Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press

Sociological Realism: Partition for South Africa? Author(s): Edward A. Tiryakian Reviewed work(s): Source: Social Forces, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Dec., 1967), pp. 208-221 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2574602 . Accessed: 22/02/2012 03:12
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SOCIOLOGICALREALISM: PARTITION FOR SOUTH AFRICA?

EDWARD A. TIRYAKIAN Duke University ABSTRACT The existing pattern of race relations in South Africa, characterized by authoritarian repression of nonwhites, provides an unstable social climate. This paper examines currently discussed alternatives and finds them wanting in terms of their practicality. A realistic appraisal of the global situation of South African society suggests that the equitable partition of South Africa into two viable autonomousstates may be the optimal solution.

It

is a truism that white-dominatedSouth

Africa is the bete noire of the rest of the continent. The current status of race relations is held intolerable for it is an explicit negation of the equality of all men holding membership in the same body politic. South Africa's government compounds the felony of "alien rule" over an "indigenous" population (a situation structurally similar to several other African countries, e.g., Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi, which until recently had castelike stratification systems) by having as the master class a white, European, capitalistic stratum. The major powers of the world are also disturbed by the South African status quo (though perhaps for more practical political and economic reasons than independent African states). In brief, there is a widespread consensus that the present South African situation is both instable and intolerable, and the days when a minority group of three and onehalf million whites can control the life situation of 13.8 million nonwhites (Bantu, Asiatic, and Cape Coloured) are definitely over in terms of international legitimacy and concern.1 Accepting the fundamental instability of the South African case-at least in terms of the international social order-this paper will first address itself to what are the major alternatives to the existing state of race relations, summarized by the label of "apartheid."2 UnforiOf course, there are whites and whites, as far as international concern goes. The situation in the Sudan where blacks live under a white repressive regime even harsher than South Africa seems not to have pricked the conscience of the world. 2 One of the few papers to have done this is the recent article by Austin T. Turk, "The Futures

tunately, there seems to have developed in popular discussions of South Africa a sort of fatalistic despair, a feeling of perhaps the inevitability of the self-immolation of that society, a feeling that it can only perish due to its own self-contradictions and that nothing cail be clone about it, that time hlas already run out, etc. An expression of this is exemplified in the initial October 1964 issue of the American Committee on Africa's South Africa Bulletin which urges its readers to write to the Chrysler Corporation to withdraw from South Africa "in view of the racial war which will certainly come, sooner or later, to South Africa." Most sociologists, for that matter, have been predicting for the past decade or so that the only outcome to the South African situation is a revolutionary holocaust.3 It is the contention of this paper that rather than accepting uncritically this extremely pessimistic prognosis-which is analogous to telling a person stricken with pneumonia that there is no point in seeking medical help since he surely must die-it may be possible to arrive at a realistic proposal which could lead us out of the present impasse, an impasse formed by an irresistible force (international and interAfrican pressures) and an unmovable object of South Africa," Social Forces, 45 (March 1967), pp. 402-412. 3 This is the general tone of Pierre L. van den Berghe, Sotuth Africa, A Study in Contflict(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1965), esp. p. 182. In terms of antecedent conditions preceding revolutionary upheavals, I would be prepared to argue that a large-scale revolution is more likely to occur in the United States than in South Africa.

PARTITION

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(South Africa's racial policy). The present mobilization of energy concerning South Africa is seen by this writer as headed for only nonconstructive consequences, no matter from zvhose standpoint of those really affected, and the problem is whether more constructive channels may be found stemming from a realistic sociological appraisal of salient actualities and viable alternatives. What, then, are the various possibilities? Taking the present state of affairs as a central point of reference on a political axis ranging from right to left, the following schematizes major patterns: total Africanization (via revolution) integration

First, should each tribal area prove to be successful and attract a large, stable population enjoying a viable agriculturally-based economy -let us say by analogy that each Bantustan became a sort of Denmark-this would soon have drastic economic repercussions on the white industrial society whose structure is contingent on large supplies of low-skilled Africans, a significant percentage of whom are migrant laborers. Faced by a growing labor shortage, South African mine owners and farmers will place pressures on the government to regress the separate development of Bantustan areas by various schemes. Second and equally "baaskap" utopian apartheid ("Bantustans")

apartheid (status quo)

The present total system of race relations is termed "apartheid" (apartness), but it is complicated by an ideological component not coextensive with the actual state of affairs.4 This refers to the doctrine of apartheid as a total separation of all distinct ethnic-racial-cultural groups into their own territories, of which the creation of separate Bantustans has received the most attention (and notoriety). Irrespective of its idealistic intenition, total apartheid as formulated by Afrikaner theorists must be seen as falling to the extreme right of actual South African society; in terms of modern trends, the compartmentalization of populations in terms of particularistic tribal-racial criteria grounded in traditional "homelands" has a strong reactionary flavor about it. The economics of the Bantustan scheme are not for present purposes at issue. Even if each of the seven or so proposed Bantustan areas were brought into being and capable of supporting its own tribal population, several factors would mitigate against the long-term survival of Bantustan areas. These bear mention since they tend to be overlooked by the government's social architects.
4 For background readings, see N. J. Rhoodie and H. J. Venter, Apartheid (Cape Town and Haum, 1960) ; Eugene P. Dvorin, Pretoria: Racial Separation in South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); L. E. Neame, The History of Apartheid (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962).

crucial, territorial separation along tribal lines will be strongly resisted by Africans who see in the Bantustan idea of "tribal development along its own line" a disguised attempt to perpetuate African backwardness and white domination.5 Since tribalism is an anathema to the modern political conscience of African nationalism, it is foolish to expect that African states will ever legitimate the status of respective Bantustan territories, no matter how much autonomly these may be given by the South African government. Even if the latter were to grant complete determination to the Transkei and other tribal states to the extent that each could apply for membership in the United Nations, it should be expected that each would receive the same treatment as Prime Minister Tslomnbe of the Congo received when he tried to mnlake appearance in Cairo in 1964 at a an sumnmitconference of African heads of state. In brief, the suspicionl of "Uncle Tomism" is bound to make the Bantustans (embodying "utopian" apartheid) meet with ill-favor outside South Africa. Moreover, inside South Africa this alternative to the status quo will never get the support of urban Africans-a steadily increasing segment of the total Bantu population-for a variety of reasons. Having
5 See, for example, Govan Mbeki, Soutth Africa: The Peasant Revolt (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964).

