06 Beyond Naturalism

s.6.1 Xenophanes of Colophon p.
6-1
Ren Mario Micallef, 14-01-2004 8:22 PM
6. BL\OND NA1URALISM
6.1 Xenophanes of Colophon
6.1.1 INTRODUCTION
Sap. We have little to say about this Philosopher at this stage since he did not seem too in-
terested in the search for an arch of nature. He was no Naturalist. he was not much
interested in material things, but rather in God.
Whiz He was a religious guy, you mean
Sap. Not really. He asked himself what would be a correct representation of God? Homers
gods were no good for him. They resemble human beings too closely to
be taken seriously as gods. In a way, Xenophanes lies beyond
naturalism since he brings Philosophical questioning to bear on another
realm of being: the divine. O.K. Thats your introduction. Now lets go
to the biographical stuff Tank
Tank Xenophanes was born in Colophon (Ionia), around 570 BCE.
When he was 25, he left his city and spent the rest of his life
travelling, going from one polis to another, without ever
settling anywhere. He used to compose poems, often
pungent and satirical, targeting popular beliefs, and went
around declaiming them in public. He also wrote poems
narrating the history of some polis he was visiting. He
seems to have known the theories of the Milesians; some
say he was a disciple of Anaximander, but we cannot give
this too much weight since, as Master Sapiens said, he was
not much of a Naturalist. At the very most we can say that he
could have visited Ionia (which is relatively close to Colophon),
and got in contact with the Naturalists there. A long-standing
tradition in History of Philosophy presents him as the master of
Parmenides and founder of the school of Elea. Actually, there is
little to link his doctrine to that of the Eleatics, and he was too
much of a nomad to have founded a Philosophical School hence
most modern scholars doubt there is any real substance in that
tradition.
Sap. Fine. Now we are going to change our way of proceeding
somewhat, since from now on, the original material becomes more
copious, and we can actually start working with the texts. I am going
to hand over to you a selection of fragments from this author
arranged according to major themes we can trace in his works.
We will read the fragments in each section and then discuss the
authors philosophy, one theme at a time. Mens: maybe you could
tell us what are the three big themes in Xenophanes
Mens 1. Critique of Traditional Religion (accused of anthropomorphism)
2. Cosmological ideas
3. Proposal of a New Conception of the Divine (God Totality of Being)
s.6.1 Xenophanes of Colophon p.6-2
6.1.2 FRAGMENTS (DK NUMBERING)
6..z.. Critiquc o rooitionol Pcligion (occusco o onthropomorphism)
(10) Since all at first have learnt according to Homer....
(11) Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace
among mortals, stealings and adulteries and deceivings of one another. R. P. 99.
(12) Since they have uttered many lawless deeds of the gods, stealings and adulteries and de-
ceivings of one another. R. P. ib.
(14) But mortals deem that the gods are begotten as they are, and have clothes like theirs, and
voice and form. R. P. 100.
(15) Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands, and pro-
duce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like
oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds. R. P. ib.
(16) The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue
eyes and red hair. R. P. 100 b.
(18) The gods have not revealed all things to men from the beginning, but by seeking they find in
time what is better. R. P. 104 b.
(2) What if a man win victory in swiftness of foot, or in the pentathlon, at Olympia, where is the
precinct of Zeus by Pisa's springs, or in wrestling, -- what if by cruel boxing or that fearful sport
men call pankration he become more glorious in the citizens' eyes, and win a place of honour in
the sight of all at the games, his food at the public cost from the State, and a gift to be an heir-
loom for him, -- what if he conquer in the chariot-race, -- he will not deserve all this for his portion
so much as I do. Far better is our art than the strength of men and of horses! These are but
thoughtless judgements, nor is it fitting to set strength before wisdom. Even if there arise a mighty
boxer among a people, or one great in the pentathlon or at wrestling, or one excelling in swift-
ness of foot -- and that stands in honor before all tasks of men at the games -- the city would be
none the better governed for that. It is but little joy a city gets of it if a man conquer at the games
by Pisa's banks; it is not this that makes fat the store-houses of a city.
6..z.z. Cosmologicol Iocos
(27) All things come from the earth, and in earth all things end. R. P. 103 a.
(28) This limit of the earth above is seen at our feet in contact with the air; below it reaches down
without a limit. R. P. 103.
(29) All things are earth and water that come into being and grow. R. P. 103.
(33) For we all are born of earth and water. R. P. ib.
6..z.. ]roposol o o Dcv Conccption o thc Divinc (Ooo otolity o bcing)
(23) One god, the greatest among gods and men, neither in form like unto mortals nor in
thought.... R. P. 100.
(24) He sees all over, thinks all over, and hears all over. R. P. 102.
(25) But without toil he swayeth all things by the thought of his mind. R. P. 108 b.
(26) And he abideth ever in the selfsame place, moving not at all; nor doth it befit him to go about
now hither now thither. R. P. 110 a.
6.1.3 DISCUSSION
6.... Critiquc o rooitionol Pcligion (occusco o onthropomorphism)
Sap. Good. Now what do you think about his verses on Homer and Hesiod and the Gods?
Whiz Sarcastic, I would say
Sap. They come from satires. Even the first one about learning according to Homer must
have been quite pungent he is probably suggesting that this sort of learning is no
learning at all. Learning the myths only fills your mind with silly fantasies. The gods of
Homer and Hesiod, and indeed, those of any culture, resemble that culture too closely to
be taken seriously they must have been invented! Thats the gist of what Xenophanes
is saying. What problem do you see with this sort of critique of traditional religion?
Mens Is it too radical?
Sap. Yes but why?
Lee It would depict all known religions as false since all religions have some degree of an-
thropomorphism.
Sap. True. And what do you find problematic with that? Why shouldnt we dump all religions?
Tank I think we should allow that if the divine were to exist, it could only reveal itself to hu-
mans using human means any experience or knowledge of the divine we may pos-
sess must be human experience/knowledge. If the divine were a rational being, than we
would have to refer to it using language and imagery from our experience of rational be-
ings, i.e., of other humans in our culture and society.
Sap. So: we know God in human form for we cannot know God otherwise, but God is not a
human being, and God is beyond human forms. So Greeks, Ethiopians, Thracians have
gods that resemble them, but behind those depictions of the divine, there may lie a di-
vine realm that does not have Greek, Ethiopian, Thracian, or indeed any other particular
feature. Yet that divine realm presents itself to different cultures in forms that such cul-
tures are acquainted to. Thats interesting. What that means is that we should be careful
about the forms through which the divine presents itself to us, as these are not an es-
sential part of the being of the divine. O.K. However there are also some comments
about Ethics that are important in the following fragments (Fr 11, 12). The Ethics of the
Homeric gods are not acceptable. The gods who are supposed to be models of virtue
are beings who perform so many bad things
Mens All right, the gods were bad from a modern or Christian ethical viewpoint, but their
lawless deeds do not cause so much problem from the Archaic Greek ethical viewpoint.
The hero is above the law, his aret does not primarily depend on his respect for others
and their property. Weve seen all this when we did Homer theres nothing so wrong
with the lawless deeds Xenophanes is ascribing them
Sap. for the Archaic culture, there is nothing so wrong. For Xenophanes and his audience,
probably, yes. What has changed, then, if the Homeric models of virtue start to be ac-
cused of vice?
Mens The ethics?
Sap. Yes but in what way?
Mens I dont know
Sap. youve just said it: law. Remember the history bit in the introduction when we spoke
about the introduction of constitutions and laws in the poleis? In the Archaic culture,
gods and heroes were above the law. Now, with constitutions in place, everyone must
abide by the law. Nobody is beyond the established law no hero-king who lords it over
all and whose wish is supreme. Abiding by the written law or breaking it becomes very
relevant to what is considered good or bad. Now, LAWS PUT RESPECT TOWARDS OTHER
CITIZENS AND THEIR PROPERTY IN THE FIRST PLACE before athletic virtues, leadership,
might, courage. And suddenly, the gods themselves seem corrupt because they are
lawless! In the new political and social culture that had surfaced in Greece, models of
virtue could not be lawless. Note that in a similar way, Fr. 2 hits out again against the
athletic and agonistic virtues that were valued by the Archaic culture: wisdom is much
better than these according to Xenophanes. Note also that people in the city squares
were ready to listen to his satires and provide him a living for such poetry, so, to some
extent, they must have found his words plausible, if not always easy to accept. This
means that the culture was changing, and wealthy people started to be interested in ac-
quiring wisdom, rather than only be trained for fighting. What bearing do such observa-
tions on change in culture and politics have on the value of accusations of anthropomor-
phism?
Whiz Xenophanes is criticizing a past culture of being anthropomorphic because his culture
has taken some distance from that culture
Sap. Yes, but what I mean is is Xenophanes critique itself anthropomorphic, when we take
anthropomorphism to a higher level?
Mens What do you mean?
Sap. O.K. Anthropomorphism literally means in human form an accusation of anthropo-
morphism is usually used to criticize something as merely a product of a particular cul-
ture (hence having no existence in itself, outside that culture). Homeric gods were the
product of the Archaic culture. They do not exist (says the critique) because you dont
find them (and they dont make sense) outside that culture. They are so tied up with that
culture that they must simply be products of that culture they dont REALLY exist. So
thats what the critique from anthropomorphism tells us. Now we can take the game to a
higher level. Xenophanes critique of the Archaic culture (a critique from anthropomor-
phism) is possible because he comes from a new culture. He can criticize the gods as
lawless (and consider lawlessness unacceptable in a characterization of the divine) be-
cause his culture gives so much importance to the rule of law. Were it not for the contin-
gent fact that he lived in Greece when the poleis system was developing together with
its intrinsic constitutional structure, he would probably not find the lawlessness of the
Homeric gods and heroes problematic. Hence his standpoint (the one from which he is
accusing the old religion and ethics) is situated within another particular culture; it is not
a standpoint independent of all cultures. His critique (that uses an accusation of anthro-
pomorphism) is SOMEWHAT DEPENDENT ON THE CULTURE HE ABIDES (its HIS CULTURE AND
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE that ultimately seeks a conception of the divine as law-abiding
and devoid of any racial connotations a God who doesnt steal, cheat, etc., and is not
particularly Greek, Ethiopian, etc). Hence in some way the critique itself is anthropo-
morphic, because, as any critique, it somewhat reflects the person and culture that
makes it. A critique from anthropomorphism tends to backfire if taken to the extreme.
Tank Maybe we can never get to a viewpoint on reality totally devoid of anthropomorphism.
However, if fragment 18 is right, human knowledge progresses, and the viewpoint we
have now must be better than the one we had in the past. When the Greeks discovered
the value of laws, and the value of observing them if you wanted to be a good and virtu-
ous person, Ethics may a great step forward
Sap. I agree that most Ethical systems after that did incorporate the value of law, and the
concept of equality before a common law, somewhat. So most later ethical systems
consider the Homeric concept of aret a false model of the good. But they remain PAR-
TICULAR ethical systems if they are any better it is because they have outlived Ho-
meric Ethics are widely accepted nowadays. They have not proved wrong the Homeric
idea of what is good and what is bad. Is that progress as we have, say, in Physics,
from Newton to Einstein? Sure, it could be that we do make progress in our knowledge
of most things. But its not necessarily so certainly, if many believe that there is pro-
gress in science, not so many believe that there is real progress in ethics, in politics, in
social structures, etc. Its hard to distinguish progress from simple change with no par-
ticular direction.
6...z. Cosmologicol Iocos
O.K. maybe Ive lost some of you guys. Lets leave this point for now and go to the next
theme: cosmological ideas (Frr. 27-29, 33). Well we can put this past us saying that
practically no modern scholar thinks that Xenophanes was another naturalist whose
arch was earth or perhaps earth and water. His cosmology was more of an attempt to
trash the mythical cosmologies, where the different mythical gods sustaining the earth
and overshadowing the heavens are removed from the picture. His cosmology has
been deemed eccentric, incoherent and incomprehensible since antiquity. Somehow, for
him, anything goes, as long as it falsifies Homer and Hesiod. By the way in this con-
text he speaks about fossils and mentions Malta. More interesting, however, are the
fragments where he seeks to provide his own image of the divine. What characteristics
does that have, Lee?
6.... ]roposol o o Dcv Conccption o thc Divinc (Ooo otolity o bcing)
Lee Xenophanes God is one, not anthropomorphic, does not move, and does everything
with the power of his/her mind.
Sap. Monotheism therefore? Do you think this is monotheism as we would know it, say, in
Christianity/Judaism/Islam?
Whiz I think there must be some degree of anthropomorphism is all of these religions. I cannot
see Xenophanes God being worshipped by any religion I know its more like an idea
regarding how God should (not) be, rather than anything else.
Sap. In fact, some interpreters would associate this God with the world as a whole, with the
totality of being. In that case, Xenophanes would be a pantheist (one who believes that
EVERYTHING IS GOD) which is not far from being an atheist (one who believes that
THERE IS NO GOD) because if you dont make a distinction between what is divine and
what is human and worldly, if you dont SEPARATE the sacred from the profane, then the
word sacred has no particular meaning. God becomes another term for Being in gen-
eral. Other interpreters avoid this association (so, according to these, Xenophanes be-
lieves that God is God, and the world is the world), but then, as you say, Whiz, we can
make very little out of this conception of God. What other characteristics can we attribute
to such a God? Does it make sense to worship such a God? How can we know his/her
will and accomplish it, if that is possible? O.K., well be meeting some of these Philoso-
phical Gods along the way. They are ideals that help us correct some ideas about God
coming from popular religion. But, for the believer, they can never really substitute the
knowledge of the divine coming from religious experience. And they will convince no real
Atheist O.K., any questions?
Mens In the beginning, you said that tradition links Xenophanes to the Eleatics how come?
Sap. Incidentally, if we were to accept the first interpretation above, we have an image of
God/Being that is somewhat similar to that of Parmenides. This may be the reason why
some ancient authors considered Xenophanes the master of Parmenides and founder of
the Eleatic school. It is a very weak link, though. Actually, Plato may have linked the
Eleatics to Xenophanes in sarcastic tone, since for him, Xenophanes was no real phi-
losopher just an old minstrel who went around singing his silly satires thats the guy
who started the Eleatics so you can imagine what sort of Philosophy comes from such
a founder. Then people may have took Plato seriously, and started to understand
Xenophanes comments about God with reference to Eleatic ideas at which point one
might even suspect that some Eleatic terminology got into the fragments and the testi-
monies. Hey, if you remember, we also started off saying that there was little to say
about this author maybe we were wrong! In any case, we did have a good discussion
s.Heraclitus of Ephesus p.6-6
starting from his fragments. So lets go on to Heracleitus (or Heraclitus) and start with
our Whos who summary Mens will you oblige?
6.2 Heraclitus of Ephesus
6.2.1 INTRODUCTION
Mens Born around 540 BCE in Ephesus (Ionia), died around 480 BCE. A hard and haughty
man, he did not sympathize with the democratic regime in his polis, and when asked to
write a new constitution for the city, he refused. Towards the end of his life, he left the
city and retired in the temple of Artemis, as the doxographer Diogenes Laertius (c. 200
CE) recounts in his 8
th
book of Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers: When
somebody asked Heraclitus to decree some rules, he showed no interest because the
government of the city was already bad. Instead, he went to the temple of Artemis and
played dice with children. Finally he became misanthrope, withdrew from the world, and
lived in the mountains feeding on grasses and plants. However, having fallen in this way
into dropsy he came down to town and asked the doctors in a riddle if they could make a
drought out of rainy weather. When they did not understand he buried himself in a cow-
stall, expecting that the dropsy would be evaporated by the heat of the manure; but even
so he failed to effect anything, and ended his life at the age of sixty.
Sap. Maybe you could also mention his nicknames
Mens He is known in Philosophy as the riddler and the obscure one. This is because he
composed sayings that are hard to decipher, that seem to contradict themselves. For
them to make sense, these aphorisms as they are called must be interpreted. Now
being quite snob, Heraclitus never really bothered to explain them to others as the
episode above illustrates hence one is never sure whether he/she is interpreting
Heraclitus correctly. This is why his writing appear so obscure you never quite know if
you are understanding him or not.
Sap. Whiz, you who have read something about his author, maybe you could tell us briefly
what most interpreters understand him as saying
Whiz So, the Milesians believed that things can be reduced to one principle, hence were mo-
nists. They believed that there is a plurality of things (of material bodies) in the universe,
and that each has an identity such that we can call it Socrates or my pen, or that tree.
Hence they believed in permanence. They also believed that things change, but to un-
derstand nature we need to look at things in their permanence, rather than at their
changes. Heraclitus, on the other hand, believes that change is supreme. Everything
changes, everything flows like a river in Greek panta rhei. Nothing is fixed and stable,
but the laws that govern change in the universe; matter itself is always changing and
there are no fixed things in the universe. His icon of the arch is fire fire is not a mate-
rial thing, it has no material permanence. In a fire, matter is continuously consumed, it
constantly changes. Yet, the fire itself is constant as long as it is fed oxygen and
flammable material in the right way and in the right measures FOLLOWING THE FIXED
LAWS OF COMBUSTION the flame will keep on burning.
Sap. Thats a good introduction, Whiz. Now let us read the themes
Lee 1. Human Ignorance both of the common people and of those deemed wise
2. The Eternal Logos
3. The Unity of the Opposites; Strife and Harmony
4. Fluxism and the Universal Becoming
5. Fire and Cosmology
6. Metempsychosis
6.2.2 FRAGMENTS (DK NUMBERING)
1

