the incident, and in answer the latter only told him not to mind it, but to go on plowing. On another occasion while Fermin Bruces was transplanting rice on the same lands, Clemente Babiera and Rosendo Paycol arrived and told him that if he continued working they would pull out someone's intestines. Fermin Bruces also informed Severino Haro of these threats, who as before, told him not to mind them, but to go on sowing. On July 23, 1927, Jose Haro, brother of Severino Haro, visited his land in the barrio of Bita, which was under the care of Victoriano Randoquile. He was told by the latter that he lacked palay seeds. At that time, Rosendo Paycol was in his field, Jose Haro and Victoriano Randoquile approached him and asked him to give them some seeds. Rosendo Paycol answered that he could not do so because he needed what he had for his own farms. Haro and Randoquile then asked him: "Which fields do you mean?" "The fields over which Copreros and Babiera are in litigation," answered Rosendo Paycol. Surprised at this answer, Jose Haro told Rosendo Paycol that what he said could not be because the lot in

dispute was leased to his brother Severino Haro. Rosendo Paycol replied that attorney Buenaventura Cordova had told Clemente Babiera and Justo Babiera that Severino Haro would never be able to reap or enjoy the fruits of the land, because if they did not win the suit by fair means they would win it by foul. Ever since he had leased said land Severino Haro visited it rather often, especially during the months of June and July, which is the sowing season, trying always to return to town early. To go to the land, which was in the barrio called Bita, there was but a beaten path that passed by the house of Rosendo Paycol, copartner on shares of Justo Babiera, where the latter and his family lived. On August 21, 1927, Severino Haro, as usual, went to visit his land in the barrio of Bita, accompanied by Gregorio Torrija, Benito Carreon and Pedro Tauro. On arriving there Fermin Bruces, his copartner on shares, told him that the day before he had found Clemente Babiera's cow grazing on that land. It happened at that moment Clemente Babiera and Dominga Bores were passing by. Severino Haro then informed Clemente Babiera of what his cow had done on the former's land and told him to take better care of his cow in future and not to let it run loose. He then ordered Fermin Bruces to take the animal to where the Babiera family lived. Severino Haro was not able to return to town until almost 7 o'clock in the evening. As it was already dark, he and his companions had to make use of a torch made out of split bamboo to light them on their way. Severino Haro went ahead, followed by Pedro Tauro, who carried the torch, some 8 brazas behind, with Gregorio Torrija and Benito Carreon following. On Coming to a place in the road near Rosendo Paycol's house, Clemente Babiera suddenly sprang from the cogon grass, went after Severino Haro and struck him with his bolo in the back. On turning his head to see who had attacked him Severino Haro received another bolo blow in the forehead near the right eyebrow. In trying to defend himself with his hand he was wounded between the index finger and the thumb. He then tried to grasp his assailant but did not succeed and he fell to the ground. Then Justo Babiera appeared and placing himself upon Severino Haro's stomach, held the latter's hands. Later, Dominga Bores appeared on the scene and held both knees of the wounded man. When Justo Babiera arrived, a voice was heard saying: "Hold him, papa," and at the same time, Severino Haro's voice was heard saying: "Help! help!" Pedro Tauro wished to come near in order to help Severino Haro, but Clemente Babiera raised his bolo in the air and kept on brandishing it to warn everybody off. Pedro Tauro, in fear, stepped back, dropping the torch he carried. Not far from there were also Buenaventura Gabalfin and Gregorio Paycol, who threatened to kill Severino Haro's companions if they helped him. After the torch had been extinguished they heard a voice which they recognized as Severino Haro's saying: "Uncle Justo, have patience with me, for I have done no wrong." Then they heard another voice, that of Dominga Bores, which said: "Here is the revolver; let us return." Before the assailants left two or three revolver shots were heard. When Severino Haro's companions saw that their assailants had already departed, they drew near to where Severino lay stretched out to see what had happened to him. Severino Haro told them not to fear for he did not feel as if he were going to die, and calling his copartner on shares, Fermin Bruces, directed him to bring a cot and take him to town. Pedro Tauro and Gregorio Torrija did as Severino Haro wished, and on arriving at the barrio of Santa Monica, they by chance came upon a truck in which were some policemen. They place the wounded man in the same truck and took him to Saint Paul's Hospital in the City of Iloilo. When Severino Haro was taken to the town he did not have his revolver and the cartridge belt, without the holster, was found by Gregorio Torrija near where the incident took place. When Severino Haro was already in Saint Paul's Hospital he was examined by Dr. Mariano Arroy, who issued a certificate stating that he found the following wounds: Three on the right frontal regions; one on the right forehead taking in the soft parts up to the auditory arch; on the right palmar arch; another on the left arm; a deep one reaching down to the spinal column on the four slight wounds on the right thigh; the ones on the forehead and the dorsal region being mortal of necessity. All the wounds were caused, in the doctor's opinion, by a sharp-edged and pointed weapon, and while the combatants were on the same plane, except the wounds on the middle of the calf which must have been caused while the assaulted party was on a lower plane than his assailant, and the wounds on the right thigh, which must have been inflicted while the assailant was on a horizontal plane. On the same morning, August 22, 1927, and in the same hospital, Severino Haro made a sworn statement before the deputy fiscal, Edmundo S. Piccio (Exhibit I), relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons who were present. This sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal on the 27th of the said month and year when he had given up all hope of recovery. In this statement, Exhibit I, Severino Haro, among other things, said the following: "Without warning, I received a slash on the left shoulder. On turning back my face, I saw Clemente Babiera, and he then gave me another slash on the forehead just above the right eyebrow. At that moment I also received a cut on the right hand, because on receiving the blow on the forehead I defended myself with that hand. I then grasped him because I could no longer support myself due to my two wounds. Then I fell. When I fell, Clemente Babiera's father placed himself upon my stomach, while his (Clemente's) wife sat on my feet, while Justo Babiera, Clemente's father, grasped my two hands and said to me, "There, now draw your revolver" addressing me. I shouted to my companion for help, for I felt I

would die and while they approached, Clemente Babiera turned upon them, and said: "Do not approach for you have nothing to do with this. Whoever comes near gets a slash from this bolo." I shammed death and when they left me, and upon seeing that neither Clemente, nor his father, nor his wife remained, my three companions came up to me from their hiding places. One Aunario, copartner on shares of Jose Abada, who lived near there, also came up to me, and later, Fermin." In his ante-mortem declaration made on the 27th of August, 1927 before the same deputy fiscal, Severino Haro, among other things, said the following: "They repeatedly passed their fingers over my upper lip and at the same time see if I still breathed; they felt and opened my eyelids and then inserted a finger in my pupil, because they believed that if I was insensible, I was already dead. They knelt on my stomach and one knelt on my lower limbs, and made a pass with something, which seems to me was bamboo or a bolo, over the anterior surface of my calf, and Dominga then took the revolver from me. I got up because I was afraid Dominga would shoot me and when I attempted to escape Clemente Babiera pursued me and gave me another cut on the left side of the waist, and I think the blow struck the ammunition belt, and if it had not been for the belt it would have severed my waist." The defense tried to prove the following facts: On the afternoon of August 21, 1927 Clemente Babiera went to a place called Caboloan, passing by the house of one Oper, located in the barrio of Bita, Oton, Iloilo. While he was in Oper's house, his father Justo Babiera arrived, and some moments later Severino Haro also arrived, and at once said to him: "Clemente, why do you leave your cow loose?" Clemente denied the imputation and said that his cow was tied. Severino Haro insisted, and added that said animal had damaged his sugar-cane plantation, and therefore, Fermin Bruces, his copartner on shares caught and tied it, by his order, to a mango tree. Clemente Babiera answered that he left the case in his hands and that he could charge him what he would, for the damages occasioned by his cow. As Severino Haro charged him P2 for the damage, Clemente told him that at the moment he had no money, but that on the following day he would get money from the town market and pay him. Severino Haro accepted the promise and left. Clemente Babiera in turn retired to his house, together with Dominga Bores and his father, and upon reaching a coconut palm they met Fermin Bruces, copartner on shares with Severino Haro, who told them that he had already tied up the cow as per his master's order. At about 7 o'clock in the evening while Clemente Babiera was in his house conversing with his father about the land which they had in Caboloan, which was attached by the Government, he suddenly heard a commotion; he went to the porch of the house to see what had happened and saw a number of persons coming one carrying a light and another leading his cow by rope. Clemente Babiera told his father what he saw and went out to meet said persons, and saw Buenaventura Cabalfin leading his cow by the rope and Severino Haro followed by his companions Pedro Tauro, Gregorio Torrija, Benito Carreon, Margarito Mediavilla and Fermin Bruces. Clemente Babiera then asked Severino Haro: "Why are you taking my cow away? Haven't I promised to pay you tomorrow the loss caused by the animal? If you have no confidence in me, then prepare a receipt showing that tomorrow without fail, I will pay you." In reply, Severino Haro only said to Buenaventura Cabalfin: "Get on, proceed." Clemente Babiera took hold of the rope by which the cow was led, and said: "Buenaventura, stop!" Severino Haro then grasped Clemente Babiera by the hand and pulled him to one side. Clemente Babiera disengaged himself from Severino Haro's grasp, but Margarito Mediavilla struck him with a bolo at the base of his little finger. Feeling himself wounded, Clemente Babiera tried to unsheathe his bolo intending to return the blow to Margarito Mediavilla but failed to do so, because he heard someone say: "Shoot him!" Immediately thereafter he saw Severino Haro with revolver unholstered, and without any loss of time he went up to the latter and at that moment shots were heard. Clemente Babiera then began to slash blindly right and left without considering what he was at, catching Severino Haro in the back, as a result of which the latter fell to the ground on his back. Clemente Babiera threw himself upon him, held him down so he could not get up, and asked him: "Where is your revolver?" Severino Haro answered that he did not have it. Then Clemente Babiera raised Severino Haro's hands and felt his back, but did not find the revolver. Justo Babiera, Clemente's father, then appeared, and was told by his son: "Papa, hold him, while I search for his revolver." When Clemente Babiera saw Fermin Bruces he thought that the latter meant to attack him because he had one hand behind, where he carried his bolo, so Severino turned on him, but his wife, Dominga Bores, restrained him telling him not to approach. One Nario also wanted to approach in order to defend Severino Haro but dared not do so in view of Clemente Babiera's threats. After having made fruitless search for Severino Haro's revolver, Clemente Babiera, his father, and his wife went back to their house. After charging Rosendo Paycol with the care of the children, the three went to town and passed the night in Florencio Mayordomo's house. On the following morning Dominga Bores went to attorney Buenaventura Cordova's house and informed him of what had happened. Buenaventura Cordova then went to Florencio Mayordomo's house and told Dominga Bores to return to the place of the incident in order to look for the revolver and deliver it to the Constabulary if she found it. Then he accompanied Clemente Babiera to the office of Captain Gatuslao of the Constabulary at Fort San Pedro, to whom they delivered the holster of the revolver and the three shells they had picked up on the night of the