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SOCIAL FORCES
A sad mistake of most international observers is to view the white South African polity as an undifferentiated structure always moving as a solid bloc. On the contrary, it is more accurate to regard the present government as one like any other elected government which has to cater to a majority of the electorate if it is to survive. That in South Africa the electorate is racially restricted is true, and that this factor may in itself undermine the existence of the government is also true, but lneither of these factors invalidate our assertion tlhat the Nationalist administration at present lhas more to fear from a white electorate than from a disenfranchised nonwhite population. In terms of South African political history, Dr. Verwoerd's proposals and enactments for pushing the territorial separation of the Bantu may be considered by a large segment of the electorate as radical and unsavory as Prime Minister Hertzog's similar program in the 1920's. Hertzog in 1923-1924 formulated a policy of segregation whose elements had been present on the South African scene much earlier but had not been explicated comprehensively. This policy of race relations had as its foundation that the Bantu "would live in reserves where they would be encouraged to develop along their own lines, and in the course of time they would have their own vote in their own Parliament in their own country."9 Much of Hertzog's program has been incorporated in the present conception of Bantustans. If Hertzog failed to implement his ideas, it was essentially due to opposition from two groups of the white community, the rural Afrikaners in the platteland, and the mining magnates along with other large-scale employers of black labor. Faced with this powerful opposition, Hertzog could not muster a majority in Parliament for his program. More generally speaking, a recurrent feature of South African politics is that the right-wing, Afrikaner Nationalist leader of yesterday has to face the problem of being successively taken for a moderate liberal and even for a progressive radical the more he seeks accommodations with the rest of the European community out9 C. M. Tatz, Shadow and Substance in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1962), p. 38.

left the tribal areas not only in search of better economic opportunities, but also because of a desire to escape from restrictive traditional political and other social constraints (a general factor in rural exodus) ,6 the modernizing urban African is hardly going to want to relocate back in the stifling atmosphere of the rural ghetto, no matter how much rural redevelopment may take place. This is the psychological factor which the South African government seems to be naively overlooking. A second alternative is a policy more conservative than reactionary. This is the policy of baaskap-naked white domination-which seems to have typified the predecessor of Dr. Verwoerd, J. G. Strydom, who placed his policy in blunt terms: Either the white man dominates or the black man takes over. I say that the non-Europeanwill not accept leadership-if he has a choice. The only way the European can maintain supremacy is by domination . . .7 Of course, one can dismiss the actual state of affairs as indistinguishable from baaskap, but this would not be accurate; total domination/exploitation would imply a much greater curtailment of African autonomy in the Transkei and other designated Bantustans, a reduction in government expenditures going into African education and welfare services, etc. If the current status quo is an amalgam of "vertical" (separate development) and "horizontal" (caste stratification) apartheid, it should be noted that were the present government to fall due to economic factors (e.g., a sharp recession), a more right-wing government would likely be elected, one which would cater to "platteland"8 discontent that first Verwoerd and now Prime Minister B. J. Vorster have been doing too much for the Africans in both tribal and urban areas.
6 See D. H. Reader, The Black Man's Portion (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 72; John H. Wellington, Southert Africa, Vol. II: Economic and Humtan Geography (Cambridge: University Press, 1960), p. 261. 7 Cited in Neame, op. cit., p. 131. 8 A term referring to the white rural areas of the northern provinces which have traditionally provided key support for the Nationalist Party, with an ethos similar to the Southern "Bible belt."

PARTITION

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side South Africa, though in their case accommodation outside the initial core support is seen as going from left to right. 11 For sophisticated discussions of the economics of sanctions, see Ronald Segal (ed.), Sanctions Against South Africa (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964). The only thing not discussed by the various experts convened by Segal, it seems, was the nature of the polity which would be brought into being assuming that economic sanctions were successful. Economic sanctions can be important means but political ends have to be agreed upon in advance, and this seems very much lacking in the Segal volume.

