Department: International Politics Term Paper: Iran Guardian Professor: Dr.

Mahr Summer Semester 2011

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was one of the most significant events of the Cold War era. It profoundly altered the balance of power in the Middle East as the USA lost a major pillar of influence in the region. Which were the Foreign Policy conclusions of the Ayatollahs?

Author: Innocent Umoette

Dedication:
My thanks go to all those who supported me in different ways, especially, my guardian Dr. Mahr, who gave me the opportunity to write this work in English. I will not forget my fellow Students for the undeniable hints they offered. This work will not be complete, without mentioning two people that are very important and who enabled me in spite of the difficulties, to write this term paper even at odd times, especially in the middle of the night, thereby expediting the completion of this work. For this I thank my dear wife Savita for her academic guidance and my lovely daughter Mandira Kokoma Umoette, who always smiles whenever she sees me on my writing desk, for her support. I also appreciate all those known and unknown for whatever help in whatever way they might have rendered that I did not notice. Lest I forget, my greatest thanks goes to God Almighty for the strength, good health and His love made abundance to see me through this project. I will not forget to acknowledge the Bavarian State Library that provided me with the needed materials to make this project a success. So I thank you Stabi.

Declaration of Authorship:
I hereby guarantee that this term paper work is solely my independent effort without any foreign help, no other given source as the provided ones herein which are also clearly marked out as such. This term paper work in this or similar form had not been presented in other courses. I stand to accept and take full responsibility in form of mistakes and shortcomings from which this work may undergo.

Table of contents

1. 2. 3.

INTRODUCTION THE THEORY AND CAUSES OF REVOLUTIONS

ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

THE COLD WAR ERA AS A PATHFINDER FOR THE REVOLUTION ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT

DEFINED. 4. THE EMERGENCE OF THE SHAH AND THE WESTERNIZATION OF IRAN ERROR!

BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 5. THE SHAH: BETWEEN PERSONAL, FOREIGN AND NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE COLD ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

WAR PERIOD 6. 7. 8. THE FOUR MAJOR OPPOSITIONS FROM PROTEST TO REVOLUTION

AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AS AN ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

AFFIRMATION OF THE REVOLUTION 9.

THE ENTRENCHMENT OF ISLAMIC ORDER AND THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE IRANIAN ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

SOCIETY AS A LOSS OF US INFLUENCE IN THE REGION

10. THE ALTERATION OF BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST DUE TO INCOHERENT UND NON UNANIMOUS POLICY BY USA 11. THE HOSTAGE SAGA ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

12. CONCLUSION: WHICH WHERE THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCLUSION OF THE AYATOLLAHS? ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

12.1. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND HIS DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY MANEUVERS ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT
DEFINED.

12.2. THE SIGNIFICANT OF THE 2004, 2005 AND THE 2009 ELECTION TO THE FOREIGN AYATOLLAHS 12.3. THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM AS A VITAL FOREIGN POLICY TOOL
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POLICY OF THE

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13. References: Error! Bookmark not defined.

1. Introduction This term paper work is in order of the topic of its given topic and the three main subtopics therein namely: (1) The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was one of the most significant events of the Cold War era; (2) It profound altered of balance of power in the Middle East as the USA lost a major pillar of influence in the region and (3) Which were the Foreign Policy conclusions of the Ayatollahs? The aim here is to try defining the term Revolution and the scientific approach of her theoretical system framework based on some works of notable Authors, who tried to examine the root cause of the Revolution in Iran that was gradually started sometime before and climaxed in 1979. Judging from the revenue of the high oil prices in the 1960s and 70s, which the majority of Iranian did not feel its positive reality impact. One could ask: Does the rapid displacement of social values and norms as the underlying cause of mass opposition to a regime due to the disequillibration between the societal values and the reality? Can aggregate psychological frustration or relative deprivation bring about revolution? What roles do accelerators and elites intransigencies play in ushering in revolution? With these theses, an attempt will be made to look at various positions of revolution analysts based on their theological works. Based on the above insights, a quick look at the historical background of Iran on which Iranian State is being erected as well as the economic, social and political imbalances in a country of diverse ethnic groups. The cold war conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States-US- could be seen as a pathfinder for the Iranian revolution. To this I will examine how important is the geo-strategic location of the country in the Gulf Region in regards of its significant importance to the outside world, especially America and why did Iran fell into their hands. What are the effects of foreign presence most especially, Britain and America during the cold war era in particular and the reaction of the Iranian people in 4

general? What contribution did the Pahlavi dynasty on one hand and the oppositions on the other hand offer in enabling the revolution? There were different oppositions in regards to the political situation, who but have different ideologies. Who were they? How powerful is the religion Islam in advancing the 1979 revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a respected state not only in the Gulf Region, but also the world over? All these questions and many more will be look into in the course of this work. Finally in my term paper I will look into the relationship of Iran with the outside world, especially, the United States of America, whose foreign policies towards Iran then and now, were and are characterized with bitter and collegial contest. The outcome as well as the consequence of divided opinions of President Jimmy Carters key advisors as to what decision to which extend was to be taken as the Shah struggled to stay in power Liberalization versus Status quo- will be discussed. After the revolution, how did the presence of America influence the foreign policies of the Ayatollahs? What are the effects of America activities in Iran that formulate the foreign policies of this country? Could it be the Westernization culture that posed a threat to the Islamic based way of life? Or how important are the many elections that keep producing the Islamic Ruling Council and in recent times the former major of Tehran, Ahmadinejad as the winner. Just recently, Israel threatened to militarily attack Iran, because they believe Tehran has nuclear weapon in his disposal. This position is supported also by the International Atomic Energy Agency-IAEAwhich claimed to have material evidences that Iran has nuclear weapon. Why is the atomic programme to the regime in Tehran in dealing with the outside world very vital in spites of many sanctions? The problem area here is the possibility of Iran becoming a nuclear nation thereby posing danger to the world peace as believed the western nations and its allies. Whereas Iran strongly argued that, it is for her energy support and that it is her right to pursue such a program, since it is a peaceful one. Another foreign policy tool of the Ayatollahs which recently came under international criticisms is terrorism. Then an assassination attempt recently on the Saudi Arabia ambassador to the US which I will not go in details, will rounding up my work.

