G.R. No.

L-9620

June 28, 1957

In Re Guardianship of the Minor Roy Reginald Lelina. SEVERO VILORIA, guardian and oppositorappellee, vs. ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, petitioner-appellant. Stanley A. Clark for appellant. Tancredo M. Guray for appellee. REYES, J.B.L., J.: In Special Proceedings No. 163 of the Court of First Instance of La Union, appellee Severo Viloria was, on October 27, 1948, appointed guardian of the person and estate of the minor Roy Reginald Lelina, beneficiary of arrears pay, insurance, and other benefits from the U.S Veterans Administration due to the death of his late father Constancio Lelina, supposedly a member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the war. On March 31, 1950, the court authorized the guardian to withdraw from the estate of his ward the sum of not to exceed P30 a month for the boy's support and other expenditures. On March 20, 1952, the U. S. Veterans Administration filed a motion in the guardianship proceedings, alleging receipt of certain letters from its central office in Washington, D. C., to the effect that the minor's deceased father had not guerrilla or other service in the armed forces of the United States, and that consequently, his heir was not entitled to the payment of gratuitous National Service Life Insurance, and prayed that the guardian be ordered to stop further payment of monthly allowances to the minor. The court found the motion well-founded and granted the same. A few years later, on February 15, 1955, the Administrator of Veterans Affairs again filed a motion in the same guardianship proceedings for a refund to the U.S. Veterans Administration of the sum of $2,879.68, the balance of gratuitous insurance benefits allegedly wrongfully paid to the minor Roy Reginald Lelina, which was still on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, San Fernando, La Union Branch. Upon opposition of the guardian, who submitted evidence of the service record of the minor's deceased father duly recognized by both the Philippine and U.S. Armies, the motion for refund was denied. Then on April 27, 1955, the guardian moved to be allowed to withdraw P4,000 from the minor's estate to meet the minor's needs. This motion was opposed by the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, arguing that the minors right to National Service Life Insurance benefits is governed exclusively by the S.S. Code Annotated, which provides (Tit. 38, section 808) that decisions of the Administrator shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact and no other official of the United States, except a judge or judges of the Unite States courts, shall have jurisdiction to review any such decisions; In the same motion, the Administrator prayed for the setting aside of the court's order denying the refund of the money in the hands of the minor's guardian, on the ground of "lack of jurisdiction". Acting on the pending motions of the guardian and the Administrator, the lower court held: If the legal provisions alleged in the petition of the veterans Administration is correct, and should be taken into account, this Court may not have the right to order the return of the amount of $2,879.68 at present credited as funds of the minor, and deposited in the name of the said minor with the Philippine National Bank. Precisely, the issue now pending in this guardianship proceeding is whether or not, the father of the minor deceased Constancio Lelina, has a valid military service to justify the payment to him or to his heirs of the National Life Services Insurance benefits. The minor Reginald Lelina through his guardian and his counsel claims that his father had rendered services as shown by certain papers submitted in this case to support that claim. As a

matter of fact, the said minor was granted and paid those benefits as shown by the statements of accounts submitted and duly approved by this court up to and including March 31, 1954, in the order of Judge Primitivo L. Gonzales dated April 22, 1954. On that other hand the Attorneys of the Veterans Administration now claim that such payment was an error because the deceased Constancio Lelina had no recognized military services or was he a member of the Commonwealth Army in the service of the Armed Forces of the United States Government. This is, therefore, a matter that should be determined in an appropriate action filed the complete court. This being the case, until this issue is, finally determined by the competent court in an appropriate action, the balance of the amount now deposited in the name of the minor through his guardian could not be disposed by this Court one way or another. In this proceeding, the matter at issue cannot be finally determined. Hence, this Court believes and so holds, that in the meantime, the status quo should be maintain with respect to funds now existing and deposited with the Philippine National Bank, La Union Branch in the name of the herein minor. (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 47-49) and denied both the guardian's motion to withdraw from the minor's deposits, and the Administrator's position for refund. The Administrator of Veterans Affairs sought reconsideration of the above order, which was denied; wherefore, it appealed to this Court. We are of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims properly submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions where the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That in effect, would deprive our tribunals or judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the veterans' Administrator. In an analogous case, we have ruled: By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his vesting order. He can not therefore now dispute this power. (Brownell vs. Bautista, 50 Off. Gaz., 4772.) From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered where paid to the appellee guardian, for the ward's benefit, the latter became their lawful possessor and he can not be deprived thereof on the sole allegation of the Veterans' Administrator that the money was erroneously paid. The burden lies upon him to satisfy the court that the alleged mistake was really committed; and the Philippine courts' determination of the question is as binding upon the Veterans' Administrator as upon any other litigant. Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was not properly filed in the guardianship proceedings, since the latter are solely concerned with the ward's care a custody and the proper administration or management of his properties. Conflicts regarding ownership or title to the property in the hands of the guardian, in his capacity as such, should be litigated in a separate proceeding. The order of the court below, dated 22 June 1955, is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Felix, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-14277

April 30, 1960

MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent. Manuel L. Fernandez in his own behalf. Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent. LABRADOR, J.: Petition for certiorari with injunction filed by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to annul two orders dated June 16 and July 29, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Hon. Eloy B. Bello, presiding. The first order reprimands petitioner for his improper conduct as counsel in Special Proceedings No. 3931, entitled "Guardianship of the Minors Federico and Pedro both surnamed Perreyras, Timotea Perreyras, petitionerguardian," orders him to return to the guardian within 15 days the sum of P200.00 collected by him, and causes a copy of the order to be sent to the Supreme Court for corresponding disciplinary action on the petitioner (Annex J). The second order denies petitioner's motion for reconsideration and warns him not to use improper terms in his pleadings. (Annex L.) The circumstances leading to the issuance of the above orders may be briefly stated as follows: Timotea Perreyras, through Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez as her counsel, instituted Special Proceedings No. 3931, for her appointment as guardian over the persons and properties of her brothers, the minors Federico and Pedro Perreyras. Upon her appointment and upon her qualifying as such, she petitioned the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned in common with the wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to Maximiano Umagay. The request was granted by Judge Villamor, and on August 24, 1951, a deed of sale, prepared and notarized by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, was executed by the guardian in favor of Maximiano Umagay for the sum of P1,000. This sale was approved by Judge Pasicolan on December 17, 1952 (Annex C). The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with right to repurchase to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay by Florentino Perreyras, father (now deceased) of the guardian and the wards. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay were, in turn, sold for P200.00 to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Of the purchase price of P1,000, P200.00 was paid to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, redemption price of the nipa land and as assignee of the credit in favor of Maximiano Umagay and Ricardo Perreyras. The other P200.00 was given to said attorney, in payment of his legal fees for services rendered by him as counsel of the father of the wards in a civil case. However, the record does not show that these payments were authorized by the court. On January 21, 1958, Judge Eloy Bello, who took over the court from Judge Pasicolan, issued an order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt for failing to account for the property and money of the wards. After hearing the guardian Timotea Perreyras, the court issued another order date January 20, 1958, exonerating her of the contempt charges, disapproving all payments made by her, including that made to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, and requiring Attys. Manuel L. Fernandez and Braulio Fernandez to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt of court. In the same order, the court charged said attorneys of having abused their relationship with the guardian and having taken money from her without previous approval of the court (Annex D). Atty. Braulio Fernandez submitted a written explanation, and the court, considering it satisfactory, exonerated him of the preferred charges. On January 30, 1958, the court again issued another order directing Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to submit in ten days a written answer to the charges stated in the order of January 27, 1958 (Annex G). On February 1, 1958, he submitted an explanation