incident. Dominga Bores having found the revolver in a furrow near the place of the crime took it to Iloilo and delivered it to Captain Gatuslao of the Constabulary between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning. Dr. Jose Gonzales Roxas, Constabulary physician, treated Clemente Babiera's wound and certified that the same was 2 centimeters long and half a centimeter deep and was situated at the base of the little finger of the right hand, taking in the cellular tissue of the skin and the exterior ligament of the wrist. In rebuttal, the prosecution tried to prove that at about half past five in the morning of August 22, 1927, Dominga Bores was seen in the ground floor of the provincial government building of Iloilo, carrying a package under her arm and from there she went to the public market of Iloilo. There is no question that Severino Haro had leased from Basilio Copreros two parcels of land the ownership of which had passed to him due to Justo Babiera's failure to repurchase them within the stipulated period. Nor is there any question that the latter tried to recover them, first, by an accion publiciana (action for unlawful detainer), and then by an action for the recovery of possession. There is likewise no question that Severino Haro paid the expenses of the defendant Basilio Copreros for the reason that he was already in possession of said lands as lessee. There is also no question that Clemente Babiera's cow damaged the plantings of Fermin Bruce, for which reason the letter caught said cow, tied it, and notified his master of the matter when the latter went to visit the lands leased by him. Neither is there any question that there was an agreement between Clemente Babiera and Severino Haro whereby the latter ordered his copartner on shares Fermin Bruces, to take the cow near Clemente Babiera's house and tie it up there. In like manner there is no question that at about 7 o'clock in the evening of August 21, 1927, when Severino Haro and his companions were returning to the town of Oton, and upon their coming near Rosendo Paycol's house, in which were Clemente Babiera, his father Justo Babiera, and his mistress Dominga Bores, said Severino Haro had an encounter with Clemente Babiera in which Severino Haro received several wounds in consequence of which he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo. The only question to determine in the present appeal is whether, as the prosecution contends, Severino Haro was suddenly and treacherously attacked by Clemente Babiera, aided by his father and his mistress Dominga Bores; or, as the defense contends, Severino Haro notwithstanding the agreement between himself and Clemente Babiera by which the latter was to indemnify him for the damages caused by his cow, wanted to take the animal to town; that in trying to prevent it, Clemente Babiera was grasped by the hand by Severino Haro and pulled to one side; that in disengaging himself Clemente Babiera received a bolo cut from Margarito Mediavilla that wounded the little finger of his right hand; and that Severino Haro then unsheathed his revolver and fired several shots, in view of which Clemente Babiera struck right and left with his bolo, thus causing the former's wounds. In order to decide the question thus raised, it is necessary to take into account all the circumstances, previous, coetaneous and subsequently to the incident in question, and to determine who had, or could have had, motives to assault the other. We have seen that Justo Babiera sold two parcels of land to Basilio Copreros with the right of repurchase, and that, having failed to repurchase them within the period stipulated, the title thereto was consolidated, in the purchaser, who leased them to Severino Haro, the latter taking possession of them. Justo Babiera restored to every lawful means to regain possession of said parcels of land, first by an accion publiciana, which failed, and then by an action for the recovery of possession. Severino Haro paid the expenses of Basilio Copreros in order to carry on the suits. Such interested intervention on Severino Haro's part without doubt must have vexed Justo Babiera, for in the month of May 1927, he went with his copartner on shares, Rosendo Paycol, to where Fermin Bruces, Severino Haro's copartner, was plowing, and asked him who had ordered him there, and when Fermin Bruces answered that it was Severino Haro, Justo asked him whether he would commit suicide if told to do so by said Severino Haro, and then told him to tell his master to go and plow himself. Later on, Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera's son, accompanied by his copartner Rosendo Paycol, seeing that Fermin Bruces went on working the land, told him that if he continued plowing, Clemente would pull out someone's intestines. If all these threats are true, as we believe they are, then Justo Babiera and Clemente Babiera must have borne Severino Haro deep resentment, doubtless believing that it was due to him that they could not recover their two parcels of land, and this was sufficient and adequate to move them, upon the failure of lawful means, to resort to violence. It has been contended by the defense that the defendant-appellant, Clemente Babiera, only acted in defense of his life and property, having been obliged to resort to arms on seeing his life endangered, contending that the provocation consisted in that after Severino Haro had agreed to an indemnity of P2 for the damage caused, the latter wanted to take Clemente Babiera's cow to the town, and that the attack consisted in that Margarito Mediavilla gave him a bolo blow on the little finger of the right hand, and that Severino Haro threatened him with his revolver and fired several shots at him.

Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, Severino Haro's alleged attitude, in having tried to take Clemente Babiera's cow after having agreed to accept P2 for the damages, and having ordered that the animal be returned to its owner, is highly illogical, and not a scintilla of evidence has been presented to explain this change of determination, as unexpected as it is unreasonable. With respect to the allegation that Margarito Mediavilla and Severino Haro began the attack, inasmuch as it has not been proved that they were the instigators, it cannot be conceived that they committed said unlawful aggression, for he who has no reason to provoke, has no reason to attack unlawfully. The defense also attempted to prove that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge would not permit it. While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated and specific acts (Underhill Criminal Evidence, par. 325, p.570), such as the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the lower court did not err in not admitting such proof. But even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless, it would not have been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the said accused who treacherously attacked the deceased. Another circumstance which shows the falsity of the theory of the defense is that of having made Buenaventura Cabalfin take part as the person whom Severino Haro employed to lead Clemente Babiera's cow. If Severino Haro's copartner, Fermin Bruces, whom he had told to return said cow to Clemente Babiera was with his master on that night, together with other companions, what need was there of said Severino Haro's employing the services of another person and one not belonging to his group? The plan of the defense necessitated a provocation and to that end they conceived the idea of the breach of the supposed agreement on the return of the animal through the payment of an indemnity of P2, making use as an instrument of one on whom the defense could depend to serve as witness, and there was no one better suited for such a purpose than Buenaventura Cabalfin who according to the witnesses for the prosecution, was at the place of the crime with Gregorio Paycol threatening the deceased's friends if they offered to help him. To rebut the evidence of the prosecution that Dominga Bores was the one who by order of Clemente Babiera took Severino Haro's revolver from him on the night in question, the defense tried to prove that on the following morning attorney Buenaventura Cordova, a relative of the Babieras, told Dominga Bores to return to the place of the incident and look for said weapon, and that she found it in a furrow near the place and took it to the office of the Constabulary in Iloilo between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning. But the rebuttal evidence of the prosecution disproved this contention and showed that Dominga Bores did not have to look for the revolver in the field, since at half past five in the morning she was already in the provincial building of Iloilo carrying a package under her arm. With regard to the small wound at the base of the little finger of the right hand which Clemente Babiera showed to the Constabulary physician as having been caused by Margarito Mediavilla, we are convinced that the latter was not in the company of Severino Haro on the night in question and could not have inflicted such a wound. Bearing in mind the plan of the defense, it may safely be said that in order to cast an appearance of reality on the concocted plea of an unlawful attack and self-defense, Clemente Babiera inflicted on himself the slight wound; since, if in order to escape military service there were men who mutilated themselves, who would not wound himself slightly in order to escape a life penalty? The facts related above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and constitute the crime of murder defined in article 403 of the Penal Code, there being present at the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstance of treachery, consisting in the accused Clemente Babiera having attacked Severino Haro suddenly while the latter had his back turned, inflicting various wounds on his body as a result of which he died a week later, said Clemente Babiera being criminally liable as principal by direct participation. Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores are also liable but as accomplices, because, while they did not take a direct part in the infliction of the wounds that caused Severino Haro's death, or cooperated by acts without which they could not have been inflicted, or induced Clemente Babiera to inflict them, yet they took part in the commission of the crime by simultaneous acts consisting in the former having mounted Severino Haro's body and held down his hands, while the latter sat on his knees while he lay stretched out on the ground in order to allow Clemente Babiera to search the body for his revolver, Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores cannot be held as accomplices of the crime of murder, inasmuch as it does not appear to have been proven that they knew the manner in which Clemente Babiera was going to assault Severino Haro, in accordance with the provision of article 79 of the Penal Code, to the effect that the circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the act or their cooperation therein. Although in the instant

