Eliminating Discrimination

From: Matthew Pappas <matt.pappas@mattpappaslaw.
com>
Date: Feb 27, 2013
Subject: 2601 W. Ball Rd., Anaheim
To: Asst. United States Attorney

The cities have been relentlessly attacking. I was watching President Obama at a
ceremony related to Rosa Parks. Of course, my pleas for the patients -- a group that
should be protected by the ADA -- the civil rights legislation of our generation -- go
unheard. They likely go unheard because, Greg, I am a poor excuse for an advocate. I've
read the history of adversity faced by numerous minority groups that our great nation
has worked to protect. I have new appreciation for the daunting challenges faced during
those previous iterations of what is, for all intents and purposes, the same conflagration
now faced by the seriously ill and disabled patients. I'd always looked at Dr. Martin
Luther King from an abstract perspective removed from any real understanding of the
formidable task of those engaged in that much more important civil rights
movement. I've found myself reading his materials and sending his quotations out to
people. I think about DOMA and the rights of people to be free in choosing who and how
they love. And I no longer look at my daughter as just a patient who is discriminated
against because of the medication prescribed by her licensed doctor, but as a woman
who deserves the same treatment, rights, respect, and concern regardless of gender.

Perhaps my soapbox speeches to the Jalalis and the Botches who were so afraid of the
federal sovereign at the outset were too convincing. Maybe my references to Federalist
#44 and #45 as well as readings from the " Anti-Federalist Papers" struck some sense in
them beyond my expectations. My thought that they would find the settlement offers
compelling were simply wrong. And perhaps that is the answer -- when citizens know
something is wrong -- when they realize who they are as Americans and what our
existence is all about -- they are more willing to stand up and question the actions of
government. There has been interest from an outside group in the forfeiture cases. That
interest has also delayed my response to you.

Each day, there is a new crisis -- new attacks by governmental entities that are much
more powerful than me and the patients who face these life threatening and even
terminal conditions. As it happens, I go through periods of great depression. How can
Marla get up each day, face the massive health challenges she has and remain so
positive even in the face of such horrible treatment? Often, I struggle to pay basic bills. I
got a three day notice to pay rent or quit last month. Then I think back to December
when Sonia Scott's mother called me and said they'd be homeless in a few days. Sonia
is about 20. She's in a wheelchair and is physically deformed. They live in San Diego
County and I was down with her, her mom, Brendan, a young man who served in
Afghanistan who was severely injured in an IED attack, and Ray, an older man who had
Polio and who must walk with braces. We were talking and Sonia communicated the
issues she faces. She talked about the effectiveness of medical cannabis as opposed to
what her Mom described as a handful of conventional medications that just wreaked
havoc on her. She and her Mom talked about the daily struggle of dealing with the
horrible condition Sonia suffers from. I think about Marla, Sonia, and others and then I
know, Greg. I know that my issues are nothing compared to what these very valuable,
precious Americans face each day. I am utterly unimportant compared to them. At the
most difficult times in their often short and unimaginable lives they should be treated
with dignity.
It is not just them -- it is two people who want to get married because they love and care
about one another. It is the struggle for gender equality. It is the continuing struggle for
racial equality. For each individual -- each person impacted by stereotypes and
discriminatory animus -- the negative impact is so very wrong. You see, each person
should be able to be who they are without excessive government
interference. Democracy is so very difficult -- but it is so very important. When it is done
properly -- when the power of the individual not harming anyone else to excel and to
achieve is unleashed -- then truly great things happen. That power is inherent in the
human spirit and it should not be subject to discrimination.
I'm sorry it has taken so long for me to get back with you. I am angry at the people who
use marijuana on a recreational basis without concern for those who do so as part of a
treatment regimen prescribed by their doctors. I am angry at those late-night T.V.
comedians who try to get mileage out of marijuana jokes. I'm angry at city officials more
concerned with their political careers and their social status than the people they are
elected to serve. I imagine that when emotion begins to tug away and utterly
discriminatory behavior goes unanswered by judges living in " Ivory Towers" it signals
the end of the ability for someone like me to advocate properly. Perhaps I never have
advocated properly.
As the President said, " we have bigger fish to fry." For Marla, Sonia, Marty, Kevin, Tori,
Brendan - I can't name them all here -- there really are not any " bigger fish to fry." I
imagine the politicians in power at the time said the same type of thing about having
more important issues when Rosa Parks (a person I talk about almost every time I speak
in public) sat in the white section of the bus.

Perhaps there will come a time when people can appreciate those who are
different. Maybe we'll look more at how important each person is rather than finding
reasons to exclude.

The Jalalis will not sign the consent agreement as presented. Included with this e-mail is
an attachment. It is the consent agreement modified.

Best regards,

Matt

The contents of this message may be protected by privilege, state and/or federal law. If you
have received this message in error, please discard the message and contact our office at (949)
382-1485.

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y

22762 ASPAN ST, #202-107
LAKE FOREST, CA 92630 (949) 382-1485
OFFICE@MATTPAPPASLAW.COM FACSIMILE: (949) 242-2605

October 5, 2012

VIA E-MAIL AND U.S. MAIL

Mr. P. Greg Parham
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Courthouse, 14
th
Floor
312 N. Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Re: United States of America v. 2601 W. Ball Rd
SACV 12-1345 AG (MLGx)

Dear Mr. Parham:

I am now in receipt of your email from earlier today. While I understand your
concern regarding Rule 7-3, I spoke with Mr. Durst shortly after your conversation with
him in late-September and he said you told him to go ahead and file. Im certain you did
not expect we would file nothing following that substantive conversation with him and
thereby just allow the federal government to engage in an improper taking of the J alalis
property?

As much as I am certain it has been wrongly represented by the corrupt city attorney
in Long Beach, California, I am not interested in practicing law and certainly not interested
in doing so to achieve pecuniary gain. Despite my dislike of the practice of law, when I
worked for J udge Hatter many years ago, he instilled in me the idea that our federal
government is, at least in-part, established to protect the rights of minorities and of those
who are often relegated by society because of stereotypes, misconceptions, and historical
discrimination. A quick reading of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 makes clear the
notion that such historical discrimination has persisted against seriously ill and disabled
Americans for many years. After a few years of practicing law following my externship
and becoming a lawyer, I decided to go back to computer engineering because the law
work seemed much more an exercise in making money than in working to protect those
who might otherwise face continuing discriminatory animus, bad government behavior, or
societal discernment.

Mr. P. Greg Parham
October 5, 2012
Page Two

Years after making that choice, the recession forced many Americans to make even
harder choices. I was not spared from the toils related to the difficult economic time
brought on almost solely by greed, corruption, and activities the federal government should
be expending resources to prevent. Accordingly, following a long period of
unemployment, I chose to do something instead of nothing and have, on a temporary basis,
returned to the law.

My decision to help disabled and seriously ill patients for whom medical cannabis is
effective and recommended by licensed physicians is not wholly altruistic. I have attached
photographs of my daughter who was within minutes of death after being assaulted. Her
decision to forego dangerous and addictive opiate based medications following what can
only be deemed the most difficult time of her then 19 years on this Earth in favor of using
medical cannabis recommended by her licensed doctor was a decision that should never
subject her to the kind of horrible behavior exhibited by city governments and the federal
sovereign. That behavior is even more deplorable considering the fact that she could, with
a prescription, simply walk to CVS and obtain Oxycontin-like opiates which have been
offered to her by doctors repeatedly since she endured emergency brain surgery and the
corresponding lengthy hospital stay following the traumatic events that have changed her
life forever.

Mr. and Mrs. J alali leased space to a group of patients operating in conformance
with California law. Your decision to write a terroristic letter to and thereafter file a
terroristic lawsuit against these upstanding citizens is not what the federal government is
meant to be. It is not what you are meant to do. And you, sir, are paid by and work for the
citizens of the United States. You do not exist to achieve a position of power that renders
you in good favor with politicians or your boss or that works to feed an ego yearning for
power and recognition. You are charged with giving meaning to the document our political
forefathers worked so dearly to ensure would be long-lasting and that they hoped would
provide a basis for the freedoms that indeed led to the greatest country in the history of
human existence.

For the federal government to support California cities subdivisions of the state
sovereign who are themselves breaking state law in their efforts to displace the votes of
California citizens is tantamount to utter usurpation of the rights provided by the Framers
and guaranteed by those federalists who had to sell the Constitution to the American people
when this country was in its infancy. Moreover, it is appalling that the remote central
power that has so often stood for the rights of those subject to discrimination would
instead place itself in the awkward position of doing that which is most inapposite to its
role. To do so with a law designed to prohibit the recreational use of drugs against patients

Mr. P. Greg Parham
October 5, 2012
Page Three

like my daughter or Marla J ames or Martin Modiano is akin to the ongoing conduct of
Syria against its own citizens.

You see, Mr. Parham, when Mr. Dunn wrote his May 3, 2011 letter to Mr. Birotte
asking the federal government to do what the City of Lake Forest could not do because it
was being stymied by state appellate courts, it forced closure of the Lake Forest
collectives. Youll note that my address is in Lake Forest. My daughter must now travel a
great distance to access the medication that is the most effective medication for her. It is
far more effective than the many pharmaceutical medications that have caused countless
issues over the years for her. Perhaps you have children. When your daughter comes
crying to you and/or your wife late at night because she does not have the medication that
works to alleviate the severe symptoms, pain, or conditions that I pray your child will never
have to endure, then you will truly know how wrong it is for a remote central power to
effectuate the illegal behavior of a few powerful and discriminatory individuals who want
to thwart state law.

Congresss purpose in enacting the federal Controlled Substances Act was to control
and prohibit recreational drug abuse. That determination by the Supreme Court is
dispositive. Moreover, there is no doubt the state of California has provided for its
seriously ill and disabled individuals in passing laws that J ustice Thomas, even before the
Oregon decision, noted belie the Article II branchs averments would undercut CSA
enforcement.

State law provides that medical cannabis patient collectives operate in a closed-
circuit. The rules are very strict. Their membership can only be patients who have
recommendations from licensed doctors. Your branchs interference is in large part why
California one of the most regulated and taxed states in the Union has not implemented
more comprehensive physician rules in this area. Indeed, those rules would help prevent
people who may not medically require marijuana from obtaining recommendations from
doctors. That is not really an issue, however, because the federal CSA has not effectively
prevented prescriptions for dangerous Oxycontin or amphetamine based drugs from falling
into the hands of people recreationally abusing those substances. No matter what the
federal or state governments do, Mr. Parham, those unfortunate issues will never be wholly
eradicated.

As you no doubt know, for ostensible patient collectives not operating within state
boundaries and regulation, the cities have criminal and civil remedies. Indeed, the federal
CSA is available for those entities operating in a manner that contravenes Congresss intent
to combat recreational drug use. It is there that your efforts should be focused not on

Mr. P. Greg Parham
October 5, 2012
Page Four

patient groups the cities cannot close under state law because those groups are indeed
operating in compliance with the law.

Back in J anuary of this year, Howard Weitzman in Costa Mesa asked you what you
expected patients to do following your letter ordering closure of the collective group in
which his wife, a former nurse, serves a managing patient. You replied to him that they
could go back to the streets. Is that really what the federal government wants, Mr.
Parham? If they go back to the streets, sir, the effect of your work is to do exactly the
opposite of what Congress intended. By sending patients back to the street, you
empower the Mexican drug cartels and individuals engaged in illegal recreational drug
dealing. You force patients to deal with scumbags who peddle much more dangerous
drugs than marijuana.

Recently, Bob Shannon, the city attorney of Long Beach, sent a letter to landlords to
coerce them into evicting collectives. He did this after the warped law he modified in
2010 and deemed a sham by a city councilwoman during a public meeting was repealed.
You see, instead of implementing regulations wholly allowed by an appellate court, Mr.
Shannon saw an opportunity to continue to his discriminatory animus and thereafter to
engage in warrantless police raids and absolutely abhorrent terroristic behavior. In his
letter, he warned he was calling in the federal government.

In April, I was called in to meet with several F.B.I. agents in Long Beach so they
could query me and several others about corruption in that city government. I am certain
they knew much more than I did during the almost four (4) hour discussion. To
demonstrate just a small part of that corruption, Ive attached an order from a federal judge
issued just days ago as well as letters I wrote to the California attorney general several
months ago. The City of Long Beach is corrupt. The federal sovereigns resources should,
at least in some part, be focused on stopping that corruption. To do anything for Robert
Shannon or the corrupt police in that city to support that City government in any way,
shape, or form will show citizens that the federal government does not do anything other
than pander to politically motivated and corrupt individuals.

Perhaps you can speak with former Los Angeles Deputy Police Chief Stephen
Downing. Chief Downing is on the executive board of Law Enforcement Against
Prohibition. Chief Downing has wisdom and knowledge that I do not have. Ask him
about Long Beach and Mr. Shannon. Ask him about the police attack on patient Dorian
Brooks and the destruction of property as well as utterly corrupt behavior. Ask him about
the patients hes met. To empower the city of Long Beach to continue its corrupt behavior
is to simply disregard something that is destroying this country politicians who are more
concerned about money and themselves than the citizens they serve.

Mr. P. Greg Parham
October 5, 2012
Page Five

These patients are people, Mr. Parham. Someday, they could be people you know
people in your family. You are damaging these people by enforcing a law meant to combat
recreational drug abuse in a manner outside the scope of the CSA and outside of Congresss
intent for it. It is wrong. If the enforcement continues, despite being the huge federal
government and despite the urgings of people who fear it, Ill file an action for damages.
The federal sovereign should not be enforcing a law meant to combat recreational drug
abuse against groups of patients operating under state law.

Please dismiss your lawsuit against the J alalis. They are not paying back rent paid
to them by Releaf Health and Wellness. I met the managing patient of that group. His wife
has cancer. That group operates fully in conformance with California law and fully in
conformance with the federal CSA. They do not, nor have they ever, operated to distribute
marijuana for anything other than medical reasons to patients with physician
recommendations.

I urge Mr. Birotte and each of the California based U.S. Attorneys to modify their
policy in this area. Stop recreational drug abuse stop doctors from issuing improper
prescriptions or recommendations for Oxycontin, Lortab, Ritalin, Marijuana, etc. Work to
give the CSA the meaning Congress intended to combat recreational drug abuse. Then
give the ADA the meaning Congress meant for that law read cases including Bay Area
Addiction v. City of Antioch, R.E.C.A.P. and Helping Hands v. Baltimore. Read those
cases and protect the seriously ill and disabled individuals who are suffering because of
city laws, rules, policies, and procedures that clearly violate Title II of that law Congress
deemed the primary civil rights legislation of our time.

Very truly yours,

Matthew Pappas

MSP:jm

cc: Pres. Barack Obama; Atty. Gen. Eric Holder; Ca. Gov. Edmund Brown,
J r.; Ca. Atty. Gen. Kamala Harris; Ms. Laura Duffy; U.S. Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher; U.S. Rep. Linda Sanchez
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANTS 12( b) ( 6) MOTION TO DISMISS

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MATTHEW S. PAPPAS (SBN: 171860)
SEBASTIAN RUCCI (SBN: 178114)
LEE H. DURST (SBN: 69704)
22762 Aspan Street, Suite 202-107
Lake Forest, CA 92630
Phone: (949) 382-1485
Facsimile: (949) 242-2605
E-Mail: matt.pappas@mattpappaslaw.com

Attorneys for Claimants,
TONY J ALALI and MORGAN J ALAEI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
v.
REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 2601
W. BALL ROAD, ANAHEIM,
CALIFORNIA (J ALALI AND JALAEI) ,

Defendants.
__________________________________
TONY J ALALI AND MORGAN J ALAEI,
Titleholders.

