Virgilio Garcillano v House of Representatives

Facts:

The Hello Garci tapes or wiretapped conversation or purportedly between the then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and a high-ranking official of (COMELEC) surfaced. It allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Petitions were filed pertaining to the tapes. The first (filed by Garciallano) is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
Issue: Whether the publication of rules on the Senates website can be used for the purpose of legislative inquiry .

No. The first petition is dismissed for being moot and academic since the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. As regards the second petition, the court ruled that the Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules

of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.\ The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the

internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of

legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

Diamond v Diehr

The patent application involves an a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products. The process uses a mold for precisely shaping the uncured material under heat and pressure and then curing the synthetic rubber in the mold so that the product will retain its shape and be functionally operative after the molding is completed. Respondents claim that their process ensures the production of molded articles which are properly cured. Achieving the perfect cure depends upon several factors including the thickness of the article to be molded, the temperature of the molding process, and the amount of time that the article is allowed to remain in the press. It is possible using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships to calculate by means of the Arrhenius equation when to open the press and remove the cured product. Respondents claimed the continuous measuring of the temperature inside the mold cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure time, and the signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new in the art. Diamond rejected the application on the ground that they were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101, which provides for the issuance of patents to "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . ." He determined that those steps in respondents' claims that are carried out by a computer under control of a stored program constituted nonstatutory subject matter under this Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson. The remaining steps - installing rubber in the press and the subsequent closing of the [450 U.S. 175, 181] press - were "conventional and necessary to the process and cannot be the basis of patentability."

Issue: Whether the a patent application if its carried out by a computer under control of stored program constituted nonstatutory subject matter under this Court's decision

Ruling: No.

the respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. These include installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the proper time. Obviously, one does not need a "computer" to cure natural or synthetic rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the process patent significantly lessens the possibility of "overcuring" or "undercuring," the process as a whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject matter. Our earlier opinions lend support to our present conclusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer.

Zaldy Nuez v Elvira Cruz Apao

Facts: An administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against Elvira Cruz-

Apao (Respondent), Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Fifteenth (15th) Division, Court of Appeals (CA). The complaint arose out of respondents solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latters pending case in the CA. A series of messages including the details of the case and negotiation of amount to be paid by Zaldi to Elvira was exchanged via SMS.

Issue: Whether messages via SMS may be admitted in evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the formers pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence[65] which provides:
Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a

party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . . In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainants cellphone from which the messages originated was hers.[66] Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant.[67] It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.[68] We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

Judge Canda v Anna Jane Lihaylihay

Two complaints for grave misconduct filed by Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay against Judge Alejandro T. Canda Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). One of which is charging Judge Canda sending her threatening and indecent text

messages. The threatening text message she received saying that she would have fair share of trouble in due time was reported to the police and Lihaylihay requested that a blotter entry be made.

Judge Canda

denied that he sent Lihaylihay indecent text messages;

described his 5 January 2006 text message as brotherly; and stated that his 6 January 2006 text message was not intimidating it only reflected the natural reaction of an angry person.

Issue: Whether the allegation of indecent text messages established a ground for gross misconduct.

No. The charge that Judge Canda sent Lihaylihay indecent text messages is unsubstantiated, thus, they must be dismissed. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence or such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, the allegations in the complaint. The Court cannot rely on mere conjectures or suppositions. However, the threatening text messages were considered by the Court and became grounds, among other actuations, for finding the judge liable of gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Eva Lucia Z. Geroy v Judge Calderon

Eva Lucia Z. Geroy filed a complaint for gross immorality against Judge Dan R. Calderon. She alleged that they had extra marital affairs. Attached to the complaint, among other documents, are transcripts of respondent's text messages to her, such as:
Gud am, just saying thanks for the wonderful evening? there?

knock, knock hello are you still

I feel more 4 your comfort Tet, I felt u really nid d rest, I just can't resist it wen u're here u know. Am in my room now thanks for a wonderful evening the songs and the towelets sleep tight,

Respondent denied the allegations and claimed that their relationship is purely platonic and professional.

While respondent insists that his relationship with complainant is purely professional, the text messages which admittedly came from him are not of the kind an employer would ordinarily send an employee. Try as he might, respondent's own admissions betray his claim of innocence.

Issue: Whether the text messages sent by Judge Calderon substantiated the charges of gross immorality against him.

Yes. While respondent insists that his relationship with complainant is purely professional, the text messages which admittedly came from him are not of the kind an employer would ordinarily send an employee. Complainant related in detail her relationship with respondent and respondent could only offer general denials. Even then, he could not completely deny some communications which transpired between him and complainant which betrayed his claim of a purely platonic relationship. Try as he might, respondent's own admissions betray his claim of innocence. As the Court has held, mere denial does not overturn the relative weight and probative value of an affirmative assertion. Denial is an inherently weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and has no evidentiary value. Granting arguendo that respondent's relationship with complainant never went physical or intimate, still he cannot escape the charge of immorality, for his own admissions show that his relationship with her was more than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.

Geraldine Dizon v Hiyasmin Campo

Geraldine P. Dizon filed a case against Hiyasmin L. Campo, Court Stenographer for Immorality. She alleged that Campo was having an illicit relationship with her husband. In one instance, the complainant received a text message from respondent that complainants husband loves her and was willing to leave his family for her. Despite the confrontation, Campo and the complainants husband applied for marriage license.

Respondent denied having sent text messages to complainant and she claimed to have been misled by complainants husband that the latter was not married. Issue: Whether the text message substantiated the charge of immorality.

Ruling: Yes. Instead of rectifying her errant ways after the wife of her paramour had pleaded with her, she continued the illicit relationship and even abhorrently aggravated the situation by marrying complainants husband. Interestingly, respondent married him after she stated in her Comment that her relationship with him was purely based on friendship. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of Arnel T. Dizons marital status for he was then a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Capas, Tarlac. Someone like respondent who works in the same Municipal Hall must have known of, or at least could have easily verified, the status of Arnel. Even assuming that she was unaware of Arnels married status when they first became acquainted with each other, she should have been put on guard when a woman claiming to be his wife pleaded to her to abort her illicit relationship for the sake of the couples two children. By agreeing to marry a man during the subsistence of the latters marriage to another person, respondent subjected both herself and her paramour to the risk of criminal prosecution. Also, while it appears that Arnel had courted respondent, the fact remains that she entertained the advances of a married man. Respondents subsequent filing of an action for the annulment of her marriage to Arnel does not extenuate her liability.