case the treachery is not considered a generic aggravating, but a qualifying circumstance, nevertheless, it does not fail to produce a special aggravation. To graduate the penalty, we are not to consider any modifying circumstance of the criminal liability, for while it is true that Clemente Babiera took advantage of the darkness of nighttime, this circumstance is included in treachery, inasmuch as, considering the fact that Severino Haro was followed by several companions, the accused would not have been able to conceal himself in the cogon grass nor attack the deceased from behind without being seen in time and prevented from executing his criminal purpose had not been for the darkness of the night. The penalty provided by law for the crime of murder namely, that of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to death must therefore be imposed upon Clemente Babiera in its medium degree, that is, life imprisonment. The penalty provided for in article 404 of the Penal Code for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal in its full extent, and the one next lower is prision mayor in its full extent, which is the penalty that must be imposed on Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores as accomplices in the crime of homicide (art. 67, Penal Code). In graduating the penalty, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity must be taken into consideration, without any extenuating circumstances to offset it, and therefore said penalty of prision mayor must be imposed in its maximum degree, that is, ten years and 1 day. As there are three persons civilly liable, one as principal in the crime of murder and two as accomplices in that of homicide, we must fix the share, for which each must answer, of the P1,000 fixed by the trial court, in accordance with the provision of article 124 of the Penal Code, that is, P600 for Clemente Babiera and P400 for Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores, each of the latter being liable solidarily between themselves for their share, and subsidiarily liable for the share of the former and the former for the share of the latter, according to the provision of article 125 of the same Code. By virtue whereof, the appealed judgment is hereby modified, and it is held that Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores are guilty of the crime of homicide as accomplices and each sentenced to ten years and 1 day prision mayor, and to pay the sum of P400 jointly and severally, and Clemente Babiera to pay the sum of P600, the former to be subsidiarily liable for the latter's share, and the latter for the former's share, payment to be made to the heirs of the deceased Severino Haro, the appealed judgment being affirmed in all other respects with the proportional costs against each. So ordered. G.R. No. L-8332 November 13, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and CATALINO MERCADO, defendants-appellants. Eugenio Paguia, for appellants Officee of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.: These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan. On the 13th of March, 1912, one Claro Mercado presented a complaint against the defendants in the court of the justice of the peace of Baliuag. The justice of the peace conducted a preliminary examination and found that there was probable cause for believing that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and held them for trial in the Court of First Instance. On the 21st of March, 1912, the prosecuting attorney of said province presented the complaint, which alleged: That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority therefore, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in a violation of law. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, found the defendants guilty of the crime in the complaint, without any aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for a period of two months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, allowing to the

defendants one-half of the time they had already suffered in prison, and each to pay one-third part of the costs. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error: I. The trial court erred in overruling the objection of the accused to the private prosecutor's question referring to the character of the witness. II. The trial court erred in reaching the conclusion that the crime prosecuted was committed and that the accused are responsible therefor. III. The trial court erred in sentencing the accused. IV. The trial court erred in not having the accused testify in their own behalf, as they offered to do, allowing them to testify in the same way as he did the sole witness for the defense. With reference to the first assignment of error, we find by referring to page 75 of the record, that Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the defense, the said Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the complaint presented in said cause, the following question: How many times have you been convicted of assault upon other persons? To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his question by saying: I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious disposition. I have had occasion to defend him in various causes for assault. Upon the question and the objection Judge Barretto ruled that "the character of the witness has an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present cause. The objection is overruled." To that ruling of the court the defendant duly accepted. Said exception is assigned here as the first assignment of error. The only argument which the appellant presents in support of his assignment of error is that the question had no relation to the question which was being discussed by the court and id not tend to show that the defendants were either guilty or not guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose the character of a witness are immaterial. In reply to the argument of the appellant, the Attorney-General contends that the question was a proper question, because it tended to impugn the credibility of the witness and that such questions were for that purpose material and pertinent. It will be remembered that the complaint charged that on the occasion when the alleged crime was committed Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and illtreat one Maria R. Mateo. In answer to said question, the witness admitted that complaint had been presented against him for the offense of assault and battery. The prosecution, in order to show the circumstances under which the crime charged here was actually committed, showed that this witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria R. Mateo, under the circumstances described in the complaint. That was an important fact. If the said assault did not actually take place, then the theory of the prosecution must fail. If there was no assault or attempted assault, there was no occasion for the alleged interference on the part of the said Claro Mercado to prevent it, and the probability of the guilt of the defendants is greatly lessened. If the witness who had committed the alleged assault, had assaulted other persons and had been prosecuted therefor, may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the proof and in testing the credibility of the witness? It was an important fact to prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time and place mentioned in the complaint, had assaulted or attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, in order to show that there was occasion for the inference of Claro Mercado.lawph!1.net Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained.

The question now arises, did the admission of the question prejudice the rights of the defendants? If there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding the particular proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the crime. then the question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants. The second and third assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the proof adduced during the trial of the cause to show that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged. A question of fact only is raised by these assignments of error. After a careful examination of the proof, we are convinced that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants are each guilty in the manner and form charged in the complaint. We find no reason for modifying the conclusions of fact reached by the lower court. With reference to the fourth assignment of error, an examination of the record shows that but one witness was examined for the defense: that was the said Santiago Mercado. At the close of the examination of said witness, we find the following statement by the accused: The accused state that should they testify they would testify in the same way as the witness Santiago R. Mercado, with whose testimony they close their evidence. Both parties close their evidence. Even admitting that the accused, had they testified, would have made the same declarations as those by the only witness, Santiago Mercado, we are of the opinion that such declarations would not have been sufficient, inasmuch as they would have added nothing to the record, except an accumulation of proof, to have shown that the defendants were not guilty of the crime charged. We find no reason in the fourth assignments of error for modifying the conclusions of the lower court. After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and that the sentence of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered. G.R. No. 159950 February 12, 2007

JOEL P. GONZALES, JR., Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: For review on certiorari is the Decision dated March 11, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22157, affirming the guilty verdict against petitioner for arson by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97. Petitioner Joel P. Gonzales, Jr. was charged in an Information dated July 24, 1997, which read as follows: That on or about the 26th day of June, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire to an inhabited place, to wit: a two-storey residential building which [was] partitioned into dwellings rented out to tenants, owned and occupied likewise by CARLOS C. CANLAS, located at No. 120 corner Halcon and Simon Streets, Brgy. San Isidro Labrador, La Loma, Quezon City, thereby setting said residential building into flames and razing it including other properties; and that the properties that were burned with their corresponding owners and value were as follows: 1. The residential building and other property owned by Carlos C. Canlas valued at . . . .P3,000,000.00 2. Property of Nicasio M. de Jesus valued at . . . 800,000.00
2 3 1

