The Concept of Personal Identity Author(s): Steven Rieber Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No.

3, (Sep., 1998), pp. 581-594 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653757 Accessed: 20/05/2008 18:48
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We enable the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Vol. LVIII, No. 3, September 1998

The Conceptof PersonalIdentity

STEVENRIEBER

Georgia State University

Theories of personal identity try to explain what the identity of a person necessarily consists in, but frequently leave open what kind of necessity is at issue. This paper is concerned with conceptual necessity. It proposes an analysis of the concept of personal identity in terms of a definite description.The analysis coheres with out judgments about clear cases and explains why cases of division seem indeterminate.The apparentindeterminacy results from attemptingto apply a definite descriptionto a situation in which more than one object would satisfy the description.The definite descriptionanalysis also explains the strengths of the influential no-branchingtheory, while avoiding the problems with that view. The no-branchingtheory is in effect a second-orderanalysis, i.e., a combination of the definite description analysis of personal identity plus a Russellian analysis of the definite description.

It is widely agreed that a theory of personal identity ought to explain, as Derek Parfit puts it, what the identity of a person necessarily involves or consists in.1Frequentlyleft open, however, is what type of necessity-metaphysical, nomological, or conceptual-is at issue.2 This essay is concerned with conceptual necessity. Its aim is to explicate the concept of personal identity: what it is to believe, think, or assert that x and y at different times are the same person. As in other conceptualinvestigations,the data are the intuitivejudgments about cases real and hypothetical. An explication of the concept ought to cohere with and explain thesejudgments.Among the imaginarycases are certain puzzle situationsin which a person divides in two and questions of personal identity seem to have no answer. Faced with such apparentindeterminacy, the theorist has a choice. One alternativeis to devise an account that yields a definite verdict even where intuition is indefinite, thus purging the concept of indeterminacy.This implies sharpeningor otherwise altering the concept, and indeed some philosophersexplicitly acknowledgean intentionto modify the concept of personalidentity.3However, if our aim is to explicate the actual concept, our analysis ought to explain, ratherthan eliminate, the indeterminacy in the puzzle cases. That is the route this paper takes. Both
1
2

Parfit1984, p. 203. On this methodologicalissue, see Shoemaker1984, section 15. See e.g. Brennan 1988.
THE CONCEPTOF PERSONALIDENTITY

581

projects are of course legitimate; in fact, they are complementary. Any attemptto modify the concept of personalidentityby drawingprecise boundaries ought to begin with an understandingof where the actual (imprecise) boundarieslie and what the source of the indeterminacyis. Moreover, both projects may help answer the much-discussed question of whether personal identitymatters.4 Theories that seek to modify the concept of personal identity have some degree of latitude,for differentmodificationsmay suit differentpurposes.But an analysis of the actual concept is more narrowlyconstrained.In particular, it must take seriously the requirementnot to be ad hoc. Every component of the analysis must make independentsense; nothing should be included which serves merely to save the analysis from an objection. In what follows I propose what I shall call the definite description analysis, which explains both our clear intuitions about ordinary cases and our judgmentaboutdivision. The definite descripinability to form a determinate tion analysis also explains both the strengths and the weaknesses of the influential no-branching theory of personal identity. I argue that the nobranchingtheoryis in effect an attemptat a second-orderanalysis.The notion of a second-orderanalysis can be illustratedas follows. Consider an analysis of knowledge that combines undefeatedtruejustified belief togetherwith the correspondence theory of truth. Thus S knows that P is analyzed as: (i) S believes that P, (ii) S is justified in believing that P, (iii) S's justification for believing that P is undefeated,and (iv) P correspondsto the facts. Now this second-orderanalysis of knowledge would face objections having nothing to theory of do with knowledgeper se, namely, objectionsto the correspondence truth. Similarly, I will show that the no-branchingtheory is a combination of the definite description analysis of personal identity plus a Russellian analysis of the definite description.The no-branchingtheory has a numberof implausible consequences. The definite descriptionanalysis shows that these theory stem ultimatelyfrom Russell's theory difficulties for the no-branching of descriptions.The problemsdo not arise for the definitedescriptionanalysis itself, shorn of the Russellian addition. In addition to diagnosing the difficulties for the no-branchingtheory, the definite descriptionanalysis also suggests a strategyby which the no-branching theory might solve these problems. Once it is seen that the problems for the no-branching theory are ultimately problems for Russell's theory of descriptions, the no-branchingtheory can avail itself of resources such as conversationalimplicaturethat have been used to defend Russell. However, while I indicate how such a defense might proceed, the definite description analysis is not committed to Russellianism. My thesis, then, is that the definite description analysis provides the correct first-orderanalysis of the
On whetherour identity matterssee, for example, Parfit 1984, Sosa 1990, Johnston 1992.
STEVEN RIEBER