2. The theory and causes of Revolutions Revolution can be defined as the upheaval from the bottom of a society to the top due to the existence of strong political, economic and social imbalances in respect of its socio-moral values, expectations and its realities not fulfilled. Chalmers Johnson (1982:3) explains, that the rapid displacement of social values and norms as the underlying cause of mass opposition to a regime. He went on in his argument that the study of revolution need to be in context of its social systems in which it evolves. Then the analysis of revolution, according to him, intermeshes with the analysis of viable, functioning societies, and any attempt to separate the two concepts impairs the usefulness of both.1 Johnson opines the homeostatic (i.e. selfregulating) nature of social system that has the adaptation ability to changes and influences in their environment.2 Disequilibration, (a term used, when there is dissynchronization between societys values and division of labour)3, occurs due to the inability of a society to adjust or adapt to environmental changes, but this does not means automatic revolution. Then according to Johnson there must be enough accelerators as well as elite intransigence in such a system for revolution to take place.4 With these Johnson identified three major types of accelerators: military weakness or disarray within the incumbent forces; the confidence of the revolutionaries in overpowering the elite; and the military strategic actions that the revolutionaries initiate against the elites armed forces. 5 So the consequence by losing or even, destroying the societal values system in a set political entity is or can lead to the loss of political legitimacy of that system. Its last resort for power consolidation is the armed forces. This usually leads to more mass opposition against such government, because it has lost its legitimacy to function. Furthermore, other Scholars, like Ted Gurr and James Davies (1962:6) are the proponents of the so called aggregate psychological approach to analyse causes of revolution. They believed that the stability or instability of a political system is ultimately dependent on a state of mind, a mood, in a society.6 These two elements in a society are associated with a mass of people who share common feelings of frustrations with a particular regime. So due to their ability to mobilise on the side of opposing force, it is termed as critical mass. The two authors strongly depend on this approach to drive home the reasons for the occurrence of
1 2

Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (London: Longman, 1982), p. 3. Ibid., p. 62. 3 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 4 Ibid., pp. 93.94. 5 Ibid., p. 101. 6 James Davies, Toward a theory of revolution, American Sociological Review 27, no. 1 (February 1962): 6.

different forms of political upheavals in given geo-political sovereignty.7 According to Davies, there is likely to be revolution, when people, rather than experiencing, perceive a reduction in their social and economic opportunities8 Backing his statement that symbolises his theory, Davies claims: Revolution are likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal.9 Similar to Davies approach identified Gurr psychological frustration as root for revolutions. This frustration sets in, when the expectation that are commonly perceived to be attainable are not realised. A conditional term he called relative deprivation10 He went on to outline the three patterns of this relative deprivation as such: Aspirational, decremental, and progressive deprivation. Decremental deprivation is the relatively monoton of value expectation in relation to the decline of value capabilities. This sort of situation is related to ones own past, then traditional and transitional societies are most likely to be affected by decremental deprivation.11 The aspirational deprivation he explained is as a result of the non-fulfilment of rising expectations and the frustration of its desire to gain them. This suffixes when the expectations are high or increase and but at the same time the capabilities are constant in other words static.12 The last form of deprivation is as a result increase in expectation while at the same time the capabilities decrease. Gurr believes that this last form of deprivation is common in todays globalised modern societies, stressing that newly upcoming social classes frequently met with restriction from limited capabilities of their society in achieving their social and economic opportunities.13 So relative deprivation, as Gurr summarised it, prepares the society for the occurrence of revolution. Then discontent, according to him leads men to political violence when their attitudes and beliefs focus it on political objects, and when institutional framework are weak enough, to give the discontented a sense of potency to execute their plans.14 The fight of dominance over one another (social Darwinism) requires from both the incumbents and the contenders enduring social support by providing patterns of action that have predictably rewarding consequences for their followers.15 With this, the success of a governing system or that of dissident organisations depends immensely on such

7 8

Jerry Rose, Outbreaks: The Sociology of Collective Behaviour (New York: The Free Press, 1982), p. 86. Davies, Towards a theory of Revolution, p. 6. 9 Ibid., p. 19. 10 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 24.
11 12

Ibid., p. 48. Ibid,. pp. 51-52. 13 Ibid., p. 53. 14 Ibid., p. 155. 15 Ibid., p. 247.

characteristics as their scope, cohesiveness, and complexity, and on the dissidents ability to provide their supporters with value opportunities, satisfactions and means for expressive protest.16 The formation of an alternative and revolutionary body that is seen and accepted by progressive members of the society as legitimate independent of the ruling government is, according to Charles Tilly, one of the mysteries of our time17 Apart from Tilly, a good number of other scholars (Theda Skocpol, Samuel Huntington and lately Jerrold Green) have delved into explaining the cause of revolution through analysing the political dynamics of the pre-revolutionary states18 Huntington, for example, sees revolution as side-effect of modernisation19 which leads to the emergence of new social classes that demand the right to participation in the political process 20 He identifies in most modernised societies most especially the middle class as the true revolutionary class21 Finally, looking into all these theories, one would conclude that they are all related to that of Iranian Revolution. Summarising the theories of three authors, Mehran Kamrava opined that Johnsons systems-values theory is based on the occurrence rapid social and cultural changes in the 1960s/70s which metamorphose to disequilibrium of the Iranian society crystallised into the 1978/79 revolution. Furthermore, Kamrava believes, that the accelerators of disequilibrium into revolution, based on this theory, were the sinking oil price after 1973 (this was the major source of income for the Shahs regime) and the United States Humans Rights policy as its foreign policies for Iran in particular
22

Not far differing

from Johnsons theory based the theories of Davies and Gurr on the sudden reversal of the generally positive economic conditions of the early 1970s after 1975 and a subsequent rise in the level of unemployment among aspiring groups and classes23 Because of the inability of the above mentioned theories to broadly outline in more than one framework of discipline all the causes of revolutions Kamrava believes that its examination should take a more multidisciplinary approach (pre-revolutionary politics and socio-cultural setting) of concerned country. Kamrava concluded that the conceptual separation of state

16 17

Ibid Ibid., p. 203. 18 Mehran Kamrava: Revolution in Iran, The Roots of Turmoil (Routledge London and New York, 1990), p. 4. 19 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 265. 20 Ibid., p. 142. 21 Ibid., 289. 22 Mehran Kamrava, pp.5-6. 23 Kamrava, p. 6.

and society and the examination of developments in both areas are fundamental to an accurate and complete understanding of causes of revolutions24 Drawing his conclusion within this theories framework, Kamrava identifies four major causes of the 1978/79 revolution in Iran: A. The cutback of states sovereignty regarding of its powers and authorities in anticipation of internal and external forces as well as occurrences. B. The weakness of a state brings about strong oppositional groups movements and agitations in anticipation. C. Social conditions as paradigm for dissemination of information carrying revolutionary emotions in a set society. D. And finally, organised establishment and coordination of ties amongst different government oppositions and the targeted classes for support.25

3. The Cold War Era as a Pathfinder for the Revolution The profoundness of the Cold War actually affected the fate of many states and Iran was one country that particularly felt its effects more. In this context, its domestic and foreign-policy settings by the onset of the cold war was so in a way that its outcome, helped eventually to create an avenue for the rise of radical Islamism in the Iranian politics, with impacts well beyond its boundaries imagination. The political Islam was as a result of the US-Soviet cold war rivalry and thereby impacting on the Muslim way of life in regards of their view of the US and its Allies in the wake of the revolution. Had it not been the US-Policies of containment, after the Second World War, of Soviet Union and the Soviet Union responses (the main Antagonists), Iran might not have played itself into the Americas net. But due to the fear of Soviet occupation and possibly loss of its sovereignty and the fact that America was just at the door knocking to give Iran access to all its military arsenals in order to check the Soviet expansionism of its communism, was enough for Iran to fall prey to Americas control as strategic policy towards gaining entrance into the oil rich middle east region. Without this conflict from the super powers nations, there would not have been any starting point in the late 70s for the radical forces of political Islam to increasingly assert their
24 25

Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

influence in the course of redefining Muslim politics, with a very strong anti-US ideology. The Background: Iran was before this time a traditional monarchy state with its vast oil and outlets to international waters. The Persians, who are influenced through the Shi ite, sect of Islam, are majority. Furthermore, Iran has long extending cross-borders ethnic connections with the Soviet Union. However, the overthrown of an elected reformist government in 1953 and the dead of the Soviet leader, Iosif Stalin during the cold war, had a major impact on the political landscape of the country. The US-Soviet rivalry was reshaped as the new Soviet leader decided to pursue Non-Interference in the internal affairs of other countries, unlike the US, in order to promote mutual coexistence, respect and peace. As the two power houses eyed Iran as important strategic cake that taste good, the Iranian crisis and its circumstances crystalized into nationalist political turmoil. The US saw Iran as a good geopolitical significance for the dominance in the oil rich Middle East thereby supporting their policy of containment cause. Whereas, Moscow view Iran as a source of her security especially in the southern part of the country. This led to differences in the heart of Iranians between Pro-West with monarch Mohammad Reza Shah and Mohammad Mossadeq, a nationalist reformer.

4. The emergence of the Shah and the Westernization of Iran

Before now, Iran was known as Persia and was politically ruled by the Qajar Dynasty before Colonel Reza Kahn took over the power in 1921 sending the Qajar Shah in exile holidays. Little did one know what are to be expected from this young man. As the Majlis (Parliament) disposed of the Qajar dynasty and entrusted Reza Shah and his family with the crown of the oldest monarchy on earth

through a constituent assembly, it marked the beginning (1926) of the longest lasting Pahlavi dynasty of fifty years. Though a continuation of old absolutist tradition, he tried to modernize the
country, embarking on the establishment of a highly differentiated and structurally strong

political system. In other words the Westernization of the society socially, economically and politically and with the birth of a modern armed forces as driving motor towards national unification. So with these the tearing down of the old order and the establishment of primary capitalist production and accumulation and industrial infrastructure was in exchange. The created institutions were at this ends, through the means of brutal tactics, secularized and put under the states control. So the first phase of the nation-building, 10

carried out by Reza Shah, was the creation of the elementary structures needed by the Iranian system to build on26. This Westernization of the country was enforced as part of his western orientation. To this effect a law was passed in 1928 requiring all men to dress in European manner. The name Persia was changed to Iran in 1931 and the compulsory wearing of hats was enforced in 1935. There was also legislation for women, but only to increase their participation in national life, than to improve their rights: Women were still under the Sharia law of polygamy and have no voting right. Another reform step was the banning of wearing veil in 1936 and government employees were encourage and permitted to attain official ceremonies with their unveil wives. Sex segregation was also abolished in cafes and cinemas. Furthermore, the Tehran University was established in 1953.

