TOWED VERSUS SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1955:

AN HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ARGUMENT

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
by
A. C. BOLE, JR., Maj, USA
Fart Leavenworth, Kansas
1966
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10 Mav 1966 Master's Thesis AUGust' 1965 - Mav 1966
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Towed Versus Self-Propelled Artillery In The Period Prior To 1955: An Historical
Investigation OfThe Argument In The United States Army
4. TITle AND SUBTITLE
.
6. AUTHORISI
Bole, Albert C., -Major,. U.S. Army
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMEIS) AND ADDRESSIESI 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER .
U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College
] Reynolds Ave.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. A
13. ABSTRACT (Mm'lmum 200 Words)
Field artIllery must move rapidly as well as shoot accurately in 'order to do its job. An
important argument as to the best way to move cannon has been, and still is, the argument
of towed versus self-propelled artillery. The purpose of this paper is to chronicle and
analyze this argument in the U;S. Army prior to 1955. The analysis shows that, of the
many reasons cited in the argument, only self-propelled artillery's advantage of rapid
occupatIon of position and its disadvantage of heavy weight were significant reasons. The
paper concludes that by 1955 there was not a preponderance of opinion for either mode
exclusively, which was quite proper, as there were many improvements to be made to both
forms of artillery transport. In order to obtain these improvements by the best use of
technology, soldiers must establish characteristics desired in materiel, and require
industry to meet those characteristics.
.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Field artillery; battlefield mobility
World War I; World War II
16. NUMBER OF PAGES
81
16. PRICE CODE
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OF REPORT
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NSN 164G-41 280-66110
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18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
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19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT
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20. UMITATION OF ABSTRACT
U
Slanderd Fonn 288 (Rev. 2-88)
Prucrlla<t by ANsI SM, Z3918
2a8t02
u. S. AND G&;ERAL stJFi CO
T
tLr03
('!besis Approval Page)
:1ar18 of Cand1date Albert C. Bole, Jr k!a,1or. Art1]] er:r
TiUe of 1hesis 'lbwed Versus Self-Propelled Art1" try in the Period
?riOt to 1955; An IAstorical Inwatigati
on
ot the Argyneot in the
th1ted stItes Amr
AppXYr
ed
by: '
/ -,.... " I
'l./" i-<- ... I i. i: ,I" lot.
_________...... ( " aesearch and 111.515 Honito.r
'lbe opinions and conclusion. expressed herein are those ot the 1nd1ndual
student author and do not necessar1l1' represent the views ot e1
fo
Jler the
u. S. J.r.rrq Ccmnand and General Statt College or CT other governmental
agetlC\1. tq thi s study should include the foregoing
statsDent
900012
11
(Abstract Page)
.n,tIe of __
Period Prior to 1955: An Historical Investigation or the Armnent
by: ("'
/" .
_:'-_.j_-t_ .... _,_. _4-_" ,_. __, 3esearch and Y.onitor Zi_"
-J
Date 10 '(1
1
:,t I i l:
'!he oo1n1ons and conclusions exoressed herein are those ot the individual
student aut.'lor and do not necesKrily represent the views of e:1".her the
u. S. Arar:! Cocnand and General statt Q:,llege or any other gove:mnental
agency. (rt,rencts to this study should include the foregoing
statement.
A3Sr?.ACT
Field artillery rapidly as well as shoot accurately
in order to do its job. An i"loortant as to the best way to
move cannon has beer" and still 15, the argu=nent ot towed versus selt
orooelled arti1.1ery. lb'l or this Jaoer 15 to chronicle and
analyze this in t.'le J. S. ANry or1or to 195.5.
Qlaoter I describes the ot the !IIateriel tor :r.ech
anized artillery trans'OOrt tro:"! 1916 to 1955. !hr1nc:; this there
was very little change in materials and technolost( used tor
develoJDent or artillery vehicles and cannon. As a result, there was
very little equiOOlent for the ot either towed or selt
?ronelled artillery to consider.
Canter II recounts the history or the ugtI'lent its begin
until tni ted States' entry into liorld 'liar II. 'lb. &rg'..tnent
orior to :-lorld :.lar II divides into two 1919-1927. and 1923
1941. with the creation ot t."le first U. S. Arrry &r'Jlored torces
the divisor. lllring t.'te first Qhase, rapid of oos1tion was
considered the chief advantage ot .elt--orooell.d artillery. and lighter
unit weight the chief or towed artillery. 3y the end ot the
second phase
t
selt-oropelled art.illery was considered alr.1ost exclusively
for &r:Ilored d1.v1sions, and towed artillery tor infantry divisions.
III describes the ot -l'Iorld tiar II V1 th
to artillery transoort. Ihring the Wart virtually all arnlored d1vision
artillery was selt-oro?elled and infantry d1. vision artillery towed. lhe
1
2
consensus was that self-!1ro')elled \"'az better fo!'
d:.. vi sions.
Chanter 17 discusses oeriod the war "until 1955.
?or the f:l0St na,rt, the anaJ..:rses continued in the sane vein as
the of the war: self-uroop.lled artillery for divi
and to't,red for eli visions. me :::Orea.'1 conflict
advantages of self-propelled in itself
1'=0111 grour,d attaC:'C. chanter ends with descriptions of nSl-l conce"1ts
for artillcr'J, based on neu technolog.
Cha?ter "/ analy"zes and concludes. ilie had
chanr;ed ver':l little durinS the neriod covered in this because the
materiel cha.n:3ed verry little. rne analysis shows that, of the
reasons aited in the arGument, only s advan
tage of rapid occupation of "Oosi tion and i ts of heaV"j"
\-lei
6
ht uere reasons. concludes that 1955
was not a pra?onderance of opinion for either self
propelled exclusively, which ouite prO?9r, as there were
in!,rove:nents to be ma.de to both for:ns of artillery In
order to obtain these by tae best use of sol
diers establish characteristics desired in materiel, and require
industrJ to these characteristics.
This '":la!1er -;olould not have been "!)ossible itrl thout t.he ;"eln of
'llany peoo
l
.e. and is
tendered to
Lt Col Ro,ert whose wise counsel, under
and were key tn the of this
!Japer.
Lt Col ,!allace :i. a.l'ld .. :aj Pierce, whose de
tailed critiques contributed to the pauar.
J.':rs 3arton :! :IaY'.Jard, whose cOl'lscientious and capable
was to the the ?ap9r.
:ly A.. 1. tzi., v..Those careful was i:nportant, and
,;-rhose su;rqort and encouragement vi tal to this
iii







TABLE OF
Page
iii
L.I 5'1' 0F 'fABLES v
1
c."la'Oter
I. 1'"dE :.-:ATIZ?- 3:L 4
'l'owed Artillery
3elf-Propelled
Gttn.llary
II.

14
The Influence of I
Ihe First 1919-27
Second Phase: 192d-41
III. 31
'lhe Setting
:.l"ne Advantages of tielf'.. Propelled Artillery
Disadvantages of Self-Propelled Artillery
:Lne Consensus
IV. 45
'lhe Post-','iorld fda!' II l\nalysis
'The Korean Conflict
The Future
V. SU'!l-iAHY, ANALY5IS, AND 58
Summar"
Analysis
Conclusions
BIBLIOGPJLPifi
66
iv
LIST OF 1'A3LSS
Tab'.c Page
1. 1941 Pri:ne for 'rowed Artillery 6
2. Early :-rol t :':anufacturing Co:n?any Self-Propelled Can.'1on 7
3. Post- totol t Company Self-Propelled
4. Chri stie Self-Propelled tzer 9
Self-Pro:?e] 1d 10Smm Howitzer, :,17

. . . . 11
6. Comparison of dolt 1,lark and i:7 .59
Co:nparison of tX>ard Report (1919) and 1946
Artillery Conference

61
v
INrRODuCTIOH
The Problem
Ibe of the U. S. Army' field artiller'J is to prov..t.de con
tinuous and timely fire support.
1
1'raditionally, thi s mi ssion has been
d.i vided into th,:,ee tasks: to move, to shoot, and to cOMmunicate. The
task of moving cannon has many as to the best form of
artillery2 transport. 't3ef'ore "t.l}e advent ot motor transport there '-las an
argU11ent as to which was better--horses or mules? vii th the introduction
of ::notor vehicles there immediately came the argUl.1ent of animals versus
Almost simultaneously another argument: which was the
better form of motor transport for or self-propelled?
Ihis argument was an important one. It has influenced the
effectiveness and tactics of both the and the it SU?
ported, and affected the spending of large sums of :,oney for artillery
:nateriel. '!he purpose of this paper is to !)resent the history of the
argument of towed versus self-pro?elled artillery in the U. S. Amy
-crior to 1955. The trends of the argument throughout the period cited
will be traced to the factors that affected the Tae
argument will be analyzed to evaluate the validi ty of the reasons put
forth by proponents of towed or self-propelled artillery. By reoounting
1
u. S., ISpartment of the Army, Field Artillery 'ractics,
FH 6-20-1 u. S. Government Printing Ofrice, Jul 65), p. 3.
2Th.roughout the rest of this paper, the term "artillery" will
refer to field artillery.
1
2
the and analyzing the argument, conclusions can be drawn as to
how soldiers :r.ay best use technology for the art.
TIle Approach
'lbe a?proach is to determine the thinking and reasoning of pro
ponents of either rom of transport. 30th. official re-po:-ts and
documents, and toTri tings of individuals are examined. For the latter,
unofficial publications such as '!he Field Artillery Jounlal and .A1!J3.
Ordnance are used extensively.. It should be pointed out that prior to
War II, service publications were quite
tant as a forum for current thinking concernin5 the service
they represented.)
This paper is organi zed into fi ve chapters. In Chapter I a
description of the materiel upon 't.l}e argument was based prior to
1955 is presented. In Cha!'ter II the history of argtnent of towed
versus selt-propelled artil1.ery is traced .fro;:, its beginning at the
close of "llar I until the {hi ted States' into \'lar II.
The experience of World War n as it relates to the is de
scribed in Chapter III. Cha!'ter IV presents the analyses of ,'[orid
iJlar II artillery transport experience, and traces the argument up to
1955. In Chapter V the argument is discussed and analyzed, and conclu
sions are presented.
A1though tank destroyers were both towed and self-pro!,elled and
)For exa.l1ple, in 1922 the annual report of the Chief of Fj.eld
!U'tillery was published 04 in '!he FieJ,d ArjJ.J.1e:t1[ Journal (Vol. XII.
6 2?J, p. 455
were at times as light
4
artillery, they will not be discussed
in this pager. A thorough review of the uertinent literature reveals
that the experience with tank destroyers did not contribute signifi
to the of towed versus self-nrooelled in the
U. Ci. Army.
4'rhrOughout this paper the following classitication of
aooording to oaliber will be used: light--l20IYUl or less; !Yledi\'Jn-
greater t.."lan 120mm but not greater than 160!ftl"l; heavy--greater than 16<mun
but not greater than 210m.1l1; very heavy--greater than 21Om.'11_ (14:,1 6-20-1,
p. 5-)
CHAPrER I
!he discussion of argument of towed versus
artiller-j in the U. S. J\r:try to 1955 begins wi. th a survey of the
davelopreent of materiel for mechanized transport. 'his devel
opment in the U. S. beginning with towed artillery and followed
by self-propelled artille!'Y, will be described in this chapter.
rowed Artillery
The earliest !,rime lltovers for cannon were track-laying vehicles.
Commercial farm tractors
1
Here used to tow artillery in 1916, during the
punitiva expedi. tion into :"Iexico.
2
In that Sa."'t19 year, a 45 horse?ower
etCaterpillar" tractor was tested at Fort Sill, It was used to
to,., a lh 7" gun and li:nber, or a 4.7" gun CaiSSOll and. limber. 'The total
weight, ,nth either load, \....8.5 -3} tons.
J
The Field Artillar:t Doard found
thi s Mover to be cheaper, easier to handle t and inore l:'!obile than
horse tea.."lls.4 l':ractors, eommerci al desi gns t wTere used extensively
l.Th.e term "tractor" ;dll be used to designate track-layinr:
tractor this pa!:'er.
2Co1 Lucian 3. :':oojy, "Hotorized Artillery," Amy Ordoance.
Vol. I, No.1 (Jul-Aug 20), 8.
3Capt 3ryden, on the Recent Tractor Test at Fort
Sill, Oklaho!na," 111e Field Artillery Journal, Vol. VI, No. 1
(Jan-Mar 16), p. 51.
TranS?ort for Heavy Field Artillery." Th.e Field Artil
lery Journat, Vol. VI, No. 2 (Apr-Jtm 16), p. 201.
4
during vJorld "'liar I as :>rime movers for medi Wl and heavy artillery.
Tractors, rather than trucks, continued to be !>rime movers for towed
artillery during the post-war "eriod.
5
In 1925 one of howitzers in Hawaii was converted
a tractor-dralorn to a truck-drawn batter'J. l11.e truc!tS proved to be
faster and generally better than the tractors. However, artillery trans
port in Hawaii was rather specialized because all movement was
over good roads and very titUe cross-cou."ltry :novernent was required.
6
Another battery lias equi!,ped with trucks in 1932. Arter a trial of this
battery, some li ltt and :nedium battalions were converted to truck-dralm
units. 'me trucks were of commercial design and had two-wheel drive.
7
By 1941 nearly all light and :nediurn artillery was truck-drawn.
lbe pl"ime movers in use were essentially of cortl1erc1al design
with the addition of front wheel drive, and had characteristics as shown
in 'I'''.b:9 1. '!'he standard prime for hea.vy artillery wa.s a ttCatel'
pillar" tractor, also of corr.:nereial design, weighing 14:t tons and having
a maximum speed of 9.4 :nph. a
The trucks described in Table 1 larere used throughout vJorld ',far II
and the Korean conflict. :Jear the end of the Korean confiict, tbe (i-Ie
2t ton truck was b:'r an improved 2i- ton truck, whi ch was devel
oped for use by the milltary, though not as an axclusively artillery
prime mover. Dle Dlamond T 4 ton truck was replaced by a 5 ton truck
S'lhe Field Artillery School, Autcrnotive Instruction, (Fort Slll,
Oklahoma: '111e Field Artillery School Reproduction Plant, 1941), p. 1.
6
:'!aj Francis T. Colby, "155-mm Howitzers 'lbwed by F. W. 1). [Four
Irive"]Trucks in Hawaii, It '!he Field Journal t Vol. A. VI ,
No. 6 (Nov-Dec 26), pp. 588-596.
?
Automotiva Instruction, p. 1.
8Ibid., p. 355
6
at this time. nere again, the truck was designed for general
use.
TABLE 1
1941 PRL'-1E HOVERS FOR ItrNED ARTILLERY&
Characteristics
Cargo capacity
Light Artillery
2t tons
b
l'1edi.urn Artillery
4 tons
c
lL-':tve six-wheel six-wheel
Weight Sf tons 9-i tons
1'otaximum speed 45 mph 40 aph
aAutomot1ye Instruction, p. 3.50.
b
'lhis was the General Hotors Corporation (GhC) 2t ton truck.
c1hi.s was the Dlamond T 4 ton truck
A half-track vehicle was also used as a light prime
mover during War II, especially in North Africa. It was essen
tially a six-wheel drive armored truck with the rear dual tandem wheels
replaced by tracks. '!he chief advantage of this prime mover over all
wheeled trucks was its better mobility in sand. It weighed 3 tons and
had a maximum speed or 45
9
'!he principal tractor used during both World War n and the
Korean conflict was the :14 high-speed tractor. It was a med:1.l%J1 artil
lery prime mover, weighed 15 tons and had a max1mun speed or JO mph.
10
9Ibid., p. 350.
lOu. S., vlar Department, Standard ZWH11tary tolotor Vehicles,
iH 9-2800 (vlashington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 6 Mar 43),
p. 175.
7
Self-Propelled
The first self-propelled cannon was developed in the United
States in 1916. Developed by Holt Company,11 it was
a 3" anti-aircraft gun mounted on a track-laying chassis.
12
IAlring
'Ilar I, the Holt company developed f'our models or self-propelled,
track-laying artillery from oorn.'11ercia1. tractors.
'!heir characteristics are at Table 2.
TABLE 2
E,AHLY HOL'r SELF-PROPELLED
Characteristics I II Mark III i'!ark IV
Caliber 8
1t
155m gun 240mm howitzE#r
iJeight 29 tons 30 tons 53 tons 36 tons
b
Haximum syeed 4 5.4 4.; mph 6.5 mph
elevation
45 35
0
60 &J
o
'Xotal traverse
SO
10 2 0
0
Levin H. Campbell, Jr., itSelf-Propelled Caterpillar
Artillery Vehicles," Journal or the lhited States Artillerr, Vol. LIV,
No.1 (Jan 21), p. 35.
b
Height listed is for !.!h or two vehicles.
'!he IV was dev-eloped to reduce the ni.gh unit weight of the III.
It consisted of tll0 vehicles, one mounting the howitzer and the other a
gasoline-driven generator. Each vehicle had an electric motor tor
11
Now the Caterpillar Tractor Company.
Levin H. Campbell, Jr., "Self-Propelled Caterpillar Artil
lery Vahi oles, It Journal or the {hi ted stateB ArUllery, Vol. LTV, No. 1
(Jan 21), p. 31.