582

concept of personal identity. I leave open the question of what the correct theory of descriptionsis, and hence what the correctsecond-orderanalysis of personalidentity might be.

The startingpoint for an analysis of personal identity is usually some notion of continuity-mental, physical or some combinationof the two. This paper is not concerned with the physical/mental issue. Indeed, it seems that this
issue is not about the concept of personal identity but about different concep-

tions of the concept.' People who apparentlyfully understandthe issues sincerely disagree aboutwhetherthey could survive withoutphysical continuity or (e.g. teletransportation) without mental continuity (e.g. total amnesia and a new personality). If this disagreementwere about the concept of personal identity, we would have to conclude eitherthat one side is simply confused or that the two sides have differentconcepts. But neitherof these is plausible. I assume, then, that whether the continuity required for personal identity is physical or mental is not a question about the concept of personalidentity. If this assumptionis wrong, then I will have given a partial analysis which can with the word 'mental'or 'physical', as needed. then be supplemented Let's begin by considering: The No-Branching Theory. To believe/assert that person x at one time is identical with person y at an earliertime is to believe/assert that x is continuouswith y and no one else is continuouswith y.6 The purpose of the no-branchingclause ("no one else is continuouswith y") is to avoid the consequence that in cases of division one person is identical with two distinct persons.7Suppose thatA's brainis removed from A's body and divided into two. Each half is then transplantedinto a new (brainless) body which is qualitativelyjust like the original body. The results are B and C, each of whom is physically and mentally continuouswith A. But B and C
5

Nozick 1981, pp. 33-34, takes a similar position. On the distinctionbetween concept and conception (applied to the notion of justice) see Rawls 1971, pp. 5-11. The analysis is expressed in terms of what it is to believe or assert something about personal identity, ratherthan as a simple biconditional, because my goal is to explicate not just necessary truths, but conceptual truths, about personal identity. Also, here and throughout the paper, by "identical"I mean: numerically identical. For psychological versions of the no-branching theory, see Parfit 1984 and Shoemaker 1984. See also Unger 1990, which does not appeal to continuitybut does employ a no-branchingclause. Most discussions of puzzle cases concern the division of one person into two, ratherthan thefusion of two persons into one. Perhapsthis is because it is not clear that in the case of fusion the resultingperson is continuouswith both of the original persons. But if fusion is conceptuallypossible and if the resultingperson is continuouswith both originals, then the no-branchingtheory ought to contain another clause: To believe/assert that person x at one time is identical with person y at an earliertime is to believe/assert that x is continuous with y, no one else is continuouswith y, and x is continuouswith no one else.
THE CONCEPTOF PERSONALIDENTITY

583

are clearly not identical to each other. Thus we do not want to say that both are identical to A, for that would violate the transitivityof identity.' Hence clause. the no-branching But while the no-branchingtheory preservesthe transitivityof identity, it has other problems as an analysis of the actual concept of personal identity. For one thing, it does not account for the fact that when we think about the
question of personal identity in division, there seems to be no right answer. It