3. Property of Andres V. Villaflor valued at . . . 350,000.00 4. Property of Gloria V. Lacasandile valued at. . . 350,000.00 5. Property of Carmen B. Principio valued at . . . 300,000.00 6. Property of Dante L. Buri valued at . . . . . . 185,000.00 7. Property of Francis F. Simpao valued at . . . . 170,000.00 8. Property of Luisito C. Abonita valued at . . . . 150,000.00 9. Property of Miraflor Saldi Manuel valued at . . 100,000.00 10. Property of Estrella C. Villaflor valued at . . 60,000.00 with the total of FIVE MILLION, FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND (P5,465,000.00), all belonging to the aforesaid persons, to the damage and prejudice of said owners in the aforesaid amount of P5,465,000.00, Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW. On arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented eyewitness Carlos C. Canlas, owner of the two-storey building in the corner of Halcon Street and Simon Street, Brgy. San Isidro Labrador, La Loma, Quezon City. He testified that at about 9:30 p.m. on June 26, 1997, he was watching television in his room when his daughter called his attention to check the commotion in an adjacent room. On his way to the room rented by Gonzales, he smelled gas. He saw Gonzales ignite a flame and throw it on a pile of clothes in the middle of the living room where Gonzales had also placed an M-Gas liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tank. Fire quickly spread to the other parts of the building. The prosecution also presented two tenants, Andres V. Villaflor and Francis F. Simpao, as witnesses. Villaflor testified that he heard Gonzales and his aunt quarreling before the fire. He said he heard Gonzales yell "Susunugin ko itong bahay na ito!" Alarmed, he went to the Barangay Hall to report the incident but immediately went back to his place when someone informed him his house was on fire. Simpao testified that he saw the fire coming from Gonzaless room. He added that Gonzales was laughing while the building was burning. After the fire was extinguished, the aunt of Gonzales told Simpao that her nephew was to blame. The testimonies were corroborated by Police Officer Alejandro Mendoza, who testified that when he and his fellow officer arrived at the crime scene, Gonzales admitted responsibility for the fire. Gonzales presented a different story. He averred that the fire was caused by faulty electrical wiring. He testified that he was napping inside his room when he was awakened by heat beside his bed. The room was on fire. He shouted for help and Canlas tried to help him but they failed to extinguish it. Gonzales denied he and his aunt were quarreling that evening before the fire started. As his aunt was partly deaf, he said he had to speak in a loud voice. He averred that he merely asked his aunt to buy food because they ran out of M-Gas LPG. Gonzales said that when he met PO1 Mendoza, he explained that he noticed the fire had started in his room. He sought police protection from his neighbors who accused him of starting it. The defense presented as exhibit the Physical Science Report prepared by Police Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio showing that the ashes obtained from the burnt premises were negative of any flammable substance. On May 28, 1998, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 97 rendered a decision convicting Joel P. Gonzales, Jr. of arson, as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
4

seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, with full credit for the entire period of preventive imprisonment provided he is qualified therefore (sic) according to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Civil liability not having been proved, the Court cannot grant the same and can only award nominal damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each to the private complainants who testified, namely, Carlos Canlas, Andres Villaflor and Francis Simpao. SO ORDERED.
5

Gonzales appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. In its Decision dated March 11, 2003, the Court of Appeals held that the denial of Gonzales cannot prevail over the positive identification of a witness. The Court of Appeals also held that the prosecution established circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals noted that although there were discrepancies in the testimony of Canlas and his affidavits, the discrepancies did not necessarily discredit him because affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the alleged discrepancies pertain to minor matters which negated any suspicion that the testimony was perjured and rehearsed. Gonzales moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, petitioner now raises the following issues for this Courts consideration: I WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED CORRECTLY IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PERTINENT RULE AND JURISPRUDENCE WHERE THERE ARE MATERIAL DISCREPANCIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES STATEMENTS MADE IN THEIR AFFIDAVITS AND THOSE TESTIMONIES GIVEN ON THE WITNESS STAND; II WHETHER UPON THE AFORESTATED GIVEN SET OF FACTS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED CORRECTLY IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FINDING 6 PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CHARGE OF ARSON. Stated simply, in our view, the main issue is whether the discrepancies in the affidavit and the court testimonies of a witness are sufficient to exculpate Gonzales of the crime of arson. Petitioner argues that the trial court and the appellate court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Canlas. He claims that the sworn statements of Canlas before the investigating officer of the fire department on June 27, 1997 and before the city prosecutor of Quezon City on July 17, 1997, were inconsistent. Further, petitioner adds that Canlas had testified that he saw petitioner start the fire, but Canlass testimony on this point was made only for the first time in court. Petitioner points out that in the two prior sworn statements of Canlas, he made no mention of seeing petitioner start the fire. This discrepancy is a material point that ought to cast doubt on the credibility of Canlas. He 7 cites People v. Salik Magonawal, where the material discrepancies between the court testimony and prior statements of a witness at a preliminary investigation made the testimony incredible. Petitioner seeks to discredit the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses for being self-serving and ill-motivated. He avers that both the trial court and the appellate court failed to consider the Physical Science Report which stated that no flammable substance was found in the specimen ashes. Finally, petitioner claims that although he had in the past threatened to burn the house, he never really meant it. In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals should stand because their findings are well supported by the records. The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses and their sworn statements were not substantial to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the trial court. The OSG asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court clarified, corroborated and complemented his affidavit. Likewise, the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses corroborated Canlass testimony.

The OSG rebuts petitioners dependence on the case of People v. Acosta, where the court held that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time, but, it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, habit, custom or usage. After thoroughly considering the submissions including testimonies and exhibits presented by the parties, we hold that the instant petition lacks merit. The arson committed in the instant case involving an inhabited house or dwelling is covered by Section 3(2) of 9 Presidential Decree No. 1613. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to 10 prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. When these are present, the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being 11 almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances 12 necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject. In this case, the eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit who caused the fire. Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. As a general rule, when the findings of both courts are in agreement, this Court will not reverse their findings of fact. Furthermore, in our view, the findings of the Physical Science Report is a negative evidence and taken together with the bare denial of petitioner, supported only with testimonies of relatives, constitute inferior evidence as against the circumstantial evidence coupled with the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense by a credible witness. On the damages, we have consistently held that proof is required to determine the reasonable amount of damages that may be awarded to the victims of conflagration. As a rule, therefore, actual or compensatory damages must be proved 13 and not merely alleged. The records do not show concrete proof of the amount of actual damages suffered by each complaining witness. Thus, we cannot grant actual damages. However, we may award nominal and temperate damages. The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the trial court according to the circumstances of the case. Generally, nominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party. However, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such a case, the law presumes damage although actual or compensatory damages are not proven. In truth, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of 14 wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. Now, temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its 15 amount cannot from the nature of the case be proved with certainty. Under the circumstances, we find it reasonable to award Canlas with P500,000 temperate damages, and to the other complaining witnesses, Simpao and Villaflor, the amount of P100,000 as temperate damages each. In addition, exemplary or corrective damages should be awarded as a way to emphasize that any future conduct of this nature is condemned so as to correct the anti-social behavior that is 16 deleterious in its consequences. Thus, Canlas and the other complaining witnesses, Simpao and Villaflor, should be awarded P50,000 each as exemplary damages. Concerning the penalty to be imposed, Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal toreclusion perpetua. But there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum prison term should be within the range of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor and the maximum, twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court on the accused ought to be modified correspondingly.1awphi1.net WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 11, 2003 of the Court of Appeals sustaining the conviction by the RTC finding the accused-petitioner guilty of the crime of arson of an inhabited dwelling is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS. He is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with full credit for the entire period of preventive imprisonment provided he is qualified therefor according to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to his civil liability, he is ordered to pay temperate damages in the amount of P500,000 to Carlos C. Canlas, the owner of the burnt premises, and P100,000 each to Francis F. Simpao and Andres V. Villaflor, together with exemplary damages of P50,000 to each of them. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Rodolfo P. Liwanag for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:p In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged before the Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of robbery with homicide committed as follows: That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner and, by means of violence and intimidation, take, carry and cart away two (2) rings, one (1) necklace, one (1) piece of earring, belonging to Arnedo Valencia y Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac, to their damage and prejudice in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P550.00); and that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take the said properties, the accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with treachery, evident premeditation and great advantage of superior strength, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac by stabbing and hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her body with pointed instrument causing injuries which directly caused the death of the said Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac. That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances were present (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) committed in the dwelling of the offended party; (3) disregard of age and sex; (4) abuse of confidence. Contrary to law. 1 At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986 convicting De Joya of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed with the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, old age, disregard of sex the victim a woman 88 years old, the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim. The accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed against him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay damages in the amount of P550.00. The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to be confined immediately in the National Penitentiary pending review of his case by the Supreme Court.

