646

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

that grants us "the obligation to belong" (p. 138). Kerr then reviews Taylor's ethical realism. The moral ontology of the human "is what we appeal to-what we draw on-when we have to defend our responses as the natural ones, the appropriate ones, the right ones, in this or that situation" (p. 142). The two characteristics of this moral ontology which best exemplify contemporary Western societies is the obligation to avoid and minimize human suffering, and the particularly Christian emphasis on "the affirmation of ordinary life" (p. 144). Of particular interest in this section is Kerr' s discussion of Isaiah Berlin's critique ofTaylor's ontology. The last section of this chapter reviews Taylor' s analysis of Heidegger's "philosophy of ecology." "Deep ecology, then, together with realist ontology of the human, the affirmation of ordinary life, and religious belief as a sense of our needing-our having-some interlocutor not ourselves, some other-that is Charles Taylor's version of the selftranscendence manifest in our lives already" (p. 158). In his final chapter, "Natural Desire for God," Kerr admits the difficulty of finding theological motifs in the "most currently fashionable philosophers" (p. 159). And yet it is not impossible.

Historically "modern philosophy derived from late-medieval theology, and that its origins may exercise much more influence than is often acknowledged" (p. 159). What particularly interests Kerr is the theological side of the debate over transcending humanity. To this end Kerr takes the reader on a veritable tour de force by comparing Hans Urs von Balthasar to Kar! Rahner over the place of religious and metaphysical views in contemporary culture. Von Bathasar's "refusal to acknowledge the continuing existence and validity of religious and metaphysical views" (p. 164) is compared to his charge against Rahner that the latter is attempting to reinstate in the post-Christian age a "modem transcendental theology" (p. 163). This chapter serves as a fitting conclusion to his examination ofdifferent versions of transcending humanity. The various philosophers and theologians selected by Kerr for this study are weIl chosen. While it is clear that the author opts for amiddie path between radical transcendence and pure immanence, the path this middle way must navigate is brightly illuminated through this engaging and highly profitable study. G.E.DANN University ofWaterloo

DIVINE PROVIDENCE. By Thomas P. Flint. Ithaca, NY: ComeIl University Press, 1998. Pp. 258. Paper $35.00, ISBN 0801434505. This book' s subtitle is "The Molinist Account." And rightly so. For Professor Flint' s discussion of providence is focused. He is concentrating on Molinism. And he is doing so as a card-carrying Molinist. He

BOOK REVIEWS

647

aims to defend Luis de Molina (a sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit). His presiding argument is "that a very powerful case can be built for seeing the Molinist account of divine providence as one that is exceptionally attractive from the standpoint of the orthodox Christian" (p. 251). And not only the orthodox Christian. On Flint's account, the virtues of Molinism are philosophical as weIl as theological. So Divine Providence is very much an exercise in philosophical theology. Molina wanted to understand how God' s governing of the created order can be compatible with it containing truly free human choices. If all that happens comes to pass because of God's will, how can anything which happens come about because ofour free decisions? And if God knows all that shall be, how can it be that anything we do is really up to us? Molina's way of dealing with such questions was to suggest that God created in the light of his knowledge as to how things would go if. On his account, God knows how uncreated (possible) people would freely act if created. According to Molina, therefore, God' s creating does not interfere with my freedom. If, as created, I pick my nose at 5.00 p.m. on June 25,2000, then I do so freely-even though God, as Creator, accounts for nlY being there doing what I do. I am free since God is merely allowing me to do my own thing-this "doing my own thing" being understood as something which God brings into actual existence in the light ofwhat Molina calls scientia media ("middle knowledge")-a knowledge ofhow I would have freely