5. The Shah: Between personal, foreign and national interest in the cold war period Nevertheless, Iran compares to Turkey, however, was economically, culturally, politically and militarily controlled and operated by the Europeans entrepreneurs -Russo-British invasion in 1914 to Soviet-British occupation of 1941- thereby violating its independence. The relationship of these foreign imperialists with Iran, according to William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, was pre-occupied with cultural disrespect, economic domination, imperial manipulation and was totally rejected in the Iranian society. These groups of occupiers are the Soviet engineers, British oil experts and or US military advisers 27. As a result of this discontent which took place in the second phase of the nation-building as Reza Shahs son, Mohammad Reza Shah came to power28, Muhammed Mosaddiq, the then Prime Minister had confrontation with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), Britain and the Shah himself, because of his strong stance for nationalization of the Iranian state. His nationalization law led to the call for a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil, the British reinforced its naval forces in the Persian Gulf Region and the country was sanction economically that made its oil revenue to fall drastically causing state financial crisis which catapulted into national and international apprehensions29. This stance earned him-Mossadiq- a good comparative reputation over the Shah in the Iranian society. Out of fear, the Shah with the help of the US Central Intelligence Agency and the British M16 in 1953 overthrew him, heightening his unpopularity even
26 27

Mehran Kamrava, p. 14. th A History of the Modern Middle East 4 ed.: William L. Cleveland, Martin Bunton, (Westview Press, A member of the Perseus Books Group, 2009), p. 290. 28 Kamrava, p. 15 29 Cleveland, p. 291.

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more in the public. That was the first and last porpular democratically oriented government Iran has ever had till date. Even Kamrava coined the coup as inimical to the aspiration of the majority of the people. The coup was seen in the internal political setting as the removal of the last vestiges of opposition to political absolutism (liberal nationalists) who were the supporter of the 1906 Constitution30. Egypt criticized the action as a threat to its region unity against force they termed as imperialism, colonialism and Zionism and then followed by Soviet Union, who interprets it as Western imperialist against independent post-colonial regimes31. Internationally, the involvement of US in the coup and its military assistance to Iran towards strengthening the anti-communist monarch was seen as an instrument and display of power ability of the cold war era. In the cause of doing this, the Iranian state developed more centralized, have taste for more political power, and its intolerance turned into a high handedness of the regime against opposition groups. Finally its over reliance on the military, diplomatic and psychological efficacy of the US was the centralization of the absolutist political system. So to consolidate this, the Shah State relied principally on three of his established instruments of power; Himself as supreme commander, the administrative network and lastly the ever fearful military and Para-military body, most deadly under was the SAVAK strike forces32. Bashiriyeh sees the Shah as the indisputable figure towering above all instances of power33 (kind of comparing himself with Ludwig the 14th the sun god), then appointed and sacked his ministers at will, involving himself in the political settings of the land thereby increasing his power. The almighty Shah supervised and controlled the war ministry and the military. His main objectives were the foreign affairs, the economy and the military34. The further thing that served as a catalyst of the revolution was his two parties system he experimented (a government and loyal opposition party). As this did not still serve his ultimate goal, he abandoned it and formed a just legal political party called Rastakhiz-Resurgence-Party. This paved the way for a one party state without opposition as he thrived towards power consolidation. His surged to power attained its climax in the appointment of Amir Abbas Hoveida as prime minister in 1965, who served a record of thirteen years given the manners and conditions in which the past ministers worked. A closer look into the cause of his long tenure discovered Kamrava his pyramid style of an elaborate
30

Kamrava, p. 16. S. M. Aliev (ed.), Sovremennyi Iran [Contemporary Iran] (Moscow: Rossiskaia akademiia nauk, 1993), 8283; see also the chapter by Douglas Little in volume II.
31 31 32 33

Ibid, .Pp. 16-17. Bashiriyeh, State and Revolution in Iran, p. 19. 34 Kamrava, p. 17.

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political system whose apex is occupied by the Shah himself supported by the impresario of the system Hoveida35.

6. The four major oppositions Since the emergence of the Pahlavi dynasty, there had been rising opposition forces prior to the revolution. Kamrava believes that two things, the structure crumbles of political machinery and the exploitation of such lapses by the activities of groups and organizations bring about revolution. These two occurrences must overlap as a condition36. Although Kamrava identifies three major opposition centres; the ulema (i.e. scholars learned in the Islamic sciences), the guerrilla organizations and the political parties37, other forces will be given more attention. These can be grouped into four sources varying from different directions, and more so from their backgrounds, their political, social and economic goals: a. The ideological and political opponents of the Shah`s regime, which comprised of not only the remnant of Mossadeqs centre-left National Front but the Marxist-Lenist groups mainly the Tudeh Party and Fadaiyan-e khalq (Peoples Devotees) as well as the radical Mojahedin-e Khalq (Peoples Wariors) that canvassed for both Marxist und Islamic messages. There were ideological competitions among this group. b. This second group stemmed from the professional stratum of the Iranian society. They include the lawyers, Academicians, and journalists. Others are civil or public servants, university students that completed this group. Their main objective was democratic political reformation of Iran. c. In this group are owners of small businesses and merchants - the Bazaaris or petit bourgeois. They shared and are therefore closed to the Shiite religious ideologies. Although many of them benefited from the Shahs politics, some were against his increase taxes and regulations as well as resenting the high cost of living. The last source of opposition is the one from the Pahlavis dynasty that accepted Islam as state religion, but rejects the operating framework. This was the reason why the Shah, unlike his father encouraged secular politics to prevent any religious center such as this from challenging his authority, which stirred widespread dissatisfaction among the clerics.
35

Ibid. same as above Mehran Kamrava, p. 51. Ibid., p. 52.