8
pro"9ulsion and both connected toeether by an electric cable. None
of these four models saw combat.
In the post- "liar I period. additional seif-propelled mounts
were developed by the Holt COl':'lpany. In 1919 a light artillery pieoe "'as
mado; an improved version was produoed in 1922. A comparison of the
charactoristics of these vehioles are shown in Table 3.
'TABU 3
.t!OLT ;:MHJFAcrURItHi CaU>J\ifi SELF-PROPELLED
Characteristics
Caliber
gun 7.5mm or
howi. tzer
\'leight St tons
6t
:ia.ximum speed 30 mph
c
Total traverse . . . .
c
Levin R. Campbell, Jr., t'Self-Propelled Caterpillar :
Artillery Vehioles, tt p. 35.
b1he nolt Company, itA Few Showing
Caterpillar Development for 1"Iilitary Purposes" (.!. 1922), 11-12.
c
elevation and touJ. traverse tor the l!a.rk 'l were' not
gi van; the above reference i..rnplies that they were similar to of
the :iark VII
.An L'Tlproved and larger motmt for e1ther the 8" howl tzar oi- the
155:nm gun wa.s also developed during the post-World 'Ilar I period. It
weighed 22t tons and could travel up to 16 mph.
1
; All of these Holt
models were developed from existing cOIl'm1erc1al-design "Caterpillar"
13'lhe Holt 2'1anuf'acturing Company, itA Few Photographs
Ca.terpillar Develo?ment for Hil1tal"J Purposes," pp. 14-15.
9
tractors. Ihe cannon could be fired di rectly from the !llOlD'lts, us:lng
spades or outri ggers for stab1lity. None had armor protection for the
weapon or crew.
In 1919, a gun mounted on a Christie mount
was tested by the Ordnance Department. lbis could be converted
from a. vroecled vehicle to a tracked vehicle by the craw in 15 to
JO lIlinutes. Joba uwheeled or trae.l(ed
ft
capabili in the o?inion of !no st
gave greater flerlbility than the "Caterpillar" mount because of the
greater highway speeds uossible in the wheeled configuration.
characteristics sho...m in 'rable 4.
TA3LE 4
C:fP.ISTIE SELF-P:lJPELLED 15511-1 GUlt
a
Characteristi.cs
22 tons :'leight

i laxi.mttn speed, \meeled

20 M?h
lIa.xi... l1lUtn speed, tracked.

q m9h
elevation

35
Total traverse

12
0
a
"lh9 Christie Self-Propelled 'Ihe Field Artillery
Journal, Vol. IX, No. 5 (U'ov-Lac 19), pp. 603-604.
It vlas given both road and firing tests, and passed these satisfac
torily. '!he testing section recommended this r.u>del for issue to the
A:rm:y.14 In 1921, another Christie self-propelled MOunt was made for
14
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Proof Department, Gun and Carr! age
Jection, ftFinal rest Report or 1hree Christie Caterpillar Zounts
for 155m/m Gun, Hodel 1918 (Filloux) ,n (Xar 21), PP. 51-53, 95.
10
01ther the or the 10.5tr:n hOlr.i.tzer. It had a shield for all
rf,)lmd protection of the crew and the carriage alone l-1eighed 6t tons.
1S
and Christie models were virtually the entire effort
in the de"lelo?ment of artilleI"J ?rior to
.-Jar II. Both the Field Artillery 30ard and the Ordnance Depart.TTlent
conducted tests of this materiel in the 1920' s and 1930' s, but few de
resulted these tests. all
co:-:cents to self-propelled artillery :>rior to I.-lorld ",jar II
ware based on this materiel developed durinf;, or di.rectly after, ','iorld
I.
i)es?i te ap!,arent advantages in weight, cost, SL":l!Jlici ty, and
ease of r.laintenance of wheeled vehicles over tracked vehicles, little
"1as done 't.n. th self-propelled, \meeled artiller'J. In 1918 an article in
The Field Artillerr Journal :,ro,osed Itauto:nobile
mounted on truck chassis--in order to save weight.
16
It was not until
1930 an oxperimental mo'tmt for a 7.5mm gun on a six wheel, four-
wheel driva COYil.-nerci al truck \-ras tested. '!he gun could be :f'i red fro."':l
the truck "d. th the installation or outri ggers on the truck. I thad
u!> to )0 :':'lph, a maximum elevation of and a )60 traverse.
Light steel tracks could be installed on the rear wheels in fiva :nin
utes, giving It a cross-country !nobility equal to a tractor-drawn 7S"l::'l
5
1 ".iotor Carriages for Divisional Artillery," j}le Field .Artillery
Journal, '01. XI, iio. 4 (Ju.l-Aug 21), p. 412.
16
Lt Col Cha:les J. "D'le Tendency of Design in
Field k-tiller-.r,u '!he Field .Artillery JOumM, Vol. VIII, Uo. 4
(Oct-1J3c 18), p. 525.








11
g1.1."1.
All tests, including w _ 13
there Has no further rlevelo?::nent of this :flOunt. At the start
of :'Io:-ld ::r 'oJ'as a hea.vy, eight-.rl1.eel driva
!":10unt tor either the 3
d
gun, or howitzer under develo:')l,ent.
1
:]
of this project, either.
principal self-";)!'O!>elled iJ. S. Al..rty artiller"J -..reapon :'n
dorld ',Iar II was t.'1e "Priest." Develo",;>ed in late 1940 for 3rit:.sh
use in Africa as a tad( destro:"rer, the ::7 was a 10,5!,;"'1 howitzor
and mou.l1tod in an tan.l< chassis.
2O
It had ar:nor ?rotection
for the (but .. ) and characteristics as sho'.m
in Table 5.
'i'ASL3 5
Characteristics


tons

speed 2) m'?h
elevation
1'otal traverse
au. S., .. jar 105-mn Ho"ritzer :!otor Carriage
9-731E G.'3. Gover!rnent Printing Office, 5 Jan
:9:'. 3, 133.
G. James, "7&:-,' Gun t :1'3 6-' ,n.. 1 . . t:1 f'
- - - ;1&.,1 .'.1oun , .. ,on ,..uee ".I-ue:<: "
'Ille Field Artillerz Vol. XX, 6 tee 30), 066-6'70.
18
:'laj G. !':. 3arnes J U 111e l&rl. versal Gun and :.:0unt '1')," &:ml
Vol. XI, 63 (!'Jov-Lec 30), !'p. 187-190.
19'1he Field Artillery School, Instruction i':gorandul1l Con
struction or Field Artillerv i1tateriel (Fort Sill, The Field
Artillery School Printing Plant, 1942), p. 62.
20Frank E. Comparato, ,\rt.e of Great Glms (Harrisburg,
vania: lhe Stackpole Co., 1965) t PP. 226-227.
12
Prosress in other cannon fforle.
II \,:as 510";1. to the :':7, the .:nost successful
brought into service during the lIar tho self-?ropelled
gun., ,:12. It was construeted by mounting a 1913 :nodel gun21 on a
22
o:.vei[:hed 20 tons and had a speed of 20 3"j
the end of the war, other cannon calibers had been on
chassis, inc1
1
lding the hOlTitzer and ',ihose latter wea!>O:lS
salT little con'::lat.
23
Jelf-pro:gel1..ed artillery employed in the :Corean con.:-lict \-Tas
essentially the sarna as used in II. L"!1proved versions of the
3
tt
he",dtzar and 15S11..l'J1 Gun self-1)ropellod mounts did seo
All of the self'-?ro;>elled cannon used during UorId ";far II and
the conflict "rere to't'red modified so that they could be
:no1l.Ylted on existing tanh: They had 50::19 amor protection for
crell, and lrere considerably heavier the toiled wea,on wi their
:'1'lovers. They had limited on-carriage trtlverse, and could not fire
fire unless sited on a reverse slope.
1'he post-iCorea."l COllfUct period saw the of a ne,,;
.family of self-propelled wea?ons. Carriages and, in SOrle cases, tubes,
were developed or especially modified for these self-propelled
Ihey l1ere lighter, had better traverse and elevat..1.on than their prode
cessors.
21This gun as on the Holt i-lark II (p. l.)
22
H
d d II
.ea quarters First thite Ar.rry, "Arti erJ Information
Service, 4," Jun 44, !'. 46.
2;
Comparato, 353.
24
Ibid., 232.
1)
3uru:'lary
Tnere were two significant concerning the develoOMent of
mechanized artillery materiel in the U. S. 1\.-:;':.>" 9rior to 1955. First,
there was ver-.f 1ittle change in the ma.terials and used for
the develop:':'1ent of artillery vehicles and cannon. It le1'as not until
after 1955 that lighter lr.etals, such as !ugh-strenrrth steel alloys and
a..ltt:unum, and :nora powerful, but lighter, enf;ines, more efficient
tranwissions and turrets were ap!,lied to the artillery vehicles. 'lliese
technolo&tcal advanoes gave the argUlnent of towed versus self-:?ro"9cllad
artillery a new
Second, and closely allied with the first aspect, there war.
really little materiel for the of towed or self
propelled to consider. 'this dearth of artillery
equtpment gave a saTJleness to the reasons cited in the ar5"Ument of self
propelled versus towed artillery trom the beginning or the argument to
19.55.
CHAPTEk II
ARGl1:E:'Il' PRI02 TO ..lORLD 'liAR II
The Influence of !.forld ilar I
florId It in its classical static form ot trench
beca.'lle an artillelj'lnan'S war, and ended with artillery a!;
the n:ung of 3attles." In a 1917 direotive to the Fre:'lch Ar:ny,
Petain gave instructions tha.t attacks in the future "rare to be
uecono::nicUly with infantry, and with the maxi=nU!n of artillery."l '!Ms
ttmax:Lv:'lUIr." was 8?i tomi zed by the 1918 offense at St !-11hiel, where over
1,400 cannon were =nassed to support an offensive on a 1.6 mile front.
2
Artillery bombardment was considered key to the success of any opera
tion. Yet, deS"f)ite the on ari,iller'J, there l-rerc n')table
defictencies in artiller-.r perfomance--particularly ,dt.h respect to
tra.nsport.
First, and })erha'Os the most serious of these deficiencies, was
the inability or the artillery to kee9 up with the infantr'J.
The very ground which the artillery had pulverized in order to
the enemy trenches, was, because or the bombardment, impassable to the
fo!'Wa.rd of the cannon. 'Ibis facet of artillery mobility
1Ri.chard 'viatt, Dare Call it Treasoll York: 3ilr.on and
Schuster, Inc., 1963), 211.
2Frank E. Com:parato, Age or Great (Sarrisburg, Pennsyl
vania.: '!he StaclC"901e Co., 1965), p. 53.
14
15
was tenned \dth of
!lever fulf:i.llin..; the need, it l,-ras t-:> J'10Ve artillery l.L'1i ts
ra-;>i dly one ';>art of the front to another. of "0':)01" road
nets and the foms of trans,?ort available, the artiJ.le!"f
..ras .lot able to these :7!oves very Hell. l'h.is facet of arti 11t3r:l
trans?ort .:!lQPility:. Third, t-"e poor response of
anLnal trarlsl)ort to the der.".ands ?laced u?on it,
the for different Additionally, the introduction of
the to warfarf"' gave rise to speculation as to the future use of
in \>1ar, and the artillery required to 5U'.?!Jort it. lhese were tho
experiences of the that were to influence on
tranS?Ol..t during the lull between the \lars.
In 191d, the i:ppdi tionar;y- Force (ASF) in :ra."lce
vaned a board of officers (the .Doard) to st"J.ctr the ex?erience
gained by the artillery of the and to sub;nit pased
on its study. :leaded. by Brig Gen J\ndre"r ]aro, Jr., board concluded
t..1.at general !"eserve artillery, COr?S artiller:r, and division
artil1erj' hO'witzers (1t55mm) should be tracto:r-drawn.
3
It also
th9 (standard for division light
artillery) be "notorized by tractor, nif a suitable lbnEfl can be found.
1I4
Additionally, the report stated: boare. believes that verJ
great exoenditures for the of tully developing a tractor-drawn
)General iieadquarters, A'Tlerican Ex:pedi tionary Forces, Office of
the Chief of fA.!'tiller"J, "Proceedings of the Board of :Jfi'icers t
9 1
1
3, 1:). 23.

