94TH 2d

CONQBEES Session

>

SENATE

REPORT

h-0. 94-755

INTELLlGENCE ACTIVITIESAND THE RIGHTSOFAMERICANS

BOOK II

FINAL
OF

REPORT
THE

TO STUDY

SELECT COMMITTEE GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE

ACTIVITIES

UNITED
ADDITIONAL,

STATES
TOGETHER WITH

SENATE
AND SEPARATE

SUPPLEMENTAL, VIEWS

APRIL

26

(legislative

day,

APRIL

14),

1976

U.S. 68-786 0

GOVERNMENT WASHINGTON

PRINTING : 1976

OFFICE

For sale

by the Superintendent Washington,

of Documents, DC. 20402

U.S. Government - Price $3.60

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SENATE

SELECT WITH

COMMITTEE RESPECT

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

OPERATIONS

FRANK CHURCH, JOHN 0. TOWER,

PHILIP A. HART, Michigan WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota WAUTER D. HUDDLESTON. Kentudty ROBERT MORQAN, North Carolina GARY HART, Colorado WILLIAM G. MILLER, Btofl DErector FB~DEBICK A. 0. SCHWAB& Jr., Chtef Counsel COBTIS R. SMOTHERS, CouneeZ to the Yinoritl AUDBPY HATBY, CZerk of the Committee ml

Idaho, Ohdrman Texas, Vfce Chairman HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.. Tennessee BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JB.. Maryland RICHARD 8. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania

LETTER

OF TR~~SSJIITTAL

On behalf of the Senate Select (ommitter to Stutly Governmental A1c+i\.itirs, ant1 piirsiiitnt to Operations with Respect to Intelligence the mantlate Of Senate Resolution 21, I am transmitting herewith to the Senate the volume of the Committees Final Report. which presents the results of the Committees investigation into Fctleral tlomcstic intelligence activities. The Committees fintlings anal conclusions concerning :I~IISCS in intelligence activity and \ycaknesses in the system of accom~tabilit~ and control are amply docnmcntrtl. I brlicw they lnakt~ a compelling case for substantial reform. The l~rconlmclldatio~~s section of this vo1111mr sets forth in detail the Committees l~rOposals for reforms nectssay to protect the right of Americans. The facts revealed by the (ornmlttees inquiry into the dcrelopmcnt of tlomestic intelligence activity are outlined in the balance of the volume. I n-Onlcl add one principal comment on the results of the Commit&es inquiry: The root cause Of the excesses \vhich onr record amply tleiiioiistrates has been failure to apply the wisdom of the constitntional system of checks ant1 balances to intelligence activities. 0111 c~sperienw as a nation has tniyht. 11s that we must, place our trust. in l:~ws, ant1 not solely in nien. The founding f:dliers foresaw exc(?ss as the inevitable cOnsequence Of granting any part Of ~government ulichcckcd p~wr. This has been tlcnlonstr:~trtl in the mtelligcncc field where. too often, constitutioii:~l principles were. subortlinwted to :Lpragmatic course of periiiitting tlesirctl cwtls to dictate and justify in1proper
111ca11s.

Onr ~rcomnirntlntioiis arc tlesipnctl to l)lace intelligence activities xithiii the coiistitiitional scliemc for controlling r p\-cImllcllt po\wl. The members of this (oinniittw liavc WI,\-et1 wtli utmost tliliprnce ant1 tlctlication. We Ilaw hat1 1% Full (onlniittcr nwcting.3. scores of other sessions at which Senators pwsitle(l at tlcl)ositions for the taking of testimony, ant1 over 40 s~~b~ornniitter meetings tlevotetl to tlrafting the t1v-o vol~~rlirs of 0111final report. I thank each ant1 every 0110 of lll;v c0llc:lglles for their hart1 work illl(1 for their tlctermination that the job be clonr fully ant1 fairly. ,Jolln Towers se].\-ice as Iice (ll:~iAlil~l n-as essential to 0111rflccti~wicss from start to finish. This inquiry c~oultl ha\-c been tlistixctetl by partisan aiyuinei~t~ over allocating the blairic~ for iiitellipncc csCCSSCS. Tnsteatl. we hare unanimously conclutlrtl tllitt intelligcww problems illc f:ll* IllOlC flllldilIll~~llt~l. Then are not tllc 1)10clll(*t of :lll;v single aclniinistr:ltion. part\-. or man. .\t the outset, of this partiwlnr vo1~11nc special iii~wtioii is ills0 tlllc . to Senator Walter F. J[ontlalc for his chairinnnship of the subcwmrnittcc chaiyd with tlrafting the final report On tloiiiestic intclligencc activity. T)iii*ing 0111hearings. Senator SIontlale hclpctl to bring into focus the threats posctl to the rights of A~inc~ricaii citizens. Tic illltl his
(III)