No.: SACV 12-1345 AG (MLGx)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
CLAIMANTS RULE 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS
COMPLAINT

Date: Nov. 5, 2012
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept: 10D, Santa Ana
Hon. Andrew Guilford

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... II
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................... 2
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 2
A. THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT. ...................................................... 2
B. A LAW MEANT TO COMBAT THE RECREATIONAL USE OF DRUGS. .......................... 2
C. CALIFORNIA MEDICAL MARIJ UANA LAWS. ............................................................... 3
D. MEDICAL MARIJ UANA IS INEXORABLY TIED TO THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE. .......... 4
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS .............................................................................. 4
A. THE NINTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. ................................................... 6
B. THE NECESSITY OF DEFINING A NARROWLY TAILORED LIBERTY INTEREST. ......... 7
C. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST. ............................... 7
D. CAREFUL SCRUTINY PRIOR TO ABRIDGEMENT. ......................................................... 9
E. WHEN A TRADITIONALLY STATE AREA IS AT ISSUE, THE FEDERAL SOVEREIGN MUST
PROVIDE AT LEAST SOME INDEPENDENT NOTICE TO A STATE CITIZEN WHO RELIES ON
STATE LAW BEFORE COMMENCING FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. .................................... 10
F. STANDING TO RAISE FEDERALISM AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS...................... 11
G. THE HISTORY AND TRADITION OF MEDICAL MARIJ UANA USE. ............................ 12
H. EMERGING AWARENESS. ......................................................................................... 14
I. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE RAICH II. ............................................................................ 15
J . THE CSA IS NOT A NARROWLY TAILORED MEASURE THAT SERVES A COMPELLING
STATE INTEREST. .......................................................................................................... 17
K. BY NOT ALLEGING RECREATIONAL DRUG ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORTING FACTS,
THE GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF. ................................... 18
III. POLICING THE BOUNDS OF FEDERALISM. ................................................. 19
A. THE CSA DOES NOT PREEMPT CALIFORNIAS MEDICAL MARIJ UANA LAWS. .......... 19
B. COMPLICIT INTERFERENCE WITH STATE SOVEREIGNTY. ......................................... 20
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 22

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch (9th Cir. 1999) 179
F.3d 725 ......................................................................................................................... 23
Bond v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. ____, 131 S.Ct. 2355 ................................... passim
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140 ................. 14
California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231 ........................... 21
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 31 L. Ed. 2d 349 ....................... 6
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006) 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.
Ct. 1211, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 ......................................................................................... 18
Gonzales v. Oregon (2006) 546 U.S. 243, 163 L. Ed. 2d 748, 126 S. Ct. 904 .......... passim
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 .......... 5, 9
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. (1985) 471 U.S. 707, 105
S. Ct. 2371, 85 L. Ed. 2d 714 ........................................................................................ 21
Horizon House Dev. Servs. Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Southampton (E.D. Pa. 1992) 804 F.
Supp. 683 ....................................................................................................................... 23
Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 ........... 14, 16
Leary v. United States (1969) 395 U.S. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57 ...................... 13
Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010 .......................... 6
Malone v. White Motor Corp., (1978) 435 U. S. 497 ........................................................ 20
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept of Health & Human Servs. (1st Cir. 2012) 682 F.3d 1 ....... 19
Natl Fedn of Indep. Business v. Sebelius (2012) 132 S. Ct. 2566 .................................. 19
New York v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 144 ................................................................. 7
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 ................ 6
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey (1992) 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L.
Ed. 2d 674 ........................................................................................................................ 6
Poe v. Ullman (1961) 367 U.S. 497, 543, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989 .................... 5, 9
Qualified Patients Association v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734 ............. 21
Raich v. Gonzales (2007) 500 F.3d 850 .......................................................... 14, 15, 16, 17
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Regl Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown (2d Cir. 2002) 294 F.3d 35
....................................................................................................................................... 23
Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1 .............................. 7
Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 ........................... 6
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed.
1655 ................................................................................................................................. 6
Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 ....................... 5
Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) 521 U.S. 702, 719, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302,
138 L. Ed. 2d 772 ................................................................................................... passim
Witt v. Department of the Air Force (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3d 806 ................................... 17
STATUTES
2008 Ca. Atty Gen. Guidelines for Safety and Non-Diversion of Marijuana Grown for
Medical Use ................................................................................................................... 11
21 U.S.C. 802 ................................................................................................................... 2
21 U.S.C. 812(1)(A) ......................................................................................................... 2
21 U.S.C. 812(a) ............................................................................................................... 2
21 U.S.C. 812(b) ............................................................................................................... 2
21 U.S.C. 812(c)(c)(10) .................................................................................................... 2
21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7) .......................................................................................................... 2
21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) ........................................................................................................ 2
Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.5 ......................................................................... passim
Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.5(B)(1)(c) .................................................................... 3
Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.7, et seq. ............................................................. passim
Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.775 ...................................................................... 11, 12
Ca. Health & Safety Code 11570 ................................................................................... 11
Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.765 .......................................................................... 11
D.C. Stat. 7-1671, et. seq. ............................................................................................. 18
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) .................................................................................................. 2
Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Act ..................................................... 16
P.L. 75-238, 75th Congress, 50 Stat. 551, repealed 1971 ................................................. 13
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The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 .............................. 2
OTHER AUTHORITIES
<http://www.britannia.com/history/docs/runnymede.html>............................................... 4
David G. Ogdens, Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum, (10/19/2010) ..................... 17
Federalist Paper #48 (1788) ............................................................................................. 22
Leeming, J ohn Robert; Stephen Langton, Hero of Magna Charta (1215 A.D., 700
th

anniversary), London: Skeffington & Son (1915); <http://www.britannia.
com/history/docs/runnymede.html>................................................................................ 4
Magna Charta of 1297 A.D. ............................................................................................... 5
Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary, <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/medical/medicine>, (2012) ........................................................................ 4
On the First Principles of Federalism, Roger Pilon, Cato Institue (1995) ......................... 9
Statement of Dr. William C. Woodward, Hearing before the Committee on Ways and
Means, U.S. House of Representatives, May 4, 1937 ................................................... 13
The Murderers, the Story of the Narcotic Gangs, Anslinger, H., U. S. Commissioner of
Narcotics, and Oursler, W. (1961), pp. 541-554 ........................................................... 13
The Pharmacohistory of Cannabis Sativa, Mechoulam, R. (1986). In Cannabinoids as
Therapeutic Agents (ed. R. Mechoulam), pp. 1-19. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press ........ 12
Therapeutic Aspects of Cannabis and Cannabinoids, Robson, P. (2001). The British
Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 178, pp. 107-115. GB: Royal College of Psychiatrists ..... 12
This President's Day, Harvey Wasserman, Huffington Post (2009) ................................ 13
RULES
VHA Directive 2011-004 .................................................................................................. 15
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment ............................................................................... 5, 6
U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment ......................................................................... 6
U.S. Constitution, Ninth Amendment ................................................................................. 6

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Claimants, Tony J alali and Morgan J alaei, are married and both approaching
retirement age. They own a commercial property as their primary asset and plan to use it
to fund their retirement in the next few years. They have two (2) sons, both in college.
Tony J alali is a computer engineer and his wife, Morgan, is a dentist.
The City of Anaheim (Anaheim) has been in an ongoing dispute with medical
marijuana collectives since enacting Anaheim Municipal Code 4.20.300 banning all
patient collectives. Recently, state trial and appellate courts have been ruling against city
and county bans finding such bans violate state law. In 2010, Anaheim was prohibited by
the Fourth District Ca. Court of Appeal from enforcing federal law. (Qualified Patients
v. City of Anaheim, infra.) Thereafter, as attempts by cities to close collectives based on
continuing discriminatory animus were failing regularly, the City of Lake Forest, through
outside counsel Best, Best, and Krieger, sent a letter to the local U.S. Attorney on May 3,
2011 asking him to do what they could not do through state civil and/or criminal actions.
The U.S. Attorney agreed and sent a barrage of letters to all Lake Forest collectives. His
office then instituted forfeiture actions later entering into consent judgments with
landlords prohibiting future leases with collectives. When other cities, including
Anaheim, saw this method was working and despite the cities being creatures of state
government, they too elicited the help of the federal sovereign in furtherance of their
hostility toward medical cannabis patients.
In response to Anaheims request to the federal government to enforce its ban
(which will almost certainly be stricken by state courts), the U.S. Attorney filed this
action seeking civil forfeiture of the J alalis property alleging they were leasing a space to
a medical marijuana collective. Notwithstanding their belief that leasing the property to a
patient collective was legal, upon receiving notice from the U.S. Attorney, Tony J alali
immediately served a Notice to Quit on the collective tenant fearing loss of the property
which is conservatively worth over a million dollars.
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DISCUSSION

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b) provides a motion may be brought asserting a pleading
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6).) In
order to state a claim for civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7), the Government
must plead that real property was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate
the commission of a violation of federal drug laws and that the owner of the property had
knowledge of and consented to the actual or intended violation of those laws. (21 U.S.C.
881(a)(7).)
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

A. The federal Controlled Substances Act.
The federal Controlled Substances Act [CSA], 21 U.S.C. 801, et seq., was
enacted into law by Congress as Title II of The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970. The CSA defines controlled substances in five schedules. (21
U.S.C. 812(a).) A drugs placement on a particular schedule depends on that specific
drugs potential for abuse. (21 U.S.C. 812(b).) Marijuana is listed in Schedule I of
the CSA. (See 21 U.S.C. 812(c)(c)(10).) When listed on Schedule I, (A) [T]he drug or
other substance has a high potential for abuse; (B) [T]he drug or other substance has no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and (C) [T]here is a lack
of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision. (21
U.S.C. 812(1)(A)- 21 U.S.C. 812(1)(C).) The CSA provides that the manufacture,
distribution, or possession of Schedule I controlled substances is a criminal offense. (21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 844(a).) Under the CSA production or manufacture includes
cultivating a drug, including marijuana. (21 U.S.C. 802.)
B. A law meant to combat the recreational use of drugs.
In Gonzales v. Oregon (2006) 546 U.S. 243, 163 L. Ed. 2d 748, 126 S. Ct. 904, the
Supreme Court concluded that Oregons assisted suicide law was not preempted by the
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CSA because health and welfare concerns historically have been regulated by the states
(Id. at 271) and Congresss purpose in enacting the CSA was to combat recreational drug
abuse. (Id. at 272, 274.)
In connection to the CSA, however, we find only one area in which Congress set
general, uniform standards of medical practice. [That area is the uniform national
standard for the medical treatment of narcotic addiction under 42 U.S.C. 290bb-
2a.] This provision strengthens the understanding of the CSA as a statute
combating recreational drug abuse (Id. at 271) (emphasis added.)
In addressing the majority opinion, J ustice Scalia noted the Courts holding in the case
meant legitimate medical purpose refers to all uses of drugs unrelated to addiction and
recreational abuse. Ante, at 274. (Oregon, supra, 546 U.S. at 287, Scalia, J . dissenting.)
J ustice Thomas referred to the Courts newfound understanding of the CSA as a
statute of limited reach and wrote that its change limiting the CSA to recreational drug
activities rests upon constitutional principles that the majority of the Court [had earlier]
rejected in Raich (Oregon, supra, 546 U.S. at 300, Thomas, J . dissenting) (emphasis
added.) It follows that, in the Oregon case, the Supreme Court has clarified: (1) the
purpose of the CSA is to regulate/prohibit recreational drug abuse; (2) that Congress did
not intend to preempt states traditional rights to regulate medicine; and (3) that the Court
departed from its earlier decision in Raich. (Id. at 274 and 300.)
C. California medical marijuana laws.
In November, 1996, California voters approved the Compassionate Use Act
(CUA). (Ca. Prop. 215 [1996]; Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.5.) The CUA in-
part provides that the state should implement a safe and affordable distribution system
that provides for all seriously-ill Californians in need of medical marijuana recommended
by a licensed doctor. (Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.5(B)(1)(c).) In 2003, the state
Legislature approved the Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMPA). (Stats. 2003, Ch.
875; enacted 2003, effective 1/1/2004; Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.7, et seq.).
Section 11362.7(h) of the Ca. Health & Safety Code provides a list of medical conditions
for which medical marijuana may be recommended by a doctor.
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Considering the names of the state laws at issue here include the words
Compassionate and Medical Marijuana in conjunction with the requirement that a patient
be recommended cannabis by a licensed physician, there is nothing in Californias
medical cannabis laws that allows, permits, or decriminalizes anything having to do with
the recreational use of marijuana.
D. Medical marijuana is inexorably tied to the practice of medicine.
Californias CUA and MMPA laws can only relate to the practice of medicine
because only doctors can provide for the use of marijuana. The practice of medicine
refers to [t]he science and art dealing with the prevention, cure, or alleviation of
disease.
1
It is illogical that a doctor would advise that medical cannabis be used to treat
the excruciating pain, discomfort, or other symptoms of a patient knowing the patient
cannot get the recommended medication. Moreover, it makes no sense to prohibit
medical use of cannabis through a federal law enacted to combat the recreational abuse
of drugs.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

After King J ohn of England was crowned in 1199, a series of failures at home and
abroad, combined with perceived abuses of power, led English barons to revolt and
attempt to restrain what the king could legally do. In 1215, King J ohn was forced to
accept the Articles of the Barons, the original Magna Charta,
2
which was created to
stop his perceived usurpation of rights, powers, and property interests.
3
Today, parts of
the 1297 version of Magna Charta remain in legal force in England and Wales. Many

1
Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/
medical/medicine>, (2012).
2
Leeming, J ohn Robert; Stephen Langton, Hero of Magna Charta (1215 A.D., 700
th

anniversary), London: Skeffington& Son (1915); <http://www.britannia.
com/history/docs/runnymede.html>.
3
<http://www.britannia.com/history/docs/runnymede.html>.
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modern concepts of liberty as well as the basic principles of procedural and substantive
due process have origins back to Magna Charta.
4

[L]iberty is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear
arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, and which also
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment. (Poe v. Ullman (1961) 367 U.S. 497, 543, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed.
2d 989 [Poe] (Harlan, J ., dissenting); view of Harlan adopted in Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 [Griswold])
(emphasis added.)

Although the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause states only that [n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, it
undeniably provides substantive protections for certain fundamental rights not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
5
(U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment.)
The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the liberty it protects
includes more than the absence of physical restraint. (Washington v. Glucksberg (1997)
521 U.S. 702, 719, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 [Glucksberg]; see

4
See, e.g., 29
th
Clause of the Magna Charta of 1297 A.D., (guaranteeing due
process, No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or
possessions, made nude in public, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in
any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so,
except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land. [originally
clause 39, renumbered clause 29], No man of what state or condition he be, shall be
put out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without
he be brought to answer by due process of law.)
5
Substantive Due Process is also applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment.
(See Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49; 530
U.S. at 64 [We have long recognized that the [Fourteenth Amendments] Due
Process Clause also includes a substantive component that provides heightened
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests.]; See then, e.g., Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 123 L.
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also, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey (1992) 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 [Casey]; 505 U.S. at 847 [It is tempting, as a means of curbing
the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those
rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal interference by the express
provisions of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution. But of course this Court has
never accepted that view.].)
A. The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution.
[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people. (U.S. Constitution, Ninth
Amendment.)
The Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition, and
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed. Although Substantive Due Process has been used to
expand and protect fundamental interests,
6
the Supreme Court has cautioned against the
doctrines expansion. (See, e.g., Glucksberg, supra, 521 U.S. at 720 [the Court must
restrain the expansion of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decision making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.].) In Glucksberg, the
Court noted that judicial extension of constitutional protection for asserted substantive
due process rights results in placement of matter[s] outside the arena of public debate
and legislative action.

Ed. 2d 1 [Flores]; 507 U.S. at 302 [admonishing use of utmost care in area of
substantive due process.]; (U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment.)
6
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 31 L. Ed. 2d
349 [use of contraceptives]; Griswold, supra, [use of contraceptives and marital
privacy]; Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010
[marriage]; Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183
[bodily integrity]; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.
Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 [have children]; Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U.S.
510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 [education and rearing of children].
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B. The necessity of defining a narrowly tailored liberty interest.
In any substantive due process analysis, the claimed liberty interest must be
construed narrowly to avoid unintended consequences. (Glucksberg, supra, 521 U.S. at
722; Flores, supra, 507 U.S. at 302.) Substantive due-process cases require a careful
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. (See Glucksberg, supra, 521
U.S. at 720-21.) In Flores, the Court rejected a broadly-worded proposed fundamental
right because it was not an accurate description of the liberty interest claimed in that case.
(Flores, supra, 507 U.S. at 302.) Instead, the Court augmented the claimed interest
stating it as the right of a child who has no available parent, close relative, or legal
guardian, and for whom the government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a
willing and able private custodian rather than a government-operated or government-
selected child-care institution. (Ibid.)
7

C. State sovereignty as a fundamental liberty interest.
The federal system rests on what might at first seem a counterintuitive insight,
that freedom is enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one. [citations.]
The Framers concluded that allocation of powers between the National
Government and the States enhances freedom, first by protecting the integrity of
the governments themselves, and second by protecting the people, from whom
all governmental powers are derived. (Bond v. United States (2011) 564 U.S.
____, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2364 [Bond]) (Kennedy, J .) (emphasis added.)
Given the Courts statement in Bond it is axiomatic that the need for separate
sovereigns is deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition, and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. Indeed, [s]tate sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
[r]ather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power. (Bond, supra, 131 S.Ct. at 2364 quoting New York v. United States
(1992) 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 [505 U.S. 144 at 181].)