16
or Q.talics rnineJ ..rould be f'ull:.,. J.lstified.
uS

''Jenera! :!i.nds, Chief of Field .tu"'tiller'J, concurred Hi
this belief and urged that along lines be
"'9ushed wi. th the greatest energy. ,,6 :'he hero doard' s ..5
pertainins to were the view of ani:nu
versus Motonzed. trans,?ol't. 3ut in 9X"Oressing its belief concerning
tractor-dra'!1n .2t tractor- cc-ried. artiller.?, the board the ques
tion of \.mat of :notorized artillery transoort the J. 3. J'..:r::..jr should
have.
V1e r:ero 30ard Report ca"':le t.'1a
in 1919. :feaded by Brig I. liestervelt. this
was convened by the t'J stuctr and n.a..l(e
for artillery for the field army. 8 Its re?ort served as a
guideline for and discussion of artiller/ through
out !Jrior to ':lorld -'jlar :I. r'nis report was also r-eferred to
by so:ne post- .K>rld II re:JOrts.
The ':lestervelt quickly and al::i.ost considereci
mechan:\.cal th3 only suita.ble type for ilit-'1
respect to self-propelled artillerf, the report stated that "while
there is pro=rl.se for such, those at ,resent in existence a"'\d under
5Ibid., p. 25.
60rioe, or Field Artillery, "1st L'1dors8:'!lent to tile
Board P.e!>ort, It 27 L:ar 19, para. 12.
7Also referred to as the Caliber Board Re?Qrt.
5., Departl11ent, tt A study of the Calibers and
:ypes of Jateriel. and ?royortion of Ammunition, and :-iethods of
or the Artillery to be Assigned to a Field Army," 5 19.
9Ibid., p. 33.
17
test ue, for the r.:ost excessively he&.vy.1I10 It cons:.dered
strategic of the ?ieces
would have to be by trucks, unloaded near ?osition areas,
al'ld 6I,lploy their good tactical to occuoy posi tions.
11
Self
ability to OCCU?y ra?idly was considered
an important advantage:
rna 155!T!. G. P. F.
12
self-?ropelled :110unt also ?resents
p:lssibilities, especially when realize that to
the vehicle si:-tlply has to to rest, the ?ower ?lant
U?on its present wheeled carriage, several
are requtred to prepare tiring
th respect to artillery tranS?ort overall, the ":lestervelt
Board concluded that a p:'&ctical plan for notorizing artillery t.o
have both toued and self-?ro!>elled artillery, tOl-red and self
rnedi u:n artillery, and tOl,red heavy artillerrJ. All tolled artil
lery "tra.s to be tractor-dra"A11"l. Dlvision artillery '\o1as to be towed.
were to be used for a.'1JJllunition and SU?ply' transport, and the
deta-i.! section. '!he sel-:?ropelled ?5-"!Ua gun was to be truck
transported for strategic mobility.14 'The -,'lestervelt r:arked the
start of the in the J. 3. of self-propelled 7ersus towed
artiller-j". '!'he report favored neither, but did point out and
lDnitations of self-?ropelled artiller,y over artillerr.
lhe First Phase:
'l'he first in the argument baiora -,{ar II started "lith
10
Ib
O
d pp. 51-52.
11
Ibid., p. 52.
12G P. F.: Great Power [designed by CaptairIJ
P.eport, !ol. 52. 14Ibid., p. 56.
13
the t Ra!>ort and ended in 1927. In 1929, the 7J. ;".). began
to armored forces; this gave a different bent to the
or self-propelled versus towed artillery.
In 1920, 'Lbe Field Artillery Journal ?rinted an article on
artiUer-J transport which included a discussion of the ts of to\ored
versus 591f-propel1ed artillet"J. Concerning 1i01t artillery, the author
listed, as did th,8 t self-propelled artillery's advan
tage of being able to occupy and displace from positions ra?idly.
Addi tionally, he lis"".ed the advantages of smaller cargo space (for rail
or boat shi!JL,cnt), loss road space, and shillty to fire throughout
36015 for self-propelled artiller,y. The author considered the
weight or self-pl''')pelled lrleapons a di sadvantage, as did the tlestervel t
Self-propelled weapons' greater size would make them more dif
ficult to camouflage than weapons. He cited two disadvantages
arising fro::! the cannon being r.'lounted on its ,rime mover. First t if the
prime mover uere disabled by either enemy action or mechanioal brea.'<down,
the camlon wa.s out of action, too.
16
Second, the pri;"'\e Mover could not
be used for any purpose (e.g., hauling ammunition) other than trans
porting the
The author concluded that light artillery c::rlld
never replace tOl-Ted artillery as di.vision artillery. But he did feel
151 assume t.he author meant that self-propelled !>ieees would
turn the ,mole mount (rather than a turret) to tire throughout
See page 19 md footnote 20. I
16For brevity, throughout the rest of this paper, this disad
vantage will be cited bo.l the "prime mover out--cannon out. tt
17:Ienceforth, this often repeated disadvantage ldll be cited by
the phrase: ttinf'lexible priMe mover. It
19
that self-9ropelled artillerJ transported by trucks to the
!,ro,osed by the :1estervelt Report) could be used as reinforcing
a.rtiller:l. a?pears that the consideration of strategic !!:obili ty
outHeighed tactical !:'lobility advantages in this conclusion. 'me author
concluded that artillery was not
18
because of the great inherent to this weapon.
In 1Lr'w Ordnance in the same year (1920), Col Lucian J. ::O)qy
listed as of self-?ro!>elled artiller'J, ty in gain.";
into nosi tion and occ'tpying less road space on the march. For tOlrJed
artillery', he listed the a.dvantages of less vehicle (the
antithesis of the "inflexible mover" disadvantr.:;o) and that .t

had been tested in war.

19
The next year (1921), :':oody gave an
additiona! advantage f'or self'-?ropellad artiller:l: 360
0
field of fire
by turnin
6
the entire :nount. 20 also listed an additional advantage
of towed artillery, its li.1hter \mit
In a article for the Journal or the United States
Artillery ti tIed tt Track-Laying Artillery, tt l":aj T.
Carpente!' recalled the significance of tactical :nobility :!on I.
13i,':a,j ,J'ebster A. rlOrdnance ..lotor 2.quip..'11ent for Artil
lery T:-ans!,ort, II The Field J\rtillery Joumal, Vol. Ijo. 5
(Sep-Oct 20), pp. 455-4-37.
19Co1 Lucian 3. Artillery," Army Ordnance,
Vol. I, 1 (Jul-Aug 20), pp. 8-14.
20Light artillery was at this time ?r1ncipally aL"!1ed by direct
fire techniques. -rhus displacement from aind.ng stakes (used in indi
rect fire) was not a consideration in Colonel iooqy's listing of this
an advantage.
21Col Lucian 3. 'r:-:otorized Combat II
Ordnance, Vol. :1:, :';0. 6 c-lay-Jun 21) t p. 303.
20
ne went on to state:
The greatest product of the late war 3elf
jun Hount, of the track laying t;roe, though it played no
active part in the war. It is certain that in the next war,
all other conditions being equal
t
the on land \.,111 rest
wi th c..'-le side which can fi rst bring into action a preponderence of
artillery having the nobillty to be obtained only with this tY';)El of
carriaga.
22

Co:lparinG towed artillery with self-pro,elled artillery't

he listed as advantaE:"es of the latter, ability to fire 3600
and to ?ositions ra?idly, and less and road S?HCe required.
had been cite0 before. Additionally, he listed greater speed and
!'lobili ty, both tactical end strategic, the :nore stable gun :lOunt, less
fuel cons\J:"l?tion t and less Cral-l personnel. And, unlike other "'ri.
ters, !1e thought self'-pro'f.)elled wea1?Ons l-Tould be easier to 23
f!1.e disadvantages he listed were tlprime :"'lover out--cannon O\lt," higher
uni t weight of :"lounts J and Ifinfle:xible ?rin:.e tI
:".. a.jor thought the last of little consequence.
24
Ce.!'?enter !lredicted that in th.e next 'tolar "Hould lead
the infantr'J, whic.'-1 'trould ?robably be :"lotorized, and that tan..:Cs would
meet r.lore resista.'lca than in -.iorld \'Tar I. would have to
aCCOr:1?Bn:' to cO::lbat tanks, machine nests, anti-tank 3..'I'}d
light artillery. This artillery would be a
direct fire ,,,reapon.
2
5 It is not u,o clear :1'0:'1 his article hoW' this
tJ!>e of would differ from thg 1he article
22.:
a
j of. It Self-Pro-pelled Track-Lay-lng Art5.l
lery': ?8.!'t I,t' Journal of the thited states Artillery, Vol. i.IV, 4
21), p. 321.
23Ibid., Part II, UV, 5 21), :J. 450.
24rbid. t P"9. 4..50-451. 25Ibid., pp. 451-452.
hOl-rover, a;,;onfj t.he first to discuss artillel".v "Tit!'"' to
arllored forces.
In his annual re'Oort for 1922, Chief of Field re
ported that, th reSl:)6ct to artillery transoort J there \olE.S a wide
difference of ooini.on as to whether ell visj 0\1 she uld be horse
or tractor-drawn.
26
In 1923, the Ordn.a.l1ca De-partr;lent invr s-cou."ltry
vehicles \m:.ch co1.lld serve all ar.ns in forNard echelons ir. the field.
3ased on its test,'. the listed the follo'wing as
of tl"al1s!Jort cO::'l'Oared to towed loads, could
trailers as Hell as cannon: 27
--less efficient because tmred artillel'Y could he :noved 'Iii th less
horsc")ower
--less both tactical and because of the Greater
unit ght
--"inflexible prir:l9 :"1over"
--"!=>ri:'le :,ovar out-- C:L"IDon out"
--more difficult to canoufla
0
e
--state of the art not develo?ed enougn
--too eX!Jonsive.
Tne reco!::1lended that all self--pro?elled vehicles be
nated at this time.
23
26"Annual Report of tho Chief of Field Arti11er;y' for Fiscal
1922,11 Field .Artillery JOH:'tl)al, Vol. Ho. 6 (i'!ov-Dac 22),
"0. 472.
27r ha.ve the eli sadvantages a.ctually ci ted to re
flect their pertinence to transport.
Cross Country Cargo Vehioles," 1he Artillery
Journal, Vol. XIII, :3 (:ll\Y-Jun 23), 250-255
22
sa:i..e :,rea:- (1923), the Field Artillery' conducted
over a six ,?eriod to deter-".ine the tactical of se1.f
mounts for lisht d::.v:.sion cO='l"9ared to or
tractor-drawn artillery. The boa.rd tested both the ciolt CC'ld c.."lristie
light self-oropelled weapons, and that on ti19n be dis-
c:>ntinued. It based this on reasons cited hefore:
pri:;le :-:lover out--cannon out," heavJ unit and in
!lrovidinr; cover and conceal:nent. ..aintenancc ,,:as also connidert d n
pro:>lan, because artillerrj' could not oe while .rort:
was on the 3ut, in
vievI, the !:ost da"TU1ing indictl1ent against self-,?I'O!Jelled Q:--ti
the tmreliability of its vehicular cO;":l?onents. 29 lbe boaro considered
to be :nora reliable, and more r.!ooile, both tactically and stra
tebically, and ii'l general, fa.vored a.."li!:'!al transport over
tra.'1.sport.3
0
E'1.e of Field in his annual for 192;"
reco!TI:"1ended that division artillery be horse-drawn, not
the first ,hase of the argument of towed ver
sus self-propelled there ,,,as a.."'1other, concurrent argurr.ent:
horse-dra\om a.rtillery versus latter argu:nont
(as ,rell as most other contern:norar:r arg1r1snts about field artillery')
29The board also considered that vehicles in genel'al required
more maintenance and skill than horses.
3OlIHorses, '1'ractors and Self-Propelled lwne Field
Artiller,! Journal, Vol. i:III, i:o. 6 (Hov-Dec 23), 472-492.
P.e"Oort of the Chief of Field Artillery," The
Artillery Journal, Vol. XIV. No. 2 24), !>. J17.
-oertained to eli lieht artiller-J. of the !,e!'
tainin3 to "t,o;red versus self-pro?clled artillo1'"j Here sta.t.ed in terns
of dissdvantazes of artilleFJ, rather
than advantages of self-,rooelled artiller'1 anel advantages of tOrlec.
arti:!.lery. In most eases it can be inferred thllt disadvarktages of self-
pro:!,elled artillor'J 't-rere t concurrently, advantage s of towed artillery.
to have been 1eneral that
artillery the best configuration for occupying tions rapidly.
'J.tJ.g was considered the 9ri:'Ile advantage at this ti.l1e. O?inion to
be div:..ded as to whether or not self-propelled artillery was than
towed artillery 1-d.th res!,ect to tactieal r-lobility. ar
tiller} was not rated highly the standpoint of strategic
3ut, recalling t."1at at t.l.is tolred artillery was tractor-dra....m,
this last 1eficiency rright to both of !:'".echanized arti.:l:
lery t:-ansool"t. To achieve a.dequate strategic mobility, b:>th self-
propelled, tOI-red, and horse-c1:'a\oTn 8.l..tillerJ would have to oe transported
to the by
Of 't.'le technic,ql advantages of self-progelled arti.ller.r, its
ability to :!"ire throughout 360 by s.'lif'ting the entire mount was al.'ilost
universally propo\D'l.ded. '!his advantage must be viel-red in the light of
the preponderance of direct fire for light at
time. 1be heaV"J unit weight or selt-p:-opelled mO\mts was 't.."le cilia.:' dis
advantage. '.ieight affected their strategic and taetical mobility by
t.i.ng their bridge crossing capability. The uniting of the cannon
to the prL"":1.e :nover raised two other reasons as disadvantagos of self-
propelled artiller-J: "prime mover out-- cannon out" and "inf'lexib1e
II
nover.
24
the Jero Board or 30ard nor
;.,Titers in publications cited considered to any orient the
:':lechanical lirnitations of artillery. :lor did any of the
above do r.luch testing of equi!,):r..ent. Both the fro::l the Ord"18..'1ce
and the Field Artillor:' 30ard were based on tef;ts and
or these organizations considered r.lee..1.anical li:nitations qui
tant reasonf for not ado!1tin3 artillery a.t this ti,e.
It would ap?ear the state of the art wa.s not sufficlE.ntly developed
to produce reliable artillery.
Little cu.!sideration "Ias given during this 'Phase to arti:L'i1ery