6.z.z.. umon Ignoroncc. both o thc common pcoplc ono o thosc occmco visc
(121) The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every adult man, and bequeath their
City-State to adolescents, since they have expelled Hermodrus, the most valuable man among
them, saying: 'Let us not have even one valuable man; but if we do, let him go elsewhere and live
among others.'
(49) One man to me is (worth) ten thousand, if he is the best.
(29) The best men choose one thing rather than all else: everlasting fame rather than things mor-
tal. The majority, like cattle, are satisfied by feeding well.
2
(40) Much learning does not teach one to have intelligence; for it would have taught Hesiod and
Pythagoras, and again, Xenophanes and Hecataeus.
(42) Homer deserves to be flung out of the contests and given a beating; and also Archilochus.
(105) Homer was an astrologer.
(57) Hesiod is the teacher of very many, he who did not understand day and night: for they are
one.
(104) What intelligence or understanding have they? They believe the people's bards, and use as
their teacher the populace, not knowing that 'the majority are bad, and the good are few'.
3

(81) (On Pythagoras). Original chief of wranglers.
(47) Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things.
(108) Of all those whose discourse I have heard none arrives at the realisation that that which is
wise is set apart from all things.
(28) The most wise-seeming man knows, (that is), preserves, only what seems [].
(56) Men are deceived over the recognition of visible things, in the same way as Homer, who was
the wisest of all the Hellenes; for he too was deceived by boys killing lice, who said: 'What we
saw and grasped, that we leave behind; but what we did not see and did not grasp, that we
bring.'
(87) A foolish man is apt to be in a flutter at every word (or, 'theory': Logos).
(17) For many men those who encounter such things do not understand them, and do not
grasp them after they have learnt; but to themselves they seem (to understand).
(34) Not understanding, although they have heard, they are like the deaf. The proverb bears wit-
ness to them: 'Present yet absent.'
(73) We must not act and speak like men asleep.
(89) To those who are awake, there is one ordered universe common (to all), whereas in sleep
each man turns away (from this world) to one of his own.
(78) Human nature has no power of understanding; but the divine nature has it.
6.z.z.z. hc Etcrnol Logos
(1) The Law (of the universe) is as here explained; but men are always incapable of understand-
ing it, both before they hear it, and when they have heard it for the first time. For though all things
come into being in accordance with this Law, men seem as if they had never met with it, when
they meet with words (theories) and actions (processes) such as I expound, separating each
thing according to its nature and explaining how it is made. As for the rest of mankind, they are
unaware of what they are doing after they wake, just as they forget what they did while asleep.

1
From: Freeman, K., 1948. Ancilla ot the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A complete translation of the Fragments in Diels,
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Harvard University Press. Cambridge (Massachusetts). USA.
2
Revised translation. Freeman has: The best men choose one thing rather than all else: everlasting fame among mor-
tal men. The majority are satisfied, like well-fed cattle.
3
Saying attributed to Bias of Prin. Diels, Vors., ch. 10, 3, s. I.
(2) Therefore one must follow (the universal Law, namely) that which is common (to all). But al-
though the Law is universal, the majority live as if they had understanding peculiar to themselves.
(32) That which alone is wise is one; it is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus.
(89) To those who are awake, there is one ordered universe common (to all), whereas in sleep
each man turns away (from this world) to one of his own.
(113) The thinking faculty is common to all.
(72) The Law (Logos): though men associate with it most closely, yet they are separated from it,
and those things which they encounter daily seem to them strange.
(50) When you have listened, not to me but to the Law (Logos), it is wise to agree that all things
are one.
(41) That which is wise is one: to understand the purpose which steers all things through all
things.
(114) If we speak with intelligence, we must base our strength on that which is common to all, as
the city on the Law (Nomos), and even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by one,
which is divine. For it governs as far as it will, and is sufficient for all, and more than enough.
6.z.z.. hc Unity o thc Oppositcs; stric ono ormony
(126) Cold things grow hot, hot things grow cold, the wet dries, the parched is moistened.
(10) These are joined: whole and not whole, connected-separate, consonant-dissonant.
(53) War is both king of all and father of all, and it has revealed some as gods, others as men;
some it has made slaves, others free.
(54) The hidden harmony is stronger (or, 'better') than the visible.
(60) The way up and down is one and the same.
(103) Beginning and end are general in the circumference of the circle.
(61) Sea water is the purest and most polluted: for fish, it is drinkable and life-giving; for men, not
drinkable and destructive.
(62) Immortals are mortal, mortals are immortal: (each) lives the death of the other, and dies
their life.
(67) God is day-night, winter-summer, war-peace, satiety-famine. But he changes like (fire) which
when it mingles with the smoke of incense, is named according to each man's pleasure.
(102) To God, all things are beautiful, good and just; but men have assumed some things to be
unjust, others just.
(111) Disease (is what) makes health pleasant and good, (likewise) hunger satisfaction, weari-
ness rest.
(88) And what is in us is the same thing: living and dead, awake and sleeping, as well as young
and old; for the latter (of each pair of opposites) having changed becomes the former, and this
again having changed becomes the latter.
(50) When you have listened, not to me but to the Law (Logos), it is wise to agree that all things
are one.
(51) They do not understand how that which differs with itself is in agreement: harmony consists
of opposing tension, like that of the bow and the lyre.
(8) That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the most beautiful
harmony.
(80) One should know that war is general (universal) and jurisdiction is strife, and everything
comes about by way of strife and necessity.
(125) The 'mixed drink' (Kyken: mixture of wine, grated cheese and barley-meal) also separates
if it is not stirred.
(*) Homer was wrong in saying: "Would that strife might perish from among gods and men!" He
did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard,
all things would pass away....
4