(Annex H.), admitting receipt of the sum of P400.00 from the guardian, but alleging that when he received the amount he was no longer the attorney of the guardian as their relation had terminated when the guardian secured the services of Atty. Braulio Fernandez; that he acted in good faith and the guardianship proceedings were instituted by him only to help the minors the action being less expensive than an intestate proceeding, and that he was paid only P50.00 for his services to the guardian. So he asked that the charges be dismissed and that the guardian be warned not to make unjustifiable complaints against him. On February 10, 1953, Timotea Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay were summoned to appear for further examination on the proceeds of the sale of the nipa land. After hearing their testimonies, the court on June 16, 1958, found Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez guilty of contempt of court because he had taken the amount of P400.00 from the proceeds of the sale without previous approval from the court. The court also found the conduct of counsel to be anomalous for the reason that he instituted the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect unpaid attorney's fees due him from the father of the wards (Annex J). This is the first order sought to be annulled in this appeal. The second order is that denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent attorney. It is claimed by petitioner in this appeal that the proceedings conducted in the court below are irregular because no formal charge was filed against him. There is no merit in this contention. The court motu proprio preferred the charges in its order dated January 20, 1958, and in another order dated January 27, 1958, the petitioner was duly advised thereof and was given an opportunity to file a written answer thereto. It has been held in the following case that there has been sufficient compliance with the requirements of law: The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold person guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. The above requirements were complied with by the filing of the order on September 30, and the giving of full opportunity to the respondent to appear and defendant himself. The contention that a formal information filed by a prosecuting officer is necessary to begin proceedings must be overruled. (People vs. B. M. Venturanza, et al., defendants, Jose Y. Torres, appellant, 98 Phil., 211; 52 Off. Gaz. [2] 769.). The court below found petitioner guilty of contempt court on two grounds, the first is that he instituted the guardianship proceedings for the sole purpose of facilitating payment to him of the debts of the wards. The facts do not, however, bear out this finding. Before the guardianship proceedings were instituted, the wards were indebted in the sum of P200.00 to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay, and as the wards had no money with which to pay the debt, the only way to settle it is by selling the nipa land. But the land could not have been sold by the minors without intervention of a guardian. So the petitioner must have believed that guardianship proceedings was the proper remedy. The judges of the court below, from whom Judge Bello took over, must have been satisfied that the procedure taken by the petitioner was more beneficial to the wards when they appointed a guardian and approved the sale of the land. As there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of petitioner, the finding on this point of the court below should be reversed. However, the finding of the court that the purchase price of the land is P1,000 was in custodia legis and could not be taken and used in payment of debts without its previous authority is correct. As a lawyer the petitioner is charged with the knowledge that the property and effects of the wards are under the control and supervision of the court, and that they could not be and expended without the latter's permission, more especially so when the money taken was to pay the debt of the father of the wards. The reprimand is, therefore, fully justified. But the order for the refund of the P200.00 and the closing of the guardianship proceedings after such return, would deprive petitioner of the fees that he was entitled to receive from the father of the guardian and the wards, for services rendered in a civil case, which services are admitted to

have been due from their father. While the reprimand is in order for petitioner's mistake, the mistake is no sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned and which his client could not pay before his death. The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly the court can not deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so. In his answer before this Court respondent judge justifies his order for the return of the P200.00 on the ground that petitioner is "below average standard of a lawyer." The opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer's fee. It is the contract between the lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered. Petitioner claims that he won a civil case for his client, the deceased father of the guardian and the wards. That P200.00 is the amount of the fee of petitioner is admitted by the guardian. We find that the court's order directing petitioner to return the P200.00, and in effect denying him the right to collect the same, is not justified, to say the least. This portion of the final order is hereby modified in the sense that the return of the P200.00 is without prejudice to petitioner's right to demand payment for the services rendered the deceased out of the proceeds of the property left by him (deceased). In this Court the judge below desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration be stricken out for employing strong language. We believe the said strong language must have been impelled by the same language used by the judge below in characterizing the act of the petitioner as "anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner." If any one is to blame for the language used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have provoked petitioner, and the judge below has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm. Wherefore, the orders are modified as above indicated. Without costs. Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur. Concepcion, J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. L-5549