36 37

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7. From protest to revolution

In 1978 the agitation and protest had transcend into a more radical Islamic revolution pioneered by Khomeini himself with massive support from the urban masses. The casualties through gathering for forty days to mourn the death helped to redefine the revolution. The death of 100 protesters in Tabriz did not stop the Iranian from commemorating their martyrdom through other forty days ceremonies. The protest took a new dimension as the call is not for the restoration of the constitution, rather death to the shah call demanding at the same time the return of Khomeini. The introduction of a martial law as a check against demonstrations had no effect as the capital city, on Friday, Sept. 8, 1978, was embroiled with confrontations between protesters from all and sundry engaging the forces royal to the Shah. In the process of wanting to stop the crowd, the government deployed all sort of military machinery ranging from helicopter gunships to tanks, leading to loss of hundreds of lives. This episode was tagged Black Friday and served as a catalyst in mobilizing public opinions against the Shah regime. Black Friday, viewed by some historians, placed a sea of blood between the shah and the people38.The brutality of the regime even inspired the people more to take sides with the Khomeini`s camp, which gave him the more confidence to call for the ouster of the Shah government. The climax of the protest was the shutting down of the oil industries and fields, paralyzing Irans entire economy in October 78. At this Stage the Shah was a shadow of himself, since he was confused of his next action and the support from Washington. The Shah, according to William F. Cleveland and Matin Bunton, vacillated, alternately offering concessions and ordering the deployment of force39. The protesters this time around dressed in white signifying their readiness for resistance and martyrdom like the sacrifice of Ali and Husayn. In spites of 700 estimated dead casualties, about 2 million people occupied the city capital on December 12. During this mourning period also, the military as the Shahs last strength crumbled: Troops abandoned their units, recoiled at ruthless killing of innocent protesters and joined the oppositions. The acceptance of Shapour Bakhtiar to become prime minister on condition, that the shah leaves the
38 39

Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two revolutions (Princeton, 1982), p. 516. William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton: A History of the Modern Middle East, p. 429f.

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country was rejected from both his colleagues and Ayatollah Khomeini himself. Khomeini even made it clear that, anyone appointed by the shah is not only illegal, but also betray to Islam.40 On January 16, 1979, Muhammad Reza Shah departed Iran. His departure was coinedan extension vacation41. W. L. Cleveland concluded by saying that an unarmed popular revolution inspired and guided by an elderly member of the religious establishment had toppled the king of kings and brought an end to the Pahlavi dynasty42.

8. Ayatollah Khomeini and the establishment of Islamic Republic as an affirmation of the revolution The emergence of a crazy old man43 Ayatollah Khomeini in the early 1960s as a leading political cleric with a strong distaste for the Shahs authority marked the turn of events that is yet to come in the scenery of Iran politics. After being arrested and detained many times he was finally sent in 1963 into exile in southern Iraq. This expulsion sees Kamrava as a mistake44 Even his attack in the Iranian press as representative of the Black Reaction made him to be the personal embodiment of the struggle against the Shah and at the same time receiving sympathetic attention of the international media45. His courageousness increased while at the same time augmenting his knowledge on economic, diplomatic and military issues through the helps of intellectuals around him. One of his great works, his book Vilayati-I Fagih: Hukomati-I Islam (Government of the Islamic Jurist), serves as resolution to the ills, which Iran was suffering under Shah. His work was seen by a scholar as not only a guide for the reorganization of the society; rather also a handbook for revolution46. In this book, Khomeini opined the possibility of an Islamic state that is built on the Quran and the community of the Prophets. He argued further, that such men that are vest with the knowledge of Islamic religion and law should manage its affairs, while the institution of monarchy is an alien to Islam. For this reasons he rooted for the exit of the Shahs government through a parallel Islamic government that will fight according to him, against injustice and tyranny. As Khomeini returned from exile (from Iraq to Paris) back to Iran, everything was in a state
40 41

Ibd., p. 430. Ibd. 42 Ibd. 43 Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 163 44 Kamrava, p. 90. 45 Ibid. 46 Bakhasd, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 38.

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of anarchy; the economy had long collapsed, the military force had disintegrated, etc. The political vacuum instigated power struggle between the Left and Right Wing political organizations. On the other side, there was uncertainty over the future of the new Iran; should it be based on religious establishment controlled by Islamic theocracy, or a constitutional government under moderate reformer, Bazargan. Indeed a war of Ideologies between secular society and Sharia Islam. This post-evolutional conflict was without a price as thousands of lives were lost as the former eventually assumed control of the country. To this end Khomeini had eliminated the rival authority in the form of Prime Minister Bakhtair, whom he strongly opposed by forcing him to resign replacing him with one of his own man, Mehdi Bazargan. Before now, Bakhtiar had attempted to promote secular governance but was hampered by the Council of Islamic Republic that operates parallel. The ulama control this council and are the supreme administrative and legislative institution of the country, whose work is supervised by Khomeini. Bazargan resigned in November 79.47 The authority of the revolutionary tribunal in 1979 was imminence as its operations are outside governments control. The execution of former prime minister, many ex-parliamentarians and hundreds of SAVAK agents was under their prerogative. The entrenchment of the Islamic establishment and ideologies in the Iranian society receives its support in the Islamic Republic Party -IRP through their backup from the ulama, the urban and rural masses. In the higher institution of learning this ideologies played a pivotal role in the enrollment of students, so that without Islamic credentials admission could be denied.