Iv
domestic subcommittee colleagues-Senator Howard Raker, as ranking Minority member, and Senators Philip Hart,, Robert Morgan and Richard Schweiker-deserve great credit for the complete and compelling draft which they presented to t,he Full Committee. The staff of the Committee has worked long, hard and well. Without their work over t.he past year-and during many long nights and weekends-the Committee could not have come close to coping with its massive job. I commend and thank them all. The staff members whose work was particularly associated with this volume and its supplementary detailed reports are listed in Appendix C.

FRASK

CHURCH,

Chairman.

In .Janunr~ lDi5. the Senate resol\-etl to establish a Conlnlittee to: contlwt an inr-cstigation mid study o$ ~overilnlental Operations with respect to intelligence activltlrs ant1 the extent, if any, to which illegal, iniproper~ or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Gorernmcnt.l This Conlmittee, n-as organized shortly thereafter anti has conducted a year-long inr-estigation mto the iiitelllgencc activities of the Vnited States Governnient. the first substantial inquiry into the intelligence conmimity since World War TI. The inquiry arosc out of allegations of substantial wrongdoing by intelligence agencies on behalf of the administrations which the? served. A deeper concern unclerlyi,n,p the investigation was whether this (+overnii~ents intelligence activities were go~ernecl and controlled consistently Cth the fundaiiiental principles of ,Iiiierican constitutional go\-ernliieiit-that power niust be checked and balanced and that the preservation of liberty requires the restraint, of laws, and not simply the gootl intentions of nicn. Our investigation has confiriiwtl that l)roperly controlled and lawful iiitellipcnce is vital to the nations interest. ,I strong ant1 effective intelligence system serves. for example. to monitor potential military threats from the Soviet I-nion ant1 its allies, to verify compliance with international agreements such as SALT. ant1 to combat espionage and international terrorism. These, ant1 nlany other necessary and proper functions are, perfomietl by detlicntctl and hard working employees of the intelligence coirininnity. Tlw Conlnlittees investigation has. however. also confinned substantial wrongdoing. And it has demonstrated that intelligence activities hnvc not. gcne~~allv been governed and controlletl in accord with thn funtlan~ental p&ciples of our constitutional systerii of go\-ernment. The task faced by this Committee was to propose eflectlre measures to prevent intelligence excesses.and at the sametime to propose sound gGde.lines anal oversight proceclnres with which to govern and co.ntrol legitimate activities. Having conrlnded its investigation, the Comiiittee issuesits reports 2 for the purposes of: providing a fair factual basis for informed Congressional and public debate on critical issues affecting the role of go\-eminental intelligence actiritirs in a free society; and
* Senate Resolution 21. January 27. 19775, Sec. 1. The full text of S. Res. 21 is printed at Appendix A. aTlir Committees final rfport is divided into two main volumes. The I~lance of this volume covers domestic activities of int~llieeucc nwncies and their activities owrseas to the extent that they affect the r&titutiokl rights of Americans. Thr other rolnme cowrs all other activities of Vnitecl States foreign and military intelligence agencies. The Committee has previously issued the reports and hearing records set forth in Appendix R.

VI

recommending such legislative and executive action as, in the judgment of the Committee, is appropriate to prevent recurrence of past abusesand to insure adequate coordination, control and oversight of the nations intelligence resources, capabilities, and activit,ies.

In elaboration of the broad mandate set forth at the outset of this Report, the Senate charged the Committee with investigating fourteen specific. matters or questions and with reporting the full facts on them. The fourteen enumerated matters and questions concern: (i) what kind of activities have been-and should be-undertaken by intelligence agencies; (ii). whether those activities conform to law and the Constitution; and (iii) how intelligence agencies have beenand should be-coordinated. controlled and overseen.3 In addition to in\-estipatiltp the full facts with respect to such matters, the Committee was instructed to determine : Whether any of the existing laws of the. United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of ,4merican citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence ancl related activities and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies. [Id., Sec. 2 (12) ] B.
THE