side the Afrikaans-speaking group-this is "Europeans" have thought of as their own.12 what happened to such Prime Ministers as Moreover, what should not be overlooked as a Botha, Smuts, Hertzog, and Malan, and this is serendipity of international hostility against what constituted a dilemma for Verwoerd and South Africa is that the country has paranow for Vorster.10 Thus, today the regime doxically grown economically stronger in seekfaces the danger of being accused as a "Kaffir- ing self-sufficiency out of necessity, particularly lover" by the numerically diminishing but polit- since it left the Commonwealth. ically entrenched rural white electorate of the Furthermore, it is the impression of this northern territories. If the Bantustan scheme, writer that the same external opposition is makincluding government expenditures for separate ing for political unification within the white Bantu facilities, has progressed as rapidly as it community (the Afrikaner-English populations has since the Verwoerd administration took mainly) which had never really felt solidary over in 1958, it is because latent right-wing heretofore. Just as racial oppression has unskepticism and opposition has been stilled by wittingly made for cohesion among otherwise the economic boom of the past decade. In other disparate elements of the urban African popuwords, there has been a sort of "you can have lation, so correspondingly is international hosyour cake and eat it, too" feeling, one which tility helping the white society in South Africa develop a profound feeling of "togetherness."'13 might be shattered by an economic recession. If we now examine alternatives which may Of course, an economic recession is precisely what seems to be desired by opponents of be designated to the left of the current state of the present system who advocate boycotts and affairs, the most moderate one is the liberal economic sanctions against South Africa.11 The model of graduated integration (which may rationale for this is the assumption that rather also be called trusteeship, partnership, assimilation, etc.). This holds that equal economic than suffering economic setbacks, South African politicians would opt for rational economic opportunities must be made available to the Bantu so that he can be vertically integrated behavior and do away with racial discriminainto South African society, such that the whole tion, as this is taking place in the American society becomes one economic whole to the South. That international and domestic ecobenefit of all.14 Economic rationality requires nomic action (boycotts, strikes, etc.) could slow down the South African economy is, of the breakdown of racial discrimination so that course, a distinct possibility, though probably there will be a more productive development of not to the extent envisaged, but even should available manpower and other resources. This alternative, focusing upon the material this occur there is no assurance that this would progress of the Africans in the European solead the white government to accommodate demands for black equality in areas which the ciety is outdated in terms of African realities, albeit it had a certain potentiality 20 years ago. 10 Structurally speaking, this is the same dilemma Integration as a model of social development of African Nationalist leaders such as Banda, was the underlying idea behind the Central Kenyatta, Kaunda, and Houphouet-Boigny outAfrican Federation, but "partnership" or "mul12After all, stringent economic sanctions have so far failed to topple the Smith regime in Rhodesia, whose economy is much more fragile than that of South Africa. 13 For supporting evidence, see the perceptive analysis of Edwin S. Munger, Afrikan,er and African Nationalismii (South African Parallels and Paramiieters) (London, Cape Town, and New York: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, 1967). 14This is the view of Ralph Horwitz, Expan7d or Explode, Apartheid's Threat to Industry (Cape Town: Business Bookman, 1957).

212

SOCIAL FORCES to the urban Africans. The conception is that of a unitary "nonracial" state based upon political egalitarianism. This strategy is in line with Dr. Nkrumah's adage of giving priority in race relations to political development ("seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will follow"). If one could accurately gauge public opinion, "one man, one vote" would probably correspond to the demand of a majority of urbanized Bantus and certainly to the desires of African heads of state outside the Republic.17

tiracialism," contained in the model, was rejected by the African leaders of what was then Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now Zambia and Malawi) because integration's pace of political development was too slow and de facto maintained the dependency of the nonwhites.15 In terms of economic rationality, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland made perfect sense, but in terms of political aspirations (something overlooked by the Colonial Office) it was a tragic blunder. Demographic logic would suggest that a numerical minority can be "integrated" or "assinmilated"on an equal-status basis with a numerical majority,16 but if integration involves a numerical majority being integrated into a supposedly "higher-level" numerical minority, the process faces formidable odds against its success. If the French colonization with its ideology of assimilation (equivalent for all purposes to integration) and relative absence of race consciousness had as a result the counterrevolution of negrituide, and if after generations of freer contacts than have prevailed in South Africa the populations of Canada, Belgium and Cyprus are still bitterly divided along ethnic-cultural lines, then how can one possibly expect a successful policy of racial-cultural integration in South Africa? Besides, to say that urban Africans in South Africa are willing to be integrated is misleading for it implies that urbanization has given them a cultural tabula rasa, whereas in fact it is precisely the desire to modernize along lines of their own choosing which underlies Africans' call for freedom, just as this underlies, we would propose, the movement of "Black Power" in the United States. Passing to more progressive alternatives, instead of the gradual socioeconomic betterment, a policy advocated in some quarters is to grant "one man, one vote" political enfranchisement
15 C. W. De Kiewet, The Anatomy of South Oxford University African Misery (London: Press, 1956), p. 86. of the Huguenots in the 16 The assimilation Dutch community of South Africa in the late seventeenth century was an outstanding successful case of integration, paralleling that of the Dutch in America. The conditions for successful assimilation badly need to be studied by comparative sociological analysis.

The unrealistic aspect of this is to suppose that a white electorate which has always been the dominant electorate of South Africa would voluntarily commit political suicide and hand over the government to a nonwhite electorate, one which would certainly not channel its vote within a white-dominated or financially supported party. The political developments in Kenya, Ghana, Zambia and elsewhere provide ample documentation for this point. On the one hand, no African political leader could possibly be a spokesman for urban Africans were he to accept limited political suffrage on the basis of educational and property qualifications; on the other hand, no Afrikaner politician could possibly ask the white community to have confidence in his sanity were he to suggest that he would lead South Africa through its devolution of political power from white dominance to black dominance. The whole rationale behind segregation and the setting up of Bantustans has been that Europeans must protect themselves from political and sexual submergence. How Europeans could ever accept a doctrine of "one man, one vote" which if implemented would lead to their sociopolitical annihilation is impossible to gloss over. "Nonracialism" for the present is a euphemism which implies a racially homogeneous society having organic solidarity, and this implicitly excludes alien races from decision-making functions in political processes. The fate of the Asiatic minority in East Africa is illustrative of this. The last and most extreme alternative is that of an all-out war of liberation which would
17 For a representative view of a black South African Nationalist, see Nelson Mandela, L'Apartheid (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1965), esp. p. 108.