9. The entrenchment of Islamic order and the islamization of the Iranian society as a loss of US influence in the region The referendum in March 1979 did not grant any administrative or judicial power to the religious establishment in spite voting for the replacement of the monarchy with an Islamic Republic, which ushers in a new constitution. The constitution personally endorsed by Khomeini himself is 100% Islamic in its foundation which shows the extent to which the Islamic order operates. This was in total contrast with the original adoption put in place by the Bazargens led government. This constitution launched Iran on the full political, legal, and
social Islamization48.

47 48

William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton: A History of the Modern Middle East, p.430f. Ibid., p. 433.

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This was a major setback for the US considering the fact that it has no chance of influencing the policies of the Ayatollahs anymore. The pro and contra of this constitution is subject of discussion. It also gives the power to choose the president and people of the single-chamber national assembly. The final power through this constitution is given to those nonelected officials that are also members of the Guardians Council which approve or reject laws and regulations. The Adoption of the principle of valayati-i faqih is the most powerful position in the structural formation of government- as Islamic jurist- representing the Hidden Imam. The process is through appointment not popular elections since an honest, virtuous, wellinformed, courageous, efficient administrator and religious jurist49 should hold this post. As Islamic Jurist, he can appoint half the member of the Council of Guardians, dismisses the head of the army forces and the Revolutionary Guards among others.The qualification of presidential candidature and the confirmation after election lies solely under his jurisdiction. The supreme Islamic Jurist is as a victory for Khomeinis ideologies which stipulates that a
truly Islamic state could be ensured only by the governance of the religious establishment50.

The Islamization of the Iranian society to sooth with the wishes of its religious leader(s) and to alter the US control in Iran began in two phases. The first phase of this Islamization was characterized with a jihadi (combative) revolution to enforce Islam in politics and society which of course cost many lives. The second phase should bring Pluralist Islamic system of governmence and foreign policy posture capable of positioning an Islamic republic in the prevailing world order, while the United States as an evil power is kept at distant51 towards establishing a solid modern Shi te Islamic state. The actualization of his wishes was completed by imparting some objectives on the Iranian society even as he revisited all the laws the shah had put in place. Amongst the objectives were Islamic principles of social justice and the amicably distribution of the nations wealth. In the economic area, there was nationalization of banks and, insurance companies and large industrial complexes, which pitched the camp of the capitalists against the agitators of state control of the economy. In the judiciary the Islamization was swift. The reorientation of the qualification for the judiciary was quicken and unlike the Reza law that permitted only Western law degree holders to practice law, the Khomeini authority based his on enough knowledge of Islamic law. So those secular judges who lacked such competence were transferred, retired or sacked. In this same

49 50

Ibid.,. P. 433. Ibid., p. 433. 51 Amin Saikal, Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation? (London: Palgrave, 2003), 6988.

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context Khomeini again ordered that all cases with secular legal codes should be thrown out since they are not backed by Islamic regulations. The Islamization drive also affected the gender relations, whereby women, unlike the Reza regime time, lost their right of divorce, right of dress code and right of child custody. Apart from that, they were not allowed to study subjects like Medicines, Law, and Engineering. The reasons were not far fetch; disruption of family life, whereby the primary role as mothers and wives would be neglected, if they take part in public events. There was, however, restriction to all these, the women could retain their right to vote. With these, all elements of Westernization were completely and systematically wiped out to mark the change of power from the US-controlled system to a totally Islam based one.

10. The alteration of balance of power in the Middle East due to incoherent und non unanimous policy by USA The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran as affirmation of the revolution and consequence steps taking, towards the entrenchment of an Islamic order to concretize the islamization of the Iranian society affect the balance of power, particularly, as it weakened and subsequently eroded the influence of US in this region. The role of the US in advancing the revolution due to their inability to take a decisive action, because of their undermining of the revolutionaries and the confusion in State Department between the supporters of liberalization curse in Iran on one hand and those who wanted the status quo uphold led to what Kamrava wrote that the United States, quite inadvertently, did nothing but accelerate the collapse of the Pahlavis52 Even President Carter was in limbo as a result of the two rivalries in State Department, and then the Pahlavi government was betrayed and abandoned at the point of need, when the US failed to develop a coherent and unanimous policy towards the faltering Pahlavi regime53 Furthermore, the US lost its balance of power, when the CIA denies any incipient revolution that could post a threat to the Pahlavi authority was a clear sign of been able to read the handwriting on the wall. Again, the revolutionaries were undermined. Again the cautious
52 53

Mehran Kamrava, p. 40. Ibid., p. 41.

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approach of the State Department officials prompt their hard line support of the shahs high handedness of the crisis erupted inevitably sharp frictions between the State Department and the National Security Council. So the US drifted further away from saving their dependently ally due to this inability to act54. Even Kamrava jettisoned the US for their internal conflict: The unending contention between officials at the NSC and the State Department undermined the administrations ability to fully and accurately realize the gravity of the crisis in Iran and to devise a clear-cut policy to deal with the situation 55 So with these short comings from the US the exit of the Pahlavi dynasty came to an end and the beginning of the establishment of the Iranian Revolutionary Council led by Ayatollah Khomeini, on Feb. 11, 1979, which did not take long for its formal recognition regionally and internationally. Even the United States and Egypt, which had been supporting the Shah government, offered de facto recognition. One exception was Israel, whose relationship with Tehran was severed after the revolution. After drastic significant changes of its foreign policies by the Islamic Revolution regime, the US was set aback, because it has lost one of its greatest regional allies. Cleveland and Bunton wrote that, the United States was at a loss over how to deal with the revolutionary Iran56. Even the Ayatollah government made every effort to end all military ties, including the closing down of the US-surveillance post on the Soviet border and cancelling of all armspurchasing contracts. The ambassador to Iran was rejected. With this new development, the US government sought to improve relations with Tehran which Cleveland and colleague again termed bizarre and inept episode called the Irangate or Contragate 57. There was even efforts by the Dr. Bazargans led government to foster workable relations with the US, while the radical dominated Revolutionary Council was against any compromise with the Great Satan. (Iran: The Khomeini Revolution, Longman Group Uk Limited, 1989, P. 53).