7
See also, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed.
2d 508 [Lawrence]; 539 U.S. at 578 [finding the narrowly defined fundamental right to
engage in consensual sexual activity in the home without government intrusion.]
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The allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity,
and residual sovereignty of the States. (Bond, supra, 131 S.Ct. at 2364.) The federal
balance has been established to ensure that States function as political entities in their
own right. (Ibid.) Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a State by
ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or
control their actions. (Ibid.) Since federalism allows States to respond, through the
enactment of positive law, to the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the
destiny of their own times without having to rely solely upon the political processes that
control a remote central power, it follows that the right to rely on the response of state
initiative is indeed implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed. (Id.; also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.)
In this case, the J alalis are the titleholders of the real property at issue here.
(Complaint at p. 2, lns. 12-17.) The Government alleges that the J alalis leased space to
medical marijuana dispensaries that were ostensibly operating pursuant to
California law, and claim to be distributing marijuana for medical purposes.
(Complaint at p.3, lns. 27-28; p.4, ln. 1) (emphasis added.) Thereafter, the Government
asserts that [medical marijuana distribution] is not a recognized exception to the
Controlled Substances Act. (Complaint at p.4, lns. 2-3.) By its own allegations, the
federal sovereign says that the J alalis are purportedly leasing space to entities operating
under state law. It then asserts such state law has no meaning. It says this despite being
on notice (as a party to the Oregon case) that the purpose of the CSA is to combat
recreational drug use (Oregon, supra), not to prevent medical marijuana patients from
accessing medicine recommended by their state licensed doctors.
Since, for purposes of substantive due process, it is necessary to define the claimed
liberty interest narrowly to avoid unintended consequences, (Glucksberg, supra, 521
U.S. at 722), the first fundamental liberty interest at issue here is the right of a state

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citizen to be free from a federal taking of real property when relying on state medical
marijuana law in an area of sovereignty traditionally
8
belonging to the states despite
purportedly conflicting federal law. Here, the Claimants have interests [that] require
particularly careful scrutiny prior to the federal sovereigns abridgment of them. (Poe,
supra, Harlan, J ., dissenting; view later adopted in Griswold, supra.)
As J ustice Kennedy stated in Bond, [f]ederalism is more than an exercise in
setting the boundary between different institutions of government for their own
integrity. (Bond, supra, 131 S.Ct. at 2364.) It provides a fundamental interest to the
states and the people to shape the destiny of their own times without having to rely
solely upon the political processes that control a remote central power. (Ibid.) That
remote central power has, for all intents and purposes, usurped an area traditionally
belonging to the states the area of health and medicine. (See, e.g., Oregon, supra, 546
U.S. at 271, [health and welfare concerns historically have been regulated by the states].)
Federalism may not be explicit in the Bill of Rights
9
, yet the rights of the people and
states related to it are fundamental in our system of ordered liberty. (Ibid.) Accordingly,
the J alalis have a fundamental liberty interest to be protected from a federal taking of
real property when relying on state medical marijuana law in an area of sovereignty
traditionally belonging to the states despite purportedly conflicting federal law.
D. Careful scrutiny prior to abridgement.
At issue here are laws of the state that ostensibly conflict with federal law. For the
J alalis, their general sovereign is the State of California. For them, the federal

8
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. (1985) 471 U.S.
707, 105 S. Ct. 2371, 85 L. Ed. 2d 714 [Hillsborough]; 471 U.S. at 719.
9
On the First Principles of Federalism, Roger Pilon, Cato Institue (1995), [Our
modern regulatory and redistributive state--the state the Framers sought explicitly to
prohibit--has arisen largely since 1937, and primarily through just two clauses in the
Constitution, the commerce clause and the general welfare clause, respectively. It is
striking that this is so, for if the Framers had meant for Congress to be able to do
virtually anything it wanted through those two simple clauses, why would they have
bothered to enumerate Congresss other powers, much less defend the doctrine of
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government represents an ancillary remote central dominant with limited powers.
10

Given there are two kings, do they look to California law in respect to health, safety,
and welfare, or do they look to federal law? Can they rely on the Courts opinion in
Oregon providing that Congresss purpose in enacting the CSA was to combat
recreational drug use and not to interfere in the traditionally state area of medicine?
11

Can they rely on Oregon insofar as that case limits the reach of the CSA to recreational
drug activities? (See, e.g. Oregon, supra, 546 U.S. at 300, [dissent referring to the
Courts newfound decision that the CSA [is] a statute of limited reach] [Thomas, J .
dissenting].) Can they rely on the Courts rejection in Oregon of its earlier and mistaken
determination in Raich? (Ibid.) Can they rely on the arbitrary decisions of the Article II
power announcing
12
first that it would not expend resources on medical marijuana
patients and then later doing exactly the opposite? Can they rely on the fundamental
right of patients to alleviate excruciating pain through the use of medical cannabis
recommended by a doctor?
E. When a traditionally state area is at issue, the federal sovereign
must provide at least some independent notice to a state citizen who relies
on state law before commencing forfeiture proceedings.
By the Governments own Complaint in this matter, the J alalis leased to medical
marijuana collectives purportedly operating in compliance with Californias CUA and
MMPA. Indeed, nowhere in its Complaint does the government assert that the J alalis
leased to anyone intending to or actually distributing marijuana for recreational use. The
Complaint refers to a green cross that signifies medical not recreational marijuana.
(Complaint at p.8, lns. 17-19.) The Complaint does not aver that the federal government

enumerated powers throughout theFederalist Papers? That is the question that cries out
for explanation.]
10
See fn. 23, infra.
11
See Hillsborogh, supra, 471 U.S. at 719.
12
David G. Ogdens, Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum, (10/19/2010)
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ever warned the J alalis prior to filing this action. Rather, it asserts the City of Anaheim
told the J alalis about federal law. (Complaint at p.8, lns. 9-11.)
California law provides that a landlord may lease property to a medical marijuana
collective. (Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.765, 11362.775.) It exempts such leases
from provisions of the states drug den abatement provisions. (Ca. Health & Safety
Code 11570; 11362.775.) In October, 2009, Dep. U.S. Attorney General David G.
Ogdens distributed a memorandum to U.S. Attorneys providing the government would
not expend resources on seriously ill patients and their caregivers operating pursuant to
state law. Indeed, state law provides that only groups of patients and their authorized
caregviers can associate together for purposes of collective and cooperative medical
marijuana cultivation and provision. (Ca. Health & Safety Code 11362.775; Sec. IV,
2008 Ca. Atty Gen. Guidelines for Safety and Non-Diversion of Marijuana Grown for
Medical Use [Guidelines].)
The Government is trying to take the J alalis real property. It did not itself ever
warn or notify the J alalis. It avers only that letters from the City of Anaheim advised of
federal law. It was and remains well aware of the continuing issues between cities,
patient collectives, and state law. As pleaded in its Complaint, the federal sovereign is
indeed seeking to take that asset under a federal law meant to stop recreational drug
activities. Such action is oppressive and must surely be protected, at a very minimum,
through some tenet of substantive due process that requires notice by the Government
itself before commencing its filing of a lis pendens and forfeiture lawsuit in
circumstances where a state has responded, through the enactment of positive law, to the
initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times. (Bond,
supra, 131 S.Ct. at 2364.)
F. Standing to raise federalism and substantive due process.
While the J alalis are not medical marijuana patients, they have standing to
challenge the validity of the federal law at issue on federalism grounds. (Bond, supra, at
holding.) Likewise, provisions of Californias MMPA that apply to the J alalis namely
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the provisions in 11362.765 and 11362.775 that protect landlords are, according to
the Government, in conflict with the CSA. Here, the J alalis who leased property
believing Californias health and safety laws related to medical marijuana protected them
(the CUA and MMPA), have standing to raise the fundamental liberty interest of patients
who are the main beneficiaries of those laws. The interests of the J alalis are inexorably
intertwined with the fundamental rights granted to patients under the states medical
marijuana laws because their lease could only be to a group of protected patients.
Accordingly, for purposes of substantive due process, the narrowly construed patient
right sought to be protected by the J alalis is the right to access and use medical
marijuana to preserve bodily integrity, avoid pain, and preserve life.
G. The history and tradition of medical marijuana use.
In analyzing substantive due process from the patient perspective, the first issue is
whether the asserted right is deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition, and
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed. (Glucksberg, supra, 521 U.S. at 720-21.)
It is beyond dispute that marijuana has a long history of use -- medically and
otherwise. Marijuana was first used as a medicine in China nearly 5000 years ago.
Recommended for malaria, constipation, rheumatic pains, and as a surgical analgesic,
13

subsequent records show it was later used throughout Asia, the Middle East, Southern
Africa and South America.
In the 19th century, marijuana became a mainstream medicine in England.
14
An
Irish scientist and physician, William OShaughnessy, observed its use as an analgesic,
anticonvulsant, antispasmodic, and antiemetic. After toxicity experiments conducted on
dogs and goats, OShaughnessy began providing medical marijuana to patients and was

13
The Pharmacohistory of Cannabis Sativa, Mechoulam, R. (1986). In Cannabinoids
as Therapeutic Agents (ed. R. Mechoulam), pp. 1-19. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
14
Therapeutic Aspects of Cannabis and Cannabinoids, Robson, P. (2001). The British
Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 178, pp. 107-115. GB: Royal College of Psychiatrists.
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impressed with its anticonvulsant and analgesic properties.
15
After OShaughnessys
observations were published in 1842, medicinal use of marijuana expanded rapidly. In
the United States a variety of marijuana-containing remedies were developed even prior
to when OShaughnessys report was published. Indeed, it is recorded that various of the
Founding Fathers grew and used cannabis.
16

In the 1930s, Harry J . Anslinger, the head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
(FBN), reported an increase in the number of people smoking marijuana.
17
Between
1935 and 1937, Anslinger advocated for passage of the Uniform State Narcotic Act and
Marihuana Tax Act. Although the marijuana tax proposal was opposed by the American
Medical Association
18
, it was eventually enacted by Congress on August 2, 1937 (P.L.
75-238, 75th Congress, 50 Stat. 551, repealed 1971).
Marijuana was not prohibited under federal law until Congress passed the CSA in
1970. (See Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1; 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2202.) There is
considerable evidence that efforts to regulate marijuana use in the early-twentieth century
targeted recreational use, but permitted medical use.
19
By 1965, possession of marijuana
was a crime in all fifty states. However, almost all states had exceptions for persons for
whom the drug had been prescribed or to whom it had been given by an authorized

15
fn. 8.
16
This President's Day, Harvey Wasserman, Huffington Post (2009),
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harvey-wasserman/this-presidents-day-
remem_b_162088.html>[Washington, Adams, J efferson, Madison and the entire
early American farm community -- about 90% of the populace back then -- would be
astonished to hear that industrial hemp or its sister are illegal].
17
The Murderers, the Story of the Narcotic Gangs, Anslinger, H., U. S. Commissioner
of Narcotics, and Oursler, W. (1961), pp. 541-554.
18
Statement of Dr. William C. Woodward, Hearing before the Committee on Ways and
Means, U.S. House of Representatives, May 4, 1937.
19
The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal
History of American Marijuana Prohibition, Richard J . Bonnie & Charles H.
Whitebread, 56 Va. L. Rev. 971, 1010, 1027, 1167 (1970) [noting that all twenty-two
states that had prohibited marijuana by the 1930s created exceptions for medical
purposes].
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medical person. (Leary v. United States (1969) 395 U.S. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 23 L. Ed. 2d
57 [Leary], 395 U.S. 6 at 16-17.)
The CSA effectively proscribed use of marijuana in the United States until
California voters approved Proposition 215, the CUA, in 1996. In the 16-year period
since California implemented its CUA, seventeen (17) additional states and the District of
Columbia have enacted medical marijuana laws
20
.
H. Emerging awareness.
In Lawrence, supra, the Court wrote that times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. (Lawrence, supra, 539 U.S. at 579.) The Court noted that since it had decided
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140 [Bowers],
the number of states with sodomy laws had dropped from twenty-four (24) to thirteen
(13). (Id. at 572-573.) It also referred to a pattern of non-enforcement even in the 13
states still retaining sodomy laws. (Ibid.)
In 2007, following reversal and remand of its underlying decision by the Supreme
Court in Raich, supra, a panel of the Ninth Circuit analyzed emerging awareness in
respect to medical marijuana. (Raich v. Gonzales (2007) 500 F.3d 850 [Raich II].) After
analyzing Lawrence and developments in the area of medical cannabis up to the time of
its decision, the Ninth Circuit declined to find a fundamental right had developed under
the Lawrence doctrine. However, in the five (5) years since the panels analysis,
substantial developments in the area of medical marijuana indeed require applicability of
the emerging awareness principle and establishment of the fundamental right of
patients asserted in this case.

20
States and districts with medical marijuana laws, enacting legislation, and effective
year: Alaska (Ballot Meas. 8, 1998); Arizona (Prop. 203, 2010); California (Prop. 215,
1996); Colorado (Ballot Amd. 20, 2000); Connecticut (2012); Delaware (2011);
District of Columbia (Initiative 59; Amd. Act. B18-622, 2010); Delaware (SB 17,
2011); Hawaii (SB 862, 2000); Maine (Ballot Quest. 2, 1999); Michigan (Prop. 1,
2008); Montana (Initiative 148, 2004); Nevada (Ballot Quest. 9, 2000); New Jersey
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I. Developments since Raich II.
In March, 2011, the National Cancer Institutes PDQ
21
(Physician Data Query)
information system for physicians and health professionals reported that potential
benefits of medical marijuana for people with cancer include, antiemetic effects,
appetite stimulation, pain relief, and improved sleep. In the practice of integrative
oncology, the health care provider may recommend medicinal Marijuana not only for
symptom management but also for its possible direct antitumor effect.
22

On J uly 6, 2010, Dr. Robert A. Petzel, Veteran Department Undersecretary for
Health, reversing the long-standing departmental policy of denying benefits to veterans
testing positive for medical marijuana, wrote:
If a Veteran obtains and uses medical marijuana in a manner consistent with state
law, testing positive for marijuana would not preclude the Veteran from receiving
opioids for pain management in a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility.
The Veteran would need to inform his provider of the use of medical marijuana,
and of any other non-VA prescribed medications he or she is taking to ensure that
all medications, including opioids, are prescribed in a safe manner. Standard pain
management agreements should draw a clear distinction between the use of
illegal drugs, and legal medical marijuana.
23
(emphasis added.)
Following Dr. Petzels letter, the Veterans Department, on J anuary 31, 2011, issued
VHA Directive 2011-004 providing that proper medical marijuana use by veterans in
states with medical marijuana laws would not lead to exclusion of benefits.
Since 2007 and the decision in Raich II, six (6) more states have enacted medical
marijuana laws. First, in 2007, New Mexicos Legislature approved Senate Bill 523.
Next, in 2008, 68% of the voters in Michigan approved ballot Proposal 1. In 2010, voters

(SB 119, 2010); New Mexico (SB 523, 2007); Oregon (Ballot Meas. 67, 1998); Rhode
Island (SB 0710, 2006); Vermont (SB 76, 2004); and Wa. State (Init. 692, 1998).
21
National Cancer Institute (National Institutes of Health) Website, Mar. 25, 2011,
<http:www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/cam/cannabis/healthprofessional/page2>.
22
See Physician Data Query (PDQ) Webpage, Cannabis and Cannabinoids, (URL
in fn. 17).
23
Letter from Dr. Robert Petzel, Undersecretary for Health, Veterans Administration
(J uly 6, 2010).
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in Arizona passed Proposition 203 and the New J ersey Legislature approved Senate Bill
119. Delawares Legislature approved Senate Bill 17 in 2011. Finally, in 2012, House
Bill 5389 was approved by an overwhelming majority in both houses of the Connecticut
Legislature.
Perhaps the most important development since Raich II has been the approval and
legalization of medical marijuana in the federal District of Columbia. After ten (10)
years of an appropriations amendment prohibiting medical marijuana in D.C., Congress
enacted Public Law 111-117 providing:
The bill [H.R. 3170] also takes further steps towards reducing undue
congressional interference in local affairs [and] allows the District to
conduct and implement a referendum on use of marijuana for medical purposes,
as has been done in various states. (H.Rept. 111-202
24
[on H.R. 3170] [111
th

Congress, 1
st
Session, J uly 10, 2009] [enacted as P.L. 111-117, Dec. 2009] at p. 8).

Thereafter, the Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Act was passed twice to
Congress under provisions of the Home Rule Act which requires almost all D.C. local
legislation to go through a congressional approval process. The law first achieved
approval in February, 2010. Thereafter, amendments to the law approved unanimously
by the D.C. council were passed to Congress in J une, 2010 and became effective
following congressional review on J uly 27, 2010.
In Raich II, the panel found that:
though the Lawrence framework might certainly apply to the instant case, the use
of medical marijuana has not obtained the degree of recognition today that private
sexual conduct had obtained by 2004 in Lawrence. Since 1996, ten states other
than California have passed laws decriminalizing in varying degrees the use,
possession, manufacture, and distribution of marijuana for the seriously ill
[citations]. We agree with [the plaintiff] that medical and conventional wisdom
that recognizes the use of marijuana for medical purposes is gaining traction in the
law as well. But that legal recognition has not yet reached the point where a
conclusion can be drawn that the right to use medical marijuana is fundamental

24
H.Rept. 111-202 (H.R. 3170, P.L. 111-117, enacted) (111
th
Cong., 1
st
Session,
J uly 10, 2009).
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and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. (Raich II, supra, 500 F.3d at
857-858.)