with an.'1ored forces. tlor lias the truck evaluated as a means of 1<iOOng
artillery.
The Second Phase:
In 1928, the War .Depart.rnent created a . l"orce on an
experimental basis. This force was a non-divisional, sel::"-contained
organization l-11th tanks as its main wea-pons, :possessing mobility
and striking p0l-ler for offensiva action.
32
'me considera:'ion of artil
lerJ support fo!' thi s zed Force marked the beginning of the
second phase of the argurr.ent of tot-red versus self-propellf)d artillery
in the U. S. Army prior to "otlar II. Artillery suppo:-t tor the
Force and tho armored forces which followed wa:3 to be the
first of two princ1!,al factors influencing the argl.tJ1ent of towed versus
self-propelled during this second ?hase. The second factor
was that the U. S. Army received very 11t Ue money dUring thi s
J2"'1'he Hechanized Force," The Field Artiller;r
Journal, Vol. XvrII, 4 (Jul-Aug 28), pp. )86-392.
25
Ibis f:ect.)nd was to '9revent materiel of any 501t bein3
developed for the Ju-my, and to ca.use Army planners to :nateriel
for equi"9!>ing the i1.rY!y in tams of strict a.l1sterit:;.
Artillery for the Hechani zed Force 1-laS pri:narily traotor-dra.wn
light artillery, wi. th t:-ucks to transport both cannon and
I
on lon8 l"Qad to enhance strategic Additionally. the
liolt light self-!,ropelled built seven years before, were
used.)3, 34
artillerJ the Force did not
,el"for:n too kl observer that the pieces were not

were unreliable, and too for tiring "9rl.pa.!'a
tions. of these deficiencies were caused by the state of the
art, or how "lare caused by the state of the cannot be
determ.ned. rne observer recor.unended that lilht artillery with the
?orce be truC:c-dratm, sinoe tractors "rere too s:Low, and the
transport of tractor-drawn was not
But another thought admitting
the existinz artillery uas not adequate J !.!a.j :?ane E.
I10yle stated:
Self-pro?elled artillerJ is considered absolutely necessar'; a
force. To bui:ld a tank sufficiently large tor cC"rying
light a..'ld nedilrtl guns and hO'tdtzers calls for the "Land Battleshi!l,tt
slo't-l-moving and a :?lost vulnerable target. It has no place in our
;:echanized Force. Self-pro-pelled artiller'J can be fast moviY1g and
present a s=nall target and must be close at hand to support the
J:3
Ib
J:.g.
J4r...t Col P. De Glassford, tiThe Force. Facts and
'lheories," The Field Artillery Journal, '/01. XVIII, 6 (Nov-ll9c 28),

35
Ibid

26
advance of the li and r.ledi ttr.. tws. 36
:ie ",rent on to list advantages of artiIlel'"J: it
could occupy positions and required smaller .-:oyle
i:-tolied that protection for the crews might be integral ,nth
artillery. '.'his ?erha!,s, the first indication that
-r>rotection was an advantage of artillery; later,
the tart:ls tlar;1!Jred 8."'1d "self-pro";,)911ed artiller"J" '-Tare to
beCOt1e al.!:lost synonymous. As disadvantages, he listed the alr.l0st ";'by
now) tradi "'Or:Lna :aover out--cannon out.. and "inflexible !Jr-l:..e
n:over
u
_Tajor rloyle further ?ointed out that
vehicles could not be L"'!lpressed as self-propelled mounts; purely r.-.ili
tarof vehicles nust be used.
37
1'his last point was listed in
light of ted states' in 'Oroduc1ng ar:ns during ({orld
..:ar I.
"l'he use of cor:unereial in was considered
from a diff:lrent tack by another ::;riting in The Field
Artillerr JO'lma! in 1929, ":'iaj L. R. Cole stated: ttjost serious
[liTflitationJ of all is t.'1e fact that it [selr-prooelled artillery] is
an exclusively :n.ilitar-/, design and does not fit in loli th arlJ" co:nercial
need, hence only a. limited number of manufacturers \r.i.ll be prepared to
it in emerge!lcies.
u33
ae listed as additional
self-?ro:?elled artillery's hea"'J "leight, difficulty of ooncealJ!lant", and
36:iaj Z. In?.. iioyle
t
'l'he Field
Journal, Vol. 1-:0. :3 23), p. 243.
37Ibid., ? 244.
3
3
::aj l.. Cole, ttAlI-Puroose Artiller.l "rraction,Ume Field
Artiller-r Journal t Vol. 6 D-c 29) t -p. 647.
----------------------------------
27
na cited the necessity for the e!'ltire to traverse ane.
that the ,ieces 1...0:::-e co :mlicated and enensi vee 39 Cole
a '"'; cavability key to :>ri:lle and -::>ro
,?o:l."1dad a of uhoeled ,,ehicles convertib!.e t::> tracked vehicles
(as the C:Lristie vehicles).40
In 1930, Jeneral .:;jur.nTlel"'all. the Chief of ;jtaff, !'ecalled tl'ie
need for to accompany the infantry in as sault in
,;ar I. ite felt that there was still a real need for an
gun, and it si",1". tid be sel f-pro?elled. He did not think there was
yet a sui table desi g:'l for this wea'')O:1. It would have have good tac
tical mooillty, and :rrlst have ere-il !J1"otectio!1. he stated that
self-pro::Jellecl artiller:r 't-l8S uindispe'1sable for a ::leche.n.ized force. n
sit1dfica::1.tly, he t:ent on to state that the force
oe em?loyed in batteries.
41
tc this
ti;lle, artillery ln th [ar:nore<n forces had been of in
the fOr:-l of individual guns tanks.
T'ne use se can.l'1on as ;;tU15 for the
infantry was tested by the Infantry Boa.rd in 1931. ;.J""l 1i.
artiller:-1 piece of 1920-21 lITQS used in the test. I"ne 'ooard conclu'ied
t:"at a self-,?ro?elled gun "of !Jro?er construction" ,.,as the de::iira
lHGan c. Sumerall, "Field Artiller'J ?rograss," l'he E'ieJ.d
Artillery Jomn,al, Vol. :io. 6 (i:ov-Dac 3D), pp. 605-606.
:van J. F'oster, trA ;rest of an Gtm," The
Field .Artillerv Joumal, Vol. XXI, 3 C:ay-Jun 31), P? 31-329.
23
As the second deca.do after ,':0 r ld I \lore on, the r 3
placed the tractor for toned 3,1'tillerJ. 'lone trucks were fcwter and
:nora reliable t.han the tractors, were basicall;.,r of ',",ar t:
t
design. Less and less was heard about self-oro:)elled artil:.er'7 v:hich
i'Tas still of ,lorld .iar : design and manufacture. :n 1935, tne Field
.Artillery 3cilool stated tnat the trend artillery
was marked by" the use of truc.l<s as I'ne,y were cheaoer and
:":"lore readily available in mobilization [than other for:ns of ::1echa.rri.eal
tra..l1spor'Q .43 in 1 1st Lt Francis J. in his thesi:) for the
Course titled
El'lployment of Field Artillery with .lechanizod CavalrJ, II wrote
there was no in use in the U. J. at
t.l-tat tiJle. Self-propelled could, he thought, havo good cross
countr.r mobility and ?!'ovide a.r:.lor for creW' protection. i t
be corr.;>licated, and the fa'niliar ltprille out--cannon out" disadvan
tage--fror.1 stand?oint of :necha."'lica..l reliabili rat:h.er than ene"ny
action--was cited by Lieutenant Hall. concluded that trucks of eoru
r.:ercia.l design would be adequate for :nechanized fc'rces
they ha.d sufficient mobility and were cheaoer.
44
l'he ST)ectacle of ;;orld II in &rope and the success of the
Geman tI?anzer
tr
div.i.sions interest in forces in the

--'The Field Artillery 3chool, .Qi..g9St of Field Artiller..i Devel
oPMents (Fort Sill, O!<lahoma: 1'he Field Artillery School Printing
Plant, 1935), p. 63.
1.I41st Lt Francis J. Hall, "Organiza.tion, end Tactical
Bnployment of Field Artillery wi th Cavalry" (unpublished
Itegular Artillery Advanced Course dissertation, 'fue Field Artillery
School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1935), pp. 10-21.
29
u. ,::). Arr:lY, and in artiller:r to su?port In 1941, th.e newly fomed
2d A.n-r.orec! ilivision was el1?loyed in :::aneuvers in '!'ennessee.
wi th the eli vision wa.s ?5T:r:;} gu:."lS tOHed by half-trao:<s. An observer at
the tho nalf-tracks satisfaotory, but thought
divisions have self-propelled artillery.45
At about t:'1e ti!:le of the ;J'ni ted Jtates' entrance into .:orld ;jar
II, the Field :Jchool listed one advantage of sel7."-oronelled
artillerJ-": s1>0ed in Jccupji.ng oosi tions. 'lhe school considered
that "due to taoti em:>loyment," artil. 1 e r"j ....rould re
quire crew and and heavyr
\-J'eight due to -;o1as i ts disadvantage. Other disadvantages
1-lare difficulty of conceaL'7lent, a.",d unavailability or the cannon
while the vehicular cor.t?Onents '\Tare b9ing !'1aintained. t;.6 It that
the Field i\,rti!lery 3chool considered to'\<red artillery th.e princi9a1 kind
\nth reS99ct to in the U. 3.
ar-tiller;y was tl s'Jecial 1{ind a.nd of li::ilited i:.lportanoe.
the second of the versus
artillery in the C. 3. Array prior to II, self-
artillery almost considered with resJect
to a..":"mored forces. :?l t.lUs light, its ontef' advantages were ability to
occupy tions and ca?ability for annor orotection. Ihe ad
vantage cited in the first phase, of fire throughout 360 by turning the
IAvrence Collin s., It Armored Field Artillery in the
Tennessee Haneuvers," '!be Field Artillety Journal, Vol. 9
(Sap 41), !,p. 698-699.
46The Field Artillery School, Instruction AEIIlorandtmt: u'n
struction of Field Artillery Nateriel (Fort Sill, Oklahona: '!he Field
Ju-tillery School Printing Plant, 1942), 61.
30
entire :10unt, vTas no longer an advantage beca.use satisfactory indirtlct
fire ?rocedures had been for light artillery. In fact, the
on-carriage traverse of self-propelled ?ieces of this time a
disadvantage.
47
vt.'lor disadvantages of self-oropelled a..wt:5.11ery were
cited in both phases: f1pri.r.le mover out--cannon out," heavy unit
(nolo1 increased \'11th ar:n.or) t and difficulty of conceaLnent. D..1rin the
second phase, mechanical limitations and of maintonance were
disadvantages that oame to the tore. It that r,l&ny disad
vantages of art"lllery contributed to th.e argument for
totred artilleI".I.
47Indirect fire procedures required the exact alizrunent of
cannon with respect to aiming stakes. Tuming of the entire self
propelled mOlmt tor large defiect10n shirts made realignment of the
aiming stakes necessary--a time consuming procedure. nus ?rocedure
was not generally required for the com})arable case (shirting trails) in
towed artillel'"J.
'fne 3attinrr
It was out .in II that with the of
t.he u. S ar::'!')rod forces, the a1";:"tr:lant of toweci versus 5e1:.....
oeca":1e an of o!' these of
artillery better for ar."lorod forces, :-ather than 1-f.l-lcn
II on t:rl.s to the Al thou::h ;'ni'tiall:J" not
ar::l0rec. divisions we!'e yd. self-!lro:Jelled l-TeapOns, "":Jy the end
of the \-Tar all had 'lbere a0gear to {lave been
instances of bein1 lsed in direct
of infa.'1try divlsions durin'S :iorld II. 1':-0 self-nrocelled artillery
battalions su'):"orted an eli vision .\.n the !:ormanr 1
division \1aS used at t.i.-nes in suP?ort of inrant:.... Y' di
visions, and the 4th Infantrrf llivlsion ;\rtiller;r had self-l1!'C\Jellad
CantlOn for a 2 dow8ver, fo!" the :.10st :;lart, artillery with infantry
divi si ons ,las to"red.
l Lt Col ?aul P. at al., of
Artillery 3attalions: A F.esearch ?s'Oort" (Fort [.nox, 'ilia
Armored 3chool, 1949-195')), -p_ 25_ .
21eadquarters States Forces, 'fheater Ooera
tions, u:leport of the General Board: .study of the Organization,
a."ld 'actical of the Infantr'.f Division (.!_ 1)46),
15, p. 10.
31
32
Thore to have been little se:!..f-?l"':>'Oelled ar-:illarr.: used
in the iJacific theaters of o'Jerations. IherEI ilere no eli visions
there. J Of the 67 divlsiO!lS that StL\v in ZurooeiLl1
terral'1ean meaters of O!)erations. 16 Here ar:r.ored divisions.'"
I"nus it ';"'205 in (and Africa) artil-
-rTas ar:nored divisions, Hillen \fere 3. con!=)ideraole
I
of the C. :j. 5 co:1bat OOt-Ter in tl'lat 'Jart of the \OTo4,...ld. 1'uo .-.0,'le15
of self-ryropelled cannon nredo:-r:inated: 105-:1r.1 hOt:i t
zar, and the self-?ro1elle,1 Althouga the
trac.1.< was used as a l)rime for artillery (?arti cularly :.::
jorth Africa.), the princi:.:>al nrime ,"'lovers for' to..reci artiller.r the
ton for lieht arti:J.er-J, the ton truck for "lled.iU'":l 8.!'tillery,
and the tractor
me argu:lent of towed versus self-::>ropelled artillE!r'.i, as it
related to the eX!;)erience of ',iorld ..iar I! J t-las vrl respect to the ad
vantages and of in
divisions. to have been little consideration of self
artill.er:r for other ty?9
'?:lis cha?ter address itself to considerine exoerionce
of the 'far as it :-elates to t.."le advanta.:;es and disadvantag-as of sel f
-oro-oelled artillery during the are;U"!'lent ?rior to ',.lar II.
----'
3Qoj,bat :utvisions of 'n"orld Har II (:'lashin:;ton: Ar-nJ 1':U"1es,
1945), pp. 1-95.
4rbid.
5For brevi.tyt these tl,"O !'ieces will be referred to as the
and respectively. throur..;hout t.1rl.s chapter.
33
The Advantaces of
occuoation of the of the
seemed a advanta3e.
ci ted rapid of nosi tion as and afterw.3.rds t
eveyrtoJ o?inion on nrtiller'"j, :>ro or c)n, consid
ered ita." ir.:?ortant advantage. Col Ii. 4th Armored Jivision
Artiller:t Co=nm.ander, conside:-ed ra!,id occupation of tiO:1S ver-J i;n
!,orta.'1t in the self-?ro!,elled artillery.
6
Lt Col
Exton, an battali.on in both :!orth Africa and =:uroge t fE'l t
his pieces better _:1 thi.s than towed ;-iowever, did
I
not consider it to be as i;'Mortant as the be:' tar tacti ty of
sel--r.>ronalled artillery. 7 Col I. A.l"r.lored Division
Artillery also considered artille-r'J
in occu9y:i..ng posttions, but tllat this llas not as significant as the
o
armor protection of self-!=>ro?elled artiller"J....J Col Frederic J. Jrown,
3d Division Artiller'J Cor.nnander, about the <.:olonels
Graham and Xurtz were referring !=>riM3rily to the ::7), thoUf;!1.t better
tactical mobility of the :-112 more rapid occupation of
position. 9
one seemed to think self-propelled artillery was slower than
towed artiller:-; in occupying :!,ositions; however, this advantage did not
I"
Col .':. K. !{ur"tz, "Self-Propelled vs. rowed ArtillarJ, ,iU1r.lU
ni tion,'f (3d iJ. S. Ann:y Artillery Conference, 1945), p. 16.
7Lt Col iIug.."l Ebcton, 'Fran liorocco to Serlin," ':r.l8 Field
JOU!'l1al, Vol .xxxViII, J (i'-1ay-Jun 4-3), p. 10.].
?p. 13-16.
9Col Frederic J. "S!learhead Artillery: Ille 3tor'J the
3d .Armored Division Artillery," '!he Field Artillery Journal, Vol.
No.9 (Sap 46), p. 506.
as innortant in the of the t-lar. 111e ti.-aes self
pl"opelled cannon Here used for assault fire
10
(especially the
indicates that in this onploY"lent at least, ra:nid occupati()n of nesi tion
was a significant advantage ')f selt-propellE,d artillery. 11 12
had been considered
tant in the second phase
1
) of the Ar6W1ent bet"-teen the wars. Colonel
i\urtz (CO, 14th .atvision Artiller-J) thought .it qui r,8 i:npor
t.ant;14 Colonel &eton (CO, :17 battalio!l), an advantage.
15
Col Carl I.
liutton, cO:"r'lander of an battalion and later, 2d Armored Division
Artillery Coman !', liked the armor protection of the .:7 because o..r its
value in fire fights with infantry and tanks.
16
But fror..
bp.ttalions stated that \oTas not too L'1l'!Jortant.
17
1he X12' s, being roamum artillery, \.f9r9 generally further to the rear
than the they did fire assault fire missions.
10As sault fire in artillery is extrc3'1lely accurate, short range
destruction tire at point targets (Dictionary 9 \hited St.!tes Army
:'cerms, .A.a. 320-5 liitwlU.ngton: U. S. Joverrnnent Printing Office, Apr 6f),
? 49.) One piece of medium or heavy artillery is usually employed for
each target. Because or the short range (the target is wit.hin sieht of
the cannon), cannon tiring assault tire missions quito often soon come
under small anns and intense cotU'lterbattery tire.
11:readquarters First United States Army, Information
3ervice, No.4" (Jun p. 46.
12rIeadquarters First United States .A.my, "J\rtiller-J Information
Service, :Iemorandun '1
11
(Dec 44), p!>. 16-22.
1J'lhe terns It socond 'Ohase" and tI first -chase" refer to the
phases of the arglrnent prior' to r,-lorld -iiar II developed in C'napter 11
(pp. 17, 24)
1l+.,. t 13 1St:\.- 3
h.ur Z, '0. ;:>. 10'.
16Co1 Carl I. Hutton, ttAn Armored Field Artillery CoITk'1lander in
the European 'Theater" (Fort SlU, Cklahoma, 1951), ? 251.
17uArtillery Information 3ervice, No.7," '9. 93.