MAJOR

QUESTIOXS

Our investigation addressed the structure, history, activities and policies of Americas most important intelligence agencies. The Committee looked beyond the operation of individual agencies to examine common themes and patterns inherent in intelligence operations. In the course of its investigation, the Committee has sought to answer three broad questions : First, whether domestic intelligence activities have been consistent with law and with the individual liberties guaranteed to dmerican citizens by the Constitution. Second, whether Americas foreign intelligence activities hare served the national interest in a manner consistent with the nations ideals and with national purposes.
S. Res. 21, Ser. 2. Examples of the matters or questions include: The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens by the FBI or other agencies. [Sec. 2 (2) I ; agencies [Sec. The violation or suspected violation of law by intelligence Allegations of CIA domestic activity, and the relationship between CIA responsibility to protect sources and methods and the prohibition of its exercising law enforcement powers or internal securit.v functions [Sec. 2(l), (6)l ; The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan [Sec. 2(7) (9)l ; activities abroad [Sec. The extent and necessity of covert intelligence 2(14)1; Whether there is excessive duplication or inadequate coordination among intelligence agencies [Sec. 2 (4) (13) ] and The nature and extent of executive oversight [Sec. 2(i) (9) ] and the need Congressional oversight [Sec. for improved, strengthened or consolidated
2(10)1;

Z(7) (9)

(11)l.

VII

Third, whether the institutional procedures for directing and controlling intelligence agencies have adcqnately emured their compliance with policy and law, and I\-llether those procedures have been based upon the system of checks and balances among the branches of government required by 0111 Constitution: The Comn1itte.e fully subscribes to the premise that intelligence agencies perform a necessary and proper function. The Preamble to the Constitution states that our government was created. in part, to insure domestic tranquility [and] proTide for the common defense. ,\ccnrate and timely intelllpence can and does help meet those goals. The Committee is also mindful, however, of the danger which intelligence collection, and intelligence operations, may pose for a society pronnded in democratic principles. The Preamble to our Constitution also declares that our government was created to secure the blessings of liberty- and to establish justice. If domestic intelligence agencies ignore those principles, they may threaten the very \-alues t.hat form the foundation of our society. Similarly, if the government conducts foreign intelligence opcratlons overseas which are inconsistent with 0~11' national ideals, our reputation, goals: and influence abroad may be undercut.

1. SELECTIOS

OF

AGESCIES,

PROGRAJIS

ASD

CASES

TO EJIPIL~SIZE

Secessarily, the Committee had to be selective. To investigate everything relevant to intelligence-and even everything relevant to the fmndamental issues on which we llad decided to fouls-would take forever. Our job was to discover-anal suggest solutions for-the major problems at the earliest practical date.* -4ccordingly. the Committee hat1 to choose the particr1lar Govenimental entities ~ipon which we wo~ild concentrate and then further llad to choose particular cases to investigate in depth. Many agencies, departments or bureans of the Federal Gorernment have an intelligence function. Of these, the Committee spent the over\\helming preponderance of its energies on fire : The Federal I3nrean of Investigation ; The Central Intelligence Agency; The Kational Security ,Igency ; The national intelligence components of the Defense Department (other than KS*\) ; and The Sational Security Council ant1 its component parts. The agencies upon which the Committee concentrated are those whose powers are so great and whose practices were so extensive that they miist be iindcMoot1 in order fairly to jntlge whether the intelligence s;!-stem of the Thitetl States neetls reforni ant1 change. ITavmg selected the agencies to en11)liasize. the Committee also had to sclecat I,cl~res(~iit:\ti\-r programs ant1 policies on which to concentrate. Tlierc were many more possible issues and allegations to investigate
S. Res. 21 ; SW. 5. G Sulwtnntinl wnrk was nue Srrvicr and the Statr also dnnp I)elmrtment. nn intelligrnw activities of the Internal Rrre-

VIII

than could be covered fully and fairly. The principles which guided our choices were : (1) More is learned by investigating tens of programs and incidents in depth rather than hundreds superficially. Our goal was to understand causesand. where appropriate, to suggest solutions. (2) Cases most likely to produce penrrnl lessons should receive the most attention. (3) Programs were examined from each administration beginning with Franklin Roosevelt?. This assured nnderstanding of the historical context within which intelligence activities have developed. Fundamental issuesconcerning the conduct and character of the nation deserve nonpartisan treatment. It has become clear from our inquiry. moreover, that intelligence excesses, at home and abroad, have been found in every administration. They are not the product of any single party, administration. or man. 2.
LIMITATIOXS ASD STRESGTHS