does not seem correct to say either that B or C is identical with A, or that both are, or that neitheris.9 Indeed, it is just this apparentlack of a determinate answer that makes the case so puzzling. Yet the no-branchingtheory says that there is a determinateanswer,namely that neitherB nor C is identical with A. On the no-branchingtheory, to ask Is B identicalwith A? is to ask Is it the case that B is continuouswith A and no one else is continuous with A? to which the answeris determinately And since thereis no relevantdifferno. ence between B and C, the no-branchingtheory implies that neitherB nor C is identical with A. Thus the no-branchingtheory does not explain why none of the answers (includingthis one) seems right. Moreover,since thereis no otherplausiblecandidatefor someone identical to A, the no-branching theory implies that after division, A does not exist. Yet this does not seem correct; division does not seem to be cessation of existence. Now, a theory of personalidentity may wish to extend or modify the concept precisely to deal with hard cases such as division. As Mark Johnston says,
When a case necessarily violates some principle relatively central to our conception of persons and their identity over time, the concepts of a person and of being the same person over time may not determinatelyapply in the case, so that there may be no simple fact about perThis of course assumes that B and C are not the same continuer.It also assumes that A's body belonged to only one person prior to division-which has been denied by Perry 1972, Lewis 1976, and Mills 1993, who claim that there were two people all along. Mills adds that there were two streamsof consciousness all along. This point is acknowledgedby Unger 1992, p. 136: "it's not (determinately)true that one survives fission," and by Johnston 1992, p. 603: "the fission case (i) violates the ordinary presuppositionof essential unity, (ii) is as a result an indeterminatecase." Parfit1984, pp. 253-60, shows that there are problems with each of the answers to the question of what happens when a person divides. He concludes that the question is "empty".If so, then an analysis of the actual concept of personal identity should explain why this is an empty question.
STEVEN RIEBER

584

sonal identity in that case. This is how it is in the fission case. Thus, the variety of philosophical accounts of who is who in the fission case are best seen as proposals about how to extend our practice to a case where it presently gives no answer.10

Thus when Parfitwrites, "Since I cannot be identical with two differentpeople, and it would be arbitraryto call one of these people me, we can best describe the case by saying neitherof these people will be me," he is apparently recommendingan extension of the concept of personalidentity." However, if our goal is not to modify the concept of personal identity, but to explicate it as it actuallyis, then our analysis should not include a no-branching clause, but should instead explain why division is intuitively a difficult case. Another problem is that the no-branchingtheory seems ad hoc.12 The nobranching clause preserves the transitivity of identity, but it has no other independent motivation. Cases of division are, as far as we know, purely imaginaryand are rarely even entertainedoutside of philosophy and science fiction. It is difficult to see why the concept of personal identity should have a componentspecifically to issue a verdict about such reconditecases. There is no problem with ad hocness, of course, if the aim of the analysis is to extend the concept to deal with difficult cases. The ad hoc objectionhas force only against the claim that the no-branchingtheory explicates the concept as it actually is. Finally, one much-discussed difficulty is that the no-branching theory implies that the existence of a person can conceptuallydepend on what happens to another person. Thatis, the theory violates the Intrinsicness of existence. If x and y are distinct, then whether x exists cannotconceptuallydependon what happensto y.13

12 13

Johnston1992, p. 603. Parfit 1984, p. 262. Cf. Garrett1990, p. 182; Noonan 1989, p. 138; and Sosa 1990, p. 299. Andrew Brennancalls this process 'conceptual development'; see Brennan 1988, pp. 6264; 345-48. Garrett1991 accepts this claim of Parfit'sand argues that it implies that persons cannot be ontologically reduced to bodies and experiences. This objection is made by Brody 1980, p. 58. It has also been claimed that the no-branching theory contradicts the Intrinsicness of identity: If 'x' and 'y' are rigid designators, then whether x is identical to y cannot depend on anything but x and y. The intrinsicness of identity (also known as the 'only x and y' principle) is a consequence of the Necessity of identity:If x and y are rigid designators, then "x is identical to y" expresses a proposition that is necessarily true or false. Thus a violation of the intrinsicnessof identity would be more serious than a violation of the intrinsicness of existence. However, Shoemaker 1984 has shown that the no-branching theory does not in fact violate the intrinsicnessof identity. Garrett1990 tries to defuse the intrinsicness objection in both forms, but Heckmann 1994 shows that Garrett'sargument does not adequately answer the objection from intrinsicness of existence. See also Noonan 1989, pp. 152-57, 233-37.
THE CONCEPTOF PERSONALIDENTITY 585