35
protection obviously added to the uei ght of the seeMS to
have been little evaluation as to whether the ?rotection the
weight.
of the argt1r.lents orior to ,iar made a
distinction between ta.ctical a."ld strategic !T.obility. dis
tinction vTas not generally tr.ade wi th to artillerJ in
in :-lc"rld II meant cross-countz-:r
and can be equated for the :ilOst part to the earlier tern, tactical no
bility. Lt Le\-rl. ... ::t. 3correr, writing about his battalion in
of the 3d Armored 'Qi.vision, reported that the superior mobi.li ty
of self-propelled medium was ver.y Lnportant. In
across France, }--4i.s battalion was the artiller-j" heavier
than 105r.1m howitzers
15
that could kee? up with the lI.3pearhead Di.vision.
u1
)
The 1st :;. 3. !'aporting on th:-ee battalions ::.J..e'..l
tenant 3correr's), stated: "TIle of
,,20
artillezo:)" lies in its tactical mobiLi.ty. Lt Col J. 0-1.
:':c?heeters, co:nr.lander of an battalion, re:.>orted that hi s pieces
could go almost everywher'e.
21
Colonel Ebctcn (CO, battalion) con
siderad the excellent nobillty of the -,:7 the outstandi.ne: characteri sti c
18 organic to armored d:ivi sions in 'dorld ','Iar II was
three :':7 battalions. aeavier artiller'J attached. Infantry di vi
sions ha.d three 10,5r.m and one 15,5m.'i'l holdtzer battalions organic. '
19Lt :Atwis ?-. .3coi'f'er, "An i:12 Battalion in Combat," J.t'le Field
ArtillelX Journal, Vol. l..XlV, ]0. 1 (Jan 45), ?p. 29-)1.
20UArtillery Information 3ervice, '1," p. 93.
21
J'J'f!!j' Ground Forces Board, "Intervieus on Cor:na."d
Acti vi ties with Orficers of the 1st Az!nored DLvision: Italy,
aovember 16-29, 1943, II p. 33.
of
h.ough there see::lS to be general the .,.12 had
su?erior :!lobiil ty to comoarable tOlled calibers, not all thoul;ht the :.7
'tTas to t?wed howitzer. Colonel .:..urtz
the -.7 had :,obility
but qualified this vdth his observation that t!le truck was bette!' tha."l
the in 23 Indicating, perha:;>5 , the state of the art at the
Colonel uointed out that neither to\'1ed nor
artillery could all types of terrain.
24
ilie 1st u. .;:it
.had this to say' about the ,
'mile it has been proved Q.n :1orth .Africa and ItaJ.i) t:1at the !:'lotor
carriage nossesses abil'tty to negotiate ter!'.rln, it ha.s
been found that truck drawn has been able to negotiate
successfullj" any terrain required 'Jf the 1<.-7 (with the exce'ntion of
dee? sand). are well suited for
emolo"/ment in direct sury'O::>rt of a:n-ohibious assaults EJ'ld executed
over beaches of a sandy nature.
2
5 L
The neld Artillery .3attalion, on ouerations in 3icily
also considered the .. s excellent for la11ding ooerations, but after
the landing, "white ele":)hants.
fI
'he towed 105' s, it were just as
:"'lobile a.s the s. 26
.3urely no would argue that good ":'lobility was not
portant for 3ut it not all
wea'Oons were uni'V'ersallY acclai:lled in ...Jorld II as having suoeriol"
ty than that of towed artiller'J.
23;( t 13
24-,., . d
.. ton, 10'.1. ..ur .

25Headquarters First States "Artillery Info:nnation
Service, .'lemorandurn 1" (.!. Jan 44) J p. 1J.
26Eeadquarters 10th Field Artillery .2attalion, ane .:.as
sons of the Sicilian Cam9aignf' (29 Jul 4) t p. 1.
37
0thel" advantages.--Colonel (C'], .:7 battalion) considered
the ca?abl:'..i ty of to a''1.'11uni tion "''i th it an but
:"lot 8,S i:i1?ortant an as l1'lobili ty or ar:'P.o!' 27
.:urtz listed as a of towed artillery' the
tion .,r ilud and/or ice on the cannon 'When towed in bad \oreat:Ler.
?ro'oelled cannon did not have oroble':1, :'e observed. 23
'The of JU-tillery
vleight.-- :('hi5 \.;as considered the ;sreatest in
tne first 'Ohase 0_ -;)rior to ,'iorld ....:ar II, a.-.,d :l siglifica.'1t
disadva."taE;e in the second Colonels and EXton consider.l,d
it ilia disadvantage of self-oro.:lelled artiller.:.,.29,)O In a
summary of artillery co:nbat 9X";)erience, Field Artillery ;'Jchool re
?orted tnat to't.md artillery had better distributiotl..:
n
Ine
heaV'j weight of the created in crossing It
a?oears that heavy se, was not as a disadvantage 3S
was It did have an effect on
ever.
:""loveLQ.ut--cannon out. u_-'1'his disadvantage t-Tas i..'ll:JOrt.ant
in bota of the prior to II; however,
---------------------------_._---
2'7i,t Col ,'. Exton, 'tFrom to 3erlin," me ?i.eld
ArtillerY Jou.rn511, Vol. 4 (Jul-Ang 43), "0. 13:;.