(a) The Focus on Problem Anm The intelligence community has had broad responsibilitv for activities beyond those which we investigated as nossibly illcpal. improper, or unethical. Our reports primarily address problenl areas and the command and control question gencrallv. However, the intelligence community performs vital tasks outside the areas on which our investigation concentrated. This point must be kept in mind in fairness to the agencies, and to their employees who have devoted their careers to the naGons service. Moreover, one of many reasons for checkins intelligence excessesis to restore the confidence, good name, and effectiveness of intelligence agencies so that they may better serve the nation in the future.6
(6) Caution on Questions of Individual Gu.ilt 01 Innocence

A Senate Committee is not a prosecutor, a grand jury or a court. It is far better suited to determine how things Tvent.wrong and what. can be done to prevent their going wrong again, than to resolve disputed questions of individual (guilt or innocence. For the resolution of those questions we properly rely on the courts. Of course, to understand the past in order to better propose guidance for the future, the Committee had to investigate the facts underlying charges of wrongdoing. Facts involve people. Therefore, the Committee has necessarily had to determine what particular individuals appear to have done and, on occasion, to make judgments on their responsibility. We. hare, however. recognized our limitations and attempted to be cautious in reaching those judgments; the reader should be similarly cautious in evaluating our judgments. The Committees hope is that this report will provoke a national debate not on Who did it ?!, but on How did it happen and what can be done to keep it, from happening again?
Indeed, it is likely that in snme cases the high priority giren to activities that appear qurstionahle has reduced the attention Siren to other rital matters. Thns, the FRI. for example, has placed more emphasis on domestic dissent than on nrgxnized crime and, according to some, let its efforts against fnreign spies suffer because of the amount of time spent checking up on American protest groups.

Ix

(c) Ability to See the FUZZ Xcopc of the Probkm This Committee examined a verv broad range of issues and compiled a hughe factual record i which covers: (i) the origins and development, of intelligence programs over seven administrations; (ii) intelligence activities both at home and abroad; and (iii) the programs and practices of the several most important intelligence agencies. Thus, for the first time, based upon the Committees investigation, it is possible to examine the patterns of intelligence activity and not merely isolated incidents. The issues for the country to rcsolre arc best posed by looking, as we hare done. at the aggregate, rnthw than at particular incidents in isolation. Keithcr the dangers, nor the causes. nor the possible solutions can be fairly evalnatcd without considering both the broad patterns of intelligence activity TThich emerge from examining particular cases over the past several decades. and the cumulative effect of activit,ies of different agencies. For example, individual cases or programs of governmental sur\-eillnnce may constitute interference with constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dissent. But only by examining the cumulatiw impact of man); such programs can the danger of Big Brother Government be rrallstically assessed. Only by understanding the full breatltb of governn~entnl efforts against dissenters can one weigh tllc extent to which those efforts ma,y chill lawful assembly and free expression.
II. TIIE PURPOSE OF THE COJZJIII~ES FISOIXGS
.\ND

RECOJIMESDATIONS

The central goal of tlic Committee is to ninkc inforiiwd Iwolllmendations-based upon a detailed ant1 balanced factual investigation-about : (1) which intelligence activities ought to be permitted, and which should be rcstrictcd or prohibited; and (2) n-hat controls and organizational structure are needed to keep intelligence operations both cffcctire and consistent with this countrys most basic 1~1aes and fundamental interests.
Some 800 witnesses were rsnmined, appr0simatel.v 250 under oath in esecutire sessions, 50 in pnl,lic sessions, and the hnlance in inten-iews. Tlv? nggregate number of trnnscript pages is nlmost 30.000. Approsiniatelg 310.000 document pages were obtained from the rnrious intelligence agencies (still more were preliminarily reviewed at the agencies). as dell xs from the White House, nresidential lil,rnrirs. and other sources. _ Over the course of its investigntion the Committer has hnd genenlly good cooperation in obtaining information from the intelligence agencies nnd the Admi&trwtion. Of course, there were problems, particulnr1.v 3t the outset+omIrliance took too long; burenucmtic rules snch ns the third agency rule (which required agencies other than t.hr custodian of the document to review it if the7 were mentioned) were frustrating. Rnt our experience suggests thnt those prohlems can IW worked out. The most important lesson to be derived from our experience is thnt effective oversight is impossible without regular access to the underlying working dorumerits of the intelligence ?ommunit;r. Top level l)riefings do not adrquntrly describe the renlitirs. Fl,r that the documents nre n necessary supplement and at times the only source.