PARTITION

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take on the aspect of a simultaneous mass revolution of urban Africans and large-scale terrorist and guerilla warfare from neighboring frontiers (Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana). Here the model might be the Algerian case with Tanzania playing the role of Tunisia. Once the outbreak occurred it would be a logical strategy to ask the United Nations to send an expeditionary force to intervene on behalf of African insurgents. This extreme possibility undoubtedly appeals to the most militant of Pan-Africanists who see the liquidation of Europeans in South Africa as the ultimate goal of the decolonization of the African continent. In many ways, of course, the development of the course of events in the last decade would be just such an eventuality. If an Algerian-type situation were to develop-that is, a prolonged physical conflict between Europeans and non-Europeans-what would be the consequences? It is dubious that the extermination of the whites would be acceptable to the West, no matter how much it might presently abhor white domination in South Africa. After all, the Hitler-type "final solution" is repudiated by international condemnation of genocide; the physical extinction of whites in South Africa would go counter to the very notion of "antiracist racism" as justification of African liberation. But could a prolonged war lead to the Europeans being "driven into the sea" by peaceftul or other means . . . that is, to their voluntarily migrating away from South Africa after defeat, leaving South Africa a racially homogeneous country where the Africans would be the uncdisputed master ?18 Again, the outcome of the Algerian war would seem to suggest this possibility. Yet, though it is conceivable that the English-speaking community might find refuge in white Commonwealth countries, and though other European minorities might "return" to their homelands (e.g.,
18 The wishful thinking expressed in some quar-

Israel, Greece), it is unlikely that the Afrikaners would "rather switch than fight." Anyone cognizant of the extremely bitter resistance of the Boers against British imperialism in the war of 1898-1901 must conclude that over 1,500,000 Afrikaners today (even accepting the dubious assumption that all other Europeans would pull up stakes) would fight to the last. Besides, the South African government today is not that of a metropole, as was the case of the Algerian situation. France could justify accepting the Evian agreements because the total costs of the war eventually outwveighed her responsibility to French colons in Algeria. However, Pretoria is not Paris and would have no choice but to carry on a war to the finish. Various consequences arising from a prolonged racial war should give pause to those who see a blood bath as a necessary catharsis for purifying the South African atmosphere. First, a prolonged conflict would be a heavy drain on the resources of cooperating African states.19 Second, it would invite the intervention of the Communist bloc, which would in turn precipitate Western intervention, or vice versa. The United Nations would in a short time directly intervene with a very extensive military and civilian force, one which would need an astronomical budget to maintain operations. If the United Nations' cost in the Congo amounted to nearly half a billion dollars in four years, a UN-in-South Africa invasion, occupation, and reconstruction would cost an amount large enough to bankrupt the United Nations.20 Leaving the United Nations aside, a prolonged conflict would certainly disrupt the progress of racial harmony around the world, particularly in the United States-in fact, it is not altogether unlikely that it could provoke an international conflict between the colored "Tiers-Monde" and the
19 Of course, large volunteer liberation armies might temporarily help out unemployment problems of several countries, but the cost of furnishing these armies, even of the guerilla type, would cancel out their socioeconomic advantages. 20 For a discussion of some of the military costs, see Amelia C. Leiss (ed.), Apartheid and United

ters that everything would be amicably settled if only the Afrikaners could be persuaded to leave South Africa is, ironically, the same sort as voiced by some American racists that the best thing for all concerned would be for Negroes to "return home to Africa." After 300 years, neither Negroes nor Afrikaners are likely to warit to return "home."

Nations, Collective Measures (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), pp. 131-153, 165-170.

214

SOCIAL FORCES mense hardship and sacrifices on the part of the whites . . .23 If apartheidcould measure up to an ideal-which some have cherished-of fair territorial partition with real autonomy for each territory and full
rights for each race, it is . . . a solution which

colorless West. Further, given the present state of international economic expansion and the requirements of gold to maintain liquidity, the extensive disruption of South African gold production at this time would produce a worldwide financial crisis whose ultimate consequences would be hard to foresee.21 Thus, the possibilities most discussed concerning South Africa are either unfeasible, impractical, or morally unacceptable, for a variety of reasons. These possibilities, which as noted range from the ideological far right22 to its polar extreme suffer from the basic deficiency of not taking into account the pertinent features of the South African situation and considering objectively the consequences. 2 Is there remaining a major alternative which might fit the exigencies of the situation and provide the basis of an optimal policy? The inevitable answer which suggests itself but which has gotten the least careful attention is that of "partition." Though partition goes counter to liberal ideals of integration, even prominent South African liberals have had to recognize grudgingly that partition is the only solution which might have a realistic chance of success. The following are illustrative: In one sense only could apartheid succeed This is in the sense of partition, where the whites and the nonwhites are given full control of their respective areas, after an equitable division of the country. But such a partition must involve a division so that each of the separate parts become independently viable. The boundaries would be hard to define; it would also inevitably entail im21 To avoid this there would have to be complicated international agreements to demonetize gold, i.e., to treat it as just any other commodity. Easier said than done! See "Practical Realism about Gold," Monthly Economic Letter, First National City Bank of New York (May 1967), pp. 53-56. 22 The extermination of the blacks, polar to the white final solution, may be thought to be the really far right of the spectrum outlined but in terms of proponents it constitutes a null cellpaternalism may be a basic ingredient of race relations in South Africa but paternalism seldom contemplates infanticide.

could be morally justified, calling for the greatest self-sacrifice, courage, and impartiality.24 The solution by partition is the only realistic
and moral one . . . Partition is the answer for

human groups whose sentimental and therefore irrational aspirations diverge.25 Even 0. D. Schreiner in his 1964 presidential address before the South African Institute of Race Relations (the spokesman organization of liberalism in South Africa) hinted that a fair partition of the country should not be dismissed, though finding an equitable division would seem most vexing: A system of partition would not necessarily be a sham. But if it were to follow the lines of genuine liquidation and redistributionbetween the groups, it would be politically and economically
impossible. The Bantustan policy . . . bears no

relation to what would be a fair method of dividing the country between the groups.26 Finally, Patrick Duncan the younger, whose article in the prestigious Foreign. Affairs seemed to suggest that nothing could or should be done for South Africa, tries to ward off the appeal of partition, curiously enough, by saying that it would be unfair not to the Bantu but rather to the whites:
23 F. P. Spooner, South African Predicament (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 236. (Italics mine.) 24D. V. Cowen, Constitution-Makingfor a Democracy, Supplement to Optima (March 1960), p. 5. 25 Paul Giniewski, Bantustans, A Trek Toward the Future (Cape Town: Herman and Rousseau, 1961), p. 223. The partition that the author espouses accepts the idea of separate Bantustan areas with industrial development made possible by heavy extensive white capital. We feel this would be rejected by urban African leaders as it would "Balkanize" South Africa into perpetually weak economic states. 26 Q. D. Schreiner, South Africa-United or Divided? (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 1964), p. 9.