6.z.z.(. ]luxism ono thc Univcrsol bccoming
(124) The fairest universe is but a dust-heap piled up at random.
(6) The sun is new each day.
(12) Anhalation (vaporisation). Those who step into the same river have different waters flowing
ever upon them. (Souls also are vaporised from what is wet).
(49a) In the same river, we both step and do not step, we are and we are not.
6.z.z.,. ]irc ono Cosmology
(126) Cold things grow hot, hot things grow cold, the wet dries, the parched is moistened.
(30) This ordered universe (cosmos), which is the same for all, was not created by anyone of the
gods or of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living Fire, kindled in measure and
quenched in measure.
(31) The changes of fire: first, sea; and of sea, half is earth and half fiery water-spout (whirlwind).
. . Earth is liquefied into sea, and retains its measure according to the same Law as existed be-
fore it became earth.
(36) To souls, it is death to become water; to water, it is death to become earth. From earth
comes water, and from water, soul.
(64) The thunder-bolt (i.e. Fire) steers the universe.
(90) There is an exchange: all things for Fire and Fire for all things, like goods for gold and gold
for goods.
6.z.z.6. Actcmpsychosis
(24) Gods and men honour those slain in war.
(25) The greater the fate (death), the greater the reward.
(27) There await men after they are dead things which they do not expect or imagine.
(62) Immortals are mortal, mortals are immortal: (each) lives the death of the other, and dies their
life.
6.2.3 DISCUSSION
6.z... umon Ignoroncc. both o thc common pcoplc ono o thosc occmco visc
Sap. We will not go through all the fragments but just through the themes and say something
about each. Starting from that about human ignorance, what are your reactions to Hera-
clitus?
Whiz Hes quite a snob! He make a clear distinction between common people (hoi polloi) and
the betters (hoi aristoi) and for him (as for Xenophanes), the betters are the wise,
not the physically strong and mighty (as aristoi is understood by the Archaic culture).
Then, he puts all the wise people that came before him (Homer, Hesiod, Xenophanes,
Hecataeus, Archilocus, Pythagoras) in the category of bards they are fake sages.
Hence, only he (and maybe his friend, Hermodorus) are wise. The others are simply
wise-seeming men who recall (and hence know, Fr. 28) only what SEEMS (rather than
what IS).
Sap. I think youve got it, Whiz. But for one thing. I wouldnt picture him as saying everyone
but me is a fool, but rather I am one of the very few who really know what true knowl-
edge is; many others, that the populace deems wise, have been deceived. One the one
hand, Heraclitus sneers at the common people, who stop at appearances, whose

4
Fragment not found in the D-K text, but in the Bywater exemplary edition, R. P. 34 d.
knowledge is not based on what IS but on what SEEMS. Hence they only have opinion,
subjective belief, DOXA rather than truth or objective knowledge, ALETHEIA. On the
other hand, most of the sages that people look up to for wisdom are no better they
simply have gathered a big quantity of doxa, of subjective belief based on appearance,
and did not overcome the chasm (Fr. 108) that divides doxa from altheia (truth). Hence,
instead of altheia, they end up with polymthia: general knowledge, a heap of dubious
beliefs. The pun on the lice (Fr. 57) is quite good: guys like Homer pass on to us as
knowledge what in fact they did not see (understand) and grasp; if they ever really un-
derstood something in their lives they probably did not recognize it as the truth, and dis-
carded it as children discard lice hence it is not contained in their writings. Their writ-
ings contain only what they think they grasped but they didnt (like the childrens hair af-
ter they thought they cleaned it: it contains the lice that they think they grasped and re-
moved but they didnt). This lack of awareness of the truth that is so common among
people is then compared to sleep by Heraclitus when we are sleeping (and dream-
ing), it seems as though we are awake but we arent. Thats how Heraclitus sees the
world of doxa
Mens But is it possible to understand anything if the truth is so hard to reach? Fr. 78 is very
sceptical about human powers of understanding can we every understand anything
for Heraclitus.
Sap. O.K. Understanding, truth, are divine they belong to divine nature rather than to hu-
man nature. But I do not think that Heraclitus is saying that he is just like everyone else
and has never understood anything, nor that he is some sort of god. As we see from the
second theme, all people can understand the Logos (and hence have true knowl-
edge) all people can (at least theoretically) wake up from their doxa sleep and have
understanding. Such an awakening would lead us into the realm of the divine truth is
divine. But there is the seed of the divine in all humans. Thats how I understand Fr. 78.
6.z..z. hc Etcrnol Logos
Lee But what is the Logos?
Sap. Tank, maybe you could tell us something about this Greek word
Tank Logos has a great number of meanings in Greek. The main meaning is word, saying,
expression, proverb. Heraclitus aphorisms are indeed logoi. Legein, to say, to
speak, in Greek indicates sensible, serious discourse that binds the speaker, not simply
chatting. The speaker who uses logos is expected to express how the world truly is:
when he/she says the ball is round, he/she judges how the ball truly is and declares it
as being round. Hence, legein is also to judge the world, to probe and measure how
things are. But also, proper discourse is intimately linked to proper thinking. It is the
mind that formulates proper statements about the world, propositions, so logos is a
product of our mental faculties, that make judgements about the world in an orderly
(logical) way. Logos expresses a piece of ones mind, it manifests ones reasoning,
ones reason and ones rationality. Finally, our capacity of naming things and linking
them logically using rational discourse allows us to order our common experience of the
world. When we say that is a tree, we are fitting that thing over there appearing to our
senses in our common understanding of the world (since language is shared with oth-
ers) whoever knows what a tree is and how it behaves will be able to fit that thing over
there in his scheme of things. So logos is also an order that we discover in nature (or,
maybe, that we impose on nature) whenever we speak (and think) about the world
around us. If that is a tree, then it will behave as all trees do, otherwise it is not a tree.
Lee I am finding this hard to follow
Sap. O.K. Logos in Greek is all of these: word, saying, expression, measurement, propor-
tion, judgement, reason, rationality, law, and also study or inquiry (as in Bio-logy from
bios-logos: an inquiry about life). Now what about law? Think of this. When we look
around us, we see pens and desks and walls and people. Yet our eyes give us no more
than a 3-d colour map all things that we visually detect get flattened into a soup of
colour on the retina. But unless we are in some crazy alien environment we dont SEE
patches of colour. We see tables and chairs and trees and houses. They have depth not
only because we see from both eyes (stereoscopic vision) but especially because we in-
stantly reconstruct objects using our mind such that we see the OBJECTS. Hence we
deal with them in a way that presupposes our knowledge of that sort of OBJECT. We see
SOFT grass in the field, COLD water in a half-frozen lake, we see also the BACK SIDE of
the tree trunk that is hidden from sight most of our seeing is in fact a matter of mem-
ory and thought filling in a mental model of what lies around us. Sense data (from our
eyes, etc.) only SKETCHES THE CONTOURS of that model. We actually detect visually very
little of that tree on the horizon. But we see a tree. When we get nearer, it becomes a
coniferous tree, then a pine tree, then the pine tree near my uncles cottage. We dont
see it as a green dot or a green triangle. The tree I see is in my mind as much as over
there. It is as if my mind analyses the data from my senses, and then goes through a
sort of dictionary or encyclopaedia or object-database, selects tree from that list, and
places it in the model of what lies around me. When more data from the senses comes
it, it revises the model if tree is confirmed, it looks up the list under tree and fits pine
tree to the picture. Or it revises the model and puts in, say, conical mound of earth.
This is possible because we constantly classify our sense experience to reconstruct ob-
jects in our mind. We never visually detect all of the tree. We only detect parts of it on
our retina, and it is always fused with other things in the background. WE DONT VISUALLY
DETECT OBJECTS because our retina does not cut up the picture into trees and grass and
rivers, and it always detects them as ONE WHOLE CONTINUOUS THING. Are you with me?
Mens More or less, yes. Objects are like files in our mind where we have all the information
about, say, a pine tree. We also assume that pine trees exist in nature, but our senses
dont ever bring us in contact directly with a pine tree, but with different bits and manifes-
tations of the pine tree, its cones, its bark, its wood, its leaves, its branches and all this
at sunrise, sunset, mid-day, night, and in winter, spring, summer, autumn Our senses
give us like partial photos which we put together to get the whole picture of the pine
tree.
Sap. Fine. But we believe that there are pine trees in nature, as there are in our mind. The
pine tree manifests itself to us in so many ways, but we recognize it and label it pine
tree. Sometimes we may be in doubt whether a young coniferous tree is a pine tree or
not. So we may label it simply coniferous tree or tree. But there we wouldnt consider it
as a mixture of pine/elm/beech if were specifying its either a pine or its not. Objects
usually fall into rigid compartments in our mental filing cabinet. Each compartment has a
label, its name. Each object has a corresponding word. The words are more stable and
rigid than the objects they designate. A river is something that changes constantly, but
we call it a river just as much as we call a mountain a mountain. Well, mountains change
too. A river is never the same, and yet its always the same river. Pine trees change, and
no one pine tree is identical to another, but the mental folder pine tree is always the
same folder (even if the name may change or the contents may be corrected). This is
the Heraclitean logos bring us. The word (logos) pine tree exists in our language, in
our mind and there are pine trees in the world (e.g. Pinus halipensis is a botanical re-
ality). But we never directly encounter in our experience of the world the CLASS or KIND
pine tree, we only encounter INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS that WE JUDGE form part of this group.
The name exists, the mental object exists, and we assume the real object exists in na-
ture, even if our senses never give us an identical experience of a pine tree twice. The
world AS SEEN BY OUR SENSES IS ALWAYS CHANGING: rivers flow, people change... The
world AS RECONSTRUCTED BY OUR MIND AND OUR LANGUAGE (logos) is made of fixed ob-
jects just as a dictionary is made of fixed entries and a filing cabinet of stable files. Mind
and language give an order to our sense experience by their faculties of classification
and judgement, hence the logos is also law, ordering, systematisation.
Lee So that is why the second group of fragments speak about the universal law the Lo-
gos with capital L.
Sap. All people share the mental folder pine tree (at least within one given culture, probably,
for most such objects, in all cultures). We assume that pine trees really exist. So when
all humans learn to recognize pine trees, they will all have the same label in their mind.
The Logos is thus common and universal. Within the folder pine tree we also get the
pine trees possible configurations, its behaviour in strong winds, in winter, in summer
All that is logos, all that is universal, all that is LAW: Pine trees behave in that way, that is
their NATURE (physis!). Pine trees change, but their LOGOS, their nature, does not. Hera-
clitus is ultimately ask us to discover the truth about things, their logos. He wants us to
get those mental folders right. It is only there that we can have order and stability, not in
our sense data. Thats one interpretation of Heraclitus.
Another one is more radical. It says that there is no order and stability in the material
world; the only stability and order that exist are in our mind. There is no such thing as a
pine tree, except in our mind and in the dictionary. The material world is made of a mul-
tiplicity of objects that are always changing and melting one into the other. The material
world is like the a 3-d version of the psychological blot test we see things that are in
our mind, not in reality. Note, however, that for Heraclitus, the Logos is universal; it
somehow exists in the mind of God, in some ideal mind
5
. Its not an order present in the
material world (according to this interpretation), but it is neither an order residing only in
particular human minds. Later philosophers would say that the Logos has a non-material
existence of its own, independent of human minds. Otherwise it would not be universal,
common, and every mind would necessarily have its own peculiar understanding of the
universe and its ordering. Thats what hoi polloi believe that there is no universal Lo-
gos, only particular logoi. Hence they rarely, if ever, come to understand the universe,
since they stick to their PARTICULAR OPINIONS (doxai) about things.
Whiz How does Zeus come into the picture (Fr. 32)?
Sap. In Homer the order in the universe is that decreed by Zeus, so it is the Logos in the mind
of Zeus. Heraclitus would accept the idea of a God in whose mind the LAW WHICH DE-
TERMINES HOW EVERY THING IN THE UNIVERSE AND HOW THE UNIVERSE AS A WHOLE MUST
BEHAVE, I.E. THE LOGOS, is inscribed. Whether you call him Zeus or not is your problem;
Heraclitus would not be too eager to attribute to such a God the myths one usually at-
tributes to the Homeric Zeus. That is why he says it is willing and unwilling to be called
by the name Zeus. In any case, the point here is that there is one LOGOS, one law gov-
erning the universe, and it is divine (Fr. 114). Its oneness makes it common to all peo-
ple, even though most are too distracted to get to know it (i.e. to get the information in
their mental folders right, identical to what is contained in the mental folders of this
God). Most people are overwhelmed by the changing appearances, the apparent lack
of permanence around them and are not ready to seek the truth, to learn the true nature
of things. Heraclitus, on the other hand, not only wants to understand the Logos of par-
ticular things (pine trees, etc.) but, more importantly, he seeks to understand the Logos
of the whole of Nature, of the whole Cosmos. This would in some way be his arch, the
principle that explains how the whole of nature behaves. And what does the Logos of
the whole of nature say? What is the supreme universal law? It is that all things are
one.