February 26, 1954

IN RE: TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 14123. TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors. AZUCENA, FLOR-DE-LIS and TIRSO, JR. all surnamed REYES Y BARRETTO, petitioners-appellants, vs. MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, oppositor-appellant. Deogracias T. Reyes and Virgilio Anz. Cruz for appellant. Calanog and Alafriz for appellee. LABRADOR, J.: This is an appeal prosecuted in this court against two orders of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, issued in Case No. 116, G.L.R.O. Record No. 12908, requiring the oppositorappellant Lucia Milagros Barretto to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14123, issued in the name of Bibiano Barretto, so that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in lieu thereof in the name of Azucena, Flor-de-lis and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes, co-owners of an undivided one-half share, and Lucia Milagros Barretto as the owner of the other half. The circumstances leading to the issuance of the said orders may be briefed stated as follows: Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, and in the testate proceedings for the settlement of his estate, Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto were declared as his children and heirs. Lucia Milagros Barretto was at that time a minor, 15 years of age, and proceedings were instituted in the same court (Case No. 49881) for the project of partition was submitted, which was signed by Salud Barretto, Lucia Milagros Barretto (minor) and Maria Gerardo (surviving spouse), the latter signing "on her own behalf and as guardian for the minor, Milagros Barretto." The project of partition was approved by the court. It was filed in the office of the register of deeds of Bulacan on May 22, 1940 but the transfer certificate of title over the property in question was never cancelled. His widow, Maria Gerardo, died on March 5, 1948, and in the testate proceedings of the settlement of her estate, Lucia Milagros Barretto submitted a will purporting to be of said deceased for probate, in accordance with which Maria Gerardo had only one child with the deceased Bibiano Barretto, namely Lucia Milagros Barretto. This will submitted by Lucia Milagros Barretto was declared to be the last will and testament of the deceased Maria Gerardo. Reyes presented the petition for the cancellation of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Bibiano Barretto on March 19, 1951 in Case No. 116, G.L.R.O. Record No. 12908. Lucia Milagros Barretto filed an opposition, claiming (a) that the project of partition approved by the court in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto is null and void, because it appears therefrom that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time she signed the said project of partition, and Maria Gerardo was not authorized to sign said project on her (Milagros Barretto's) behalf; and (b) that in accordance with the will of the deceased Maria Gerardo, Salud Barretto was not a daughter of the said spouses. The lower court overruled the above objections and issued the orders mentioned; so Lucia Milagros Barretto prosecuted this appeal. Under our rules of procedure, the validity of a judgment or order of the court, which has become final and executory, may be attacked only by a direct action or proceeding to annul the same, or by motion in another case if, in the latter case, the court had no jurisdiction to enter the order or pronounce the judgment (section 44, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). The first proceeding is a direct attack against the order or judgment, because it is not incidental to, but is the main object of, the proceeding. The other one is the collateral attack, in which the purpose of the proceedings is to obtain some relief, other than the vacation or setting aside of the judgment, and the attack is only an incident. (I Freeman on Judgments, sec. 306, pages 607-608.) A third manner is a petition for relief from the judgment or order as authorized by the statutes or by the rules, such as those expressly provided in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but in this case it is to be noted that the relief is granted by express statutory authority in the same action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was entered. In the case at bar, we are not concerned with a relief falling under this third class, because the project of partition was approved in the testate proceedings in the year 1939, whereas the petition in this case is in a registration proceeding and was filed in the year 1951.

In the case at bar, the respondent Lucia Milagros Barretto is objecting to the petition by the second method, the collateral attack. When a judgment is sought to be assailed in this manner, the rule is that the attack must be based not on mere errors or defects in the order of the judgment, but the ground that the judgment or order is null and void, because the court had no power or authority to grant the relief, or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both. (Ibid., sec. 326, p. 650.) In case of collateral attack, the principles that apply have been stated as follows: The legitimate province of collateral impeachment is void judgments. There and there alone can it meet with any measure of success. Decision after decision bears this import: In every case the field of collateral inquiry is narrowed down to the single issue concerning the void character of the judgment and the assailant is called upon to satisfy the court that such is the fact.To compass his purpose of overthrowing the judgment, it is not enough that he show a mistaken or erroneous decision or a record disclosing non-jurisdictional irregularities in the proceedings leading up to the judgment. He must go beyond this and show to the court, generally from the fact of the record itself, that the judgment complained of is utterly void. If he can do that his attack will succeed for the cases leave no doubt respecting the right of a litigant to collaterally impeach a judgment that he can prove to be void. (I Freeman on Judgments, sec. 322, p. 642.) Is the order approving the project of partition absolutely null and void, and if so, does the invalidating cause appear on the face of said project or of the record ? It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the partition, and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor, and her authority to sign can not be questioned (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court). The mere statement in the project of partition that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean that the guardian had not been appointed; it meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been appointed when she signed the project of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in the project of partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which shows that Maria Gerardo had no power of authority to sign of partition as guardian of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention that the order approving the project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked collaterally in the proceedings. That Salud Barretto is not a daughter of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, because Maria Gerardo in her will stated that her only daughter with the said deceased husband of hers is Lucia Milagros Barretto, does not appear from the project of partition or from the record of the case wherein the partition or from the record of the case wherein a partition was issued. This new fact alleged in the opposition may not be considered in this registration case, as it tends to support a collateral attack which , as indicated above, is not permitted. The reasons for this rule of exclusion have been expressed in the following words: The doctrine that the question of jurisdiction is to be determined by the record alone, thereby excluding extraneous proof seems to be the natural unavoidable result of that stamp of authenticity which, from the earliest times, was placed upon the "record", and which gave it such uncontrollable credit and verity that no plea, proof, or averment could be heard to the contrary. . . . Any other rule, . . ., would be disastrous in its results, since to permit the court's records to be contradicted or varied by evidence detours would render such records of no avail and definite sentences would afford but slight protection to the rights of parties once solemnly adjudicated. . . . . (I Freeman on Judgments, sec. 376, p. 789.) Finding no error in the orders appealed from, we hereby affirm them, with costs against the oppositorappellant. So ordered. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-4898

March 19, 1909

SALVADOR GUERRERO, guardian of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muoz,plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEOPOLDO TERAN, defendant-appellant. J. Rodriguez Serra for appellant. Jose Varela y Calderon for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: On the 18th day of March, 1908, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. This amount was claimed by the plaintiff from the defendant upon the theory that the defendant had been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the 1st day of September, 1901, until the 22d day of October, 1906. The plaintiff made a part of his complaint the following items of indebtedness: Difference, account of the property "Bonga" ........................................................ P10.55 Difference, account of the property "Basag" ......................................................... 218.75 Difference, small accounts "Bonga" and "Basag" ................................................ 8.80 Difference, account estate of A. Sanchez .............................................................. 150.00 Difference, account heirs of J. M. Ceballos ............................................................ 224.81 Difference, account hemp of "La Trinidad" ........................................................... 82.87 Difference, account workmen at "La Trinidad" ..................................................... 80.70 Difference, account lates of Ligao .......................................................................... 2.00 Small accounts of "Bonga" and "Basag" .............................................................. 3,676.84 Cost 1 lamp and 1 barometer .................................................................................... 33.50 Workmen at "La Trinidad" ....................................................................................... 5,709.90 Excess of salaries paid account general expenses at "La Trinidad"................... 670.00 Account of cockpit .................................................................................................... 34.15 Account "late Caualog" ........................................................................................... 220.10 Account Jesus Teran ................................................................................................ 235.92 Account Antonio Moreda ....................................................................................... 1,029.83 Total .......................................................................................................... 12,388.72 In answer to the said complaint, the defendant admitted certain allegations and denied others. The defendant admitted that he owed the plaintiff P188.39 but claimed that the plaintiff owed him the sum of P482.14, and that the plaintiff, therefore, still owed to the defendant the difference between P188.39 and P482.14, or the sum of P239.75, for which latter amount the defendant prayed for judgment, with interest and cots against the plaintiff. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court found that the evidence that the defendant, as administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz, or that part of the said estate belonging to the plaintiff, owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46, with interest at 6 per cent until the same amount should be fully paid. From this decision of the lower court the defendant appealed and made the following assignment of error: 1. The court erred in holding that the defendant, from September 17, 1901, to October 6, 1906, managed and administered the estate of Sanchez Muoz as a judicial administrator and executor.