The no-branchingtheoryimplies that,when A divides into B and C, A ceases to exist. But it also implies that if the operationon C had not succeeded, the person with B's body would have been identical to A, and hence A would have existed. That is to say, on the no-branchingtheory, the following two statementsare both true: A does not exist. If the operationon C had not succeeded,A would have existed. So A's existence depends on what happens to C. Since on the no-branching theory A and C are distinct, the theory thus violates the intrinsicnessof existheorymight claim that divitence. To be sure, defendersof the no-branching to sion is a counterexample the intrinsicnessof existence.14 Nevertheless, this principlehas some intuitive support;there is a cost to abandoningit. The no-branchingtheory thus faces a numberof problems.It implies that thereis a determinateanswerto personalidentityin division and that a person who divides does not survive; it appears to be ad hoc; and it violates the intrinsicnessof existence. II I shall argue that the correct analysis of personal identity is in terms of a definite description.The no-branchingtheory is, if anything, a second-order analysis: the definite descriptionanalysis of personalidentity combined with a Russellian analysis of the definite description.The difficulties for the nobranchingtheory are ultimately problems for Russell's theory, for the firsttheory orderanalysis is immuneto these problems.Whetherthe no-branching is correctas a second-orderanalysisthus dependson whetherRussell's theory can solve these problems-which is a questionI shall leave open. First, let's define a continuer as follows: To say that x is a continuerof y is to say that x is continuouswith y. I propose the following first-orderanalysis:

The Definite DescriptionAnalysis. To believe/assertthat person x at one time is identical with person y at an earlier time is to believe/assertthat x is the continuerof y.15 It might be objected that the analysis is circular,for in saying "x is the continuer of y" we are presumablyusing the 'is' of identity. It is true that the
14

15

For other counterexamples,see Sosa 1990, p. 304; and Unger 1990, p. 165. Again, if fusion is a conceptual possibility and if the resulting person is continuous with both originals, then the definite description analysis ought to contain another clause: To believe/assert that person x at one time is identical with person y at an earlier time is to believe/assert that x is the continuerof y and y is the predecessor of x.
STEVEN RIEBER

586

definite description analysis leaves the notion of identity itself unanalyzed. That is because an analysis of personal identity is not primarilyan analysis of identity. Rather,as Shoemakerwrites, "If one is analysing any concept in giving an account of personal identity, it is the concept of a person."'16Thus the definite description analysis is not viciously circular, since it is not intendedto explicate the concept of identityitself. The first problem for the no-branchingtheory was that it did not explain why there seems to be no right answerto the question of personalidentity in division. The definite description analysis can explain this. Suppose, as before, thatA divides into B and C, and considerthe question: Is B identicalwith A? Accordingto the definitedescriptionanalysis, this question asks the same as Is B the continuerof A? Now, there are two continuers of A. Hence this question contains an improper definite description, i.e. a description of the form 'the F' where there is more than one object that is F. In general, if there is no contextual reason to favor one of the objects over the other as the denotation, such a question will seem intuitively to have no determinateanswer. For example, Bolivia has two capitals:Sucre and La Paz. Considerthe question: Is La Paz the capitalof Bolivia? Neither 'yes' nor 'no' seems right. Similarly,in division, Is B the continuerof A? seems not to have an answer. Thus, the definite descriptionanalysis explains why there seems to be no answerto Is B identicalwith A? The definite descriptionanalysis by itself is thus consistent with the intuitive judgments aboutdivision. The no-branching theory runs into trouble because it in effect gives a Russellian analysis of the definite descriptionthe continuer, and is thus subject to all the difficulties facing Russell's theory. Russell's theory of definite descriptionsclaims that a sentence of the form "A is the F" means:

16

Shoemaker 1984, p. 122.