5
God here is simply a guarantee of universality... not a particularly religious sort of divinity. The true Logos is in Gods
mind, and when we discover it, we partake in the divine. This is why true understanding is of a divine nature for Hera-
clitus.
6.z... hc Unity o thc Oppositcs; stric ono ormony
Whiz Does that mean that everything we see is one single block of matter?
Sap. Thats more what Parmenides would say. The oneness of Heraclitus is sometimes
called the unity of the opposites, and this brings us to the third theme. Remember the
traditional idea that the world is made of conflicting opposites (in Anaximander, for in-
stance)? Heraclitus says that in all things, in all objects, in all matter, the opposites are
simultaneously present, and in constant conflict or strife (PLEMOS). As the frame and
the string in a bow the act in different directions and the tension (strife, polemos) keeps
the bow together (Fr. 51), so is it in all things. The opposite tendencies present in each
object create a tension that keeps that object together, as a harmonious whole. Were
this tension to cease, the object (and on a lager scale, the whole universe) would fall
apart (Fr. *). Strife is thus harmony (Fr. 80), the opposites are one. The opposites not
only coexist in things, they cannot exist without one another. Disease is what makes
health pleasant and good: there wouldnt be anything particularly healthy if disease
were not to exist, nor would there be anything particularly satiating if one never experi-
enced hunger (Fr. 111). In the same seawater, live-giving and destructive properties co-
exist and sometimes one overcomes the other, and vice versa depending on who in-
gests that seawater (Fr. 61). The divine mind (i.e. whoever understands the Logos)
would understand this oneness of all opposite tendencies, and would see everything as
beautiful, good and just, since no thing can be what it is unless its opposite existed: if
anything is beautiful, it is because the existence of its opposite makes it so, so its oppo-
site contributes to its beauty making the whole beautiful (Fr. 102). The common peoples
mind welcomes a descent on the road and grumbles when there is an ascent to climb.
But the way up and down is one and the same (Fr. 60): a descent is pleasant because
there is a slope, and hence also an ascent. In all strife, then, there is hidden harmony
(Fr. 54) and this is better than apparent harmony since it is the one that truly keeps
things together. Heraclitus picture of the universe is that of something that is held to-
gether by tension, movement, strife (like the posset kyken in Fr. 125): different ten-
dencies and components in conflict keep it together. STRIFE MAKES OF ALL OPPOSITES
ONE HARMONIOUS WHOLE, all things are one. Strife (Polemos) is therefore the arch, the
Logos. But strife is also (one with) its opposite, harmony according to this very theory.
Change and conflict are the basis of nature, the arch, the Logos, the nature of the uni-
verse, the LAW governing the universe. Hence, change is also order and stability (Lo-
gos). This law which is change, this harmony which is strife, this oneness which is a plu-
rality of conflicting tendencies: this is the Logos, the arch; this is the truth (aletheia)
about nature. In the end, this is the mental structure we should use to understand the
reality around us, the model according to which we can understand, grasp and see
properly all things around us. This is the way the mind of God would order a universe
that is (or at least, appears) intrinsically chaotic. O.K. I asked Whiz to read something
about Heraclitus fluxism Whiz
6.z..(. ]luxism ono thc Univcrsol bccoming
Whiz Mainly, its the idea that everything changes. The opposite tendencies pull all things at
times to one side, at times to the other, hence things are always changing (though the
tension, the Logos, is always the same). The river thing in Frr. 12 and 49a is another
double-sided story, as most things in Heraclitus (I notice you often repeated fragments
under more than one heading). On one hand we are and are not in the same river be-
cause different waters flow all the time in the river, and hence THE RIVER CHANGES (it is
not the same river). On the other hand, Heraclitus holds a cosmological theory that
states that souls are vaporised by what is wet, so the presence of water dissolves my
soul. Hence when I step into the river I am destroyed (because my soul is vaporised)
and when I come out again, my soul is restored: by stepping into the river I AM CHANGED.
Hence I am and am not in the same river.
Sap. If I and the river and everything else is always changing (this idea is called Fluxism), is
what am I? What is a river?
Whiz There are moderate and extreme versions of Fluxism. If everything were to change al-
ways in all respects (as extreme fluxists like Cratylus would hold), there would be no
stability in the world. If we were to believe this we could not coherently use language, as
the things designated by our words would have no stable existence. They would be
mere appearances with no identity. Cratylus (the Heraclitean master of Plato) is said to
have lived his last days pointing at things, without ever speaking. Moderate fluxists, on
the other hand, would hold that things are always changing in some respect that al-
lows the possibility that they may be stable in some (other) respects. I think that Heracli-
tus was a moderate fluxist, because he provided stability to things via the Logos.
Sap. O.K. The thing is quite complex due to the fact that the Logos is a non-material thing,
and the Pre-Socrates were just starting to discover the existence of non-material entities
with Heraclitus. Heraclitus is saying (without maybe realizing this fully) that there is sta-
bility on a non-material level (the universal logos), which has real existence (in the mind
of Zeus or wherever). He could be AN EXTREME FLUXIST ON THE MATERIAL LEVEL (all ma-
terial things change always in all respects), but then admit that the Logos has a stability
of its own and that it gives an order to the universe by classifying the manifestations of
matter according to its word bank. But surely this would be a MODERATE FLUXISM if one
believes that not everything is material: if so, everything changes always in all its MATE-
RIAL respects, but not in its non-material respects. What Plato comes up with after his
encounters with Cratylus and Socrates is a non-material identity of things that he calls
the form or idea. The pine tree in my mental database, if identical to that universal
pine tree in the mind of God, is the form according to which all material pine trees are
modelled.
So, it is difficult to tell if, for Heraclitus, there is any real order in the (material) world
since we do not know if he believes there is anything else but the material world (the
Logos seems to exist in an immaterial world, the mind of God which provides it uni-
versality but it is not until Plato that an immaterial world is clearly postulated in Philoso-
phy). For Heraclitus, the universe may be like the blot in the blot test (see above: second
interpretation), having no intrinsic order with all order coming from the Logos (so its
all in the Mind. with a big M, though, for it is in no particular mind, but in ALL minds
that think properly)
6
. Plato says: from our observation of the material world, there seems
to be no order: everything changes. But there is an aspect of all things that never
changes: its form. This is not in the material world, but in the world of ideas, the Mind of
God. But if it is the same God that shaped the world according to the ideas present in
his/her mind, then the material world and the objects within it do have one aspect in
which they do not change: their form, their logos. The pine tree in the world is a pine tree
because it is modelled on the entry pine tree in Gods mind. If it is so, then we KNOW
(according to Plato) that there is an order in the material world by virtue of its being
modelled on the LOGOS (not because our senses tell us that the world is ordered: they
dont!). Plato has taken the whole thing a full circle from material world appears in flux
dont know if it has any order the only order I can see is that in my mind, the Logos to

6
Heraclitus and Cratylus would be moderate fluxists if they believed in a stable non-material world of ideas (or logoi),
like Plato. Probably, however, this was still beyond them. If so, they believed only in a material world (i.e. that all that
existed was material) and hence were extreme fluxists (all is material, and all material things change continuously in all
respects: thus no stability is possiblewhich explains why Cratylus stopped using language). This however would re-
veal an incoherence in their position: if the Logos is part of the material world, it is not immune from flux, and it cannot
be really universal.
s.The Pythagoreans p.6-15
O.K., if my minds Logos is universal, the individual logoi, or forms, are those present in
Gods mind, but the material world must have been created according to Gods mind, so
I know that it has an order. There are such things as pine trees in the world, not be-
cause I visually detect pine trees (I visually detect no more than ever-changing colour
maps, and when I analyse these maps, I simply get partial images of things ever new),
but because I mentally construct pine trees and those mental constructions are the
same that must have been used when the world around me was shaped. Plato comes to
claim that the mental objects are more real than the material objects in the world, they
have a higher and more stable existence.
O.K. Ill leave you with this for now Ill just add that extreme fluxism denies the possi-
bility of IDENTITY: of anything being THE SAME (identical to itself) today and tomorrow, in
summer and in winter. Nothing is ever the same, so no object exists! Nothing has iden-
tity over time. We have to save identity from being shipwrecked by such theories as ex-
treme fluxism, otherwise words would lose their meaning and language would become
senseless. And when the identity of human beings is involved (personal identity), deny-
ing identity means denying moral responsibility for ones actions, among other things:
Im not the same guy who killed that person because since then Ive changedtheres
no such thing as I. Problems with the identity of objects (e.g. the story of the Ship of
Theseus) and with personal identity (e.g. the moral consequences of Startrek-type tele-
transportation) make interesting reading. Mens, maybe you could finish off the last two
themes with some brief comments.
6.z..,. ]irc ono Cosmology; Actcmpsychosis
Mens Heraclitus believes the universe worked according to a cycle of quenching and rekin-
dling of fire. The sun is reconstituted anew every day according to a daily cycle of
evaporations and condensations from and to the world (hence Fr. 6). There is a sort of
continuum here: Fire Water Earth (& Air?). In any case, what is most relevant is
the importance given to fire. In some textbook you find that fire is the arch for Heracli-
tus. This is only partially true. Fire appears as the protagonist element in these natural-
istic fragments, but the bulk of the fragments is not naturalistic: the arch, as we said
above, is the Logos, and the Logos of the universe is strife, polemos (that is one with
harmony). Fire is a good icon of the Logos and of polemos: its material components are
always changing, but flame lives on, it is stable. Combustion can be seen as a conflict
between flammable materials and air (as long as both are present, there is the tension
that keeps the fire going), furthermore it follows a law, a Logos: the materials combine in
certain measures or proportions (a modern chemist would invoke the chemical equation
that governs the combustion process this is its stable logos that constitutes the fire).
So in many ways, fire is both Logos and polemos.
The last section deals with the Greek theory of reincarnation (or better, transmigration)
of souls (metempsychosis), which links his sayings on people with his fluxism and his
theory of the unity of opposites.
6.3 The Pythagoreans
6.3.1 PYTHAGORAS AND THE EARLY PYTHAGOREANS
Lee We mentioned Pythagoras, before, among the so-called sages. Who was he?
Tank The Pythagoreans were a sect, widespread in Greece, who knew a certain Pythagoras
of Samos as their founder. (Samos is an island off the coast of Asia Minor). Pythagoras
is said to have travelled widely, and so did his doctrine: Pythagoreanism flourished in
Southern Italy and Asia Minor, its popularity varied. Even after the sect died out (after
some 200 years of existence), its doctrines came in fashion now and again at later
times, as neo-Pythagorean schools developed. A great philological problem resulting
from this is that, since many of the Pythagoreans attributed their discoveries to Pythago-
ras (and some neo-Pythagoreans to the original sect), it is difficult to separate earlier
from later doctrines. Furthermore, it was a secret sect; for many years their doctrines
were unknown to people at large; it is only later that the secrecy rules were relaxed, and
members of the sect were allowed to disseminate their Pythagorean beliefs. By the time
this happened, more than 100 years had passed since the earliest Pythagorean com-
munities had been founded and the earliest Pythagorean authors themselves were con-
fused as to what ideas came from who, where and when. It is possible that some phi-
losophers such as Parmenides, Heraclitus and Melissus were Pythagoreans for some
time, then left the sect and developed a philosophy of their own.
Pythagoras was known for his wisdom and left nothing in writing. He was born around
572 BCE. The order he founded (probably the first communities were started in Italy)
was originally of a religious nature; eventually, it took the shape of a sort of freema-
sonary and members helped one another to secure the high places in society. The in-
volvement in politics eventually brought about periods of persecution as people reacted
to their infiltration into all spheres of political life.
Mens What do we know about early Pythagoreanism?
Tank The early sect held doctrines of a religious nature, and ones of a more scientific nature.
They believed in transmigration of souls (metempsychosis), practiced abstinence from
certain foods, observed certain taboos called akousmata. They considered the body
(sma) as the tomb (sma) of the soul; to escape from the cycle of transmigration, and
hence liberate the soul from the body, one had to practice abstinence and observe the
akousmata. However, Pythagoreans also believed that the best way to live life, and
hence to liberate the soul from the body, was that of practicing theoretical activity (sci-
ence, mathematics, philosophy). Hence, many Pythagoreans devoted their energies to
mathematical and scientific research, making some major breakthroughs in geometry.
Early Pythagoreans probably used arrangements of pebbles to represent numbers,
eventually, they came to use dotted representation of numbers of the sort we see on
dice and dominoes. The zero had not yet been discovered, hence a convenient arith-
metical system such as that using Arabic numerals was still far away. Even so, they
counted to ten and then over again (thus, they used a decimal system). The number
ten was therefore a special number, called the decad, and represented using a triangle
with four rows of dots (tetraktys) of 1, 2, 3 and 4 dots respectively:

The tetraktys was considered sacred, and they swore by it. As regards geometry, they
discovered that a triangle with sides in the proportions 3:4:5 must be a right-angled tri-
angle, and that the square on the hypotenuse (h
2
) of a right-angled triangle must be
equal to the sum of the squares on the sides. If the hypotenuse is the diagonal of a
square, h
2
would thus be equal to twice the area of the square (2s
2
). However, this
geometrical discovery lead to an arithmetical scandal, since simple arithmetic doesnt
provide solutions to problems based on this knowledge. If h is a whole number, s must
be an irrational number (since no square number can be divided into two equal square
numbers), hence the problem remained insoluble because their arithmetic was not
geared up to the task. This was kept secret since THEY HOPED TO EXPLAIN EVERYTHING
WITH THEIR SIMPLE ARITHMETIC.
Everything means everything. The Pythagoreans hoped to explain how the whole uni-
verse works using numbers. They studied proportions in music and discovered that mu-
sic can be reduced to numerical relationships (e.g. octaves, fifths, fourths). If music can
be reduced to an arithmetical system why not the whole universe?
In their cosmology, they mentioned the limit and the boundless (peras and apeiron), and
Aristotle tells us they consider the boundless as a sort of breath that was inhaled by the
world (made of limited things) so as to separate the things within it: hence they believed
in the existence of free space as a sort of infinite principle that separates out the individ-
ual (limited) things in the universe.
6.3.2 LATER PYTHAGOREANISM: FRAGMENTS AND TESTIMONIES
Sap. After that illuminating introduction to Early Pythagoreanism, let us go on to later theories.
Maybe we could start by reading Aristotles testimony, and then give the fragments from
Philolaus.
6..z.. Aristotlc's cstimony
(Testimony from Aristotle: Metaphysics A (tr. W. D. Ross))
Contemporaneously with these philosophers and before them, the so-called Pythagoreans, who
were the first to take up mathematics, not only advanced this study, but also having been brought
up in it they thought its principles were the principles of all things. Since of these principles num-
bers are by nature the first, and in numbers they seemed to see many resemblances to the things
that exist and come into being-more than in fire and earth and water (such and such a modifica-
tion of numbers being justice, another being soul and reason, another being opportunity-and
similarly almost all other things being numerically expressible); since, again, they saw that the
modifications and the ratios of the musical scales were expressible in numbers;-since, then, all
other things seemed in their whole nature to be modelled on numbers, and numbers seemed to
be the first things in the whole of nature, they supposed the elements of numbers to be the ele-
ments of all things, and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number. And all the prop-
erties of numbers and scales which they could show to agree with the attributes and parts and
the whole arrangement of the heavens, they collected and fitted into their scheme; and if there
was a gap anywhere, they readily made additions so as to make their whole theory coherent. E.g.
as the number 10 is thought to be perfect and to comprise the whole nature of numbers, they say
that the bodies which move through the heavens are ten, but as the visible bodies are only nine,
to meet this they invent a tenth the 'counter-earth'. We have discussed these matters more ex-
actly elsewhere.
But the object of our review is that we may learn from these philosophers also what they suppose
to be the principles and how these fall under the causes we have named. Evidently, then, these
thinkers also consider that number is the principle both as matter for things and as forming both
their modifications and their permanent states, and hold that the elements of number are the
even and the odd, and that of these the latter is limited, and the former unlimited; and that the
One proceeds from both of these (for it is both even and odd), and number from the One; and
that the whole heaven, as has been said, is numbers.
Other members of this same school say there are ten principles, which they arrange in two col-
umns of cognates-
limit and unlimited,
odd and even,
one and plurality,
right and left,
male and female,
resting and moving,
straight and curved,
light and darkness,
good and bad,
square and oblong.

In this way Alcmaeon of Croton seems also to have conceived the matter, and either he got this
view from them or they got it from him; for he expressed himself similarly to them. For he says
most human affairs go in pairs, meaning not definite contrarieties such as the Pythagoreans
speak of, but any chance contrarieties, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter, good and bad,
great and small. He threw out indefinite suggestions about the other contrarieties, but the Py-
thagoreans declared both how many and which their contrarieties are.
From both these schools, then, we can learn this much, that the contraries are the principles of
things; and how many these principles are and which they are, we can learn from one of the two
schools. But how these principles can be brought together under the causes we have named has
not been clearly and articulately stated by them.
6..z.z. hc socollco `]rogmcnts o ]hilolous o orcntum'
(1) Nature in the universe was fitted together from the Non-Limited and the Limiting, both the uni-
verse as a whole and everything in it.
(2) All existing things must necessarily be either Limiting, or Non-Limited, or both Limiting and
Non-Limited. But they could not be merely Non-Limited (nor merely Limited). Since however it is
plain that they are neither wholly from the Limiting nor wholly from the Non-Limited, clearly then
the universe and its contents were fitted together from both the Limiting and the Non-Limited.
This is proved also by actual existing things; for those of them which are made of Limiting (ele-
ments) impose Limit, whereas those made of both Limiting and Non-Limited (elements) both do
and do not impose Limit, and those made of Non-Limited (elements) will appear Non-Limited.
(4) Actually, everything that can be known has a Number; for it is impossible to grasp anything
with the mind or to recognise it without this (Number).
(5) Actually, Number has two distinct forms, odd and even, and a third compounded of both, the
even-odd; each of these two forms has many aspects, which each separate object demonstrates
in itself.
(6) This is how it is with Nature and Harmony: the Being of things is eternal, and Nature itself re-
quires divine and not human intelligence; moreover, it would be impossible for any existing thing
to be even recognised by us if there did not exist the basic Being of the things from which the
universe was composed, (namely) both the Limiting and the Non-Limited.
But since these Elements exist as unlike and unrelated, it would clearly be impossible for a uni-
verse to be created with them unless a harmony was added, in which way this (harmony) did
come into being. Now the things which were like and related needed no harmony; but the things
which were unlike and unrelated and unequally arranged are necessarily fastened together by
such a harmony, through which they are destined to endure in the universe. . . .
The content of the Harmony (Octave) is the major fourth and the major fifth; the fifth is greater
than the fourth by a whole tone; for from the highest string (lowest note) to the middle is a fourth,
and from the middle to the lowest string (highest note) is a fifth. From the lowest to the third string
is a fourth, from the third to the highest string is a fifth. Between the middle and third strings is a
tone. The major fourth has the ratio 3:4, the fifth 2:3, and the octave 1:2. Thus the Harmony (Oc-
tave) consists of five whole tones and two semitones, the fifth consists of three tones and a semi-
tone, and the fourth consists of two tones and a semitone.
(11) One must study the activities and the essence of Number in accordance with the power ex-
isting in the Decad (Ten-ness); for it (the Decad) is great, complete, all-achieving, and the origin
of divine and human life and its Leader; it shares.... The power also of the Decad. Without this, all
things are unlimited, obscure and indiscernible.
For the nature of Number is the cause of recognition, able to give guidance and teaching to every
man in what is puzzling and unknown. For none of existing things would be clear to anyone, ei-
ther in themselves or in their relationship to one another, unless there existed Number and its es-
sence. But in fact Number, fitting all things into the soul through sense perception, makes them
recognisable and comparable with one another as is provided by the nature of the Gnomon
7
, in
that Number gives them body and divides the different relationships of things, whether they be
Non-Limited or Limiting, into their separate groups.
And you may see the nature of Number and its power at work not only in supernatural and divine
existences but also in all human activities and words everywhere, both throughout all technical
production and also in music.
The nature of Number and Harmony admits of no Falsehood; for this is unrelated to them. False-
hood and Envy belong to the nature of the Non-Limited and the Unintelligent and the Irrational.
Falsehood can in no way breathe on Number; for Falsehood is inimical and hostile to its nature,
whereas Truth is related to and in close natural union with the race of Number.
(14) The ancient theologians and seers also hear witness that because of certain punishments
the soul is yoked to the body and buried in it as in a tomb.
6.3.3 LATER PYTHAGOREANISM: DISCUSSION
Sap. In the first paragraph of Aristotles testimony, we have a great deal of information about
the sect some of which we mentioned already. If Pythagoreanism started off as a reli-
gious movement, it ended up searching for the arch of nature as the many scientific
movements of the time; hence Pythagoreans constructed their own cosmology using
numbers: numbers are clearly the principles of maths, and if mathematical relationship
can explain all things (as they explain all music), then numbers must be the arch of
everything. In the second paragraph, Aristotle gives us a neat scheme of their scientific
outlook in this way:
Even & Odd The One Number All things (the whole heaven).
The One is considered both even and odd, hence it unites within it the two elements of
number, the two opposite tendencies present in number (does the name Heraclitus
ring a bell here?). So: even and odd are the elements of the One, which is the arch of
nature. The One and the numbers derived from it, i.e. Number in general, gives rise to
all things, it is their principle in a formal and also in a material sense (since the
presocratics did not yet believe that there could be a non-material world, so the numbers
had also to be material in some strange way).
The complication comes in where Aristotle links the Even and Odd with Boundless
(Unlimited) and Limit, respectively. Is this his addition, or maybe a Platonic addition? We
cannot tell. Aristotle goes on to give what another group of Pythagoreans believe so
he seem to be telling us that not all Pythagoreans would accept his neat scheme. These
other Pythagoreans believe that all things are derived from a decad of paired opposites.
The first pair of opposites in the decad is Boundless-Limit. If these are linked to even
and odd as Aristotle thinks, there could be a sort of super-theory linking the numerical
scheme and the scheme with the decad of opposite pairs. We do not know if any Py-
thagorean made such a synthesis of the two schemes or if it is only Aristotle trying to put
together two disparate Pythagorean theories (coming from different Pythagorean
schools).
Lee Can we use the fragments from Philolaus to tell?
Sap. The fragments are problematic in that we do not know if they are from one source (Phi-
lolaus) or only attributed to Philolaus. Furthermore, Philolaus may have been a Py-
thagorean guy who collected information about the theories held in the different Py-
thagorean schools. Most of the fragments speak either of numbers or of bound-
less/limit we cannot really reconstruct Aristotles two schemes from the fragments, let
alone tell whether they were linked. Let us therefore leave it at that, and move on to
Parmenides, a philosopher that put into question the tendency to reduce things to two