2. The court erred in holding that the defendant was responsible to the plaintiffs for the loans made to different persons for different accounts, and for credits against the persons mentioned in the complaint. 3. The court erred in declaring in the judgment that the difference in the weight of the scales was illegal. 4. And the court erred in sentencing the defendant to pay the costs specified in the judgment. With reference to the first above assignment of error, from the record brought to this court the following facts appear: First. That the defendant Leopoldo Teran was, on the 17th day of September, 1901, appointed as administrator of said estate. The record also discloses that the defendant entered into a bond in the sum of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithful performance of his duties as such representative of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz. Second. The record further discloses that upon the 18th day of March, 1902, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay appointed Maria Muoz y Gomez as guardian for the said Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muoz, and that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez gave the required bond for the faithful performance of her duties as such guardian. Third. While there are some indications in the record that the defendant continued to act as the administrator of said estate after the appointment of the said Maria Muoz y Gomez, up to and including the 6th day of October, 1906, yet the fact exists and must be accepted as true that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez was the actual representative of the said Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muoz in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz, from and after the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906, and therefore the said Maria Muoz y Gomez, as such guardian and administratrix of the estate of the said minors, must be held responsible for the property belonging to said minors during the period while she (Maria Muoz y Gomez) was the actual guardian of said minors. Fourth. On the 6th day of October, 1906, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay, for the reason that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez was not a resident of the Philippine Islands at the time for her appointment (the 18th day of March, 1902) removed her as such guardian and appointed as guardian of said minors Felix Samson, and required from said Samson, as provisional guardian, a bond in the sum of P2,000. On the 18th day of October, 1906, the said Samson duly executed the bond as required. From the order of the judge annulling the appointment of the said Maria Muoz y Gomez her lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court, which appeal was subsequently withdrawn. The order therefore revoking the appointment of the said Maria Muoz y Gomez became final. The mere fact, however, that she had been removed as said guardian did not relieve her, nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors during the time that she was duly acting as said guardian. It must be clear, therefore, that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez is responsible to the said minors for administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the time of her acceptance of said appointment on the 18th day of March, 1902, up to the time of her removal on the 6th day of October, 1906. If during this time she allowed other persons to handle the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her. Unquestionably, she may have an action against the persons to whom she entrusted the direct management of said estate for any loss which they may have negligently and corruptly occasioned her. Therefore, if any loss occurred to the plaintiff between the 18th day of March, 1902, and the 6th day of October, 1906, they have a right of action only against the said Maria Muoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and under the law the administratrix of the property of their estate.

In the claim presented by the plaintiff against the defendant no dates are given showing the time of the particular loss and losses occasioned by the defendant. As was said above, the defendant was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal representative of the said minors in the management of their estate, from the 17th day of September, 1901, up to the time that he was superseded by the said Maria Muoz y Gomez, on the 18th day of March, 1902. There is no proof showing that any of the losses constituting the amount which the plaintiff claims occurred within this period. However, the defendant acknowledged that of the amount claimed by the plaintiff, he owes to them the sum of P188.39. There is no claim of any loss or that the estate has not been properly managed since the appointment of the said Felix Samson on the 6th day of October, 1906. From a consideration of all of the evidence brought to this court, we reach the following conclusions: First. That the defendant, Leopoldo Teran, was the duly appointed and recognized representative of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muoz in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the 17th day of September, 1901, until the 18th day of March, 1902. Second. That the said Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was the duly appointed representative of the said minors in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906. Third. That the Leopoldo Teran was responsible to the plaintiff (the said minors) for the fruits and profits resulting from their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the said 17th day of September, 1901, to the 18th day of March, 1902. Fourth. That the said Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was responsible to the plaintiff (the said minors) for the fruits and profits resulting from the management of the estate of the said Don Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906. The record not disclosing that any of the amounts claimed by the plaintiff were due as a result of the management of the said estate during the time while the said defendant was administering their interests therein, except the sum of P188.39, admitted to be due by the defendant, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the only amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action is the said amount of P188.39. Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of error for the reason that there is no evidence in the record indicating any liability on the part of the defendant other than his admission above indicated. For the reason above stated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, without any special finding as to costs.

Arellano, C. J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur. Willard, J., concurs in the result. G.R. No. L-5131 July 31, 1952

ANTONIO MA. CUI, and MERCEDES CUI DE RAMAS, petitioners, vs. EDMUNDO S. PICCIO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, EUGENIO RODIL, as sheriff of the incompetent Don Mariano Cui, respondents. Amador E. Gomez for petitioner. Claro M. Recto for respondent. MONTEMAYOR, J.: Don Mariano Cui, widower, as owner of Lots Nos. 3212,2313 and 2319 situated in the City of Cebu, with anare of 152 square meters, 144 square meters and 2,362 square meters, respectively, of a total extension of 2,658 square meters, on March 8, 1946, sold said three lots to three of his children named Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de Ramas and Antonio Ma. Cui, pro indiviso for the sum of P64,000. Because Rosario C. de Encarnacion for lack of funds was unable to pay her corresponding share of the purchase price, the sale to her was concealed and the one-third of the property corresponding to her returned to the vendor. These three lots are commercial. The improvements thereon were destroyed during the last Pacific War so that at the time of the sale in 1946, there were no buildings or any other improvements on them. Because of the sale of these lots pro indiviso and because of the cancellation of the sale to one of the three original vendees, Don Mariano and his children Mercedes and Antonio became co-owners of the whole mass in equal portions. In the deed of sale vendor Don Mariano retained for himself the usufruct of the property in the following words: . . . do hereby sell, transfer, and convey to Messrs. Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de Ramas and Antonio Ma. Cui, the above-mentioned parcel of land in equal parts, . . . and the further consideration, that I, shall enjoy the fruits and rents of the same, as long as my natural life shall last. Granting and conveying unto the said buyers the full right as owners to enjoy the constructive possession of the same, improve, construct and erect a building in the lot, or do whatever they believe to be proper and wise, as long as the same will not impair nor obstruct my right to enjoy the fruits and rents of the same . . . . (Emphasis ours.) Subsequently, a building was erected on a portion of this mass facing Calderon street and was occupied by a Chinese businessman for which he paid Don Mariano P600 a month as rental. The date when the building was constructed and by whom do not appear in the record. Sometime after the sale to Mercedes and Antonio the two applied to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation(RFC) for a loan of P130,00 with which to construct a 12-door commercial building presumably on a portion of the entire parcel corresponding to their share. In order to facilitate the granting of the loan an inasmuch as only two of the three co-owners applied for the loan, Don Mariano on January 7, 1947, executed an authority to mortgage (Annex U) authorizing his two children co-owners to mortgage his share, the pertinent portion of said authority reading thus: That by virtue of theses presents, I hereby agree, consent, permit, and authorize my said coowners to mortgage, pledge my share so that they may be able to construct a house or building in the said property, provided however, that the rents of the said land shall not be impaired and will always be received by me. (Emphasis our.)