The panel continued that for now, federal law is blind to the wisdom of a future day
when the right to use medical marijuana to alleviate excruciating pain may be deemed
fundamental. (Ibid.) It then opined that, [a]lthough that day has not yet dawned,
considering that during the last ten years eleven states have legalized the use of medical
marijuana, that day may be upon us sooner than expected. (Ibid.)
Since Raich II, the National Cancer Institute, part of the federal governments
National Institutes of Health, stated on its Website in 2010, medical cannabis not only
provides pain and symptom relief, but has potential antitumor properties. Six (6) more
states have passed medical marijuana laws. The National Institute on Drug Addiction has
modified its publications noting there is medical value to marijuana. Deputy Attorney
General Ogden recognized the needs of seriously ill and disabled patients in his 2009
memorandum to U.S. Attorneys. The Veterans Administration a part of the federal
government has recognized the medical benefits of marijuana and has changed long-
standing prohibitions against its use. Finally, Congress twice approved the District of
Columbias Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Act after removing a ten
(10) year prohibition on medical marijuana in the District. Accordingly the proverbial
day referred to by the panel in Raich II has indeed dawned.
J. The CSA is not a narrowly tailored measure that serves a
compelling state interest.
Given the right to use medical marijuana to preserve bodily integrity, avoid pain,
and preserve life is fundamental thereby invoking substantive due process, the next
inquiry is whether the CSA is a narrowly tailored measure that serves a compelling state
interest (Raich II, supra, at fn. 16) or whether the CSA, in furtherance of its purpose to
combat recreational drug use, advances that governmental interest by proscribing use of
and access to medical cannabis by seriously ill, disabled, and permanently ill patients
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working together in a closed circuit. (See, e.g., Witt v. Department of the Air Force (9th
Cir. 2008) 527 F.3d 806, [applying intermediate scrutiny in fundamental rights analysis].)
As the Supreme Court found in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
do Vegetal (2006) 546 U.S. 418, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 [O Centro] [126 S.
Ct. at 1221-23], the government presented no evidence that narrow exceptions to
Schedule I prohibitions would undercut the governments ability to effectively enforce
the CSA. First the CSA is not narrowly drawn in light of the fundamental right at issue
here. Likewise, the CSA does not advance the stated purpose of the CSA to combat
recreational drug abuse by proscribing use, possession, transportation, or distribution of
medical marijuana within the closed-circuit system provided under California law. As
J ustice Thomas noted while dissenting in Raich, supra:
[T]hese controls [referring to the CUA and MMPA] belie the Governments
assertion that placing medical marijuana outside the CSAs reach would
prevent effective enforcement of the interstate ban on drug trafficking.
[citation.] Enforcement of the CSA can continue as it did prior to the
Compassionate Use Act. Only now, a qualified patient could avoid arrest or
prosecution by presenting his identification card to law enforcement officers
Moreover, under the CSA, certain drugs that present a high risk of abuse and
addiction but that nevertheless have an accepted medical use--drugs like morphine
and amphetamines--are available by prescription. [citations.] No one argues that
permitting use of these drugs under medical supervision has ever undermined the
CSAs restrictions. (Raich, supra, Thomas, J . dissenting) (emphasis added).
K. By not alleging recreational drug activities and supporting facts,
the Government has failed to state a claim for relief.
Patients suffering excruciating pain, ailments, and medical conditions have a
fundamental right to use medical marijuana recommended by their respective state
licensed physicians. The remote central powers (Bond, supra) law combating
recreational drug abuse is not thwarted by Californias medical marijuana provisions.
In this traditionally state area, California has provided a system albeit in its infancy
for patients to access medical cannabis just as Congress has provided a system for that
same purpose in Washington D.C. (Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment
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Act, D.C. Stat. 7-1671, et. seq.) To remain purposely blind to the developments that
have taken place in just the five (5) years since Raich II by continuing to deprive
thousands of our citizens facing the daily challenge of serious illness and disease the
access to medical cannabis that is effective for them is the epitome of leaving in-place
something that serves only to oppress. (See Lawrence, supra, 539 U.S. at 579.)
III. POLICING THE BOUNDS OF FEDERALISM.

Policing the bounds of federalism protects not only the States, but also individual
liberty. (Bond, supra, 131 S.Ct. at 2364.) One virtue of federalism is that it permits [a]
diversity of governance based on local choice. (Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept of Health
& Human Servs. (1st Cir. 2012) 682 F.3d 1, 16.) Even in genuine matters of economic
regulation, courts should pause to consider the implications of the Governments
arguments for exercising new and expansive conceptions of federal power. (Natl
Fedn of Indep. Business v. Sebelius (2012) 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 [NFIB] [opn. of
Roberts, C.J .].) Courts ordinarily defer to congressional classifications when Congress
enacts routine economic legislation or other legislation of known and common type.
However, when Congress interferes in an area of historic and primary state concern, it is
by definition operating in a field where it has little experience and no expertise. In this
context, judicial deference is warranted not to the congressional judgment but rather to
the state policy judgments that Congress has sought to displace, in areas where the States
experience and interests are most compelling and entitled to respect. Courts may
appropriately examine congressional justifications with greater care when these
federalism concerns are present because Congress is operating on the edge of its
constitutional authority.
A. The CSA does not preempt Californias medical marijuana laws.
Past Supreme Court cases have recognized that the Supremacy Clause, U. S.
Const., Art. VI, may preempt state law either by field, express provision, implication, or
by a conflict between federal and state law. (See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commn (1983) 461 U. S. 190, 203-
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204;Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., (1947) 331 U. S. 218, 230 [Rice].) And yet, despite
the variety of these opportunities for federal preeminence, the Court has never assumed
lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead it has addressed claims of
preemption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state
law. (See Maryland v. Louisiana (1981) 451 U. S. 725, 746.) Indeed, preemption
analysis starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. (Rice, supra, 331 U.S. at 230;Alameda Newspapers v. City of Oakland (9
th

Cir., 1996) 95 F.3d 1406, 1413 [Alameda]; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505
U. S. 504, 516 [Cipollone]; Jones v. Rath Packing Co. (1977) 430 U. S. 519 [Jones].)
Accordingly, in any preemption analysis, [t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone.(Alameda, supra, 95 F.3d at 1413; Malone v. White Motor Corp., (1978) 435
U. S. 497, 504.)
Considering anti-preemption section 903 of the CSA and that the purpose and
intent of the CSA is to combat recreational drug use (Oregon, supra), the ultimate
touchstone test results in the CSA not preempting Californias CUA or MMPA. Since the
CSA does not preempt those laws, then it follows that the Government cannot bring
forfeiture or criminal cases against medical marijuana patients, patient collective groups,
or their respective landlords unless marijuana is being used, distributed, transported, or
stored for recreational or non-medical purposes.
B. Complicit interference with state sovereignty.
There is no Medical Evaluation Clause in the Constitution. Since it has long
been recognized that issues of health and welfare fall within the powers reserved to the
states, it is up to the states to make such determinations. However, because at the time of
the CSAs passage, the states all had anti-marijuana laws as societal stereotypes about
marijuana were at their height reinforcing reefer madness ignorance, the federal
sovereigns determination of medical value went unchallenged. In just the five (5) year
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period since Raich II, there has been more understanding, learning, and acceptance than
in the thirty (30) year period preceding that decision.
25

The determination of marijuanas medical or health value falls squarely within the
scope of state power not federal authority. (See Hillsborogh, supra, 471 U.S. at 719
[traditionally state power]; see also, Raich, supra.) California has made that
determination. Federalism is not the exclusive domain of the national government it is
a cooperative balance between it and the states (Gibbons, supra; Bond, supra). Anaheim
is a subdivision of the state of California (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos
(2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 255) and has been told by a state appellate court it cannot enforce
federal law in the area of medical cannabis. (See Qualified Patients Association v. City
of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 754.) Having a city itself a subdivision of
the state -- undermine state law in light of the CSAs purpose with the aide of the federal
government is tantamount to throwing federalism out the window. The federal
sovereign is interfering with California citizens rights to provide, effectuate, and rely on
positive state laws (Bond, supra) as well as the laws of the remote central power
regarding the purpose of its CSA (Oregon, supra), its statements in official memoranda
(2009 A.G. Memorandum, supra), and the actions it takes for citizens in federally
controlled areas (D.C. Stat. 7-1671, et seq., supra).
Combating the recreational use of drugs the sole purpose of the CSA has
nothing to do with a states sovereign right to provide for its sick, disabled, and
permanently injured citizens. In Oregon, supra, the Court noted the limited scope
Congress intended for the CSA. (See, e.g. Oregon, supra, 546 U.S. at 300, [dissent
referring to the Courts displacement of the breadth of CSA applicability decision in
Raich.] [Thomas, J . dissenting].) Accordingly, Californias medical marijuana laws are

25
In 2010, 78% of Americans supported medical marijuana for patients. In 1972, 60%
of Americans thought that marijuana was physically addictive (research shows that it is
generally not physically addictive because regular users rarely show physical
withdrawal symptoms, but marijuana can be psychologically addictive). [Gallup,
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/6331/decades-drug-use-data-from-60s-70s.aspxs.aspx>].
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not preempted by it. Despite the limits set by Congress as expressed by the Supreme
Court (Oregon) and in section 903 of the CSA itself, the Executive branch continues to
interfere with state sovereignty in the area of medical cannabis. While it may enforce the
CSAs total ban of marijuana to prevent recreational drug use, the Article II branch has no
authority under any enumerated power to usurp the power to provide rights and
protections for patients in states that have, under their sovereignty as expressed by the
Framers, passed laws for those patient citizens. (Bond, supra.) To hold otherwise moves
the Union one step closer to Congresss being able to everywhere extend[] the sphere of
its activity and draw[] all power into its impetuous vortex. (J ames Madison, Federalist
Paper #48 (1788).)
CONCLUSION

Given the CSAs purpose is to prevent recreational drug use, the Government has
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted by failing to allege the property was
being used to distribute, transport, manufacture, or store marijuana used recreationally or
intended for recreational use. The Government also failed to warn the J alalis before
instituting its forfeiture action. In fact, it alleges in its Complaint that the City of
Anaheim warned the J alalis about federal law. (See, e.g., Complaint, [alleging the City
of Anaheim referenced federal law in a letter it purportedly sent to the Claimants].) The
Government did not warn them at any time prior to filing this case to take their property.
In an area traditionally within the states power where the J alalis looked to the state law
providing for the activity, the Government has simply filed a lis pendens along with its
Complaint for forfeiture without any direct warning under its law designed to combat
recreational drug abuse.
In light of the fundamental rights at issue here, the Government should be required
to plead in its Complaint that the Jalalis knew of and consented to their tenants use of the
subject property for recreational possession, distribution, and storage of marijuana in
order to state a claim for relief. (Oregon, supra, 546 U.S. at 721.) Likewise, a
conclusory allegation in the Complaint that the Claimants are not in compliance with
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state law should not suffice when the remaining allegations refer to medical marijuana
and even describe the medical green cross associated with it. Remarks by unknown
individuals allegedly from an Internet website included in the Complaint for no apparent
reason other than to raise the ire of the Court have no connection with or to the J alalis.
Those remarks are not tied to them nor do they in any manner support the position that
the J alalis knew of or consented to recreational drug activities on the property. Indeed,
the Governments inclusion of those comments is evidence of its own per se
discriminatory animus toward medical cannabis patients. (See Bay Area Addiction
Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch (9th Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 725; see also Regl
Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown (2d Cir. 2002) 294 F.3d 35, 45-46;
Horizon House Dev. Servs. Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Southampton (E.D. Pa. 1992) 804 F. Supp.
683, 690 [Horizon]).
While recreational marijuana drug activities are illegal under both California and
federal law, medical marijuana is not illegal under either governments law. Here, the
United States provided no factual pleadings, evidence, or information alleging such
recreational use/activity. Nor can it. (See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.) Its actions are utterly
oppressive, result in severe harm to patients, and, if allowed to proceed lead to the taking
of the Claimants a married couple with two kids in college -- property. The pleading
itself shows the Government is engaged with a city subdivision of the State of California
in an effort to thwart state law and sovereignty. To allow forfeiture in this case through
the Complaint filed here would be an utter miscarriage of justice and further empower the
federal government to continue its oppressive behavior. Accordingly, the J alalis Motion
to Dismiss should be GRANTED.
DATED this 1
st
day of October, 2012:

_________________________________
MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
Attorney for Claimants

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SUPPLEMENTAL BRI EF AND APPLI CATI ON
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MATTHEW S. PAPPAS (SBN: 171860)
CHARLES M. FARANO (SBN: 86915)
DAVID R. WELCH (SBN: 251693)
22641 Lake Forest Drive, #B5-107
Lake Forest, CA 92630
Phone: (949) 382-1485
Facsimile: (949) 242-2605
E-Mail: matt.pappas@mattpappaslaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARLA J AMES; KATHERINE
ALDRICH; and VICTORIA PAPPAS,

Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CITY
OF COSTA MESA, CALIFORNIA; CITY
OF LAKE FOREST, CALIFORNIA; and
ERIC HOLDER, in his capacity as
Attorney General of the United States,

Defendants.

No.: SACV 12-00280 AG (MLGx)

APPLICATION TO ALLOW
ADDITIONAL BRIEFING;
PLAINTIFFS [PROPOSED]
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION; AND DECLARATION
OF MATTHEW PAPPAS

Date: March 26, 2012
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Hon. J udge Andrew J . Guilford

//
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//
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APPLICATION TO ALLOW SUPPLEMENTAL BREIFING

Following oral argument heard earlier today by the Court, the Plaintiffs
respectfully request that the Court allow supplemental briefing on the issue of
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), as that case affects the matters now before the
Court. The supplemental brief proposed by the Plaintiffs could assist the Court in its
review of the pending matter as well as aide in efficient resolution. The proposed brief
has been submitted with this application. The Plaintiffs also request that the United
States be granted permission to file a supplemental brief should it deem such a brief
necessary. Plaintiffs request is in-part based on the declaration of Matthew Pappas,
included with this application.

DATED this 26
th
day of March, 2012.

Respectfully submitted,

________________________________
Matthew Pappas
Attorney for Plaintiffs

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DISCUSSION

I. THE DISSENTS OF JUSTICES THOMAS AND OCONNOR IN RAICH
PROPERLY REFLECT CONGRESSS ROLE WHEN IT STOPS ACTING AS A
USURPER AND INSTEAD PROPERLY ACTS WITHIN OUR CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK

In his dissent
1
in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), J ustice Thomas referred to the
CSA and Californias regulation of medical marijuana noting:

[T]hese controls belie the Government's assertion that placing medical marijuana
outside the CSA's reach "would prevent effective enforcement of the interstate ban on
drug trafficking." Brief for Petitioners 33. Enforcement of the CSA can continue as it
did prior to the Compassionate Use Act. Only now, a qualified patient could avoid
arrest or prosecution by presenting his identification card to law enforcement officers.
In the event that a qualified patient is arrested for possession or his cannabis is seized,
he could seek to prove as an affirmative defense that, in conformity with state law, he
possessed or cultivated small quantities of marijuana intrastate solely for personal
medical use. People v. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th 457, 469-470, 49 P. 3d 1067, 1073-1075
(2002); People v. Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1549 (1997). Moreover, under the
CSA, certain drugs that present a high risk of abuse and addiction but that
nevertheless have an accepted medical use--drugs like morphine and amphetamines--
are available by prescription. 21 U. S. C. 812(b)(2)(A)-(B); 21 CFR 1308.12
(2004). No one argues that permitting use of these drugs under medical supervision
has undermined the CSA's restrictions.

Although not controlling, J ustice Thomas dissent correctly points out that
prescription use of drugs like morphine and amphetamines does not undermine the CSA. He
further points out that California has enacted a comprehensive set of regulations for medical
marijuana use. As J ustice Thomas notes, [E]nforcement of the CSA can continue as it did
prior to the Compassionate Use Act.

1
The referenced portion of J ustice Thomas dissent in Raich does not relate to the holding in that
case. Raich is a Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8) case. The holding in Raich does not
evaluate the efficacy of Californias medical marijuana laws nor does Raich compare those laws
to the federal CSA. Rather, although wrong, the Court in Raich determined Congress acted
within its Commerce Clause, supra, authority when enacting the CSA.
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II. CONGRESS USE OF ITS COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER REQUIRES
ANALYSIS AND OVERSIGHT BY THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES
WHEN IT LEGISLATES IN AREAS TRADITIONALLY RESERVED TO THE
STATES

In Raich, supra, the Supreme Court noted [R]espondents in this case do not dispute
that passage of the CSA, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act, was well within Congress' commerce power. (Raich at 8).
After King J ohn of England was crowned in 1199, a series of failures at home and
abroad, combined with perceived abuses of the king's power, led English barons to revolt and
attempt to restrain what the king could legally do. In 1215, King J ohn agreed to the "Articles
of the Barons, the original Magna Charta
2
. The 1297 version of the Magna Charta remains
in legal force in England and Wales. Principles of procedural and substantive due process
have origins back to the Magna Charta
3
.
The Magna Charta exists because feudal Barons, essentially local governors
subordinate to the king, objected to the kings perceived usurpation of their rights, powers
and interests
4
. In 1787 and 1788, at the time the U.S. Constitution was being considered as a
replacement for the Articles of Confederation, some of the framers of the Constitution
addressed similar concerns about the proposed Constitution in a series of articles later
deemed the Federalist Papers. There can be no doubt that the cornerstone issue for those
opposing a strong federal constitution was the potential usurpation of states rights by the
federal sovereign.

2
Leeming, J ohn Robert; Stephen Langton, Hero of Magna Charta (1215 A.D., 700th
anniversary), London: Skeffington & Son (1915); http://www.britannia.com/
history/docs/runnymede.html.
3
The 29
th
Clause of theMagna Charta of 1297 A.D., guarantees due process. (Originally clause
39, No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, made
nude in public, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we
proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his
equals or by the law of the land." Renumbered clause 29, No man of what state or condition he
be, shall be put out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without
he be brought to answer by due process of law.")
4
http://www.britannia.com/history/docs/runnymede.html.
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Addressing these concerns, J ames Madison, oft referred to as the Father of the
Constitution and the fourth President of the United States, wrote the success of the
usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound and
give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the
people who can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the
usurpers. Federalist Paper #44 (1788). Subsequently, in Federalist Paper #45 (1788),
Madison wrote, [T]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite. He continues, [T]he powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.
In further addressing the issue of state versus federal powers, Alexander Hamilton, a
federalist
5
, founding father, and first Secretary of the Treasury, wrote:
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State
governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States
only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the
common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be
concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations,
in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the
dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily
renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was
made in the other. Federalist Paper #46 (1788).