acted given certain circumstances. God knows how I would act if. Then he creates me with all my options and free choices in place. This is the position which Flint wishes to defend. And he does so in three stages. To begin with (Chapters 1 and 2), he notes and defends what he takes Molina to have accepted as a basis for arguing in defense ofscientia media. He also offers an account of what Molina subsequently taught about middle knowledge. The account of Molina comes in Chapter 2. In Chapter 1 Flint outlines what he calls "the traditional notion of providence," according to which "to see God as provident is to see hinl as knowingly and lovingly directing each and every event involving each and every creature toward the ends he has ordained for them" (p.12). Flint suggests that this view ofprovidence has support fronl the Bible and from some important Christian documents, not to mention support from some classical philosophers (e.g. Xenophanes and Epictetus.) And, so heargues, "with all this going for it, the traditional notion of providence is surely one that an orthodox Christian should be most reluctant to jettison" (p. 22). Also in Chapter 1, Flint distinguishes between differentviews ofhuman freedom while defending what he calls "Libertarianism." This view of freedom, according to which "it is not possible that a free human action be ultimately causally determined by events notunder the causal control of its agent" (p. 23), is, so Flint suggests, both correct and, for various reasons, one which ought to

648

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

seem attractive to Christians. And, so he continues to stress, Libertarianism and "the traditional notion of providence" are the "twin bases" ofMolinism, ones which give Christians grounds for accepting it. "An orthodox Christian," says Flint, "has good reason to hold on to both the traditional notion of divine providence and the libertarian analysis of freedom (p. 71). And, so Flint adds, "[t]he Molinist picture ofprovidence ... clearly offers one way of doing so" (p. 71). But are there "alternative pietures of providence available which any Christian ought to find equal or superior to the MoHnist account"? With this question raised, Flint launches on part two of his book, "A Defense of the Molinist Account." To begin with (Chapter 3), he argues that "no coherent libertarian traditionalist could be anything but an advocate ofMolinism" (p. 108) and that "the three principal competitors to Molinism "not only jettison either traditionalism or libertarianism ... but also enmesh us in problems ... which can apparently be avoided by the Molinist" (p. 108). In Chapters 4 to 7 Flint fleshes out and defends the position adopted in Chapter 3. He does so by offering detailed criticisms of aseries of objections to Molinism coming from a variety of quarters. Chapter 4 deals with "Five Thomistic Objections to Molinism" (drawn from the writings of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange O.P.). Chapter 5 deals with an objection concerning the causalorigin of contingent truths (basically, it amounts to the question "Where do Molina's 'what ifi,'

considered as objects of God's knowledge, come from?"). Chapters 6 and 7 then deal respectively with teasers raised by William Hasker (in his book God, Time, and Knowledge, published in 1989) and Robert Adams (in his article "An Anti-MoHnist Argument," published in 1991). And what ifMolinism is true? One might expect light to be shed by it on a range of theological questions. And, so Flint argues in the final part ofhis book, such light is indeed shed. Here he argues that "applied Molinism" (p. 4) gives us good results when we turn to the topics ofpapal infallibility (Chapter 8), prophecy (Chapter 9), unanswered prayers (Chapter 10), and praying for things to have happened (Chapter 11). In this part of the book, Flints aims "to investigate the ways in which, and the degree to which, adopting the Molinist picture allows one better to understand these specific areas of divine providential activity" (p. 180). "Adopting the Molinist stance," says Flint, "enables us better to understand certain dimensions of divine providential activity ... And the success ofthese endeavors to apply the MoHnist outlook serves further to confirm the attractiveness of that approach" (p. 251). Flint's concerns in Chapters 8-11 evidently strike hirn as ones which philosophers of religion should now be turning to with confidence in the years ahead. He clearly assurnes that orthodox Christian philosophers ought now to accept that one of their most profitable areas of inquiry should He in the area of "applied Molinism." But is Molinism a persuasive