The loan was eventually granted and was secured by a mortgage on the three lots in question. Don Mariano being included as one of the three mortgagors and signing the corresponding promissory note with his two co-owners. He did not however, join in the construction of the 12-door commercial building as may be gathered from the "Conveniode Asignacion the three co-owners to assign to Don Mariano that one-third of the whole mass facing Calderon street and on which was erected the building already referred to as being occupied by a Chinese Businessman and for which he was paying Don Mariano P600 a month rental. The area of this one-third of the total are of these three lots. The pertinent portion of this Annex V reads as follows: Que como quiera que. la propiedad arriba descrita esta actual-mente hipotecada a la Rehabilitation Finance Corporation paragarantizar la construccion que mis conduenos construyeron en laparte que les correponde; Y que como quiera quie, el Sr. Don Mariano Cui, uno de los conduenos, no ha querido unirse a la construccion de dicho edificio, y desea que la parte que le corresponda sea la /3 que este dandofrente a la Calle Calderon. (Emphasis ours.) The 12-door commercial building was eventually constructed and the buildder-owners thereof receive the rents thereof amounting to P4,800 a month and paying therefrom the installments due for payment on the loan to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. On March 25, 1948, two other children of Don Mariano named Jesus and Jorge brought an action (civil case No. 59-R) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the purpose of annulling the deed of sale of the three lots in question on the ground that they belonged to the conjugal partnership of Don Mariano and his deceased wife Antonia Perales. Thereafter, plaintiffs Jesus and Jorge applied for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the lots and of the rentals of the building. This petition was denied on November 8, 1948. On March 19, 1949, Rosario C. de Encarnacion, that daughter of Don Mariano who was one of the original vendees filed a petition to declare her father incompetent and to have a guardian appointed for his property, in Special Proceeding No. 481-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In May 1949 the petition was granted and Don Mariano was declared incompetent and Victorino Reynes was appointed in civil case No. 599-R seeking to annul the deed of sale of the three lots in favor of Mercedes and Antonio was amended so as to include as plaintiffs not only the guardian Victorino Reyes but also all the other children of Don Mariano. On June 15, 1949, guardian Victorino Reyes filed a motion in the gurdianship proceedings seeking authority to collect the rentals from the three lots in question and asking the Court to order Antonio and Mercedes to deliver to him as guardian all the rentals they had previosly collected from the 12-door commercial building, together with all the papers belonging to his ward. This motion was denied by Judge Piccio in his order of July 12, 1949. The guardian did not appeal from this order. On May 22, 1951, Judge Saguin rendered a decision in civil case No. 599-R and found that the three lots in question were not conjugal property but belonged to exclusively to Don Mariano and so upheld the sale of two-thirds of said lots to Antonio and Mercedes. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending. On August 1, 1951, after the rendition of judgment in civil case No. 599-R upholding the sale, guardian Victorino Reynes again presented of filed a motion in the guardianship proceedings No. 481-R asking for the delivery of the rentals of the 12-door commercial building to him and for authority to collect future rentals thereon. On September 5, 1951, respondent Judge Piccio, the same Judge who had denied a similar motion about two years before, that is, on July 12, 1949, granted the motion in his order of the same date directing Antonio and Mercedes to deliver to the guardian the rentals of the building they had

so far collected, at the same time authorizing the guardian to collect future rentals. The motion to reconsider the order filed by Antonio and Mercedes was denied in an order dated October 1, 1951. The present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction was filed in this court for the purpose of annulling said order of September 5, 1951 and the order of October 1, 1951 denying the motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the trial court in the guardianship proceedings lacked jurisdiction to issue the order. To decide whether or not the respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the order of September 5, 1951 directing the petitioners herein to deliver to the guardian Victorino Reynes the rentals collected by them from the building and authorizing said guardian to collect future rentals, we must first determine the nature and status of said rentals in relation with the guardianship proceedings. Said determination requires an interpretation of section 6, Rule 97 of the Rules of Court which reads as follows: SEC. 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or conceling property of ward. Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having an actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away any money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear for examination, touching such money, goods, interest, or instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment, or conveyance. Chief Justice Moran in his comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 3rd, ed., pp. 478-479, says the following on this section; Substantially the same as sec. 573 of Act No. 190. This provision is similar to the procedure in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person and its purpose is merely to elicit information or secure evidence from the person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed any personal property of the ward. In such proceeding the court has no authority to determine the right of the property or to order delivery thereof. If after the examination the court finds this sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper action. Section 573 of Act 190 referred to above is now embodied in Rule 88, section 6 of the Rules of Court, and under said rule, Moran has practically the same comment as that reproduced above. In other words in his opinion neither in gaurdianship proceedings nor in administration proceedings may the court determining the ownership of property claimed by the gurdian or administrator to belong to the ward or to the estate of the deceased, and order its delivery to them. We believe that the purpose of these two rules, Rule 97, section 6 and Rule 88, section 6 of the Rules of Court is merely to secure evidence from persons suspected of embezzling, concealing or conveying away any property of the ward or of the deceased so as to enable said guardian or administrator to institute the appropriate action to obtain the possession of and secure title to said property, all for the protection of the interests of the ward and the estate of the deceased. Counsel for respondents invite our attention to several cases purporting to support the theory that the court in guardianship proceedings may actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. Out of the cases cited, the only one we find to have some relevancy in that of Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil., 839. In this case, the court made a distinction between the provisions of sections 709 and 593 of the Code of Civil Procedure which now correspond to section 6, Rule 88 and section 6 of Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. This Court in that case said in effect that while in admission proceedings the court under section 709 may only question the person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away property belonging to the estate, section 593 of the same Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Judge or the court to issue such orders as may be necessary to secure the estate against concealment, embezzlement and conveyance, and this distinction is now given emphasis by respondents' counsel. The way we interpret section 573 of the Code of Civil procedures as now embodied in Rule 97, section 6 of the Rules of Court in the light of the ruling laid down in the case