54 55

Ibid., p. 42f. Ibid., p. 43. 56 Cleveland and Bunton, p. 437. 57 Ibid., p. 438.

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11. The Hostage Saga The decaying of relationship continued, when the US in October, contrary to its former assurance, allowed the Shah into its soil to treat his cancer ailment ignoring the Central Intelligence Agency and the embassy staff in Tehran warning of the Shahs stay there that could trigger an anti-Americanism violence in Iran which could eventually fueled an attack on the US embassy. The embassy was already been temporally occupied by Fedayeen-e Khalq members in aftermath of the revolution on Feb.14. This shows and exposes again the lapses between the US government and its Central Intelligence Agency. As if that was not enough, the worst terror came on Nov. 4, as a group of armed militants, calling themselves students58 invaded the embassy and made the staff their hostage. Their demand was that the United States government releases the Shah to be tried in Iran. Through Ayatollah Khomeinis, five women and three black men were released on the 17th November leaving still 52 hostages, who were kept under so called Spartan conditions 59. Efforts from both the PLO and the US to get their release, met a brick wall. Had the extraditions proceedings worked, it would have been enough reasons for the release of US hostages in Iran 60. So, at this point, at the end of February, the fate of the hostages, according to Ayatollah Khomeini lies by the next incoming Majlis session. The resort by the US and its Allies to severing the diplomatic relations and imposing economic sanctions on Iran was criticized not only by Russia but also by some third-world states as they bear their minds on one side condemning the hostage taking and on the other hand denouncing the US increasingly bellicose response as provocative and threatening61. Again, a rescue effort embarked upon by the 90 US commandos failed due to complications of their transport system. And so the rescue plan was abandon, since they need a minimum of six helicopters for the operation making it another disaster for the US. Thereafter, the peace brokers from Algeria managed a breakthrough not after the special Majlis commission had approved on the 3rd. November of the hostage swap from students control to governments control. The Gulf War played a major role to the release of the hostages on Jan. 28. 1981. Never the less their released was without conditions; (a)US Government undersigned an accord that will see her stay clear from Irans internal affairs, (b)

58 59

Iran: The Khomeini Revolution, Countries in Crisis (Longman Group UK Limited, 1989). P.53. Ibid., p. 54. 60 Ibid., 61 Ibid.,

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freeze the assets of the Shahs family in the US, (c) release of assets frozen at the start of the crisis. Others are, end all trade embargos against the country, set up an international tribunal to decide all claims of US Citizens against Iran and vice-versa. These entire requests were fulfilled by the Reagan administration62.

12. Conclusion: Which where the foreign policy conclusion of the Ayatollahs?

12.1. Ayatollah Khomeini and his diplomatic and military maneuvers

Neither East nor West.
63

. With this, it was clear that neither the US nor the Soviet Union

was welcome including some Middle East countries. That was Khomeinis foreign policies phrase as one of his goals to end Irans dependence, especially, on the US which led to the isolation of the country from both in the Middle East and the international community in the whole 80s. The reasons were the ideologies behind the Islamic revolution which, backed with statements from Ayatollah Khomeini and his cohorts, were to be established universally. This was seen by her neighbor as a security threat to their governments. The Ayatollahs intent to export the revolution internationally manifested as they backed the kidnapping of US and European citizens by radical Shi a group in Lebanon. His diplomatic and military maneuver in dealing with international matters was reflected as Israel was used by the US-Government as mediator with Iran, and as a great number of antitank missiles and tons of military spare parts were sold secretly to Iran, although the US was at the same time a leading campaigner in the 85/86s for international embargo on Iran. The goal of this deal (to improve relations and to help in releasing US hostages in Lebanon) did not materialize. As M. F. Cleveland and colleague put it, failed miserably, then while only three were released, additional ones were taken even as Iran was boosted with military aids. The revelation of this deal was seen as domestic scandal in the US and president Reagans image was rubbished because of that. This caused the US-Arab allies in the Gulf to put doubts over the sincerity of the US diplomacy. Based on this context, the subsequent Ayatollahs foreign policies did and do not differ from that of their predecessors. This curse summarizes Sadjadpour the foreign policies of

62 63

Ibid. p. 54f. Ibid. , p. 437.

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Khamenei as neither confrontation nor accommodation64. To cement this policies, the interview granted to CNN by Khatami, calling for a dialogue with the US in order to improve relations was strongly criticized back home not only by the radical ulamas. Khameini himself ruled out any possibility of reconciliation in a publicized sermon.