It is the failure of the branches responsible for ensuring the States as valuable actors
in our system of government that could threaten the viability of our well designed system. It
is not necessary to bring to the attention of the court the growing political movements in this
country that seek to redress perceived encroachments by the federal sovereign. Nor is it
necessary to presuppose that such movements will result in trials of force. Nevertheless, it

5
The federalist party was a political party in the United States that existed roughly between 1792
to 1816. Chambers, William Nisbet. Political Parties in a New Nation: The American
Experience, 17761809 (1963).
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is the system itself, designed to thwart the consolidation of power that inevitably led to
failures of similar yet different governments throughout history that should redress
encroachments. As J ames Madison noted, the success of the usurpation will depend on the
executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative
acts.
III. THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES HAVE ABANDONED
THEIR ROLES IN OUR CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND HAVE ALLOWED
IMPERMISSIBLE USURPATION BY THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH TO
CONTINUE FOR MORE THAN EIGHTY (80) YEARS

In Raich, the Supreme Court states, [W]e have never required Congress to legislate
with scientific exactitude we have never required Congress to make particularized
findings in order to legislate. (Raich at 14, 15). These statements by the Court demonstrate
abandonment on the part of the judiciary. Although not a part of the Constitution, the
Federalist Papers represent the thoughts and expectations of at least two of the Founding
Fathers arguably most responsible for the Constitutions existence. From any perspective,
their writings represent urgings in favor of adoption and should be considered in evaluating
the intent of those framing the Constitution, their expectations for it, and their warranty of it.
In Raich, the Court states that Congress is not obligated to make findings in respect to
its Commerce Clause power absent a special concern such as the protection of free speech,
see, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 664-668 (1994) (plurality
opinion). This seems to suggest that free speech is more important than the issue of our
citizens rights to exist themselves and as states with any measure of certainty within the
Constitutions framework. It further suggests that free speech is a special concern and that
the framework on which our government exists is not. When enacted, the Constitution
contained no written provision protecting free speech. In fact, the Constitution included no
bill of rights. In addressing miscellaneous concerns about the proposed constitution,
Hamilton wrote:
It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin,
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stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor of
privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was MAGNA
CHARTA, obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King J ohn. Such were the
subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes. Such was the Petition
of Right assented to by Charles I., in the beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the
Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in
1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament called the Bill of
Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they
have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the
people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in
strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have
no need of particular resations. "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America." Here is a better recognition of
popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure
in several of our State bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise
of ethics than in a constitution of government. Federalist Paper #84 (1788)
(emphasis added).

If usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments as Madison
suggests, then the conclusion that when a general regulatory statute bears a substantial
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that
statute is of no consequence (Raich at 12) must certainly be an impermissible abrogation of
a Constitutional obligation by the judicial branch. It is that kind of abrogation and failure to
require the Legislative branch to identify its basis for usurpation for every part of a law and
every impact that law has, no matter how small the part may be or how minimal the impact,
that has led to and is allowing the explosive growth of the federal sovereign. It may be
difficult and take Congress more time before it acts, but that is part of the cost of democracy.
In this modern era, Congress is not known for passing single page laws. Rather, it
creates massive acts that consist of tens or hundreds of little laws. Separation and
usurpation are special concerns that deserve more than a declaration by Congress invoking
its Commerce Clause powers. There is nothing de minimis about sending a person to jail or
taking that persons property based on a part of a law that may be, on its own, an
impermissible usurpation yet has been approved because another part of that same act or
the act itself is said to generally address an end that substantially relates to interstate
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commerce.
In Raich, the government took the respondents property. The Courts reference to de
minimis is made specifically in that case. The respondents certainly did not feel that anything
that happened to them was de minimis. The federal government does not indict people under
a general regulatory statute. It does not specify just a general interstate commercial
concern when it engages in a Fifth Amendment taking. Rather, it is always an individual
instance and not the general concern that affects a citizen. When the Federalists sold their
plan, they represented the individual instance[s] would be protected. See Hamilton,
Federalist #84. The Supreme Courts statement in Raich addressing individual instance[s]
shows that it has not complied with its Constitutional obligation to oversee Congress and
restrain it when necessary. The Court is saying that it is not concerned with individual
instances when Congress has passed a general statute an Act that consists of lots of
little laws yet has tied the general enactment to a valid interstate commerce concern. Yet it
is those individual instance[s] it is charged with overseeing.
Essentially, Congress could pass the Revamp Americas Laws Act and make a
general statement showing that Americas laws as presently written are causing economic
issues in different parts of the country, show a few statistics and then enact a 1,000 page
document with a whole bunch of little laws included. If it happens that one of those little
laws requires Colorado to change some of its criminal justice regulations, under the Supreme
Courts modern commerce clause jurisprudence, it is likely the hypothetical Revamp
Americas Laws Act would be deemed constitutional. Instead, the part of the Revamp
Americas Laws Act that requires Colorado to change its laws must itself be analyzed for
constitutional infirmity. If the analysis of that part of the Act, no matter how minimal that
part is, results in usurpation then that part must not be forced on Colorado. Only then does
the separation framework operate properly.
//
//
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IV. CONGRESS HAS BEEN ACTING IN THE ROLE OF USURPER SINCE 1942.
IT IS THIS COURTS SOLEMN DUTY TO INTERVENE LEST A TRIAL OF
FORCE ENSUE

Since [T]he powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State (Madison, Federalist #45), then
the Legislative branchs findings must provide that each individual federal law relates more
to an enumerated federal interest than to those powers reserved to the states. It is not enough
that a general concern is stated and then tied to interstate commerce followed by a massive
collection of little laws passed under one title or name. The means of getting to the
announced end for each distinct rule must substantially affect interstate commerce.
Madison wrote, [T]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite. He and the other federalists sold this idea to the American
people. The industrial revolution did not usher in an era that so radically changed things so
as to render the federal sovereigns Constitutional power limitations more than the few and
defined Madison referred to in Federalist Paper #45 -- nor did the Great Depression. The
burden is on the federal sovereign to prove that each action it takes each rule it passes and
each case it prosecutes -- meets the qualifications set in the framework. The holdings in
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and Raich have altered that burden placing it on the
states and the people. Those cases were decided by a branch of the federal sovereign a
branch responsible for preserving the separation framework a branch that has failed to meet
its Constitutional obligations. Under those cases, roles are reversed and the federal
governments powers are numerous and indefinite while the states powers are illusory and
constantly subject to Article VI, Clause 2.
It is more than just the states powers that have been affected. It is the power of the
people. The abrogation of duties owed to the people as defined in the separation framework
by the executive and judicial branches combined with the legislative branchs usurpations
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have disenfranchised the people. This is demonstrated in California where in 1996 the
people voted to approve Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act. The people in
Washington D.C., voted to approve their medical marijuana initiative two (2) years later.
The decisions in Raich and Wickard are an abrogation of the duties of those branches
responsible to the people. Considering the significance placed on the writings of J ean Marie-
Arouet and J ohn Locke, it is that part of government contractually binding the federal
sovereign to its limited role that has been relegated to mere illusion. Modern Commerce
Clause jurisprudence provides the federal sovereign with the ability to expand its powers
beyond that which was guaranteed by the federalists when they sold the Constitution to the
American people. The line of cases starting with New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), including United States v. Alfonso Lopez, J r., 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and ending with
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), began recognizing the judiciarys responsibility under our
federalist system. The anomalous decision is Raich has returned to Congress its power to
usurp without limit. The return of that power threatens not only our system of government,
but our entire way of life.
V. DESPITE THE SUPREME COURTS FAILURE TO PROTECT THE
CONSTITUTION, THIS ARTICLE III COURT IS BOUND TO ENSURE THE
FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY OUR FOREFATHERS REMAINS PROECTED
AND IN-TACT

Under Wickard and Raich, the federal sovereign can regulate virtually anything. The
limits on it are illusory. Wickard served its purpose long ago. Both of those cases have
allowed unfettered usurpation that this Court and every other court in this country have an
obligation to stop. The warranty expressed by Alexander Hamilton and J ames Madison the
promise made to the American people is embodied in the Constitution that provides this
Court as part of the system that protects against usurpation. The failure of the executive and
judicial branches to prevent past usurpation do not prevent this Court from its participation as
an essential part of our system of checks an balances. Indeed, this Courts duty is to the
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Constitution of the United States and to those people who are the beneficiaries of the
commitments made by our forefathers who proffered it as a replacement for the Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union. The federalist papers were meant to quell significant
mistrust of a strong centralized government. Those papers are, in fact, a warranty for the
American people then, now, and forever. The federal Controlled Substances Act is an invalid
usurpation. It is not an invalid usurpation under Raich or Wickard, but an invalid usurpation
under the core framework that ensures the checks and balances embodied in our system of
government. It follows that it is Raich and Wickard themselves, regardless of the majesty or
importance placed on the United States Supreme Court, that are examples of what Alexander
Hamilton described as willing participation by co-equal branches in usurpation.
Unlike the [R]espondents in [Raich who did] not dispute that passage of the CSA, as
part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was well within
Congress' commerce power (Raich at 8), the Plaintiffs here correctly assert that, where it
interferes with the laws of California and its people, the CSA was and is an invalid usurpation
disguised as a law proper under Congresss art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3 authority. The burden must
return to that intended by the framers. Accordingly, those provisions of the federal
Controlled Substances Act that impermissibly interfere with California law are an invalid
usurpation and must give way to the laws of the people and the state under art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3
of and the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
DATED this 26
th
day of March, 2012.
Respectfully submitted,

________________________________
Matthew Pappas
Attorney for Plaintiffs

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y

24611 SPADRA LANE
(949) 235-6532 MISSION VIEJ O, CA 92691 LEGAL ASSISTANT:
MPAPPAS@MATTPAPPASLAW.COM DIVINA MAGARIFUCHI

August 30, 2010

HAND DELIVERED AND VIA EXPRESS MAIL

Mr. Robert E. Shannon
Long Beach City Attorney
333 W. Ocean Blvd, 11
th
Floor
Long Beach, CA 90802-4664

Re: Pack v. Long Beach
Long Beach Ordinance 10-0007

Dear Mr. Shannon:

My office represents several medical cannabis patients who live in Long Beach. In J uly, I
mailed a letter to the city outlining concerns my clients have about the citys medical marijuana
collective cultivation ordinance.

As I said in my J uly letter, we would like to work with the city to modify ordinance 10-0007
in a way that balances the needs of the disabled and seriously ill patients with the citys important
interests. To date, I have not received a response from the city. Our office has also tried to discuss
the ordinance with Mr. Eric Sund, the city staff member who has been managing the
implementation of the ordinance. Although Mr. Sund allowed patient groups to submit
applications in accordance with the provisions of 10-0007 notwithstanding the earlier imposition of
an arbitrary cut-off date, he was unwilling to address serious concerns patients have expressed.
Also, a number of patients have addressed the city council at various public meetings with no
success in urging the council to consider their important concerns.

The ordinance has now become effective. Since our efforts to date to work with the city have
not been successful, I would like to meet with you so we can avoid having to involve the courts. I
will travel to your office to meet personally to go over the concerns my clients have and to see if
we can work positively and without litigation toward a resolution that considers the citys interests
and the needs of the disabled and seriously ill. I believe that there are positive benefits for
everyone if a balanced regulation can be achieved.

Because my prior efforts to open a dialog with the city have failed, I have prepared a
complaint against the city seeking judicial intervention. It is my hope that we will not have to file
suit. However, I have included a copy of the complaint and summons for your review.

Mr. Robert Shannon
August 30, 2010
Page Two

Should it be necessary to file the lawsuit, I will move the court to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinance pending trial. When elements of probable success on the merits, affectation of the
parties, and irreparable harm are considered in regard to the suit my clients are prepared to file, I
believe the court will grant preliminary injunctive relief. I believe it is important for the city to
consider the legal basis for my clients action before summarily deciding to refuse discussions
related to the ordinance.

As you know, the Compassionate Use Act and MMPA are only applicable to the disabled and
seriously ill. They are the only people the medical marijuana laws provide for. There are many
people in Long Beach with cancer, glaucoma, serious disabilities, AIDS, and other serious illnesses
who benefit from medical marijuana. While some of these people are effectively treated with
dangerous opiate based drugs, others are treated with medical marijuana. Ordinance 10-0007 treats
these people very differently than other municipal laws that regulate traditional pharmacies
notwithstanding the fact that the drugs dispensed by those pharmacies are often far more dangerous
than medical marijuana. To treat a person suffering from cancer and the extreme side effects of
chemotherapy who uses medical marijuana differently than we treat a person with the same
condition who uses opiate based Oxycontin or Vicodin is inappropriate. Moreover, to levy a
$14,000.00 plus permit fee on groups of these patients who work together for the benefit of each
other while charging about $400 for CVS, Walgreens and other large pharmacies does not seem
appropriate.

Thousands of patients are facing closure of their respective patient collective groups that work
for the benefit of their disabled and seriously ill members. While I do not use marijuana, I believe
that efforts to garner excessive sums of money and to disproportionately regulate medical
marijuana patients are harmful for everyone, including those of us who do not use medical
marijuana. In the future, I may be diagnosed with cancer or glaucoma and it may end up that
medical marijuana is the most effective treatment for me. A close family member could be injured
or be diagnosed with a serious disease and find that medical marijuana works most effectively to
treat his or her condition. Nobody would want a family member to be treated differently than a
person with the same condition that uses a dangerous drug like Oxycontin.

Many of the patients who will be affected by 10-0007 are disabled people who depend on
social programs and services. I do not believe our society should take advantage of these types of
citizens. Rather, we should truly be compassionate and work to address their needs rather than
capitalize on their disabilities. Some of these patients are terminal. Some have disabilities that
they must face every day with no hope of improvement other than the treatments that are available
to alleviate associated pain and discomfort. Ordinance 10-0007, while including some very
positive provisions, must be revised and must properly consider the needs of those people it affects.

Mr. Robert Shannon
August 30, 2010
Page Three

The complaint I have included seeks to strike 10-0007 in its entirety. If successful, it could
lead to the immediate refund of fees paid to date under its provisions. It could lead to additional
work on both sides. If the complaint is filed, it will cost these disabled patients time and energy
and it will certainly lead to additional stress and worry for people who already suffer from
disability and/or permanent injury. There could be media coverage. I personally do not like media
coverage and so I am very hopeful it can be avoided. Filing suit means additional time, energy and
effort on both sides where discussions and negotiations between the parties would likely eliminate
litigation related time and expense. There are other considerations that make discussion a much
better option than fighting the issue out in court. By working to revise the statute in a constructive
way, the efforts already expended can be, at least in part, preserved and built on through a positive
effort that includes patients and city officials.

Although I am urging resolution without court intervention, I do not think my clients will lose
in their effort to strike down 10-0007. To the contrary, I believe their legal position is very solid
and that the ordinance will be invalidated. In the unlikely event their effort is unsuccessful, I am
not concerned about negative press because it is not me that is important here it is the effort of the
disabled and seriously ill patients who are being forced to seek redress that I am concerned about.
It is not just their legal interests but their interests in avoiding additional stress and worry that is
important to me and so I implore you to consider discussions rather than litigation. Likewise, the
city should consider its disabled and seriously ill medical marijuana patients conditions as well.

I will adjust my schedule to meet with you at your convenience on Wednesday, Thursday or
Friday this week. My office number is (949) 472-9300. My email address is
mpappas@mattpappaslaw.com. I would like to work with the city to resolve this matter in a
positive way that does not require court intervention because it is the right thing to do. I believe
balanced regulation that is fair and considerate and which addresses city responsibilities and patient
concerns can be achieved.

Thank you very much for your time and consideration -

Very truly yours,

Matthew Pappas

MSP:dg

encl.

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y

22641 LAKE FOREST DRIVE, #107
LOS ANGELES COUNTY OFFICE: LAKE FOREST, CA 92630-1726 (949) 382-1485
4340 ATLANTIC AVENUE FACSIMILE: (949) 242-2605
LONG BEACH, CA 90807 OFFICE@MATTPAPPASLAW.COM

December 23, 2011

VIA U.S. MAIL

Ms. Kamala D. Harris
Attorney General
State of California
1300 I Street, Suite 1740
Sacramento, CA 95814

Re: Pack v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4
th
1070

Dear Ms. Harris:

I am the attorney representing the patients in the above referenced case. I am in
receipt of your letter to members of the state Legislature dated December 21, 2011
regarding medical marijuana in California.

Anthony Gayle is one of the patients in the Pack case. He is 25 years old. He
suffers from renal failure. Hes had heart surgery to replace a part of his heart. Mr. Gayle
must have kidney dialysis three (3) times per week. He is likely terminal. Dangerous and
addictive opiate drugs like Vicodin and Oxycontin have been contraindicated given his
condition.

In the underlying Pack case, Mr. Gayle, along with patient Ryan Pack, who was
permanently and seriously injured after being hit by a vehicle while riding a bicycle,
applied to the trial court for a preliminary injunction.

Long Beach enacted Chapter 5.87 of its municipal code in March, 2010. I have
included video excerpts from a City Council meeting held that date. In the video, you will
see that city council members were confused by a presentation made by the Los Angeles
District Attorneys office. Apparently, the District Attorney felt it necessary to confuse
council members based on his staunch opposition to patient rights. It appears he either
willfully withheld information regarding the provisions of Ca. Health & Safety Code
11362.775 or simply failed to read that state law before discussing transportation.