PARTITION
TABLE- 1. I)ISTRIBUTION

FOR SOUTH AFRICA?

AFRICA, BY PROVINCE,

215
1960 (000's omitte(l)
!

OF MAJOR GROUP'S IN SOUTH

Groups Province
_ _. _ .__ ._ _ ._.._ - - - - -........ - - -

White
.,_ _I__ _._ . . _.. - - - - - -.....__ _._ , __ -

Banitu
-. . . . . -

| Asiatics
_ -.. .

Coloureds 1,314
43

All Races 5,309 2, 933 (G,225 1, 374

__.______.___ _-

........ Cape .. Natal .3..............4.......... Transvaal .1,455 Orange Free State ......

..... ......

997 3t0 275

2,976 2,156 4,(i02 1,074

20 394 63 0

1()5 26

fromlState of South Africa, Year Book1962 (Johannesburg: Da Glaya Puiblications,. *Data comripiled

In particular, there is no just partition that could leave the white territory with any sizable
infrastructure . . . If it is the whites who wish

to destroy the partnershipand undo the union, they couldlnot reasonablyexpect to keep what was built in p)artnership.27 Obviously, partition as a way out for the South African impasse faces difficult obstacles in being accepted by various groups. Among the questions to be faced are the following: (1) are there more meaningful alternatives to partition, (2) what would the partition of Souith Africa look like, and (3) what would be the major consequences of partition? Partition would be obviously doomed were it defined by the Africans as a European schemiieto deprive the blacks of what is theirs; it would also be doomed to failure if whites felt they had nothing to gaiui from partition. For this proposal to have a chance of being accepted before rather than after a prolonged conflict it must be seen for what it is: a pragmatic, realistic compromise solution falling outside the plane of alternatives previously sketched in this paper, a proposal which if implemented would save all sides (including the rest of the world) much grief. Of course, being a compromise, it will not maximize the interests of the blacks nor those of the whites nor those of other ethnic groups (e.g.. Cape Coloured, Tndians), but that is precisely why partition will turn out to be the only equitable solution. 3 Prior to considering the basis of an equitable partition proposal, it is worthwhile to indicate
27 P. Duncan, "Toward a World Policy for South Africa," Forcign Affairs (October, 1963), reprinted in Philip W. Quigg (ed.), Africa, A Affairs Rcader (New York: Frederick Forcign

briefly certain structurcal ancl historical aspects of what underlies the present state of affairs. Let us briefly examine two major comuponents of the morphology of South Africa, population distr-ibution and land allocation. The preliminary results of the 1960 census place(l South Africa's total population at 15.8 million inhabitants, of which 10.8 were listed as Bantu (corresponcling to the common use of "African"); 3.1 as Whites; 1.5 as Coloureds; ancl .5 Asiatics. Table 1 shows the population (O hut;(I by plrovinces. istri The black African population is segregated from the rest of the population by means of Bantu areas which cannot be alienated (the Reserve areas plus lan(d purchase(d frolmiEuropeans by native Commissions out of a special fund), and of course by means of "locations" and native townships in urban, non-Reserve areas. The present policy and practices of apartheicl represents one of the fundamenta? continuities of South African social structure, namely the attempts of the white population to erect barriers forestalling the effects of a permanenit African urban population. African urbanization is a response in part to the same set of socioeconomic factors which have led to Afrikaner urbanization: depletion of rural resources and higher wages and employment opportunities in urban areas. However, the artificial restrictions have made the African urban population more of a migrant than a settle(d population. As of 1951 when the Bantu population was about 8.6 million, the permanently settlecl 'Bantu population was estimatedl by the Tomlinson Commission to be arouind 1.5 million; since South Africa's total uriban resi(lent population was placed at 5.4 millions for that year, this suggests the African percentage to be about 28 percent.28 Tn 1946
28

A. Praeger, 1964), p. 260.

Si1ummary of the Report of the Commission

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SOCIAL FORCES up by the Nationalists slhortly after they assumed power in 1948. Accepting the premise of Bantustan areas, the Commission proposed their consolidation into seven major historico-logical "homelands," the restriction of Bantu migrant workers to temporary mine employment outside tribal areas, and an initial extensive ten-year Bantustan development program with top priority given to soil reclamationl. The present carrying capacity of 3.6 million people would, under optimal developmental conditions, increase to eight million by the 1980's (assuming an average annual opening of 20,000 jobs in secondary industry and 30,000 in tertiary activities). Were all this to be accomplished, the Tomlinson Report hoped that the Bantu areas could provide adequate homesteads for nearly three out of four blacks by the end of the century. Thus, the report accepted as economically feasible a doubling of the population density of the Bantustan areas from a present density of 70 per square mile to a potential density of 123-147 per square mile. More concretely, the Bantustan areas (about the total area size of England and Wales) could support a population by the end of the century roughly the size of the total Bantu population in South Africa. The predecessor of the Tomlinson Commission was the Smuts-appointed Native Laws of Comllmission 1946-1948. Its report (the Fagan Report) differed in the fundamental premise of racial policy, for it accepted the liberal United Partv cloctrine of economic integration and parallel political coexistence (within the same body politic) evolving into a whole. Its major recomimendation, in contrast to the Tomlinson Report, was to favor strongly stabilizing the labor force and reducing migrant labor via the permanent urban settlement of African families.34 It also concluded that greater procluctivity for the Reserve tribal areas could only be achieved by drawing off the human population35 coupled with curtailing unproductive
34 Report