77
A figure used in solving geometrical problems.
s.6.4 Parmenides of Elea p.6-20
principles/elements/tendencies: such as even/odd, boundless/limit or the unity of the
opposites in Heraclitus. Parmenides advocated a return to monism, as we find in the
Milesians, but this time a monism of a more radical sort.
6.4 Parmenides of Elea
6.4.1 INTRODUCTION
Mens So, Parmendes came from Elea (somewhere near Naples); he was born around 515-
510 BCE according to Platos testimony. Tradition has it that he was disciple of Xeno-
phanes but we already said that this is highly unlikely. More probably, he was a Py-
thagorean for some time then left the sect. He is said to have been a legislator in Elea
and to have visited Athens.
Sap. Something about the Poem?
Mens Parmendes wrote a poem which is referred to as his writing On Nature, Peri Physeos.
A good deal of it has been preserved. It is a literary work in three parts: Prologue, Sec-
tion 1 (The way of Aletheia) and Section 2 (The way of Doxa). He plays around with
the verb to be and with Being all over the place such that the poem is said to be the
first attempt at an ontology: a study of Being (on, ontos) indeed, many ontologies fol-
low in the history of Philosophy. He distinguishes knowledge based on WHAT IS from
knowledge based on WHAT SEEMS, as we did when explaining the Heraclitean logos:
knowledge coming from the mind (known to be true by virtue of its logical structure) IS,
knowledge coming from the senses SEEMS. Now, true inquiry (about whatsoever), for
Parmenides, is that proceeding from the mind; no proper inquiry can proceed from the
senses (since these sometimes deceive us and are hence not trustworthy) only opin-
ion (doxa) can come from these. Truth (aletheia) respects the universal ordering of na-
ture that can be perfectly rendered by a proper use of our mind; nature cannot but re-
spect that ordering if it is to have any order at all (recall Platos developments on Hera-
clitus). If our senses tell us otherwise they must be deceiving us.
Now true inquiry can theoretically be of two types: inquiry on how things are (on their
being); inquiry on how things are not (on their non-being). Parmenides tells us that this
second type of inquiry cannot be used in practice since we can have no knowledge of
non-being: it does not exist! So we cannot think about it, nor speak about it. There is no
logos concerning non-being. Here we note that Parmenides makes being, thought and
speech coincide: we SAY what we THINK, and we THINK the way things ARE. The order
present in nature must be the same order present in my thinking, and that must also be
the have logic present in my (correct) speaking. That is why his investigations on the
proper use of the verb to be end up becoming a description of how the universe is.
The Prologue depicts a scene where Parmenides (or the reader) passes from the hu-
man (mortal) realm of the DOXA to the divine realm of ALETHEIA, as the goddess Dik
opens the gates that separate the house of night (ignorance, false knowledge) from the
daylight. As in the case of the Heraclitean Logos, true knowledge here is divine. Dike
then makes two speeches to the stranger who has just come to visit her: she explains
firstly what truth is, and how to make true enquiries about things (Section 1), secondly,
she expounds the opinions of the mortals (Section 2). The existence of this second
section has been much debated: if such opinions are not trustworthy, and indeed false
(given the image of the world resulting from Section 1), why would Parmenides use up
so much of his poem to explain them to us? Is this a method by which he is teaching his
disciples the ideas of his adversaries? Is this a formal retraction of his earlier beliefs
about nature? Or does he admit that what we can know using the mind alone is very lim-
ited, hence we must make use of knowledge coming from the senses for managing our
daily lives keeping in mind its dubious nature? Its hard to tell, especially since the
second section is the most fragmented and incomplete.
6.4.2 THE POEM (RECONSTRUCTED FROM THE FRAGMENTS)
8

[PROLOGUE]
(1) The mares, which carry me as far as my heart desires, were escorting me. They brought and
placed me upon the well-spoken path of the Goddess, which carries everywhere unscathed the
mortal who knows. Thereon was I carried, for thereon the wise mares did carry me, straining to
pull the chariot, with maidens guiding the way. The axle, glowing in its naves, gave forth the shrill
sound of a musical pipe, urged on by two rounded wheels on either end, even whilst maidens,
Daughters of the Sun, were hastening to escort me, after leaving the House of Night for the light,
having pushed back the veils from their heads with their hands.
Ahead are the gates of the paths of Night and Day. A lintel and stone threshold surround them.
The aetherial gates themselves are filled with great doors, for which much-avenging Justice holds
the keys of retribution. Coaxing her with gentle words, the maidens did cunningly persuade her to
push back the bolted bar for them swiftly from the gates. These made of the doors a yawning gap
as they were opened wide, swinging in turn the bronze posts in their sockets, fastened with rivets
and pins. Straight through them at that point did the maidens drive the chariot and mares along
the broad way.
The Goddess received me kindly, took my right hand in Hers, uttered speech and thus addressed
me: "Youth, attended by immortal charioteers, who come to our House by these mares that carry
you, welcome. For it was no ill fortune that sent you forth to travel this road (lying far indeed from
the beaten path of humans), but Right and Justice. And it is right that you should learn all things,
both the persuasive, unshaken heart of Objective Truth, and the subjective beliefs of mortals, in
which there is no true trust. But you shall learn these too: how, for the mortals passing through
them, the things-that-seem must 'really exist', being, for them, all there is.
[THE WAY OF ALETHEIA (TRUTH, OBJECTIVITY)]
(2) "Come now, listen, and convey my story. I shall tell you what paths of inquiry alone there are
for thinking:
[#1]. The one: that it is and it is impossible for it not to be. This is the path of Persua-
sion, for it accompanies Objective Truth.
[#2]. The other: that it is not and it necessarily must not be. That, I point out to you, is a
path wholly unthinkable, for neither could you know what-is-not (for that is impossible),
nor could you point it out.
(6) "Whatever can be spoken or thought of necessarily is, since it is possible for it to be, but it is
not possible for nothing to be. I urge you to consider this last point, for I restrain you firstly from
that path of inquiry [#2], and secondly from:
[#3]. The one on which mortals, knowing nothing, wander, two-headed, for helpless-
ness in their breasts guides their wandering minds and they are carried, deaf and blind
alike, dazed, uncritical tribes, for whom being and not-being are thought the same and
yet not the same, and the path of all runs in opposite directions. (7) For never shall this
be proved: that things that are not are. But do restrain your thought from this path of in-
quiry, and do not let habit, born from much experience, compel you along this path, to
guide your sightless eye and ringing ear and tongue. But judge by reason the highly
contentious disproof that I have spoken.
(8a) "One path only is left for us to speak of: that it is. On this path there are a multitude of indica-
tions that what-is, being ungenerated, is also imperishable, whole, of a single kind, immovable
and complete. Nor was it once, nor will it be, since it is, now, all together, one and continuous.
For what coming-to-be of it will you seek? How and from where did it grow? I shall not permit you
to say or to think that it grew from what-is-not, for it is not to be said or thought that it is not. What
necessity could have impelled it to grow later rather than sooner, if it began from nothing? Thus it
must either fully be, or be not at all. Nor will the force of conviction ever allow anything, from