The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the record of this case to the Supreme Court for review. SO ORDERED. 2 In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of which, however, amount to one basic assertion: that the lower court erred in concluding that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The facts have been summarized in the brief of the Solicitor General in the following manner: The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, June 11, 1981, p. 2). Both spouses are teachers by profession. Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia Valencia teaches in an intermediate school at Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 7). In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. (TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 3). Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he proceeded home. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 8). At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the direction of the Valencia's house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's. (TSN, June 11, 1981, pp. 2-4). When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?". (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 10). . . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 14 and 17). Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because she was drenched with her own blood. His Nana Edeng told him to immediately see his mother Herminia Salac-Valencia to inform her of what happened. (TSN, Id). Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own blood." (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 20). Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went home. Alvin followed, riding his bicycle (TSN, Id., p. 21). When she reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood at their sala in front of the television. Her mother's hands were stretched open and her feet were wide apart. Blood was oozing out of her mother's ears. She then embraced her mother and placed her on the sofa. She asked Alvin and the tricycle driver to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 25-26). Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead immediately left. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 27-29). Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of these were valued [at] P300.00 (TSN, Id., p. 15).

That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador) were taken out. Its secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed. (TSN, October 12, 1978, pp. 15-17). When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor, she found the two (2) rooms thereat in disarray. She then caused the rooms and things photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto (Exhibits "A" to "A-11"; TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 17). Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor to issue a death certificate so that her mother could be embalmed. (TSN, Id., pp. 33-34). On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side of the cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim was lying prostrate. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 24-25). Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when she saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter. (TSN, Ibid.). Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the four-day wake, Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house. (TSN, Id.). On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Romulo Madrid, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. Per examination, the cause of the death arrived by Dr. Madrid was "shock, secondary to punctured wound neck" (Exhibit "D-1") situated at the right side of the neck, just below the right ear wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost in the same location, from one side of the neck to the opposite side. (Exhibit "D-2"). In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led to the judgment of conviction against appellant. These factors, as set out in the decision of the trial court, were the following: In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim as testified to by the witnesses and proven during the trial, also the dying statement of the deceased, which are: Herminia testified that two weeks before the incident the accused and the deceased quarreled over a bicycle which the former took from their house without the consent of the latter; that Exhibit "B" (step-in beach walk type) which was found near the cabinet one meter away from the body of the victim was identified by Herminia as the step-in that she gave to the wife of the accused and which she saw accused wearing on January 29, 1978 when she visited them in their house; the testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of January 31, 1978 at around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of Herminia standing and holding a bicycle; the accused admitted, although his wife is the sister of the husband of Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four days that it was lying in state without any justifiable reason and contrary to the ordinary experience of man; last but most convincing is the dying statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin asked her "Apo, Apo, what happened?" and she answered, "Si Paki", then she expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is this Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his testimony never denied that he is called Paki. The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus the dying statement of the deceased leads only to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that the accused is the author of the crime. Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into account by the court in convicting appellant De Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as follows: 1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia a 10-year old boy: "Si Paqui"; 2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took place two weeks before the robbery and homicide, between the appellant and the deceased over the use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the Valencia's house without the consent of the victim;

3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according to Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from the body of the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she had given to the wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season; 4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing; 5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the four-day wake. We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the 10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his grandmother who was sprawled on the floor of their house drenched with blood: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended to designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a verb, we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, whathappened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?" It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. 3 The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work: The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. 4 (Emphasis supplied) The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received. 5 It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed. The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks before Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a violent and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no identification was shown at all, certainly weakens the case of the prosecution. The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in the living room where Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or beach, walk slippers are made in such quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of the same color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife. And even

if conclusive identification of the slippers had been offered, and it is assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those very slippers on that fatal afternoon, still the presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and directly connect the appellant to the robbery or the slaying. At most, under that assumption, the presence of that slipper in the house of the Valencias showed that the accused had gone to the house of the Valencias and there mislaid that slipper. We note in this connection, that appellant himself had testified that he did enter the house of the Valencias that afternoon, but after the killing of Eulalia Diamse had been perpetrated, and there had found many persons in the house viewing the body. The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The behaviour of the appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers no basis for supposing that appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just slain an 88-year old woman by skewering her through the neck and had ransacked both floors of the Valencia house. Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias' house in the afternoon Eulalia Diamse was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable to agree with the trial judge that such behaviour was "contrary to the ordinary experience of man" although respect for the dead is a common cultural trait of the Filipinos. In the Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence against appellant included: "the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his counsel to settle the case amicably." 6 We have examined the testimony that the Solicitor General pointed to in referring to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal charge amicably. That testimony, given by Arnedo Valencia, son-in-law of the deceased Eulalia Diamse and brother-in-law of appellant Pioquinto de Joya, was as follows: Q You also testified that before the release of the accused from the municipal jail, you had a conversation with him, is that right? A Yes, air. Q What was this conversation about? A He called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar and according to him if only Atty. Aguilar can talk with me, everything will be settled. Q Have you seen and talked to this Atty. Aguilar? A Yes, I went with him to Manila, sir. Q When was this? A The time he was fetched out of jail. Q You are referring to the municipal jail? A Yes, sir. Q What did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally was able to see Atty. Aguilar? A When I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar and Atty. Aguilar asked me as to what I liked to happen. Q What did you say? A I said if it will be settled, well and good.

Q Anything else that transpired? A He even told me if I might be able to convince both my wife and her sisters. Q Did he tell you he can settle this? A He was very certain that he can settle this, the very reason why he told me because I was very certain as to what happened. Q Was the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you were discussing this with his lawyer? A Yes, sir Q He heard what his, lawyer was telling you? A It is possible because he is only one or two meters distance away. Q Did the accused say anything? A None, sir. (Emphasis supplied) We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so far as a supposed attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the criminal charge is concerned. We are aware of the provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that Sec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person making the offer. However, in criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied) We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a member of the (extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did not believe that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide. The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence supporting the judgment of conviction. The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's guilt of the crime of robbery and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable doubt. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. It is so ordered. G.R. No. 173608 November 20, 2008

JESUS GERALDO and AMADO ARIATE, petitioners vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were, by Information dated December 23, 2002 filed on December 27, 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao del Sur, charged with Homicide allegedly committed as follows: x x x [O]n the 1 day of July, 2002 at about 3:00 o'clock early morning, more or less, at Sitio Tinago, Barangay Bunga, municipality of Lanuza, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, armed with xxx handguns and with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sho[o]t one ARTHUR 1 U. RONQUILLO, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter wounds described hereunder: POINT OF ENTRY: 1. Right lumbar area 2. Right iliac area POINT OF EXIT 1. Left lateral area of abdomen 2. Right hypogastric area which wounds have caused the instantaneous death of said ARTHUR U. RONQUILLO, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the following amount: P50,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 40,000.00 CONTRARY TO LAW.
2 st

as life indemnity of the victim; as moral damages; as exemplary damages; and as actual damages.

At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other persons, on being informed of the shooting of Arthur Ronquillo (the victim), repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and found him lying on his side and wounded. Although gasping for breath, he was able to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing distance of Arnel, that 3 he was shot by Badjing and Amado. Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" and "Amado" responsible for the shooting of the victim were subjected to paraffin tests at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Butuan City. In the PNP Chemistry Report No. 4 C-002-2002-SDS, the following data are reflected: xxxx TIME AND DATE RECEIVED REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT : : 1105H 03 July 2002 Chief of Police Lanuza Police Station

Lanuza, Surigao del Sur SPECIMEN SUBMITTED :

Paraffin casts taken from the left and the right hands of the following named living persons: A B /x/x/x/ /x/x/x/ PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION To determine the presence of gunpowder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/ FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on specimens A and B gave NEGATIVE results for powder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/ CONCLUSION: Specimens A and B do not reveal the presence of gunpowder residue, Nitrates. /x/x/x/ REMARKS: The original copy of this report is retained in this laboratory for future reference. TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 1700H 03 July 2002 x x x x (Underscoring supplied) In a document dated July 1, 2002 and denominated as "Affidavit" which was subscribed and sworn to before Clerk of Court II Manuel A. Balasa, Sr. on July 26, 2002, the victim's son Arnel gave a statement in a question and answer style that herein petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his father. In another document dated July 4, 2002 also denominated as "Affidavit" which was subscribed and sworn to also before the same Clerk of Court II Balasa on July 26, 2002, Mirasol also gave a statement in a question and answer style that her father uttered that herein petitioners shot him. At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that "Badjing" and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially 7 corroborated Mirasol's statement. Upon the other hand, petitioners gave their side of the case as follows: Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod of Bunga, declared that Barangay Kagawad Omboy Roz (Roz) woke him up at 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002 and informed him that the victim was shot. He and Roz thus borrowed a tricycle, proceeded to the crime scene and, along with others, brought the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Ariate 8 submitted himself to a paraffin test and tested negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates. Petitioner Geraldo declared that he slept in his house located also in Barangay Bunga, Lanuza at 9:30 p.m. of June 30, 2002 and woke up at 4:00 a.m. the following day. At 6:30 a.m., on seeing many people in the vicinity of the 45-meter away house of one Josita Bongabong where the victim's body was found, he inquired and learned that the victim was shot.
6 5