The first step for this Committ,ee, its successor oversight Committees and the Congress as a whole is to devise the legal framework within which intelligence agencies can! in the future, be guided, checke.d and operate both properly and efficiently. A basic law-a charter of powers, duties, and limitation-does not presently exist for some of the most important intelligence activities (e.g.? FBIs domestic intelligence or NSA) or, where it does exist, as w-lt,h CT,\, it is vague, conflicting and incomplete. The absence of laws and the lack of clarity in those that exist has had the effect, if not the intention, of keeping vit,al issues of national importance away from public debate. This Committees job was to pose the issues that have been ignored for decades. The technique for doing so was to investigate and then to propose basic laws and other rules as to what can and cannot be done, and on the appropriate command and control structure for intelligence activities. There are many other questions, such as the efficiency, cost and quality of intelligence, which are also of vital national importance. We have also examined these matters and consider them in this report. But, the main emphasis of our investigation was on what should be done and not on how it should be done. We seek in our recommendations to lay the underlying legal foundation, and the control and oversight structure for the intelligence community. If these are sound, then we have faith that the other questions will be answered correctly in the future. But if the foundation is unsound or remains unfinished--or if intelligence agencies continue to operate under a structure in which executive power is not effectively checked and examined-then we will have neither quality intelligence nor a society which is free at home and respected abroad.

CONTENTS
Page

Letter of Transmittal_-_____.__ -___- ______ - __._____ -_-.- .____ ----Preface____------------------------------------------------------I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY________. -------______ A. Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens Rights- ____ -_-_----________ - ______ B. TheQuestions__------------------.--------..----------C. Summary of the Main Problems- _ __________________ -- - -. 1. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity ____ --- ______ - ____ -___-_- ______. 2. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long-3. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means-----~--------..---~----~--~--~~-~--.-a. Covert Action- _______ -_-_- _________ - ___.(1) The FBIs COINTELPRO-_-------. (2) Martin Luther King, Jr _____ - -- _. _ _ b. Illegalor Improper Means___-----------.-(1) Mail Opening ____ -- _.____.___ - -_._(2) NSA Monitoring_ ____ _ _ _ - _ - - - _. - _ _ (3) Electronic Surveillance__-_-----.-.~. (4) Political Abuse..----.. __ _ - _ ___-. . - _(5) Surreptitious Entries- - - - -__ - _ - _. _. _ (6) Informants-_--._._ ---_-----~.-.-_ 4. IgnoringtheLaw.____ ---_-----_____._-.__.-.-5. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control-- - _ - _ _. . _ 6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity-----_____----~---------~~-------~~---.a. General Efforts to Discredit ____ -__. -_- -_._. b. Media Manipulation ________ -_---_--_____ c. Distorting Data to Influence Government Policy and Public Perceptions-__---_.---. d. Chilline First Amendment Rights_- _. _ - . - _ e. Prevent&g the Free Exchange OF Ideas- __ _ _ _ 7. Cost and Value ____ -_--- __._____________..__----II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, 1936 to 1976: A. Summary_-_____-_-__________--~_-_-___-~---~~-..-----1. The Lesson: History Repeats Itself ____.___ _____-_2. The Pattern: Broadening Through Time ______ ______ 3. Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence-.. B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure: 1936-1945---____--_-_______----------------------------1. Background: The Stone Standard----___ __ - _- __ __ 2. Main Developments of the 1936-1945 Period----__ _ 3. Domestic Intelligence Authority: Vague and Conflicting Executive Orders _______________ ----- __.____ a. The Original Roosevelt Orders- _ _ _ ___-__- _. b. Orders in 1938-39: The Vagueness of Subversive Activities and Potential Crimesc. Orders 194943: The Confusion Continues- - 4. The Role of Congress-- ___________ --_------_____ a. Executive Avoidance of Congress- _ ___ - ____ _ b. Congress Declines to Confront the Issue- - - - (XI)

... 111 V

1 i 5 t

13 14

ii:

15 16 ::: 18 21 21 21 22 23 23 24

25 27 ii 29

II. THE

GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-Continued B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure1936-1945 Continued 5. Scope of Domestic Intelligence--__.____________ -_ a. Beyond Criminal Investigations_ - _ - __- ___ _ b. Infiltration Investigations--------------c. Partisan Use- ___ __ - ____ _ - - __ _________ ____ d. Centralized Authority: FBI and Military Intelligence _____ --------------: _______. 6. Control by the Attorney General: Compliance and Resistance____.------------------------------7. Intrusive Techniques : Questionable Authorization -- a. Wiretaps: A Strained Statutory Interpretation~__-------------------------------b. Bugging, Mail Opening, and Surreptitious Entry___-----------------------------C. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1946-1963--_1. Main Developments of the 1946-1963 Period__ _ _ - __. 2. Domestic Intelligence Authority- __- _ _ _ _ _- _ - _ - ___. _ a. Anti-Communist Consensus - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ b. The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Program_--------------------------------(1) Origins of the Program---__ _. _ -_ _ _ (2) Breadth of Investigations----_- ____ (3) FBI Control of Loyalty-Security Investigations _____ - _- ___ ______ ____ c. Executive Directives: Lack of Guidance and Controls----------------------------------3. Scope of Domestic Intelligence- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ a. Subversive Activities-_ _ _ __ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (1) The Number of Investigations_- ___ (2) Vague and Sweeping Standards- _ _ _ _ (3) COMINFIL---or--~~~m~~~~--~~(4) Exaggeration fluence------------------------b. Racial Matters and Hate Groups- _ _ _ __ c. FBI Political Intelligence for the White House__------------------------------d. IRS Investigation of Political Organizations_ 4. Accountability and Control-_ _ _- _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ a. Emergency Detention Act- _ _ _____ _- __ _ ____ b. Withholding Information_ _ _- __ _- __ __ _ __ _c. CIA Domestic Activity-- - _ _ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ (1) Vague Controls on CIA- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (2) Drug Testing and Cover Programs-5. Intrusive Techniques----_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - __ __ _ __ __ __ - _ _ _ a. Communication Interception: CIA and NSAb. FBI Covert Techniques_-_-__ _ _ _ _ __ - _ _ _ _ __ (1) Electronic Surveillance--_ __ __ _ __ _ _ (2) Black Bag Jobs- _ __-___________(3) Mail Opening---____ --___-__- ____ c. Use of FBI Wiretaps-- __- _________ -__ __ ___ 6. Domestic Covert Action __________________ -__ - -___ a. COINTELPRO: Communist Party--------b. Early Expansion of COINTELPRO--_- - ___ D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976- -________-_1. Main Points During the 1964-1976 Period-----__ _ 2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence_ _ _ __ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ a. Domestic Protest and Dissent: FBI_-- _ ____ (1) Racial Intelligence- - __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (2) New Left Intelligence _ _ - - _____ _. b. FBI Informants _____ -___-_-___-___-___--_ (1) Infiltration of the Klan _ _ _ _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _

tZ 47
48 49 50

58
58

70 71 ii 74

XIII II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE-Continued D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976-Continued 2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence-Continued b. FBI Informants-Continued (2) Listening Posts in the Black Community----__._____._.__ ~_---(3) Infiltration of the New Left -- - - - _ _ c. Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity--_-------_-_-___.____ -_----__ d. Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence _.___ -~---------------_____ e. The Justice Departments Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU)--________ ~---~_. f. COhlINFIL Investigations: Overbreadth__ _ 3. Domestic Intelligence Authority_. _. . . _ __ _ _ - - - __ _ a. FBI Intelligence-~-----~---------~---~~~~~ b. Army Intelligence_._------------~--~.~.~~~ c. FBI Interagency Agreements-~-~------._..~ 4. Domestic Covert Action-------------------~~ a. COINTELPRO---__________._.._. ---_.. (1) Klan and White Hate- _ ________ (2) Black Nationalist COINTELPRO. (3) New Left COINTELPRO _...___ b. FBI Target Lists--_________________ ----_. (1) Rabble Rouser/Agitator Index._ __ (2) Key Activist Program-------___. (3) Key Black Extremist Program_. . (4) Security Index ____________ ~_-----c. Internal Revenue Service Programs_ - - - - _. . _ (1) Misuse by FBI and CIA----------(2) The Special Service Staff: IRS Targeting of Ideological Groups_- - - _ 5. Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent _ - _- ____ a. Origins of CIA Involvement in Internal Security Functions--___________ ---____ b. CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups________--_-___________________ (1) CIA Response to FBI Requests__- _ (2) Operation CHAOS_ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ c. CIA Security Operations Within the United States: Protecting Sources and Methodsd. NSA Monitoring ____--_____________ -_-_-6. Intrusive Techniques_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ a. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance__ __- - - (1) Executive Branch Restrictions on Electronic Surveillance: 1965-68-. (2) Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968_ (3) Supreme Court Restrictions on National Security Electronic Surveillance: 1972_-___-________------~ b. CIA Mail Opening-________ -_----_______ c. Expansion of NSA Monitoring_ _- - - - - _____ d. FBI Cutbacks_.____--__--________________ (1) T20tong Subcommittee TnvestigaDirector Hoovers Restrictions-__ _ _ 7. Accountability and Control-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a. The Huston Plan: A Domestic Intelligence Network--_-------_-___________________ (1) Intelligence Community Pressures-_ (2) The Interagency Committee Report-(3) Implementation___-------________ (2)