of Castillo vs. Bustamante, supra, is that the court may issue an order directing the delivery or return of any property embezzled, concealed or conveyed which belongs to a ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and indisputable. Such was the case of Castillo vs. Bustamante where husband and wife, parties in litigation, arrived at a compromise whereby they donated their conjugal property to their only child and this donation was duly accepted. This compromise was approved by the court and embodied in the decision and the parties were directed to comply with the terms of the compromise. Later, the husband refused to deliver the property donated. This court affirmed the order of the trial court requiring the husband to deliver said property to the guardians of the minor child because the title of the ward of res judicata. "We believe, however, that where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question as in the present case, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the ward or in favor of the persons said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings. Incidentally it may be here stated that about a month after the filing of the present case of certiorari, or rather on November 1, 1951, guardian Victorino Reynes filed an ordinary action, civil case No. R-1720, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Antonio and Mercedes to recover all the rentals of the 12-door building collected by them (Annex A-3). In the present case, is the right of the ward, Don Mariano, to the rentals of the 12-door building, clear and indisputable? The answer is definitely in the negative. Without any attempt or desire to determine the rights or lack of right of the ward to said rentals and prejudge the civil action No. R-1720 brought by the guardian in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover said rentals, on the basis only of the documents involved or presented in this certiorari proceedings and without any additional evidence, these are reasons to believe that the scales of title instead of favoring the ward, incline more in favor of and point to the owners of the building. We need not estate those reasons here. In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to issue his order of September 5, 1951, in the guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver the rentals collected by them to the guardian and authorizing the latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason that the jurisdiction of the court guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In view of the foregoing, the petition is granted and the order of respondent Judge of September 5, 1951, and his order of October 1, 1951, are hereby set aside. The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent. The respondent-guardian, Victorino Reynes, will pay the costs." Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-9979

March 28, 1958

In re guardianship of the minor MARINA or MARTA EBREO and GLORIFICACION EBREO. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Guardian of the Property, oppositor-appellant, vs. ASUNCION EBREO DE BORROMEO, guardian of the person, movant-appellee. Ramon B. de los Reyes for appellant. Eligio Cordero for appellee. PADILLA, J.: In January 1952, Asuncion Ebreo de Borromeo engaged the services of Attorney Eligio Cordero to file a petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the appointment of a guardian for her two minor nieces Marina or Maria and Glorificacion surnamed Ebreo and agreed to pay 20% of the value of the estate of the minors. On 2 July 1952, letters of guardianship were issued to her. On 24 August 1953, the letters were modified the appointment of the Philippine National Bank as guardian of the estate of the minors and of Asuncion Ebreo de Borromeo as guardian of their persons. On 25 July 1955, Asuncion asked for authority to pay Attorney Eligio Cordero the sum of P800 as attorney's fees, or 20% of P4,000, the total value of the estate of the minors secured by their widowed mother from the United States Veterans Administration. The Philippine National Bank objected to the petition on the ground that the fee is excessive. Attorney Cordero submitted a detailed description of his services together with the amount of compensation for each. On 13 September 1955, the probate court granted the petition directing the Philippine National Bank to pay Attorney Cordero the sum of P800 as attorney's fees. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Philippine National Bank has appealed. The provisions of Republic Act No. 145 which prohibit a "person assisting a claimant in the preparation, presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration" from directly or indirectly, soliciting, contracting for, charging or receiving, or attempting "to solicit, contract for, charge, or receive any fee or compensation, exceeding twenty pesos in any one claim," refer only to compensation to be paid to any person assisting a claimant in the preparation, presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration and not to attorney's fees for services rendered in a guardianship proceeding. Although the appellant Bank, as guardian of the estate of the minors, was not a party to the agreement entered into by the former guardian, nevertheless it is bound to pay a reasonable amount as attorney's fee, for legal services rendered by the attorney for the benefit of the estate of the minors. The agreement entered into by Asuncion Ebreo de Borromeo before her appointment as guardian and Attorney Eligio Cordero does not bind the estate of the minors without the approval of the probate court. Mention is made in the record on appeal of a compromise whereby Encarnacion H. de Ebreo, the mother of the minors, bound herself to pay to the guardian Asuncion Ebreo de Borromeo the sum of P4,000 as belonging to the estate of the minors, but it does not appear what professional service was rendered by the attorney except the drawing up of a petition to require the mother of the minors to turn over to the guardian the "properties" of said minors. The fact that a compromise agreement was entered into whereby the mother of the minors promised and bound herself to pay to the guardian of the minors P4,000 belonging to the estate of said minors is proof that, with the exception of drafting of the petition referred to and the writing of letters in connection therewith under dates of 15, 17 and 24 March, 1953, no other service was rendered by the appellee. Taking into consider on the value of the minor's estate which is P4,000 only and the professional service rendered in connection with the appointment of a guardian of the

minors, the amount of fees to which the attorney is entitled is P300, or 7.5% of P4,000, excluding of course any amount he had advanced for which he must reimbursed by the guardian Bank. The order appealed from is modified by reducing the attorney's fees to P300, without pronouncement as to costs. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-3352 June 12, 1950