THE CONCEPTOF PERSONALIDENTITY

587

Exactly one entity is F, and that entity is A."7 Thus, "x is the continuerof y" means, accordingto Russell: Exactly one entity is continuouswith y, and that entity is x or, in other words, x is continuouswith y and no one else is continuouswith y -which is the no-branching theory.In short: The definite description analysis of personal identity + Russell's analysis of descriptions= The no-branching theory of personalidentity. It is only when the definite description analysis is combined with Russell's theory of descriptionsthat trouble arises. When we combine the two, we get the no-branchingtheory, which, as we saw, implies that the answer to "Is B identical with A?" is determinatelyno. For on Russell's theory, this question means the same as Is it the case that B is continuouswith A and no one else is continuous with A? The answer to this question is definitely no. In general, Russell's theory has trouble with improperdefinite descriptions.On Russell's theory, "Is La Paz the capitalof Bolivia?"means Is it the case that Bolivia has exactly one capital and everythingthat is a capital of Bolivia is La Paz? The answerto this questionis determinately no-which does not accord with ourjudgments about "Is La Paz the capital of Bolivia?"As we will see in the next section, a defenderof Russell and the no-branching theoryis not without responses to these difficulties. Notice, however, that there is no problem at all for the definitedescriptionanalysis by itself. The no-branchingtheory implied that to divide is to cease to exist. What about the definite description analysis: does it imply that A does not exist after division? To ask this is to ask whether The continuerof A does not exist

17

Formally:(3x)(Fx & ((Vy)(Fy D y=x) & x=a)). See Russell 1905. As Neale 1990, pp. 4447, shows, Russell's theory of descriptionsis not committedto this particular formalism.
STEVEN RIEBER

588

is true after division. Intuitively, it does not seem that this statementis true. Analogously, it does not seem that The capitalof Bolivia does not exist is true. Thus the definite descriptionanalysis explains why it does not seem correct to say that after division A does not exist. Again, it is only when we combine the definite description analysis with Russell's theory that we get into trouble. This combination (i.e. the no-branching theory) implies that "Thecontinuerof A does not exist" says It is not the case thatA has exactly one continuer which is true. And again, the difficulty is a general problem for Russell's theory, which also implies that "Thecapitalof Bolivia does not exist" says It is not the case thatBolivia has exactly one capital which of course is true.18 Thus the definite description analysis explains both the intuitive judgments about division and why the no-branchingtheory seems to go wrong. Can the definite descriptionanalysis be shown not to be ad hoc? Is there an explanationof why the concept of personalidentity should contain a definite description?I think there is. The first step is to point out that as a matter of empiricalfact we implicitly assume that each of us has and can have at most one continuer.Indeed, it is because we assume this that we are surprisedand puzzled when we first confronta hypotheticalcase like division in which this assumptionis false. The second step is to notice that it is naturalto use 'the F' when it is assumedthat there is only one F. For instance, since-despite a few counterexamples like Bolivia and South Africa-most of us typically assume that a country has only one capital, we naturallyspeak and think of 'the capital', ratherthan 'a capital'. Even if we knew virtuallynothing about Nigeria, we would say or think, "Is Lagos the capital of Nigeria?"ratherthan "Is Lagos a capitalof Nigeria?"Similarly,because we assume that each of us can have only one continuer,we find ourselves thinking,"Is the continuer
of ?" rather than "Is a continuer of ?" That is to say, it is natural for

our thoughts about continuity of persons to contain a definite description. Thus it is not surprisingthat a definite descriptionshould occur in the analysis of the concept of personalidentity.

18

Actually, Russell's analysis implies that there is a scope ambiguity in "The capital of Bolivia does not exist". But since the wide-scope reading ("Bolivia has exactly one capital, and every capital of Bolivia does not exist") is self-contradictory,it is unlikely to be meant and can be ignored here.
THE CONCEPTOF PERSONALIDENTITY