78 81 ii

94 96 96 98 zi 102 104 104 105 105 106 107 107 108 109 109 110 111 111 112 113 115

xiv
II. THE INTELLIGENCE-Continued Dissent: 1964-1976Continued and Cantrol-Continued Intelligence--__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - Name Check Requests_ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ - Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964.----_______ ---(3) By-Product of Foreign Intelligence Coverage__-----------~~-~-----(4) The Surveillance of Joseph Kraft (19s9)----------------~--~~-~~~ (5) The 17 Wiretaps_ _ _ _ _- - - _. . . . . c. The Justice Departments Internal Security Division____._____---------------------(1) The new Internal Security Division(2) The Sullivan-Mardian Relationship. _ d. The FBIs Secret Administrative Index_-_-8. Reconsideration of FBI Authority-. . . ._._ ._._. ~. . a. Develonments in 1972%1974- _ -. - _ __ _. _. -. b. Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority- - -FINDINGS___------~-------------~~------~--~~-..-~--.-----A. Major Finding: Violating and Ignoring the Law-.-----..-_-- Subfindings: _ (a) Violating Statutory Law and Constitutional Rights______-__-___----------.-------.-(b) IgnoringIllegalIssues--------_-__-_________ (c) Continuing Legal Activities-_-----_-_-~-----(d) Tightening Security for Illegal Activities_ ____ (e) Concealing Illegal Activities __._____ __ _ __ _. _ __ (f) Weakness of Internal Inspection ._____ - ______. (g) Weakness of Oversight by Senior Administration Officials-___---------~..~---~~------~----B. Major Finding: The Overbreadth of Domestic Intelligence Activity--_~-------_-~~-____ ------_-_-_______ I__._ Subfindings: (a) Broad Scope of Investigations ________________ (b) Imprecise Standards for Investigations- - - - __ _ (c) Overinclusive Targeting-_---_--~-----------(d) Vacuum Cleaner Approach - _______- _______ (e) Excessivelv Long Investigations---------_-_-.. C. Major Finding: Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques_-__-- Subfindings : (a) Insufficient Legal Standards and Procedures - __ fb) , Excessive Collection Counled with Violent and \ Illegal Activities of Informants and Difficulty of Limiting Surveillance-__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ (c) Imprecise Labels Lead to Abusive Use of Techniques--_____._ ----_____._________ D. Major Finding: Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups__-. _ - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Subfindings : (a) Targeting Law-Abiding Citizens--_ __ __ __. __ _ (b) Interference With First Amendment Rights---(c) Dangerous Covert Tactics- _- __ _ __ __ __. __ __ _ (d) Actions Against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr--E. Major Finding: Political Abuse of Intelligence Information_ - Subfin dings : (a I) Political Intelligence for the White House__(b) Dissemination of Incidental Political or Personal Information_--_____ -----___._________(c) Volunteering Information to the White House and Targeting Critics and Political Figures-(d) Influencing Social Policy and Political ActionGROWTH OF DOMESTIC D. Intellieence and Domestic 77 Accountability b. Political (1) (2)
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III.

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III.