8
Text 1996 Allan Randall (randall@io.org), edited from translations by David Gallop, Richard D. McKirahan, Jr.,
Jonathan Barnes, John Mansley Robinson and others. The D-K numbering of the fragments is given in round brackets.
what-is, to come-to-be something apart from itself; wherefore Justice does not loosen her shack-
les so as to allow it to come-to-be or to perish, but holds it fast.
"The decision on these matters depends on this: either it is or it is not. But it has been decided,
as is necessary, to let go the one as unthinkable and unnameable (for it is no true path), but to al-
low the other, so that it is, and is true. How could what-is be in the future? How could it come-to-
be? For if it came-to-be, it is not, nor is it if at some time it is going to be. Thus, coming-to-be is
extinguished and perishing unheard of.
"Nor is it divisible, since it all alike is. Nor is there any more of it here than there, to hinder it from
holding together, nor any less of it, but it is all a plenum, full of what-is. Therefore, it is all continu-
ous, for what-is touches what-is.
"Moreover, unchanging in the limits of great bonds, it is without beginning or end, since coming-
to-be and perishing were banished far away, and true conviction drove them out. Remaining the
same, in the same place, it lies in itself, and thus firmly remains there. For mighty Necessity holds
it fast in the bonds of a limit, which fences it about, since it is not right for what-is to be incom-
plete. For it lacks nothing. If it lacked anything, it would lack everything.
(8c)"Since, then, there is an ultimate limit, it is completed from every direction like the bulk of a
perfect sphere, evenly balanced in every way from the centre, as it must not be any greater or
smaller here than there. For neither is there what-is-not, which could stop it from reaching its like,
nor is there a way in which what-is could be more here and less there, since it all inviolably is. For
equal to itself in every direction, it reaches its limits uniformly.
(3) "The same thing is there for thinking of and for being. (4) Look upon things which, though ab-
sent, are yet firmly present in thought (for you shall not cut off what-is from holding fast to what-is,
since it neither disperses itself in all directions throughout the order of the Cosmos, nor does it
gather itself together). (8b) It is the same thing, to think of something and to think that it is, since
you will never find thought without what-is, to which it refers, and on which it depends. For noth-
ing is nor will be except what-is, since it was just this that Fate did shackle to be whole and un-
changing; wherefore it has been named all things that mortals have established, persuaded that
they are true: 'to come-to-be and to perish', 'to be and not to be' and 'to shift place and exchange
bright colour'.
[THE WAY OF DOXA (OPINION, SUBJECTIVITY)]
(5) "Wherever I begin, it is all one to me, for there I shall return again.
(8d) "Here I stop my trustworthy speech to you and thought about Objective Truth. From here on,
learn the subjective beliefs of mortals; listen to the deceptive ordering of my words. For they
made up their minds to name two forms, one of which it is not right to name at all (here is where
they have gone astray) and have distinguished them as opposite in bodily form and have as-
signed to them marks distinguishing them from one another:
[#1.] Here, on the one hand, ethereal flame of fire, gentle, very light, everywhere the
same as itself...
[#2.] But not the same as this other, which in itself is opposite: dark night, a dense and
heavy body.
"All this order I present to you as probable, so that no mortal belief shall ever outdo you. (9) But
since all things have been named light and night, and their powers have been assigned to each,
all is a plenum of light and obscure night together, both equal, since nothingness partakes in nei-
ther.
(10) "You shall know the nature of the ether and all the signs in the ether, the destructive works
of the splendid Sun's pure torch, and whence they came-to-be. And you shall learn the wander-
ing works of the round-faced Moon, and its nature, and you shall know also the surrounding
heaven, whence it grew and how Necessity did guide and shackle it to hold the limits of the stars.
(14) The Moon: night-shiner, wandering around the Earth, an alien light, (15) always looking to-
wards the rays of the Sun. (15a) The Earth: rooted-in-water. (11) And you shall learn how Earth
and Sun and Moon and the ether common to all, the Milky Way and the outermost heaven, and
the hot force of the stars did surge forth to come-to-be.
(12) "For the narrower rings are filled with unmingled fire, the ones next to them with night, but a
due amount of fire is inserted amongst it. In the midst of these is the goddess who governs every-
thing. For she rules over hateful birth and union of all things, sending female to unite with male,
and again conversely male with female.
(13) "She devised Love first of all the gods. (18) When man and woman mingle the seeds of love
that spring from their veins, a formative power, maintaining proper proportions, moulds well-
formed bodies from this diverse blood (for if, when the seed is mingled, the forces therein clash
and do not fuse into one, then cruelly will they plague the offspring with a double-gender). (17)
She placed young males on the right side of the womb, young females on the left.
(16)"According to the union within each person of disparate body parts, thus does mind emerge
in humans. For it is the composition of body parts which does the thinking, and Thought (since it
defines the plenum) is the same in each and every human.
(19)"Thus, according to belief, these things were born and now are, and hereafter, having grown
from this, they will come to an end. And for each of these did humans establish a distinctive
name. (20) One and unchanging is that for which as a whole the name is: 'to be'."
6.4.3 DISCUSSION
Sap. Whiz, maybe you could show us the sketch you have done of the scene in the prologue.
Whiz Here it is there are two paths, representing mental pathways of inquiry. You can also
see the goddess, the chariot
Sap. Fine. We will not linger on the Prologue, though its symbolism is very interesting. In the
text you have #1, #2 and #3, corresponding to the two ways of aletheia (being and non-
being respectively) and the path of doxa (what seems, is). In #3, he describes this third
path as one trodden by double-headed mortals. If the senses could deceive us, what
SEEMS may BE but may just as well NOT BE. So what seems is what is or is not: the
third path is the one that says what is or is not, is. But this is obviously false or so it
seems!
Mens Your use of the verb to be is becoming quite confusing, here!
Sap. Youre right it is not only confusing, but as we shall discover, confused! Consider
these two sentences: John is and John is tall? What do they mean? The first states
that he really exists. The second attributes a property to John. Are they two completely
different and unconnected uses of the verb to be? Not really, because the existence of
John includes and presupposes physical characteristics such as height, and moreover,
when stating that John is tall, we are supposing (or assuming) that there exists that
something (John) were talking about.
The problem, however, comes with the negatives: John is not (= he doesnt exist) and
John is not tall. The second proposition does not presuppose (or assume) the first, but
rather, when we say John is not tall, we usually assume that John DOES exist! Par-
menides does not make this distinction between the different uses of the verb to be (ac-
tually, his comments made us aware of them because people started to realize he must
have gone wrong somewhere in his use of language and logic). For him, STATING WHAT
SOMETHING IS NOT is the same as STATING THAT IT IS NOT. Using to be in the negative
form hence would entail making statements about non-being, about nothingness, which
would be senseless statements.
Lee Can you say something more about this nothingness
Sap. Parmenides would answer you with a no nobody can say anything about nothing-
ness, since it does not exist. The link between speech, thought and being entails that we
cannot speak or think what IS NOT, what does not exist. The problem here is that there
are subtle distinctions to make. For Parmenides, who believes that all Being must be
material and corporeal, VOID (empty space) has no real existence, so it does not exist.
This means that there is no empty space in the universe. We would deny this, saying
that empty space has an existence of its own, a non-corporeal one. Furthermore, the
FUTURE cannot exist for Parmenides for it is not, now. Similarly all characteristics of
things that are different in the future from now: if they ARE NOT at this present moment,
they cannot ever exist. He believes that any change in the universe must involve the
transformation from what-(something)-is-not to what-is: a passage from non-being to be-
ing. This would involve nothingness, and is therefore not acceptable, logically.
We would say that void and future (or better, future conformations of the world) are not
something material, but they are not nothingness. They have a being of their own. Void
is what allows changes in space. Change in 3-d space means plurality of being (i.e., if
the universe were just one block of the same material, there would be no change as we
follow the material in any of the 3 dimensions; if, however, the universe were to contain
a desk surrounded by air, one would note a change of material a change of being as
one moves along the spatial dimensions, from the desk to the adjacent air). Similarly, fu-
ture (and past) is what allows changes in time (as we move along the time axis, the
state of the universe changes, things change and move). No void and no future means
no diversity and no change. The universe would then seem to be one whole block in
space which never moves or changes in time. This is how the universe appears to Par-
menides. His conclusions result, however, not from experiments or astronomy (these
are based on data coming from the senses, and are hence dubious). His conclusions
come from what he thinks the logical structure of language is (remember that for him,
the logical structure of language is the same logical structure of the mind, the same logi-
cal structure of the universe).
Tank Lets see if Im getting it right.
1. Heraclitus and Pamenides both believe that there is nothing but material being. For
them all that exists is material.
2. Heraclitus says that if the universe has any order or not WE CANNOT REALLY SAY;
surely, trusting what appears (our sense), the universe seems always changing.
3. Heraclitus system finds its stability in the Logos; in the universe, panta rhei (every-
thing flows). His inconsistency is that either the Logos is material (and hence is not
stable at all (2)) or else it is not (hence this would violate (1)).
4. Parmenides says that we CAN say that the universe has an order: it has the same
order as our speech and thought (the order of the Logos). But this violates what our
senses tell us about the world (that it is always changing).
5. Plato denies (1), accepts (2) provisionally, assumes the stability of the Logos (3)
though placing it in a non-material world, assumes (4) hence refuting (2), and ex-
plains that the order of the world is the same order present in our minds (or better, in
Gods mind) since God shaped the world according to the order in Gods mind.
Things do change on a material level but that change is within the limits set by the
Logos that is stable and firmly grounded on the non-material level.
6. Though Plato makes a synthesis of Heraclitus and Parmenides, making them sound
very similar, indeed two sides of the same coin, their belief in the assumption (1)
makes them end up at two extreme positions. Heraclitus says that everything
changes, the senses are trustworthy, nothing is stable (well, the Logos is stable, but
if he were to be consistent, he would conclude that the Logos does not exist (see
(3)). Parmenides says that nothing changes, the senses are not trustworthy, all is
stable according to one order uniting mind, speech and being.
Sap. That seems a good sketch to me.
Mens Could you say something more about the two types of knowledge why are the senses
untrustworthy? How can one trust a logic that says that there is no change, no past, no
future, no empty space, no differences between the table, the air and my hand that
space and time are one big homogenous bock?
Sap. Take it easy, Mens! Parmenides does seem crazy, we would never accept his conclu-
sions, and we would promptly doubt his logic (and eventually discover his confusing use
of the verb to be). But we would never really doubt the fact that what can be known by
a correct logical procedure from true premises must be true. The premises (being is,
non-being is not) seem indubitable if they are taken to mean what exists, exists, what
does not exist, does not exist. When that being starts to refer to properties or predi-
cates (such as being tall), the logic goes wrong.
We all make a distinction between the two types of knowledge, and tend to trust our
minds more than our senses when in doubt. We blink our eyes if we see something we
dont expect and disbelieve our ear if we hear our grandpas voice when we know hes
dead. Several doubts have been raised by sceptics in the history of Philosophy about
the value and the truth of the knowledge coming from our senses. Descartes proposed
two famous questions. (1) What if what I see now is a dream? (when Im dreaming I
cannot tell Im dreaming, so if this is a dream, I would not be able to tell). (2) What if at
this moment I am being deceived by senses (e.g. this is a hallucination, or an optical il-
lusion)? (when I am being deceived, I cannot tell, so if I am being deceived now, I would
not be able to tell). A modern version is: (3) How do I know Im not a brain in a jar being
fed fake sense data from a computer as in the film Matrix?
Such doubts are quite daunting. Some people have also doubted whether knowledge
coming from logical reasoning can be as sure as we usually assume. But in this case we
can hardly see what could go wrong. How can I be deceived into thinking that I do not
exist, or that I am not thinking, or that 1+1=432, or that squares can be round? Maybe I
could, but its not clear how unless I am TOTALLY INSANE (since mild mental disorders
do not usually induce mistakes in our minds internal logical functioning, but rather in our
perception of the world)! And that usually shows, as it would not allow me to go on with
my life.
Lee Where do I find all this in the text?
Sap. Well, you wont find the Descartes stuff, nor the Matrix. We mentioned the three paths:
#1, #2, #3. Paths 2 and 3 are no good, so fragment 8a starts to investigate path 1. It de-
velops into a number of attributes of being: being is one; it is not generated or de-
stroyed; it has no past or future; it does not change or move; it is whole, continuous, in-
divisible; it is limited on all sides and resembles a sphere. This last conclusion is strange
within the context of what we said above, but probably Parmenides thought that the fi-
nite was more perfect than infinite, so Being must be finite. Hence it is limited in space
though there is nothing outside it. It must be spherical to he homogenous, otherwise one
side would be different from the other and no differences are allowed within Being. So
we get the picture of how the universe should be: a huge solid ball.
I will not go through the second section; here Parmenides says that heeding our senses,
the universe does not look like a ball. It is not very clear what he is trying to do here. He
could be rejecting his old beliefs, or collecting the best data on his opponents beliefs for
his disciples. It is could be an ironic presentation of the stupidities that those who trust
the senses preach, or else, as some have suggested, a theory of how things are bound
to present themselves to our senses (i.e. not in the way they really are). Instead, I will
ask you two little questions (1) how does Parmenides compare with the Pythago-
reans?
Tank His arch (the one) is theoretical, cannot be seen by the senses just like number for
the Pythagoreans though both deem it something material.
Sap. And (2), how does he link to the theory of the opposites?
Lee Being and non-being are opposites.
Whiz But non-being does not exist
s.6.5 Zeno of Elea p.6-26
Sap. precisely. The opposites are reduced to one. The other opposite does not exist, it is
the absence of the first. Darkness does not exist, it is simply the absence of light. Void
does not exist, it is simply the absence of matter. This destroys the tension between the
opposites found in all objects (even and odd tendencies, decad of opposites in the Py-
thagoreans and also the Heraclitean stife-harmony). It brings us back to monism. But
to be coherent, now, all is being, all is light, all is matter, all is good, all is round The
opposite does not exist and any gradation between the extremes is an illusion. The
universe must be fully illuminated fully solid etc. There are no shades of grey we
only find white in the pure state and no black. There is no black to mix with the white and
achieve grey. That is why everything ends up being one big block with no distinctions.
6.5 Zeno of Elea
6.5.1 INTRODUCTION
Sap What can you tell me about Zeno, another native of Elea, disciple of Parmenides?
Whiz Well, he didnt really come up with great innovations: he stuck to Parmenides guns. The
great thing about Zeno is that he found interesting ways how to argue for Parmenides
views. He realized that they sounded so crazy and incredible how can one not trust
ones senses AT ALL? How can a person believe they are no different from the floor and
the air they breathe and the other person over there? How can one believe nothing ever
changes?
Parmenides ideas are hard to swallow. His arguments do not convince us too much
they sound like a play on the verb to be. Zeno does not have anything better to con-
vince us that Parmenides is right. But he has some good arguments to show that Par-
menides opponents are wrong, or at least as hard to accept as Parmenides.
Sap What is this technique called?
Whiz It is called reductio ad absurdum (or simply reductio), meaning sustaining a position by
reducing the contrary position/s to absurdity.
Lee Meaning?
Mens Meaning somebody, call her A says no square is round, and someone else, B, dis-
agrees saying some squares are round. A does not try to prove that there are no round
squares directly, instead, she says: You say some squares are round. But if they are
square, they are not round, and if they are round, they are not square. So whatever the
case, you must be wrong. But if youre wrong, Im right. Hence no square is round.
In general it works like this: You say x. Your opponent says not x. You analyse your
opponents statement, bring out the possible consequences, say if not x is true, then ei-
ther y or z is true (and not anything else). So if your opponent is right, they either y or z
must be true. So you show that y and z are false, or at least you argue that if you were
to believe them, you would have to accept some absurd conclusion. So y and z must be
discarded. But if y and z are not acceptable, and there is no alternative to y and z, then
the not x position (which generated them) must be absurd. But if not x is unaccept-
able, its opposite (i.e. x, your original position) must be acceptable.
Sap Zeno is famous for his paradoxes. How do these come in?
Tank Zeno uses them is his arguments to prove his opponents wrong. He believes, namely,
that nothing moves, nothing changes and that there are no differences between things,
no plurality of objects. His opponents would hold the opposite view, viz. that things move
and that many things exist. So he tries to show these positions as absurd by assuming
them (for arguments sake) as true, and showing that they lead to paradoxical conclu-
sions, stuff like for something to move, it must perform an infinite number of operations
in finite time, and this is impossible. Hence he concludes that if you claim that things
move, you are also (indirectly) making some very absurd claims. Hence, if you dont
want to be absurd and unreasonable, you have to agree that NOTHING MOVES.
6.5.2 REDUCTIO ARGUMENT AGAINST DIVISIBILITY OF BEING
Sap Most of we know about Zeno comes from testimonies, in Plato, Aristotle and old com-
mentaries on Aristotle. Some interpreters have reconstructed an argument against mul-
tiplicity (i.e. it seeks to prove the idea that there is more than one thing in the universe as
leading to absurd conclusions, hence inconsistent.) Clearly, if he manages to show that
a multiplicity of objects cannot exist in the universe, then he would automatically prove
that the Parmenidean One must be upheld. Tancred will explain this argument to us,
hence giving an example of a reductio ad absurdum argument.
Tank Let us clarify one thing at the start. Zenos argument is not directly against multiplicity of
being, but against divisibility of being.
Lee What do you mean?
Tank He seeks to show that being cannot be divided. On its own this does not mean that
there is only one thing in the universe, but that multiplicity in the universe (if it exists)
cannot be derived from the division of an original entity. So he seeks to show that things
in the universe cannot be divided, and directly that there is only one thing in the uni-
verse. The argument allows that there could well be many things in the universe, but
they cannot have arisen from the division of something else. (From Zenos or Par-
menides point of view, no divisibility means no multiplicity, because for them, though
our senses tell us that there are many things in the universe our mind tells us that all is
united into one: if that unity cannot be divided, than there must only be one thing in exis-
tence. From our point of view, this is not the case, since we can still claim that the uni-
verse is made up of a multitude of indivisibles (atoms, from the Greek) and has been so
since ever and will be so for ever, so it could be that being was never divided and yet is
a many).
Mens Good. Now you may get on with the argument.
Tank All right. To prove: that being is indivisible (Claim A). Statement to disprove (show as
absurd): that being is divisible (Claim non A).
Assume (for arguments sake) that being is divisible. If so, there are two (and only two)
possibilities whereby it is divisible: either into a finite number of parts (possibility 1) or
into an infinite number of parts (possibility 2).
To render claim non A absurd, we have to show that both possibilities cannot exist. As-
sume that being is divisible into a finite number of parts. But to distinguish between
these parts we need to put separators between them. And to distinguish between the
parts and the separators, we need further separators, and so on to infinity. Hence possi-
bility 1 is untenable (it resolves itself in possibility 2)
9
.
Considering now possibility 2, we can see that it breaks down into two further possibili-
ties, 2a and 2b (disproving which we will disprove possibility 2, disproving which, we will
disprove claim non A (given we have disproved possibility 1), hence proving claim A).
If being is divisible into an infinite number of parts, there and two (and only two) further