h 1.1, ,. 14

30 .
Vol. AXXViII, 4, p. 10d.
31.rl1e Field Artillery Sc.l-}ool, "3ecret Information .3u.1mar-j !':urn
bel" One" (Fort ..3111, Oklaho:na, Feb 44), 129. ('This re90rt has been
declassified).
Information Service, ]0. 4,t 46.
]i3
'toJ'as surprisingly litUe mention of th.is as a disadvantage during tiorld
dorld II. :'iaj C. a. P..evie, who commanded a equipped at fi rst
v..i th tOl-Ied 105' s, and laotar loTi th s, considered uprime ver out-
ca.'1non outll a significant disadvantage. 33
'1't<10 factors te!lded to cloud the issue of out-
cannon out,tt per se, as a first was t..'le of
ri!aintenance ...,roblams. If a co:ttr.1ander had f61f !Jroblems in kee!>ing all of
his pieces o!,erational, then "!,ri:ne r.1over out--cannon out" had little
si gnificance for him. (Aaintenance proble:i15 'Hill be folic fl
ing.) Ibe second factor was the difference in of in
artillery batteries; batteries ha.d four cannon, the:.7 batteries,
six.
34
, 35 .A aJ.'tillery battalion with six
pieces out of aotion could still set as much steel on the target as his
towed artillery' oounte11>art.
36
(
orgblems.--All machinery :;>oses
self-nronelled oannon had more towed cannon and their
.
?ril:19 movers primaril..v be cause the:}r lo1ere !ilOre machines th r;,ore
parts. .Uso, the lack of expertise in maintaining track-layinfj vehicles
33u::LntervieloTS on Cor:1..lnand Activities ldth Officers o.r the
1st Ar.nored Division: Italy, :rovamber 16-29, 1943," p. 38.
s., -..ra:r Departlilent, 'ractics and Technique: i3atta.lion and
2attery, F:l 6-101 C'iashington: U, S. Government Printing
Office, 28 Jun 44 , p. 220.
35u. S., Department, Armored DiV1si.on ArtilleI;,", 6-105
C,'lashington: U. S. CDvernment Printing Oftice, 15 Aug 44), p. 2.
361he U. S. Army changed to six cannon per firing batter'J for
all light and medium artillery units after II, largely based
on the greater destruction wrought by six cannon compared to four, :!is
demonstrated by armored division
39
contr-.l.buted to the n"..!r.ber of of self-uro
palled artillery. ,self-oro,elled artillery's disadvantage of f?;reate:'
:1aintenance ::>roblens was in the second :,hase of t.he arst..t:nqnt
nrior to II. .:ajor Revie (CO, ho\ritzor, later
,:7, battalion) considered maL"ltenance as a serious disadvantage.
reported that hi s :':7' s needed one to tl[O days of maintenance
for every 500 rules travaIled. J? ine 1st U. 3. abo:!':.
.:.7' s, pointed out increased as a disadvantage of self-Jr')
naIled cannon; 33 ) did the field ArtillezrJ in its Sllr.'t'n&r'j 0 f
artillery activities in COi"llbat.39 :Jut not all considered ita dis&dfan
tage. Colonel cO""1."!1anded an .:7 battalion in the sa."1e
di vision as .:ajor Hevie) felt that r:'laintenance procedures elL'lli
nated 40 Th.e 1st w. ::;. Ar:f'.y t re?Orting on the .:12,
stated that after six of combat, aU 1.reapons in three battalions
stil:!. in action. It attributed this to construction of -the
chassis and eood unit maintenance, backed u? by excellent Ordnance
Lieutenant Scoffer, lmting about one of these ba.ttalions,
stated that in the nursuit across Northern France, the had
fa,,-: maintenance ::>roble:ns. Colonel (CO, !Av:i.. siC'in
J7"Interviews on Armored Command Activities with Officers of
the 1st Armored Division: Italy, November 16-29, 1943," ? 33.
33'Artillery Information Service, :IemorandUC1 No. 1til p. 1).
J91f3ecret Information 3ummary, One," 129.
40UInterviews on Armored Command Activities with Of'ficers of
the 1st A..'t1fnored Division: Italy, November 16-29, 194J,ft p. 39.
41.. Artiller-.f Infomation Service, No.7, rt "9. 21..
42
Scoffer, JO.
that there was increased wear the cannon ?arts
the s and . s cO:'1!Jared to t!1e to"rec. 10.501''n howitzers and 15.5:'11\
guns. 43
It that :naintena.l'lce were not as serious a cis-
advantage as had been earlier, and that then, as today,
they could by 9roper
"Inflexible 'OM.me :nover."--This disadvantage is linked to the
"pri!l1e mO"J'er out--cannon out" disacivantage, but had not been considered
too i.11?ortant prior to .'K>rld II. JiPparently the experience of ti1.e
war showed "inflexible -ori'11e ::laver" to be a runor disadvantage, too.
Both Revie and the Field Artillery 3chool listed it as a disadvan
tage of artillery. 45 Colonel cited the
flexibility of towed artillery movers as an advantage of towed
utillery. 46 All of above artillerymen oonsidered Itinflexib1e
mover
r
in the of a..'T1.'nu."'li.tion
Concealr.1ent, --lAfficulty of concealment was considered more or
a disadvantage in the first phase 't.i-}an in the second phase of the a.rgu
ment prior to 1.I-ar II. 'he 10th field Artillery Batta.lion
this as a deficiency of artillery,47 as did the 1st U. S.
Anr;y.43 Both organizations considered the high silhouette of the :!'7 the
43
Kurtz, 13.
44Ulnterviews on Armored Corarnand Act!vities wit.h Of"ficers of
the 1st ArtBored 1li.vi s1?n: Italy, 16- 29 t 194Jt" p. 3d.
4.5uSecret Inromation Summary, Number One," '9. 129.
46.. t 15
z, 9.
47"Notes and Lessons of the Sicilian Ca:n9aign," p. 1.
48., Artillery Inf'onnation service, Hemorandum No.1, If 13.
41
drawback in this res;>ect. Colonel f.urtz cited the smaller target !'rE
sented by towed pieces as an advantage of towed artillery. 49 1ajor
Ravie thought the hard to c&r.1ouflage, and additionally, he stated
that it left tell-tale tracks into the oosition area, whereas the tOl-red
could be manhancUed.5
0
traverse.--rhis disadvantage had never been considered
as significant as others. Lt Col I. 3. tlashburn, c01":\enting on the .:7,
sta.ted that it had to be realigned to its airrdns stakes quite often be
cause it was to shift to fire on many targets to the
and rea.r.51 (He imolied that targets tro:n all quarters "1a5 a hazard
COITlZ'lon to artillery wi th divisions.) Revie thought that
,..
just the turning of the was more difficult than
trails on the towed howl tzer. 52 But ':Alonel (Cu, 4th Armored
Division Artillery) felt the 2':7 could shift faster than the towed 10.smm
howitzer. 53
Other disadvantages.--deither the nor the A12 had an in.'1erent
capability for high angle fire. Colonel t..'tis lL"dta
tion as a disadvantage. 54 Q)lonel Kc?heeters (CO, battalion) was
able to high angle fire by siting his s on reverse slo:.'es.55
49Kurtz, 15.
50UlnterviEnls on Connnand Activities with Officers of
the 1st Ar:nored Division: Italy, November 16-29, 1943,11 p. 38.
S1 Lt Col I. B. 9,Jashburn, "Armored FA. Across France,tI Field
Artillery Journal, Vol. xrJ..V, No. 4 (Apr 45), pp. 204-205.
5
2
nInterviews on Armored Command Activities with Jfficers of
the 1st .Armored Division: Italy, November 16-29, 1943,11 38.
p. 16. 54"Kurtz, p. 15.
55"Interviews on Armored Command Activities with Officers of
the 1st Armored Division: Italy, NOV8.11ber 16-29, 194;,tt p. ;P.
42
There "UlS very little othe:, cor.rnent on this limitation. fuel con-
or self-:>ropelled pieces a disadvantage in the view of the
1st 0. S. Ar-::rry and Colonel 56, 57 Colonel a'\urtz esti:r:ated that
self-oropelled weapons consWled twice as much fuel as the mo vers
for t.,wed cannon. 50 'laere l-laS 1itUe other com.'11ent on this disadvan
tags; this dearth of cO::1lments might be viewed. fro!U the aspect that se:"f
pro-pelled artiller'lJ was sUl'!,orting amored divisions which Here geared
for laree fll.el :':ajor and the 10th Field Ar:.illery Ja't
talion Doth re"9c "',ed one the cramoed firing crew
on t ne ' "7 It was felt that for this reason, the towed '\oTeapon space
could fire faster than the version.
59
,60
TIle Consensus
listing of advantages and disadvantages as above is useful
in analyzing the of :tlar II th respect to the argu
ment of towed versus in the J. 3.
nouever, the listing is not the tmole sto!'Y. It migl'lt a:opE:&r t.lo}at the
disadvantages of self-propelled artiller-f outweighed the advantages by
the listing in this chapter, in numbers of i te.llS and nu"'lbers of
CO='UTlents. 3ut how did t."'e artiller:P1en feel overall, in 1
artillerf with towed artillery?
battalion commanders believed self-,!,ro!,elled artillery
56ft Artillery Information 3e:"Vice, .'iernorandun Jo. 1t" ? 13.
5?Aurtz, 9- 15. 5
3
Ibid
59"Intervitnrs on Armored Corr.und A.ctivities with Officers of
the 1st Armored Divisi< : lta4r, November 1&'29, 194;," !:>. 33.
6OUNotes and Lessons of the S1.cilian Cam?aign," ? 1.
bettel'" because of its zreater ty. One .. battalion cO:7l.':1ander
't-trote: "'.."he arrnorec s wi. th l-mch we wer'e
u
were truly wonderful

felt their orotection
':9Y to their sU':>eriori t:Y.. over towed 61 me 1st !j. Ar:1Y
well of the because of its and value in assault
fire russians. One ar;nored division artiller.l cO::1:na."lder, discussin2
artillery for eli visions, stated: tt It hOes in.. thout sa,ving tilat
all these llea!'ons should be self-?l"opelled. It 62 di vi
sion thought all at,tillery should be self-o:oo?el.led
.6ut one a....""'nored division artillery co:n:r.:.ander, \\rhile
artillery for divisions, listed nar
v
advantages
of tal-Tea artillerJ. faIt there l.as a need for towed ur..:i ts in non-
di vi sion 3-pecificallyt he both the l.5SrlM hot-Ii
and gun r.lobile enough for combat in 0) 'J.be J. .J.
considered that the had no marked ove!' the towed 10,5rrtn
lhe 10th Field Artillery 3attalion, had referred to
the .:17' s as "",rl'.i te elephants, II obviously towed artillery'. 30
did one light artillery battalion who had had co'Tlbat e:...rperi
ence "'1i th botcl tOl-Ted and self-pro?elled 105:un ho\ritzers.
On the basis of these artillerynen's views overaL:_
t
the oon
sensus was self--;>ro:::>elled artillery--for armored eli visions, at
least. consensus must be weighed by two factors. First, as
\<-ras stated at the begi.nning of this chapter, the dirac":.
for armored divisions was by units,
and the 'Oredominate infantry division direct su!'port by to'W"'9d units.
61 .
;1U
tt
on, '!'. 251.
was, then, a vel-VY li:nited basis for best CO:7l'oar
ison ,,1. th tao toued i7'.ed:..tt"1 a:r-tille!'y; hEn-e the self
version \;as favored because of i ts Li t?
.::Jecond t st of the artiller'ften c::i. i:1 thi 5 cha')ter uere
closely involved 'uith co:nbat o?erations and right have only 1I:'11e
trees t and not the forest." :low ::::a.r(! :orotection iMoor
tant because :lne of their ba.tteries had to off an infantry
attack? dow illl?reSsed with the ::'lobillty of
artillery as the:'t a '..lni t--or felt the o;:>'?osi te oe
ca'.lse had to be used t., thai r I;.'," S on i C.l roads? j'
intensity of cor.'i'.Jat ":....ould ca'.tse incidents to :lave :>rofoiJnd
effects on their views.
Further, what about the interaction:> of
armor 8(l hO\1 .1UC:l was its incre3.sed wei ght t!
:r nobility effected b:r \'1&S 3.."1 ad
V'antaGo, hOioT :n.lch of a di i.ras the increased fuel

Ihase questions a.."ld others as :J1ey :>ertained to t.'-l1 of
self-':')roIJelled versus artillery in tho U. .,:;. Arr.1Y \\'9_"'9 n:>t
anSlrerad by the exnerlenc.e, ,?Gr se, of 'dorld ',ie II. A o".1eo
t.i v'a '!)ost-l:ar analysis would have to be conducted to
,Ii tho t,o end of the \-Tar, and even before, mDJ\.v bo lords of 0::.1'1
cars '.,rore convened to tho e:-:perience of .:o=ld ',iar I:L. .:Jri.s
portion of 11 ?resent tho of t:te !10re irl"'Jor
.1944 Field Artille2"'f Cchool ;tenort. --In 1 Q. s:>ecial
board of officers ,-las convened at the !"i.eld ArtillerJ" to ravimr
develo!J!nents in field artillar-J. l!eaded by :-iaj ::len
lic r. Pennell, t."le school' s the boa!'d was to conduct
,Tith a vie\.; to imtiatine guidelines fo!' current and ?OSt-t-1Gr
develop:nent. 1 th respoct to artiller"J transport, th9 board concluded:
30th tal-Ted and self-?ro?elled weapons are necessat"J in var,/1 ng 9ro
?ot-tions lTithin any a!'tillor'J echelon. Ina relative r>rol')ortion of
will be deter::dned by' the r.u.ssion, the rr..obili ty and the
theater. '!he range of this pro!'Jortion include all
and \to to include the 155-m:n gun..r1 and hot-ritzAr.
1'hi5 re;.>ort tto10 sificant !JOints. i?i.rst, rTas
l TIte Field Artiller-.r School, ItHe!,ort of ::30ard
to Review ihvelop.-nents in Field Artiller-.t' (Fort Sill,
27 0. 1.
2
A later nodel gun than G. P. F.
of Board Appointed to aeview Develo!,ments in
Fi eld Artillery', II o. 4.
45
no discussion in the the and cons of towed vel
artiller-J. 'lbere '!-tas no c;=?lanat::'on of :10l.' the
Ilva:r,-lin; proryortions
Cf
llere to be detOl":"lined, nor any indica":.ion to
t:le effect the rission 01' theater have on the 0: touod
to sclf-IJro:Jellod artiller,.,l. Second, there lfas no eli rae
t::)!'s -:6.ich led th.e board to rocOi:lollend that all calibers hav3 a
4

1944 /..xny :1round Forces convened a
board in lata 1944
5
to stud;}-" all used by the .:;. Ar:rry ane to
,
cha..Y1ge to the '9ost-uar C It
reco4":1mended tilat self-pro!>elled chassis should be developed for all
cannon calibers, the ?.5tit1l !>ack howitzer. Further, it reco::'.:ended
t."'lat in de",eloping artillery !l1ateriel, chassis be de
signed s:oecirica.lly for artiller:r, in order to save
Height. chassis of \.'iorld ";[tlr I: had been chassiz de
for tan<s and Foro quite neavy.? 'ilie oo9.rd concluded, in the
sa..'11e a.s neld Artillerj" f';chool .:leport "both to';jOO