BOOK REVIEWS

649

position to begin with? Flint suggests envisaged by Flint, would contain a that "most people start off as tacit Brian Davies who never wrote this Molinists; they feel no difficulty in review ofFlint's book. But why should granting that there are truths about what we take seriously the notion of such a Brian Davies being an object ofGod's free people would have done had they been in different situations" (p. 114). knowledge prior to God's creating the What Molinism does, says Flint, "can world in which I am here to write my reasonably be seen as merely applying review? I, at any rate, can make no to theology what the man in the street sense of such a notion, and I do not find already believes" (ibid.). But can one light shed on the matter by Flint's study. Nor am I convinced by what Flint know what someone would do freely? As far as I can see, one can only urges in defense of his claim that reasonably be said to know what would Molinism has advantages on grounds of Christian orthodoxy. For it effectively happen if what is going to happen is denies what Christians seem to be determined in its causes-if one had committed to when professing their reason to think that present conditions render some outcome inevitable or belief in God the Creator. Iassurne that to believe in God is to believe that necessary. If that is so, however, everything real apart from God is made applying the man in the street's to be by hirn-not only as beginning to intuitions to theology looks like denying be, but also as continui~g to be. I take it human freedom. And, as far as I can see, that to believe in God is to believe that Flint does nothing to show that we there is an (albeit utterly mysterious) should think otherwise. Having stated at answer to the question "How come any the outset that he presumes (among other things) that "properties can exist . world at all?"-"How come something rather than nothing?" In that case, even if nothing has that property ... however, our free choices are made to [and] ... that states of affairs can exist even if they are not actual, or do not be by God. AB that we do is part ofwhat God makes to be, causes to be. And it is obtain" (p. 6), he makes nluch of the hard to see how this picture can be suggestion that God's knowledge squared with the Molinist picture ranges over logically possible worlds defended by Flint. Molinists such as which are not created by God. But he Flint will presumably say that one ofthe seems fairly insensitive to the oddness virtues of Molinisrn is that it allows us ofhis presumptions. They are "far from to believe both that everything depends idiosyncratic," he says, if we refer to for its being on God and that there are "the literature" (p. 7). For my part, I find free human choices-because of God' s the presumptions pretty nonsensical. middle knowledge. But possibilities And I do not see that Flint does anything like enough to help us make with respect to creatures surely depend on actualities, as the man in the street sense of the notion of a world distinct might say. And, so an orthodox from and known to God independently Christian rnight reasonably add, ofGod's creative act. Such a world, as

650

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

actualities depend on God as making them to be. Flint will doubtless insist that the notion of creation I am appealing to here (readers of Aquinas will find it pretty familiar) cannot be reconciled with belief in human freedom. But that seems false to me largely for the sort of reasons given by Aquinas in texts such as the Con1mentary on Aristotle' s De Interpretatione or Perihermeneias, book 1, chapter 9, lectio 14-in which Aquinas, in very non-Molinist terms, argues that I am free not in spite ofGod but because ofGod, who acts in every operation-a position which offers an alternative to the views which Flint calls "Libertarianism," "Compatibilism" and "Determinism." Had Flint wished to deal significantly with "Thomist" objections to Molinism, he would have done better to have scrapped the chapter on Garrigou-Lagrange and to have considered in some detail what Aquinas hin1selfhad to say on the nature of God,

divine causality, human freedom, and the difference between God and a creature. Be that as it may, however, Divine Providence is the only full-scale treatment ofMolinism to have appeared in recent years. So it fills a gap. A lot of contemporary writings in the area of philosophy of religion contain much that only makes sense on the presumption that something like a Molinist view of God and the world is the right one. Flint's book tackles Molinism directly and at length. It is written with great clarity, and it gives one a good idea of what can reasonably be argued for given its basic thesis. Those who want get a sense of how modern-day Molinists might wish to defend themselves today have nothing better to read at the moment. BRIAN DAVIES Fordham University

DECONSTRUCTION AND PRAGMATISM. Simon Critchley ... [eta!.]; edited by Chantal Mouffe. New York: Routledge, 1996. Pp. 88. Hard Cover $49.95, ISBN: 0415121698; Paper $12.95, ISBN: 0415121701. What have deconstruction and pragmatism to do with democratic politics? This is the question explored in the engaging collection ofessays edited by Chantal Mouffe entitled Deconstruction and Pragmatism. The .book is the transcription ofa 1993 Paris symposium whose participants were Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty, Simon Critchley and Ernesto Laclau. Anyone interested in an introduction to the current alternatives to rationalist politics which some pract1t1oners of deconstruction and pragmatism propose would be advised to read this book. They will find that these two nonrationalist approaches offer-each in theirown distinctive manner-insightful ways ofworking through the problem of democracy. The book is divided into seven chapters. Three of the chapters belong to Rorty since he also gives responses to the essays ofboth Critchley and Laclau. The other four chapters are