about 40 percent of the Bantu lived in native areas in the then Union as a whole, though the range of variation was considerable, from just four percent in the Orange Free State to 66 in the Cape Province.29 Tn 1951, 43 percent of the Bantu was residing in Bantu areas, 27 in urban areas, and the remainder in European farms and other non-Reserve rural areas.30 The demographic strains are obvious and complex. On the one hand, present resources make the Bantu Reserve areas overpopulated; on the other, government policy is geared to control urban influx by making it impossible, by the notorious pass system, and by various other means, for the blacks to purchase new land in urban areas. This is in theory, and in practice apartheid is subverted by illicit immigration, much of which rests on white complicity.3' The presence of blacks in urban areas has always presented a problem (or a mixed blessing) for the whites in South Africa (just as, in a complementary fashion, the presence of whites has presented a problem in tropical "Apartheid" is a recent political Africa). slogan (dating back to the 1948 elections), but the various measures which the Nationalist government has carried out in its unprecedented tenure in office, particularly regarding the formation of Bantu areas though in other matters of race relations as well, are of ancient vintage in South African history.32 A cursory glance at past Commission findings and recommendations dealing with "the native problem" is necessary to have a historical perspective.33 The most voluminous survey is the Tomlinson Report, the findings of a Commission set
for the Socio-Economic Developmett of the Banti Areas Within the' Union of South Africa, U. G.

61/1955 (Pretoria, 1955), p. 27f. Hereafter cited as the Tonmlinson Report. 29 Helen Suzman, A Digest of the Fagan Report (3d ed.; (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 1952).
30 31

Tomlinson Report, p. 28.

of the Native Laws Conmission 1946-

Reader, op. cit., p. 53f. and passim. 32 Edward A. Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Politics in South Africa," Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), pp. 682-697. 33 Tatz, op. cit., provides an excellerit historical background of various legislations concerning Africans in this century.

1948, U.G. 28/1948 (Pretoria, 1948), p. 46.

35 This would be achieved via rural villages serving as "merely a half-way house for families of men who start as migrant laborers but in the course of time become urbanized and will then desire to take their families out of the Reserves," ,ibid., p. 47.

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animal stock.36 The problem of overstocked lands had been thoroughly investigated by an earlier commission, the Native Economic Commission of 1930-1932 (the Holloway Report).3? The findings of the latter are outdated only in its consideration of the poor-white problem (which plagued South Africa at a similar time and for similar reasons as in the United States). Its trenchant analysis of the black African situation is still relevant. The Holloway Report noted four major sources of grievances of the Africans: (a) the shortage of land, (b) the restriction upon individual liberty imposed by the pass laws, (c) the colour bar, and (d) artificially low wages. ft advocated developing a stable urban African labor force with higher skills and wages (essentially involving breaking down the colour bar in urban areas) and allowing rural Africans to come from the Reserves on a temporary basis for odd or seasonal jobs requiring no skills (e.g., farm migrant workers). Considering the era during which this report was prepared, it was remarkably objective and farsighted, for it made a point of stressing that removal of the colour bar in industry and thereby improving the African standard of living would not have a "zero-sum game" effect on white job opportunities. The report carefully pointed out that a pathological aspect of the labor market is that the stable African urban labor force is caught in a pincer since it faces a job ceiling on the one hand, and on the other is undermined by the periodic influx of less skilled Reserve Africans, thus depressing wages further. This is wvhy the Hollozuay Report advocated establishing artificial barriers between urban and Reserve areas. To allow a greater population in the Reserves-which, the commission noted,
See also the Tonmlinson Report, p. 114. Report of the Native Economic Commission 1930-1932,. U.G. 22/1932 (Pretoria, 1932), p. 47. Hereafter cited as the Hollozay Report. Simply giving more land to the Africans is a necessary but not sufficient condition for rural Bantu prosperity, if only because as long as the traditional social structure gives cattle ownership a ritualsymbolic rather than economic significance there will always be a sort of rural Malthusi.an dilemma: an arithmetic increase in land will inevitably result in a near geometric increase in animal stock.
3G 37

contain some of the richest lands in South Africa in terms of soil and rainfall-not only more lands88 but also better farming methods would have to be developed. Stress was placed oll destocking so as to reduce denudation and the creation of desert conditions in the Ciskei and Transkei areas as well as elsewhere. For lack of space we shall not discuss earlier Commissions, such as the Stallard Commission of 1922 or the Beaumont Commission of 19131916. Suffice to say that some form of territorial segregation within South Africa has been a cardinal feature of white approach to race relations by means of tribally distinct areas. In terms of historical continuities, South Africa has followed a policy toward tribal Bantus practically identical to the policy of the American federal government toward American Indhan tribes-a policy of manifest benevolent segregation.39 No commission has ever been appointed to examine the feasibility of partition, which should definitely not be identified with "segre38 Ibid., p. 29. The recommendation for the acquisition of more land for the Bantu areas was carried out in the Natives Trust and Land Act, No. 18/1936, which provided a fund to purchase up to fifteen million acres as part of Hertzog's package deal to Parliament involving taking Africans off the common roll in the Cape Province. 39 If the development of separate tribal Bantu areas is so counter to the modern temper, tribalism in the United States should go as well. Yet, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, cornerstone of contemporary human American Indian policy, seems identical in conception with Verwoerd's Bantustan policy. The policy of our Bureau of Indian Affairs is reflected in the statement that "since Indian groups differ widely in the degrees of their acculturation and educational, health, and economic conditions, it would be folly for the government to fit them into an identical pattern by a general law applicable to all Indian groups," (T. H. Haas, "The Legal Aspects of Indian Affairs from 1887 to 1957," The Annals, 311 [May 1957], p. 22). See other articles in the same issue for similar sentiments from American specialists in Indian affairs. Not only has the American government's policy toward Indians strikingly resembled that of South Africa, but furthermore an impartial observer would be hard put to find the average Indian reserve better off psychologically and materially than the average Bantu reserve!

218

SOCIAL FORCES Republic) or a more centralized state (such as Tanzania or Ghana). On the other hand, there would be a "white" republic consisting of the Orange Free State and the Cape Province. This is a first approximation, for the Transkei and perlhaps the Ciskei could be detached from the Cape, thereby restoring the older historical boundaries between whites and Africans back to the Kei or Fish Rivers. The Thaba Nchu Bantu area, presently an enclave in the Orange Free State, could become part of Lesotho. Conversely, the predominantly white area of the Transvaal just above the Vaal River (the Klerksdorp-Potchefstroom district) up to and including Vereeniging would remain a part of the white republic (as would Pretoria but not Johannesburg). The black African state would have a diversified economy made possible by the Witwatersrand mining area, the heavily industrialized Johannesburg area adaeent to it, the Durban complex including its excellent maritime facilities, and the East London industrial center. Economic development would give priority to the agricultural development of the Transkei and other presently underdeveloped Bantu Reserve areas.42 Yet, it would be unwise and senseless to tell Africans how they should economically or politically organize and run their state, since too long have they been told in South Africa and elsewhere what is in their "best interests." Partition should let Africans decide for themselves, free from foreign intervention, how to operate a modern political state of their own, one to which they are entitled. The white area would, of course, be greatly shrunk from the present polity which the Europeans consider legitimately theirs. Why would
42 A substantial amount of the necessary capital could be taken out of excess Rand mining profits. The present political uncertainty is a key factor in making dividend yields of Rand gold mine shares up to ten percent of their capital value in contrast to three or four percent of Canadian gold shares. Reducing profits via substantially heavier taxation to a still respectable yield of five percent could provide at least $50,000,000 for rural redevelopment purpose. See Giniewski, op. cit., p. 240. Moreover, any increase in the world price for gold could easily multiply this figure available to the black South African state.

gation."40 Segregation implies the notion of a cordon sanitaire drawn by a dominant (in terms of power) racial group to enclose a minority group within the confines of a political territory for the purpose of maintaining the status quo in the stratification system of race relations. That Africans would reject whiteimposed segregation at the first opportunity is only to be expected, but that Africans would also reject partition is another matter, albeit both seem initially to be the same phenomenon of racial differentiation. In the absence of public opinion polls of urban Africans in the Republic, it is hard to estimate accurately what percentage would opt for a viable partition proposal. Nevertheless, it is this writer's opinion that a great majority would endorse the words of D. D. T. Jabavu spoken over 30 years ago at the All-African Convention: Segregation and colour-bars must go; alternatively we want a separate state of our own where we shall rule ourselves freed from the present
hypocritical position.41

In the absence of a comprehensive survey evaluating the basis of a partition, in the last part of this paper we shall sketch a tentative proposal. The major criterion which underlies our suggestion is that partition be viable economically and politically. Grosso modo, a viable partition of South Africa would have as the basis of division the formation of two new states out of the present Republic, as indicated in Figure 1 near the end of this paper. On the one hand, a "black" state composed of the bulk of the Transvaal, Natal, Lesotho (formerly Basutoland) and Swaziland would be reconstituted in the nature of a federal republic (such as the Cameroun
Turk, op. cit., seems to equate the two. Of the various "futures" of South Africa he discusses, the one that seems most probable to him is a federal system within which there would be racially segregated areas. In view of the fate of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the shaky nature of federation in Nigeria, and for considerations mentioned elsewhere in this paper, we consider two political states more realistic than a single federal system. 41 Tatz, op. cit., p. 88. This is paralleled today in a striking fashion by leaders of the militant American Negro movement.
40

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FOR SOUTH AFRICA?

219

they accept such a partition, especially considering that both Verwoerd and his successor have rejected the idea of anybody trying to "carve up" South Africa?43 The answer is that whites in South Africa are as realistic as the Africans. If the white population were to feel that a shrunken territory would be legitimated by black popular leaders both inside and outside South Africa, if they felt there would be a place in the African sun for their grandchildren, then we suggest that pragmatic considerations would make them accept this difficult but only alternative to an Algeria- or Kenya-type all-out conflict. Furthermore, if we exclude the TranskeiCiskei areas from the Cape and then also the present Bantu area from the Free State, then it would be practical to have a "owe mtan, one vote" criterion, for political suffrage operative in both political states, provided the Cape Coloured be placed oni,a common roll with the Europeans, since the white-Coloured population are there in the majority. The step of returning the Cape Coloured to a common roll would be logical and in keeping with the deep and widely held belief among the Europeans that the Coloureds are culturally part of the white civilization (Afrikaans being their language of expression). After all, the great Nationalist leader of the Afrikaners in this century, Hertzog, always held that the Cape Coloureds were an integral part of European civilization in South Africa. If a Nationalist government were to return the franchise to the Coloureds, chances are more than even that the latter would vote Nationalist, just as German settlers in SouthWest Africa did when they were oiven their franchise back by Malan after having been deprived of it by the Smuts government during World War TI (a treatment similar to that of Japanese-Americans on our own West Coast). Unrestricted adult suffrage would be a sine quta nton for the international acceptance of partition, but there is no reason why this condition could not be met in either of the contemplated states. Further, in the white-Coloured state a program calling for the progressive repeal of racial discriminatory legislation could
43 This, ironically, is one of the few areas of agreement between the Nationalist government and South African liberals.

be adopted. It is the contention of this writer that much racially discriminatory legislation in South Africa stems more from fear than malevolence, and the fear is objectively grounded at present in cold demographic logic. If the source of the fear were removed (i.e., if there were not a black numerical majority in the white territory), much of the legislation (e.g., absurd pass law restrictions) could be done away with in a short period of time to the psychological and social benefit of all. To be sure, the Transvaal presently contains a heavy white population, but it is expected that a great many farmers, living in really marginal farms whose existence is made possible only because of cheap Bantu labor, would relocate in an area of the white state. In this context it is feasible to contemplate a vast irrigation scheme for the Western Cape. The settled urban European population in the Johannesburg area would have the option of remaining as either permanent citizens or as expatriates on a temporary visa, and vice versa for the Africans in the white state. The partition could be supervised by the United Nations with a period of five or ten years given for relocation. Undoubtedly, one may expect that the minority group in each state would feel somewhat apprehensive about remaining, yet since a sort of "hostage" population would have its counterpart on the other side, the problem of Cyprus would not present itself. Optimally, Africans in the white-Coloured state would have a civil status similar to that of Italian, Greek or Spanish workers in France or Switzerland; the same would be true for whites in the black South African state. There are recent precedents for the international legitimation of a partition plan for South Africa. Having accepted the partition of British India and of Palestine because of irreconcilable conflicts between the two major segments of the population in the respective cases, can the United Nations do less vis-a-vis South Africa where the structural features parallel the case of India and Palestine? Of course. a white state in Southern Africa, no matter how mall, might still vex the more intransigent African leaders. A white state would for a long time occupy the same precarious position as Israel in the Middle East, but to deny the legitimacy of a homelan(d to the

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SOCIAL FORCES

00 4

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i

H)LU~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~~~~~~
FIUE1SGETDPATTO A FSUH FIC BAKSAT NLTIE RA

Adaptedfrom United Nations,Report

uatton m the

of the United NationsCommission on the Raci 1 Sit Unionof South Africa (New York: General Assembly, 1953), p. 166.~~~~~~~0:

population of European extraction in South Africa is to engage in racial exclusion no less pernicious than the denial of the legitimacy of a Jewish homeland. We have not previously made reference to

a last-ditch liberal argument that the long association of whites and blacks should be preserved and that there is a deep feeling of racial good will which can still be harnessed for uniting the two groups. This writer is of the

ECOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION opinion that this represents more sentimental and wishful thinking than anything grounded in sober facts.44 Generations of unequal status contacts has given the urban African at best ambivalence toward the white man, and more salient is profound distrust of the latter, no matter what his political affiliation may be (UP, NP, Progressive, Liberal, or even Communist). The most immediate desire of the urban African is the craving for emancipation, for being one's own boss in one's own country, without having to be careful as to what one says for fear of losing one's job or going to jail. Yet, it is highly possible that the partition proposal drawn up by contracting parties would
44 For corroborating evidence, see A. G. J. Crijns, Race Relations and Race Attitudes in Soutth Africa (Nijmegen, Netherlands, 1959). Among other findings concerning a sample of 110 youthful Bantu intellectuals, Crijns found that less than ten percent had favorable attitudes toward South African whites (over 70 percent had very unfavorable feelings). At the same time, 79 percent felt tensions between whites and nonwhites would increase in the future, and 81 percent felt that the likely future development of South Africa, given present trends, would have as its solution bloodshed, revolution, or other means of violence.

IN MEXICO

221

make allowance for considering an eventual Swiss-type confederation after several years of evaluating the experience of "neighborliness." Should this confederation ever materialize, justified by the complementary economies of the two states, it might also include Botswana (formerly Bechuanaland) and South-West Africa.45 However, it is best not to think in such grandiose terms for the present. In any case, "Africa the unknown" has produced unexpected things in the past; a peaceful and fair solution to South Africa's ills, based upon sociological considerations, is still very much a possibility.
45 The ultimate state of affairs envisaged by this writer has many features in common with that discussed by Jordan K. Ngubane in his incisive An Afr-icani. Explains Apartheid (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963). Unlike Ngubane, however, I consider partition initially necessary because interracial feelings are so exacerbated at presenit that a cooling-off period via partition is essential. I am not confident that the damage done to race relations by past white oppression can be undone in our lifetime, but I do feel certain that the only way Africans are ever likely to think of Europeans sincerely having a change of heart is to allow Africans to run their own, unified' modernizing country.

ECOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL CITY: SOME MEXICAN EVIDENCE

FERNANDO PERALOSA
California State College at San Bertardino

ABSTRACT Evidence from three small Mexican cities suggests that the inverse-concentriccircle model ordinarily postulated for Latin-American and other preindustrial or transitional cities should be modified to take account of asymmetry of pattern and of the importanceof arterials. It is suggested that the major determinant of ecological patterns in such cities is accessibility. Comparisonof data with that from Mexico City and Oaxaca tentatively confirms the generality of the needed modifications in the model.
INTRODUCTION

s the forces of urbanizationand indus-

trialization continue to transform the nature of the developing countries, unique opportunities are afforded for the study of changing ecological patterns. Ecological concepts derived from the study of modern,

industrialized cities can be tested against data derived from cities of other types, particularly in societies moving through a transitional stage from preindustrial to industrial patterns. Sjoberg particularly has succeeded in clarifying the problem of what features of the imo(lerll industrial-commercial city can be at-