The relative )ro'Oortion of each -Nill be by the
nobility and tho Again:. l1as eA-pl3.'1ation
_._------------
4At this the only se!:f.'-,!,ropelled arttller-J lar[;el"
lae Doa.r Has fr-Lven a copy of the .'l3stervelt Ho!X>rt as a
the 105::1.-:1 ho'tritzer in 11se the .<12 (155;n., gtm). Other !=ieces
under devolo,:t.ent.
5.r1' d "I
6
Jir.1Y Ground Forces t rr Ra!JOrt of Board of Orfice,-.s
to 'the Zquip:nent of the Post A..'"'mY" l:'1e Amy (;ar
College, 20 Part I.
:>
7.,... A__ D 2
Ad
,nunex ,:? .
of how the "va.rying pro?ortions
et
were to be determined, nor My incica
tion as to the affect the !','1i.ssion or theater would have on :.he
1945 r.::'heatar 3oa..""<i latu .Ieadquarters,
Theater of Operations appointed a board to the strategy,
tactics, and administration of the ..>. Anrry in the theate r- during the
war. 9 .r.,e board's a!'!>roach see.""!1ed to be: the U. 3. Arar.r had to
fight the i:1 Euro?e again, \o1hat would be done as before, and what
'Hould be done dirrerentl
J
"7 'There was litUe consideration of the nature
or future liars. me "7805 di videa. in to many sections to exam:)',e
in detail the 'Ian;y facets involved. One hundred thirty-one seoarate
studies u::> the entire ..t. Geroane to this are studies
by the Artillerf and G) sections.
found that the .':7 very successful in
sup-port, primarily because of i ts ?2 otection,
tacti.cal :nobillty, and ability to occupy posi. tions rapidly.10 'lbe sec
tion reco:1rl1ended that armored divisions be with self-!Jropelled
lieht and artille:-y for t.."le sa.":1e a.dvantages demonstrated by the
:';7.
11
It citeo. the folloldng as advantages of towed artillerf for
infantry divisions:
--fower Maintenance problens
--easier to emplace and conceal; less noi.se
--lighter ireight, tor bridges
--better tactical mobility in bad (mud and ice;'
9Headquarters \.hi ted states Forces, European J."heat..er ot Opera
tionSt of the General stuc:tr of the OrganizlLtion and
Equipment of Field Artillery ::..hits" (,SA. 1946).
__ t
l1Ibi<!. o. 13.
10.:i:bid., "9. 12.
43
..- better strategi c cr.obilit:r
fire ca!labili ty
on-carriage traverse
fuel
::''16 folloHinc 1.;ere ci tad as advantages of for
divisions:
--better tactical !nobilltr in "lea.ther
-- fo!' the creW'
--ability tC' positions
ilia Artillery ')action concluded that infantl9J" division liCht and :neditr.'l
artillery should be towed.
14
The G3 Section, in its stuctl of the infantr.r did n:>t
agree with the Artiller:l ;.)ectiQn' s concernin:;: infantry di vi
sion art:lllerJ .ibe section considered armor ?rotection V8r'J
important foY:' artillery because of air attao}:s and the prcxir.'.i ty fuze.
It division be 'tdth self-
propelled their 1he section recognized
the .,:7 to be too heavy, TTl thout overl1ead and 'Wi t.'lout a high
angle capability, but a.dvocated infar.try division be
t1i th s at that
For non-division artiller-J, the Artille:-y Jection recor.=:lended
the because it mig."lt be in of amor units. 'llle section lo1ent
"d
13Ibid., ? 4.
p
5
15.:ieadauartars :hited 3tates Forces, ;]m"opean '!heater of O?ex-a
tions, l'?e,ort of the ,study of the
and 'l'aotical of the Infantry Jlvislon
il
(.2.!. 1946),
p. 9.
on to state tha. t the :17 had oroved its worth because of i 'reod tacti
cal :nobility.16 It tha.t in addition to battalions, so:r.e
15.5.'1l.11 g-un battalions be self-oro"Oelled, and all other non-dvision
artillery be towed.!7
Of the considered thus far in this cna9ter, the 1)45
3urooean :heater aoard :ieport was by far the detailed and exhaus
tive. It is curious that there should be thH conclusions
reached artillery for the infant:r;r ell vision.
1j
If one con
siders the by the 3ection of the of
artillery for int'lt!".Y divisions, one might lVonder why towed
.
.
was not also recol1l'11ended for ar.-nored di visions. the hand, the
Artillery Section in non-division artillery, felt that on
those occasions \-Then .,17 battalions had infantry :;nits, t.i1e
had been ?erha?s, because of tria thoughts
of self-?ropelled artillery arTIored forces and the associ
ation of self-?rooelled artillery the war, a tra.di tion of lIself
propelled for towed for infantry" had been established
artillery:nen.
1946 Artillery Conference.--In :iarch 1946, an artillery confer
enoe was conducted at Fort 3ill to discuss 821 phases of
10
to for future and
of the General 3oard: 3tudy of the Or?anization and
of Field Artillery :.inits," 1'. 19.
17Ibid., 46-47.
ldrhe Artillery took cognizance of the GJ s
conclusions; knowing, it still dissented.
19The Field Artillery 3chool, "rieport 3ased on Jtudies Conducted
at the Artillery Conference" (Fort 3111, Oklaho;ua, .iar 46).
50
tion the conference
c:101acad
--less road
, t uf'. 20
--coeaner 0
--botter tactical
--ar"ilOr nro:'E"; _ ion, ryri:7lc!1rily for ticm
--bette:- for devcloJ:Tlont of ..tcal a!i':'.llmi tion
--:ess ?ersonnel required
ilisadvantaces :
--lack of for ali'l."!'!uni tion
--difficulty of conceaLroent becauso of silhouette
--no high Mgle fire
strategic z10bility.21
The corni ttee' s opinion of dar II self-.9ro!'elled Has
that it had not 9roved entirely satisfactor"J beca.use it Has cO:lstructed
fro;.} and tank chassis. 'The cor.mt tee .':1ajori ty
recorl.nended the for to be all weapons It
_____0 _
2O'Ihis advantage not substantia.ted in the report. does
not seem reasonable, in vie;r of all other opinions that
cannon \'rere expensive to !>roduce.
.dased on .studies Conducted at t.."le It.rtille1''Y Confer
ence: Co!'rnittee O!1 1A, pp. 1-J.
51
recoli1.'7lended t.."lat self-:.>ro:oelled artillery be developed with the hi Ghest
However, for the present, the cOIl"_7.ittee majority reco!n!llended
that armored division and non-division light artillery be self-pro
?olled, and that infantry division artillery be towed until a lighter
mount t,.dth a lower silhouette could be developed. It reco:ll11ended that
both toued and self-propelled versions of mee:ium and heavy artillery be
develo!,>ed, c0l"?s artillery to be self-propelled, amy to be towed. 22
'l11e committee's recommendations 101ore not unanimous. Ibere viere
two dissensions--at ends of the One estinated
t..i.at i t ten years to develop a completely satisf.3.ctor'.1 self-
propelled and it urged t.."at divisions be e'luipped
immediately l:i light artiller.r_ Ibis
considered that lisht self-!)l-opelled artillery must have a lUgh angle
fire oapabili ty to be com,!,letely sati sfactory. 23 The other groU?
recommended that infantry division artillery be towed because
artillery was too It cited greater maintenance
y>roble:ns and "il'lflexible pr:LYJle :nover" as other disadvantages of self-
propelled Further, considering the aspects of
transport, this group thought self-propelled cannon to be
expensive and that the Jnited States could not enough to equi!,
the entire f..:rrrw in war.
24
'lbese last two disadvantages of self-
propelled artillery are similar to tl"ose listed during the second phase
of the argument prior to "..iarld ilar II.
lhe 1946 Artillery Conference was more inclined to consider
favorably self-propelled artiller'J for infantry divisions than had
00. 1-4 2
J
Ibid
., Tab 1B, p. 3.
24
Ibid
., p. 4.
- ..
-------- -----
si.'7ti.lar bodies 1)L'h also tI'lO
ei'i'ects of future techtl.ical 2.dvances tha'1 si:rl.l.l:''' had before.
30ard was established in 19
/
+6 to ty?6S of equi'1:',lent reauired
for the post-1'1ar J\nn:;.25 As Do nrafaco to its for
all of tho boa.:-d vTrote it felt that
.states' 'Oroduction ca?D.ci ty w"'O'..ud not be o:"Ou3ht to ocar In future ,rars
as it had in :/iar II, and that future l1US ,;ould ha.ve to bo fO.lght
Hi th the or. hand at the outset. 26 tho baed
recol-:1mcndod the of both tovreQ and self-:Jro?o::!.lcd artill Jry,
!
1)7
except ver;/ li and tcry h9avy artiller:t. . ca."l.&'1on
be used for both a."'ld configU:'atj.ons, and since
self-,ropelled :"lore difficult to dev'elop, the Ca."'l110:l
should 00 for calf-propelled and ada?ted or use
U'J.
. th.4-
",01010
d

t""
:!....:....J.cry.
23
",res the reverce of practi ce for con
'.lorJ..d ",7a.r II artillery Lastly, t..'1e board
artillor:{ th splinter-proof amor, overhead
for
1949 Field Forces .AdvisorY ?ane1 on J.eld .Artillea.--::n
1949, the Field Forces eotablished an advisor"J !lanel to rev:\_ew t:'le
25Letter, '1.bG Adjutant General's Office, Subject:
of 'liar De!1a1"tr.!ent &ard" (2 Oct 45).
26.. C' .1 De t . J_ t r t' 1 De rt t' .&0.
oJ. .:.., :,Iar ,ar",-'!:en , .1 ""por 0 .'le: ar . ::>a
:'1ent !:ioa:....d
ll
(.:lashington, 19 Jan 45), p. 1.
27.J.11e implied that very light artillery was the hOH
i tzer. 30th very light and heaV"J artillery was to be tal-red only.
2.3
r'He?ort of the De!)ar'tMent .30 ard," ?_ 23.
29Ibid., !>. 24.
5J
Ci,U'rent u .::. doctrine, and cha:acteristics
nertaining to field artillery wea?ons. Lieaded by Ge:l :Uft
the !lanel Has also to initiate actions to secure :U..litaro}
characteristics for field a!'tillery wea?ons and equi!,2ent. LasUv, it
'tolas report on the of reco.i:'lendations of the 1940
Artillel"".1 Conference and the De?artment .::quipment Joa!'d .-.e
port.)O
Th.e !Janel made 8SSUl1?tions fo:!' wars of the futU!'e.
First, t.'1e earliest najor war ,.;ould not occur until 1952, 2.1ld
this war would be a nuclear in which thE! battlefield woU:d be dl3vas
tated, particularly lines of co,-.rr.unications. Jecond. the ona.'nY would
have From these the
tha.t the :i. 3. :llust have a hi.gh degree of cross-country mobility,
and the Jnited :Jtates niust its superior and p:-oductil,n
?otential to i.'nprove mechanical l':leanS of waging war. 31 From
the panel cO:lcl'.Idea that all ne\oT artiller'J weapons should be
self-propelled (exce:;>t special types
J2
), and field artille:-'.1 uea
?ons in the infantr"J division artillery should be air transportable. 3.3
These conclusions implv that the envisioned the elimination
or reduction of the heaV'J disadvantab8 of artil
lery. 2.11e nanel stated requirements for self-propelled models
30 U. 3., .De!>artment of the Army, .. Report of the Field
Forces Panel on Field Artillery" (',\ashington, 18 Feb 49), ? 2.
31 'L4
Ibid., .r
32'I'he It special tYges
lt
were not defined.
3J"P.eport of the Army Field Forces hivisory Pa."el on Field
Artillery," p. 6.
of t21e 21o,.ritzc:" 15S-r:11 :3:t and
hawi tzar. me key self-nronelled art i ller:-... in
the panol' s "Aas its better cross-cotmtrJ :,10bility
end ot the oost-,.;ar analysi.s.--It is not t'eall:; T)ossible
to establish a ?recise ti.,e or event t.hat the end of the a"laly
sis, \<rith to of :1:1. -:he 1949
Ar:rw Field ?anel on :nade little l'efer
ence to the late waT; its re?ort \vas of a forecast of f',,1turc
rat:ler than an analysis of the ?a.st. Other boa.."'"Ci and panel
that ;followed "rare f:-om similar vieV\'P0ints. this tine
1949 J't:r.;ry Field torces Pa.'1el on Field :'5 "lsed
in th::.s Ylaper tlS the ?oint of the ?Ost-l-:ar
Connict
ilie l:.:orean conflict had chara.cteristics a.rfectinE artil
It 'lIas for the -part, over terrain nueh :'":lore
than in 8urone; i.t waSt at the 'oegi.:1nin:;, a of move:nent, and for
of the uar, onE) of static fronts of ":,'orld 'dar I.
'r-nero were man:r times when ?"sitions lJTere over!"un and cannon
lost; those actions had the vivid impact on
Tnere was not as high a of artillerJ
as in durlngl:orld II; there no divisions in
Iorea.. ::.bare "tare, however, non-elivision battalions that sau ::luch
action. Lt Col 1eon F. Lavoie, or a se?arate self-propelled
15.5rnr.1 hOldtzer battalion in considernd tactical mobility tOe 1,ey
advanta{;9 of towed Lwti:le%"J. i!e felt t..'l.e
55
protection of salf-p!'o?alled artillerJ to gi. ving t.."le c a.
r
U10n the
8.01li ty to defend ves. :'ie also t.l1ought any i:1CreaS9d :lainte.
nance ,roble::ls of artiller:-l could be o"/erco .,e. 35
Col F. Dunn, of a seoarate self-oro?elled
15.5.ill:l gun battalion the conflict, on the role of self
artiller-j' in static battalion
assau.l t fi!'e .,,:issions, which he felt we!'e cO"!'_'!lon static w8.rfare :r.issions
..:elf-"O!"ooelled a.r tL!..ler.l 'tofas bettel for these ssions bec:a'...lse it iad
amo!' could a.l"ld \.1. thdra"tT -;>osi tions raDi ely. 36
The k"t111e!'Y' ..;chool, in a stuct. v of artillery of the
conflict, concl'.1ded that artillery 'Was ",han towed
for that c:Jnflict. The cited better tactical r1obil:.t:.. for em?loy
went on broad f:-onts over rOUGh terrain, and arnlor -;>rotec:.ion
'9osi tion defense as !{ey 'j,"he study au':' that self
be able to fire angle fire be truly
superior towed artiller:r. 37
Colonel La Voie, wri tin; about botr. ",:ar II 9J'ld the ::orean
oonflict., considered the ability of self-'Jl'opelled to ;>rotect
itself very _{is studies ShOl-Ted towed artillery uni.ts
were overrun often than self-orope11ed units in both wa.rs. .:n
attributed better record in
35'::'t Col ison F. La ".:ake ::i.ne 3P,u U, .j, i:rm..v
Forces Journal, Vol, II, i-to, 7 (Feb 52), )2-JJ.
36Lt Col Jerry F, Uunn, "3e1i'-Pro'9'911ed Artillery in ?ositional
.tIhe Army forces Journal, vol. I if, ]0. 4 53).
?p. 1'-4-17.
371ha .Artille:J Sc."lool, .. i\rtillal'jr in (Fort 3:1.11,
Oklahoma, 1953), 9.
56
its ta.ctical :nobility, its a.."1d its ability t,
oositions raoidly. l-ie did not, hOH9ver, advocate abandoni.n:::
to\o:ed artiller.? cO:T:>letely.
ihe of the conflict uoon tne of towed
self-oronelled in the 0. J. was to emohasize
of al.. tillery in defendinp; itself. ..::t did n-:>t
brin=?; out a"lV facet of the ar:;ltnent.
The t"'uture
the of tOttled versus self-urooel1..ed artiller"f on essentiall)'
the sa."!le as Nhen it stal:-tod. A :leH was introduced as
f:!'tL"'11e of this ends. In 1952, Lt. Col !jidwell ._oo:,e lon-ote
that the U. .Y had never :tad self-orouel1ed light arti llery. :i. 3
described four categ'ories of destroyer artiller"j',
assault ';U1'\ artillery, ar:nored artillery, and sel.f-?roT?elled ;;'-:i.
grouped first three as all )ro-
taction, resu.lted in their being quite heavy. sel;'-pronelled
ne felt, have no and be on a cnas
sis. l'his 1:ould oe a "'..,rea"90n T",;d.th excellent tactical ty and
able to OCCUryy factors, he thought, for
transoort.39 .?erha"Js ferT artiller:men \tr.)'J1d with Colonel s
was a concept that was to be considered carefully.
}3.Lt Col F. La iToie, Artillery is tho :J1ing,"
.Ar:nor, Vol. L.:u, ]0. 5 52), 10-13.
39 Col 3idwell t lI i Jhy Jot 3?1," -t'le Army Co:lOat Forces
J oumal, "/01. III, :\:0. 52), 30- J1.
l
57
A variation on the r":1cU!'!t \las
Gosted bJl' John c. aumey, J=. in 1954. ;us idea 1-TaS to develoD a
self-?ro?olled or cun, a.bout four tons, :.hat couLd
be air-drop:;:>ed. :fo folt the tactical : ty of a :ras
to 1. ts value th airbomo forces. 40
'1':10S6 conceptz, callin:.:; for a. cannon embnetrin::
nel.... end the accoll."'1t of the argullont of to\icd self-
propelled artil in the U. nrior to 1955. foU!'
decades it had been an ir1portant a:10ne; and it Has
to conti!luQ to be i i:T')Ortant one. 3ut in the future, it 'liould con
ducted wi thin fra:nel,'lork of a technolo?y that ,.,as chansin:: '":1uch !:lore
ra?idly than it ever had before.
40
Capt John C. Bumey, Jr., "Self-propelled Guns Can ae
Dropped, It '!he Army Q>mbat Forces Journal, Vol. V, No. :3 (Oct
pp. 52-54.
AiiALISIS, D ..
3urn:nary
The r:lost significant factor in the argunent of
versus tovred artiller:l in the U. S. ,Ar:ny prior to 195.5 was the lir.ti ted
a'llount of ma.teriel upon proponents of ei ther of artillery
transport could base their .judgsnents. (l.bwed artillerJ transport
showed the :advance in the period prior to II,
evolving, in the case of artillery transport, !rare U.rea-mile-an
hour tractors to the 2} ton 6 x 6 truck capable or 45 mph on the
highways. lbi.s reflected the ascendent posi.tion of the li'-..ited States
in !notor transport during the tvlO decades between the \lorld (iars.
Sel:f'-pro!'elled artillor'J advanced very 11ttle in the same two
decades. j,lle only !:lodels of self-!>ro!,elled artillery t..'lat saw exten
51va cO::lbat were L'nprovisations that utilized neither the s'dll of 'the
guns:ni.th nor the technology of the automotive engineer. Jobe slo", p:.-'O
gress !:lade is reflected in the cOr.1!,arison in Table 6 or or the
characteristics of the earliest light artiller"J and the
II salt-:!,ropelled light artillery pieces. 'mis table does
not. shot,r other important characteristics such as reliability
and time to prepare to fire t but 1t does suggest that 11tUe improV9
\-Ias made in 22 years.
59

