PHILCOMSAT Vs.

Alcuaz Case Digest

PHILCOMSAT Vs. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 G.R. No.84818 December 18, 1989 Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional. Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.

Bayan Vs. Executive Secretary Ermita Case Digest

Bayan Vs. Executive Secretary Ermita 488 SCRA 226 G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006 Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek

to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies. Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional. Held: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by

some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.

Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment GR 152214 September 19, 2006 OFW Manny dela Rosa Razon died of ied of acute cardiac arrest while asleep at the dormitory of the Samsong Textile Processing Factory in South Korea. As a result thereof, the OWWA requested petitioner Equi-Asia, the agency responsible for Razons recruitment and deployment, to provide for Prepaid Ticket Advice (PTA) and assistance for the repatriation of Razons remains. Equi-Asia denied responsibility for providing such assistance arguing that Razon violated his employment contract by unlawfully escaping from his company assignment without prior authorization. In lieu of such assistance, it suggested that Razons relatives can avail of the benefits provided for by OWWA in cases involving undocumented/illegal Filipino workers abroad. OWWA, in response to petitioners denials, invoked Sections 52 to 55 of the Implementing Rules Governing RA 80421 provding that the repatriation of OFW, his/her remains and transport of his personal effects is the primary responsibility of the principal or agency and to immediately advance the cost of plane farewithout prior determination of the cause of worker's repatriation. In consequence thereof, Equi-Asia filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the legality and constitutionality of said provisions in the implementing rules on the ground that it expanded Section 15 of RA 8042. It contends thus - Sec. 152 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior notice and hearing before responsibility thereunder could be established against the agency that sets up the defense of sole fault in avoidance of said responsibility -.Besides, the sections in question unduly grant the powers to require advance payment of the plane fare, to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension in case of non-compliance therewith, within 48 hours and to recover said advance payment from the dead worker's estate upon the return of his remains to the country before the NLRC, when the law itself does not expressly provide for the grant of such powers.
1 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 2 The repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which, recruited or deployed the worker overseas.All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal.Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or the local agency.However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.

Issue: Whether or not Sections 52, 53, 54 and 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8042, issued by DFA and POEA, is illegal and/or violative of due process such that POEA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or in grave abuse of discretion in issuing said order to pay said expenses. Held: The petition of the petitioner should be dismissed on the following grounds: (1) [Procedural] For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the writ must be directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the Court prefatorily defined and distinguished between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers exercised by administrative agencies. In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, must be observed. Other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that

have to be established or ascertained. In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the Omnibus Rules. However, these rules were clearly promulgated by respondents Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment in the exercise of their quasi-legislative powers or the authority to promulgate rules and regulations. Because of this, petitioner was, thus, mistaken in availing himself of the remedy of an original action for certiorari as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper subjects thereof.

(2) [Delegation of Administrative functions; Rationale] It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the face of increasing complexity of modern life. Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the members of today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

(3) [Compliance with test of delegation] Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules is not invalid for contravening Section 15 of the law which states that a placement agency shall not be responsible for a worker's repatriation should the termination of the employer-employee relationship be due to the fault of the OFW. The statute merely states the general principle that in case the severance of the employment was because of the OFW's own undoing, it is only fair that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not preclude a placement agency from establishing the circumstances surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate proceeding. As such determination would most likely take some time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at the soonest possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that recruitment agency contests its liability for repatriation. Repatriation is in effect an unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that cannot be delayed by an investigation of why the worker was terminated from employment. To be left stranded in a foreign land without the financial means to return home and being at the mercy of unscrupulous individuals is a violation of the OFW's dignity and his human rights. These are the same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect. In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protesthad thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protestsagainst the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