ILEANA A. CELIS, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. SOLEDAD CAFUIR, ET AL., respondents-appellants. Jose S. Sarte for respondents-appellants. Valenton, Ildefonso, Jr. and Bautista for petitioners-appellees. MONTEMAYOR, J.: This is an appeal taken by the respondents, Soledad Cafuir and Jose Simeon, supposedly her husband, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in a habeas corpus case granting the petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the Sheriff of Manila who then had custody of the boy, Joel Cafuir (John Cafuir) to deliver said child to its mother, petitioner Ileana A. Celis. The appeal involving as it does only questions of law, we accept the findings of fact made by the trial court. The facts are few and quite simple and may be stated briefly as follows: On July 10, 1946, petitioner, Ileana A. Celis, single, gave birth at the North General Hospital to a boy subsequently named Joel (John) Cafuir. The father seems to be unknown, although from what may be gathered from the decisions appealed from, he was an American soldier who formed part of the American Liberation Forces. Due to the anger and extreme displeasure of the father of Ileana because of the alleged disgrace that she brought on herself and the family for having maintained illicit relations with a man to whom she had not been married and because of her father's objection to having her son in the paternal home where Ileana was then living, nine days after the delivery, Joel was given to the custody of the respondent Soledad Cafuir, who thereafter took him direct to the hospital to her house, ministered to his needs and comfort, and even employed a nurse to take care of him. Ileana herself spent several days in Soledad's house while recuperating; later, she returned to her own home leaving her child to the care of the respondent Soledad. Thereafter, Ileana visited her child every Saturday, taking him condensed milk, food, and a little money. On September 17, 1948, Ileana married her co-petitioner Agustin C. Rivera. The couple thereafter decided to get back Joel Cafuir. Because of the refusal of respondent Soledad to give him up, petitioners sued out the corresponding writ of habeas corpus. The theory of the respondents-appellants is that Ileana had definitely renounced her custody of and patria potestas over her child and that now she may not get him back. In support of this claim, Exhibit 4 and 1 were presented in evidence. The first exhibit is dated July 10, 1946, the same day that John Cafuir was born at the hospital, and reads as follows: July 10, 1946 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I hereby entrusted to Mrs. Soledad Cafuir of 131 Limasana, Quiapo, Manila, my son named John Cafuir, for the reason that I don't have the means to bring the child up. Anybody who may claim my son for adoption in the future without the consent of the undersigned is hereby ignored. (Sgd.) NENITA CELIS Mother The second, Exhibit 1, is dated November 2, 1946, and reads as follows: November 2, 1946 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: I, Nenita Celis, of 1196 Singalong, Malate, Manila, is hereby designate Mrs. Soledad Cafuir, residing at 131 Limasana, R. Hidalgo, Quiapo, Manila to be the real guardian of my son, named Johnny Cafuir. No one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir. (Sgd.) NENITA CELIS Mother The trial court found and ruled that under these two exhibits signed by petitioner Ileana Celis, there is no basis for finding that she had renounced the custody of her child in favor of respondent Soledad. We agree with the said finding and ruling of the trial court. In the case of Diaz vs. Estrera (L-1155, June 30, 1947; 44 Off. Gaz., 4354),1 this court in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus involving the custody of a child held that paternal authority or patria potestas may be waived, and it denied the petition of the mother to recover the custody of her child from the respondent Estrera. The facts in that case are, however, a little different from those in the present case. There, the mother in giving up the custody of her child signed a document reading as follows: A quien concierna: Hago constar que yo, Soria Bernardo Diaz, filipina, mayor de edad y vecina del pueblo de Badian, Cebu, doy a mi hija Dulcisima que nacio en la propia casa de los esposos seor y Seora, de Servando Estrera, del pueblo de Mandaue, Cebu, debido a su amor grande a mi hija y como correspondencia a sus preocupaciones y gastos con motivo de mi parto ofrecido a ellos sin ninguna vacilacion o deseo de tener la referida nia. Hago entender que cuando firme este documento ha cesado mi autoridad sobre mi hija y si en los dias futuros intentare intervenir, reclamando dicha nia y sacandola, yo podria ser acusada ante los tribunales del pueblo para que me castiguen por la infraccion, que yo comitiere de este contrato que he firmado. He firmado esto en este dia 20 de Febrero del ao 1944 en presencia de los testigos que firman abajo.

(Fda.) SORIA BERNARDO DIAZ Madre de la nia From a reading of the above-quoted document it is not hard to see that the mother definitely gave up and renounced all right and claim to the custody of her child. She even imposed against herself a penal sanction should she in the future try to claim her child. Moreover, in that case, was the latter's adulterine father and the circumstance seems to be one of the considerations which impelled this court to overrule the mother's claim and leave the custody of the child in the status quo, for the reason that the respondent being the father, tho illegitimate, of the child, he had obligations and duties towards said child such as support, care, and education, and that said duties and obligations could best be complied with by keeping the child in his own home. The facts in the present case, however, are quite different. The respondents, particularly Soledad, are strangers to the child. She is not related to him in any degree by consanguinity or affinity. Furthermore, the document wherein the boy's mother is supposed to have definitely renounced custody over the child cannot be reasonably interpreted as having contemplated such renunciation. In the first document she merely entrusted her son to Soledad because she did not have the means to bring him up. The word "entrusted" cannot convey the idea of definite and permanent renunciation of the mother's custody of her child. The second document, Exhibit 1, merely designated respondent Soledad as the "real guardian" of the child. The designation of one as the guardian of another cannot and does not mean that said guardian will always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position. Guardianship is always or almost invariably understood to be temporary. While one is a minor or is incompetent, a guardian is appointed; but when minority has passed or incapacity has ceased, guardianship also terminates. The same reasoning may be applied in the present case. While petitioner Ileana was still unable to care for and support her child and because she could not bring said child to live with her in the home of her father, she entrusted its custody and care to respondent. Now, that she has been emancipated from the parental authority of her father and now that she has already been married and is now in a position to care for and support her own child, this with the consent and desire of her husband, who joins her in the petition, there can no longer be any reason for depriving her of the custody of her boy. In her legitimate efforts, and to have her realize her natural desire in this respect, the law and this court should give her every help. Furthermore, the very last paragraph of Exhibit 1 to the effect that "no one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir," envisages a future act; it means that no one else may adopt the boy except respondent Soledad. It does not mean, however, that she has already adopted him. She may or may not adopt him. It is something yet to be done in the future. This the respondent has not done. Of course, we realize and understand the position and attitude of respondent Soledad. She must have come to love the boy whom she raised from baby-hood and on whom she may have lavished her affections and spent money for rearing him up. To separate the boy from her now will mean a loss and mental suffering. But to assuage such suffering she has her own children, four of them. Now let us look at the other side of the picture. It shows to us the case of a real and natural mother legitimately, anxiously, and desperately trying to get back her child in order to fill the void in her heart and existence. She wants to make up for what she has failed to do for her boy during the period when she was financially unable to help him and when she could not have him in her house because of the objection of her father. Now that she has her own home and is in better financial condition, she wants her child back, and we repeat that she has not and has never given him up definitely or with any idea of permanence. This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the

cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise all that they have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. On this point we quote with approval a paragraph in the decision of the trial court presided over by Judge Tiburcio Tancinco: El juzgado mira con simpatia los esfuerzos hechos por la recurrida Soledad Cafuir y su familia por el ciudado del nio Joel, a quien se le ha rodeado de todas las comodidades y cuyos maneras caprichos han sido satisfechos, y preve el dolor que causaria a ella y a los demas miembros de su familia la seperacion del nio Joel, en quien se han acostumbrado a ver a un verdadero hijo. Pero si este cario es digno de respeto, que es el amor de madre, no solo porque esta reconocido y amparado por las leyes y constituye un derecho mejor, sino porque tiene su origen en la misma sangre. The decision of the trial court does not assess the financial means of the mother to support and educate the boy. But bearing in mind the fact that she is now married to a man who with her is ready and willing to assume the responsibility of support and education, we may presume that the couple is able to discharge and cope with said responsibility. It is possible that the means of the respondent in this respect are more adequate, and that Joel would be better off staying and remaining with her. But financial means is not everything. Whether a child should stay permanently with a kindly stranger or with his own mother, is not to be determined alone by considerations of affluence or poverty. Poor youths who had to work their way thru school and college, have, not infrequently, scaled the heights of success, as easily and swiftly as their more favored companions, and done so with more, inner satisfaction, and credit to themselves and their humble parents. As to the petition of respondents that they be indemnified in the sum of P5,531.15, the amount spent for the care and support of the child, we agree with the trial court that said claim should be made and established in a separate suit. Pending the present appeal, upon motion of respondent Soledad, she was, by resolution of this court dated October 14, 1949, given temporary custody of the boy Joel Cafuir, and pursuant thereto, the Sheriff had been directed to deliver said boy to Soledad. The dispositive part of the decision appealed from should therefore direct not the Sheriff but respondent Soledad to deliver the boy to petitioners. With this modification, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs. Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-17066

December 28, 1961

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON, Incompetent. CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON, petitioner-appellee, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, guardian-appellant, ADMINISTRATION OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, oppositorappellant. REYES, J.B.L., J.: chanrobles virtual law library As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson became entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits which amounted to P10,738 as of July 1, 1957, and to a monthly death compensation for the rest of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration. Upon inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent, the Veterans Administration filed Special Proceeding No. 586 in the Court of First Instance of La Union, where in due course, an order was entered on August 8, 1957, adjudging Carmen Vda. de Bengzon to be an incompetent and appointing the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as guardian of her estate comprising the monies due from the said Veterans Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued in favor of the Philippine National Bank.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On March 5, 1960, alleging that she had regained her competence, her ward, by counsel, filed a petition asking for an order terminating the guardianship, and for delivery to her of the residuary estate. Attached to this petition was a medical certificate attesting that she was mentally competent and possessed full knowledge of her environmental surroundings. This was opposed by the Veterans Administration on the ground that by reason of her advanced age (78), physical and mental debility, she was still an incompetent within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. On March 30, 1960, the son of the ward, Francisco Bengson, filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that he was the personal guardian of the incompetent; that if appointed guardian of her estate as well, he will comply with all the provisions of the Rules of Court, will not ask any remuneration for his services, and will file a nominal bond. He prayed to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate in place of the Philippine National Bank, and for the balance of her estate to be withdrawn or transferred from the Philippine National Bank's main office to its branch at San Fernando, La Union, in his account as guardian. On the same date, the lower court ordered Francisco Bengson to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate to substitute the Philippine National Bank, upon filing a P1,000 bond with proper sureties; the Philippine National Bank to transfer to its branch office at San Fernando, La Union, whatever funds it has belonging to the ward, upon Francisco Bengson's filing the required bond and taking his oath. As reasons for the removal of the Philippine National Bank and the appointment of Bengson, the lower court observed that the ward was living with Francisco Bengson in the latter's capacity as personal guardian; that the appointment of Bengson in place of the Philippine National Bank would save the compensation being paid that Bank; and that the transfer to the Philippine National Bank branch at San Fernando, La Union would be more convenient to all concerned for the proper administration of the estate. The required bond was thereafter filed and letters of guardianship issued to Francisco Bengson. A motion to reconsider was denied by the order of May 11, 1960, which, however, raised of the amount of the bond to P13,000, based on a finding that the cash balance of the estate then amounted to P11,464.34 plus the monthly income estimated at P134, or P1,608 per annum. Hence, this joint appeal by the Philippine National Bank and the Veterans Administration..chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find this appeal meritorious. The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in Section 2, Rule 98 of the Rules. When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to render an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto.... (emphasis supplied). Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a guardian, a guardian cannot be legally removed from office except for the causes therein mentioned (Alemany vs. Moreno, 5 Phil. 172; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed. p. 515). This is also the American law (39 C.J.S., p. 657). Accordingly, conflict of interest (Ribaya vs. Ribaya, 74 Phil. 254; Gabriel vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25) has been held sufficient ground for removal, premised on the logic that antagonistic interests would render a guardian unsuitable for the trust. To the extent that a court uses its discretion in appraising whether a person is insuitable or incapable of discharging his trust, that much it can be said that removal is discretionary. But the discretion must be exercised within the law, and when the latter has laid down the grounds for removal of a guardian, discretion is limited to inquiring as to the existence of any of those grounds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that there was any legal ground upon which the removal of the Philippine National Bank as guardian was founded. Neither in Francisco Bengzon's manifestation nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to appear that the Philippine National Bank had become incapable of discharging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed anything which the Rules includes as grounds for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all throughout, the Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily. The it has received commissions allowed by law for its services is no ground to remove it, especially since the Bank's commission averages no more than P100.00 a year and is offset by interest on the ward's deposit and the sum that the son would probably have to disburse in bond premiums. Neither is it sufficient to base removal on the unsubstantiated opinion that it would be more beneficial to the interests of the ward and more convenient for the administration of the estate. A guardian should not be removed except for the most cogent reasons (39 C.J.S. 65); otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As to the alleged inconvenience of the guardian of the incompetent's person having to come to Manila to obtain money for the ward's sustenance, the same can be obviated by merely requiring the appellant Bank to keep part of the moneys in the San Fernando (La Union) branch, without altering the guardianship.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from dated March 30, 1960 and May 11, 1960 are reversed, costs against the appellee Francisco Bengson.