12.2. The significant of the 2004, 2005 and the 2009 election to the foreign policy of the Ayatollahs
With the outcome of the 2004 parliamentary elections which empowered the Councils of Guardians control the Majlis and the self-chosen ulama, which control the center it was perfect in defending the Islamic state and sustaining the Ayatollahs foreign policy programs. The results of the 2005 presidential elections solidified the conservative establishment as Mohamoud Ahmadinejad, a former major of Tehran, emerged as the first non-cleric president in twenty four years. Cleveland and Bunton see him as one known for his streak, reputation for pettiness and austerity. He uses his rhetoric and provocative utterances to denounce Israel which the Ayatollahs used as their significant foreign policy propaganda. This puts his government under pressure and isolation from the outside world. In spites of negative consequences it bring to the country, it was rightly in line with the wishes of Ayatollah Khamenei the spiritual head of the Supreme Islamic Council. Like his predecessors,

Ahmadinejad and Khamenei stance against Israel and their unrelenting arrogance pursuit of Nuclear Power Program put their neighbors in the region on alert while attracting international censure of the regime in Tehran. However, this foreign policy strategies seems to work as great economic nations like China and India are attracted to invest their and at the same time outsmarting the West from his confrontational posture. To this effect some Middle East neighbors see this type of foreign policies as aligning with the general aspiration of the entire Gulf region.

12.3. The Nuclear Program as a vital foreign policy tool The occupation of Iraq by America, the continued policy of containment by both the Clintons and Bushs administrations and the inclusion of Iran in 2002 alongside Iraq and North Korea on US list of countries as axis of evil strengthen Iran, to go ahead amidst critics in pursue of
64

Karim Sadjadpour. Readin Khamenei: The World View of Irans Most Powerful Leader, Carnegie Endownment for International Peace 2009, p. 3.

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its Nuclear Power program. Coincidentally, the election of Ahmadinejad and the reopening of the Nuclear Program were timely, raising fear of its danger and possible stoppage through military approach. But the US was stretched to its capacity at this time in 2008, due to the war in Iraq and the dwindling enthusiasm to engage Iran while at same time the insurgency in Iraq was on the rise again. Tehran had refused to give account of its nuclear weapons program since two decades. Although, Intelligence report from America, states that Iran had suspended its nuclear program; there are still fear of Irans fuel enrichment process and the running of over 3,000 centrifuges in Natanz. Because of this that Iran business allies, Russia and China joined the US and its Allies to sanction Iran. However, Iran stood unperturbed on his nuclear program to support its energy needs, as a guide in a situation of reducing oil resources. Another stance on this issue as its foreign policy is its national honor, which is very important for Ali Khamenei. He even saw this as Irans legal right under the rules of Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, supporting his argument to that of Israel being allowed to have such program. In spite of the fact that the Arab countries are afraid of the stability in the region due to Irans foreign policies ideologies, they are not in support any military action against Iran. This was made clear, by an editorial in a local newspaper in Kuwait, when Bush made a seven-day tour of the Gulf region in 2008, says Mr. President, the region needs smart activities, not smart bombs65. There are even growing involvements of Arab states with Iran in defiance of US policy. In fact, the rivalry factions in Lebanon were united together by Qatar, dismissing the US attempt to isolate and defeat Hezbollah66. So at the end of it all, Iran agreed to export its rich uranium to other countries of their choice to be developed in order to escape tough international sanctions. Until now it is not really clear which state of development it has reached. However, the recent threat from Israel to attack Iran militarily, because of its believe that Tehran possesses nuclear weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency statement that it has material evidence of Irans nuclear capability have raised a major international security issues. This is so, because Iran has warned that any attack on its territory could spell apocalyptical consequences. The recent assassination attempt on the Saudi ambassador to the US was credited to Iran by the United State CIA. Irans strongly denial of this accusation could be seen as one of its antics to draw international attention towards its foreign policies drive.

65 66

Quoted in Ian Black and Rory McCarthy, Bush Takes Sounding on Iran, Guardian, January 12, 2008. Cleveland and Bunton, 2009. P. 575.

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Drawing conclusion from the meaning and causes of revolution to the cold war era of dependence on America by Mohammed Shah and the revolution and islamization of Iran led by Khomeini and coupled with the Anti-West foreign policies backed by its nuclear programs as stipulated by Ayatollahs, one will continue to see Iran as one of the global players in the coming 22nd century. It remain to seen, what impact this region will post to reshaping the international politics, if by recent developments are to be taking seriously. Many political analysts have already predicted that the third world war will come from this region. If Israel will, like America attacks Iran, then this prophesies will come to pass. The change of its foreign policies stance will depend not only on the change of government in Tehran, but also the respect of Iran in the international community.

13. References: Abrahamian, Ervand: Iran Between Two revolutions, Princeton, 1982 Aliev S. M. (ed.): Sovremennyi Iran [Contemporary Iran] Moscow: Rossiskaia akademiia nauk, 1993, 8283; see also the chapter by Douglas Little in volume II. Bakhasd: The Reign of the Ayatollahs Bashiriyeh: State and Revolution in Iran Cleveland, William L u. Bunton, Martin: A History of the Modern Middle East 4th ed.: Westview Press, A member of the Perseus Books Group, 2009 Davies, James: Toward a theory of revolution, in: American Sociological Review 27, no. 1, February 1962 Gurr, Ted Robert: Why Men Rebel? Princeton, NJ 1968 Huntington, Samuel: Political Order in Changing Societies New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968 Johnson, Chalmers: Revolutionary Change, London 1982 Kamrava, Mehran: Revolution in Iran, The Roots of Turmoil, Routledge London and New York, 1990

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Sadjadpour, Karim: Read in Khamenei: The World View of Irans Most Powerful Leader, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2009 Saikal, Amin: Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation? London, Palgrave, 2003, Iran: The Khomeini Revolution, Countries in Crisis, Longman Group UK Limited, 1989 Rose, Jerry: Outbreaks. The Sociology of Collective Behaviour, New York 1982 Quoted in Black, Ian and McCarthy, Rory Bush Takes Sounding on Iran Guardian, January 12, 2008.

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