= =

Jesus Geraldo Jr. alias Bajing Amado Ariate

Policemen subsequently went to his house and advised him to take a paraffin test. He obliged and was tested at the PNP 9 Crime Laboratory and was found negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates. In the course of the testimony of Ariate, his counsel presented the PNP Chemistry Report reflecting the negative results of the paraffin test on him and Geraldo. The trial court restrained the presentation of the document, however, as reflected in the following transcript of stenographic notes taken on March 21, 2003: xxxx Q I am showing to you [Ariate] a copy of the result of the paraffin test attached to the record of this case. COURT Is it covered in the Pre-trial Order? You cannot do that. That is why I told you; lay your cards on the table. ATTY. AUZA May I ask for the court's reconsideration. COURT Denied. I am warning you, all of you. ATTY. AUZA With the denial of our motion for reconsideration, I move to tender exclusive evidence. He would have identified this result. The paraffin test, which [forms] part of the affidavit of this witness attached to the record of this case on page 29. May I ask that this will be marked as Exhibit "3" for the defense. COURT Mark it. (Marked).
10

(Underscoring supplied)

As shown from the above-quoted transcript of the proceedings, the trial court restrained the presentation of the result of 11 the paraffin tests because the same was not covered in the Pre-trial Order. In the Pre-trial Order, the trial court noted the parties' agreement "that witnesses not listed in this Pre-trial Order shall not be allowed to testify as additional witnesses." Significantly, there was no agreement to disallow the presentation of documents which were not reflected in the Pre-trial 12 Orders. At all events, oddly, the trial court allowed the marking of the PNP Chemistry Report as Exhibit "3." When petitioner Geraldo's turn to present the same PNP Chemistry Report came, the trial court ruled: COURT That is the problem in the Pre-Trial Brief if the exhibits are not stated. I will set aside that Order and in the interest of justice I will allow the accused to submit, next time I will not any more consider exhibits not 13 listed in the Pre-trial Order. (Underscoring supplied) The version of the defense was in part corroborated by witnesses. The trial court, passing on the demeanor of prosecution witness-the victim's eight-year old daughter Mirasol, observed: . . . She talks straightforward, coherent and clear, very intelligent, with child mannerism[s]. While testifying she was criss-crossing her hands, touching anything within her reach, innocent and simple, pressing of[f] and on her stomach but she talks with correct grammar. No doubt, this Court was convinced of her testimony which was 14 corroborated by her brother Arnel Ronquillo. On the nature and weight of the dying declaration of the victim, the trial court observed:

A dying declaration may be xxx oral or in writing. As a general rule, a dying declaration to be admissible must be made by the declarant while he is conscious of his impending death. However, even if a declarant did not make a statement that he was on the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the wound and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition; People vs. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353. Even assuming that the declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly after the startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, hence, under the 15 circumstances, the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive. (Underscoring supplied) Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted petitioners, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding the accused JESUS GERALDO y CUBERO and AMADO ARIATE y DIONALDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and with the presence of one (1) aggravating circumstance of night time and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of which could be properly imposed under the rules of said code and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribe[d] by the code for the offense, hereby sentences each to suffer the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporalmaximum as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law. To pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as life indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The claim for actual damages is denied, there being no evidence to support the same. The bail bond put up by the accused Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate are ordered cancelled and to pay the cost. SO ORDERED.
16

(Underscoring supplied)
17

The Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 30, 2006, affirmed with modification the trial court's decision. It found that the trial court erred in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. And it reduced the award of moral 18 damages to P50,000, and deleted the award of exemplary damages. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED save for the modification of the penalty imposed. Accordingly, accused-appellants are each hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years, Five (5) Months and One (1) Day of prision mayor medium as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, with all accessory penalties provided by law, and to jointly and solidarily pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED.
19

(Italics in the original)

20

Hence, the present Petition

raising the following issues: I

WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AS THE ALLEGED ASSAILANT HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED AS PER EVIDENCE ON RECORD? II WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY 21 PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT? (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioners argue: With due respect, herein petitioners disagree with the holding of the Honorable Court of Appeals that "It is not necessary that the victim further identify that "Badjing" was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that "Amado" was Amado Ariate" because, [so petitioners contend], it is the obligation of the prosecution to establish with moral certainty that indeed the persons they identified as the as the assailant of Arthur O. Ronquillo were really the ones who perpetrated the crime.

Admittedly, prosecution witnesses were able to identify positively herein petitioners as the alleged assailant[s] of Arthur O. Ronquillo. But said identification is based on the assumption that they were the very same "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND AMADO" referred to by their deceased father in his dying declaration. What the Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider is that, just because the victim declared that it was "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND AMADO" who shot him does not necessarily follow that herein petitioners were really the perpetrators in the absence of proof that the "BADJING" referred to by him is Jesus Geraldo and that the "AMADO" is Amado Ariate. It would have been a different story had the prosecution witnesses [been] eyewitnesses because proof that the "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND AMADO" referred to by the victim and the persons identified by the prosecution witnesses are the same is unnecessary. Herein petitioners believe, that even assuming that there are no other "BADJING" or "AMADO" in the barangay, still it does not follow that the person[s] referred to by the dying declarant as his assailant were Jesus Geraldo alias "BADJING" and Amado Ariate alias "AMADO". Although, it is inconceivable how the Honorable Court of Appeals arrived at the said conclusion that there are no other "BADJING AMADO" and/or "BADJING AND 22 AMADO" in the barangay absent any proof to that effect from the prosecution. (Underscoring in the original) The petition is impressed with merit. The trial court relied on the dying declaration of the victim as recounted by his daughter Mirasol and corroborated by his son Arnel. A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she 23 survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death. There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his children related to the identities of his assailants. As for the victim's consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary to prove that he stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices that, judging from the nature and extent of his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that it may 24 safely be inferred that such ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death. The location of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his eventual death before arriving at the hospital 25 meet this requirement. It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been competent to testify had he survived the attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity to see his assailant. Among other things, there is no indication whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem examination report having merely stated that the points of entry of the wounds were 26 at the "right lumbar area" and the "right iliac area." "Lumbar" may refer to "the loins" or "the group of vertebrae lying 27 between the thoracic vertebrae and the sacrum," or to "the region of the abdomen lying on either side of the umbilical 28 region and above the corresponding iguinal." "Iliac" relates to the "ilium," which is "one of the three bones composing either lateral half of the pelvis being in man broad and expanded above and narrower below where it joins with the 29 ischium and pubis to form part of the actabulum." At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify the assailant with certainty; 30 otherwise it loses its significance. In convicting petitioners, the trial court, as stated earlier, relied on the testimony of the victim's daughter Mirasol, which was corroborated by her brother Arnel, that the "Badjing" and "Amado" mentioned by the victim as his assailants are 31 herein petitioners whom they claimed to know because they live in the same barangay. The Court of Appeals believed too the siblings' testimonies, holding that It is not necessary that the victim further identify that "Badjing" was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that "Amado" was Amado Ariate. There was never an issue as to the identity of the accused. There was no other person known as "Badjing" or "Amado" in their neighborhood or in their barangay.Accused-appellants never presented any proof that a person in their locality had the same aliases or names as they. It is not uncommon that even an eight-year-old child can identify that Jesus Geraldo was known as "Badjing" and that Amado Ariate was 32 "Amado." (Underscoring supplied)

Contrary, however, to the immediately-quoted ruling of the appellate court, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had the burden of proving that petitioners were, at the material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such nicknames or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to discharge. When there is doubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction. The Court notes that in their affidavits supporting the criminal complaint, the victim's wife and children Mirasol and Arnel proffered not knowing 34 any possible motive for petitioners to shoot the victim. At the trial, no evidence of any motive was presented by the prosecution. Petitioners' defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance. Specifically with respect to petitioner Ariate, the victim's wife admitted that Ariate accompanied her family in bringing the 35 victim to the hospital. While non-flight does not necessarily indicate innocence, under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, Ariate's spontaneous gesture of immediately extending assistance to the victim after he was advised by 36 the Barangay Kagawad of the victim's fate raises reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the crime charged. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2006 affirming with modification the Decision of Branch 41 of the Surigao del Sur Regional Trial Court isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate are ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City who is directed to cause the immediate release of petitioners unless they are being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from notice hereof. SO ORDERED. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEMARIE CERILLA
33