December 23, 2011
Page Two

In the video excerpts, you will notice that the members of the council are clearly confused
about the transportation issue during the meeting.

Chapter 5.87 was not enacted for the benefit of the all seriously ill Californians in
need of medical cannabis the voters of California considered when they enacted the
Compassionate Use Act in 1996. As then councilwoman Tonia Reyes-Uranga stated on the
record during the March 16, 2010 meeting, Chapter 5.87 is pretty much a sham that was
designed to take away medication access for patients like Ryan Pack and Anthony Gayle.

On October 6, 2010, patients Pack and Gayle argued before the trial court in the
underlying case that a preliminary injunction should issue barring the City from enforcing
Chapter 5.87 because the enforcement of that law would result in their inability to access
collectives. Dealing with serious medical conditions and life issues, Pack and Gayle access
medication through collectives established under and operating pursuant to the Medical
Marijuana Program Act and 2008 Attorney General guidelines governing the Safety and
Non-Diversion of Marijuana Used for Medical Purposes.

As you know, injunctive relief is extraordinary in nature and requires the court to
assess probability of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and balance respective
hardships. On November 2, 2010, although finding Chapter 5.87 was motivated by
sentiments contrary to and inconsistent with the Compassionate Use Act and Medical
Marijuana Program Act, the trial court declined to issue the requested preliminary
injunction. Thereafter, the patients petitioned the Second District California Court of
Appeal for a peremptory writ of mandamus or for an alternative writ. The appellate court
granted the alternative writ and ordered the parties to show cause.

On October 4, 2011, after extensive briefing by the parties and by amici curiae
including the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Southern California, the ACLU
of Northern California, the ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties, Americans for Safe
Access, the National Drug Policy Alliance, the City of Los Angeles, the League of
California Cities, and the Association of California Counties, the appellate court granted
the petition for writ of mandamus.

When it granted the patients Petition, the court said there was a 100% chance the
injunction should have been issued by the trial court. The irreparable harm claimed by
the patients was their inability to access medication through the collective and
cooperative system provided for in the MMPA because enforcement of Chapter 5.87
would lead to closure of their respective collectives. Yet, days after the Pack decision, in
a retaliatory manner and with the same sentiments contrary to the CUA and MMPA

December 23, 2011
Page Three

referred to by the trial court in its November 2, 2010 order, City Attorney Robert Shannon
told the Long Beach City Council it must ban all collectives.

Mr. Shannon and the Los Angeles District Attorney are violating state law. They
are violating the states Compassionate Use Act and the Medical Marijuana Program Act.
On December 13, 2011, Mr. Shannon publically represented in a Long Beach City Council
meeting that the Pack case required the Long Beach City Council to ban all patient
collectives. He did not say a moratorium was appropriate, but instead said a ban was
absolutely necessary. Mr. Shannons presentation was recorded on video and is now
available on the longbeach.gov Website. He misrepresented what the Pack decision
means.

After the appellate court ordered the parties to show cause in Pack back in
November, 2010, the City of Long Beach engaged in abhorrent conduct aimed at attacking,
harassing, and arresting patients. Ill just provide one (1) example of the Citys outrageous
behavior against patients during the appellate court briefing period. Petitioner Ryan Pack
is a member of the non-profit 562 Collective in Long Beach, California. On March 1,
2011, the City of Long Beach filed an action in Los Angeles Superior Court seeking to
declare 562 Collective in violation of LBMC 5.87.020 and 5.87.090 as well as to abate
562 Collective as a nuisance. On May 10, 2011, around twenty-five (25) Long Beach
police officers broke-into the 562 Collective without a warrant using a battering ram.

On J une 2, 2011, after the warrantless raid, seizures, and arrests, 562 Collective
applied ex parte for an order to show cause regarding preliminary injunction prohibiting
enforcement and for a temporary restraining order pending the order to show cause hearing.
City of Long Beach v. 562 Collective, et al. (March 1, 2011) L.A.S.C. No. NC055751.
After reviewing the moving papers as well as an opposition filed by the City, the trial court
made a preliminary finding that the Citys break-in, search, and seizure at the patient group
was improper stating:

THE CONCERN THAT I HAVE IS AS ARTICULATED BY THE DEFENDANTS,
THE EVIDENCE SEEMS TO SHOW THAT THE CITY THROUGH ITS POLICE
HAVE USED WHAT I REFER TO AS STRONG-ARM TACTICS TO KNOCK
DOWN DOORS OF THE COLLECTIVE WITHOUT A WARRANT AND WITHOUT
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. PEOPLE WHO HAVE USED THE COLLECTIVE
HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND BOOKED AND IT'S FURTHER ALLEGED THE
CITY HAS CONTACTED THE LANDLORD AND THREATENED TO WITHDRAW
THE BUSINESS LICENSE UNLESS THE LANDLORD EVICTS THE
DEFENDANT. AND THIS IS WHILE THIS CASE WHERE THE CITY IS THE

December 23, 2011
Page Four

PLAINTIFF IS SEEKING TO ABATE WHAT IT REFERS TO THE NUISANCE
WHICH IS THE DEFENDANT COLLECTIVE 562 FROM OPERATING. AND SO
WHAT I DON'T UNDERSTAND IS WHY THE CITY WOULD USE SUCH
TACTICS WHILE THE CASE IS PENDING? Long Beach v. 562 Collective,
Transcript, J une 2, 2011, at p.2, lns.10-24 (excerpt included.)

The trial court then ordered a show cause hearing on an expedited basis for J une 10,
2011. The briefing schedule in advance of the hearing was announced by the Court and
accepted by the parties. On J une 10, 2011, after the City had been ordered to show cause
and the parties were before the trial court for the show cause hearing, the trial judge stated:

IT'S ALLEGED THAT THE CITY, THROUGH OFFICERS AND OF THE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, AN AGENCY OF THE CITY, ENGAGED IN CONDUCT THAT
WAS NOT PART OF FORMAL CIVIL DISCOVERY. IT WAS NOT BASED UPON
A SEARCH WARRANT. IT WAS NOT BASED UPON WHAT I WOULD REFER
TO AS EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, INSTEAD, BASED UPON WHAT I READ,
OFFICERS USED A BATTERING RAM AND BROKE DOWN A DOOR AND
SEIZED DOCUMENTS IN THE COLLECTIVE. I DON'T SEE ANYTHING
PRESENTED BY THE CITY THAT SHOWS ANYTHING OTHER -- THERE'S
UNREBUTTED ALLEGATIONS THAT WERE MADE BY THE COLLECTIVE,
AND I DIDN'T SEE ANY RESPONSE TO THAT BY THE CITY. Long Beach v. 562
Collective, supra, Transcript, Order to Show Cause Hearing, J une 10, 2011, at p. 3, lns.
12-22 (excerpt included).

Thereafter, the trial court reviewed a declaration of a Long Beach police officer
submitted by the City apparently in support of its warrantless raid and search of and the
seizure of property from 562 Collective. The judge then addressed the deputy city attorney
stating:

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, I DON'T THINK IT'S UP TO OFFICER COOPER TO
TELL ME WHETHER OR NOT HE'S COMPLIED. IF THAT WERE THE CASE, WE
WOULDN'T NEED J UDICIAL OFFICERS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS
PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT, AN ARREST WARRANT,
WHETHER THERE'S PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD THE DEFENDANT TO
ANSWER FOR A FELONY, ET CETERA, ET CETERA, ET CETERA. THERE IS
NOT -- THERE'S NOT ONE FACT IN HERE THAT REBUTS ANY OF THE
ALLEGATIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANTS THAT IT WAS A SEARCH NOT
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL SEARCH WARRANT OR ANY SEARCH WARRANT
OR THAT ANY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED. AND, THIRDLY, THAT

December 23, 2011
Page Five

A BATTERING RAM DEVICE WAS USED TO BREAK DOWN A DOOR AND
SEIZE DOCUMENTS AS TO AN OPPONENT IN A CIVIL CASE. Long Beach v.
562 Collective, supra, Transcript, J une 10, 2011, at p. 5, lns. 4-18 (excerpt included.)

This is one (1) of about twenty (20) similar warrantless raids. There were many
patients arrested under the invalid Chapter 5.87 permitting provisions. There are videos of
several raids, harassment, and attacks now on YouTube. Interestingly, despite the
numerous deaths related to drug abuse of dangerous opiates like Vicodin and Oxycontin,
there were no warrantless raids of CVS, Walgreens, or similar medication providers.
Likewise, in all of the 5.87 raids in Long Beach, there were no arrests for violation of
state law. In other words, the patient groups were in compliance with the MMPA and
Attorney General guidelines. I spoke with a managing patient in regard to the effect of
such raids. He told me that patients become fearful of coming into the collectives, they are
left without medication, and that it takes weeks for some patients to build up enough
courage to come back, if they ever do, because of fears caused by this behavior.

Noting the reference to gangs and criminal activity in your December 21, 2011
letter sent to the leaders of the Assembly and Senate, it is appropriate to note that the vast
majority of managing patients of patient collective groups are not people making
$100,000.00 per month
1
or who drive expensive cars. While there are likely a small group
of people distributing marijuana improperly and taking advantage of medical marijuana
laws, the managing patients I have had the privilege of working with drive older vehicles
that have over 100,000 miles on them. They do not make large sums of money and instead
face financial issues and challenges while working to maintain medication availability for
patients. Most of them have families and rent the houses they live in. While people like
Mr. Cooley and Long Beach City Attorney Robert Shannon
2
would like to give the

1
During a May, 2011 warrantless raid of non-profit patient collective in Long Beach, a police
officer remarked to a volunteer patient being arrested solely for alleged violation of the permit
provisions of invalid Chapter 5.87. The officer told the volunteer he was getting the short end of
the stick since the managing patient made $100,000.00 per month. In fact, the managing patient
was facing serious financial issues at the time, made less than 1/30
th
of the amount suggested, drove
a domestically produced GMC vehicle with over 130,000 miles on it that was more than seven
years-old, and was, following the improper raid, evicted from her rented apartment. That managing
patient has never made $100,000.00 per month or anything even close to that. In her life, shes
never made more than a few thousand dollars per month.

2
During a December 13, 2011 Long Beach City Council meeting, information from an earlier held
closed-session meeting of the council indicated the police had told council members that 40% of
medical marijuana comes from illegal drug cartels. After discussing the issue with patients, the
marijuana provided by illegal drug cartels is apparently so very bad that patients would not accept

December 23, 2011
Page Six

impression that medical marijuana is just a front for drug dealing, it is not it is
certainly not that for those patients who suffer from ailments like Mr. Gayle and Mr.
Pack. On the other hand, drug abusers choosing more dangerous drugs like Vicodin and
Oxycontin can feign conditions, obtain prescriptions, go to a traditional pharmacy, have the
prescription filled, and purchase a bottle of vodka and pack of cigarettes as they leave the
pharmacy. Yet, they are not discriminated against through improper police raids and
attacks simply because of the medication used that effectively works to mitigate symptoms
and medical conditions they suffer from.

The Pack court granted the Petition for writ of mandamus. The appellate court
referenced the balance of hardship requirements in analyzing the standard of review.
That court did not create a situation that requires cities to ban medical marijuana
collectives. Media seeking politicians get out in the press aggrandizing themselves by
claiming the necessity of bans in an effort at getting that all-important spot on the evening
news. Perhaps those politicians need to sit down and meet a cancer patient who is able to
eat and who can participate in life because medical cannabis is effective.

I represent the plaintiff patients in Marla James, et al. v. City of Costa Mesa, et al.
(2010 9
th
Cir.) 10-55769. It is the patients assertion in that case that the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) as amended by Congress in 2008 is applicable to them.
Under Title II of the ADA, cities may not implement policies or procedures, including but
not limited to zoning laws, that facially or by operation discriminate against qualified
disabled individuals.

In addition to the ADA argument in James, I have included an argument that is more
applicable to all seriously ill Californians in medical need of cannabis. On December 17,
2009, President Obama signed into law the 2011 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-
117, 2009.) For ten years prior to that date, Congress used its art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17 plenary
authority over the federal District of Columbia to prohibit implementation of that Citys
voter passed Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Uses law. (D.C. Initiative 59, 1998.)
Thereafter, under that federal jurisdictions Home Rule Act, the D.C. City Council
unanimously approved D.C. Stat. [Proposed] 13-138. The Mayor signed that law in early

such medication nor would such medication be effective for them. A cursory review indicated that
no medication provided by the patient groups in Long Beach comes from illegal drug cartels and,
in fact, the police agency in Long Beach is really concerned with budget cuts and is seeking to
increase crime rates in an effort to maintain federal funding for narcotics programs. Given the
clear evidence shows crime increases when medical marijuana collectives are closed down, , it is
clear the intent of the police and public employees is to ensure job security in a manner that harms
seriously ill and disabled Californians.

December 23, 2011
Page Seven

J une, 2010 and, because Congress has plenary power over the District and to ensure
compliance with the mandate in art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17, the proposed law had to go to
Congress for approval. On or around J uly 29, 2010, the law was effectively approved by
Congress allowing the federal district to implement its Legalization of Marijuana for
Medical Uses law.

The House report on P.L. 111-117 shows Congress knew it was allowing the
District to implement the Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Uses law much like the
states. There was dissent reported and detailed in the House report. The press reported
Congresss action as allowing medical marijuana in the District of Columbia. Today,
there is a complete section of Washington D.C. law that legalizes medical marijuana
use, possession, transportation, cultivation, and distribution in that federal district.
Codified as Wa. D.C. Stat. 7-1671, et seq., I have included just a small part of that law.
The entire argument and detail is available on Pacer under 9
th
Cir. No. 10-55769.

Should Tony Gayle move to Washington D.C. to obtain marijuana and to be
protected like patients using Vicodin or Oxycontin under the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act? No, he should not. When Congress acted to allow the voters of
Washington D.C. to legalize medical marijuana in P.L. 111-117, it likewise granted that
same fundamental right to vote to legalize not just decriminalize marijuana to the
voters and their respective representatives in all of the states including California.

I believe the 9
th
Circuit will rule in favor of the disabled and seriously ill patients in
James v. Costa Mesa. However, I am a sole practitioner and you are the Attorney General
of California. There need to be regulations not bans. The public safety, health, and
welfare need to be balanced with the important needs and rights of the seriously ill,
disabled, and permanently injured patients who have been recommended medical cannabis
by a licensed doctor. The doctors need to be regulated they should not be handing out
recommendations via Skype or willy-nilly.

Most importantly, cities like Long Beach, its City Attorney, and the Los Angeles
District Attorney should not be thwarting state law in a manner that causes the irreparable
harm redressed by the appellate court in Pack.

I believe the California Legislature has the ability to act now. I do not believe,
considering Congresss action in Washington D.C., that California medical marijuana laws
are now preempted by the federal CSA. Although I must wait until the Ninth Circuit
decides that issue, perhaps the State of California itself can assert that issue or provide a
letter brief to the Ninth Circuit. Likewise, perhaps the Governor as well as members of the

December 23, 2011
Page Eight

Legislature can work with their federal counterparts to ensure cities can regulate (not ban)
collectives, doctors can be regulated in this area, and, most importantly, that patients have
access to medical marijuana when that medication works effectively.

In addition to these issues, I respectfully ask that you please submit a letter brief
supporting review of Pack, including all three (3) issues presented by the City, in the
California Supreme Court. As with many of my letters, let me conclude by noting I do not
use marijuana. I do not currently have a medical need for it. However, my daughter is a
patient. She is 19-years-old and was almost killed in an assault in Nevada. Medical
marijuana is effective for her and I do not believe that she should be treated differently than
a patient for whom opiates, amphetamines, or benzodiazepines are effective.

Very truly yours,

Matthew Pappas

MSP:tp

encl.

cc: Mr. Anthony Gayle, Mr. Ryan Pack, and Ms. Marla J ames
Mr. Darrell Steinberg and Mr. J ohn A. Perez
Mr. Robert Shannon, Ms. Rae Gabelich, and Ms. Suja Lowenthal
Mr. Charles Farano, Mr. David Welch, and Mr. Lee Durst
Mr. J ose Huizar
Mr. Edmund G. Brown, J r.
Mr. Andre Birotte, J r., Mr. Eric Holder, and Mr. Barrack Obama

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y

22641 LAKE FOREST DRIVE, #B5-107
LAKE FOREST, CA 92630-1726 (949) 382-1485

J une 25, 2012

VIA U.S. MAIL AND
FACSIMILE [(949) 260-0972]

Ms. Sonia Carvalho
Best, Best, and Krieger
5 Park Plaza, Suite 1500
Irvine, California 92614

Re: City of Santa Ana v. Burkaw, et al.
O.C.S.C. No. 30-2012-00567205

Dear Ms. Carvalho:

This office, along with the offices of David Welch and Sebastian Rucci, represent
patient and patient group defendants in the above referenced action. My assistant, Ms. Kat
Aldrich, spoke with J eff Dunn earlier this month regarding a stipulation to extend time to
respond in the above referenced matter.

As you know, the California Supreme Court has taken up a number of medical
cannabis cases. Mr. Welch and I are each counsel on one or several of those cases (Pack
and Evergreen). I know that Santa Ana has joined with eighteen (18) other California
cities as well as with police associations in filing an amicus curiae brief. Yesterday, I
received notice from the Supreme Court that permission to brief as amicus for Santa Ana,
the other cities, and police associations had been granted.

In the Pack case, the issues before the Court are:

1. Whether a municipal ordinance that affirmatively permits and regulates
medical marijuana collectives is preempted by federal law.
2. Whether a public entity has the legal authority to enact a total ban on
medical marijuana collectives and related activities.

Ms. Sonia Carvalho
J une 27, 2012
Page Two

3. Whether a public entity can authorize and regulate medical
marijuana collectives pursuant to local land use regulations and
zoning codes.

I have highlighted issues 2 and 3 because both of those issues are similar or that same as
the gravamen of the suit filed by Santa Ana here. As you likely know, the appellate court
in the Evergreen case deemed outright bans by cities to be against state law. Although that
case is on a grant and hold order, the issue of outright bans, zoning rights, as well as state
and federal pre-emption are the issues the Court will likely determine in Pack, City of
Riverside, and G3, cases now being briefed by the parties and various amici.

One of the issues raised by the appellees in the Pack case is the applicability of the
California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA) and section 51(f) of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
Interestingly, the case of Jankey v. Lee is also pending before the state Supreme Court.
Considering the holdings in Jankey and Munson v. Del Taco, the disabled and seriously ill
patients in Pack are urging the Court that state disability laws do, in fact, protect
Californians from improper city discrimination thus prohibiting outright bans of collectives
as well as discriminatory zoning regulations
1
.

This area of the law is currently in a state of flux. Accordingly, I am proposing
the following agreement an effort to: A) reduce litigation costs; B) provide a reasonable
and organized process during the pendency of the Supreme Court cases; and C) provide the
City with closure terms for the patient groups should the Courts decision require such
closure by any/all of the defendants:

1. The above referenced action pending and enforcement action of the ban or
current zoning restrictions by the City against the collectives will be
stayed pending a decision by the Supreme Court;
2. The specific defendant patient groups and patients will not expand or open
any additional facilities in the City of Santa Ana and shall operate in full
compliance with state law (see below and attachment included with this
letter for additional detail);

1 I am also counsel in James I, a federal case addressing ADA issues (James v. Costa Mesa, et al.). In
May, a three (3) judge panel of the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ruled against the patients in that
case in a 2-1 split decision. I have petitioned the Ninth Circuit for Rehearing En Banc and have started
preparing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

Ms. Sonia Carvalho
J une 27, 2012
Page Three

3. If the Supreme Court determines that cities may ban all collectives and,
following such decision, Santa Ana decides to continue/enact such a ban,
the defendant patient groups shall close and stop operating in Santa Ana
within twenty-one (21) days of notice by the City of such decision;
4. Should the Supreme Court determine that cities may not ban all
collectives but instead that cities may zone and regulate collectives, the
defendant patient groups shall, if not already, comply with city regulations
meeting any requirements promulgated by the Supreme Court with the
caveat that each may, if outside an approved zone, have the right to seek a
variance that will be fairly considered and heard by the City;
5. In any case, should the Supreme Court determine that patients and patient
groups have the right to seek damages for city bans and/or discriminatory
action, each of the patients and patient group defendants shall agree to
waive any and all rights, past or present, including those for damages,
against Santa Ana for any and all alleged discrimination, tort, inverse
condemnation, and/or constitutional claims. Such agreement would
include any and all claims through a thirty-day period following decision
by the Supreme Court and subsequent action (or inaction should none be
necessary) by the City;
6. Should there be any complaints by neighboring entities near the patient
group defendants made to the City during the stay period, the patient
groups will work cooperatively with city personnel to resolve the issues
(with the caveat that the complaint be valid and not be the result of an
individual or entity that is simply complaining because of bias or for
unwarranted reasons);
7. Each patient group shall deposit into escrow the sum of $2,500.00 that
shall be held until a decision by the Supreme Court is handed down at
which time, should the Court deem that cities may completely ban all
collectives, such funds shall be released to the City to cover: A) costs of
litigation; and B) any and all citations and fines previously issued. Should
the Court rule that bans are not permitted but that cities may zone and
regulate patient groups, the funds will remain in escrow for either sixty
(60) days or until the zoning and regulation considerations set forth above
have been evaluated and determined. After such zoning considerations,
including any required variance consideration, the patient group must
close, should such closure not take place within the required twenty-one
(21) day period, the $2,500.00 deposited by that specific patient group
shall be released to the City. In any case, the $2,500.00 shall be deemed
to cover any and all citations issued, fines levied, and/or any and all costs

Ms. Sonia Carvalho
J une 27, 2012
Page Four

of the city, including but not limited to court costs in this and any other
case, as to each patient group defendants and landlord Burkaw; and
8. The defendant patients and patient groups shall agree that, should the
Supreme Court decision result in the full proscription of collectives or
excluded zoning of any of the patient groups by the City, following
consideration and hearing re: variance, if applicable, irreparable harm and
probability of success on the merits are presumed for purposes of
injunctive relief should any of them that are required to close fail to
comply with the closure terms.
During the term of the agreement and pendency of the Supreme Court cases,
enforcement action by the City as to the patient group and patient defendants would focus
on ensuring compliance with state law and the agreement made between the patient groups
and the City. All enforcement and citation action would be stayed pending the Courts
decision. Likewise, the City would agree to forgo requesting involvement by the federal
government during the agreement period. The agreement would not prevent police or
other law enforcement personnel from ensuring compliance with state law. To that end, I
have included a paper written by me regarding the CUA, MMPA, and state Attorney
General guidelines (2008). I ask that the agreement include a definition of patient group
activities that meet the requirements of state law solely for purposes of the stay period.
Any activity outside the agreed upon terms would trigger a short correction period and
breach terms that would require immediate closure including the injunctive relief
provisions discussed in item number 8, above.

During this period, seriously ill and disabled patients who are members of the
defendant patient groups will continue to have access to medication. Indeed, there are
numbers of patients with cancer, in wheel chairs, and who have serious disabilities for
which medical cannabis is effective and necessary. Similarly, such an agreement gives to
the City the ability to close the collectives upon improper operation of the patient group,
violation of state law, or upon decision by the Court allowing full bans. It also provides the
City with the ability to enforce zoning regulations should the Court find cities may enact
such laws.

I realize that it has taken me a number of weeks to get this letter out to you. The
sheer volume of materials in the various cases has presented a time challenge for me.
However, the importance of reducing litigation and associated costs as well as providing a
fair, balanced, and effective mechanism for both the City and the patient groups during the
pendency of the Supreme Court cases is of paramount importance.

Ms. Sonia Carvalho
J une 27, 2012
Page Five

I ask that you please stipulate to a delay in response by the defendant patients and
patient groups in the aforementioned case until we have been able to reach agreement terms
or until next Wednesday should we be unable to reach an agreement. Although I will be
out of the office until J uly 14, I will be available to discuss these terms or any proposal you
may have via telephone.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Matthew Pappas

MSP:jm

encl.

CC: Mr. J eff Dunn
Mr. David Welch
Mr. Sebastian Rucci
Mr. Lee Durst

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y

LAKE FOREST, CA 92630-1726 (949) 382-1485

April 17, 2012

VIA U.S. MAIL AND FACSIMILE
(213) 978-8717

Ms. Rebecca J . Gardner
Deputy City Attorney
Los Angeles City Attorney
200 N. Main Street, Suite 966
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Re: Governmental Claim Act Notice
People v. A & S & YAS, LLC, et al.
L.A.S.C. No. BC471862

Dear Ms. Gardner:

Like Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Californias
Disabled Persons Act (CDPA), Civil Code 54 and 54(c), prohibits laws, policies,
procedures, and practices, including zoning regulations and actions, that impermissibly
impact disabled individuals. The patient members of Organic Care Givers are individuals
protected by the CDPA. Accordingly, the nuisance abatement case filed by the City against
Organic Care Givers violates the CDPA, the ADA, and provisions of the California
constitution.

Medical marijuana collectives, even those operating in commercial property
locations, are provided for by state law. In People v. Hochanadel (2010) 176 Cal.App.4th
997, the Ca. Court of Appeal held storefront dispensaries are anticipated and acceptable
when operating in compliance with Ca. H&S 11362.5 and 11362.7 as well as the 2008
California Attorney General Guidelines on the Safety and Non-Diversion of Marijuana
Grown for Medical Use. (See Id., e.g. at pp. 999-1000, [W]e also conclude that storefront
dispensaries that qualify as cooperatives or collectives under the CUA and MMPA, and
otherwise comply with those laws, may operate legally). Moreover, in Lake Forest v.
Evergreen (2012) 4
th
Civ. No. 043909, the appellate court held the trial courts decision to
grant a nuisance injunction based on [Lake Forests] purported per se ban on medical
marijuana dispensaries violates state medical marijuana law.

Ms. Rebecca Gardner
April 17, 2012
Page Two

On J anuary 18, 2012, the California Supreme Court granted review in four (4)
medical cannabis cases. One issue before the Court in three (3) of the cases is whether
cities can outright ban medical marijuana collectives. Also before the Court is the issue of
whether and how county or city medical marijuana regulations and/or bans may be
preempted by state law. Given that the 1996 voter-passed Compassionate Use Act provides
for all seriously ill Californians in medical need of marijuana with a physician
recommendation, it is likely zoning provisions that effectively ban all patient groups will
be deemed constitutionally invalid.

The patient members of Organic Care Givers include people with disabilities and
who suffer from serious illness. The Compassionate Use Act and Medical Marijuana
Program Act (MMPA) were enacted for these people. The MMPA directly references the
ADA (Ca. Health and Safety Code 11362.7).

It is likely state courts will consider federal ADA cases when reviewing applicability
of the CDPA in light of Californias more inclusive and broadly applied disability
legislation. In Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch (9th
Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 725, the operator and patients of a methadone clinic sued the City of
Antioch after it adopted an ordinance prohibiting methadone clinics from locating within
500 feet of any residential property. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the ordinance was
facially discriminatory and a per se violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 USC 12132,
because it subjected methadone clinics, but not other medical clinics, to a spacing
limitation. The Ninth Circuit remanded with instructions. Upon remand, the district court
enjoined the defendant from implementing the ordinance.

The City of Los Angeles has sent cease and desist letters to patient groups. It has
filed suit against the landlords of collectives. It has harassed the managing patient
members of Organic Care Givers and has likewise filed an action seeking to abate the
patient group as a nuisance per se citing, inter alia, its prohibition of all patient collectives
in the zone at issue.

Governmental Claim Act Notice

The cease and desist letters sent to the patient group, the harassment by City
officials and employees, and the action filed by the City against the patient group and its
landlord occurring in 2011 and 2012 violate: 1) art. 2, sec. 11, sub. (c) of the California
constitution; 2) art. 11, sec. 7 of the California constitution; 3) the California Disabled
Persons Act; 4) Title II of the ADA; 5) Ca. Health and Safety Code 11362.5 and
11362.7, et seq.; 6) provisions of art. 1 of the California constitution providing for due

Ms. Rebecca Gardner
April 17, 2012
Page Three

process; and 7) provisions of art. 1 of the California constitution prohibiting unlawful
property interference and taking. Moreover, the policies, procedures, and actions of the
City of Los Angeles constitute unlawful and tortious interference with business
relationships and contracts. For each of the constitutional violations as well as violations
of Civil Code 54, the patient claimants allege that Civil Code 52.1 provides a minimum
of $4,000.00 in civil damages.

The acts that led to the claims being made by Organic Care Givers and its patient
members include letters sent in 2011 and 2012 ordering the patient group to cease and
desist, letters sent to the landlord for the facility in the City of Los Angeles operated in
accordance with state law by the patients of Organic Care Givers, harassment by City
officials and/or employees of patients and managing patient members of Organic Care
Givers in 2011 and 2012, and the improper filing of the above referenced civil action
against the patient group, a managing patient of the group, and the landlord of the patient
group. Also, the conscripting of the landlord in respect to the unlawful detainer filed by it
against the collective and the costs associated in defending that case.

As noted, each and every action by the City that violates provisions of the CDPA
and/or constitutional provisions is remediable through Civil Code 52.1. The patient
claimants estimate the damages against the City caused by its violations and illegal actions
to be $500,000.00. This damage estimate includes the costs of closure, loss to patients,
damages to patients when medication access has been interfered with, and minimum
statutory damages for each violation under Civil Code 52.1.

The lawsuit filed by the City should be immediately dismissed with prejudice. If
the City is interested in considering balanced legislation that protects the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens and the needs of its seriously ill and disabled citizens, I would like to
meet with officials and/or employees to explore options. Effective regulation helps the
community and will meet the obligations the City has in regard to its seriously ill and
disabled citizens provided for by the voters in 1996.

If you would like to discuss this matter, please contact me at (213) 278-3500 -

Very truly yours,

Matthew S. Pappas

MSP:jm

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y

LAKE FOREST, CA 92630-1726 (949) 382-1485

March 23, 2012

VIA FACSIMILE AND E-MAIL

Ms. Kendra Carney
Deputy Long Beach City Attorney
333 W. Ocean Blvd., 11
th
Floor
Long Beach, CA 90802

Kendra:

The City is now refusing to issue me a business license. You have one (1) day to
issue the license. If you do not, I will file an action in federal court. I am tired of your
retaliatory, small-town behavior.

You may think that youre above the law, but you are not. Your attack on me, the
patients, and others is inappropriate and wrong. The purpose of the business license is
revenue read your code. You have received that revenue. Since December, we have
been working to get that license. You have stopped us at every turn. This is the last straw.
I received a note on my door yesterday that I dont get a business license because of
alleged violations of your zoning code i.e. not having a business license that is not
going to work, Kendra.

Im copying this letter to the F.B.I. I am through being harassed and attacked by
you people. You have attacked NatureCann because you know that patient group has been
supportive of our effort to fight for the rights of the patients. Your bad behavior is
obviously targeted at me as the briefing in Pack is coming due. Ive been patient with you
and the City I told you in my letter Thursday that my patience has ended. Issue the
business license.

Very truly yours,

Matthew Pappas
MSP:jm
Cc: Federal Bureau of Investigation

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y

LAKE FOREST, CA 92630-1726 (949) 382-1485

April 23, 2012

(760) 639-6129

Mr. Martin Grover
Assistant City Attorney
City of Vista, California
200 Civic Center Drive
Vista, CA 92084

Re: Governmental Claim Act Notice
City of Vista v. North County Botanicals, et al.
No. 37-2012-00052180-CU-MC-NC

Dear Mr. Grover:

This office represents the patient members of defendant North County Botanicals in
the above referenced matter.

Like Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Californias
Disabled Persons Act (CDPA), Civil Code 54 and 54(c), prohibits laws, policies,
procedures, and practices, including zoning regulations and actions, that impermissibly
impact disabled individuals. The patient members of North County Botanicals are
individuals protected by the CDPA. Accordingly, the zoning action filed by the City
against North County Botanicals violates the CDPA, the ADA, and provisions of the
California constitution.

Medical marijuana collectives, even those operating in commercial property
locations, are provided for by state law. In People v. Hochanadel (2010) 176 Cal.App.4th
997, the Ca. Court of Appeal held storefront dispensaries are anticipated and acceptable
when operating in compliance with Ca. H&S 11362.5 and 11362.7 as well as the 2008
California Attorney General Guidelines on the Safety and Non-Diversion of Marijuana
Grown for Medical Use. (See Id., e.g. at pp. 999-1000, [W]e also conclude that storefront
dispensaries that qualify as cooperatives or collectives under the CUA and MMPA, and
otherwise comply with those laws, may operate legally). Moreover, in Lake Forest v.
Evergreen (2012) 4
th
Civ. No. 043909, the appellate court held the trial courts

Mr. Martin Grover
April 23, 2012
Page Two

decision to grant a nuisance injunction based on [Lake Forests] purported per se ban on
medical marijuana dispensaries violates state medical marijuana law.

On J anuary 18, 2012, the California Supreme Court granted review in four (4)
medical cannabis cases. One issue before the Court in three (3) of the cases is whether
cities can outright ban medical marijuana collectives. Also before the Court is the issue of
whether and how county or city medical marijuana regulations and/or bans may be
preempted by state law. Given that the 1996 voter-passed Compassionate Use Act provides
for all seriously ill Californians in medical need of marijuana with a physician
recommendation, it is likely zoning provisions that effectively ban all patient groups will
be deemed constitutionally invalid.

The patient members of North County Botanicals include people with disabilities
and who suffer from serious illness. The Compassionate Use Act and Medical Marijuana
Program Act (MMPA) were enacted for these people. The MMPA directly references the
ADA (Ca. Health and Safety Code 11362.7).

It is likely state courts will consider federal ADA cases when reviewing applicability
of the CDPA in light of Californias more inclusive and broadly applied disability
legislation. In Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch (9th
Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 725, the operator and patients of a methadone clinic sued the City of
Antioch after it adopted an ordinance prohibiting methadone clinics from locating within
500 feet of any residential property. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the ordinance was
facially discriminatory and a per se violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 USC 12132,
because it subjected methadone clinics, but not other medical clinics, to a spacing
limitation. The Ninth Circuit remanded with instructions. Upon remand, the district court
enjoined the defendant from implementing the ordinance.

The City of Vista has sent cease and desist letters to patient groups. It has filed suit
against the landlords of collectives. It has harassed the managing patient members of
North County Botanical and has likewise filed an action seeking to abate the patient group
as a nuisance per se citing, inter alia, its prohibition of all patient collectives.