Calibor
3?eed
: elevation
:"'ota.l. traverse
i\r.mor
gun
.. I to
:J.t ns
15 :non
"50

23
none
105:.itr. hOldtzar
tons
4!"'.ainst .'r.l'Ound f'iroJ
oi'Uy1 no :
?rotection .
a,Above, 'P. 3.

.:a.uove, p. 11
Ihe uwG\l"lent of tot'led versus self'-pro?elled ctillcry quic!<ly
took sha-oe a.s to the advantages of one of transport to
other. As ani:nal transpo!'t 'Was re!,laced by :notor transport, the
argUl::ent took the form of the advantages and disadv8...9'}tages of 5e1
!,ro?elled artiller'J, to tol'Ted artillery. Fu.!'t..'ler, ,dth the
bef9.nnine of the G. S. an10red forces, thore gret., an incre.1.sing tend
ency to consider self-propolled artillery solely for annor9d forces.
'.L'his tendenc:y was :'I'1a.nifestad iT.! the eX?erience of :Iorld .lar II,
lri th artillery supporting elivisions alnost
exclusively. It Has natural for the artillol"j!!len fightins t..'1e uar to
consider self-propelled and to"red artillery in this light. :J11e :lost-uar
analysis have to carefully other possible application?
of both tOvred and self-propelled artillery.
6J
me ?Ost-l;ar a'lalysis, initially-at least, did not ;:iva
careful consideration. 'l"na state."r..ont, IIboth to'Hec and
lrea'Oons are necessar-J in J>l''O?ortions In.thin artiller::r
lon,,,1 trit:l0ut any fu...-ther oX!1lanation the ",ri1.h
vrhich the experience of vTar Has viel-red. tionally,
a..""lalysis a,!)earod to be bound to t110 of salf-pro!->clled
artillery for tOt-red for infantr-J. It was only to'W2rd t:te end of
of elivisions. 'lbere seems to have been no consideration fror.l the
site stand!)oint--tovred artillory for all typos of divisions
t
includ..t'lG
"
annored divisions. 'llie l;:Orean oonflict mar;nified the of
sel-pro?elled artillo!'Y in itself', but added litUe else to
the ..
'l."he in 19.55 had not changed from that of 1919, as
indicatod b:l 'fable 7, l.mch co!npares the -.iestervelt 30ard Report
"dth the Artiller.f Conference Report ooncaming the advantages and
disadvantages self-!Jro:!'slled artillery to towed
Only l-rith the of ne9,o, could the grounds uoon vmich the
argument of to"led versus sell-propelled artillery in t!le t. 3. be
expected to change ver"'J much.
1
P!J. 4;, lJ.6.
'l.'lLiLE 7
Cited by 30th

--Jetter tactical mobility
- - .feavy eht
--Poor strategic ::lobi::!.i ty
lli. sadv3..Y1ta;;es Cited by thor Report
-- U?r:l:-le ;.'.over oat--can..l'lO!l out"
--: :aintona.'l'lco 'Problems
alJJove, ?p. 16-1'1.
b
Above, p. 50.
of tins chapter "rill ackireois itself to the analy
sis of t.1.e validity of reasons used in the argu.r4ent of self
toHed artil1.ery. '1'he fo:-mat t.nIl be a di 5cussion of
the !!lost often cited advnntases and disadva."ltages of
.ilgva..,tages of self'--oropelled artillery, --1hroughout the :,eriod
discussed in t.."lls pa:::>cr, the ::'lost often cited advantage of self
:orouelled artiller-.f was i ts ty for being rapidly a:nplaced. In
the case of medi un and heaV'J artiller'J, self-pror>elled cannon could
into action almost one-ha.lf hour sooner than its towed eql.ti.valent. rhe
62
difference in ti"ne for t.he bM> artille2"J Has '"'leas
s'd' .. 1. uS'Ja.1" .. SSlon 0... urad in "!'.inutes,2 con '1. l' ht a. r",l_ ""1' er:, s .;'
direct sU')l)ort. these :!"in'ltes ",rere often crucial.
artillery' in ra'Oid occu'Oation of 'Oositio:1 ;vas a
advantage.
he next often cited was
rrreater tactical fais was attributed to
cannon because, in all10st all cases, l-lere trac:<:-laY:L!1g
In the earlier :rears of the when towed arti llery l-laS by
+.... ack-laying tra(;w.)l"s, this advantage was not cited too c!ten. iLS
trucks oeca-ne the for towed arti llary, self-nrooelled
artillelj oeca:lle to be considered as naving greater tacti cal :nobi Ii ty.
ihe exnerience of Jar does not give self-propelled a
clear advantage in res?ect, in sand. The
analysis often cited self-pro,elled artiller,y as having freater tacti
cal '!'his appears to been based :nora on
ra.ther tha..'i1 fa.ct. Self-')ro!'elled artillery did !'lot have a
in tactioal !T!o:>ili tv to have a si!!"ifioant in t.his res"Ject.
Armor orotectio"l was considered as an for self-
pro-::>elled artillery in the '.ater years of the arg\tnent. It was con
sidared particularly for esoecially for
V. ving cannon the ca::>abili tjr for se'.f-defense against attack.
rakan by itself, was a marked advantage for
2;). S., D9partrnent of the Ar:T1Y, Field Artil:l;,e!X
li'..... 6-40, Change 2 U. s. GtJvam'nent rrintinf; Office,
16 Sep 64), :.:'able 1.
63
arti.llery, but consi.derlnr; the weight ar1:')T added to t.'1e piece,
ar:nor orotection beca.'11A less si f;nifi For ':'ladi and heavy arti. 1
ler,:r, rihich was usually tht3 li!'le of contact than
li
5
ht arnot' orotection ;,-1as not Ii adva!1ta;:;-e.
Overall, then, t!1e only clear-cut of self-r)ro".Jelled
arti ller"f orioX' to 1955 was its capabi li ty for rapid tion of
posi tions.
of _self-:Jronelled artille!:!.--All1ost ever'I
article artiller-,/ listed thE! heavy ..,eizht
as a disadvantap;a; both and ouoo
nents of artiller:r listed it. :lore often than !'lot,
heav)r wei ':,T8.S ci ted as the serious disadvantage. :ieavy wei gh t
lessened tactical and increased fuel
'treiC?;ht resulted, in part, f'rom inherent characteristics of track-layin.,:
vehicles tdth tneir neavJ -t,racks a."d requirement for more "Oowerful
heavier ene1-nes. For ,"world ,"iar II models, use of tank chassis,
which were arr:lo-red, and the addi. tlon of armor ?late added :nore weight.
Heavy weight, '!Jer l-TaS not significant; it was significlmt in its
effect on other factors, tactical
!he disadvantage mover out--cannon out" inherent to
artillery. It became a disadvant&ge from two asoects:
inoperabi11ty of the piece because ')f action, and
because of mechanical failure. there were several of
action, fire was the greatest threat.
ability to dis?lace rapidly from, as well as
into, positions tended to reduce the threat fron counterbnttery tire.
failure was tied closely with
64
associated wi. th the 'l1o.:"e (than towed) self-Dro'Oelled weanons.
In the years of the arsument, was in
1. ts infancy, '"1aintenance Here :-:tany and su'.)oortE)d
out--can!'1on out
tf
as a ilie exoerience of ''-orld ';iar II
and the Aorean conflict did not show oroble.T.s to be a :;,ajor
di3advantage of artillerJ to towed
"Prime mover out--cannon O'..lt" vIas an intuitive reason agai!:st self
artillery; the facts do not support it as a significant dis
advantage.
30th liTdted traverse and of a for angle
fire were mechanical lirni tations of the cannon itself as it "ras ;'lotL"lted
on the Increased traverse could have been obtainEld by the use
of a turret, albei t adding 'oJeight, and higher elevations by
mou"lting or shortening the recoil distance. Both were wi thin the state
of the ;lrt in the period prior to 1955. It is undGrstandahle that
using self-propelled in these two
disadvantages of their weapons in particular,
but it is not so cIgar wn}" those making the post tiorld II analyse,')
still considered these general of self
propelled artillery. traverse and a lack of high. angle fire
were not signiflcant disadvantages of self-propelled artil
lexnJ.
The di sadvantages of self-!Jropelled artillery distill to one:
heavy and attenda.1'lt li:nitations. i'iithin the limitations of tb.e
materiel available, and the technology that coulri be hear.r
weight was a significant drawback that to be inherent to self
artillery "Crior to 1955.
65
Conclusions
By 1955. mach could be said in favor of both towed self
artillery. l'here was a tendenC'J. because of ad,rar..ces in
for self-prooelled artillery to be considel'ed lr.cre favorably
as a u..u.versal mode of artillery transport. dut by 1955, net clear-cut
of opinion existed for either towed or
artillery. 'l'ft1.S was ?robably just as well; lluoh remained to be done to
improve the materiel for towed and self-propelled. artillery.
:'he artille!"J in the iJ. 3. in 1955 Has bot.'l selof-orooelled
and This of artiller,y was due to the argu
Inent that had been conducted through the years. In general, the
argwnent had been conducted well, by nroponents of both fon1S of
lery trans"9ort. 'llie only criticis:n that :night be !Tlade would be towards
those in the post .,jorld ;,jar II era who failed to base their judgement
on what could be done, rather than what had been done.
And this is the lesson that can be drawn from the at"gu1I'1ent of
towed versus self-propelled artillery in the U. 3. Army pri:>r to 1955:
In the present age ..,r rapid advances in technology, it is i.nportant to
take appropriate cognizance of equi?l'lent that be made, as well as
that is made. Further, to best use technology, soldiers
learn to establish characteristics desired in materiel and require
to design to these characteristics.
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iJepart.rn9!lt .iqui 3oal-.d." 'J October
........., of t,he l..r:TJ. ;r !;.e?ort of the Ar.':lY Field
Advi on Field Arti11e1'7 If ,;ashington,.1 j .Februal?
J.9
1
}1.
,)., t. if 0;: the .. .. 3oarcj. II
,'-asm.n ::ton, 1) Ja.."'luar::.r 1946.
____a UA of the itr""lamO?lt, Calibers a"d i:,rpes of
::.inds and ?ro'1ortion of iV!L"r.'.Uli tion
t
and 1:ethods of of
the to be i ..ssi:'1\ed to a Field im:..y." 5. 1919.
Aberdeen Ground, :'roof Gun and Carriag'3
I'Final of l'hree Chrl.stie J',beeled Cater)illar
for 155 ::l/r:. 191,) (Fil1oux). It 2l
j,'ile Artillel"J"::';choo:!.. H ArtillezrJ in I' ?ort ...;ill, 01(!.ahoma.
1953. (l)raft
.. .:;ccool. 3ased on Jtudies Cond'lcted at the
Conference: on 11,
19
J
k5.
__e tf :)f 'igecial :3oard A!,,,?ointed to ::'..evie11 :.:,ere:o?!:lents in
Artillery. U Fort .Jill t Oi-:lahona. 27 1944.
____a If :i:nfomation St1r.1!nary Ono." Fort ,;'ill, Oklaho:1a.
1944.
Gene:-a2. A Forces, of the Chief
of ..Artillery. iI?rocgedings of the .:3oard of ::>ffice:s. a
9 1913.
I
'/ )
, ....
loSt :,,:. :'ra::1cis "O!"f:anization.
of JielJ A:."tiller:-/ "r.i.th ..echanized Cavalr'J.;'
fo!' tha Advance eo'..lr-SO, I'ie
Field Ar Jchool, :"ort -;ill, O;{la:lo .193=.
lOth !Il'ti i..ler:r Jatta.lion. ;i a.."d Lassons of tjo
.licilian 2'-) 1)/,-).
Lt Co1 ?aul F., et al, of ?i. 910
Jattaltons: A ;'.esearcil II .:.cho)1,
l'J10X, 1949-19.50.
:iutton, Col Carl I. l' .. F.ield Artillel.7 COr.trAand<9::' in
'::'U:-o.)ea21!neater. II ?ort 11, 1951.
Col... Artillcr.-.,.,
v :)<1 J. i..n'.l.'T .Artillor:: lQh5.
O!'fico, Cltic.r :)f .::-: eld
,.e.1"C!1 .191).
Off:.ce, C:Uef of Ol'Wlance. on Javelol1:r:ent .a.t3riel:
:o'to!", .I\:-t
22 1. 9)