DECISION Tinga, J.: For automatic review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00032 3 which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 23 dated 15 August 2000 in Criminal Case No. 496502 finding appellant Joemarie Cerilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On 6 July 1998, an Information was filed against appellant charging him of the crime of murder committed as follows: That on or about April 24, 1998, in the Municipality of Leganes, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Alexander Parreo with the firearm which the accused was then provided, hitting and inflicting pellet wound at the right back portion of his body which caused his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.
4 1 2

The prosecutions evidence shows that at around 6:00 pm on 24 April 1998, the victim, Alexander Parreo (Alexander), his 14-year old daughter, Michelle, and neighbor, Phoebe Sendin (Sendin), went to the house of appellant. They were 5 cordially welcomed and entertained by appellant and his wife. An hour later, a blackout occurred. At this time, Alexander 6 sought permission from the couple to leave, which the latter acknowledged. On their way home, Michelle was walking ahead of Alexander with the latter closely following his daughter. Suddenly, after walking for about 100 meters from appellants house, Michelle heard an explosion. Michelle immediately turned her back and saw appellant pointing a 7 gun at Alexander who, at that moment, was staggering towards her. Sendin, who was also with Alexander and Michelle, 8 did not look back but instead ran away and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Parreo. Meanwhile, Michelle was cuddling 9 Alexander beside the road when the latter repeatedly told her that it was appellant who shot him. Twenty minutes later, Alexanders other daughter, Novie Mae, arrived; she was also told by Alexander at that moment that it was appellant who 10 shot him.

SPO3 Frederick Dequito (SPO3 Dequito) and other police officers rushed to the crime scene and helped carry Alexander to an ambulance. SPO3 Dequito was able to ask Alexander who shot him to which he answered "Pato." "Pato" is an alias 11 by which appellant is known. Alexanders wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was also told by Alexander that it was appellant who shot 12 13 him. Alexander died the following day. Dr. Tito D. Doromal, Philippine National Police medico-legal officer, performed an autopsy on the body of Alexander. The 14 autopsy report stated the cause of death to be hemorrhage secondary to pellet wounds. Testifying on his report, Dr. Doromal explained that Alexander died from a gunshot wound which penetrated the ribs and lacerated the right lobe of the liver, colon, stomach, duodenum, and right kidney. The entrance wound was located at the middle-back portion of the 15 body. Seven (7) pellets were recovered on the muscle of the upper and middle abdominal wall. The defenses evidence consists of the testimonies of appellant himself and of his wife, Madoline, his stepdaughter, Franlin, PO1 Manolito Javelora, PO3 Alberto Sarmiento, and PO3 Wilson Allona. Appellant interposed alibi as his main defense. He claimed that Alexander, together with his daughter and Sendin, had gone to his house on 24 April 1998 at 16 around 6:00 p.m. where they were welcomed and offered snacks. They were having a conversation when a blackout occurred. Alexander then asked permission to leave. After the visitors had left, appellant ordered his stepdaughter Franlin to buy candle at the store across their house. Appellant and Madoline posted themselves at their doorway holding a flashlight to light Franlins path. Upon Franlins return to the house, appellant heard an explosion and he immediately closed the door. Later, the policemen went to his house and told him that he was a suspect in the shooting of Alexander and was then brought to the police 17 18 station. The following day, he was subjected to paraffin test the result of which turned out to be negative. Appellants testimony was corroborated by Madoline and Franlin. PO1 Javelora declared that when he asked Alexander 19 who shot him, the latter did not answer. Likewise, PO3 Sarmiento and Allona stated that when they went to the hospital 20 to interrogate Alexander, the latter could not give a definite answer as to who shot him. On 15 August 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the decision read: WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, judgement is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, hereby sentencing the said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659[,] amending Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The said accused is further condemned to indemnify the surviving heirs of the deceased, Alexander Parreo, the sum ofP257,774.75 by way of actual damages; the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and the sum of P50,000.00 by way of death compensation. The accused who is detained is entitled to be credited in full with the entire period of his preventive detention. The Jail Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center is ordered to remit the said accused to the National Penitentiary at the earliest opportunity. SO ORDERED.
21

The trial court regarded the victims dying declaration as the most telling evidence pointing to appellant as the 22 assailant. It appreciated the presence of treachery in qualifying the crime to murder because the victim was unarmed and walking on his way home when he was suddenly and unexpectedly shot from behind by appellant. The trial court ruled that appellants alibi 24 and denial could not prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses. Moreover, it observed that appellant was 25 not able to prove the impossibility of his presence at the crime scene which could have proven his alibi. In view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant, the case was initially elevated to this Court for review. 26 However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling but modified the award of moral damages from Thirty Thousand Pesos 27 to Fifty Thousand Pesos. Hence, the instant appeal.
23

In a Resolution dated 16 July 2007, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental 28 briefs if they so desired. Both parties manifested that they would adopt their briefs filed before the appellate 29 court. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Michelle, as well as the dying declaration of Alexander considering that the circumstances under which the crime was committed rendered the identification of the gunman impossible. This argument essentially challenges the credibility of the witnesses, including the eyewitness, whose testimonies were relied upon by the trial court in convicting appellant. Basic is the principle that the findings of fact of a trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. This rule holds true especially when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate 30 court. Appellants authorship of the crime was proven by the positive identification of an eyewitness and the victims dying declaration. The prosecution presented Michelle, who categorically identified appellant as the one who shot Alexander, viz: Q: While you and your father were walking towards home, did you remember anything unusual that happened? A: Yes, Maam. Q: What was that? A: I heard an explosion. Q: Where were you in relation to your father when you heard that shot? A: I was in front of my Daddy and he was at my back. Q: You said you heard a shot, what did you do when you heard a shot? A: When I heard the shot, I turned back and I saw Joemarie pointing to my Dad. COURT: Q: What did he point towards your Dad? A: Firearm. PROSECUTOR PADILLA: Q: You said Joemarie was pointing a firearm to your father. Was it [a] long or short firearm? A: About 11 inches. Q: After you saw Joemarie pointing a firearm to your father, what happened next? A: I saw my father staggering towards me and I saw Joemarie Cerilla ran. Q: Where was he going? A: Maybe towards his house.
31

xxxx Q: If this Joemarie Cerilla is inside the Courtroom, can you identify him? A: Yes, Maam. Q: Please point to him. (Witness pointing to the accused Joemarie Cerilla).
32

Michelles account of how her father was shot by appellant was corroborated by the post-mortem examination which 33 reveals that the entrance wound is located at the back of the victim. In the same vein, the medico-legal expert concluded that the gunshot was fired at a close range, as evidenced by the presence of a power burn measuring four (4) centimeters 34 35 in diameter surrounding the periphery of the wound and penetrating his internal organs. Significantly, the eyewitnesss positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime is fully supported the victims dying declaration. A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is 36 certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death. As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless 37 and false accusation. It is thus admissible to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and the circumstances under which the assault was made upon him. The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarants death renders it impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; allowing it, therefore, prevents a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, because the declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of death as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by 38 an oath administered in court. Of the doctrines that authorize the admission of special classes of hearsay, the doctrine relating to dying declarations is the most mystical in its theory and, traditionally, among the most arbitrary in its limitations. In the United States, the notion of the special likelihood of truthfulness of deathbed statements was widespread long before the recognition of a general rule against hearsay in the early 1700s. Not surprisingly, nearly as soon as we find a hearsay rule, we also find an 39 exception for dying declarations. Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the declarants injury or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the act are 40 admissible. Second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and 41 looked on death as certainly impending. Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Accordingly, declarations made by a child too young to be a competent witness or by a person who was insane or incapable of understanding his own statements by reason of partial unconsciousness are not admissible in 42 evidence. Thus, in the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a witness 43 had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have been competent. Fourth, the declaration must 44 be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. Anent this requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had caused its witnesses to take the stand and testify in open court on the substance of Alexanders ante mortem statement in the present criminal case for murder.