Governmental Claim Act Notice

The cease and desist letters sent to the patient group, the harassment by City
officials and employees, and the action filed by the City against the patient group and its
landlord occurring in 2011 and 2012 violate: 1) art. 2, sec. 11, sub. (c) of the California
constitution; 2) art. 11, sec. 7 of the California constitution; 3) the California Disabled
Persons Act; 4) Title II of the ADA; 5) Ca. Health and Safety Code 11362.5 and

Mr. Martin Grover
April 23, 2012
Page Three

11362.7, et seq.; 6) provisions of art. 1 of the California constitution providing for due
process; and 7) provisions of art. 1 of the California constitution prohibiting unlawful
property interference and taking. Moreover, the policies, procedures, and actions of the
City of Vista constitute unlawful and tortious interference with business relationships and
contracts. For each of the constitutional violations as well as violations of Civil Code 54,
the patient claimants allege that Civil Code 52.1 provides a minimum of $4,000.00 in
civil damages.

The acts that led to the claims being made by North County Botanicals and its
patient members include letters sent in 2011 and 2012 ordering the patient group to cease
and desist, letters sent to the landlord for the facility in the City of Vista operated in
accordance with state law by the patients of North County Botanicals, harassment by City
officials and/or employees of patients and managing patient members of North County
Botanicals in 2011 and 2012, and the improper filing of the above referenced civil action
against the patient group, a managing patient of the group, and the landlord of the patient
group. The North County Botanical patient group is now no longer able to utilize the
facility referenced in your lawsuit. It follows that it is also inappropriate and improper for
you to continue your action, which is against state law.

As noted, each and every action by the City that violates provisions of the CDPA
and/or constitutional provisions is remediable through Civil Code 52.1 and/or 42 U.S.C.
1983. The patient claimants estimate the damages caused by the Citys violations and
illegal actions to be $400,000.00. This damage estimate includes the costs of closure, loss
to patients, damages to patients when medication access has been interfered with, losses
associated with collective cultivation, and minimum statutory damages for each violation
under Civil Code 52.1.

Ca. Supreme Court Review of Medical Cannabis Cases

As you may know, this office represents the disabled patients in Pack v. Superior
Court (City of Long Beach, real party in interest) (2010) No. S197169, an action now
before the California Supreme Court. I have included a courtesy copy of the Appellees
Answer Brief on the Merits in that case for your review. I specifically draw your attention
to the sections in the brief related to the CDPA as well as state preemption under art. 11,
sec. 7 of the California constitution and Govt Code 37100. Of particular interest is the
area in the brief that discusses the legislative history of AB 1300 (2011), now codified at
Health and Safety Code 11362.83.

The lawsuit filed by the City should be immediately dismissed with prejudice. If
the City is interested in considering balanced legislation that protects the health, safety, and

Mr. Martin Grover
April 23, 2012
Page Four

welfare of its citizens and the needs of its seriously ill and disabled citizens, I would like to
meet with officials and/or employees to explore options. Effective regulation helps the
community and will meet the obligations the City has in regard to its seriously ill and
disabled citizens provided for by the voters in 1996.

The patient group would rather work with the City than engage in legal action. It
makes sense that Vista work with our team toward a positive and effective solution.

If you would like to discuss this matter, please contact me at (213) 278-3500 -

Very truly yours,

Matthew S. Pappas

MSP:jm

encl.
MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y

22762 ASPAN ST, #202-107
LAKE FOREST, CA 92630 (949) 382-1485

September 7, 2012
VIA E-MAIL AND U.S. MAIL
Mr. Theodore Zinger
Long Beach City Attorneys Office
th
Floor
Re: Victoria Pappas v. City of Long Beach, et al.; L.A.S.C. No. BC484645
Dear Ted:
As you know, in the above referenced case, the Court found that LBMC Chapter
5.89 conflicts with state law and is preempted. I am now in receipt of the Citys answer in
the above referenced matter. The answer is defective.
First, the Answer caption reads Defendants Answer to Plaintiffs Verified
Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate There is only one Plaintiff in BC484645
Victoria Pappas. Also, my daughters complaint does not include any Petition for
Peremptory Writ of Mandate. Additionally, there are errors throughout the pleading
references to sections that do not exist inapplicable affirmative defenses. It appears the
City has simply copied the answer it prepared for 301 Atlantic, et al. v. City of Long
Beach, et al.-- which is a mandamus proceeding and made cursory changes.
I am going to move the Court to strike the answer and I will demurrer to the answer.
Given the Court has already made a substantive decision that LBMC Chapter 5.89 is
preempted by state law, that ordinance is invalid. Accordingly, I will ask the Court to
sustain the demurrer to the answer without leave to amend.
Very truly yours,
Matthew Pappas
MSP:jm
encl. (answer; 8-17 order)
THIS IS NOT A MANDAMUS ACTION

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y

LAKE FOREST, CA 92630-1726 (949) 382-1485

March 24, 2012

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Ms. Kamala Harris
California Department of J ustice
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

Dear Ms. Harris:

I am not sure what to do at this point. I have never been exposed to so much blatant
corruption by a city. Since I filed the Pack v. Long Beach case, the City of Long Beach has
engaged in outright flagrant disregard of the law.

The City is retaliating against me because I prevailed in the Pack case. I am
attaching several recent letters to City officials. The letters include transcripts from the
Superior Court. Despite the Courts clear findings and admonitions, the City engaged in
another warrantless raid arresting patients and taking property.

When it passed LBMC 5.87, city councilwoman Tonia Reyes-Uranga called the law
pretty much a sham designed to close all patient groups. She was right. Except, certain
city officials thought it was O.K. to take bribes and engage in outright racketeering.

Ive attached a declaration from Larry Parks. Ive also spoken with people who
work for the City who told me that they were absolutely told by the City to deny permits,
fail patient groups on all inspections even if they passed it is all a scam as councilperson
Uranga noted on March 17, 2010.

Ive also attached photos of my daughter who is a patient. She was seriously
injured when attacked at an event in Las Vegas, Nevada. I am a software engineer. I am
back practicing law to ensure that my daughter has access to a medication that is effective
for her. The City knows that my daughter is a member of the NatureCann collective that it
raided on March 21 just a few days ago. That collective is just a few doors down the
street from my office in Long Beach for which Ive been trying to get a business license
since December, 2011. For others, it takes about 5 days to get a business license. For me,
the City has outright refused to issue a business license. I paid for the building permit,

Ms. Kamala Harris
March 24, 2012
Page Two

which ended up not being necessary even though they said it was at the time, back in
J anuary/February. We have jumped through hoops for the City. We had to physically go
down to the City to get inspectors out because they would not return our calls. After I had
dinner with a current city inspector, I learned that Erik Sund and Kendra Carney have told
the inspectors not to approve things even if people pass the Citys requirements.

Each time briefing is due on Pack, they engage in this type of behavior. Each time,
they target patients and patient groups that have challenged its invalid laws. Please read
the transcripts from the Superior Court attached to one of the letters. You may have a
positive relationship with the City Attorney thats fine hes probably a nice guy at
fundraisers or dinners. The fact is, he is corrupt and the people running the City are
corrupt. Theres an article on the corruption that was published around February by Nick
Schou of the Orange County Weekly. Please read that article.

Im angry at what the City is doing. It is using its police power to harm the judicial
process. It is taking in money and protecting people who are paying it and its officials.
Those people are corrupt and they are making a mockery of the system. Four (4) patients
were arrested on the 21
st
despite the clear mandate in the CUA regarding criminal penalties
for medical cannabis. It is outrageous. The booking officers were shocked that the City
would arrest people under its 5.89 municipal ordinance. The bail -- $150.00. It is
outrageous. The actions are designed to scare people. The City knows it cannot get an
order from the Courts to shut down the collectives. This is because, when it tried to back
in March, 2011, the trial court sustained the demurrers I filed on all causes of action and
then on two causes of actions without leave to amend. One of those causes of action was
the Citys claim for injunctive relief. What did they then do? They raided without
warrants. Even after J udge Madden wrote his order (see parts of the order attached to one
of the letters), they raided at least five more times.

These people are corrupt. I have never seen anything like it. And Ive never been
in a situation where peoples rights are being trampled with such disregard.

Very truly yours,

Matthew Pappas

MSP:jm
encl.

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y


February 12, 2012

VIA U.S. MAIL

Mr. Robert Shannon
Long Beach City Attorney
th
Floor

Re: Pack v. Long Beach

Dear Mr. Shannon:

As you know, I have been coordinating with a number of the collectives in Long
Beach. I have talked with reporters as well as Ms. Carney about the various cases and the
situation in Long Beach.

I have proposed to Ms. Carney that: 1) a list of existing collectives will be prepared;
2) existing collectives that are in full compliance with state law will continue to exist
without interference through decision by the Supreme Court; 3) the City can impose a
Claremont v. Kruse moratorium on startup of new collectives during this period; 4) the
existing collectives will cooperate with the City meeting with appointed officials on a
quarterly basis to discuss issues and report any collective that is not operating in
accordance with state law; and 5) this office will agree to assist up to and including
bringing private actions against any collective that is not participating and operating in
compliance with state law. Should any collective be a nuisance similar to another business
use that is operating inappropriately, the issue will be raised, the group will meet, and
action will be taken to resolve the issue or to close the collective.

This proposal should work for everyone. There will not be any discrimination in
the preparation of the list of existing collectives regardless of their opinions of this office,
the City, or any other person/entity.

Mr. Robert Shannon
February 12, 2012
Page Two

I cannot speak for all collectives, but I believe I speak for almost all of them and
that this proposal is acceptable to all of them. It resolves the issue and addresses the
potential liability, similar to that the City endured in McClure, related to discrimination
under the ADA, the CDPA, and similar laws.

As I have on many occasions previously, I ask that you sit down with me to discuss
this resolution. We can resolve this issue in a manner that balances the important needs of
the City with the needs of seriously ill and disabled Long Beach citizens. Perhaps the City
Council can urge you to meet with me so we may resolve this issue in a way that reduces
litigation costs and moves things forward for everyone.

Very truly yours,

Matthew Pappas
MSP:jm

MATTHEW S. PAPPAS
A T T O R N E Y


J anuary 31, 2012

(202) 514-0293

Mr. Tony West
Mr. Mark L. Gross
United States Department of J ustice
Ben Franklin Station
P.O. Box 14403
Washington D.C. 20044-4403

Re: J ames v. Costa Mesa (9
th
Cir. 2010) No. 10-55769

Dear Mr. West and Mr. Gross:

I am writing in regard to federal positioning in the area of medical marijuana
namely the collusion between local U.S. Attorneys and California cities. At the behest of
cities, the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California has been threatening patient
collectives.

Patients with cancer, AIDS, and other serious illnesses are now facing closure of the
collectives that provide medication for them. When it decided, in Pub.L. 111-117, to give
to the voters of Washington D.C. the right to vote on and implement that federal districts
Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment law, Congress turned over the issue of
medical marijuana to the government in that City. Congress has plenary power over the
District of Columbia under art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17 of the federal Constitution. Its Home Rule
Act notwithstanding, it cannot divert control of the federal city and so has included
provisions in that legislation ensuring the Home Rule Act survives Constitutional scrutiny.

I have attached a copy of DC ST 7-1671, et seq. for your review. That law does
not decriminalize medical marijuana. It legalizes medical marijuana. In House Report
111-202 on Pub.L. 111-117, Congress provided:

[T]he measure [H.R. 3170 amended (P.L. 111-117)] allows the District [of
Columbia] to conduct and implement a referendum [referring to 1998 D.C.

Mr. Tony West
Mr. Mark Gross
Page Two

voter Initiative 59] on use of marijuana for medical purposes, as has been
done in various states. H.Rpt. 111-202 (emphasis added.)

Accordingly, not only did Congress provide the citizens of Washington D.C. the right to
vote on and control medical marijuana, it has allowed the voters in the several states the
same right.

U.S. Attorney Briottes office asserts that there is no medical marijuana under
federal law. Relying solely on the over forty-year-old federal Controlled Substances Act,
Mr. Briotte asserts there is no such thing as medical cannabis. Given that the
implementing provisions for the District of Columbias Legalization of Marijuana for
Medical Treatment law have completed the final rulemaking phase and the law is now in
the implementation phase, there is no longer an issue of standing based on ripeness as there
was when Montgomery Sibley brought his case in May of last year.

Mr. Briottes position in respect to collectives in California that are operating in
strict compliance with California law would not have any weight in Washington D.C. in
respect to a dispensary operating in full compliance with DC ST 7-1671.06(a) or a
cultivation facility operating in full compliance with DC ST 7-1671.06(b).

You are in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of J ustice. I am certain each
of you are familiar with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq., the Americans with
Disabilities Act. In fact, I believe that you either worked on or participated as counsel in
United States v. City of Baltimore. Considering that the ADA is Congresss cornerstone
civil rights legislation for this era and considering the ADA was meant to address not only
disabilities themselves but the stereotypes related to the mitigation used by the disabled, it
makes sense that your office would support medical cannabis patients like Marla J ames.

Ms. J ames is wheelchair bound. She suffers from debilitating conditions. She is
going blind. She was originally prescribed opiate based medication. She had severe side-
effects related to that medication. She was then recommended medical cannabis by her
licensed doctor. She does not use medical cannabis to get high. She uses medical
cannabis to treat her severe disability. It is the medication that best mitigates the conditions
she suffers from.

If you read your departments arguments in United States v. Baltimore, you should
see the similarities between that case, Bay Area v. City of Antioch, and others. Our
Congress our democratic representatives in the federal government the Article 1 branch
has granted a fundamental voting right to the voters of Washington D.C. With thousands
of patients with cancer, AIDS, and other serious illnesses using medical cannabis, it makes

Mr. Tony West
Mr. Mark Gross
J anuary 31, 2012
Page Three

sense that you, as the civil rights division of the J ustice Department, would support these
patients.

People with cancer and other serious disabilities are focused on their respective
illness or disability. The ADA addresses their oft difficult plight that prevents them from
being heard and that led to that hallmark civil rights legislation. Congress has acted for the
seriously ill and disabled in Washington D.C. It approved the Legalization of Marijuana
for Medical Treatment law not just once, but twice. First in February, 2010 and then in
J uly, 2010. To be sure, simply read the Legislative History included in the Districts
law. Prior to these two (2) approvals, Congress granted the right to vote in this area, an
area traditionally reserved to the states, to the voters of Washington D.C. in Pub.L. 111-
117.

For patients like Tony Gayle, who is 25-years-old, has renal failure, has had open
heart surgery, and who is likely terminal, more dangerous drugs like Oxycontin and
Vicodin are contraindicated. Medical cannabis works for Mr. Gayle. For patients like now
deceased disabled plaintiff J ames Armantrout, a wheelchair bound former veteran, medical
marijuana allowed him to get out of bed to enjoy his family and to participate in life
activities. These patients cannot cultivate medical marijuana on their own. That is why
Congress approved the dispensary and cultivation center provisions of the federal Districts
Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment law.

When the city governments in California tell you that most medical marijuana
comes from illegal Mexican drug cartels, you should review whether that is true because it
is not. The drug that comes from Mexico is of such poor quality compared to that
cultivated under California regulations that no patient would use it when the medical
cannabis collectives are available. Moreover, if this were true, considering the
discriminatory and adverse position taken by the cities in respect to medical marijuana, the
cities would long ago have enforced state prohibitions when the state criminal law
exceptions provided under California law are not applicable.

In United States v. Baltimore, your division correctly argues that discrimination is
shown through comments about proliferation, alleged criminal activity, and the different
treatment of comparable uses. While that case is about residential alcohol treatment
centers and Bay Area v. City of Antioch is about methadone clinics, all of the cases are
about discrimination. Those are the same arguments made by the city governments. You
need not look beyond your own briefing in recent Title 2 cases to see that there is clear

Mr. Tony West
Mr. Mark Gross
J anuary 31, 2012
Page Four

discrimination. But in the medical cannabis collective cases, the discrimination is against
patients with cancer, AIDS, and other serious illnesses and disabilities.

In a 2010 article, the Denver Post reported that crime rates around medical
marijuana dispensaries were the same as that of traditional pharmacies. The Los Angeles
police chief made similar comments. The recent Rand Corporation report finding crime
increases when collectives are closed, although rescinded under political pressure from city
officials who are discriminating against patients, is likewise an appropriate indicator under
of not only that discrimination (see your own arguments in U.S. v. Baltimore), but also that
the likelihood of illegal drug trafficking will increase dramatically if the actions of the U.S.
Attorney in concert with the discriminatory cities continues.

I ask that you please think about the patients. I am not a patient. I do not use
medical cannabis. Last year, my 19-year-old daughter was assaulted and within minutes of
dying before undergoing emergency brain surgery. She is a patient. What is happening is
discriminatory. It is wrong. Congress has acted. Please support the patients.

I am filing a Rule 27-3 Emergency Motion in the 9
th
Circuit in James v. City of
Costa Mesa. The United States has appeared in James. The motion will be filed via the
Pacer/ECF system. I am also faxing a copy of the motion to you. The motion asks that the
threats and closures be stopped.

I have attached a partial copy of DC ST 7-1671.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Matthew S. Pappas

MSP:jm
encl.
cc: Mr. Andr Briotte Hon. Kamala Harris
Mr. Eric Holder Hon. Edmund G. Brown, J r.
Hon. President Barack Obama

Eliminating Discrimination

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Eliminating Discrimination

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From: Matthew Pappas <matt.pappas@mattpappaslaw.

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