589

How does the definite descriptionanalysis stand in relation to the intrinsicness of existence? Recall thatthe no-branching theoryimplied that the following are trueafterdivision: A does not exist. If the operationon C had not succeeded,A would have existed. This violates the intrinsicnessof existence. The definite descriptionanalysis by itself does not have this problem. It implies that to make the above two statementsis to say, respectively: The continuerof A does not exist. If the operationon C had not succeeded, the continuerof A would have existed. Although the second of these is true, it is far from clear, as we have seen, that the first is true. So the definite description analysis does not by itself violate the intrisicness of existence. Were it combined with Russell's analysis of the definite description,it would violate this principle. But that combination is not mandatory. Another benefit of the definite descriptionanalysis is to explain why the concept of personalidentity seems to presuppose uniqueness.Ourjudgments about personal identity seem to presupposea single continuerbecause these judgments involve a definite description, which as Strawson points out, seems to presuppose-rather than to assert-uniqueness." This is not to say that Strawson is correct in claiming that definite descriptionsmake this presupposition. The point is simply that they seem to do so, and thus the definite descriptionanalysis can explain why the concept of personalidentity seems to do so as well. III The definite descriptionanalysis explains our intuitivejudgments, it is not ad hoc, and it avoids the problemsfacing the no-branchingtheory. We can conclude that it is the correct first-orderanalysis of personal identity. Still the question remains:What is the truthabout division? The definite description analysis explains why "B is identical with A" seems neither determinately true nor determinatelyfalse. But what in fact is its truth value? To answer this question, we need to know what the correct theory of descriptions is. That is to say, we need to know the correctsecond-orderanalysis of personal identity. The theory of descriptions is a large issue which cannot be fully
19

Strawson 1950.

590

STEVEN RIEBER

adjudicatedhere. In this section, however, I will briefly consider, first, what Strawson's theory would say and, second, how Russell's theory might be defendedagainstsome of the objectionswe have raised. Let's assume that the definite description analysis is the correct (firstorder) analysis of personal identity. On Strawson's view, a definite description 'the F' does not assert that there is exactly one F. Rather,it implies or signals this.2"When this implication is false, the sentence containing the definite descriptionassertsno propositionand thus has no truthvalue, according to Strawson.Considerthe sentence B is identicalwith A which, on the definitedescriptionanalysis, is analyzedas B is the continuerof A. On Strawson's theory, this last sentence implies (but does not assert) that there is exactly one continuer of A. Since this implication is false in division, Strawsonwould say that the sentence expresses no propositionand thus has no truth value. So if Strawson is right there is in fact no answer to the question, "Whathappens when a person divides?" Thus Strawson's theory together with the definite descriptionanalysis can explain the intuitivejudgment that the question of personal identity in division has no answer, for it
holds that this judgment is correct.

Alternatively,we could use the definite descriptionanalysis as a basis for defending the no-branchingtheory as a second-orderanalysis. Again, we are assumingthe definitedescriptionanalysis. Hence to say that B is not identical with A is to say that B is not the continuerof A. Now it might be argued that, despite appearances,this last statement is in fact true in the case of division. One relevantconsiderationhere is that statements like the following seem quite acceptable: B is not the continuer of A because there is more than one continuer.21

20

21

Strawson 1950. Later theorists have understoodthis special type of implying as a presupposition. Like other theories of descriptions, Strawson's has been much criticized. For a good overview, see Neale 1990. This considerationis mentionedby Grice 1989, p. 270.
THE CONCEPTOF PERSONALIDENTITY

591

B is not the continuerof A. However, it is also incumbenton the defenderof the no-branchingtheory to explain why "B is not the continuer of A" uttered by itself with no stress does not seem true. Here we can draw on Grice's defense of Russell's theory of descriptions.Grice arguesthat Russell's theory is correctand that some of its counterintuitive consequences can be explained away as the result of a conversational implicature.22 According to Grice, a sentence of the form " is not the F" conversationally implicates (but does not actually state) that there is exactly one F.23Hence, if it is not the case that there is exactly one F, the sentence " is not the F", while true, will not seem acceptable since it conversationally implicates something that is false. So if Grice is right, "B is not the continuerof A" in the context of division, while in fact true, conversationallyimplicates something that is false, namely, that A has exactly one continuer.Thus "B is not the continuerof A" is not heard as true even though it is. Hence, since we are assuming the definite description analysis, the same goes for "B is not identicalwith A." By showing that the problems for the no-branchingtheory result from problemsfor Russell's theory of descriptions,the definitedescriptionanalysis thus shows how the no-branching theory might be defended, namely, by employing arguments(such as Grice's) which have been used to defend Russell. Again, while the definite description analysis is consistent with such a defense of Russell, it is not committed to Russell's theory any more than it is committedto Strawson's. What, then, is the truthabout division? According to the definite description analysis, the answer depends on the theory of descriptions.If Russell is right, both "B is identical with A" and "C is identical with A" are determinately false; hence to divide is to go out of existence. If, on the other hand, Strawson is right, these sentences express no propositionand hence have no truthvalue, and so there is no answer to the question of personal identity in
division.