The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with unanimity that they had been told by the victim himself that it was appellant who shot him. Michelle recounted: Q: You said your father moved towards you, what happened next? A: I approached my father and cuddled him. Q: What happened next? A: While I was cuddling my father he said, "Day, it was Joemarie who shot me." Q: How many time he said he was shot? A: Not once but about 10 times.
45

Shortly thereafter, Novie Mae arrived and was told by Alexander that it was appellant who opened fire at him: Q: When you reached Confessor Street, what happened? A: I saw that my elder sister was assisting my father. COURT: Q: Whats the name of your sister? A: Michelle. COURT: Proceed. FISCAL: Q: When you saw your sister Michelle assisting your father, what [sic] happened next? A: And I immediately went near my father and asked him who shot him and he answered it was Joemarie Cerilla who shot him. Q: Before you reached your father, did you observe his physical appearance of what happened to him? A: Yes, Maam, he was supporting with his arm and when I asked him he still made a response. Q: You said [that] before you approached your father[,] you saw him supporting his body, what was his position at that time? A: He was in a position of lying with his hand on the road and my sister was assisting him. xxx Q: Were you able to observe why your father was sitting on the ground and supporting himself not to fall. A: Yes, Maam. Q: Why, [sic] what did you observe? A: My father was supporting himself in order that blood will not [ooze] from his body and his body will not fall down.
46

SPO3 Dequito, who responded immediately to the crime scene, corroborated the testimonies of the Alexanders children, to wit: Q: So, what did you do when you arrived at the crime scene? A: We advised the group to carry Mr. Parreo to the ambulance because the ambulance was on the way and after our mobile arrived, the ambulance arrived also [sic] so we carried Mr. Parreo to be brought to the hospital. COURT: Q: Meaning you loaded the victim into the ambulance? A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: And after he was loaded, what did you do? A: Before the ambulance left the area, I questioned the victim who shot him and he answered Alias "Pato." I am referring to Joemarie Cerilla, the accused. Q: The accused Cerilla, Alias "Pato"? A: Yes, Your Honor. PROSECUTOR: Q: Can you remember the exact words uttered by the victim when you asked him who shot him? A: He answered me that: I questioned him, "Who shot you?" and he answered that it was Cerilla and I further asked him 47 "The husband of Madoline" and he answered "Yes, Alias "Pato", the husband of Madoline. Likewise, Alexanders wife, Sonia, testified: Q: You said from your house when you were told by the girls that your husband was shot, what did you do? A: I looked for a taxi and proceeded to the hospital. xxx Q: When you arrived at the hospital, where did you go first? A: To my husband. xxx Q: When you reached that hospital and your own mother led you to where Alexander was, in what part of the hospital did you first see him. A: Outside the operating room. Q: What was the situation of your husband when you first saw him? A: He was leaning on his side and many nurses attending to him and saying "araguy." xxx Q: Between you and your husband who spoke first?

A: My husband. Q: What were the exact words stated by your husband? A: He told me that it was Joemarie who shot him.
48

These statements comply with all the requisites of a dying declaration. First, Alexanders declaration pertains to the 49 identity of the person who shot him. Second, the fatal quality and extent of the injuries he suffered underscore the imminence of his death as his condition was so serious that his demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation. Third, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was the victim. Other police officers were presented by the defense to refute the dying declaration. PO1 Javelora alleged that he happened to pass by the crime scene and saw a young girl crying. The girl led him to her father who was sitting on the 50 roadside. He asked the victim who shot him but he did not get any reply. PO3 Allona and Sarmiento arrived at the hospital and questioned Alexander as to who shot him but the latter told them, "I am not sure because it was 51 dark." These statements cannot be construed as a categorical statement of the victim denying knowledge as to the identity of his assailant. It can be recalled that at the time Alexander was being questioned, he was already being readied for surgery. At that point, he was understandably no longer fit to respond to questions. Between these two seemingly conflicting testimonies, it is the positive identification made by Alexander in his dying declaration which must be sustained. Appellant insists that there was an inherent impossibility in identifying the assailant with clarity since there was a power blackout at the time of the commission of the crime and was then a moonless night. The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexanders and Michelles positive identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this did not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the assailant, especially since the shot was delivered at close range. In dismissing appellants contention, the trial court rationalized: x x x This argument deserves scant consideration. In the case of People v. Hillado, G.R. No. 122838[,] promulgated on May 24, 1999[,] citing the case of People v. Oliano, "visibility at nighttime is possible not only at the exact minute and date when the moon is full as indicated in the calendar. Thus, a persons nocturnal eyesight, is not necessarily diminished just because there is no illumination from the moon, because it is a fact that our eyes can actually adjust to the darkness so that we can still see objects clearly even without sufficient lighting. In the case at bar, it would not be so hard for Michelle to identify a persons fact especially if the latter as in the present case was barely two (2) arms length away from them which is confirmed by the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the body of the victim. We stress, that the normal reaction of the person is to direct his sight towards the source of a startling [shot] or occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, the most natural reaction of the victims in criminal violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and to observe the manner in which the crime is committed. Added to this is the fact that the accused Joemarie Cerilla and the victim Alexander Parreo have known each other quite well before the incident so that they became familiar with each others 52 face and physical features. x x x Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were not shown to be impelled by ill motive to testify falsely against appellant. Besides, Susan, Michelle and Novie Mae, being immediate relatives of the deceased, would naturally be interested in 53 having the real culprit punished. The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi. It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The distance of his house, where 55 he supposedly was, from the locus criminis is only 120-150 meters, more or less. Appellant counters that there was absence of any motive on his part to kill the victim; that it was not clearly proven that he fired a gun, based on the paraffin test; and that he appeared calm and composed and showed no indication of guilt when he was invited by the police officers shortly after the commission of the crime. Time and again, we have ruled that a negative finding on paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun because it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrates or gunpowder, as when the culprit 56 washes his hands or wears gloves. The trial court correctly rejected the result of the paraffin test in light of the positive identification of appellant.
54

The trial court held that the killing was qualified by treachery because Alexander, who was unarmed, was suddenly and unexpectedly shot from behind by appellant without any risk to the latter from any defense which the former might make. There was no opportunity given to Alexander to repel the assault or offer any defense of his person. There was not the 57 slightest provocation on his part. We agree with the findings of the trial court. The presence of treachery was evident in the execution of the crime. Appellant suddenly, and without warning, shot Alexander from his back. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, murder is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. Because the killing of Alexander, although qualified by treachery, was not attended by any other aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. We deem it proper to further impose exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 which is recoverable in the 58 presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, in the commission of the crime. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2006, affirming with modification the Regional Trial Court Judgment dated 15 August 2000 finding appellant, Joemari Cerilla, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Alexander Parreo P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 111692 February 9, 1996

ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: Still professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks 1 reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder. At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short 2 hair." Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he 3 muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him. Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July 1989, reported that death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar region 1-1/2 in. in length with extracavitation of the small and 4 large intestines." Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was 5 arrested at eight o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay. The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina 6 the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court; hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred when it held that petitioner was positively and categorically identified as the killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgment of conviction and in holding petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of the victim. Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the left lumbar region. This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina was stabbed to death and that three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the knife wielder. It must be stressed that these witnesses had known petitioner for quite some time and never had any personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him. That it was another person who committed the offense is too incredible. No less than petitioner's own witness, Nerio Biscocho who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and "Jonie" Fuentes are one and the same person. Thus COURT: Q Who is this Joni Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes?

A That Joni Fuentes is the same of that or the accused Alejandro Fuentes. I do not know his real name but he 7 is called as Joni, sir, . . . On cross-examination witness Biscocho further admitted that he himself would call petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., as 8 "Joni" or "Jonie" Fuentes, as some of his friends did, but victim Malaspina occasionally called petitioner "Junior". Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day however he learned that the 9 self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit. For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal information for murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who fatally stabbed Malaspina Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then 10 personally went to Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he was told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had already fled. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons." The 11 admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness. There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not 12 admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. We are not unaware of People v. Toledo, a 1928 case, where Justice Malcolm writing for the Court endeavored to reexamine the declaration of third parties made contrary to their penal interest. In that case, the protagonists Holgado and Morales engaged in a bolo duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado who was seriously wounded gave a sworn statement (Exh. 1) before the municipal president declaring that when he and Morales fought there was nobody else present. One (1) month later Holgado died from his wounds. While the Court was agreed that Toledo, who reportedly intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be exonerated on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an accord on the admissibility of Exh. 1. One group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was ample testimonial evidence to support an acquittal. The second group considered

Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to which Justice Malcolm belonged, opined that the court below erred in not admitting Exh. 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest. For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain cases of declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied in the instant case which is remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of such a statement 13 may likewise be, according to Wigmore, "shocking to the sense of justice." Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement. But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make 14 him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such 15 evidence. The Court of Appeals as well as the trial court correctly determined the crime to be murder qualified by treachery. The suddenness of the attack, without any provocation from the unsuspecting victim, made the stabbing of Malaspina 16 treacherous. However, the court a quo erred in imposing an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since aside from treachery qualifying the crime to murder there is no other modifying circumstance proved, the medium period 17 of the penalty, i.e. reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed on petitioner. Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document to support such claim. This is a valid point. in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the 18 natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon 19 competent proof and on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply, rely on speculation, conjecture or 20 guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the testimony of the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of 21 Malaspina. However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be 22 granted. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO FUENTES JR. guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted.

SO ORDERED.