NITED BF HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BF HOMES, INC.,respondents. DECISION
PARDO, J.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision[1] and resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals granting respondent BFHIs petition for prohibition, and ordering Atty. Roberto C. Abrajano, hearing officer of the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation, to refrain from hearing HIGC CASE NO. HOA-95-027 and to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. The antecedent facts are as follows: Petitioner United BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (UBFHAI) is the umbrella organization and sole representative of all homeowners in the BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision, a seven hundred sixty five (765) hectare subdivision located in the south of Manila. Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI) is the owner-developer of the said subdivision, which first opened in 1968.[3] In 1988, because of financial difficulties, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed respondent BFHI under receivership to undergo a ten-year (10) rehabilitation program, and appointed Atty. Florencio B. Orendain receiver. The program was composed of two stages: (1) payment of obligations to external creditors; and (2) payment of obligations to Banco Filipino.[4] When Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI in 1988, several things were not in order in the subdivision.[5] Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered into an agreement with the two major homeowners associations, the BF Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single, representative homeowners association and the setting up of an integrated security program that would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision. On December 20, 1988, this tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of agreement, and amended on March 1989.

Pursuant to these agreements, on May 18, 1989, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC),[6] and recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners association inside the subdivision. Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation of the subdivisions clubhouse at #37 Pilar Banzon Street,[7] and a strip of open space in Concha Cruz Garden Row,[8] on June 23, 1989 and May, 1993, respectively. On November 7, 1994, the first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of respondent BFHIs eleven (11) members of the board of directors was appointed.[9] On April 7, 1995, based on BFHIs title to the main roads, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the different homeowners association in the subdivision informing them that as a basic requirement for BFHIs rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would be responsible for the security of the subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing proliferation of squatters.[10] On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI.[11] In substance, petitioner UBFHAI alleged that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous receiver. They complained that even prior to said date, the new committee of receivers committed the following acts: (1) deferred petitioner UBFHAIs purchase of additional pumps; (2) terminated the collection agreement for the community assessment forged by the petitioner UBFHAI with the first receiver; (3) terminated the administration and maintenance of the Concha Cruz Garden Row; (4) sent a letter to petitioner UBFHAI stating that it recognized BFPHAI[12] only, and that the subdivisions clubhouse was to be administered by it only; and (5) took over the administration of security in the main avenues in the subdivision. On April 11, 1995, the HIGC issued ex parte a temporary restraining order. Particularly, respondent BFHI was enjoined from: taking over the Clubhouse located at 37 Pilar Banzon St., BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila, taking over security in all the entry and exit points and main avenues of BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision, impeding or preventing the execution and sale at auction of the properties of BF Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc., in HIGC HOA-90-138 and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract or agreement of petitioner with the former receiver/BFHI concerning funding or delivery of community services to the homeowners represented by the latter.[13] On April 24, 1995, without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAIs petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case.[14] On May 2, 1995, the HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAIs application for preliminary injunction, until such time that respondent BFHIs application for prohibition with the appellate court has been resolved. When the twenty-day (20) effectivity of the temporary restraining order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to maintain the status quo.[15]

Meanwhile, on November 27, 1995, the Court of Appeals decision[16] granting respondent BFHIs petition for prohibition, as follows:

promulgated

its

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED, prohibiting the public respondent Roberto C. Abrajano from proceeding with the hearing of HIGC CASE NO. HOA-95-027. Consequently, the public respondent is hereby ordered to DISMISS HIGC CASE NO. HOA-95-027 for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[17] On April 24, 1996, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[18] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner UBFHAI raises two issues: (1) whether or not the Rules of procedure promulgated by the HIGC, specifically Section 1(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure in the Settlement of Homeowners Disputes is valid; (2) whether or not the acts committed by the respondent constitute an attack on petitioners corporate existence.[19] Corollary to these, petitioner questions the appellate courts jurisdiction over the subject case. Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners associations was vested by law with the Securities and Exchange Commission. On May 3, 1979, pursuant to Executive Order 535,[20] this function was delegated to the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).[21] Section 2 of Executive Order 535 provides:

2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers; (a) To require submission of and register articles of incorporation of homeowners associations and issue certificates of incorporation/registration, upon compliance by the registering associations with the duly promulgated rules and regulations thereon; maintain a registry thereof; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to homeowners association, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P. D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;
By virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC not only assumed the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over homeowners associations, but also the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: (b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity.[22]