Finally, recall that the main motivation for the no-branchingtheory was to preservethe transitivityof identity.Is the definitedescriptionanalysis consistent with the transitivity of identity? Again, the answer depends on how definite descriptionsare analyzed. But if either Russell or Strawsonis right, then the answer is yes. This is obvious in the case of Russell, since the definite descriptionanalysis and Russell's theory together constitute the nobranchinganalysis. So we only have to consider Strawson's theory. Transitivity of identity would be violated only if, after division, both of the following were true:
22 23

Conversationalimplicaturesare meant by the speakerbut are not part of the conventional meaning of the sentence. See Grice 1989, ch. 2. See Grice 1989, pp. 269-77.
STEVEN RIEBER

592

B is identicalwith A C is identical with A Accordingto the definitedescriptionanalysis,these are analyzedas: B is the continuerof A C is the continuerof A. Now, if Strawson is right, these sentences have no truthvalue. Thus there is no violation of the transitivityof identity. The definite descriptionanalysis offers a simple and non-ad hoc explication of the actualconcept of personalidentity.By itself it does not answer the question of what happenswhen a persondivides. But it does tell us where the answer is to be found, namely, in the theory of descriptions.It also explains both the advantages and the drawbacks of the no-branchingtheory, and it shows how thattheorymight be defended.24

24

Many thanks to Robert Almeder, Anne Bezuidenhout, Mark Daley, James Humber, Eugene Mills, ChristianPerring,George Rainbolt, and Greg Ray for discussion and criticism. A version of this paperwas presentedat a colloquium of the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meeting in April 1996.
THE CONCEPTOF PERSONALIDENTITY

593

References Brennan,A. (1988): Conditionsof Identity.Oxford:ClarendonPress. Brody, B. A. (1980): Identity and Essence. Princeton:Princeton University Press. Garrett,B. (1990): "PersonalIdentityandExtrinsicness," Philosophical Studies 59:177-94. Garrett,B. (1991): "PersonalIdentity and Reductionism,"Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch51:361-73. Grice, P. (1989): Studies in the Wayof Words. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UniversityPress. Heckmann, H. D. (1994): "Can Personal Identity Be Analysed in Terms of Relations of (Non-branching) Continuity?," in G. Meggle and U. Wessels, eds., Analyomen1. Berlin:Walterde Gruyter. Johnston, M. (1992): "Reasons and Reductionism,"Philosophical Review 101:589-618. Lewis, D. (1976): "Survivaland Identity,"in A. Rorty, ed., The Identity of Persons. Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress. Martinich,A. P. (ed.) (1990): The Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed., Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress, 1990. Mills, E. (1993): "Dividing without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity,"Mind 101:37-51. Neale, S. (1990): Descriptions. Cambridge,Massachusetts:MIT Press. Noonan, H. W. (1989): Personal Identity.London:Routledge. Nozick, R. (1981): Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge,Massachusetts: Harvard UniversityPress. Parfit,D. (1984): Reasons and Persons. Oxford:ClarendonPress. Perry,J. (1972): "Canthe Self Divide?,"Journal of Philosophy 69:463-88. Rawls, J. (1971): A Theoryof Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Russell, B. (1905): "On Denoting," Mind 14:479-93. (Reprinted in Martinich 1990.) Shoemaker, S. (1984): "PersonalIdentity: A Materialist's Account," in S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne,Personal Identity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Sosa, E. (1990): "SurvivingMatters,"Nous 24:297-330. Strawson, P. F. (1950): "On Referring," Mind 59:320-44. (Reprinted in Martinich1990.) Unger, P. (1990): Identity, Consciousness and Value. New York: Oxford University Press. Unger, P. (1992): "Precis of 'Identity,Consciousness and Value'," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch52:133-37.

594

STEVEN RIEBER