FINDINGS-Continued: F. Major Finding: Inadeouate Controls on Dissemination and retention--~_-------____ -__--__-__-_______ ---___--. Subfindings : (a) Volunteering Irrelevant Information and responding Unquestioningly to Requests- _ _ - _ (b) Excessive Dissemination_ _ _ _ ___ _ __ _ _. _ __ _ _. (c) Federal Employee Security Program- - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ (d) FBI Retention of Sensitive, Derogatory, and Illegally Obtained Information-______._.__ G. Major Finding: Deficiencies in Control and Accountability_ Subfindings : (a) Presidential Failure to Limit and Control Intelligence Activities._- ___ - _ _ _ ___ __ ______ (b) Attorneys General Failure to Limit and Control FBI Intelligence Activities.-------__-~~ (c) Encouraging Political Intelligence __- - _- __- - _ (d) Executive Failures to Inquire___--__----__--(e) Congressional Failure to Oversee Intelligence Activity and Exert Legislative Control-- _ - - _ (f) Intelligence Agencies Act with Insufficient Authorization------________ --__----__--_ (g) Termination of Abusive Operations- _ __ _______ IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________ A. Conclusions---_--------------------------------------B. Principles Applied in Framing Recommendations and the Scope of Recommendations ______ -_ -_ ____ _____ __ __ _- ___ C. Recommendations __-__ _ __ __ - _ _ __ _-_ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ 1. Intelligence Agencies Are Subject to the Rule of Law (Recommendations l-3) _____ --__--_-__-_______ 2. United States Foreign and Military Agencies Should Be Precluded From Domestic Security Activities (Recommendations 4-27) ___ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a. Central Intelligence Agency (Recommendations 4-13)___-___-__--___~----~~-~--~-b. National Security Agency (Recommendations 14-19)______-_--__-_------------~----~~ c. Military Service and Defense Department Investigative Agencies (Recommendations 20-26)___-_-_____-_-~~-~--~------~----3. Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred From Domestic Security Activity (Recommendations 27-37)___--_-_--_---~~~~.~-~----~~----~---~-~ a. Internal Revenue Service (Recommendations 27-35)___________-__------------------b. Post Office (U.S. Postal Service) (Recommendations 36-37)---.-__--__-__--~--------4. Federal Domestic Security Activities Should Be Limited and Controlled to Prevent Abuses Without Hampering Criminal Investigations or Investigations of Foreign Espionage (Recommendations 38-69)---~-----~~--~..~.~~.-------~~--~~~~-~.~ a. Centralize Supervision, Investigative Responsibility, and the Use of Covert Techniques (Recommendations 38-39) _ _ _. _ _ . _ b. Prohibitions (Recommendations 40-41) - . - --c. Authorized Scope of Domestic Security Investigations (Recommendations 42-49). _ _. d. Authorized Investigative Techniques (Recommendations 50-63).~.~.-~--------~-~~ e. XInintennnce and Dissemination of Information (Recommendations 64-68)------.---f. Attorney General Oversight of the FBI, Including Termination of Investigations and Covert Techniques (Recommendation 69)--

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316 316 317 318 324 330 332

XVI IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-Continued C. Recommendations-Continued 5. The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorney General for Oversinht for Federal Domestic Securitv Activities must be clarified and General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies Strengthened (Recommendations 70-86) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a. Attorney General Responsibility and Relaship With Other Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 79-74) _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - b. General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations -- ^a.
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c. Office of Professional Responsibility (Recommendation 82) ________ I_______ ~------__ d. Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors of the FBI (Recommendations 83-85) _ _ _ _ 6. Administrative Rulemaking and Increased Disclosure Should Be Required (Recommendations 86-89)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_--~-~-~~~~~~~~~~~ a. Administrative Rulemaking (Recommendations86-88)____________________________ b. Disclosure (Recommendations 89-90) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 7. Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded (Recommendation 91)_-_-______-_-_____----~---------------8. Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted (Recommendation 92) ______ _________ __________________ 9. The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act Should Either Be Repealed or Amended (Recommendation 93) - - - _ _ 10. The Espionage Statute Should Be Modernized (Recommendation 94) __________ _________ ____ ___ 11. Broaden Access to Intelligence Agency Files Should Be Provided to GAO, as an Investigative Arm of the Congress (Recommendation 95) _______ __ _____ 12. Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified (Recommendation 96)___----------------------13. Definitions ______ -----______________ -___-_---___ n . . . ^. Appendix A: Senate Eesolutlon ~I---------_-_----------------____ -Appendix B: Previously Issued Hearings and Reports of Senate Select Committee~~~~~~~~~--~------------~~--------------Appendix C: Staff Acknowledgments-----_______ - _____ --__-_---_-___ Additional Views: Philip A. Hart_-____--~----~~--------------~--------------~--RobertMorgan__-_-_-_-_-_---~---~------~-~----~-~---~-----~Introduction to Separate Views of Senators John G. Tower, Howard H. Baker, Jr., and Barry Goldwater- - _ _. _ ___ ___. __ __ __ _ __ __ _ _ John G. Tower---___----_------~---------~-----~---~-------~-~ Howard H. Baker, Jr__--_----~~.-----_------_____ -_----__---Barry Goldwater_______________________________------.-.-----Charles McC. Mathias, Jr _________ ---__--_-_-_-----_-----------