On December 21, 1989, the HIGC adopted its rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners disputes. Section 1(b), Rule II enumerated the types of disputes over which the HIGC has jurisdiction, and these include:

Section 1. Types of Disputes- The HIGC or any person, officer, body, board, or committee duly designated or created by it shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following:
xxx

(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations between and among members of the association, between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are members, and insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and the state/general public or other entity. [emphasis supplied]
Therefore, in relation to Section 5 (b), Presidential Decree 902-A, the HIGCs jurisdiction over homeowners disputes is limited to controversies that arise out of the following intracorporate relations: (1) between and among members of the association; (2) between any or all of them and the association of which they are members or associates; and (3) between such association and the state, insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity. (Emphasis supplied.) Though it would seem that Section 1(b), Rule II of the HIGCs revised rules of procedure is just a reproduction of Section 5 (b), Presidential Decree 902-A, the rules deviated from the provisions of the latter. If the provisions of the law would be followed to the letter, the third type of dispute over which the HIGC has jurisdiction should be limited only to a dispute between the state and the association, insofar as it concerns the associations franchise or corporate existence. However, under the HIGCs revised rules of procedure, the phrase general public or other entity[23] was added. It was on this third type of dispute, as provided in Section 1 (b), Rule II of the HIGCs revised rules of procedure that petitioner UBFHAI anchors its claim that the HIGC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In the comment filed by the HIGC with the appellate court, it maintained that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to the power and authority granted it in the revised rules of procedure. Respondent BFHI disputes this, contending that the rules of procedure relied upon by petitioner are not valid implementation of Executive Order No. 535, as amended, in relation to Presidential Decree 902-A. The question now is whether HIGC, in promulgating the above-mentioned rules of procedure, went beyond the authority delegated to it and unduly expanded the provisions of the delegating law. In relation to this, the question is whether or not the revised rules of procedure are valid. As early as 1970, in the case of Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators (PVA),[24] we ruled that the power to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. Its terms must be

followed for an administrative agency cannot amend an Act of Congress.[25] The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.[26] If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.[27] In the present case, the HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A. As provided in the law, insofar as the associations franchise or corporate existence is involved, it is only the State, not the general public or other entity that could question this. The appellate court correctly held that: The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC cannot legally do x x x.[28] The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.[29] Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate.[30] A statutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.[31] It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of the enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to be valid.[32] Thus, we hold that Rule II, Section 1(b) of HIGCs Revised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Homeowners Disputes is void, without ruling on the validity of the rest of the rules. Neither can the HIGC claim original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus under the two other types of disputes enumerated in Presidential Decree 902-A and in the revised rules. The dispute is not one involving the members of the homeowners association nor it is one between any and/or all of the members and the associations of which they are members. The parties are the homeowners association and the owner-developer, acting at the same time as the corporations committee of receivers. To reiterate, the HIGC exercises a very limited jurisdiction over homeowners disputes. The law confined this authority to controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the association; (2) between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are members; and (3) insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and the state. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed.[33] Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. Nothing

can change the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none by the legislature may change.[34] In light of the foregoing, we do not see the need to discuss the second issue. Whether or not the acts committed or threatened to be committed by the respondent against the petitioner would constitute an attack on the latters corporate existence would be immaterial. The HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear and resolve the dispute. Having dispensed with the question of jurisdiction, there is no need for the HIGC to proceed with the hearing of HIGC-HOA 95-027. It would just be an exercise in futility since it has no jurisdiction. Furthermore, it was apparent that the board of directors of respondent BFHI, acting as the committee of receivers, was only trying to find ways and means to rehabilitate the corporation so that it can pay off its creditors. The revocation of the security agreements and the removal of administration and maintenance of certain property that are still under the name of respondent BFHI, were acts done in pursuance of the rehabilitation program. All the security agreements and undertakings were contractual in nature, which respondent BFHI, acting as a committee of receivers and being the successor of the former receiver, could very well alter or modify. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, for lack of merit. The decision and resolution appealed from in CA-G. R. SP. NO. 37072 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.