9
The obvious objection to this argument is that there is no need for separators because the parts could be qualitatively
distinct, so their qualities would determine boundaries between them. Alternatively, if we do need to separate between
things in the universe, we could use void (empty space), which is clearly distinct from the objects it separates and
hence does not need to be further distinguished from the objects it separates. In fact, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and
the Atomists (the philosophers that follow) seek to solve the Eleatic dilemma by postulating a plurality of qualitatively
distinct objects in their cosmology. The Atomists also integrate void in their universe: it is not non-being (non-existent)
but it is an existent space devoid of material being, hence void is.
possibilities. Either (2a) these parts are extended (they occupy some space, however
small) or (2b) they are not extended (they have no magnitude, they occupy no space).
Clearly 2a would mean that the parts occupy infinite space (infinity of parts x magnitude
of parts = infinite magnitude) and this is unthinkable (how can each divisible object in the
universe occupy infinite space?), 2a is absurd. Yet, 2b is equally absurd since it entails
that the parts occupy no space at all (infinity of parts x zero magnitude = zero magni-
tude).
Hence 2a and 2b are both absurd. Hence possibility 2 is absurd. But possibility 1 re-
duces it self to possibility 2, so claim non-A is absurd. It is therefore absurd to claim that
being is divisible. Hence being is indivisible.
Sap Very neat, indeed! Are you all happy with that?
Whiz Not really. I believe that things are divisible, and therefore there must be a flaw some-
where.
Mens The argument against possibility 1 is wacky, I think.
Sap Yes, that a possible weakness. As we shall see, the next group of philosophers will seek
to show that the (many) things that the universe is made of are qualitatively different, so
dont need separators to allow distinction between them. Some philosophers (the Atom-
ists) have a way of claiming that empty space (void) really exists and could separate be-
tween atoms without requiring further separators (the existence of void was a big issue
here for most of the presocratics, being non-material it could not exist if it is nothing
how could it be something?!). Yet the Atomists in a way accepted the claim that the ba-
sic things that make up the universe are indivisible they simply claim that there are
many of these indivisibles (atoms) all the same. Hence they hold that accepting this ar-
gument does not entail accepting the truth of the Parmenidean One (all is one big ho-
mogenous mass of material). Yet there are ways to attack 2a and 2b any ideas?
Whiz I cant see how. Its simple maths: 0 times infinity = 0. Anything else times infinity = infin-
ity? How can you argue against that?
Mens Maybe you could alter Maths?
Sap In a way, yes. You could claim the existence of infinitesimals: things that are so small
that they have practically no magnitude but not quite they are special things such that
if you have an infinity of them, they occupy finite space. The problem here would be that
they could occupy any finite space. Another attempt could be to say that the parts tend
to zero magnitude, rather than have zero magnitude. Furthermore there are some inter-
esting Maths techniques for dealing with infinite sets (Cantorian sets) that may be inter-
estingly applied here or in dealing with the paradoxes of motion.

6.5.3 THE PARADOXES OF MOTION
Sap Paradoxes are logically valid arguments that go against (par) common sense or com-
mon belief (doxa). The most interesting (and convincing) of Zenos paradoxes of motion
are three, namely the Dichotomy Paradox, the Achilles Paradox, and the Arrow Para-
dox. Mens maybe you could explain them to us.
Mens Sure. Tim Foster (http://orca.ucd.ie/~timf/matihps.html) explains the paradoxes quite
straightforwardly. Nick Huggetts account (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/ en-
tries/paradox-zeno/) is more technical.
The DICHOTOMY PARADOX depicts a fast runner (who can move at constant speed) trav-
elling between the starting line (point A) and the finish line (point B). So she sets off (or
at least attempts to): clearly before reaching B, she must reach C, which is the mid-point
between A and B. But before reaching C, she must reach D, the mid-point between A
and C. Yet before that, she must reach E, between A and D and so on to infinity. In
other words, before travelling a distance, the runner must travel , before which she
must travel , before which 1/8, and so on. But since there is an infinity of such divi-
sions, how can she complete even the least of such distances in a finite time? (Remem-
ber the argument above if it does take her some time to complete a division, then it
takes her infinite time to complete the race, if it takes here no time to complete a divi-
sion, then it takes her no time to complete the race). Indeed, how can one complete an
infinity of tasks in finite time?
The point, here is to show that a runner cannot even start a race, hence to say that
movement is possible in the universe would entail an absurdity. This means that there
cannot be movement in the universe (viz. Parmenides claim that nothing ever changes,
nothing ever moves).
The ACHILLES (AND THE TORTOISE) PARADOX is very similar, the main difference is that
the points on the line of motion are not fixed. Achilles and a tortoise participate in a
race Achilles runs from the start line (A) to the finish line (B), the tortoise is given an
advantage it starts the race from a point C, closer to B than A. The race starts. A pe-
riod of time t
o
passes, and Achilles reaches the initial position of the tortoise (point C).
Yet the tortoise, however slow, has moved to point C during time t
0
. No problem, Achil-
les thinks, Ill catch up with it in no time. Very quickly, indeed, in a few seconds (t
1
)
Achilles reaches C but finds that the tortoise has moved to C, a few centimetres fur-
ther on. Chicken feed, says Achilles see, Im closing in fast!). And clearly, in a fraction
of a second Achilles gets to C, but during that time the tortoise has moved a minute dis-
tance further on. And so the story goes Achilles reaching the tortoise position ever
faster, but always finding out that the tortoise has moved on, albeit an ever smaller dis-
tance. Achilles is amazed, but as Zeno explains, he cannot expect to ever reach (let
alone overtake) the tortoise if space and time are infinitely divisible.
Para-doxical? We all believe (hold the doxa) that Achilles does overtake the tortoise, at
some point, but the argument shows he cannot Huggett has the mathematical analy-
sis, but it boils down to the same infinity stuff as above.
The ARROW PARADOX is simpler, but just as startling. At any instant during its movement
between points A and B, an arrow is at rest (not moving). But if the time taken to move
from A to B is made up of such instants (be they finite or infinite in number), the time
taken to move from A to B is time spent at rest (not in motion). So the arrow cannot
move from A to B if it is always at rest.
Tank Quite daunting, I must say. I cant think of any valid way of disproving such arguments
Mens Obviously the wisest thinkers have been at it for hundreds of years with little avail
Lee But, Master Sapiens, you mentioned the Cantorian techniques do they resolve the is-
sues?
Sap They are mathematical solutions to problems in Physics. Some argue that they do not
really solve anything. Why? Because Cantorian Set Theory invents a whole new
(mathematical) universe wherein some intriguing problems can be solved but the
question remains whether that universe tallies with the real physical universe out there.
Recall the Dichotomy paradox. It is about performing an infinite number of tasks in finite
time. An agent that can do that is called an infinity machine, and if you assume they can
exist, you could solve some of the paradoxes. But we cannot see how such machines
could exist in nature. You cant solve the problem by inventing a universe where such
things exist yet that is what Cantorian Set Theory does.
s.6.6 Melissus of Samos p.6-30
6.5.4 FURTHER READING
Sap Zeno has stimulated the interest of many people over the centuries: are there solutions
to his paradoxes? People with a good knowledge of Maths and Physics who are aware
of their deeper potentialities and limitations will find the issues raised by the paradoxes
serious and intriguing. Some interesting mathematical discussions (and possible
mathematical solutions to the paradoxes) can be found at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/ and in McLaughlin, W. I., 1994,
Resolving Zeno's Paradoxes, Scientific American, November: 84-89. K. Svozil argues
at http://tph.tuwien.ac.at/~svozil/publ/set.htm (Care! Not for the mathematically faint-
hearted!) that mathematical solutions are no solutions to the problems since Zenos
paradoxes concern physics, and cannot be solved by mathematical systems (e.g. Can-
torian set theory) that have no clear physical underpinning.
http://orca.ucd.ie/~timf/matihps.html has a discussion of infinity machines.

6.6 Melissus of Samos
Sap. What does Melissus of Samos add to the picture of the universe traced by the other
Eleatics?
Whiz Melissus agrees with Parmenides and Zeno in everything, except when they consider
the universe as spatially finite. For him, the indivisible One, being, must be infinite in
space as much as it is unlimited in time (it has no past or future). Having no distinctions
within it, the result is very much the same as Anaximanders apeiron but this time, no
ordered world, no cosmos, comes out of this apeiron it is THE world. The other
world, with its temporal and spatial limitations, and with its distinctions and separate
things, is just an illusion of the senses.
Thus, Melissus corrects the Eleatic vision of the universe since he detects an incoher-
ence. If Being was finite, what would there be outside it nothingness? But nothingness
does not exist! As we said, the Eleatics did not believe in the existence of empty space.
If Being were to be finite, it would have limits but there is nothing else in the universe
but Being so nothing can put limits to being, otherwise Being would not be one you
would have a second thing in the universe, distinct from Being, that limits Being. But in
this way you destroy monism.
Sap. Melissus seems to have taken some ideas from the Milesians and from other philoso-
phers, but criticized the original sources. We can see from his arguments what he would
find wrong in Anaximanders apeiron: it would need another principle to be cut up into a
universe made of distinct entities. You cannot separate a body of water into two distinct
bodies of water unless you introduce a partition which is not water between the two par-
ts. Hence either the aperion stays forever as it is (which is Melissus position) or else
you have to admit the real existence of something else besides the apeiron, which is ir-
reducible to the apeiron, typically void. Hence, your attempt to reduce nature to one
principle, as is required by monism, would have failed. Anaximenes air is also problem-
atic. Anaximenes thinks he has one principle, which is transformed into all things by the
processes of rarefaction and condensation. But in condensation you get more air per
unit volume, and less air per unit volume in rarefaction. Now, if air was one solid mass of
stuff, how could you get less or more of it in a certain space. You could have more or
less of it only if it is mingled with empty space such that the processes of rarefaction and
condensation would be simply changing the relative proportions of air : empty space.
Here again, a second principle not reducible to the first is being introduced; Anaximenes
s.6.6 Melissus of Samos p.6-31
thinks his system is monistic but in fact it is not rigorously so. Only Parmenides system
is truly monistic.
Mens But Parmenides system is ridiculous! How can anyone accept something of the sort?
Why dont we simply abandon monism?
Sap. Clearly, the Eleatics leave us with a dilemma: either you accept diversity in the universe
and abandon monism, or you accept monism and refute the existence of a plurality of
things around you. For the presocratics, who had not yet discovered non-material Being,
this dilemma meant the downfall of science. If all things were material, THE INABILITY OF
REDUCING THEM TO ONE MATERIAL PRINCIPLE MEANT THE INABILITY TO EXPLAIN THEM COM-
PLETELY. So abandoning monism meant abandoning the possibility of taking our inquiry
about nature all the way. The alternative, of course, was to agree with Parmenides and
his lot: accept monism but deny plurality and change. But this would defeat the purpose
of science that of giving a rational explanation to the natural phenomena to the dif-
ferent things we meet in the world and their changes. If we were to conclude with Par-
menides that everything is just one thing that nothing changes, that change and plural-
ity are illusions of the senses (which are untrustworthy) we would not be making any
scientific conclusions at all. Science insists that we save the phenomena, i.e. that we
attribute value to what manifests itself to our senses. So we need a synthesis that
brings together our reason and logic with our sense data, that bridges the divide be-
tween the two types of knowledge kept well distinct by the Eleatics. We need an expla-
nation of change and plurality. The next group of Philosophers (Empedocles,
Anaxagoras, the Atomists) try to do this by introducing complications in the material
world so that the distinction one-many is overcome. Aristotle and Plato, however, solve
the dilemma by seeking explanations of the material world outside the realm of matter:
multiplicity and change are acceptable in the material world if there is something else
(not material) that will provide unity and stability to the material world. Thus, A COMPLETE
EXPLANATION OF THE MATERIAL BEING WILL BE PROVIDED USING UNITY AT THE LEVEL OF
NON-MATERIAL BEING.

06 Beyond Naturalism

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

06 Beyond Naturalism

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

s.6.1 Xenophanes of Colophon p.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi