Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 6

Jonathan Langseth Phi466 Peirces On the Fixation of Belief In his essay, On the Fixation of Belief, C. S.

Peirce presents a unique portrayal of how it is that humans come to think logically, how belief, doubt and inquiry are manifest in human nature, and concludes, with qualifications, that the method of science affords the most advantageous approach to the settling of doubt into belief. The act of inquiry, of investigating the world with the hope of some resulting knowledge gained, or, with Peirce, the struggle, caused by the irritation of doubt, to attain a state of belief (Peirce, 126), has led to the use of reason (as the, usually unconscious, use of logic). Pierce cites practical gains from such use: Logicality in regard to practical matters is the most useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore, result from the action of natural selection. (Peirce, 123). One might wish to stop here by asking why wouldnt we proceed logically, given or ability to do so. Yet Peirce proceeds to delve deeper into the forces at play behind the actual process of coming to an unsettled state of doubt, and a static, position of belief. Peirce notes that all inquiry rests on implicitly assumed premises. Yet the relation of premises to conclusions in the form of an argument, says Peirce, finds its validity in facts, not thought. This is an important claim that runs counter to the standard view of what

constitutes of valid argument. In order to grasp the importance of such a claim, the reasons for and the implications derived from this position are in need of further explication. Whereas the traditional view says that an argument form is valid if and only if it is true under all interpretations (thus giving prevalence to the structure of an argument), Peirce says that:
The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else that we do not know. Consequently, reasoning is good if it be such as to give a true conclusion from true premises, and not otherwise. Thus, the question of its validity is purely one of fact, and not of thinking. A being the premises and B the conclusion, the question is, whether these facts are really so related that if A is, B is. If so, the inference is valid; if not, not. (122)

And
That which determines us, from given premises, to draw one inference rather than another, is some habit of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired. The habit is good or otherwise, according as it produces true conclusions from true premises or not; and an inference is regarded as valid or not, without reference to the truth or falsity of its conclusion specially, but according as the habit that determines it is such as to produce true conclusions in general or not. (123)

Peirce gives the name guiding principle of inference to any proposition formulated by a specific habit of mind that determines any inference. It would seem from the above quote that Peirce is merely reiterating the Humean notion of how induction is derived from the experience of constant conjunction. But what of deduction? Is Peirces distinction between constitutional and acquired habits equivalent to the distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning? If so this would seem to suggest the Kantian distinction between a priori analytic and a posteriori synthetic forms of cognition. The former, as constitutional, predetermines the form and possibility of experience;

the latter is derived out of experience through engagement with the world. Yet one could also interpret constitutional habits as those basic, naturally occurring impulses and drives that lead us to action in the world, such as hunger and desires. Such an interpretation can further illuminate the relation between doubt and belief. Confronting the unknown places us in doubt. This doubt, which in a state of uncertainty is the conjunction between our needs/wants and the world by which such needs and wants are to be gratified, moves us to action in order to establish beliefs that will successfully satisfy the basic constitutional habits/impulses required for the furtherance of life. Naturally, if how our doubts and beliefs lead us to act in order to appease the wants and needs essential for life are not successful, it is probable that we would not exist; natural selection would have phased us out. This explains why Peirce likens the use of logical thought to natural selectionlogic is the best means (so far) of getting along in the world. In other words the practical result of a belief or way of thinking determines whether that belief of way of thinking works or, what the pragmatists want to claim is the same, is true. Peirce proceeds to outline four methods by which we may move from states of doubt to states of belief. These methods, as should become apparent, all require a belief structure that is fixed in a community. These four methods are that of tenacity, of authority, the a

priori method, and the scientific method. In brief, the method of tenacity is akin to the deriving of beliefs through traditions and customs; the method of authority comes from accepting or being forced to accept beliefs without personal experience to justify the beliefs; the a priori method by which foundational propositions guide ones pursuance of belief; and the scientific which presupposes a world of facts independent of our thought of them, which we discover through experimentation. Although he grants each approach certain benefits, in the end Peirce regards the scientific method as the most successful method to date. I believe Peirce would argue that if we recognize how much science pervades our lives we have evidence of its superior methodology.

On Peirces How to Make Our Ideas Clear

The essay begins with the between clear and obscure conceptions, and distinct and confused conceptions, first brought under philosophical scrutiny by Descartes. Peirce defines a clear idea as one that is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is met with, and so that no other will be mistaken for it (137), and a distinct idea as one that contains nothing that is not clear (138).

Utilizing the distinction of methods, put forth in his essay On the Fixation of Belief, Peirce gives an abridged rendition of how he sees the historical progression of an ever-increasing awareness of clarity in thought. In Descartes we find the transition from the method of authority to the a priori method. In Peirces day the western world was in the midst of finalizing the transition from a priori method to the scientific method. From a historical point of view we could say this was also the slow transition into modernity, a transition arguably beginning with Bacon and Hobbes. In this essay Peirce wants to further develop his analysis of belief, show beliefs dependence on habit, and conclude by proving we come down to what is tangible and practical, as the root of every real distinction of thought (145). Peirce says beliefs have three properties: our being aware of them, that they erase doubt, and that they involve the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, i.e. a habit. This last property Peirce goes on to deem as the essence of belief. In equally strong claims he says, the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action and ...what a thing means is simply what habits it involves (145). This emphasis on habit focuses on the connection of self and world through action. When someone has a belief, this belief is tested through how that person proceeds in the world having that belief. If it appears to work and no viable option is known to be available, we can say with Peirce that thought is at rest, and the belief is true, having

meaning to the extent that the belief produces results or successful action. The persistence of belief, unchallenged, creates habits which, typically, subside from consciousness and guide our decisions throughout experience. If a particular belief is challenged by a new experience or competing belief, doubt may arise. If a competing belief produces precisely the same practical result as an already established belief, the two beliefs are equal in all discernable regards. Thus, beliefs are produced and maintained or challenged, by how they enable us to get along in the world, by their practical consequences.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi