Digitized by the Internet Archive

in

2009

with funding from

Ontario Council of University Libraries

http://www.archive.org/details/workstranslatedi08aris

^A

THE

VI^

-^^

^^

WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH UNDER THE EDITORSHIP
OF

J.

A.

SMITH

M.A.

FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE

W.

D.

ROSS MA.
ORIEI. COLLEGK.

FELLOW OF

VOLUME

VIII

METAPHYSICA

\0.

OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1908

HENRY FROWDE,

M.A.

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK

TORONTO AND MELBOURNE

I
GENERAL PREFACE
It was the desire of the late Master of Balliol^l^r. Benjamin Jowett, as formulated in his will, that tl^ proceeds
from the sale
of
his

works,

the

copyright #i which he

bequeathed

to Balliol College, should

be used x promote the

study of Greek Literature, especially by thefcublication of new translations and editions of Greek authoi*. In a codicil
to his will

he expressed the hope that the translation of

Aristotle's

works begun by
with

his

own

translation of the Politics

should be proceeded

as

speedily

as

possible.

The
Greek

College resolved that the funds thus accruing to them should,

in

memory

of his services to

the College and

to

letters,

be applied to the subvention of a series of translations

of the works of Aristotle.

Through the co-operation,

it

financial

and other, of the Delegates of the University Press

has

become possible

to begin the realization of this design.

now By

agreement between the College and the Delegates of the Press

the present editors were appointed to superintend the carr>''ing

out of the scheme.

is

The

series,

of which the
is

first

instalment

now brought

before the public,

of the College

published at the joint

expense and
Press.

risk

and the Delegates of the

co-operation

The

editors

have

secured

the

of

various

scholars in the task of translation.

The

translations

make

no claim to

finality,

but aim at being such as a scholar might

construct in preparation for a critical edition and commentary.

The

translation will not presuppose

of the text.

any critical reconstitution Wherever new readings are proposed the fact
iii

GENERAL PREFACE
will

be

indicated,

but notes

justificatory

of

conjectural
will,

emendations or defensive of novel interpretations

admitted, be reduced to the smallest compass.

where

The
its

editors,

while retaining a general right of revision and annotation,

will leave the responsibility for

each translation to

author,

whose name

will in all cases

be given.
J.

A.

S.

W.

D. R.

IV

METAPHYSICA
BY

W.

D.

ROSS

TO

INGRAM BYWATER

PREFACE
With
the permission of Messrs. Teubner
I

have followed

in

this translation the text of VV. Christ

(Leipzig, 1895}.

All

divergences from his

notes, except that I
itself

readings have been mentioned in the

have frequently

left

it

to the rendering

to

show

that

have not followed

but
I

his punctuation or his

excisions.

The commentaries
greatest help
;

of Alexander and Bonitz have

been
notes,

my

and to the translation

owe much also to BuUinger's of Book Z, chaps, i-xi, by

the late Mr. Richard Shute.

I wish to acknowledge my deep obligations to Mr. By water and Prof Cook Wilson, whose opinions on several diflRcult passages have been most kindly placed at my disposal to the members of the Oxford Aristotelian Society, for what I learnt from them during our reading of Books M and N to Mr. H. H. Joachim, Fellow of Merton College, for the loan of his valuable notes on Books Z, H, and to Mr. C. Cannan, Secretary to the Delegates of the University Press, and Mr. R. P. Hardie, of Edinburgh University, whose comments on various parts of the work have been of the greatest assistance to me to my co-editor Mr. J. A. Smith, and to Dr. G. R. T. Ross, who have read the whole book both in manuscript and in proof, and whose suggestions I have adopted in countless passages and to my wife, who has read the whole book in proof, and has
;
;

aided

me

very greatly

in points of style.

W. D.

R.

vn

COxNTENTS
Ch.
1.

A.

The advance from

Characteristics of
'

sensation through

memory, experience, and

"

art, to

~*

theoretical knowledge.
2.
3.

wisdom

'

(philosophy).

The

successive recognition by earlier philosophers of the material,

efficient,
4.
5.

and

final causes.

Inadequacy of the treatment of these causes. The Pythagorean and Eleatic schools the former recognizes vaguely
;

the formal cause.

6.

7.
8.

The The

Platonic philosophy

it

uses only the material and formal causes.

relation of the various systems to the four causes.

Criticism of the pre-Platonic philosophers.

Criticism of the doctrine of Ideas.

9.
10.

The

history of philosophy reveals no causes other than the four.

a,

2.

General considerations about the study of philosophy. There cannot be an infinite series, nor an infinite variety of kinds, of
causes.
Different

3.

methods are appropriate

B.

to different studies.

1.

2.

Sketch of the main problems of philosophy. Fuller statement of the problems (i) Can one science treat of all the four causes
:

(ii)

Are the primary axioms treated of by the science of substance, and if not, by what science ?

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

Can one science treat of all substances ? Does the science of substance treat also of its attributes? Are there any non-sensible substances, and if so, of how many
kinds?

3.

(vij

Are the genera, or the constituent

principl^5_?
If the genera, is
Is there Is
it

parts, of things their first

(vii)

the highest genera or the lowest ?

?

4.

(viii)

anything apart from individual things

first

(ix)

each of the

principles one in kind, or in

number?

(x)

(xi)
5.

(xii)

Ai^ the principles of perishable and of imperishable things the same? Are being and unity substances or attributes ? Are the objects of mathematics substances ?
ix

CONTENTS
Ch.
6. (xiii)

Do Do

Ideas exist, as well as sensible things and the objects of

?

mathematics
(xiv)

the

first first

principles exist potentially or actually

principles universal or individual
r.
?

(xv)

Are the

1.

Our

object

is

the study of being as such.

2.

3.

must therefore study primary being (viz. substance), unity and and the derivative contraries, and the attributes of being and of substance. We must study also the primary axioms, and especially the law of
plurality,

We

contradiction.
4.
5.

Fatal

difficulties

involved in the denial of this law.

The connexion

of such denial with Protagoras' doctrine of relativity

the doctrine refuted.

6.

7.
8.

Further refutation of Protagoras. The law of excluded middle defended.

All judgements are not true, nor are
rest,
all false
;

all

things are not at

nor are

all in

motion.
A.

Philosophical Lexicon.
1.

'Beginning.'
*

2. 3. 4.
5.

Cause.'

'Element.'
'Nature.'
'

Necessary.'

6.
7.

'One.'
'

'Many.'

Being.'

8. 9.

'Substance.'
'

The

same.'
'

'

Other.'

'

Different.'
'

'

Like.*

'

Unlike.'

10.

'

Opposite.'

Contrary.'

Other

in species.'

'

The same

in species.'

11. 'Prior.'
12.

'Posterior.'

'Potency.'
possible.'

'Capable.'

'Incapacity.'

'Incapable.'

'Possible'

'Im-

13. 'Quantity.'
14. 'Quality.'

15. 'Relative.'
16.

'Complete.'

17. 'Limit.'
18.
*

That

in virtue of which.'

'

In virtue of

itself.'

19. 'Disposition.'

20.

'Having' or 'habit'

(e^ts).

21. 'Affection.'
22. 'Privation.' 23.
'

Have

'

or

'

hold'

(ex^ti').

Be

in.'

24.

'

From.'

CONTEXTS
Ch.
25.
*

Part.'

26. 'Whole.'
27.
'

'Total.'

'AIL'
(ytvoi).
'

Mutilated.'

28.

Race or genus '

' '

Other in genus.'

29. 'False.'

30. 'Accident.'

E.
1.

Distinction of th eology
*

',

the science of being as such, from the other

2.

3.

4.

theoretical sciences, mathematics and physics. Four senses of being Of these (i) accidental being of no science. The nature and origin of accident. (ii) Being as truth is not primary being.
' '.

is

the object

1.

The study

of being

is

primarily the study of substance.

?

2.

Various opinions on the question, what things are substances

3.

Four things are commonly held

to

be substantial

the

essence, the

may be conceived Reasons why matter and the concrete individual cannot be primary substance. Form
universal, the genus, the substratum.

The

last

as matter, form, or the concrete individual.

to
4.

be studied
is

first in

sensible things.

What

essence
?

and

to

what does

it

belong,

i.e.

what things can be

defined
5.

Primarily substance.

6.
7. 8.

Combinations of a subjecl with one of its proper attributes have no definition nor essence. Is a thing the same as its essence ? Yes, if it is a substance. Analysis of generation, whether by nature, art, or spontaneity. Form is not generated, but put into matter yet it did not previously exist apart the agent in generation is form embodied in another
;

individual of the
9.

same

species.

Why

spontaneous generation sometimes takes place. The conditions of generation in the categories other than substance.
are definitions of the parts included in the definition of the
?

10.

When
Which

whole
1 1

When

the parts are parts of the form.

?

parts are parts of the form, which of the concrete individual

consists the unity of

12.

Wherein

an object of definition

In the appro-

priateness of the differentia to the genus.

1

3.

universal cannot be either the substance or an element in the sub-

stance of anything (yet

14.

how

else

Hence it is fatal to make Ideas substances and composed of other Ideas.

can a thing be defined ?). yet hold that they are

15.

No
The

individual can be defined, whether sensible or, like the Ideas,

intelligible.
16.

parts of sensible things are only potencies.

Unity and being

are not the substance of things.

xi

CONTENTS
Ch.
17.
""

Substance
startc;

is
it

the cause or form which puts matter into a determinate

is

that in a thing

which

is

distinct

from

its

material

elements.

H.
1.

The

discussion of sensible substances continued.

Their matter

is

itself
2.

substance.

The main
and

types of form or actuality.

Definitions of matter, of form,

of the concrete individual distinguished.

3.

Form
on

distinguished from the material elements

definition
;

Antisthenes' attack

definition analogous to
;

4.

Remote and proximate matter

but the concrete individual.

number. the substratum of attributes not matter

5.

6.

The relation of matter to its contrary states. What gives unity to a definition ? The fact that the genus

is

simply the

potency of the differentia, the differentia the actuality of the genus.

e.
\

I.

Being as potency and actuality. Potency potency of motion, active or passive.

in

the

strict

sense, as

2.
3.

Non-rational potencies are single, rational potencies twofold.

4.
5.

6.

Potency defended against the attack of the Megaric school. Potency as possibility. How potency is acquired, and the conditions of its actualization. Actuality distinguished from potency; a special type of potency
described
;

actuality distinguished

from movement.
;

7.

When
how

one thing

may be

called the potency or matter of another

things are described by

names derived from

their matter

or their accidents.
8.

Actuality prior to potency in definition, time, and substantiality

nothing eternal or necessary

9.

is

a mere potency.
;

Good

10.

actuality better than potency, and bad actuality worse therefore no separate evil principle in the universe. Geometrical truths found by actualization of potencies, Being as truth, with regard to both simple and composite objects.

I.

1.

Four kinds of unit

or of quality
;

the essence of a unit

is

to

be a measure of quantity
its

various types of measure.

;

2.

Unity not a substance but a universal predicate

denotation the

3.

same as that of being. Unity and plurality identity

;

likeness
;

otherness
related

difference.
to privation

4.

Contrariety

is

complete difference

how

and

contradiction.
5.

6.

The The

opposition of the equal to the great and the small. opposition of the one to the many.
xii

CONTENTS

Ch.
7.

Intermediates

are

homogeneous

with

each

other

and with

the

extremes, stand between contraries, and are

these contraries.
8.

compounded out of
is

Otherness in species
its

is

otherness of the genus and

contrariety

nature further described.

9.

10.

What contrarieties constitute otherness in species. The perishable and the imperishable differ in kind.

Recapitulation of B.

2, 3.

B. 4-6. r. I, 2.

r. 3.

r. 4.
r. 5-8.

E.

I.

E. 2-4.

Extracts from Physics

9.

III.
;3.

11.
12.

on luck. on potency, actuality, and movement. IV. 4, 5, 7, on the infinite; there is no actual especially no infinite body. V. I on change and movement. V. 2, 3, on the three kinds of movement.
II.
5, 6,

1-3,

infinite,

and

Definitions
'

of

'together
',

in

place',
',
'

'apart',

'touch',
',
'

'between'.
'.

contrary in place

successive

contiguous

continuous

A.
1.

'-. \

Substance the primary subject of inquiry. Three kinds of substance perishable sensible, eternal sensible, and unmovable (nonsensible).

2.

j.

Change implies not only form and privation but matter. Neither matter nor form comes into being. Whatever comes into If form ever being comes from a substance of the same kind.
exists apart

from the concrete individual,

it

is

in

the case of

natural objects.
4.

Different things have elements numerically different but the

same
also

kind they all have form, privation, and matter. have a proximate and an ultimate moving cause.
in
;

They

5.

Again actuality and potency are principles common to all things, though they apply differently in different cases. The principles of
all

things are only analogous, not identical.

6.

Since

movement must be eternal, there must be an eternal mover. and one whose essence is actuality (actuality being prior to potency). To account for the uniform change in the universe,
xiii

CONTENTS
Ch.
must be one principle which acts always alike, and one whose action varies. The eternal mover originates motion by being the primary object of
there
desire
(as
it

7.

is

of thought)
;

being thoroughly actual,

being,

it

cannot

change or move it is a sensible things, and without

8.

living
parts.

perfect, separate

from

Besides the

first

mover there must be as many unmoved movers

as there are simple motions involved in the motions of the planets.

is probably either 49 or 55. As there is but one prime mover, there must be but one heaven. The divine thought must be concerned with the most divine object, which is itself. Thought and the object of thought are never

The number

9.

different
ID.

when
is

the object

is

immaterial.

How the good

present in the universe both as the order of the parts

their ruler.
Difficulties

and (more primarily) as

which attend the

views of other philosophers.

M.
1.

\^'^;',

We

pass

to

immaterial

substance.

Two

substances have
Ideas.

been

believed

in,

kinds of immaterial mathematical objects and

We

shall discuss first

the former, then the latter, then

the view that numbers and Ideas are the substance of sensible
things.
2.
(i)

Mathematical objects cannot

or apart from sensible things.
in

exist as distinct substances either in

3.

They can be separated only

alleged.

thought.

Mathematics

is is

not entirely

divorced from consideration of the beautiful, as

sometimes
too

4.

(ii)

little,

Arguments which led others too much.

if

to the belief in Ideas.

Some prove

5.

Even

there were Ideas, they would not explain the changes in the

sensible world.
6. (iii)

Various ways in which numbers

may be conceived as the

substance

of things.
7.

(a)

If all units are addible, this gives only

(b) If all

mathematical, not ideal

number,

units are inaddible, this gives neither

(c)

mathe-

matical nor ideal number,

If only the

units in

the
units

same
must

number
8.

are addible, this leads to equal difficulties;

have no difference of kind.

The views
ideal

of Platonists

who

disagree with Plato, and those of the

difficulties.

Pythagoreans, lead to equal

Further objections to

numbers
.''

(a)

How

are the units derived from the indefinite

dyad what
9.

{d) Is

the series of
.-"

numbers

infinite or finite
is

and
?
-

if finite,

is its

limit

(r)

What

sort of principle

the one

Discussion of the principles of geometrical objects.

Criticism of the

generation of numbers from unity and plurality, and of spatial

xiv

CONTENTS
H.

magnitudes

from

similar

principles.

The
of Ideas

criticism

of
at

ideal

numbers summed up. The upholders universal and individual.

Are the
first

make them
?

once

principles of substances individual or universal

N.

The

principles cannot be contraries.

The

Platonists in

making them

contraries treated one of the contraries as matter.

Various forms

of this theory.

The

nature of unity and plurality expounded.

Eternal substances cannot be

object of the Platonists
is

compounded out

of elements.

The
the

to explain the presence of plurality in

the world, but in this they do not succeed.

belief in the separate existence of
:.

What

justifies

numbers ?
number.

Difficulties in the various theories of

The Pythagoreans

ascribe generation to numbers, which are eternal.

4.
5.

The

relation
is

between the

first

principles

and the good.

its

How
The

number supposed

to
?

be derived from
is

elements

How

is it

the cause of substances

6.

causal agency ascribed to numbers

purely fanciful.

XV

BOOK
All men by
is

(A)

CHAPTER
the delight

nature desire to know.

in

An
;

indication of this

980^

we take

our senses

for

even apart from

;

their usefulness they are loved for themselves

and above all For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer
others the sense of sight.
sight to almost everything else.

25

most of

all

the senses, makes us

The reason is that know and brings to

this,

light

many differences between things. By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them,

And therefore the former are more 980'' in others. and apt at learning than those which cannot remember those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent though they cannot be taught, e. g. the bee, and any other race of animals that may be like it and those which besides memory have this sense of hearing, can be taught. The animals other than man live by appearances and 25 memories, and have but little of connected experience but the human race lives also by art and reasonings. And for many from memory experience is produced in men memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. Experience is almost identified with 981^ science and art, but really science and art come to men
though not
intelligent
; ; ;

through
says,^

experience
rightly,
'

for

experience

made

art

',

as

Polus
5

and

but inexperience luck.'

And

art _arigj

when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgement about a class of objects is produced. For to have a judgettrent thar~wTieh" Callias was ill of this disease this did him good, and similarly in the case of Socrates and in

many

individual cases,
^

is

a matter of experience

but to

10

Cf. Gorgias, 448 C.

AR.

MET.

98i^

METAPHYSICA^
judge that
constitution,
it

has done good

off in

to

all

persons

of a

certain

one class, when they were ill of this disease, e, g. to phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with fever \ this is a matter of art.

marked

With
15

a view to action experience seems in no respect in-

and we even see men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without experience. The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with
ferior to art,

the individual
in

for the physician does not cure man, except an incidental way, but Callias or Socrates or some other
;

20 called

by some such
If,

individual name,

who happens

to

be

a man.

then, a

man

has the theory without the experience,

and knows the universal but does not know the individual
he will often fail to cure for it is the into be cured. But yet we think that knoivledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of
included in
this,
is
;

dividual that

\
25

experience (which implies that

rather on knowledge)
cause, but the latter
;

that the thing

30

is
'

so,

Wisdom depends in all cases and this because the former know the do not. For men of experience know but do not know why, while the others
the cause.

know

the

'

why and
in

Hence we think

that the

master-workers
gSi**

each craft are more honourable and

know

and are wiser than the manual workers, because they know the causes of the things that are done [we think the manual workers are like certain lifeless things which act indeed, but act without knowing what they do, as fire burns, but while the lifeless things perform each of their functions by a natural tendency, the labourers perform them through habit] ^ thus we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes. And in general it is a sign of the man who knows, that he can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is for artists can teach, and men of mere experience cannot.
in a truer sense

981^ 12 read xoKaheot, nvpeTTova-i Kavaca (following H. Jackson,/. of p.

206).

vi.
"

981^ 2 rovs ...

5 i6os is

probably a later addition.


A.

BOOK

981''

Again, we do not regard any of the senses as

particulars.
e. g.

Wisdom

10

yet surely these give the most authoritative knowledge of

But they do not

;

tell

us the

'

why

'

of anything

why fire is hot they only say that it is hot. At first he who invented any art that went beyond the common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men,
not only because there was something useful in the inventions,
15

but because he was thought wise and superior to the

rest.

But as more

arts

were invented, and some were directed to

life,

the necessities of

others to

its

recreation, the inventors of

the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the

inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge

did not aim at

utility.

Hence when

all

such inventions were

20

already established, the sciences which do not aim at giving

pleasure or at the necessities of
in the places
life were discovered, and first began to have leisure. This is why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure. We have said in the Ethics'^ what the difference is between 25 art and science and the other kindred faculties but the point of our present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things. This is why, as has been said before, the man of 30 experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any

where men

first

perception whatever, the artist wiser than the

ence, the master-worker than the mechanic,

men

of experi-

and more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive. Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about 982^ certain causes and principles.
the theoretical
kinds of knowledge to be

CHAPTER

II
5

Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge If we were to take the notions we have J>f which is Wisdom.

about the wise man, this might perhaps

make

the answer

more evident. We suppose knows all things, as far as

*

first,

then, that the wise

man

possible,
3-7.

although he has not

vi.

B 2

982^
lo

METAPHYSICA
knowledge of each of them
can learn things that are
in detail
;

secondly, that he
for

difficult,
is

and not easy

to
all,

who man to

know,

is

wise (sense-perception

common
;

fore easy
I

and no mark of

Wisdom)
;

again, he

who
is

and thereis more

wiser, in

exact and more capable of teaching the causes

15

every branch of knowledge and of the sciences, also, that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of Wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science
is

more

of the nature of

Wisdom

than the ancillary

for the

wise

man must

not be ordered but must order, and he must

not obey another, but the less wise must obey him.
20

Such and so many are the notions, then, which we have Wisdom and the wise. Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in for he knows in the highest degree universal knowledge
about
;

a sense

all

the subordinate objects.

And

these things, the

;

25

most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know And the most exact for they are furthest from the senses. of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e. g. arithmetic than geometry. But the science which investigates causes is also the more communicable, for the people who teach are
those

30

who

tell

the causes of each thing.

And

understanding

and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing will choose most 982^ readily that which is most truly knowledge, and such is the knowledge of that which is most knowable; and the first principles and the causes are most knowable for by reason of these, and from these, all other things are known, but these are not known by means of the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must 5 be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science and this end is the good in each class, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question ('Wisdom') falls to the same
;

A.

BOOK

982*
investigates the
i.

ence; this must be a science that

principles
IS /one!

first

and causes
is

for the

good,

e.
'

the end and aim,

'

of the causes.
it

,.

-.--;

,,

',

*TKat
'

not a science of production

is

clear even

For it is wonder that men both now begin and at first they wondered originally at the obvious diffiilosophize culties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun, and about the stars and about the genesis of the universe^ And a man who is puzzled and
the history of the earh'est philosophers.
*-'^eir
;

from owing to began to

10

15

wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of

myth

is

in

a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the

myth

is

comjo

posed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing
science in order to know,

and not

for
for

And

this is

confirmed by the facts;

any utilitarian end. it was when almost

all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation were present, that such knowledge began to be Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any sought. other advantage but as the man is free, we say, who exists
;

35

for himself

and not
it

for another, so

we pursue
itself.
>^

this as the

only
._

free science,^ for

alone exists for

>.

-v,

zr-^

Hence the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power for in many ways human nature is in
;

bondage, so that according to Simonides

'

God

alone can

have

and it is unfitting that man should not be 30 content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine power, it would probably occur in this 983^ case above all, and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. But the divine power cannot be jealous (nay,
this privilege
',

according to the proverb,^

'

bards

tell

many

lie

'),

nor should

any science be thought more honourable than one of this sort. For the most divine science is also most honourable and For the this science alone is, in two ways, most divine.
;

*
2 '

982''

26 read nvr^v ws
fr.

fiovtfv

oZaav ikfvdfpav.

Fr. 3 Hiller.

Solon,

26 Hiller.

983^
science which
it

METAPHYSICA
would be most meet for God to have is is any science that deals with divine objects and this science alone has both these qualities for (i) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better. Yet the acquisition of it must in a sense end in something which is the opposite of our original inquiries. For all men begin, as we said, by wondering that the matter is so (as those who have not yet perceived the explanation marvel at automatic marionettes) whether the object of their wonder be the solstices or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side for it seems wonderful to all men that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by the smallest unit. But we must end in the contrary and,
a divine science, and so
; ;

10

15

according to the proverb, the better state, as

these instances

is

the case in

when men

learn the cause

for there is

nothing

20

which would surprise a geometer so much as if the diagonal turned out to be commensurable. We have stated, then, what is the nature of the science we are searching for, and what is the mark which our search and
our whole investigation must reach.

CHAPTER
25

III

causes (for

Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of the original we say we know each thing only when we think
recognize
its first

we
(for

cause),

and causes are spoken of

tl\e

in four

senses.

In one of these
*
'

we mean

substance,

i.e.

the essence
ulti-

why mate why is

the
' '

is

reducible finally to the formula, and the

;

a cause and principle)

in

another the matter

30 or

substratum, in a third the source of the change, and in a

fourth the cause opposed to this, the purpose and the

(for this
is

good
have

the end of
causes

all

generation and change).

in

We

studied

these

sufficiently

our work on nature,^

qSs^ but yet

let us call to

our aid those

^

who have

attacked the

r/iys.

ii.

3, 7.

A.
esti'gation

BOOK

983*

of being and philosophized about reality before For obviously they too speak of certain principles and uses to go over their views, then, will be of profit to the
.

esent inquir>% for

we

shall either find

another kind of cause,

or be

more convinced of the

correctness of those which

we

now maintain. Of the first philosophers, most thought

;

the principles which

were of the nature of matter were the only principles of all things that of which all things that are consist, and from which
they
first

come

to be,

and

into

which they are

its

finally resolved

(the substance remaining,

but changing in

modifications), 10

this they say is the element and the principle of things, and therefore they think nothing is either generated or destroyed,
is always conserved, as we say Socrates be absolutely when he comes to be beautiful or musical, nor ceases to be when he loses these characterSo :cs, because the substratum, Socrates himself, remains. they say nothing else comes to be or ceases to be for there must be some entity either one or more than one from

since this sort of entity

neither

comes

to

^5

which

all

other things
all

come

to be,

it

being conserved.

Yet they do not

agree as to the

number and the nature

of these principles.

Thales, the founder of this school of 20

is

philosophy, says the principle

water (for which reason he

all

declared that the earth rests on water), getting the notion

perhaps from seeing that the nutriment of

things

is

moist,

and that heat itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it (and that from which they come to be is a principle of He got his notion from this fact, and from the all things). fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and that
water
is

25

the origin of the nature of moist things.

Some

think that the ancients

first
;

who

lived long before the

framed accounts of the gods, had a similar view of nature for they made Ocean and Tethys the parents of creation, and described the oath of the gods as
present generation, and

30

being by water, which the poets themselves call Styx

for

what is oldest is most honourable, and the most honourable thing is that by which one swears. It may perhaps be uncertain whether this opinion about nature is primitive and 984* ancient, but Thales at any rate is said to have declared him-


984^
self thus

METAPHYSICA
about the
first

cause.

Hippo no one would think

fit

to include

among

these thinkers, because of the paltriness of

his thought.
5

10

Anaximenes and Diogenes make air prior to water, and the most primary of the simple bodies, while Hippasus of Metapontium and Heraclitus of Ephesus say this of fire, and Empedocles says it of the four elements, adding a fourth for these, he says, earth to those which have been named always remain and do not come to be, except that they come to be more or fewer, being aggregated into one and segregated

out of one.

15

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who, though older than Empewas later in his philosophical activity, says the principles are infinite in number for he says almost all the things that are made of parts like themselves are generated and destroyed (as water or fire is) only by aggregation and segregation, and are not in any other sense generated or destroyed, but remain
docles,
;

eternally.

From
facts

these facts one might think that the only cause

is

the

so-called material cause; but as

men

thus advanced, the very

in forcing
it

showed them the way and joined

them
that or
?

to
all

investigate the subject.

20

However

true

may be

generation and destruction proceed from

elements,

some one
is

why

does this happen and what

the cause
itself

more For
;

at least the

e.g. neither the

either of
25

itself does not make wood nor the bronze causes them, nor does the wood manufacture

substratum

change

the change of
a bed

and the

bronze a statue, but something else

is

the cause of the change.

And
say,

to seek this

is

to seek the second cause, as zve should

that from which comes

those

the beginning of the movement.

Now

who

at the very beginning set themselves to this

kind of inquiry, and said the substratum was one, were not at
all dissatisfied

with themselves
it

but some at least of those

defeated by this search
is

30

who maintain
for the

to be

one as though
in respect

second cause

say
;

the one and nature as a whole

unchangeable not only

tion (for this
is

of generation and destrucall

is

a primitive belief, and

agreed in

it),

but
in

also of all other

change

and

this

view

peculiar to them.

984^ Of those

who

said the universe

was one, none succeeded


A.

BOOK
I

984^^

'discovering a cause of this sort, except perhaps Parmenides,

and not only one supposes there is insomuch that he that only But for those who make more in some sense two causes. ments it is more possible to state the second cause, e.g. for se who make hot and cold, or fire and earth, the elements they treat fire as having a nature which fits it to move ngs, and water and earth and such things they treat in the contran,' way. When these men and the principles of this kind had had ^T^ir day, as the latter were found inadequate to generate the Lire of things, men were again forced by the truth itself, as For surely it said, to inquire into the next kind of cause. lot likely either that fire or earth or any such element uld be the reason why things manifest goodness and beauty
.

10

coming to be, or that those was nor again could it be ht to ascribe so great a matter to spontaneity and luck. \\ hen one man said, then, that reason was present as in animals, so throughout nature as the cause of the world and of all its order, he seemed like a sober man in contrast with the random talk of his predecessors. We know that Anaxagoras certainly adopted these views, but Hermotimus of Clazomenae is credited with expressing them earlier. Those who thought thus stated that there is a principle of things which is at the same time the cause of beauty, and that sort of cause from which things acquire movement.
:h in their

being and

in their

nkers should have supposed

it

15

20

CHAPTER
One might
such a thing

IV
first

or some one
first
:

suspect that Hesiod was the

else

to look for

who put

love or desire
;

among

existing things as a principle, as Parmenides does

for he, in 25

constructing the genesis of the universe, says

Love

of

all

the

Gods she planned.

And Hesiod

says-

was chaos made, and then Broad-breasted earth, and love that foremost Among all the immortals,
First of all things
^

is

Fr. 13, Diels, Vorsokratiker.

TJuog. 116.


984"
30
^

METAPHYSICA
which impHes that among existing things there must be from the first a cause which wilLmoveJhings and bring them together.

How

these thinkers should be arranged with regard to priority

;

of discovery let us be allowed to decide later

contraries of the various forms of

but since the

I

good were

also perceived to

be present

in

nature

not

only order and the beautiful, but

in greater

985 also disorder and the ugly, and bad things

thinker introduced friendship and
strife,

number

than good, and ignoble things than beautiful, therefore another

each of the two the
cause of one of these two sets of qualities.

For

if

we were

to

follow out the view of Empedocles, and interpret

5

it

according

to

its

meaning and not to

is

its

lisping expression,

we should

find that friendship

the cause of good things, and strife of

said that

bad.

Therefore,
is

if

we

mentions, and
principles,
10

the

first

to mention, the

Empedocles in a sense both bad and the good as

right, since the cause of all

we should perhaps be
itself.

goods

is

the good

These thinkers, as we
exten t, two of the causes

say, evidentl y grasp ed,

and to

this

work on nature^ the matter and the source of the movement, vaguely, however, and with no clearness, but as untrained
distinguished in our

w hich we

15

in fights for they go round their opponents and often strike fine blows, but they do not fight on scientific principles, and so these thinkers do not seem to know what they say for it is evident that, as a rule, they m ake no use of their For Anax^qras^ uses causes e xcept to a small extent.
;
;

men behave

reason as a dejis ex machin a for the making of the world, and

when he
20 sarily
is,

is

at a loss to tell for

in,

what cause something necesbut

in all
2.

then he drags reason

other cases ascribes

And Empedocles, though he uses the causes to a greater extent than this, neither
events to anything rather than to reason

does so sufficiently nor attains consistency

least, in

in their use.

At

25

makes friendship segregate things, and For when the universe is dissolved strife aggregate them. into its elements by strife, fire is aggregated into one, and so but when again under the is each of the other elements influence of friendship they come together into one, the parts must again be segregated out of each element.
cases he
;

many

Phys.

ii.

3, 7.

Cf. Diels,

Vorsokratiker, ed.

2, p.

303. 42.


A.

BOOK

985'

Empedocles, then,
first
'

in contrast

with his predecessors, was the

to introduce this cause in a divided form, not positing one 30

uce of movement, but different and contrary sources. Again, was the first to speak of four material elements yet he
;

does not use four, but treats them as two only

by

itself,

and

its

opposites

earth,
we

air,

he treats fire 985 and water as one kind

;

of thing.

We may

learn this

by study of
say,

his verses.

This philosopher then, as

-

way, and

made them

of this number.

spoke of the principles in Leucippus and his

Democritus say that the full and the empty are the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being the and solid being being, the empty and the rare non-being lence they say being is no more being than non-being is, ause the solid is no more being than the empty ^) and they
c^coociate

'.

ke these the material causes of things.

'<e

And
all

as those

who
be

10

the underlying substance one generate

modifications, supposing the rare

other things
to

its

and the dense

the sources of the modifications, in the

same way

these philo-

sophers say the differences in the elements are the causes of

all

other qualities.

These
'

differences,

they say, are three

15

For they say the real is and inter-contact differentiated only by rhythm and turning and of these rhythm is shape, inter-contact is order, and turning is position for A differs from X in shape, AN from NA in order, E from H in position.^ The question of movement, whence or how it belongs to things these thinkers,
shape and order and position.
'

'

'

'

'

like the others, lazily neglected.

to

Regarding the two causes, then, as we sa}-, the inquiry seems have been pushed thus far by the early philosophers.

20

CHAPTER V
Contemporaneously with
to

these

philosophers

and before

them, the Pythagoreans, as they are called, devoted themselves

mathematics
^

they were the

icevoO

first

to advance this study ,^ and

985

**

3 "

985** 18 58.

9 read ovhl toD read to dt

to aStfia. tow H deafi.

So perhaps Alexander. Cf. Gomperz, GreeJb Thinkers^

985^ 24 read Trpwrot ravra irpo^yayov.

'

985*
25

METAPHYSICA
having been brought up in
the principles of
are
all
it

they thought
in

its

principles were

things.
first,

Since of these principles numbers

jso

numbers they seemed to see and come intoj being more than in fire and earth and water (such and such a modification of numbers being justice, another being soul and reason, another being opportunity and similarly almost

by nature the

and

many resemblances

to the things that exist

all

other things being numerically expressible

^)

since, again,

they saw that the attributes and the ratios of the musical
scales were expressible in numbers since, then, all other things seemed in their whole nature to be modelled after numbers, and numbers seemed to be the first things in the whole of 986^ nature, they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things, and the whole heaven to be a musical And all the properties of numbers and scale and a number. 5 scales which they could show to agree with the attributes and parts and the whole arrangement of the heavens, they collected and fitted into their scheme and if there was a gap anywhere,
; ;

they readily
coherent.
10

made

additions so as to

make
is

their

whole theory

E.g. as the riurriber-io"

thought to be perfect

and to comprise the whole nature of numbers, they say that the bodies which move through the heavens are ten, but as the visible bodies are only nine, to meet this they invent a We have discussed these matters tenth the counter-earth

'

'.

15

more exactly elsewhere.^ But the object of our discussion is that we may learn from these philosophers also what they suppose to be the principles and how these fall under the causes we have named. Evidently, then, these thinkers also consider that number is the principle
both as matter

20

and as forming their modifications and hold that the elements of number are the even and the odd, and of these the former is unlimited, and the latter limited and the i proceeds from both of these (for it is both even and odd) and number from the i and the whole heaven, as has been said, is numbers. Other members of this same school say there are ten
for things

and

their

permanent

states,

^ ^

De

Cf. Diels, Vorsokraiiker, ed. 2, p. 235, 12. Coelo, ii. 13; Fr. de Pythagorets, ii. 1513^35-^20.

Cf. Diels,

ibid. p. 270. 48.


A.
principles,

986^

BOOK

which they arrange in two cokimns of cognates * limit and unlimited, odd and even, one and plurality, right and :. male and female, resting and moving, straight and curved, In this ht and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong. -v Alcmaeon of Croton seems also to have conceived the j matter, and either hb got this view from them or they got it ^ m him for he expressed himself similarly- to them. For
;

25

30

go in pairs, meaning not definite contrarieties such as the Pythagoreans speak of, but any ince contrarieties, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter, He threw out indefinite 3d and bad, great and small.
-^

says most

human

atiairs

^gestions about the other contrarieties, but the Pythagoreans 986*

declared both
I

how many and which their contrarieties are. we can learn this much, that J contraries are the principles of things; and how many ti.ese principles are and which they are, we can learn from one of the two schools. But how these principles can be brought together under the causes we have named has n_Q t been clearly a n d articulately stated by them they seem,
From both
these schools, then,
;

(Tvaroixia and aixTTOixos are used in a great variety of connexions by Aristotle, but the common notion is that of things which from some point of view may be treated as forming one line or column. The meanings in

'

the Metaphysics may be summarized thus : In A. 986* 23, N. 1093^ 12 the reference is to a Pythagorean classification of important general notions. The first column is the line of good (^ vvfTTo^xm T) Tov KaXov, N. 1093^ 12), the second the line of evil. To the line of good N. 1093'' 13 adds the equal and the powers of certain numbers '. In r. 1004^ 27, K. 1066* 15, A. 1072* 31 there is no explicit reference to the Pythagorean doctrine, but Aristotle speaks of two lines ', one of which is knowable in itself ', while the other is ' privative ', and its ' principles are indefinite because they are privative '. In I. 1054^ 35, 1058^ 13 we have a different sort of line. Terms which in the strict sense differ are said to be either different in genus or in the same line of predication, and therefore in the same genus and contraries which differ in species and not in genus are said to be in the same line of predication, (tvotoixm t^? Karrjyopias seems to correspond to o-^^^ ri/S KOTTjyopiai (1054^ 29), which is said in ^. 1016** 33 to be coextensive with a yivos. It is surprising to find genus identified with category, and one is tempted to suggest that arvaroixia (or <r;^/ia) rrji Ka-njyopias means one of the main divisions of a category, within which the same sort of predicate is found. Thus number would be the genus within which the predicates odd and even, and various subordinate predicates, are found. Then the subordinate predicates may be thought of as forming a column under 'odd and even.' But A. 1024^ 12-16 shows that genus in one sense can be identified with category'. The categories are the only genera proper, since they are the only genera which are not species.
' ' ' '
'

'

'

986* 29 omit tyevfTO

tijv ^Xikmu',

tnl ytpovri Ilvdayopq,

and

d(.

986''

METAPHYSICA
however, to range the elements under the head of matter
out of these as
;

for

immanent

parts they say substance

is

composed^

and moulded.^

From
lo

these facts

of the ancients

than one
it

we may sufificiently perceive the meaning who said the elements of nature were more but there are some who spoke of the universe as if
entity,

were one

though they were not

all

alike either in the

excellence of their statement or in regard to the nature of the

entity.

The

discussion of

them

is in

no way appropriate to

our present investigation of causes, for they do not, like some

of the natural philosophers, assume being to be one and yet
15

generate

it

out of the one as out of matter, but they speak in

another way; those others add change, since they generate

the universe, but these thinkers say the universe
able.
is

unchange-

Yet

this

much

is

appropriate to the present inquiry

20

seems to fasten on that which is one in formula, Melissus on that which is one in matter, for which reason the former says that it is limited, the latter that it
^ while Xenophanes, the first of this school of Parmenides is said to have been his pupil), gave no clear statement, nor does he seem to have grasped either of these two kinds of unity, but he contemplates the whole heaven and says the One is, namely God. Now these thinkers, as we said, must be neglected for the purposes of the present

Parmenides

is

unlimited
(for

monists

25

two of them entirely, as being a little too naive, Xenophanes and Melissus but Parmenides seems to For, claiming that, speak with somewhat more insight.
inquiry
viz.
;

besides the existent, nothing non-existent exists, he thinks

one and that nothing else exists (on this we have spoken more clearly in our work on nature) ^ but being forced to follow the observed facts, and supposing the existence of that which is one in formula, but more than one according to our sensations, he now posits two causes and \ two principles, calling them hot and cold, i. e. fire and earth 987T and of these he ranges the, hot with the existent, and the
30 that the existent is of necessity
;

other with the non-existerit.f'

From what has been

^

said, then,
5,

and from the wise men who

,^
J

Cf. Philolaus, Fr. 2, Cf. ibid. p. 142. 20.

6 Diels, Vorsokratiker.
13

pjiys^

2^

<

Cf. r. loioa i."


A.
i

BOOK

987'

las e

now

sat in council with us,

"rem the earh'est philosophers,

IS

we have got thus much both who regard the first principle
5

corporeal (for water and

fire

>f

whom some

suppose that there

are

and such things are bodies), and is one corporeal principle,

more than one, but both put these inder the head of matter and from some others who posit X)th this cause and besides this the source of movement, which is stated by some as one and by others as two. Down to the Italian school, then, and apart from it, philoothers

that there

sophers have treated these subjects rather obscurely^, except

that, as

10

we

said,

they have used two kinds of cause, and one

of these

the

source of

movement

some

treat as

one and
the same
15

others as two.

But the Pythaeoreans h ave

said in

way
is

that there are two prin ciples, but added this much, which

peculiar to them, that they thought finitude and infinity

e. g.

and unity were not attributes of certain other things,

fire

of

or earth or anything else of this kind, but that .hifinitY,^

itself

and unity

itsel f

were the substance of the things of which a

I'his is

they are predicated.

of all things.
:

why number was

the substance
20

they expressed themselves thus and regarding the question of essence they began to make statements and definitions, but treated the matter too simply. For they both defined superficially and thought that the first subject of which a given term would be predicable, was the substance of the thing, as if one supposed that double and 2 were the same, because a is the first thing of which double is predicable. But surely to be double and to be 2
this subject, then,
'
'

On

'

'

'

'

25

are not the

same

if

they

are,

one thing

will

be

many

a consequence which they actually drew.^

philosophers, then,

From

the earlier
learn

and from

their successors

we can

thus much.

CHAPTER
After the systems
of Eb*"Q
^

VI

which

in

we have named came the philosophy most respects followed these thinkers,

30

9S7* 10 read fiopvxanepov. i. e. 2 will be identified with each even number. ' e. g. as friendship was 4, and 4 was the first square number, friendship was identified with each square number.
-

'

987*

METAPHYSICA
but had peculiarities that distinguished
of the ItaHans.
it

from the philosoph;

first

For, having in his youth

become
is

familia
al

with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that

sensible things are ever in a state of flux

and there

no know

ledge about them), these views he held even in later years

gSi)* Socrates,

however, was busying himself about ethical matter and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking th< universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought fo the first time on definitions Plato accepted his teaching but held that the problem applied not to any sensible thing
;

but to entities of another

kind for

this

reason, that the

j:ommon

no t be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this othei sort, then, he called I deas, and sensible things, he said, were apart from these, and were all called after these for the multitude of things which have the same name as the Form
definitio n could
;

10

/,
^

by participation in it. Only the name participation was new for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name. But what the participation or the imitatio n of the Forms could be they left an open question. Further, besides sensible things and Forms he says there
exist
' ; '
'

15

are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate

position, differing

from sensible things

each case unique.

in

being eternal and

unchangeable, from Forms

the

in that there are

many
other
all
;

alike, while

Form

itself is in

Since the Forms are the causes of

20

all

things,

he

thought their elements were the elements of

reality,

things.

As

matter, the great and the small were principles

as essential

from the great and the small, by i.e. the Numbers. participation in the One, come the Forms But he agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of something else and
the

One

for

in saying that the

25

Numbers

are the causes of the realit y of

;

but positing a^yad other things, he also agreed with them and constructing the infinite out of great and small, instead of treating the infinite as one, is peculiar to him and so is his view that the Numbers exist apar tjrom sensible things, while t/ie}' say that the things themselves are Numbers, and do not
;

A.
:e

BOOK

987*^

of mathematics between Ideas and His divergence from the Pythagoreans in 30 laking the One and the Numbe rs separate from things.. nd his itroduction of the Forms, were due to his inquiries in the egion of definitoryjprmulae (for the earher thinkers had no incture of dialectic), and his making the other entity besides be One a dyad was due to the belief that the numbers, xcept those which were prime,^ could be neatly produced ut of the dyad as out of a plcistic material. Yet what happens is the contrary th e theory is not a reason- q 88^ For they make many things out of the matter, iale one nd the form generates only once, but what we observe is hat one table is made from one jnatter, while the man who pplies the form, though he is one, makes many tables. And 5 he relation of the male to the female is similar for the latter s impregnated by one copulation, but the male impregnates nany females yet these are analogues of those first principles. Plat o, then, declared himself thus on the points in question t is evident from what has been said that he has used only " c ausgg that of the essence and the m aterial caus e (for the 10

the

objects

ensible things.

ns are the cause of the essence of all other things,

and the
evident

)ne

is

the cause of the essence of the Forms)

is,

and

it is

which the Forms are predicted inTTiFcasF'oT'sensTBTethings, and the One in the case rf Forms, viz. that this is a dvad^ the great and the small. urther, he has assigned the cause of good and that of evil to
vhat the underlying matter

of

iJie

elements, one to each of the two, as

e. g.

[predecessors sought to do,

we say ^ some of his Empedocles and Anaxagoras,

15

CHAPTER VH
Our account
'

of those

rnd reality and of the

This
is

who have spoken about first principles way in which they have spoken, has been
;

not quite accurate. Really it is only powers of 2 that could produced out of this I and the indefinite dyad cf. N. 1091* 9. In Parmenides 143 C- 144 A 3 is derived from 1 and 2 (the number 2, not,
DC neatly
is Aristotle says, the indefinite 2) by addition, and the numbers higher dian 3 are derived from 2 and 3 by multiplication. Primes are not there 3xcepted Plato speaks as if all the higher numbers could be got by plication. Nothing in the works of Plato corresponds exactly to Aristotle says here.
;

:t.

984*18,935*4.

MET.

988^
20 concise

METAPHYSICA
and summary but yet we have learnt this much fron them, that of those who speak about principle and cause no one has mentioned any principle exc ept those which hav( been distinguished in our work on nature,^ but all evidentlj
;

'

'

'

25

have some inkling of them, though only vaguely. For some speak of the first principle as matter, whether they suppose one or more first principles, and whether they suppose this t( be a body or to be incorporeal e. g. Plato spoke of the grea'
;

and the

30
,

Empedocles of fire Anaxagoras of the infinity of thingj composed of similar parts. These, then, have all had notion of this kind of cause, and so have all who speak of aii or fire or water, or something denser than fire and rarer thar air for some have said the prime elenient is of this kind.' These thinkers grasped this cause only but certain others have mentioned the .source of movement, e. g. those whc make friendship and strife, or reason, or love, a principle.
small, the Italians of the infinite,
earth, water,

and

air,

Th e esagpce,
35 distinctl y.

i.

e.

the substantial reality, Qo_one has expressed

It is
;

988^ the Forms

for

mentioned chiefly by those who believe in they do not suppose either that the Forms

are the matter of sensible things,

and the One the matter

o)

the Forms, or that they are the source of

movement

(for

they

say these are causes rather of immobility and of being at rest), but they furnish the Forms as the essence of every other thing, and the One as the essence of the Forms. That which is the end for which actions and changes and

movements take
not
in this

place, th ey assert to

be a cause

in a

way, but

to be a cause.

way, i. e. not in the way in which it is its nature For those who speak of reason or friendship class these causes as goods they do not speak, however, as il
;

10

anything that exists either existed or came into being for the sake of these, but as if movements started from these. In the same way those who say the One or the existent is the good
say that
is
it is

the cause of substance, but not that substance eithei

for the

or

comes to be

sake of

this.

Therefore

it

turns out

that in a sense they both say

15 for

they do not
Phys.

call it

and do not say the good is a cause: a cause qua good but only incidentally.

ii.

3, 7.

Cf. Diels, Vorsokratiker, ed. 2, pp. 15. 4, 327. 28.

A.
.ill

BOOK

988"

these thinkers, then, as they cannot pitch on another

seem to testify that we have determined rightly both ow many and of what sort the causes are. Besides this it is
luse,

lain that

when

the causes are being looked

for, either all

four

lust
)ur

be sought thus or they must be sought

ways.
to the

in

one of these
to

Let us next discuss the possible difficulties with way in which each of these thinkers has spoken, nd with regard to his views about the first principles.

^rd

CHAPTER
Those, then,

VIII
is

who

say the uni verse

one a nd posit one kind

ot

Wng as matter, and

litude,

as coiporeal matter which has spatial

mag-

evidently go astray in

many

ways.

For they posit the

the causes of

flements of bodies only, not of incorporeal things, though there 25

re incorporeal things.

And

in trying to state

eneration
:

and destruction, and in giving an account of the of all things, they do a.way with the cause^of moveme nt.
, ,

_-

-her they err in not posit ingjt he substance

i.

e.

the essence,

the cause of anything, and besides this in

of the simple bodies except earth the
first

lightly calling

my
>ut

principle, with- 30

inquiring
fire,

how they

are produced out of one another,

air.

For some things are produced )Ut of others by combination, others by separation, and this nakes the greatest difference to their priority and posteriority, "or (1) in a way the property of being most elementary of all 35 vould seem to belong to the first thing from which they are )roduced by combination, and //it's property would belong to 989* Therefore those 'he most fine-grained and subtle of bodies. [irho make fire the principle would be most in agreement with his argument. But each of the other thinkers agrees that the .'lement of corporeal things is of this sort. At least none of 5 he later philosophers who said the world was one claimed ':hat earth was the element, evidently because of the coarseness )f its grain. (Of the other three elements each has found some udge on its side for some maintain that fire, others that .vater, others that air is the element. Yet why, after all, do i;hey not name earth also, as most men do for people say all
nean
water, earth, and
;

988^ 28-29 read ra

yfjv.

tw paBlas.

Cf.

I.

Bywater in/. 0/ P.

x-wHii.

1146.

C 2

989''

METAPHYSICA
things are earth.

10

And
;

Hesiod says^ earth was produced

fir:

of corporeal things
been.)
right

so ancient and popular has the opinio

this

According to

argument, then, no one would t

first

who

either says the

fire,

principle
it

is

any of the ek
ai

ments other than

15

or supposes

to be denser than

20

35

But (2) if that which is later in genera and that which is concocted an compounded is later in generation, the contrary of what w have been saying must be true, water must be prior to aii and earth to water. Let this suffice, then^ as our statement about those wh posit one cause such as we mentioned but the same i true if we suppose morepf these, as Empedocles says th matter of things Is tou^ bodies. For he too is confronted b; consequences some of which are the same as have beei mentioned, while others are peculiar to him. For we se< these bodies produced from one another, which implies tha the same body does not always remain fire or earth (we have spoken about this in our works on nature ^) and regardin| the moving cause and the question whether we must supposi one or two, he must be thought to have spoken neither correctl)
but rarer than water.
tion
is

prior in nature,

[And in general those who speak ir way must do away with change of qualit y, for on theii view cold will not come from hot nor hot from cold. For if
nor altogether plausibly.
this
traries,

ii

did there would be something that accepted those very con-

and there would be some one entity that became fire and water, which Empedocles denies.^] As regards Anaxagoras, if one were to suppose that he saic 30 there were two elements, the supposition would accord thoroughly with a view which Anaxagoras himself did nol state articulately, but which he must have accepted if any one had developed his view. True, to sa y tha t in the beginning all ^ things were mixed is absurd both on other grounds and because it follows that they must have existed before in an unmixed 989'' form, and because nature does not allow any chance thing tc be mixed with any chance thing, and also because on this view
^
"^

Theog. 116.

De
LI.

Caelo,

iii.

De

Gen. ct Corr.
gloss.

ii.

6.

26-30 are probably a

A.
^

BOOK

989'

and accidents could be separated from subsame things which are mixed can be separated) ^ -et if one were to follow him up, piecing together what he "^"-^ns. he would perhaps be seen to be somewhat modern in \ iews. For when nothing was separated out. evidently
nodifications
'

tances (for the

5
1

'hothing could be truly asserted

existed.

of the substance that then

I mean, e. g. that it was neither white nor black, nor any other colour, but of necessity colourless for if it lad been coloured, it would have had one of these colours. \nd similarly, by this same argument, it was flavourless, nor 10 for it could not be either of any iad.it any similar attribute |uality or of any size, nor could it be any definite kind of For if it were, one of the particular forms Avould have Jiing, jelonged to it, and this is impossible, since all were mixed tofor the particular form would necessarily have been gether -idy separated out, but he says all were mixed except ^m^, and this alone was unmixed and pure.^ From this it 15 follows, then, that he must say the principles are the One (for this is simple and unmixed) and the Other, which is of such a nature as we suppose the indefinite to be before it is defined and partakes of some form. Therefore, while expressing himself neither rightly nor clearly, he means something like what the later thinkers say and what is now more 20

jrey nor

clearly seen to be the case.-

But these thinkers

are, after all, at

home

only

in

arguments
;

about generation and destruction and

principles

movement

for

it

is

practically only of this sort of substance that they seek the

and the causes. But those who extend their vision and of existing things suppose some to be perceptible and others not perceptible, evidently study both classes, which is all the more reason why one should devote some time to seeing what is good in their views and what bad from the stand-point of the- inquiry we have now before us. The Pythagoreans treat the principles and the elements more strangely " than the physical philosophers (the reason is that they got the principles from non-sensible things, for the
to all things that exist,
'
'

25

30

'

Fr. 12, Diels, Vorsokratiker. 989'' 20 read roTy vvv (fxupofifyois fmWov. 989^ 30 read fKronartpas.

989^

METAPHYSICA
objects of mathematics, except those of astronomy, are of th
class of things

without movement)
all

yet their discussions an.

for

investigations are

about nature;

they generate th

990^ heavens, and with regard to their parts and attributes an( functions they observe the phenomena, and use up the princi pies and the causes in explaining these, which implies tha they agree with the others, the physical philosophers, that th< real is just all that which is perceptible and contained by th< 5 so-called heavens '. But the causes and the principles whicl they mention are, as we said, sufficient to act as steps ever up to the higher realms of reality, and are more suited t( They do not tell u! these than to theories about nature. at all, however, how there can be movement if limit and un 10 limited and odd and even are the only things assumed, 01 how without process and change there can be generation anc destruction, or how the bodies that move through the heaveni Further, if we either granted therr can do what they do. that spatial magnitude consists of these elements, or this were proved, still how would some bodies be light and others have weight? To judge from what they assume and 15 maintain, they speak no more of mathematical bodies than of perceptible hence they have said nothing whatever about fire or earth or the other bodies of this sort, I suppose because they have nothing to say which applies peculiarly to /
' .
I

perceptible things.
Furtlxer,

how

are

we

cations of number,
20 exists

to combine the beliefs that the modifiand number itself, are causes of what

25

and happens in the heavens both from the beginning and now, and that there is no other number than this number out of which the world is composed ? When in one particular region they place opinion and opportunity, and, a little above or below, injustice and sifting or mixture, and allege as proof of this that each one of these is a number, but when there happens to be already in each place ^ a plurality of the extended bodies composed of numbers, because
these modifications of
of places,

number attach
so,
is

this

being

this

to the various groups number, which we must

990* 25, 26 omit

[liv

and read

av\i^a[vr\

tottov ^8r),

A.

BOOK

990'

ii

suppose each of these abstractions to be, the same number

is

a|which

exhibited in the material universe, or

Plato says
it

is it

another

/-

n this?

is

different

yet even he thinks that 3

:h these bodies
Iligible

and

their causes are

numbers, but that the

numbers are

causes, while the others are sensible.

CHAPTER

IX
;

I.et us leave the Pythagoreans for the present for it is enough as we have done. to have touched on them as much ^ But as for those who posit the Ideas as causes, firstly, in seeking to grasp the causes of the things around us, they introduced 690*' others equal in number to these, as if a man who wanted to count things thought he could not do it while they were few, \ I but tried to count them when he had added to their number. s For the Forms are practically equal to or not fewer than the things, in trying to explain which these thinkers proceeded 5 from them to the Forms. For to each set of substances there answers a Form which has the same name and exists apart from th e substances, and so also in the case of all other groups ^ in which there is one character common to many things, whether the things are in this changeable world or are eternal. Further, of the ways in which we^ prove that the Forms exist^none is convincing for from some no inference necessarily follows, and from some it follows that there are Forms 10 of things of which we think there are no Forms. For according to the arguments from the existence of the sciences there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences, and according to the argument that there is one attribute common to many things there will be Forms even of negations, and according to the argument that there is an object for thought even when the thing has perished, there will be Forms of perishable things for we can have an image
I
;
\

of these.

Further, of the more accurate arguments,

some lead

to 15

Ideas of relations, of which

class,
1

we say

there

is
'

no independent
third

and others involve the

difficulty of the

man '.^

'

* Aristotle speaks as a Platonist. 990^ 7 read riav re oXXco*'. Cf. K. losQ** 8 and Plato Farm. 131 E.

990''

METAPHYSICA
And
are
in general the

arguments

for the

Forms destroy
^

thi

things for whose existence those

who maintain
is
first,

the
;

Form
for
i

more anxious than

is

for the existence of the Ideas

20

follows that not the dyad^. b ut

relative

number

i.

e.

that th(

prior to the absolute,^

besides

all

the other point;

on which certain people by following out the opinions helc about the Ideas have come into conflict with the principles o:
the theory.
Further, according to the assumption on which our belief
ir

the Ideas

rests,

there will be

Forms not only

of substances
is

but also of
25

many

other things (for the concept

single not

only

in the case of

substances but also in the other cases, and

there are sciences not only of substance but also of other

30

and a thousand other such conclusions also follow). But according to the necessities of the case and the opinions held about the Forms, if they can be shared there must be Ideas of substances only For they ^t-^^t^^^^ g\]firffl ''"^'^^^^^-a^^Yi but a thing must share in its Form as in something not prethings,
.

dicated of a subject
'

(e. g. if

a thing shares
;

in
'

'

double itself,
eternal
'

it

shares also in eternal

/ 991^

happens ', will be predicable the double Therefore Forms to be of th e '). substance and the same terms indicate substance in this and
but incidentally
for
'

world (or what will be the meaning of saying that something apart from the particulars the one over many?).* And if the_ Ide as and the particulars that share them have the same Form/tnere will be something common to these for why should 2 be one ^ and the same in the perishable a's or in those which are many but eternal, and
in the ideal
is

there

'

'

not the same in the

i

'

2 itself as in the particular 2

Lb ej Lhave not the sq.me

in

Form they must have

,

only the

B ut if name

common, and

it is
'

as

if
',

one were to

call

both Callias and

a wooden image a

man

without observing any community

between them.^
^

990^ 18 read ^ovXovrai. Sc. the indefinite 2 which Plato held to be one of the
'

'

first

principles

of number.
^ i. e. number, which is relative, is prior to the indefinite 2, which Plato held to be an absolute first principle. * This seems to be an enthymeme, the conclusion to be supplied being that the Forms, since they are substances, must be ^substances. ^ 991*5 omit eivai. * With ^go^ 34-991^ 8 cf. M. 1078^ 32-1079^ 3.

A.

BOOK

991*

t he

Above all one might Forms contribute to

discuss the question

wh at on

earth

sensib le things, eith er to those that 10

are eternal or to those tnat

come

into

bemg and

cease to be.
in

For they cause neither

m ovement

nor any change

them. >y

But again they help in nowise towards t he knozi'led^e o f the other things (for they are not even the substance of these, else they

1/

would have been

in

them), nor towards their bein g,

if

they

are not in the particulars which share in

them

though
this

if

they

were, they might be thought to be causes, as white causes 15

.iteness in that with
lich first

which Anaxagoras and

upset
;

it is

mixed.
not

But

argument,

later
it is

Eudoxus and

certain others

ed, is too easily

for

difficult to collect

many
in

uperable objections to such a view.

But further

all

other things cannot

'

come from

the

Forms

An d to say that they are ao .y of the usual senses of from patterns and the other things ghar^ thpm igj|r>_^ncip empty
'.

jvnrds and poetical metaphors..

I'^oking to the Ideas?
ce

For what is Anything can either

it,

it

that works,

be, or

become,

another without being copied from

so that whether 25
;

Socrates exists or not a

man might come

if

to be like Socrates

and evidently

this

might be so even

Socrates were eternal.

And

according to the Platonist's principles there will be

several patterns of the

e.g. 'animal'

same thing, and therefore several Forms, and 'two-footed' and also 'man himself will be Forms of man. Again, the Forms are patterns not only of
sensible
things,

but of things-in-themselves
is

also,
;

i.

e.

the

genus as genus

the pattern of the species

therefore the

same thing

will

be pattern and copy.

^Again^it must be held to be i mpossible that the subsjance_a9 and that of w hich it is the SUb frt^nrp <;^nn1r1 pvi'gt apart hnWj theretore, can the Ideas, being the substances of things, exist
apart
? is

In the P/iaedo'^ the case

stated

in

this

way

that
;

the

Forms are causes both of being and of becoming yet when the Forms exist, still the things that share in them do not and come into being, unless there is some efficient cause many other things come into being (e. g. a house or a ring),
;

of which

we say

there are
^

no Forms.
100 D.

Clearly, therefore,

991^

METAPHYSICA
even the other things can both be and come into being owing
to such causes as produce the things just mentioned.^

Again,

if

the

Forms
is

are numbers,

how can they be

e.g.
?

causes

i
y.

10 Is it
is

because existing things are other numbers,

Socrates, another CalHas

one number
then are
not
It will

man, another

Why

the one set of numbers causes of the other set?

make any
world
is
(e.

difference even

if
is

the former are eternal and the

latter are not.

g.

But if it harmony) are

is

because things in this sensible

ratios of

numbers, evidently there they are

ratios.
If,

some one

15 this

numbers themselves too will be ratios of something to something else. E. g. if Callias is a numerical ratio between fire and earth and water and air, his Idea also will be a number of certain other underlying things and the Idea of man, whether it is a

the matter

class of things of which

then,

some

definite thing, evidently the

number
20 certain

be a numerical ratio of things and not a number proper, nor will it be a

in a sense or not, will still
it is

number merely because

Again, from

a numerical ratio.^

many numbers one number is produced, but how can one Form come from many Forms? And if the number comes not from the many numbers themselves but from the units in them,^ e.g. in 10,000, how is it with the
units?
If

they are specifically

alike,

numerous absurdities
in

will follow,

and also

if

they are not alike (neither the units

like

the same
25

one another nor those in different numbers being all like to all) for in what will they differ, as they are without quality ? This is not a plausible view, nor can it be consistently thought out. Further, the Platonists must
;

number being

up a second kind of number (with which arithmetic deals), all the objects which are called intermediate by some thinkers and how do these exist or from what principles do Or why must they be intermediate between 30 they proceed ? the things in this sensible world and the things-in-themselves ? 992^ Further, the units in 2 must each come from a prior 2 but
set

and

'

'

With
i.

ggi'i

8-^9

cf.

M. 1079^ 12-1080*

8.

It the Idea is a numerical ratio in some underlying material. may perhaps be called a sort of (rty) number, but strictly it is a numerical ratio. The passage, however, is very difficult, and the contradiction in
^

e.

11.

19,
^

99

20 almost intolerable. 1 '^ 22 read rav iv rai api6fj\

A.
this is impossible.
all

BOOK
why
is

992'
a number,

Further,

when taken
if

together, one?

Again, besides what has been said,

Platonists

the
like

units

are

diverse the

should have spoken

;

those
these

who say
thinkers
is
is

there are four, or two, elements

gives
e. g.

for

each of
to that
5

the

name

of element

not
earth,

which
there
in fact

common,

to body, but to fire

and

whether

something
water

common
and

to them, viz. body, or not.

if

But

the Platonists speak as

;

the

One were

homogeneotis

like fire or

if this is so,
if

the numbers will not be

is
;

substances.^

Evidently,
*

there

is

a One-in-itself and this

first

principle,

one

'

is

being used in more than one sense

impossible.

for otherwise the

theory

is

When we
ciples,

Platonists wish to reduce substances to their prin- 10

we

state that lines

come from the

short and long

(i.

e.

from a kind of small and great), and the plane from the broad

and narrow, and the solid from the deep and shallow.

Yet
f

how then can

a plane
?

the plane contain a

line,

or the solid a line or

is

For the broad and narrow

a different class of

things from the deep and shallow.

Therefore, just as

number

15

is not present in these, because the many and few are different from these, evidently no other of the higher (more abstract) But classes will be present in the lower (more concrete). for deep, again the broad is not a genus which includes the

then the solid would have been a species of plane.^

Further, the line

from what principle

be derived
?

will the

presence of the points

in

Plato even used to object to this class of things 20

(sc. points) as

being a geometrical

fiction.
line,

What we
and
this is

call

the point he called the principle of the

what he meant by the indivisible lines which he often posited. Yet these must have a limit therefore the argument from which
;

the existence of the line follows proves also the existence of

the point.

In general, though philosophy seeks the rauseofp ^rceptib le

thrngs,

we
we

Platonists have given thi s

up

(for

the cause from which change takes

fa ncy

its

start),

we say nothing of 2: butwhile_we_

are stating the substance of perceptible things,

we

assert the
*

existence of a second class of substances, while

numbers. M. 1085* 9-19.
Cf.

Sc. but ordinary mathematical

M. 1081^

5.

With 992* 10-19

cf.

992^

METAPHYSICA
^ur account
before,^

jerceptib le thingrs

way in which they are the substances _Q f empty talk for sharing as we said means nothing^ Nor have the Forms any connexion
of the
is
'

',

with that which^wesee to be the cause in the case of the

30

arts,

whose sake mind and nature produce all that they do produce,^ with this cause which we assert to be one of the first principles but mathematics has come to be the whole of philosophy for modern thinkers,^ though they say that it 992 should be studied for the sake of other things * Further, one might suppose that the substance which according to them underlies as matter is too mathematical, and is a predicate and differentia of the substance, e. of the matter, rather than
for

and

i.

the matter

itself;

i.

e.

the great and the small are like the rare

and the dense which the physical philosophers speak of, calling these the primary differentiae of the substratum for these are a kind of excess and defect. And regarding movement, if the great and the small are to he movement, evidently the Forms will be moved but if they are not, whence did movement come ? If we cannot answer this the whole study
;
;

of nature has been annihilated.

And what
10

is

thought to be easy
;

are one

is

not done
^

for

to show that all things by t he separating of the uni versal

from particu lars

a ll thing s do not' c"OIYiel:o be one but ther e

comes

to be a One-in-itself, if
if

And
is

not even this follows,

;

we we do

grant

all

the assumptions.

not grant that the universal

15

and this in some cases it cannot be. it be explained either how the lines and planes and solids that come after the numbers exist or can exist, or what meaning they have for these can neither be Forms (for they
a class

Nor can

are not numbers), nor the intermediates (for those are the

objects of mathematics), nor the perishable things.

This

is

evidently a distinct fourth class.^

In general,

if

we

search for the elements of existing things

witho ut distin gui shing the

said to exist,
991a
8_i)

many

se n ses in

w hich
if

thinc^i ^rft"-

we cannot
2

succeed, especially

the search for

9,

g(,_ ^jjg f^j^al

cause.

Cf. B. 9968' 29-^

i.

992* 33 read (f)aaK6vT(oi' aWcov. Cf. Plato, Rep. vii. 531 D, 533 B-D. ^ For this Platonic method cf. B. iocs'* 10, Z. 1031^ 21, M. 1086^ 10. Cf. Z. 1028^ 24, M. 1080^ 23.

A.

BOOK
is

992"
is

the elements of which things are

Platonic
'

made
'

conducted

in

the

manner.
'

For

it

surely impossible to discover 20

', ',

what acting or being acted on or the straight is made of, but if elements can be discovered at all, it is only the
'

elements of substances
existing things or to

therefore to

s eek

the elements of
is

all

thl^ one has them

incorrect.

And
35

how

we /ear;i the elements of all things? Evidently we cannot start by knowin g something before. For as he who is learning geometry, though he may know other things before, knows none of the things with which the science deals and
could
is

about which he
fore if there
is

to learn, so

is it

in all other cases.

There-

some maintain, he ho is learning this will know nothing before. Yet all learniiig is by means of premises which are (either all or some of them) known before, whether the learning be by demonstran or by definitions for the elements of the definition must and learning by inducbe known before and be familiar
a science of
all

thing^s,

as

30

But again, if the science is innate, it 993* is wonderful that we are unaware of our possession of the Again, how is one to k/iazu what all greatest of sciences. things are made of, and how is this to be ma.6e evident? 'This also affords a difficulty for there might be a conflict of opinion, as there is about certain syllables some say s^a is made out 5 of s and d and a, while others say it is a distinct sound and Further, how could we none of those that are familiar.
tion proceeds similarly.
; ;

know
tion?

the objects of sense without having the sense in ques-

consist, as

Yet we should, if the elements of which all things complex sounds consist of their proper elements,
10

are the same.

CHAPTER X
It
is

evident, then, even from

what we ha\e said

before,

that all

men seem
;

to seek the causes

named

in the
;

Physics ^,

and that we cannot name any beyond these but they seek these vaguely and though in a sense they have all been described before, in a sense they have not been described at
'

3, 7.

993^
15 all.

METAPHYSICA
For the
lisps,

earliest
its

philosophy
beginnings

is,

who

since in

it is

on all subjects, like one but a child.^ For even

ratio in
it.

Now
it is

Empedocles says^ bone exists by virtue of the this is the essence and the substance of the
and of everything
else,

thing.

But
on

similarly necessary that the ratio should be the substance

20 of flesh

or of none

therefore

it is

account of this that flesh and bone and everything else

will

exist, and not on account of the matter, which he names, fire and earth and water and air. But while he would necessarily have agreed if another had said this, he has not said it clearly.

On
25

such questions our views have been expressed before

us return to enumerate the difficulties that might be

but

let

raised

on these same points

for

perhaps we

may

get

some

help towards our later

1

difficulties.

993* 16 read via

/car'

dpx^as

Diels, Vorsokratiker, ed.

2, fr.

ova a, enei. 96 and

p. 166. 4.

BOOK

II

(a)

CHAPTER

The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another 30 An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is easy.
able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, 993

no one

fails entirely,

but every one says something true about

the nature of things, and while individually they contribute tittle or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable

jamount
way
:^and
;
it

is

amassed.

Therefore, since the truth seems to be

fail

llike the proverbial door, which no one can

is

to hit, in this

easy, but the fact that

we can have a whole

at

truth
it.

not the particular part

we aim

shows the

difficulty of

Perhaps, as

difficulties are
is

of two kinds, the cause of the

us.

present difficulty

not in the facts but in

is

For as the
10

eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so

soul to the things which are
It is just that

the reason in our

of
all.

by nature most evident

we

should be grateful, not only to those

whose opinions we may share, but also to those who have expressed more superficial views for these also contributed something, by developing before us the powers of thought. It is true that if there had been no Timotheus we should have been without much of our lyric poetry but if there had been no Phrynis there would have been no Timotheus. The same holds good of those who have expressed views about the truth ^ for from the better thinkers we have inherited certain
:

15

opinions, while the others

have

been responsible

for

the

appearance of the better thinkers. It is right also that philosophy should be called knowledge
of the truth.

For the end of

theoretical
is

knowledge

is if

truth, ao

while that of practical knowledge

consider
itself,
^

action (for even

they

how

things are, practical

men do

not study the cause in

but ^ in some relation and at some time).

ttjs.
'

Now we do not

993^ 17 read n-ept rar TSpi

993^ 22 read ov to atnov xaff avro akXa

993''

METAPHYSICA
know
a truth without
its

cause

and a thing has a quahty

if

in

a higher degree than other things

25

in virtue of
(e. g.

it

the similar

quahty belongs to the other things

things
;

fire is
all

the hottest of
;

for

it is

the cause of the heat of

other things)
is

so

that that which causes derivative truths to be true

most true. Therefore the principles of eternal things must be always most true for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are
;

30

the cause of the being of other things, so that as each thing

is in

respect of being, so

is it in

respect of truth.

CHAPTER
994^
Evidently there
kind.
is

II

first_jgrinciple,

and the causes of

things are neither an infinite series nor infinitely various in

on the one hand, one thing cannot proceed from ad infinitu m, e. g. flesh from earth, earth from air, air from fire, aniJ~so^ on without stopping nor on the other hand can the efficient causes form an endless
(i),

For

another, as from matt er,

series,

man
by

for instance
Strife,

being acted on by

air, air

by the

sun,

the sun

and so on without limit. Similarly the final causes cannot go on ad infinitum, walking for the sake of

health, this for the sake of happiness, happiness for the sake
10 of

something

else,

and so one thing always

is

for the

sake of

another.

And

the case of the formal cause

similar.

For

in

the case of an intermediate, which has a last term and a prior term outside it, the prior must be the cause of the later terms. For if we had to say which of the three is the cause, we should say the first; surely not the last, for the final term is the
15

cause of none
of one.
It

nor even the intermediate, for

it is

the cause only

makes no

difference whether there

is

one intermeinfinite

diate or more, nor wh-ether they are infinite or finite in number.

But of

series

which are
so that

infinite in this

way, and of the

in general, all the parts

down
th ere
is

to that

now
there

present are alike

is

intermediates
20

if

no

Nor can
beginning
in

there be an infinite

no ca iisf ^<- ^H process downwards, with a

first

the upper direction, so that water should proceed

from

fire,

earth from water, and so always

should be produced.

some other kind For one thing comes frotn another in


a.

BOOK

II
'

994'
' '

:is

wo ways (if we exclude the sense in which froni means after,' we say 'from the Isthmian games come the Olympian '), (a) as nan comes from the boy, by the boy's changing, or (d) as air By as the man comes from the boy' we OS from water. .n as that which has come to be from that which is coming
'

25

'

to be,

from that which is being ichieved (for as becoming is between being and not being, so :hat which is becoming is always between ^ that which is and
or as that which
'

is

finished

[hat

making, and this

and the learner is a man of science in the what is meant when we say that from a on the other hand, science is being made) of man earner a from air implies comes as water a)ming from another thing
which
is

not

is

[he destruction of

the other thing.

This

is

why changes

of

e former kind are not reversible,

the

boy does not come

lom the man (for that which comes to be does not come to from the process of coming to be, but exists afUr - the for it is thus that the day comes 994 process of coming to be sense that it comes after the the morning in the Trom cannot come from the morning the therefore morning and
ife
; :

iay)

but changes of the other kind are reversible. But in K)th cases it is impossible that the number of terms should be For terms of the former kind being intermediates ^ nfinite.
;

we

nust have an end, and terms of the latter kind change into anotlicr for the destruction of either is the generation of
;

:he other.

At
s

the

same time

it is

impossible that the

;

first

cause, being

iternal,

should be destroyed

for while the process of

first

becoming

not infinite in the upward direction, a

cause

by whose

destruction something
1

came

to be could not

be

eternal.*

27 read eVrt ^era^v. 994^ I read aXX' eari. The meaning seems to be, that in this kind of ;hange the y that comes from x is not simply x rearranged, but x affected .*. x cannot be got from/. jy a lapse of time.
994'''
^

^
*

Cf. * 27-29.

Aristotle has in ^11-19 given a This paragraph is very obscure. general argument which applies to all the four causes, to show that there He nust always be a first cause. This, he assumes, must be eternal. low applies this argument to the prime material cause, and shows that There are two difficulties in the paragraph t must be indestructible. (i) It seems pointless to say that the first cause must be indestructible because it is eternal. Ground and consequent appear to be identical. But probably the object is to show that the first cause must be to its
:

AR. MET.

994^

METAPHYSICA
Further, the final cause
is

an end, and that sort of enc

else,

which
lo
sort,

is

not for the sake of something

is
;

but for whose sak(

there

everything else

so that

if

there

is
;

to be a last

the process will not be infinite

will

but

if

term of thi; is no sucl

maintair
it.

term there

be no

final cause.

the infinite series destroy the

But those who Good without knowing

Yei

no one would try to do anything if he were not going to comt Nor would there be reason in the world ^ the 15 to a limit. n reasonable man, at least, always acts for a purpose and thii is a limit, for the end is a limit. But the formal caiise^ also, cannot be reduced always tc another definition which is fuller in expression.^ For thtj original definition is always more of a definition, and not the and in a series in which the first term is noi later one
;
; I
;

20 correct,

the next

is

not so either.
;

Further, those who

speal

25

thus destroy science for it is not possible to have this till one comes to the indivisible concepts. And knowledge becomes impossible for how can one think things that are infinite ir For this is not like the case of the line, tc this way ^ ? whose divisibility there is no stop, but which we cannot thinls so that one who is tracing the if we do not make a stop infinitely divisible line cannot be counting the possibilities 01
; ;

section.

But

further, the matter in

*.

a changeable thing

must

be

cognized
being

Again, nothing
infinite is
(2)
if

infinite

can exist

and

if it

could, at leasl

not

infinite.^

But

the kinds of causes had been infinite in

;

then also knowledge would have been impossible

effects not as

for

number we thinl<

and

water to air but as boy to man. It develops into them not destroyed when they come into being. (2) The clause beginning with eVei seems, as is often the case, to b( Since the process of becoming The meaning probably is elliptical. is not infinite in the upward direction, (there must be an eternal firsi cause, but) a first cause by whose destruction something came to be coulc not be eternal.'
is
:

'

read ^v to'ls ovaiv. one can reduce the definition of man as mortal rational animal mortal rational sensitive living substance ', but one cannot carry 01 to process ad infinitum.
^ ^

994^^ 15
e.

i.

'

'

' *

i.

e.

actually infinite.

Sc.
i.

and therefore cannot form an

infinite series.

e.

the notion of infinity does not contain an infinite

number of marks

BOOK
ow, only which
finite
is

II

994
30

infinite

when we have ascertained all the causes, but that by addition cannot be gone through in a

time.

CHAPTER
The
eflfect

III

which lectures produce on a hearer depends for we demand the language we are accus- 995 tomed to, and that which is different from this seems not n keeping but somewhat unintelligible and foreign because For the customary is more intelli>f its unwontedness. The force of habit is shown by the laws, in whose gible. 3ise, with regard to the legendary and childish elements 5
jn his habits
;

H them, habit has more

influence than our

listen

knowledge about
a

m
e e

^.

Some
others

people

do not

to

speaker unless

speaks mathematically, others unless he gives instances,

expect him to

cite

a poet as witness.

And

want to have everj'^thing annoyed by accuracy, either because they cannot follow
connexion of thought or because they regard
it

done accurately, while others

as petti10

For accuracy has something of this character, so hat as in trade so in argument some people think it mean. Therefore one must be already trained to know how to take ach sort of argument, since it is absurd to seek at the same and ime knowledge and the way of attaining knowledge
oggery.
:

leither

is

ea-'v to get.

The minute ccuracy

n
all cases, V

of mathematics

is

not to be demanded
for pre-

15

in

the case of things which have no matter.

'-

not that of natural science

Hence we must inquire first we shall also see what natural science ' ^?longs to one science or to more
natter.

the principles of things]..

20

eer.

alrav to (60s. viongly inserted from 995*6.

BOOK
We
25 first

III

(B)
I

CHAPTER

must, with a view to the science which

first

we

are seeking

recount the subjects that should be

discussed. These

30

some have held on certain and any points besides these that happen^ to have been overlooked. For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is advantageous to state the difficulties well for the subsequent free play of thought implies the solution of the previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a knot which one does not know. But the difficulty of our thinking points to a knot in the object for in so far as our thought
include both the other opinions that
points,
;
'

'

is in difficulties, it is in

like case

with those

who arc bound

for

in either case

it is

impossible to go forward.
all

Therefore one

should have surveyed

the reasons
35

the difficulties beforehand, both for

we have

stated

without

first

stating the difficulties are like those

;

and because people who inquire who do not

QQS''

know where they have to go besides, a man does not otherwise know even whether he has found what he is lookir'g for or not for the end is not clear to such a man, while to hi" 1 who has first discussed the difficulties it is clear. Further, h' who has heard
all

the contending arguments, as

if

they

wciC; Jic parties to a

case,
5

must be in a better position for judgi v The first problem concerns the subject .vii
our prefatory remarks.
It is this

.we discussed

in

wheiT
J''

jthe Jnvestiga^

tion of the causes belongs to to one,

whether
e.

this

one or to should survey only uu:

nces,^ and,
lirsL

if

principles of

substance, or also the principles

proofs,
10

on

(^h^ alt

men

base their

wnetRer it is possiBle^^Sf'^'i *(i1tte time to assert and deny one and the same thing or not, and all other such
g.

questions.*

And

if

the science in quest'on deals with sub"

"

^ '

995* 27 read Tvyxdvd.

Cf. 9968' 18-'' 26.

Sc, the four causes.

f.

996^ 26-997^

15.

w
B.

BOOK

III
all

995
substances, or
akin, or

ttance, whether does one science deal with lore than one, and if more, whether are
c of

all

must

them be
? ^

called forms of

Wisdom and
also

the others

ov^./.ething else

one of the things that hether sensible substances alone should must be discussed 36 said to exist or others also besides them, and whether
is

And this itself

15

one kind or there are several classes of substances, as is supposed by those who believe both in Forms and in mathematical objects intermediate between these and
these others are of
sensible things.-

We must inquire, then, as we say, into and also whether our investigation is conthese questions,
ubstances.^
like

cerned only with substances or also with the essential attributes Further, with regard to the

same and other

20

and unlike and contrariety, and with regard to prior and all other such terms, about which the 2cticians try to inquire, starting their investigation from
posterior

ubable premises only,

these these

whose

business

is

it

to inquire into

? Further, we must discuss the essential attributes 25 themselves and we must ask not only what each of
;

cse

is,

ain,

but also whether one thing always has one contrary'.* whether are the principles and elements of things the
arts present in each thing, into which
it

is

are the classes, whether are they the

icated proximately of the individuals, or
e. g.

whether

is

animal or

man

the

first 3

independent of the individual instance?*

discuss especially whether there
is^

thin^g that ij a cause in itself or^not,

ist

apart or not, and whether

is

it is

one
the 35

or

more

nee more,

there something apart

I

from the
matter witW
apart, or
is
tl

(by the concrete thing

icated of
in
it),

mean

or

is

there nothing

and what so
the principles
^

some cases though not in others, e " ? Again we ask whether 99^^
in kind,

Tumbe. or

both those
19-

in

Cf. 997* 15-25. Cf. 997 25-34. Cf. r. 1003^ 32-100;^ iS. Z. 10, Cf. 998*
Cf.

^f. 997* 34-998*

and
Ii.

' *

20-^ 14. 998^ 14-999* 23.

24-" 24.

996^

METAPHYSICA
and whether the principles of perishable and of imperishable things are the same or different and whether they are all imperishable or those
^
;
;

the formulae and those in the substratum

of perishable things are perishable.^

5
^

Further there

is

the

10

and most perplexing-., whethet unity and being, as the Pythagoreans and Plato said, are not attributes of something else but are the substance of existing things, or this is not the case, but the substratum is something else, as Empedocles says, love as someone else says, fire; while one says water and one, air.^ Again we ask whether the principles are universal or like individual things,^ and whether they exist potentially or actuall y fur ther, whethe r
question which
i

hardest of

all

they are pot ential or actual

;

any o th er sense than in reference to movement ^ for these questions also would present much dmicini5'7~Fuither, whether are numbers and lines and figures and points a kind of substance or not, and if they are substances whether are they separate from sensible things or
in
15

present in them?*'

With regard

to

all

these matters not

it

only

is

it

hard to get possession of the truth, but

difficulties well.

is

not

easy even to think out the

CHAPTER
First then with regard to

II

what we ment

her the

does
20

belong to one or to more sciences kinds of causes ? How could it belong t

it

know
inciples

the principles

if

these are not contrary

Further, there are

pertain.

many

things to

wh

For how can a principle of the good be present in unchangeable^ that in itself and by its own nature
25

nature of

very thing
end, and a
ings both

cause in the sense that for

its

sa!

come to be and are, and sinc. of some action, and all actioni w^p-y
'

arpose

is

the end

so that in

unchangeable things

this principle could noi exist

nor could
nothing

there be a good-in-itself
^

This

is

why in mathematics
2
^

Cf.

999^ 24-1000*

4.

*
"'

Cf. lOOia 4-l> 25. Cf. I002^> 32-1003'' 5.

Cf.

5-1001^ 3. 1003^ 5- 1 7. Cf. looi^ 26-1002*' II.

Cf. looo^'

B.

BOOK

III
is

996=
there

is

proved by means of this kind of cause, nor

Jemonstration of this kind

any
';

30

'

because

it

is

better, or

worse

deed

no one even mentions anything of the kind.

Sophists,
e. g.

And

so

rthis reason some of the

lothematics
Jig.
;

Aristippus, ridiculed

for in

the arts, even

in

the industrial arts,

is
'

in

carpentry and cobbling, the reason always given

it is

because
:ake

better, or

worse

',

but the mathematical sciences

no account of goods and evils. But if there are several sciences of the causes, and a 996^ iififerent science for each different principle, which of these sciences should be said to be that which we seek, or which of the people who possess them has the most scientific knowledge the object in question ? The same thing may have all 5
kind_s of causes
^

e. g.

the

moving cause of a house

cause
is

is

the

or the builder, the

fina. 1

the function
is

it

fulfils,

jg atter
rmula.

is

earth and stones, and the form

the definitory

To judge from
applying the
t

our previous discussion^ of the

to each of them.

question which of the sciences should be called

IS re;

name

Wisdom, there For inasmuch

it,

10

architectonic and authoritative and the other

lave-women,

may

not even contradict

is

the

and of the zood

of the nature of

Wisdom

m
whid
of suh.

But inasibed as dealing with the first causes and that he' cnse object of knowledge, the sci ence.
gs are for the sake of the end).
the nature of Wisdom.For as

know t
what a tHfc;. than he who
in

many ways, we
characteristics

say that he

men may who knows

15

it

has knows more fully

it

the characteristics
f^-ie

has not, and

the forme

and he knov.

who knows
do or have ^o\\^ x It where demonstrat

than another, knows more 10 knows what a thing is, not he |^ty or what it can by nature
fully

^Wier

in all other cases also (i.e.

^^'e think that the knowledge ao

' i.e.

'

Cf. A. 2.

'

996^ 19

KOI
is

2)1/

aTToScij^^^^w'

.l;^^^^

essence.
SiCkoi^.

be explanatory of fVTOis

that whetlwHBfc-^ - ^nown directly (as in the case oemonstration (as in the case of attributes 'of substances) or by means or of events hke thunder or eclipse), knowledge of the essence is the

The meaning

primary knowledge.

996^
of each thing
I

METAPHYSICA
is

present
is,

when we know what

it is

it is,

e.g.

what
;

squaring a rectangle

viz. that

the finding of a

mean

and

similarly in all other cases.

And we know

about becomings

and actions and about every change when we know the source of the movement and this is other than and opposed to the end. Therefore it would seem to belong to different sciences
;

25

to investigate these causes several ly.^

But, regarding the starting-points of demonstration also,

is

it

a disputable question whether they are the object of one

science or of more.

By

the starting-points of demonstration

all

mean
e. g.

the c ommon beliefs, o q whirh

that everything

men

base their pro ofs,

must be

either affirmed or denied,

and
all

30 that a thing

cannot at the same time be and not be, and

;

other such premises

deals with
it is

the question

is

whether the same science

if

them

as with substance, or a different science, and

not one science, which of the two must be identified with

that which

we now

seek.

Jt

is

not reaso nable that these topics

should be the object of one science; for

peculiarly appropriate to
35 to

why

should

it

be

geometry or

to
it

any other science

belongtitei every

understand these matters?

alike,

If then

997^ science

and cannot belong to all, it is notikcadiauprt the science which investigates substances, any mi jy thiiii any other science, to know about these to^s.-^Andpat tiic same time, in what way can there be a scicitfff^i^^ \^ fifst prinat ciples ? For we are aware even now what
..
'
i

least

even other sciences use them as familiar.

science

tlicre is
tii

dem onstrat ive

wh ich

deals with thum.

ic

viU

have

to be an underlying kind, and

some of tlifeiR^in'iist be demonstrable attributes and others must be axitintS'^f'^i' it is impossible

that there should be demonstration
atestit^Jtl)

things)

for the

demonstration must start from cert^atOff^leMises and be about a certain subject and prove cenfaiM^ attributes. Therefore it
follows that
10 class
;

all

attributes that

ai'i^

pflfliVedmiist

belong to one

for all

demonstrative

.'^cienci^ltise tlie
^^

axioms.

But

if

the science of substance and the science

l.ich

deals with the

axioms are
prior?
^

different,

The axioms
996^^

which of j^i^tja is more authoritative and are most universal and are principles of
cf.

With

18-^26

995^5-7.

For the answer

to this

problem

cf. r. 2.

B.

BOOK

III

997

all

things.

And
it

if it is

not the business of the philosopher, to

is

whom

else will

belong to inquire what

?
^

true

and what

is

jV^

ue about them
h\ general,

do
?

all

substances

fall

under one science or under

is

15

more than one

If

the latter, to what sort of substance

?

the

present science to be assigned

On

the other hand,

all.

it is

not

reasonable that one science should deal with

there

For then

would be one demonstrative science dealing with all For every demonstrative science investigates with attributes. regard to some subject its essential attributes, starting from
the

20

common

beliefs.^

attributes of one subject,

Therefore to investigate the essential starting from one set of beliefs,

the business of one science.

le

science,

For the subject belongs to and the premises belong to one, whether to the
;

ime or to another
either

so that the attributes also are investigated

by

these sciences or

by one derived from them.^

I

Further, does our investigation deal with substances alone or

alsdiMl^ their attributes

-;bst?-nce

mean

for instance, if the solid

is 25

^: ...^.

and planes, is it the business of the eto know these and to know the attributes of each ..s^ (the attributes which the mathematical sciences
and so are
lines

If of the safe, the science proW), or of a dii:Lient science ? of substance also must be a demonstrative science; but it is 30

thought

^'''*-

^^ "

'"^

demonstration of the essence of things.

.

And

if

will
:^

the attributes ot siib^taftcc

be the science that investigates This is a very difficult question."*

Further, must

we say

that sensible substances alone exist,

or that there are o thers besides these? ^^nd^ are substances

of one klHd Or-afethere several kinds of substances, as those 35

say
deal

who
?

assert thef existence both of the

Forms and

of the 997^

intermediates with which they say the mathematical sciences

In what sense we

stances in themselves has been explained in our

^

say the Forms are causes and subfirst remarks

For the answer cf. r. 3. 15 cf. 995^ 7-10. 996^ 28. ' 997* But no really good sense can be made of 24 read elff arrac. the passage. With 997* 15-25 cf. 995^ 10-13. For the answer cf. r.
'

With 996^ 26-997"

Cf.

1004^ 2-9, E. I. * With 997^ 25-34 cf. 995^ 18-20. ^ Cf. note on A. 990'' 9.

For the answer

cf. r.

1004^ 5-26.

997"
5

METAPHYSICA
about them

many

while the ideal theory presents difficulties in ways, the most paradoxical thing of all is the statement
;

that there are gertain things besides those in the

universe,

material

and that these are the same as sensible things except that they are eternal while the latter are perishable. For they say there is a man-in-himself and a horse-in-itself and healthin-itself, with no further qualification, a procedure like that

lo of

the people

who

said there are gods, but in

human

form.

For they were positing nothing but eternal men, nor are the Platonists making the Forms anything other than eternal

sensible things.

Further,

if

we

are to posit besides the

Forms

15

20

and the sensibles the intermediates between them, we shall have many difficulties. For clearly on the same principle there will be lines besides the lines-in-themselves and the sensible lines, and so with each of the other classes of things so that since astronomy is one of these mathematical sciences there will also be a heaven besides the sensible heaven, and a sun and a moon (and so with the other heavenly bodies) besides the sensible. Yet how are we to believe these things ? It is not reasonable even to suppose these bodies immovable, but to suppose their moving is quite impossible. And similarly with the things of which optics and ma'.hematical harmonics treat. For these also cannot exist apart from the sensible things, for the same reasons. For if there, are sensible things and sensations intermediate between Form and individual, evidently there will also be animals inteimediate between animals-in-themselves and the perishable animals.- We might
;

25 also raise

the question, with reference to ivhich

i^/;/^

of existing

things
is

we must look for

these additional sciences.

If geometry

to differ from mensuration only in this, that the latter of

.)

these deals with things that

we

perceive,

and the former with

things that are not perceptible, evidently there will be a science

other than medicine, intermediate between medical-science-initself

o

and

this individual

medical science, and so with each

of the

other

sciences.

Yet how

is

this

possible

There

would have

to be also healthy things besides the perceptible

healthy things and the healthy-in-itself.

^

And

at the

same

Cf. A. 6

and

9.

B.

BOOK
;

III

997^

time not even this

tible

is

true, that

and perishable magnitudes

perished.

mensuration deals with percepfor then it would have

Fished, when they

And astronomy also cannot

this
lines
is
'

ling with perceptible

magnitudes nor with

such

For neither are perceptible

lines

be heaven above as the geometer

'

35

speaks of (for no perceptible thing

straight or curved in the

'

998*

way
it

in

which he defines

,'

straight

and curved

for

a hoop

touches a straight edge not at a point, but as Protagoras said

did, in his refutation of the geometers),

nor are the move-

cnents

and complex
treats,

orbits in the heavens like those of

which

astronomy

nor have geometrical points the same nature

as the actual stars.

so-called intermediates

things exist,

there are some who say that these between the Forms and the perceptible not apart from the perceptible things, however,

Now

but in these

the impossible results of this view would take

it is

too long to enumerate, but

as the following:
onl}- in

enough to consider such points

10

It

is

not reasonable that this should be so

for the

the case of these intermediates, but clearly the

in the perceptible things
;

also

might be

Farms same account

I
I

applies to both.
are

Further,

it

follows from this theory that there

place,

two

solids in the

same

and that the intermediates

in the

moving perceptible things. And in general to what purpose would one suppose hem to existjndeed, but to exist _^ perceptible things ? For ;he same paradoxical results will follow which we have
are not

immovable, since they are

15

already mentioned
Dnly
it

there will be a heaven besides

in the

t/ie

heaven,
is
still

will

be not apart but

same place

which

nore impossible.^

CHAPTER
Apart from the
irinciples,

III

difficulty of stating the case truly with re- 20

is

^ard to these matters, it

hard to say, with regard to the

first

whether
it is

it

is

the genera that should be taken as

dements and
a

principles, or rather the

primary constituents of
all articulate

thing; e.g.

the primary parts of which

sounds consist that are thought to be elements and principles

^

With 997* 34-998*

3.

19

cf.

995^ 13-18.

For the answer

cf.

A. 6-10,

M. 2,

998^

METAPHYSICA
of articulate sound, not the common genus articulate sound and we give the name of elements' to those geometrical propositions, the proofs of which are implied in the proofs of the
; '

25

others, either of all or of most.

Further, both those

who

say-

there are several elements of corporeal things and those

who
and

say there
30

is

one, say the parts of which bodies consist and are

compounded

are

principles, e.g.

Empedocles says

fire

water and the intermediates between these are the constituent elements of things, but does not describe these as genera
of existing things.

Besides
else,

this, if

we want

to

examine the
then
^

998^ nature of anything

a bed consists and

we examine the

parts of which, e.g.,

know

"

its

nature.

how they are put together, and To judge from these arguments,
;

we

then, the

would not be the genera but in so far as its definition, and the genera are the principles or starting-points of definitions, the genera must also be the principles of definable things. And if to get the knowledge of things is to get the knowledge of the species according to which they are named, the genera are at least startingprinciples of things

we know each

thing by

points of the species.

10

And some
great

also of those

who say
it

unity
of

and

being,

or

the

and the small, are elements

things,

seem

to treat

them as genera.
is

But,

again,

is

not

possible to describe the principles in both ways.

For the

formula of the essence

different

one

but definition by genera will be

from that which states the constituent parts of a

this,

thing.^

Besides
15

principles,

even if the genera are in the highest degree whether should one regard the first of the genera

as principles, or those which are predicated directly of the

? This also admits of dispute. For if the universal always more of a principle, evidently the uppermost of the genera are the principles for these are predicated of all things.

individuals
is

There
20

will,

then, be as

many
;

principles of things as there

are primary genera, so

principles

of

all

being and unity will be and substances for these are most of all predicated things. But it is not possible that either unity or being
that both

998
^

read aQptiv, d6pe7

cf.

olov

avyKei/xevcov, Ka\ Torf.

With 998* 20-0 14

995^' 27-9.

For the answer

cf. Z. 10, 13.

B.

BOOK
;

III

998"
differentiae

should be a genus of things

for

the

of

any
it is

^enus must each of

lot possible for

them

both have being and be one, but

the genus to be predicated of the differentiae

taken apart from the species (any

the

more than

for the species of 25

genus to be predicated of the proper differentiae of the jenus) ; so that if unity or being is a genus, no differentia will But if unity and being are not either be one or have being.
jenera, neither will they
ciples.

be principles,

if

the genera are the prin-

Again, the intermediate classes, whose concepts include

on
this

:he differentiae, will

theory be genera, down to the indiare thought to be genera

iduals
ire

but as

it is,

some

and others

not ^thought to be so.

Besides

this,
;

the differentiae are 30

3rinciples even
arinciples, there

more than the genera and if these also are comes to be practically an infinite number of

>rinciples, especially if
I

we suppose
if

the highest genus to be

principle.

But

again,

unity
is

is

more of the nature

of a

999*

>rinciple,
s

and the

indivisible

one, and everything indivisible

and that which is so in and genera are divisible into ipecies (for man is not the genus of individual men), that which s predicated directly of the individuals will have more unity. Further, in the case of things in which the distinction of prior
so either in quantity or in species,
is

jpecies

prior to the divisible,

t
5

md

posterior

is

present, that which

is

predicable
;

of these

ihings cannot be
:he first of
:he

numbers, there
;

something apart from them e.g. if two is will not be a Number apart from
10

ipart

and similarly there will not be a Figure from the kinds of figures and if the genera of these hings do not exist apart from the species, the genera of other for genera of these things are hings will scarcely do so
kinds of numbers
; ;

any do. But in the indivisible species one prior and another posterior. Further, where is not nember 5ne is better and another worse, the better is always prior so From these considera:hat of these also no genus can exist. ;ions, then, the species predicated of individuals seem to be But again, it is not easy principles rather than the genera. :o say in what sense these are to be taken as principles. For ;he principle or cause must exist alongside of the things 3f which it is the principle, and must be capable of existing in separation from them and for what reason should we suppose
:hought to exist
if
;

15

999^
20

METAPHYSICA
any such thing
that
it

to exist alongside of the individual, excep'

all ?

is

predicated universally and of

so that the highest

But

if

this h

the reason, the

of a
principle
;

more universal must be supposed

to be more
tht

genera would be

principles.^

CHAPTER
25

IV

There is a difficulty connected with these, the hardest of all and the most necessary to examine, and to this our argument has now brought us. If, on the one han 4, there is nothing apart from individual things, and the individuals are infinite in number, how is it possible to get knowledge of the infinite'' individuals ? For all things that we know, we know in so far as they have some unity and identity, and in so far as some attribute belongs to them universally. But if this is necessary. 30 and there must be something apart from the individuals, it will be necessary that the cla sses exist^ apart from the indiI

viduals,

by

discussion just
in

either the lowest or the highest classes but we found now that we impossible. Further,
;

this is

if

admit

the fullest sense that something exists apart from the

is

concrete thing, whenever something

predicated of the matter;

something apart, be something corre35 sponding to each set of individuals, or to some and not to 999^ others, or to none?^ (i) If there is nothing apart from individuals, there will be no object of thought, but all things will be objects of sense, and there will not be knowledge of anything, unless we say that sensation is knowledge. Further, nothing will be eternal or unmovable for all perceptible things perish ^ut if there s nothing eterna l, neither 5 and are in movement. can there be a process of coming to be for that which comes to be, and that from which it comes to be,jgiust be some thing, ind the u ltimate term in this series cannot have c ome to be, smce the series has a limit and nothing can come to be out of that which is not. Further, if generation and movement exist there
there,
if

must

there

is

19,
"^

With 998*' 14-999^ 23 and 13.

999* 27 read

cf.

995'' 29-31.

For the answer

cf. Z. 12.

1038'

jotv 7' aTrelpcov.

question which individuals have something apart corresponding to them suggests to Aristotle the further question whether any have Thus the end of the sentence takes a form inconsistent with the beginning
'

The

B.

BOOK

III

999**

no movement ]s in6nitp,.hut every lo Tiovement has an end, and that which is incapable of com- ^, dieting Its commg to be cannot be in process of coming to be md that which has completed its coming to be must be as
for
;

nngf a kn he a limit

<

on

as

it

has

come

to be.^

Further, since the matter

is

exists,^

>ecause

it is

ungenerated,

it is

aforiiorixQ2iSov\2^Az that the sub-

itance or essence, that

which the matter

if

at

any time coming

is,

o be, should exist

vill
i

for

neither essence nor matter

is

nothing
15

be at

all.

And since this

impossible t here must be someit is hard to say in which which not. For evidently

ng besides the concrete

thing, viz. the shape or forrn^j But

Lgain (2) if

we

are to suppose this,

it

ases
is

we

are to suppose

and
it

in

not possible to suppose

is

in

all

cases

we

could not

ppose that there

a house besides the particular houses.

.lo

besides this, will the substance of all the individuals, e.g. of

1

men, be one ?
is

This

is

paradoxical, for

all

the things whose

abstance

on
?

this

view one are not one.^ But are they

is

many

nd different
o\v

This also

unreasonable.

At the same time,

how
*

does the matter become each of the individuals, and

the concrete thing these

two elements

Again, one might ask the following question also about the
rst principles.

If

they are one in kind only, nothing

ther e

will

be

35

umerically one, not even unity-itself and being-itself.

.^aid-

ow w ill it b e

possible to know,
i

if

is

not to be something

a whole set ot ndividuals ? But if there is a common ement which is numerically one, and each of the principles is ne, and the principles are not as in the case of perceptible

3mmon to

lings different for different things (e.g. since this particular

/liable
f it

is

the

are also the

same m kmd whenever same in kind only

:

it

occurs, the elements

in kind, for these also, 30

ke the syllable, are numerically different in different con:xts),

if

the principles of things are not one in this sense,

for there

jt are
le

numerically one, there will be nothing else besides

;

elements

is

no difference of meaning between

Sc. and thus there is a limit to its Sc, before the concrete thing. * 999^ 21 read ov yap iv arravra.
" *

coming

to be.

With 999* 24-^ 24

10.

cf.

995^ 31-36.

For the answer

cf. Z. 6,

A. 6-10,


999^

METAPHYSICA
'numerically one' and
'

individual'.

For

this

is

just

what

w
th

mean by
universal

the individual

the

numerically one, and

is

by

we mean

that which
if

predicable of the individuals

looo^ Therefore just as, limited in number,

confined to the
letters of the

the elements of articulate sound wer

the literature in the world would
since there could not be
is it

all

ABC,

b two or mor

same

kind, so

with

all

existing things anc

their first principles.^

5

One

difficulty

which

is

as great as

any has been omittei

L/

both by modern philosophers and by their predecessorswhether _th e principles of perishable and those of imperishabl If they are the same, ho\ things are the same or different.

10

15

some things imperishable and others perishable, and fc what reason ? The school of Hesiod and all the mythologist thought only of what was plausible to themselves, and had n regard to us. For asserting the first principles to be gods am born of gods, they say that the beings which did not taste c and clearly they ar nectar and ambrosia became mortal using words which are familiar to themselves, yet what the; have said even about the very application of these causes above our comprehension. For if the gods taste nectar ant ambrosia for their pleasure, these are in no wise the causes c and if they taste them to maintain thei their existence But int existence, how can gods who need food be eternal ? the subtleties of the mythologists it is not worth our while t
are
; i

inquire seriously
20

those, however,

who

use the language

we must cross-examine and ask why, after all, thing which consist of the same elements are, some of them, eternc
proof
in

nature,

while others
it is

perish.

Since these philosophei

h

mention no cause, and

as

unreasonable that things should

principles o r causes of

they say, evidently

t he

thing

25

canno t be the same. Even the man whom one might suj pose to speak most consistently Empedocles, even he hz made the same mistake for he maintains that strife is principle that causes destruction, but strife would seei

none the
With

less to

produce everything, except the One; for

'

999^^ 24-1000-'^

cf.

996'*

1-2.

For the answer

cf.

Z. 14, A.

M. 10.


B.

BOOK
III
strife.

looo^

things
sa>'s
:

excepting

God proceed from

At

least

he

Trees, and

From which grew all that was and is and will be hereafter men and women, and beasts and birds

30

And
The
strife

water-nourished

fish,

and long-aged gods.^

;

for if looo** is evident even apart from these words had not been present in things, all things w'ould have been one, as he says when they have come together, strife stands outermost.' ^ Hence it also follows on his theory' that God most blessed is less wise than all others for he does not know all the elements for he has in him no strife, and knowledge 5 is of the like by the like. For by earth,' he says,

implication

'

'

By
But

we see earth, by water water. ether godlike ether, by fire wasting fire,
love,

Love by

and
it

strife

by gloomy

strife.^

and
is

this is the point

we

started from

this
is

at least is

evident, that
::ause of

on

his

theory

fol lows

that strife

as

much

the 10

existence as of destruction.

A nd
;

similarly friendfor in collecting

hip

not specially the cause of existence

;hings into the

One

it

destroys

all

other things.

And

at the
its elf,

:ame time Empedocles mentions no cause of the change

except that things are so

u/

But when

strife

by nature. waxed great in the

limbs,
'5

And

sprang to honour as the time was fulfilled Which is fixed for them in turn by a mighty oath,^
;

7his implies that

change was necessary but he shows no ause of the necessity. But yet so far at least he alone speaks onsistently for he does not make some things perishable and thers imperishable, but makes all perishable except the ements.' The^fficulty we are speaking of now is, why some lings are peris hable and ot hers are not, if they consist of the ~
;

20

irne^nhciples.

Let
e

this suffice as proof of the fact that the principles

cannQt

the same.

But

if

there are different principles, one difficulty

or

whether these themselves will be imperishable or perishable, if they are perishable, evidently these also must consist of
*
' *

Fr. 21 Diels, Vorsokratiker. Fr. 109 Diels, ib.

'

Fr. 36 Diels,
ib.

ib.

1000^ 16 read

Trap'
ib. p.

AjjXara*.

Fr. 30 Diels,

*
KB..

But

cf.

Diels,

161, 52.

MET.

looo*'
25 certain
/(

METAPHYSICA
elements
;

fo r all things that perish

perish
;

by

being
i1

resolved into the elements of which they consist

so that

follows that prior to the principles there are other principles

And
exist,

this

is

impossible, whether the process has a limit 01

infinity.

proceeds to
if

Further,

how

will

perishable

thingj

their principles are to be destroyed

^
30

principles are imterishahle.

why
?

will things

imperishable principles be perishable,

the others are imperishable
either impossible or needs

? But if the composed of somi while those composed o

This

is

not probable, but

i;

much proof

Further, no one ha;

;

even tried to maintain different principles

looi^

they maintain

th(

/^

But they swallow the difficult} we stated first ^ as if they took it to be something trifling.^ The harcjf^t in q"ir)i'' of f^ll. and the one most necessary foi 5 knowledge of the truth, is whether being and unity ar e th< substances o f things, and whether each of them, without bein^ anything else^is being or unity respectively, or we must inquin what being and unity are, with the implication that thej have some other underlying nature. For some people thinl they are of the former, others think they are of the latte Plato and the Pythagoreans thought being am 10 character. unity were nothing else, but this was their nature, thei essence being jus t unity and bein g. But the natural philc sophers take a different line e. g. Empedocles as thoug reducing it to something more intelligible says what unit at least, this is for a for he would seem to say it is love is say this unity an Others being one. cause of their things the lig made, is fire, an been and have being, of which things consist
principles for all things.
;

same

others say

it is air.

A similar view

is
;

expressed by those
for these also

wh

make
that

the elements more than one

must sa

they say are prmciples.

20

being and u nit y are precisely a ll__tlie--th4Hgs-'whic (i) If we do not suppose unit
it

and being to be substances,

universals
is

follows that none of the oth(

a substance
is

for these are

most universal of
there

al

For

if 2

there

no

unity-it self or

being-itself,

wi
ai

scarcely be in
^

any other case anything apart from what

For the answer
7-1

1000^

7.

With

looo'''

5-1001* 3

cf.

996* 2-4.

cf. Z.

1,

A.

looi" 22 read

yap.

B.

BOOK
Further,
if

III

1001=

called the individuals.

unity

is

not a substance,

evidently

number

also will not exist as an entity separate

;

from

25

the individual things

for

number is units, and the unit

is

some-

thing whose essence

itself

it is

to be one.

But (2)
is

if

there

is

a unity;

and a
;

being-itself, their
is

substance must be unity and

predicated univerif

being

for

it

not something else that

sally of

them, but just unity and being.

But
is

there

is

to be

a being-itself and a unitv-itself. there

seeing

much

difficulty in 3

how

there will be anything else besides these,

Ijnfian,
is

how

things will be

more than one

in

number.
it

For what

differentfrom being does not exist, so that

are one and this

necessarily follows,,
all

according to the argument of Parmenides.that

is

things that are

being.

There are objections to both views.

looi''
if

itself,

For whether unity is not a substance or there is a unitynumber cannot be a substance. We have already^

said

why
if it is,

this

result follows

unity

is

not a substance:

and

the same difficulty arises as arose with regard to

For whence is there to be another one besides the unity-itself ? It must be not-one but all things are either one or many, and of the many each is one. Further, if the
being.
;

unity-itself

is

indivisible,

according to Zeno's doctrine

^ it

will

be nothing.
J

For that which neither when added makes a thing greater nor when subtracted makes it less, he asserts to have no being, evidently assuming that whatever has being is
a spatial magnitude.
for the corporeal

And

if it is

a magnitude,

it is

corporeal;

10

^
,

has being in every dimension, while the other

J
^

added in one way what they are added to, but in another way will not do so,^ and a point or a unit does so in no way. But if he argues thus,* his argument is of a low order and an indiobjects of mathematics, e.g. a plane or a line,
will increase
;

visible thing can exist, so that in this

;

way

too the position

15

may be defended even against him for the indivisible when added will make the number, though not the size, greater. But how can a magnitude proceed from one such indivisible or from many ? It is like saying that the line is made out
'

'

'

Cf. 1001^ 24. Cf. Diels, Vorsokratiker, ed. 2, p. 130, 21. e. g. a line added to another at the end makes

it

longer, but one which

lies
'

beside another makes it no broader. 1001^ 13 read 81) ovrua.

E 2

looi''

METAPHYSICA
one supposes the case to be sue! as some say, number proceeds from the unity-itself anc something else which is not one, none the less we musi
of
points.
if

But even

20 that,

25

inquire why and how the product will be sometimes a numbei and sometimes a magnitude, if the not-one was inequalit> and was the same principle in either case. For it is not evident how magnitudes could proceed either from the one and this principle, or from some number and this principle.^

CHAPTER V

question connected with these

is

whether numbers and

If

bodies and planes and points are substances or not.

are not,
it

they

30

and what the substances of things are. For modifications and movements and relations and dispositions and ratios do not seem to
baffles us

to

say what being

is

indicate the of a subject,

substance of anything

for

all

are

predicated

and none is a 'this'. And as to the things which might seem most of all to indicate substance, water and 1002^ earth and fire and air, of which composite bodies consist, heat and cold and the like are modifications of these, not substances, and the body which is thus modified alone persists But, on the other as something real and as a substance.
hand, the body
5

is

surely less of a substance than the surface

and the surface less than the line, and the line less than the unit and the point. For the body is bounded by these and
;

they are thought to be capable of existing without body, but the body cannot exist without these. This is why, while

10

most of the philosophers and the earlier among them thought substance and being were identical with corporeal matter, and that all other things were attributes of this, so that the first principles of bodies were the first principles of being, the more recent and those who were held to be wiser thought numbers were the first principles. As we said, then., if these are not substance, there is no substance and no being
that
at
all
;

for surely

it is

not proper to
996^^ 4-9.

call

the accidents of these

cf.

With

I.

2,

looi'* 4 -'^ 25 M. 1083'* 20-5' 2.

cf.

For the answer

Z.

1040^ 16-24,

B.

BOOK

III

looa*
15

beings.

stance

But if this is admitted, that lines and points are submore than bodies, but we do not see to what sort of
be no substance.

bodies these could belong (for they cannot be in perceptible

bodies), there can

evidently divisions of the body,

one

Further,

these are

all

a division in breadth,
^

another

in

depth, another in length.

Besides this, no sort of 20

;

shape
if

is

present in the solid

is

more than any other

is
;

so that

the

Hermes
in
is

not

in

the stone, neither

the half of the

therefore the

cube

the cube as something determinate

surface
it,

were in the surface which marks off the half of the cube would be
not
in
it

either

for

if

any

sort of surface

in

it

too.

And

the same account applies to the line and to

Therefore,
if

35

on the one hand the body is in the highest degree substance, and on the other hand these things are so more than the body, but these are not even instances of substance,^ it baffles us to say what
the point and the unit.

being

is

and what the substance of things

is.

For
if

besides

what has been said, the questions of generation and destruction

confront us with further paradoxes.

For

substance, 30

not having existed before,

now

exists, or

having existed before,

afterwards does not exist, this change is thought to be but accompanied by a process of becoming or perishing points and lines and surfaces cannot be in process of becoming nor of perishing, though they at one time exist and at For when bodies come into contact or are another do not. separated, their boundaries instantaneously become one at one time when they touch, and two at another time when they are separated so that when they have been put together one boundary does not exist but has perished, and when they have been separated the boundaries exist which before did For it cannot be said that the point (which is not exist. indivisible) was divided into two. And if the boundaries come into being and cease to be, from what do they come into being ? ^ similar account may also be given of the
;

1002'^

A
;

now

in

time

for this also

cannot be

in

process of

coming

into being or of ceasing to be, but yet

seems to be always

'

'

1002* 21 omit f) ovdff. Sc. not to speak of their being the whole of substance. 1002'' 5 read eK rivos yiyvoi^ui ;

1002^
different,

METAPHYSICA
which shows that
it

is

not a substance.

And

evidently the
10 for

same is true of points and lines and planes; the same argument applies, as they are all alike either

limits or divisions.^

CHAPTER
ceptible things

VI

In general one might raise the question why, besides per-

another class
If
it

and the intermediates,^ we have to look for of things, such as the Forms which we " posit.
because the objects of mathematics,

is

for this reason,

while they differ from the things in this world in

15

some other
of the same

respect, differ not at all in that there are

many

kind, so that their

(just as the

first

principles cannot be limited in

all

number

elements of

the language in this sensible world

are not limited in number, but in kind, unless one takes the

elements of this individual syllable or of this individual articulate

20

sound
it

whose elements will be limited even in number

;

so

is

also in the case of the intermediates

for there also

the
if

members

of the

same kind

are infinite in number), so that

there are not

others
25

besides perceptible and mathematical objects

is

such as some maintain the Forms to be, there will

be no substance which
but only
in kind,

one

in

number

as well as in kind,

nor will the first principles of things be determinate in

number,

if

then this must be

so,

30

must therefore be held to exist. Even if this view do not express it distinctly, still this is what they mean, and they must be maintaining the Forms just because each of the Forms is a substance and none is by accident. But if we are to suppose that the Forms exist and the principles are one in number, not in kind, the impossible results that we have mentioned * necessarily follow. Closely connected with this is the question whet her the
or in sn m^ nthpr wa;|r^*33' in t;nmp
first

Forms also those who support

the

^ elements exist potentiallv

*

other way, there will be something else prior to the

With 1001^ 26-1002^

For these
999^ 27.
cf.

II

cf.

996* 12-17.

For the answer

'

cf.

M, N,

esp. 1090^ 5-132

*

A. 6. 987^ 14.

Sc. Platonists.

B.

BOOK
is

III

1003a

principles
it is

for the

potency

prior to the actual cause,

and

not necessary for everything potential to be actual.

if

But

the elements exist potentially,

is

it

is

possible that

For even that which is not is capable of being for that which is not comes to be, but nothing that is incapable of being comes to be.^ We must not only raise these questions about the first principles, but cilso ask whether they are universa or what we call individuals. If they are universal, they will not be subrything that

should not be.

;

stances

for ever}-thing that

',

is

but a

'

such

but substance

is

'

common indicates not a this this And if we can actually

' '

".

10

oostatize the
i

common

predicate as an individual, Socrates

be several animals himself and 'man' and 'animal,'

'

ach of these indicates a

this

'

and a single

thing.
;

If,

then,

principles are universals, these results follow

if

they are

not universals but of the nature of individuals, they will not

be

knowable

for the
jv^

knowledge of anything
hf>

is

universal.
15

Tl^ erefore

if t hprp

tn

l-nr>-1prta^

of the principles there

must be other principles prior to them, which are universally

predicated of them.-

'

With 1002'' 32-1003* 5 cf. 996* lo-i I For the answer cf. H. 2-e. 9, a. 6. With 1003a 5-17 cf. 996* 9-10. For the answer cf. Z. 13, 14, M. 10.
.

/ k^J-l^^^

BOOK
There
this
;

IV

(r)

CHAPTER
is

,\

-A

a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.
the same as any of the so-called special none of these others deals generally with being They cut off a part of being and investigate as being. the attributes of this part this is what the mathematical
is

Now

not

sciences

for

^5

sciences
first

for

instance

do.

Now

since

we

are seeking

the

principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be

some thing
If

to which these belong in virtue of

its

own

nature.

then our predecessors

who sought

the elements of existing

things
>
,, -

30 that the

were seeking these same principles, it is necessary elements must be elements of being not by accident
it is

^-'*^\^^

but just because

being.

Therefore
first

it

is

of being as being

P^
1^

iP-J/ that

we

also

must grasp the

causes,

CHAPTER
*

II

There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ~^ be but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and have not merely the epithet being in common. Everything which is healthy is related to health, 35 one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in
',
'

'

the sense that

is

it

produces
medical
it

it,

another

in the
it

sense that

it
it.

symptom

of health, another because

is is

is

capable of

1003^

And
that
is

that which

relative to the medical art,

it,

one
it

thing in the sense that

it

possesses
it,

another
in

in

the sense
find other

is

naturally adapted to

another

the sense that

shall

a function of the medical

art.

And we

words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one
starting-point
;

some things

are said to be because they are

r.

BOOK

IV

1003

substances, others because they are affectians of substance,

others

because they are a

process towards

substance, or

destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or pro-

ductive or generative of substance, or of things

relative to substance, or negations of

which are
of
10

some of

these things or

of substance

itself.
it

It is for this

reason that

we say even
is

non-being that

is

non-being.

As, then, there

one science

which deals with

other cases also.

all

healthy things, the same

in

applies in the

For not only

the case of things which

have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to for even these in a sense have one one common nature
;

common
science

notion.
also to

It is clear

then that

it

is

the work of one

'5

study

all

things that are, qua being.

is

But

everywhere science deals chiefly with that which

primary,

and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which y get their names. If, then, this is substance, it is of' 3stances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and
the causes.

ception, so there

one pergrammar, being one science, investigates all articulate sounds. Therefore to investigate all the species of being qua being, is the work of a science which is generically one, and to investigate the several species is the work of the specific parts of the
for

Now

every single class of things, as there

is

is

one science, as

for

instance

20

science.
If,

now, being

and

unit^

are

the the

sam e and
sense
it

are

one

thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as

principle

and cause
if

are,

not

in

that

they are
differ25

explained by the same definition (though

ence even

makes no

would our strengthen case) for one man and existent man and man are the same thing, and the doubling of the words in does not give any new meanthe man is one and is a vian ing (it is clear that his unity is not severed from his humanity either in coming to be or in ceasing to be and similarly his
interpret
;

we

them

similarly
'

'

in fact this

'

'

'

'

'

'

being

is

not severed
1003**

-),

so that

it

is

obvious that the addition

icai

30

28 read as earw Svdfxoiros 1003^ 30 read tov ovtoj.

(<ttiv avdfxoTTOs.

I003''

METAPHYSICA
means the same thing, and unity is noth ing and if, further, the essence of each thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from its very nature something that is all this being so, there must be
in these cases

apart from being^

exactly as

many

species of being as of unity.

is

And

to in-

vestigate the essence of these

35 is

the work of a science vyhich

generically one

mean,

for instance, the discussion of the

same and the similar and the other concepts of this sort ^ 1004^ and nearly all contraries are reducible to this source but let us take them as having been investigated in the Selection of
;
*

Contraries

'

^.

And

there are as

many

parts of philosophy

must necessarily be among them a first phi losophy and one which. follows this. For being and unity fall immediately into genera and
as there are kinds of substance, so that there
;

therefore the sciences too will correspond

'

to.

these genera.

For philosopher is like mathematician with its variety of meanings for mathematics also has parts, and there is a first and a second science and other successive ones within
'
'

'

the sphere of mathematics.*

Now
10

since

it

is

the work of one science to investigate

is

opposites,

and

plurality

opposite to unity, and

it

belongs

to one science to investigate the negation

and the privation

.

because

in

both cases we are

is

really

investigating

unity,

to which the negation or the privation refers (for we, either

say simply that unity

in

not present, or that

;

it is

not present

some

particular class

in the latter case the characteristic

'

T5

meaning of unity as compared with the meaning conveyed in the bare negation for the negation means just the absence of unity, while in
difference of the class modifies the
*,

privation there

is

also implied an underlying nature of

^),

which

the privation

is

predicated

since, then, plurality is opposite

to unity, in view of all these facts, the contraries of the concepts

^ The argument is obscured by doubts as to the reading, but seems to be that being and unity are not severed from the parlicular thing which is and is one, and .'. are not severed from one another. ^ 1003^' 36 read ToiovTav' o-;^e8oi'. 8 Fr. \A72>^ 36-1479^ 5 (Fr. 31 ed. Rose, 1886). * With 1004'* 2-9 cf. 13. 995IJ 10-13, 997^ 15-25. * i.e. negation is simply the negation of an attribute in privation some member of a definite class is said not to have the attribute in the form
;

appropriate to that class.

r.

BOOK
is

IV

1004^

named Wfn
plurality

above, the other and the dissimilar and the unequal,

derived either from these or from
20

and everything else which

and unity, must fall within the province of the science above-named. And contrariety is one of these concepts, for contrariety is a kind of difference, and difference is a kind Therefore, since there are many senses in which of otherness. a thing is said to be one, these terms also will have many senses, but yet it belongs to one science to consider them

all

for a

term belongs to different sciences not

if

if it

has
all 25

different

senses, but

its

definitions

neither are

identical

nor can be referred to one central meaning.

things are referred to that which
all
.

And

since

is

primarj^ as for instance

things which are one are referred to the primary one,

we

'

must say that this holds good also of the same and the other and of contraries in general so that after distinguishthe various senses of each, we must then explain by rence to what is primary' in each term, saying how they
;

related to
otl.ers in

it

some

in the

sense that they possess

it,

it,

the sense that they produce

and others

in

other

such ways.
It is

evident then

that

it

belongs to one science to be able

to give an account of these concepts as well as of substance.

This was one of the questions in our book of problems.^

And

it

is

the function of the philosopher to be able to

investigate all things.

For

if

it

is

not the function of the 1004

philosopher,

who

is it

who

will inquire

whether Socrates and

Socrates seated are the same thing, or whether one thing has

one contrary, or what contrariety

it

is,

or

how many meanings

Since,
5

has?

And

similarly with all other such questions.

then, these are essential modifications of unity (^ua unity

an d of
clear

beinr
that
it

iJiVit

boin^ not qua numbers or

lines or fire,

it is

belongs to this science to investigate both the essence

of these concepts

and

their properties.

And

those

who study

i,

these properties err not

by

leaving the sphere of philosophy,^

but by forgetting
correct idea,
is

t hat

subs tance, of which they have no

10

prior to thpgp rtfher things.

^

^ For number qua

^
^

1004* 32 omit oTTf//. . i\ix.6ti. 20-27. Sc. which they do not do.
.

i.e. B. (jg^^

ioo4^

METAPHYSICA
number has
peculiar attributes, such as oddness and evenness,

commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and these

belong to numbers either

another.

in

themselves or

in relation to

one

And

15

which is in weight have other peculiar properties.

and the motionless and that motion and the weightless and that which has
similarly the solid

So too
it

perties are peculiar to being as such, a nd

is

certain p roabout these

that the philosopher has to investigate the truth.

tion
:

20

25

of this may be mentioned dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher, for sophistic is philosophy which exists only in semblance, and dialecticians ^ embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common but evidently their dialectic embraces these to all things For sophistic subjects because these are proper to philosophy. philosophy, dialectic turn on the same class of things as and but this differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty required and from sophistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy
;

An indica-

but

is

not.^
in the list of contraries

30

one of the two columns ^ is and all contraries are reducible to being and nonbeing, and to unity and plurality, as for instance rest belongs to unity and movement to plurality. And nearly all thinkers agree that being and substance are composed of
privative,

Again,

contraries

some

at least all name contraries as their first principles name odd and even, some hot and cold, some limit
;

and the unlimited, some love and strife. And everything else is evidently reducible to unity and plurality (this reduction 1005^ we must take for granted*}, and the principles stated by other thinkers fall entirely under these as their genera. It is obvious then from these considerations too that_it_ bglongs t q on e science to examine being gua being. For all things are eitFer contraries or composed of contraries, and unity and
5

plurality are the 'starting-points of all contraries.

And

these

belong to one science, whether they have or have not one

^ ^

1004^ 18 read
Cf. note

rj

yap

SiaXeKTiKol BinXeyovrai Trept diravTrnv.

With 1004^ 5-26

cf. B.

on A. 986*

23.

995^ 18-20, 997* 25-33. * Cf. Fr, 1478^ 36-1479*

5.


r.

BOOK

IV
'

1005^
'

Probably they have not yet even if one has several meanings, the other meanings will be related to the primar}' meaning and similarly in the case of the contraries. And if ^ being or unity is not a universal and the same in every instance, or is not separable from the particular instances the unity is in some cases that (as in fact it probably is not
notion.
;

common

10

of common reference, in some cases that of serial succession),

it does not belong to the geometer to inquire what is contrariety or completeness or being or unity or the same or the other, but only to presuppose these concepts and "^ reason from this starting-point. Obviously then it is the work of one science to examine being qua being, and the attributes which belong to it qua being, and the same science will examine not onl y snhsfan rp<; huf plg^ fVtf.iV affriKnt^^^c tf both those above named and the concepts prior and posterior genus and species, whole and part, and the others

just for this reason

'

'

',

3f this sort.-

CHAPTER
We
"

III

must

state

whether

it

belongs to one or to different

which are in mathematics ao d axioms, and into substance. Evidently the inquiry these also belongs to one science, and that the science of for these truths hold good for everything that lie philosopher and not for some special genus apart from others. And 11 men use them, for they are true of being qua being, and ach genus has being. But men use them just so far as to satisfy 25 leir purposes that is, as far as the genus, whose attributes
"ces to inquire into the truths
; ,
;

ley

are

proving,

extends.

Therefore since these truths

early hold

good

for all things

)mmon
to

to them), hp
too.

who

sf^ii(;^i>.s

qua being (for this is what is \\e\r\a qua being wil jngniV^
]

no one who is conducting special inquiry tries to say anything about their truth or Isehood, neither the geometer nor the arithmetician. Some itural philosophers indeed have done so, and their procedure as intelligible enough for they thought that they alone

them

And

for this reason

30

'

With

1005* 8 omit Kai hih. TovTO. ch. 2 cf. B. 995'' 5-7, 996" 18-^ 26.

1005^

METAPHYSICA
were inquiring about the whole of nature and of beinj But since there is one kind of thinker who is even above th*. natural philosopher (for nature is only one particular genus of being), the dis cussion of these truths a lso will belong to him whose inquiry is universal and deals with primary
Physics also
is

35

1005^ substance.

a kind of Wisdom, but

it

is

not

the

first

kind.

And
;

the attempts of

some who

discuss the

terms on which truth should be accepted, are due to a want of training in logic for they should know these things already
5

when they come to a special study, and not be inquiring into them while they are pursuing it. Evidently then the philosopher, who is studying the nature of all substance, must

inquire also into the principles of^ yllogism.

10 to state

^^

15

But he who knows best about each genus must be able the most cert ain pppriplpg of his subject, so that he whose subject is bein^ qua bein g must be able to state the most certain principles of all things. This is the philosopher. and the most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men may be mistaken about Foi things which they do not know), and non-hypothetical. a principle which every one must have who knows anythin| about being, is not a hypothesis and that which every om must know who knows anything, he must already have wher he comes to a special study. Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all which principle this is, we proceec
; ; ;

to say.
''^

It

is,

|Jiat

tl] ^

same

attrihnte cannot at the

in the

belong and not belong to the same subject

same tim( same respect

20

we must

presuppose, in face of dialectical objections,

am
i

further qualifications

which might be added.

it

This, then,

the most certain of all prj nci]3la.since

tion given above.

answers to the defini

25

For it is impossibkJor_any_onejQj2li3 be andnot to_be, as some think Heraclitij says lor \vhat a man says he does not necessarily believe If it is impossible that contrary attributes should belong i the same time to the same subject (the usual qualification must be presupposed in this premise too), and if an opinio
the

same thing
;

to

which contradicts another

impossible for the same

is

contrary to
at the

it,

obviously

it

man

same time

to believe th

r.

BOOK
;

IV

1005*'

*me thing to be and not to be for if a man were mistaken this point he would have contrary opinions at the same
time.
It
is

for this reason that all

it

who

are carr>M*ng

oiit

a demonstration reduce
this
is

to this as an ultimate belief; for

naturally the

starting-point

even for

all

the other

axioms.^

CHAPTER
assert that
be,
it, is

IV
said,

There are some who, as we have

possible for the

both themselves
to be and not to
case.

35
.

same thing
this to

and say that people can judge

be the

And

1006*

'

among others many writers about nature use this language. But we have now posited that it is impossib ^^ ff"" anythinpr at the sa me time to be and iiot to be. and by this means have
snown that
this is the niost in disputable of all principles.-

Some
but
of

indeed

demand

that even this shall be demonstrated,

this

they do through want of education, for not tojgamy

what things one may demand demonstration, and of wha t one may not, argues simply want of education. For it is
impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely
there would De an innnite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration. But if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, these persons cannot say what principle they r^ard as more indemon-

everything

10

strable than the present one.

We
view
is

can, however,

impossible,

if

demonstrate ne<yatively even that this our opponent will only say something

and if he says nothing, it is absurd to attempt to reason with one who will not reason about anything, in so far as he refuses to reason. For such a man, as such, is seen already to be no better than a mere plant. Now negative demonstration I distinguish from demonstration proper, because in a demonstration one might be thought to be begging the
question, but
if another

15

person is responsible for the assumption

we
^

shall

have negative proof, not demonstration. The starting-

With ch. 3 cf. B. 995^ 7-10, 996'' 26-997* 15. i.e. we have shown that since A cannot be both can think A is both B and not-^ (1005'' 22-31).
*

B and

not-^, no one

' ;

ioo6^
point for

METAPHYSICA
all such arguments is not the demand that our opponent shall say that something either is or is not (for this one might perhaps take to be a begging of the question), but that he shall say something which is significant both for himself and for another for this is necessary, if he really is to say anything. For, if he means nothing, such a man will not be capable of reasoning, either with himself or with another. But if any one grants this, demonstration will be possible The person for we shall already have something definite. responsible for the proof, however, is not he who demonstrates but he who listens for while disowning reason he listens to reason. [And again he who admits this has admitted that something is true apart from demonstration, so that not everything will be so and not so '.^] First then this at least is obviously true, that the word be
; ;
' ' '

20

25

30 or

not be

'

has a definite meaning, so that not everything

'man' has one meaning, by having oile meaning if 'man' means 'X\ then if y^ is a man I understand this: 'X' will be what being a man means for him. And it makes no difference even if one were to say a word has several 1006^ J^eanings, if only they are limited in number; for to each
will
let

be 'so and not so'.

Again,
'

if
;

this

be 'two-footed animal'

'

might be assigned a different word. For that man has not one meaning but several, one of which would be defined as 'two-footed animal', while there might be also several other formulae for a peculiar name if only they were limited in number; of might be assigned to each the formulae. If, however, they were not limited but one were to say that the word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would for not to have one meaning is to have no be impossible
formula
there
instance,

we might say

'

'

meaning, and
10

if

words have no meaning reasoning with other

;

people, and
it

indeed with oneself, has been annihilated

^

for

is

impossible to think of anything

;

one thing

but

if this is

possible,

we do not think of one name might be assigned

if

to this thing.
^ This sentence T^eaeL 183 A.

Let
is

it

be assumed then, as was said at the

For
'

probably out of place.

so
,

and not so

'

of.

PI.

loos'* 10

read ov8fv yap.

; ;

r.

BOOK
'

IV

1006^

name has a meaning and has one meanbeing a man should mean precisely not being a man if man is not only predicable of one subject but also has one meaning (for we do not
beginning,^ that the

ing

it is

impossible, then, that

',

'

'

'

15

identify

'

having one meaning

'

with

'

being predicable of one

'

subject '.since on that assumption even musical' and white 'and

man would have had one meaning,

'

so that

all

things would

have been one

for

they would

all

have had the same meaning).

And
we
call

it

will

not be possible for the same thing to be and

not to be, except in virtue of an ambiguity, just as one

'

whom
ao

man
is

',

others might call

this,

'

not-man

'

but the point in

whether the same thing can at the same man in name, but whether it can in fact. Now if man and not-man mean nothing difierent, obviously not being a man will mean nothing different from being a man so that being a man will be not being a man for they will be one. For being one means this what we find
question

not

time be and not be a

' ' '

'

'

'

'

'

in

the case of
is

''

raiment

'

and dress
*

'

'

25

viz. that
'

the definitory
'

formula

one.

And

man

'

are to be one,
earlier that

was shown

fore, if it is true to

say

be a two-footed animal

and not being they must mean one thing. But it they mean different things. Thereof anything that it is a man, it must for this was what man nigant
if
*

being a

man

'

and

if this is

necessary,

it

is

impossible that the same thing

;

should not be a two-footed animal

necessary' means
be.

for this is

what

'

being

that

it

is

impossible for the thing not to

it

It is,

then, impossible that

is

should be at the same time

is

true to

say the same thing

for

man and

not a man.
'

The same account holds good

Tian
'

with regard to
'

not being
different 1007^

-,

'

being
even
'

man and
'

'

being not-man
'

mean
'

;hings, since

and being man are different or the former terms are much more opposed, so that they Tiust a fortiori mean different things. And if any one says :hat zi'Jiite means one and the same thing as man again .ve shall saj' the same as what was said before, that it would bllow that all things are one, and not only opposites. But if ;his is impossible, then what has been said will follow, if our
being white
'
'

'

'

',

opponent answers our question,

*

^ 31.

1007*

read

\u] fivai

avd^janov.

AS. MET.

ioo7^

METAPHYSICA
And
is
if,

when one asks the question simply, he adds the

he
is

10 contradictories,

not answering the question.

For there

nothing to prevent the same thing from being both

man

15

20

and white and countless other things: but still if one asks whether it is true to call this a man or not our opponent must give an answer which means one thing, and not add that it is also white and large. For, besides other reasons, it is impossible to enumerate the accidents, which are infinite in number let him, then, enumerate either all or none. Similarly, therefore, even if the same thing is a thousand times man and notman, we must not add, in answering the question whether this is a man, that it is also at the same time not a man, unless we are bound to add also all the other accidents, all that the subject is or is not and if we do this, we are not
; ;

observing the rules of argument.

And
I

in general

those

who

use this argument do

all

away with

substance and essenc e. For they must say that

accidents,
'

attributes are

and that there is no such thing as being essentially For if there is to be any such thing as being essentially man this will not be being not-man or not being

man
25

'

or animal
'

'.

'

'

'

'

'

man

'

(yet these are negations of

it

it ^)

for there

was some one

thing which

meant, and this was the substance of something.

And
is

denoting the substance of a thing means that the essence

is

of the thing
to

nothing

else.

But

if its

being essentially

man ^

be the same as either being essentially not-man or man, then its essence will be something else. Therefore our opponents must say that there caiinot 30 be such a definition o f anything, but that all attributes are ac ci dental for this is the distinction between substance and accident white is accidental to man, because though he is white, whiteness is not his essence. But if all statements are accidental, there will be nothing primary about which they are made, if the accidental always implies predication about 1007^ a subject. The predication, then, must go on ad infiiiitinn. But this is impossible for not even more than two terms can be combined in accidental predication. For (1) an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because
essentially not being

'

'

Sc.

and hence (on the view attacked) should be compatible with

read
et
fi'

it.

1007"' 27

earat avrco to oTTtp

avOpama

elvai.


r.

BOOK

IV
I

1007''

both are accidents of the same subject.

the white
is

mean,
is

for instance,

musical and the latter

is

white, only because both

are accidental to man.

this sense, that

But

(2)

Socrates

musical, not in
else.

both terms are accidental to something

Since then some predicates are accidental in this and

in that sense, (a) in

some

those which are accidental in the latter sense,

is

which white

accidental

to

Socrates, cannot form an

infinite series in the

upward

direction,'
;

e.

g.

Socrates the white

10

no unity can be got out of such a sum. Nor again white have another term accidental to it, e. g. musical '. For this is no more accidental and at the same time we have to that than that is to this drawn the distinction, that while some predicates are accidental in this sense, others are so in the sense in which musical is accidental to Socrates and the accident is an accident of an
has not yet another accident
for
(d) will
' '

'

'

'

15

accident not in cases of the latter kind, but only in cases of

the other kind, so that no t a/l term s
will

be accidental.^

And

There must, then, be something which denotes substance. it has been shown that, if this is so, contradictory statements cannot be predicated at the same time.
Again,
if all

'.

contradictory statements are true of the same

subject at the

same

time, evidently all things will be one.

For the same thing

will

be a trireme, a

wall,

and a man,

if it is

20

equally possible to affirm and to deny anything of anything,

and
is

this

premise must be accepted by those

who
;

share the

views of Protagoras.
also is a trireme,

For

if

any one thinks that the man

is

not a trireme, evidently he

if,

not a trireme

so that he

as they say, contradictory statements are

both true.

And we

thus get the doctrine of Anaxagoras,^

;

25

that all things are

exists.

mixed together

so that nothing really

They seem,

then, to be speaking of the indeterminate,

and, while fancying themselves to be speaking of being, they

ire

speaking about non-being

for that

tially

and not actually

is

the indeterminate.

which exists potenBut they must

'

i.

e. in

the direction of predicates, which are naturally wider or higher

(i)

han the
^

subject.

Sense

reduces to sense
is

(2),

and

in this
;

an

infinite

number of

iccidents
'

combined together
Diels, Vorsokratiker.

impossible

there

must be substance

iomewhere.
Fr.
I

F 2

,b 1007

METAPHYSICA
predicate of every subject every attribute and the negation

30

of
its

it

indifferently.

For
is

it

is

absurd

if

of

every subject
not prethat he
is

own

negation

to

be predicable, while the negation

it is

of something else which cannot be predicated of

dicable of
is
it
;

for instance, if
it

it is

true to say of a

man

not a man, evidently

If,

is

also true to say that he

^

not not

35

a trireme.

then, the affirmative

;

can be predicated, the

if

negative must be predicable too

and

the affirmative

is

predicable, the negative, at least, will be

more predicable than

then, even the latter
'

1008^ the negative of the subject

negative
is
;

itself.

If,

predicable, the negative of

trireme

'

will

be also

predicable
so too.

and,

if

this is predicable, the affirmative will

be

Those,

then,

who

maintain this view are driven to

and to the further conclusion that it is not For if it is true that a thing is man and not-man, evidently also it will be neither man nor not-man. For to the two assertions there answer two negations. And if the former ^ is treated as a single
this conclusion,

necessary either to assert or to deny.

proposition

compounded out

of two, the latter also

is

a single

proposition opposite to the former.

^
10

Again, either the theory is true in all cases, and a thing is both white and not- white, and being and non-being, and all other contradictories are similarly compatiblCj or the theory is true
of some statements and not of others. exceptions
is

And

if

not of

all,

the

will
if

be contradictories of which admittedly only one

of all, again either the negation will be true wherever the assertion is, and the assertion true wherever the negation is, or the negation will be true where the asser-

true

but

tion
15 is.

is,

but the assertion not always true where the negation

in the latter case there will

And(i)
is

fixedly

is 7tot,

and

this will

be something which belief; and if an indisputable be

non-being
tion will

indisputable and knowable, the opposite asser-

be more knowable.

But

(2) if

what
is

it

is

necessary to
^

deny

it is

equally necessary to assert,

it

either

true or not

true to separate the predicates and say, for instance, that a

20 thing is white,
^

and again that

it is

not-white.

And

if [a) it is

^
^

Sc. 'trireme'. Sc. that the thing is man and not-man. 1008* 18 read Ka\ oaa anocprjaai (pdvai avayKijy

iJtoi.

r.

BOOK

IV
is

1008^

not true to apply the predicates separately, our opponent

not really applying them, and nothing at
all

exists

but
?

how
Also

could non-existent things speak or walk, as he does

all

things will on this view be one, as has been already said,

and

man and God and

For
if

trireme and their contradictories will be

25

the same.

contradictories can be predicated alike of

will in

each subject, one thing

if it differ,

no wise

differ

from another

for

this difference will

(/;)

be something true and peculiar

with truth apply the predicates

to

it.

And
it

if

one

may
all

none the less. would then be right and all would be in error, and our opponent himself confesses himself to be in error. And at the same time our discussion with him is For he for he says nothing. evidently about nothing at all but both yes and no and says neither yes nor no again he denies both of these and says neither yes nor no for otherwise there would already be something definite.
separately, the above-mentioned result follows

Further,

follows that

30

'

'

'

',

'

'

'

'

'

'

Again,

if

when the

assertion

is

true, the negation

is false,
it

is

false,

and when

this is true, the affirmation

will

not be
1008**

possible to assert

same

time.

and deny the same thing truly at the But perhaps they might say we had assumed
in

the very question at issue.

Again,
he

is

he
it

error
so,

who judges
and
is

either that the thing

is

so or that
If
is

is

not

he right

who
?

judges both?

not right,

what can they mean by saying that

is

the nature of existing things

is

of this kind

And

if

he
the

not right, but more

will

right

than he

who judges

in

other way, being

this will

already be of a definite
at the

nature, and

be

true,

and not

same time

also not true.

But
this

if all

are alike both right and wrong, one

who

believes
;

can neither speak nor say anything intelligible

at

for

he
10

same time both 'yes' and 'no'. And if he makes no judgement but 'thinks' and 'does not think', indifferently, what difference will there be between him and
says

the

the plants

Thus, then,

it

is

in the highest

degree evident

any one of those who maintain this view nor any one else is really in this position. For why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home thinking he is walking? Why does he not walk early some morning into a well or
that neither

15

I008''

METAPHYSICA
over a precipice,

one happens to be in his way ? Whydo we observe him guarding against this, evidently not thinking that falling in is alike good and not good ? Eviif

dently he judges one thing to be better and another worse.

And
20

if

this

is

so,

he must judge one thing to be

man and
all

another to be not-man, one thing to be sweet and another

to be not-sweet.

For he does not aim

it

at

and judge

things alike,

when, thinking

desirable to drink water or to

;

see a man, he proceeds to aim at these things

if

yet he ought,

the same thing were alike

said, there is
25

But, as was no one who does not obviously avoid some

man and

not-man.
seems,

things and not others.

unqualified judgements,

Therefore, as
if

it

all

men make
still

not

about
if

all

things,

about

what

is

better and worse.

all

And

this is not

knowledge but

opinion, they should be

as a sick

man

the more anxious about the truth, more should be anxious about his health than
;

one who
30

is

healthy

for

he who has opinions

not
in

is,

in

comparison

with the
truth
is

man who knows,

concerned.

a healthy state as far as the

Again, however much

still

all

things

may

be 'so and not

;

so',

there

is

a more and a less in the nature of things

for

we
is

should not say that two and three are equally even, nor
__

he who

thinks four things are five equally wrong with him

If

35

who

thinks they are a thousand.

then they are not equally

wrong, obviously one is less wrong and therefore more right. If then that which has more of any quality is nearer the

1009^ norm, there must be some truth to which

nearer.

the,

more
is

true

is

And

even

if

there

is

not,

still

there

already

and we shall have got rid of the unqualified doctrine which would prevent us from determining anything in our thought.
something more certain and
true,
\

CHAPTER V
Again, from the same opinion proceeds the doctrine of
Protagoras, and both doctrines must be alike true or alike

For on the one hand, if all opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be at the same time true and false. For many men hold beliefs in which they conflict
untrue.

r.

BOOK
;

IV

1009^

with one another, and

the

all

think those mistaken

who have

not

to

same opinions as themselves so that the same thing must be and not be. And on the other hand, if this is so, all opinions must be true for those who are mistaken and those
;

who
if,

are right are opposed to one another in their opinions

is

then, reality

such as the view

in question supposes, all

15

will

be right

in their beliefs.

Evidently, then, both doctrines

proceed from the same

way

of thinking.
"*

But the same method of discussion must not be used with opponents for some need persuasion, and others compulsion. Those who have been driven to this position by difficulties in their thinking can easily be cured of their ignorance for it is not their expressed argument but their thought that one has to meet. But those who argue for the sake of argument can be convinced only by emending the argument
all
: ;

20

as expressed in words.

Those who
t hat

really feel the difficulties

have been led to

(i)

this

opinion by observation of the sensible world,

contradictions or contraries are true at

Theythink the same time^

because they see contraries coming into existence out of the

same
as

thing.

If,

then, that

which

is

not cannot

come

to be, 25

the thing must have existed before as both contraries alike,

Anaxagoras says
says
tire
is

all is

mixed
full

for he

void and the

being,

and Democritus too exist alike in every part, and

in all,

yet one of these

then,

and the other non-being.

shall
err.

To
.

those, 30
in

whose
is
'

belief rests

on these grounds, we

say that

sense they speak rightly and in a sense they

For

'

t^^ at
.'

Ut
i<.

has two meanings, so that in s o me sense a thin g can be out oT that which is not, while in some sense it cannot, and the same thing can at the same time be and not be hiif; nr>t ?'" thp ^ame respect. For the same can be ^p otentially at the same time two f/^nft-oi-ipo but jt

which

come

to

',

f4.<c^
/y,

<

And again we shall ask them to believe among existing things there is another kind of substance to which neither movement nor destruction nor generation at all
cannot act uaU^that

belongs.

And
'

(2) similarly

some have inferred from the

'.

sensible world 1009^

the truth of appearances

For they think that the truth should

large or small

not be determined

by the

number

of those

who

1009^
hold a
belief,

METAPHYSICA
and that the same thing is thought sweet byit, and bitter by others, so that if all were ill or all were mad, and only two or three were well or sane, these would be thought ill and mad, and not the others. And again, many of the other animals receive about the same things impressions contrary to ours and even to the senses of each individual, things do not always seem the same. Which, then, of these impressions are true and which are false is not obvious for the one set is no more true than the other, but both are alike. And this is why Democritus, at any rate, says that either ^here is no truth or to us at least it is not evident. And in general it is because these thinkers suppose knowledge to be sensation, and this to be a physical alteration^ tKat they say that what appears to our senses must be true for it is for these reasons that Empedocles and Democritus and, one may almost say, all the others have fallen victims to opinions of this sort. For Empedocles says that when men change their condition they change their knowledge

some who

taste

10
)

(
15

For wisdom increases

state.^

in

men according

to their present

And
20

elsewhere he says
far as their

So

nature changes, so far to them always

Come changed thoughts into mind.^ And Parmenides also expresses himself in

the

same way

For as in each case the much-bent limbs are composed, So is the mind of men for in each and all men
'Tis

one thing thinks the substance af their limbs For that of which there is more is thought.^
saying of Anaxagoras to

25

some

of his friends

is

also related,

that things would be for them such as

to be.

they supposed them

And

they say that

Homer

also evidently

had

this

opinion, because he
30

made Hector, when he was unconscious

from the blow, lie 'thinking other thoughts', which implies even those who are bereft of thought have thoughts, though not the same. Evidently, then, if both are forms of
that

thought, the real things also are at the same time

'

'

so and not

Fr. 106 Diels, Vorsokratiker. ' Fr. 16 Diels,

''

Fr. 108 Diels,

ib.

ib.

r.

BOOK

IV
consequences are most
is

1009''

And
difficult.

it is

in this direction that the

if

For

those

who have

seen most of what truth

possible for us (and these are those

who seek and love it most)^if these have such opinions and express these views
is it
?

.>
1

about the truth,

flying

not natural that beginners in philosophy

should lose heart

For to seek the truth would be to follow j

game.

But the reason for this opinion is that while these thinkers loio^ were inquiring into the truth of that which is, they thought 'Jhat which is was identical with the sensible \vorlHT mt:his, L,
.

'

however, there

is

largely present the nature of the indeter-

minate of that which exists in the peculiar sense w^hich we have explained ^ and, therefore, while they speak plausibly, For it befits us to put the they do not say what is true.
;

matter so rather than as Epicharmus put it against Xenophanes.- And again, they held these views because they saw
that all this world of nature
is in

movement, and that about

;

that which changes no true statement can be made at least, regarding that which every\vhere in every respect is changing

nothing could truly be affirmed.

It

was

this

belief that 'o

blossomed into the most extreme of the views above mentioned, that of the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus. who finally did not think it right to say anything
but only
river
for

moved
it

his

finger,

and

criticized

Heraclitus

for

saying that
;

is

impossible to step twice into the

it

same
15

Ae thought one could not do

shall

even once.

is
is

say in answer to this argument also, that there some real sense in their thinking that the changing, when it
changing, does not exist.
is

But we

Yet
is

it is

after all disputable

^

for
is

^
<
y
<^

that which

losing a quality has something

of that which

being

lost,

and of that which

coming
a thing
;

to be,
is

something must

already be.
be. there

And

in general if

perishing, there will

and if a thing is coming to must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it is generated, and this process cannot be * ad infinitutn. But leaving these arguments, let us insist
be present something that exists
^

aoC
"^

Cf.

1009* 32.
',

Epicharmus may have said that Xenophanes' views were 'neither

or that they were
rt roi.
*

true nor plausible ^ loio* 18 read

true but not plausible

'.

loio* 22 read

/117

tlvai eV.


loio^

METAPHYSICA
on
this,

that

it is

not the same thing to change

in

in

quantity and
;

in quality.
25 it
is

Grant that

quantity a thing
those

is

not constant

still

in respect of its
it

form that we know each thing.

And

again,

would be

fair to criticize

who

hold this view for

30

what they saw For only that region of the sensible world which immediately surrounds us is always in process of destruction and generation but this is so to speak not even a fraction of the whole, so that it would
only in a minority even of sensible things.
;

asserting about the whole material universe

have been juster to acquit this part of the world because of the other part, than to condemn the other because of this. And
again, obviously
that

we

shall
;

we made

before

make to them also the same reply we must show them and persuade them

35

that there is something yyVirxiP nafnrp ig rhgjgfOp^^Indeed/^ from the assertion that things at the same time are and are not,

there follows the assertion that

that they are in

all

things are at rest rather than

is

movement
all

for there

nothing into which they

that not

can change, since

loio*'

attributes belong already to all subjectsv^

truth,
true.

Regarding the nature of

everything which appears
sensation
is

we must maintain
Firstly,

they contend that

the sense in
is

question

at
is

least

of the object peculiar to

;

not false

we answer
it

that appearance
fair to

not the

same
5

as sensation,

Again,

is

express surprise at

our opponents for raising the question whether -magnitudes

are as great,

and colours are of such a nature, as they appear

to people at a distance, or as they appear to those close at

hand, and whether they are such as they appear to the sick or
to the healthy,

and whether those things are heavy which appear so to the weak or those which appear so to the strong,

10

and whether truth is what appears to the sleeping or to the For obviously they do not think these to be open questions no one, at least, if when he is in Libya he fancies one night that he is in Athens, straightway starts for the
waking.
;

Odeum.

And

again with regard to the future, as Plato says,^

surely the opinion of the physician and that of the ignorant

man

are not equally weighty, for instance, on the question

whether a

man

will get well or not.

And again, among sensa

Cf.

1009* 36.

"^

Cf, Theaetetus 171 E, 178 C.

I
the appropriate object,
tative,

r.

BOOK

IV

loio*
15

tions themselves the sensation of a foreign object

and that of or that of a kindred object and that of

the object of the sense in question,^ are not equally authori-

but

in

the case of colour, sight, not taste, has the

in the case of flavour, taste,

authority,

and

not sight

each of

which senses never says at the same moment of the same But not object that it at the same time is 'so and not so'. the one sense about moments does disagree different even at

quality, but
I

only about that to which the quality belongs.

20

mean,

for instance, the at

same wine might seem,

it is

if

either

it

or
^

one's

body changed,
;

one time sweet and at another time not

sweet

but at least the sweet, such as

is

when

it

exists,

has

never yet changed, but one

always right about

it,

which

is

to be sweet

must

of necessity be of such

and that and such

25

a nature.

Yet all these views destroy this distinction, so that no essence of anything, so nothing is of necessity as there "or the necessary cannot be in this way and also in that, so that if anything is of necessity, it will not be both 'so and
is

not so

'.

And,
3e

in

general,
if

nothing

animate things were not

acuity of sense.
lot exist
Derceiver),
is

t here would would be no The view that the sensations also would

if

o nly the sensible exists,

;

for there

doubtless true (for they are affections of the

but that the subst rata which cause the sensation

exist even apart
is

should not

from sensation
s ensation

is

impossible,

^or sensation
s

surely not the

ot

itsel t,

but there

35

something bey ond the sensation, which must be prior to he sensation for that which moves is priur in liaTure tcT hat which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is loii^
;

10 less

the case.

CHAPTER

VI

There are, both among those who have these convictions nd among those who merely profess these views, some who
aise a difificulty

by

asking,

who

is

the judge of the healthy

^ loio'' 16 read avrris. E.g. the knowledge which smell gives us of avour and of odour respectively.

loii^

METAPHYSICA
man, and
in

general

who

is

likely to

judge rightly on each

class of questions.

But such

inquiries are like puzzling over

the question whether

such questions

we are now asleep or awake. And all have the same meaning. These people demand
;

that a reason shall be given for everything

for

they seek

10

a starting-point, and they wish to get this by demonstration, while it is obvious from their actions that they have no conviction.

But

their

mistake

is

what we have stated

is

it

to be;

they seek a reason for that for which no reason can be given
for the starting-point of

demonstration
but those
is

not demonstration.
it

These, then, might be easily persuaded of this truth, for

15 is

not

difficult

to grasp

who

seek merely com;

pulsion in argument seek what

to be

impossible

for

they demand
things

made

to contradict themselves, while they are contrafirst.

dicting themselves from the very

^But

if

not

all

are relative, but

some are
;

self-existent, not everything that

appears will be true

for that

which appears appears to some

things that appear are true,
therefore, those

one
20

so that he

who

says

all

makes all things

irresistible

relative.

And,

who ask

for

an

argument, and at the same time demand to be called to account for their views, must guard themselves by
saying that the truth
is

not that what appears exists, but that

to

what appears exists for him and in the sense ijt which, and

whom

it

appears, and when,

it

the ivay in ivhich

appears.
it

And

if

they give an account of their view, but do not give

in this way,'
25 selves.

they
it is

will

soon find themselves contradicting them-

For

possible that a thing

may

for the

same mar
i

appear as honey to the sight, but not to the taste, and that, as we have two eyes, things may not appear the same to each,
30

namea and therefore that al things are alike false and true, for things do not appear eithei the same to all men or always the same to the same man, but often have contrary appearances at the same time (for touch! says there are two objects when we cross our fingers, while sight
the eyes are unlike.
^

For to those who

is

for the reasons

above

say that what appears

true,

says there
35

is

one),

to these we
^

shall
it

same sense and

in the

same part of
Cf. 1009''

say yes, but not to the and in the same way anc
'

I.

r.

BOOK

IV

loii^

at the

tions true.

same time so that what appears is under these qualificaBut perhaps for this reason those who argue thus
',

loii*'

not because they

as has

feel

a difficulty but for the sake of argument,

should say that this

is

not true, but true for this man.

And
5

been already

said,

they must make everything relative

-relative to

thought and perception, so that nothing either

has
so.
all

come
But

to be or will be without
if

some

one's

first

thinking

be or will be,^ evidently not Again, if a thing is one, it is in relation to one thing or to a definite number of things and if the same thing is both half and equal, still the equal is not correlative to the double.'^ If, then, the same thing is a man, in relation to that which thinks, and is that which is thought, in relation to that which thinks, that which thinks will not be a man, but only that which is thought. Again, if each thing is to be relative to that which thinks, that which thinks will
to

things have

come

things will be relative to opinion.

lo

be relative to an infinity of specifically different things.

Let
of
all

this, then, suffice

to

show

(i) that the

most indisputable

beliefs

is

that contradictory statements are not at the

same time
it

denial of this belief, and (3)

is

what consequences follow from the why people do deny it. Now since impossible that contradictories should be at the same
true,
(2)

and

15

time true of the same thing, obviously contraries also cannot

For of the contraries, no less than of the contradictories, one is a privation and a privation of substance and privation is the denial of
;

belong at the same time to the same thing.

'

a predicate to a determinate genus.

to affirm

If,

then,
is

it

is

impossible 20

and deny truly at the same time, it

it

also impossible

that contraries should belong to a subject at the

same time,
one
in

unless

both belong to

in

particular relations, or

a particular relation and one without qualification.

CHAPTER

VII

But on the other hand there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate. This is clear, in the first
'
'''

25

Sc. without

some

one's

first

thinking so.

Sc. but the equal to the equal, the half to the double.


loii''

METAPHYSICA
place,
if is

we
that

define what the true and the false are.

it is

To

say of

what
is is

not, or of

to say of

what

is

that

it

what is not that it is, is false, while is, and of what is not that it is not,
it
;

true

so that he

who
is

says of anything that

is

is,

or that

it

not, will say either

is

what
not

true or what

is

false

but neither

is said to be or not to be.^ Again, between the contradictories will be so in the way in which grey is between black and white,^ or a& that which is neither man nor horse is between man and horse, (i) If it were of the latter kind, it could not change into the extremes, for change is from not-good to good, or from good to not-good (but as a matter of fact when there is an intermediate it is always observed to change into the extremes). For there is no change except to opposites ^ 35 and to their intermediate. (2) But if it is really intermediate,'^ in this way too there is a difficulty there would have to be 1012^ a change to white, which was not from not-white but as it is, this is never seen. Again, the understanding either affirms or denies every object of understanding or reason this becomes obvious if we define when thought is true and when false. When it connects in one way by assertion or negation, it is Again, 5 true, and when it does so in the other way, it is false. there must be an intermediate between all contradictories, if one is not arguing merely for the sake of argument so that it will be possible for a man to say what is neither true nor untrue. And there will be a middle between that which is and that which is not, so that there will also be a kind of change intermediate between generation and destruction. Again, in all classes in which the negation of an attribute 10 means the assertion of its contrary, even in these there will be an intermediate for instance, in the sphere of numbers

what

nor what

30 either the intermediate

there

will
this
is

be number which
impossible, as
will
is

is

neither

odd nor not-odd.l

and the number

But

obvious from the definition.

infinitiim,

Again, the process

go on ad

^ Sc. by those who say there is an intermediate between contradictories. Hence such a statement is neither true nor false, which is absurd. ^ Though of course it differs from this case in being between contra

dictories, not contraries.

^ *

Sc. contrary, not contradictory opposites. Sc. as grey is between black and white.

r.

BOOK
made

IV

ioi2^

of realities will be not only

greater.

half as great again, but even

be possible to deny this intermediate with reference both to its assertion and to its negation,^ and this new term will be some definite thing for its essence Again, when a man, on being asked is something different. whether a thing is white, says no he has denied nothing

For again

it

will

15

'

',

except that

it

is

and

its

not being

is

a negation.

Some
opinions
eristical

people have acquired this opinion as other paradoxical

have been acquired ; when men cannot refute arguments, they give in to the argument and agree This, then, is why some argue that the conclusion is true. others do so because they demand a reason in such fashion
;

20

for

everything.
is

And

the starting-point in dealing with

all

such people

definition.

Now

the definition rests on

;

the

meaning something for the formula, of which the word is a sign, becomes its definition. The doctrine -^ of Heraclitus, that all things are and are not, seems to make 25 /
necessity of their

everything true, while that of Anaxagoras, that there

is

an

intermediate between the terms of a contradiction, seems to

make everything
mixture
is

false-;

for

when things

are mixed, the

neither
is

good nor

not- good, so that

one cannot say

anything that

true.

CHAPTER
In view of these distinctions
theories

VIII

it is obvious that the one-sided which some people express about all things cannot be /alid on the one hand the theory that nothing is true (for, iay they, there is nothing to prevent every statement from Deing like the statement the diagonal of a square is com-

30

'

Tiensurate with the

side'),

on

the other hand the theory

:hat everything is true.^

IS

These
also

views are practically the same

that of Heraclitus
all

for that
'

which says that

'

all

things are
35

rue and

are false

makes each of these statements

separately, so that since they are impossible, the double state- loia''
Tient

:ontradictories
i.e.
I

must be impossible too. Again, there are obviously which cannot be at the same time true. Nor
if

there

is

a term
is

new term C which

neither 1012^ 27 omit wore.

which is neither B nor not-B.

nor not-A, there

will

be

ioi2^

METAPHYSICA
on the other hand can all statements be false yet this would seem more possible in view of what has been said. But against all such arguments we must postulate, as we said above/ not that something is or is not, but that people mean something, so that we must argue from a definition, having got what falsity or truth means. If that which it is true to affirm is nothing other than that which it is false to deny,^ it is impossible that all statements should be false for one side of the contradiction must be true. Again, if it is
;

10

necessary with regard to everything either to assert or to

deny
ojte

it,

it

is

impossible that both should be false

is

for
all

it is

side of the contradiction that

false.

Further,
own

such

i5

arguments are exposed to the often-expressed objection, that they destroy themselves. For he who says that everything is
true

makes the statement contrary

to his

also true, so

that his
that
it

own

is

not true
while he

(for

the contrary statement denies

is

true),

who
if
it

says everything

is

false

makes

himself also
contrary
20 latter

false.

And

the former person

excepts the

statement,

saying

alone

is

not true, while the

excepts his

own

as being alone not false,

none the

less

they are driven to postulate the truth or falsehood of an

infinite

number of statements
is

for that

statement
right,
I

true,

is

true,

and

this process will

which says the true go on to infinity.

Evidently again those

nor are those

who say all things are at rest are not who say all things are in movement. For

'

if all

true and the

25 for

same statements will always be same always false, but they obviously are not; he who makes a statement himself at one time was not
things are at rest, the
will

and again
nothing
it

not be.
;

And
is
;

if

all

things are in motion

false.

will

be true

everything therefore will be

impossible.
for

Buj

has been shown that this

is

be that which
to something.
30

that changes

change

is

Again, it must from something

all

'But again

it

is

not the case that

thingi
foi
ir

are at rest or in motion sometimes, and nothing _/<?r ever;

there

something which always moves the things that are motion, and the first mover must itself be unmoved.
is
1 ^

Cf. 1006=* 18. 1012'' 9 read

\Xo to dXrjdts

(jidvai ^

(6) n7ro0vat

yj/fodor.

So perhaps

Asclepius.

BOOK V
CHAPTER
Beginning means
'

(A)

(i) that part of

a thing from which one

vould start

first,

e.g. a line or a road has a beginning in 35

(a)

That from which each 1013^ e. g. we must sometimes begin learn not from the first point and the beginning of the hing. but from the point from which we should learn most asily. (3) That from which (as an immanent part) a thingirst arises, e. g. as the keel of a ship and the foundation of a lOUse, while in animals some suppose the heart, others the 5 irain, others some other part, to be of this nature. (4) That rom which {not as an immanent part) a thing first arises, and om which the movement or the change naturally first proeeds, as a child comes from the father and the mother, and fight from abusive language. (5) That at whose will that 'o hich is moved is moved and that which changes changes, g. the magistracies in cities, and oligarchies and monarchies nd tyrannies, are called dpxai,^ and so are the arts, and of lese especially the architectonic arts. (6) That from which
ather of the contrary directions,

hing would best be originated,

thing can
f

first

be known

for this also

- is

called the beginning 15

the thing, e.g. the hypotheses are the beginnings of demon-

rations.
)r

(Causes are spoken of

in
It

an equal number of senses

is

all

causes are beginnings.)

first

common,

then, to

all
is

eginnings to be the
r
1

point from which a thing either

;

comes
thing

to be or

is

known

but of these some are immanent

20

and others are outside. Therefore the nature of and so are the elements of a thing, id thought and will, and essence, and the final cause for the
the thing
is

a beginning,

' The double meaning of apx^ nnot be reproduced in English. ' 1013* 15 read (cat yap avrrj,

'

beginning

'

and

'

government

'

AR.

MET.

1013^

METAPHYSICA
good and the beautiful are the beginning both of the knowledge and of the movement of many things.

CHAPTER
'

II

25

from which (as immanent material e. g. the bronze of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and the classes which include these and (2) The form or pattern, i. e. the formula of the essence, numbei i and the ratio 2 this (e. include classes which g. the
Cause' means
(i) that

a thing comes into being,

in general are causes of the octave) and the parts of the

formula.
30

(3)

That from which the change or the freedom

fron:

change first begins, e. g. the adviser is a cause of the action and the father a cause of the child, and in general the make: a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of th( changing. (4) The end, i. e. that for the sake of which a thinj For why does on( is, e. g. health is the cause of walking. healthy be and in speaking may that one walk ? We say cause. The same is true o 35 thus we think we have given the all the means that intervene before the end, when something 1013^ else has put the process in motion (as e. g. thinning or purging
'

',

or drugs or instruments intervene before health

for all these are for the

is

reached)
difife

sake of the end, though they

from one another

are actions.

in that

some
all

are instruments and other

These, then, are practically

are spoken
5

the senses in which cause

in several senses
i

of,

and as they are spoken of

and no accidental sense, e. g. both the art of sculpture and th bronze are causes of the statue not in virtue of anything els but qua statue not, however, in the same way, but the on^ An( as matter and the ot her as_jpm:ceof_ the movement things can be causes of one another, e. g. exercise of goo<
follows that there are several causes of the
thing,
;

same

ii

10

condition, and the latter of exercise

not, however, in th

same way, but the one as end and the other as source movement. Again, the same thing is sometimes cause c contraries for that which when present causes a particula thing, we sometimes charge, when absent, with the contrary

e. g.

we impute

the shipwreck to the absence of the steers

A.

BOOK V
;

1013"

man, whose presence was the cause of safety

the

and both

presence and

the privation

are

15

causes as sources of

movement.
All the causes
are

now mentioned

fall

under four senses which

are the causes of

the

most obvious.

For the

letters

and the material is the cause of manufactured :hings, and fire and earth and all such things are the causes pf bodies, and the parts are causes of the whole, and the
syllables,

lypotheses are causes of the conclusion, in the sense that

:hey are that out of which these respectively are

20

made

but of

hese

some are cause

as substratum

(e.

g.

the parts), others as

sscnce (the whole, the synthesis,

le physician, the adviser,
otirces

and the form).

in general

The semen,
all
35

and

the agent, are

The remainder are causes as of change or of rest. he end and the good of the other things for that, for the
;

ake of which other things

are, is naturally the best

and the

nd of the other things

'hether

let

us take

it

as

making no
the

difference

we

call it

good or apparent good.

is

~
number of
in

These, then, are the causes, and this

inds,

their

but the varieties of causes are

are

many

number,

lough when summarized these also are comparatively few.

"auses

hich are of the

thers in

in many senses, and even of those'30 same kind some are causes in a prior and a posterior sense, e. g. both the physician and the

spoken of

'

'

'

rofessional

man
'

'

are causes of health, and

'

the ratio 2

' :

nd

'

number

are causes of the octave, and the classes that

elude any particular cause are always causes of the particular

Tect.

Again, there are accidental causes and the classes which

e. g.

elude these,

while in one sense

'

the sculptor

'

causes the

35

atue, in another sense

Polyclitus
;

'

causes

it,

because the
in- 1014a
'

ulptor happens to be Polyclitus

a

and the classes that

'

ude the accidental cause are also causes, e. g. man or in ;neral animal is the cause of the statue, because Polyitus is a man, and a man is an animal. Of accidental causes so some are more remote or nearer than others, as, for
' '

stance,
la

if

'

the white

'

and
*

'

the musical were called causes of

'

e statue,
e.se

r)'

varieties of causes,^

and not only Polyclitus or man But besides all proper or whether accidental, some
'
'

'.

'^

^0143'

7 retain

napa.

1014^

METAPHYSICA
are called causes as being able to act, others as acting,
e. g

the cause of the house's being built

lo
,

is

the builder, or th

builder

when

building.

The same variety of language will b

e.

found with regard to the effects of causes,

g.

a thing ma;

be called the cause of this statue or of a statue or in genera of an image, and of this bronze ^ or of bronze or of matter ii
general
;

and similarly

in the case of accidental effects.

Again
in

both accidental and proper causes

bination, e.g.

may

be spoken of
'

com

we may say not

'.

'

Polyclitus

nor

'

the sculptor

but
15

'

Polyclitus the sculptor

all

Yet

these are but six in number, while each

;

is

spokei

of in two ways

for (i)

they are causes either as the individual

or as the class that includes the individual,^ or as the accidental or as the class that includes the accidental, and these either a

30 acting or as

and (2) all may be taken a But they differ inasmuch a the acting causes and the individuals exist, or do not exis simultaneously with the things of which they are causes, e. ^
combined,^ or as taken simply
;

having a capacity.

this particular

man who
is

is

curing, with this particular ma:

who

is

recovering health, and this particular builder with thi

particular thing that

being built
;

but the potential cause

are not always in this case

for the

house does not perish

the

same time

as the builder.*

CHAPTER
a

III
i

'Element' means the primary component immanent thing, and indivisible in kind into other kinds, e.g. th elements of speech are the parts of which speech consists an into which it is ultimately divided, while ^/ley are no long( divided into other forms of speech different in kind from ther 30 If they are divided, their parts are of the same kind, a part of water is water (while a part of the syllable is n a syllable). Similarly those who speak of the elements bodies mean the things into which bodies are ultimate
this way of speaking cf. PAys. II. 194* 33. IOI4* 17 for avTov read tov kuO' fKaa-rov. ^ Sc. the particular proper cause with the particular accidental, or general proper with the general accidental. * With this chapter cf. Fkys. II. 3.
^

For

t'

A.
divided, while they are
differing in
ar

BOOK V

1014^

kind
in

no longer divided into other things and whether the things of this sort are one

more, they

call

these elements.

The elements of geometrical

35

proofs,

and
is

general the elements of demonstrations, have

;

similar character
,vhich
^f

for the

primary demonstrations, each of

1014''

implied in
;

many

demonstrations, are called elements

and the primary syllogisms, which have hree terms and proceed by means of one middle, are of this
demonstrations People also transfer the word

lature.

md

apply

it

to that which, being

;

nany purposes
ndivisible
is

for

from this meaning one and small, is useful for which reason the small and simple and
'

element

'

called an element.

Hence come the

facts that the

Tiost universal

things are elements (because each of

is

them being
all

ine
)r

and simple

present in a plurality of things, either in

in as

many

as possible^), and" that unity

first

and the point

re

thought by some to be

principles.

Now,

since the

o-called genera are universal

nalytic formula of them),

and

indivisible (for there is

no

10

some say the genera

are elements,

nd more so than the differentia, because the genus is more niversal for where the differentia is present, the genus accompanies it, but where the genus is, the differentia is not always,
;

is

common
is

to all the meanings that the element of each

hing

the

first

component immanent

in each.

15

CHAPTER
Nature
le
'

IV
of

means

(1)

the genesis

leaning which would be suggested

i;

in ^^Vts long.^

(2)

thing,

om
lid

from which its which the primary movement

it

growing things the one were to pronounce The primary immanent element in growth proceeds. (3) The source
if

in

each natural object

is

resent in
to

Those things are grow which derive increase from something else by
in virtue

of

its

own

essence.

20

T] on vrKfiaTois shows that A. is not thinking of the strict universals of ience but of the rough generalizations of dialectic. Cf. the use of roixf'ioif in the Topics, and Diels, Elenientttm, p. 29. 1014^ 8 omit hi6.
"^

This (i. e. growth ') is the etymological sense of <^vai%. o grow,' has v long in most of its forms.
'
'

^veadm,

1014"

METAPHYSICA
contact and organic unity, or organic adhesion as in the case

25

Organic un ity differs from contact for in the need not be anything besides the contact, but in organic unities there is something identical in both parts which makes them grow together instead of merely touching, and be one in respect of continuity and quantity, though not of quality. (4) Nature means the primary matter of which any non-natural object consists or out of which it is made, which cannot be modified or changed from its own potency,
of embryos.
;

latter case thjgre

'

'

as

e. g.

bronze

30 utensils,

be the nature of a statue and of bronze and wood the nature of wooden things and so in all
is

said to

other cases

for

when a product

is

made

out of these materials

the
call

fiirst

matter

is

preserved throughout.

In this

way

people

the elements of natural objects also their nature, some

fire,

naming
35 these,

others earth, others

sort,
all

air,

others water, others some-

thing else of the

and others

and some naming more than one o of them. Nature means the essenc, (5)

'

'

of natural objects, as with those

who say

the nature
^

is
:

th

primary mode of composition, or as Empedocles

1015^

says

Nothing that is has a nature, But only mixing and parting of the mixed, And nature is but a name applied to them by men.

Hence as regards the things that are or come to be by nature though that from which they naturally come to be or are already present, we say they have not their nature yet, unles they have their form or shape. That which comprises both c exists by nature, e.g. the animals an^ these- matter and form their parts and nature is both the first matter (and this in tw
i

senses, either

first,

counting from the thing, or

in bronze,

first in

genera

e.g. in the case of

works

bronze

is first

withreferenc
things ihi

to them, but in general perhaps water

10

is first, if all

can be melted are water), and the form or essence, which

the end of the process of becoming.
of
'

And

from

this sens

nature

'

every essence in general

'

is in fact,

by an extensio

of meaning, called a

nature

',

because the nature of a thing

plain that nature^ in

one kind of essence. From what has been

'

said, then,

it is

\.\

Fr. 8 Diels, Vorsokratiker.

I
primary and
strict

A.

BOOK V
the essence of things which have in

1015^

sense

is

themselves, as such, a source of

called the nature because
it

movement;

for the

matter

is 15

is

qualified to receive this,

and

processes of becoming and growing are called nature because

they are movements proceeding from

sense
is

this.

And

nature in this

the source of the

movement

of natural obje cts, being

i

present in

them somehow,

either potentially or actually.

CHAPTER V
'

The necessary means (i) that without which, as a

'

condjiimi, 20

a thing cannot

live, e.g.
it is

breathing and food are necessary for

an animal; for
without which
the medicine
disease,

incapable of existing without these.

(2) The
to be, or

conditions without which good cannot be or

come

we cannot get rid or be

is

freed of evil, e.g. drinking

necessary in order that

and

sailing to

Aegina

is

necessary in order that

we may be cured of we 25
.

may
i.e.

get our money. (3) The compulsor}'^ and compulsion, that which impedes and hinders contrary to impulse and
;

purpose.

For the compulsory is called necessary whence the says: For every necesis painful, as Evenus ^ Ahd compulsion is a form of jary thing is ever irksome.' lecessity, as Sophocles says Force makes this action a lecessity.' And necessity is held to be something that cannot DC persuaded and rightly, for it is contrary to the movement A'hich accords with purpose and with reasoning. (4) We say And ihat that which cannot be otherwise is necessarily so.
accessary
'

30

'

35

Vom
;ar}'

this sense of
;

necessary

'

all

the others are

somehow
it

lerived

for as regards the

compulsory we say that

isneces1015*'

to act or to be acted on, only

when we cannot act according

impulse because of the compelling force,

lecessity
vise
;

which implies that

5

is that because of which the thing cannot be otherand similarly as regards the conditions of life and of good, vhen in the one case good, in the other life and being, are

lot possible

without certain conditions, these are necessary,

is

ind this cause

s

a kind of necessity.

Again,

(5)

demonstration
sense

a necessary thing, because the conclusion cannot be otherthere has been demonstration in the

vise, if

full

and

Fr. 8 Hiller.

E/ec/ra 256.

lois''

METAPHYSICA
the causes of this necessity are the
that
first

premises,

i.e.

the fact

the

propositions from

which the syllogism proceeds something other

in

cannot be otherwise.

Now some
lo

things
;

owe

their necessity to

than themselves

others do not, while they are the source of

necessity in other things.

Therefore the necessary

the simple
;

the

primary and
of

strict

sense

is

for this

does not admit

more states than one, so that it does not admit even of one for already it would admit of more than state and another one. If, then, there are certain eternal and unmovable things,
;

15

nothing compulsory or against their nature attaches to them.

CHAPTER
which

VI

20

'One' means (1) that which is one by accident, (2) that is one by its own nature. (1) Instances of the acci and musica! musical dentally one are Coriscus and Coriscus (for it is the same thing to say Coriscus and musical and musical Coriscus '), and musical and 'just For all these are and musical Coriscus' and 'just Coriscus called one by accident, 'just and musical because they are accidents of one Substance, musical and Coriscus because the one is an accident of the other and similarly in a sense
'
'

'

',

'

'

'

'

'

'

',

'

',

'

'.

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

25

one with Coriscus because one of the parts of the concept is an accident of the other, i. e. musical is an accident of Coriscus and musical Coriscus is one with
'

musical Coriscus

'

is

'

',

'

'

'

'just Coriscus', because

both have parts which are accidents

ol

one and the same subject.

is

The
'

case

is

similar

if

the accident
e. g. if
is

predicated of a class or of any universal term,

one

30 says that

man

is

the same as
'

musical

man

'

for this
is

eithei

because

'

musical

is

an accident of man, which

one sub-

both are accidents of some individual e. g. Coriscus. Both, however, do not belong to him in the same way, but one doubtless as genus and in the substance
stance, or because

the other as a state or affection of the substance.

35

The

things, then, that are called

one by accident, are

callec

(2) Of things that are called one in virtue o their own nature some {a) are so called because they arc continuous, e.g. a bundle is made one by a band, and piece;

so in this way.

A.

BOOK V
glue
;

ioi6^
line,

wood
is
is,

are

made one by
if it
is

and a

even

if it is

bent,

called

one

continuous, as each part of the body-

e.g. the leg or the arm.

Of

these themselves, the conart.

tinuous by nature are more one than the continuous by

_A thing

is

called

continuou s

which has by
;

movement and cannot have any other one when it is indivisible, and indivisible in time. Those things are continuous by their own nature which are one not merely for if you put pieces of wood touching one by contact another, you will not say these are one piece of wood or one body or one contininim of any other sort. Things, then, that are continuous in any way are called one, even if they admit of being bent, and still more those which cannot be bent, e.g. the shin or the thigh is more one than the leg, because the movement of the leg need not be one. And the straight line is more one than the bent but that which is bent and has an angle we call both one and not one, because its movement
;

own nature one 5 and the movement is

its

10

may

be either simultaneous or not simultaneous

is
^

of the straight line

but that always simultaneous, and no part of it

;

15

which has magnitude

bent
{b)

rests while

another moves, as

in the

line.

Things are called one

differ in

in

another sense because the

;

substratum does not

the case of things

kind

it

does not

differ

in

whose kind is indivisible to the sense. The substratum meant is either the nearest to, or the furthest
from, the final state.
For, on the one hand, wine
said to be one,
all juices,
all
is

said to 20
;

be one and water

and,
said to be one,

is

qua

indivisible in kind

on the other hand,

e.g. oil

and wine, are

and so are
air.

things that can be melted,

all
is

because the ultimate substratum of

of these are water or
{c)

the

same

for all

Those things are called one whose genus is one though distinguished by opposite differentiae and these are all called ^one because the genus which underlies the differentiae is one (e.g. horse, man, and dog are one, because all are animals),
iK

25

and

in

way

similar to that in which the matter

is

one.^
but

' Any point may remain fixed while the line rotates round it a point has no magnitude. ^ ' Cf. {l>) above. 1016* 18 read d8idcf)opovd8ia(t)opov 8f.

ioi6^

METAPHYSICA
called one in this way, but
^

These are sometimes

it

is

the higher genus

that

is

said to be the

same

sometimes (if they

30 are

infimae species of their genus) the genus above the proximate genera,^ e.g. the isosceles and the equilateral are one and the sdS^Q figure because both are triangles, but they
are not the
{d)

same

triangles.^

Two things are

is

called one,

when the formula which

states

the essence of one

35

from another formula which shows the essence of the other (though in i tself every formula is divisible). Thus even that which has increased or is
indivisible

diminishing
1016''

is

one, because
is

its

formula

is

one,

as,

in

the

case of planes,

the formula of their

form.
is

In general
indivisible,

those things, the

thought of whose essence

and cannot separate them either in time or in place or in formula, are most of all one, and of these especially those which are substances. For in general those things that do not admit of division are one in so far as they do not admit of it, e. g. if something qua man does not admit of division, it is one man if qiia magniif qua animal, it is one animal tude, it is one magnitude. Now most things are called one because they do or have or suffer or are related to something else that is one, but the things that are primarily called one
;
;

are those

10

15

one either in conas more than one either things that are not continuous, or those whose form is not one, or those whose formula is not one. {e) While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i. e. unless it has one form e. g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow we should not call them one all the same (unless because of their continuity) we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and have already some one form. This is why the circle is of all lines most
is

whose substance

one,
;

and

tinuity or in form or in formula

for

we count

truly one, because

it is

whole and complete.

10 16'* 29 read ori 8e t6 avat yevos. 1016* 30 retain to avaripa tovtcov, ^ Horse, man, and dog, are one, because all are animals. But if we are to call them one something, we cannot call them one (kind of) animal, but must go to the higher genus and call them one (kind of) living thing.
^

A.

BOOK V
be a beginning of number
;

1016*
for the
^

he essence of' one

first

'

is

to

measure
is

is

the beginning, for that

first

by which we
;

first

know

measure of the class the one, then, is 20 But the the beginning of the knowable regarding each class. one is not the same in all classes. For here it is a quartertone, and there it is the vowel or the consonant and there is another unit of weight and another of movement. But everywhere the one is indivisible either in quantity or in kind. That which is indivisible in quantity and qua quantity is called a unit if it is not divisible in any dimension and is 25 without position, a point if it is not divisible in any dimension and has position, a line if it is divisible in one dimension,
each class
the
;

a plane
in three
is

if in

body if divisible in quantity in all i. e. dimensions. And, reversing the order, that which
two, a

in

two dimensions is a plane, that which is divisible that which is in no way divisible in quantity is a point or a unit, that which has not position a unit, that which has position a point.
divisible in

one a

line,

30

Again, some things are one

others in genus, others

in

number, others
;

in species,

by analogy

in

number those whose

definition
is

matter

is

one, in species those

whose

one, in

genus those to which the same figure of predication applies,by analogy those which are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity are always found when
the former are,
in species, in
e.

y?

g. things that

are one in

number
are

are one
all

while things that are one in species are not

;

one
in 1017*
in

number

but things that are one

in species

all all

genus, while things that are so in genus are not

species but are all one
;

one one

by analogy while things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus. Evidently many will have meanings opposite to those of one some things are many because they are not continuous,
' '

'

others because their matter

the ultimate

either

the proximate matter or

is

divisible in kind, others

because the formulae

one.

which state
'

their essence are

more than
"pcoro).

1016'' 19 read

4 7^9

Sc. the

same category,

Cf. note

on

A. 986* 23.

' '

ioi7^

METAPHYSICA

CHAPTER
Things are said to 'be'
their
(i) in

VII
an accidental sense,
(2)

by

own

nature.

10

15

20

(i) In an accidental sense, e.g., we say 'the just is musical', and the man is musical and the musical is a man ', just as we say the musical builds because the builder happens to be musical or the musical happens to be a builder for here one thing is another' means 'one is an accident of another'. So in the cases we have mentioned for when we say the man is musical' and 'the musical is a man', or 'the white is musical' or the musical is white the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same thing, which is the first that the attribute is an accident of that which is while the musical is a man means that musical is an accident of man. In this sense, too, the not-white is said to be, because that of which it is an accident is. Thus when one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is.
'

'

'

',

'

'

',

'

'

'

'

(2) The kinds of essential being are those that are indicated by the figures of predication ^ for the senses of being are Since some predicates indicate just as many as these figures.
' ;
'

25

what the subject

its
'

is,

others

its

quality, others quantity, others

*

relation, others activity or passivity, others its

where

',

others

when
'

',

'

being

'

has a meaning answering to each of these.

'

30

For there is no difference between the man is recovering and the man recovers nor between the man is walking or and similarly in all cutting and the man walks or cuts
'

',

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

other cases.
(3)

'Being' and
'

'is'

mean

that a statement

is

true, 'not

being that
true, or
'

it is
;

not true but

e.

false,
is
'

and this alike

musical
'

in affirmation

and negation
'

g.

'

Socrates

means

that this
;

is

Socrates

is

not-white
is

the diagonal of the square

it is

means that this is true not commensurate with the

is',

but

side

means that
35
(4)

false to

say

it is.

Again, 'being' and 'that which

^
i.

in these cases

we

e.

the categories.

Cf.

note on A. 986* 23.

I
times being actually.

A.

BOOK V

1017*

mean being potentially, and someFor we say both of that which sees potentially and of that which sees actually, that it is seeing and both of that which can use knowledge and of that which is using it, that it knows, and both of that to which rest is already present and of that which can rest, that it rests. And
have mentioned, sometimes
'

',

similarly in the case of substances

stone,

we say the Hermes

is

in the

and the half of the line is in the line, and we say of When a thing is that which is not yet ripe that it is corn. potential and when it is not yet potential must be explained
elsewhere.^

CHAPTER Vni
Substance means (i) the simple bodies, i. e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine All these are called substance beings, and the parts of these.
'
'

10

because they are not predicated of a subject but everything

else is predicated of

them.

(2)

That which, being present

is

in 15

such things as are not predicated of a subject,

their being, as the soul
is

the cause of

of the being of animals.^

(3)

The

parts which are present in such things, limiting

them and

marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of and in general number is thought by some to be 20 the line
;

of this nature

for
all

if it is

destroyed, they say, nothing exists,

and which
thing.

it

limits
is

things.
is

(4)

The

essence, the

formula of

a definition,

also called the substance of each

It follows, then, that substance has two senses, [a) the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and {b) that which is a this and separable ^ and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing.
' '

25

0.

7.
^

1017'' 16

read rav

C<m)v.

Cf.

H. 1042a 29.

1017^

METAPHYSICA

CHAPTER
'

IX
is
'

The same means

'

(i)
'

that which

the

dental sense,

e.

g.

'

white

and

'

musical

are the
'
'

same in an accisame because

'musical'
'

they are accidents of the same thing, and

1/

man and
;

'30

and the musical' And the comis 'man' because it is an accident of man. plex notion is the same as either of the simple ones and each of these is the same as it for man and musical are and this is the same as said to be the same as musical man
because the one
is

an accident of the other

'

'

'

'

'

',

they.

This
;

is

why
it
'

all

of these

statements are

universally
35

for

is
;

not true to say that every

nature, but accidents

made man is

not
the

same as them
'

musical

for universal attributes

belong to things

in virtue of their

own

do not belong
'

to

1018^

in virtue of their

own

nature, but are predicated without

'

For Socrates and ' musical Socrates are thought to be the same but Socrates is not predicable of more than one subject, and therefore we do not say every Socrates as we say every man Some things are said to be the same in this sense, others (2) 5 are the same by their own nature, as that which is one is in some cases one by its own nature for both the things whose matter is one either in kind or in number, and those whose Clearly, therefore, essence is one, are said to be the same. sameness is a unity of the being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one, i. e. when we say a thing is the same as itself for we treat it as two. Things are called other if either their kinds or their 10 matters or the formulae of their essence are more than one and in general other has meanings opposite to those of the same 'Different' is applied to (1) those things which though
qualification

only of the individuals.

'

'

'

'.

'

'

'

'

'

'

'.

other are the

same
and

in

some

respect, only not in

;

either in species or in genus or

genus
15

is

other,

contraries,

number but by analogy (2) those whose and all things that have their
have the same
is

otherness in their essence.

Those things are

the

called 'like' which

attri-

butes in every respect, and those which have more attributes

same than

different,

and those whose quality

one

and

A.

BOOK V
number or them one of two
altering,
is
'

ioi8^

that which shares with another thing the greater

the more important of the attributes (each of

contraries) in respect of
like that

which things are capable of

other thing.^
'

The

senses of unlike
'

are opposite to

those of

like

'.

CHAPTER X
opposite is applied to contradictories, and and relative terms, and privation and possession, and the extremes from which and into which generation and dissolution take place ^ and the attributes that cannot be present at the same time in that which is receptive of both, are
*
'

The term

20

contraries,

said to be opposed,

either
is

themselves or their constituents.

to the

Grey and white colour do not belong at the same time same thing therefore their constituents are opposed.^
;

The term

'contrary'

applied (i) to those attributes that

25

which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject, (2) to the most different of the things in the same genus, (3) to the most different of the attributes in the same receptive material, (4) to the most different of the things that fall under the same faculty, (5) to the things whose difference is greatest cither absolutely or in genus or in species. The
differ in genus,

30

other things that are called contrary are. so called,

cause they possess contraries of the above kind,

some besome because

they are receptive of such, some because they are productive

of or susceptible to such, or are producing or suffering them, or
are losses or acquisitions, or possessions or privations, of such.

Since

'

one

'

and

'

being

'

have

many

senses, the other concepts 35

' '

which are derived from these, and therefore same ', other ', ind 'contrary', must correspond, so that they must be
different for

each category.
'

The term
Deing of the

other in species

'

is

applied to things which

to the

1018*'

same genus are not subordinate the one

lard
*

attributes are hot and cold, wet and dry, rough and smooth, white and black, sweet and bitter. The more important )airs of contraries, in Aristotle's view, are the first two.
soft,

Such and

The extremes meant may be

and form
(actuality).

(i)

being and not being, or

(2)

matter

potentiality)

' cannot say grey and white are opposed, but uents of grey (black and white) are opposed.

We

we say

the consti-

IOI8''

METAPHYSICA
other, or
;

which being in the same genus have a difference,^ or which have a contrariety in their substance and contraries are other than one another in species (either all contraries 5 or those which are so called in the primary sense ^), and so are those things whose formulae differ in the infima species of the genus (e. g. man and horse are indivisible in genus, but their formulae are different), or which being in the same substance have a difference.^ The same in species has the various meanings opposite to these.
'

'

CHAPTER
The words
'prior'
lo

XI

and 'posterior' are applied (i) to somel things (on the assumption that there is a first, i. e. a beginning, in each class) because they are nearer some beginning determined either absolutely and by nature, or by reference to something or in some place or by certain people, e. g,
things are prior in place because they are nearer either to

15

some place determined by nature, e.g. the middle or the last place, or to some chance object and that which is further is posterior. Other things are prior in time some in the by being further from the present, e. case of past events (for the Trojan war is prior to the Persian, because it is further from the present), others by being nearer the
; ;

i.

present,

i.

e.

in

the case of future events

(for

the

Nemean

20

games are prior to the Pythian, if we treat the present as beginning and first point, because they are nearer the present). Other things are prior in movement for the things that

* This definition is wider than the previous one, since it includes species subordinate one to the other. ^ Cf. 1018* 25-31 in distinction from 31-35. ^ No satisfactory explanation of this clause has been proposed. Alexander suggests that Aristotle may mean that individuals with the same specific essence differ in individual essence but in ordinary language (which alone Aristotle is examining in A) these would not be called 6Tepa iihiu He also suggests that the reference may be to bodies such as earth and water which are trfpa ctSei without being contrary like fire and water but these could hardly be said to be iv rfj avrrj ova-la. Asclepius suggests more plausibly that the reference may be to different elements in the essence of complex substances, e.g. to heat and cold in the essence of man. Cf. vovs and lua-drjais in the human soul. Aquinas thinks the reference is to attributes in the same substance.
; ;


A.
are nearer the
first

BOOK V
prior
(e. g.

1018''

mover are
;

the boy

is

prior to the

and the prime mover also is a beginning absolutely. Others are prior in power for that which exceeds in power, the more powerful, is prior and such is that according i. e. must follow, so e. the posterior to whose will the other that if the prior does not set it in motion the other does not move, and if it sets it in motion it does move and here will is a beginning. Others are prior in arrangement these are

man)

i.

25

[the

things that are placed at certain intervals in reference to

e. g.

isome one definite thing according to rule,

in the

chorus the

second

man

is

prior to the third,

is

and

in the lyre the second-

owest string

prior to the lowest; for in the one case the

is

leader and in the other the middle string

the beginning.

These, then, are called prior

sense that which
Drior
;

in this sense,
is

but

(2) in

another

33

is

prior for

knowledge

treated as absolutely

of these,

the things that are prior in formula are

in

lifferent

from those that are prior

also
'

perception.

For

in

ormula universals are

n formula
musical
IS
'

prior, in perception individuals.

And
exist 35

the

accident

is

prior

to

the whole, e.g.

to

musical

man

',

for

the formula cannot

a whole without the part

is

yet musicalness cannot exist

musical.
called prior,
is

mless there
(3)

some one who

is

The

attributes of
is

prior things are

;

e. g.

traightness

prior to smoothness

for

one

an attribute of
in
e.

line as such,

and the other of a

surface.

Some

things then are called prior and

posterior
i.

this 1019^

ense, others (4) in respect of nature

and substance,
If

those

;hich can be without other things, while the others cannot be

/ithout them,

a distinction which Plato used.^

'

we
is

consider
prior (so
5

he various senses of
aat substance
is

being
;

',-

firstly

the subject

prior)

secondly, according as potency or

ctuality

is

taken into account, different things are prior, for

prior in respect of potency, others in respect
in
e. g.

Dme things are

f

actuality,

potency the half

line

is

prior

to the

hole line and the part to the whole and the matter to the

Dncrete substance, but in actuality these are posterior

^
I

for

1019* 4 read (xpifaaro. Cf. Tzmaeus 34 B, c. Or the reference may be the Platonic Aimpeo-fis. Cf. Divisiones Aristoteleae, ed. Mutschmann,
xvii, xviii.

3.
2

Cf. ch. 7.
AE. MET.

1019^
10 it is

METAPHYSICA
only

when

the whole

is

dissolved
all

that they will exist

in actuality.

In a sense, therefore,

things that are called

this fourth

prior

and posterior are so called according to

;

sense

for

some things can

e. g.

exist without others in respect of

generation, e.g. the whole without the parts, and others in

respect of dissolution,

the part without the whole.

And

the same

is

true in all other cases.

CHAPTER
15
is
'

XII

Potency' means
in

(i)

a source of

another thing than the thing

e. g.

movement moved
is

or change, which or in the same,

is

thing qua other,

the art of building

a potency which
is

not in the thing built, while the art of healing, which

potency, might be
'

in

the

man healed, but

the
s ource,

not in him qua healed.

of change or

Pot ency

'

then
in

mean s

in general,

movemen t
and
20 or

another thing o r

in

also the source of a thing's; hpinpr moy^r^

itself

the same thing qua other, hy annthpr thing

qua other. For in virtue of that principle, in which the patient suffers anything, we call it capable of suffering and this we do sometimes if it suffers anything at all, sometimes not in respect of everything it suffers, but only if it suffers a change for the better. (2) The

by

virtue
'

of
'

capacity of performing this well or according to intention

for

sometimes we say of those who merely can walk or

speal^
01

35

but not well or not as they intend, that they cannot speak
walk.

case of p assiv ity is similar. (3) The states ir virtue of which things are absolutely impassive or unchange

The

30

changed for the worse, are called potencies broken and crushed and bent and in genera destroyed not by having a potency but by not having one anc by lacking something, and things are impassive with respec
able, or not easily
for things are

to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affectec by them, because of a potency and because they can d something and are in some positive state.
*

'

'

'

As 'potency
in

'

has so

many

meanings, the 'potent' or 'capable

one sense

will

mean
'

that which can begin a

movemen

(or a

change
is

in general, for
'

even that which can bring thing

to rest

potent

thing) in another thing or in itself qu


^.

'

BOOK V

1019*
35
1019*^

and in one sense that over which something else has such a potency and in one sense that which has a potency of changing into something, whether for the worse or for the better (for even that which perishes is thought to be capable of perishing, for it would not have perished if it had not been
other
; ;
'

capable of
position

it

but, as a matter of fact,

it

has a certain dis;

and cause and principle which fits it to suffer this sometimes it is thought to be of this sort because it has some- 5 thing, sometimes because it is deprived of something but if privation is in a sense having or habit ', everything will be
;
'

'

'

by having something, so that things are capable both by having a positive habit aji d princi ple, and by having the [privation of Jhe^j>ositive_grincipleiilflt_js^ to have^ 1 privation and if privation is not in a sense habit', capable s used in two distinct senses ^) and a thing is capable in mother sense because neither any other thing, nor itself qua
[capable
*
;
'

<r^

10

)ther,
ill

has a potency or principle which can destroy

it.

Again,

these are capable either merely because the thing might

it

:hance to happen or not to happen, or because

veil.
'.

might do so

This sort of potency

in

is

found also in

lifeless things,

g.

speak
las

for we say one lyre can be made to and another cannot be made to speak at all, if it not a good tone.

instruments

'

',

'

Incapacity
s

is

privation of capacity

has been described

either

i.

e,

of such a principle
case of

15

in general or in the

omething that would naturally have the capacity, or even t the time when for it would naturally already have it le senses in which we should call a boy and a man and a unuch incapable of begetting are distinct. Again, to either
;

ind of capacity there

an opposite incapacity both to that hich only can produce movement and to that which can
is
it

20

roduce

well.

Some
f

things, then, are called ahvvaTa in virtue of this kind

i.

incapacity, while others are so in another sense,

e.

in

lat in

which we couple hvvaTov and ahvvaTov?

7

The
^PXV"

impossible
*'<'^'

IOI9
I

read

eu;

Ti,

ware rw

re

fX****

''I'*'

'"""'^

*"'

fii'i'aroj'

TO* f X*'*' ^'Z"

TovTov

aT(pt]<Tiv, ft

fv8(XfTai fxav artprjaiv'

d di

fit],

ofuovvfiai.

1)

perhaps Alexander.
ioi9*> 22 retain olov.
'

J*

Aristotle passes
'

now

to bvt/arov

and dbvvaroy

in

e sense of

possible

'

and impossible

'.

loig"
is

METAPHYSICA
that of which the contrary
is
is

of necessity true,

e. g.

that
is

the diagonal of a square

25

commensurate with the

is
it

side

impossible, because such a statement

a falsity such that not

only

is

the contrary true but

;

is

necessary that the diagonal

it

should be incommensurate
the possible,
is false, e. g.

that

is

commensurate, then,

is

not only false but of necessity

is

false.

The
is

contrary of

this,

found when

it is

not necessary that the contrary

possible
;

that a
is

man

should be seated
false.

for that

30

he
in

is

not seated

not of necessity
said,

The possible, then

is

one sense, as has been

;

means that which

is
'

not

ol

'

necessity false
is

in one, that

which
'

true
'

in one, that
'

which

capable of being true.

so called
'

potency or power

in

geometry
'

is

by a change of meaning.
'

These senses of

capable

36 or

possible

involve no reference to potency.

But the senses

which involve a reference to potency all refer to the one primary 1020^ kind of potency and this is a source of change in another thing
;

or in the same thing qua other.

'

For other things are

else has
it

callec

capable

',

some because something

it

such a potency
has
it
ir

over them, some because

has not, some because

is

a particular way.
incapable.
5

The same
be
'

true of the things that

an

Therefore the proper definition of the primar}

will

kind of potency
in

a source of change in another thing o

'.
j

the same thing qua other

CHAPTER
'

XIII.
divisible into
'

Quantity' means that which

is
is

is

two or mor
a this
'

constituent parts of which each

by nature a 'one and

is

A quantity
10

a plurality
'

if it is

numerable, a magnitude
rnagnitude

if it^

measurab le.
tially into

Plurality'

means that which

'

divisible poter
'

non-continuous parts,
;

that which

divisible into continuous parts

in magTiltude, that

which

continuous in one dimension

depth.
is

is

length, in
is

Of

these, limited plurality

two breadth, in thrc number, limited lengt

in virtue of
is

breadth a surface, depth a solid. Again, some things are called quantities
line,

the

15

own nature, others its own nature, the

^

incidentally, e.g. the line

a quantity h

musical

is
is

one incidentally.
to squares

Of the thim

The reference

and cubes.

; ;

-i.

BOOK V
own nature some
'

I020*
are so as sub-

that are quantities

stances,
e. g.
'

by

their
is

the h'ne

a quantity (for

a certain kind of
it is),

quantity

is

present ^ in the formula which states what

and

others are modifications and states of this kind of substance, 20

e. g.

much and

little,

long and short, broad and narrow, deep

and shallow, heavy and light, and the other terms of the And also great and small, and greater and smaller, sort. both in themselves and when taken relatively to each other,

by their own nature attributes of quantity but these names are transferred to other things also. Of things that are quantities incidentally, some are so called in the sense in which musical and white were quantities, viz. it was said that because that to which they belong is a quantity, and some are quantities in the way in which movement and time are so
are
;
'

25

'

'

'

for

these are called quantities and continuous because the 33

I

ihings of which these are attributes are divisible.

hat which

is

moved, but the space through which

is is

it is

mean not moved

;

or because that

a quantity

movement
is

also

is

a quantity,

md

because this

a quantity time

so.

CHAPTER XIV
'Quality' means
s

(i)

the differentia of the essence, e.g.

is

man
is

an animal of a certain quality because he

is

two-footed, and
circle

he horse

so because

it

is

four-footed
it is

and a

a 55
1020''

igure of particular quality because

r

without angles,

hows that the essential me meaning of quality

nother sense in which
tiathematics
i

differentia

is

a quality.

This, then,

which
is is

essential

differentia, but (2) there

it

applies to the unmovable objects of

e.

the numbers have a certain quality, e.g. the

in

omposite numbers which are not

f

one dimension only, but

5

which the plane and the solid are copies (these are those :tl.hich have two or three factors) and in general that which
;

i[

xists in the essence of

3r

numbers besides quantity is quality what it is once, e. g. that of 6 is not 'hat it is twice or thrice, but what it is once for 6 is once 6. in motion All the attributes of substances (e. g. heat and (3) Did, whiteness and blackness, heaviness and lightness, and the
the essence of each
is
;
'

i^

1020* 19 read noaov

ri vrrdpxfi.

o"

METAPHYSICA
others of the sort), in virtue of which,

when they change,

bodies are said to

alter.

(4)

Quality in respect of virtue and

vice and, in general, of evil

and good.

Quality, then, seems to have practically two meanings, and

one of these
for
it

is

the more proper.

The

pr ima ry quality
in

is

the

15 essential differentia,
is

and of this the quality

in

numbers

is

a part

a differentia of essences, but either not of things in

motion or not of them qua

differentiae of

motion.

Secondly, there are

the modifications of things in motion qua in motion, and the

movements.
for

Virtue and vice

fall

among

these

modifications
20 or activity,

they indicate differentiae of the movement

in

according to which the things

;

motion act or are

25

which can be moved or act in acted on one way is good, and that which can do so in another the contrary way is vicious. Good and evil indicate quality especially in living things, and among these especially in those which have purpose.
well or badly
for that

CHAPTER XV
Things are relative (i) as double to half and treble to a third and in general that which contains something else many time; to that which is contained many times in something else, anc that which exceeds to that which is exceeded (2) as tha' which can heat to that which can be heated, and that whicl can cut to that which can be cut, and in general the activ( to the passive (3) as the measured to the measure and th( known to knowledge and the perceived to perception.
;

30

(i)

Relative terms of the

first

kind are numerically

relatec
t(

either indefinitely or definitely, either to various

I,

numbers or

e.g. the double

is
'

is

in

that which
1021^ tion to

many

a definite numerical relation to i, an( times as great is in a numerical, bu

'

not in a definite, relation to

it
;

i, i.e.

not
is

in this

or in that rela
t

the relation of that which

is

| of something else

that something that which

is

a definite numerical relation to a

number

+
71

times something else

is

in

an indefinite relation to that some

A.
thing, as that which
relation to
i
;

BOOK V
as great
'

loai*
in

is

'

many times

is

an indefinite

the relation of that which exceeds to that which

;

is exceeded is numerically quite indefinite for number is always commensurate, but this relation may involve a non'

commensurate number for that which exceeds is, in relawhich is exceeded, so much and something more and this something is indefinite for it can, indifferently, be
'

tion to that

either equal or not equal to that

which

is

exceeded.

All these

and are determinations of number, and so in another way are the equal and the like and the same, for all refer to unity. Those things are the same 10 whose substance is one those are like whose quality is one those are equal whose quantity is one and i is the beginning and measure of number, so that all these relations imply number, though not in the same way. (2) T he active and the pa ssive imply an active and a passive 15 potency and the actualizationof the potencies, e.g. that which is capable of heating is related to that which is capable of being heated, because it can heat it, and, again, that which heats is related to that which is heated and that which cuts to that which is cut, because they actually do these things. But mnnerical relations are not actualized except in the sense which
relations are numerically expressed
;

has been elsewhere

stated

actualizations in the sense of 30

movement they have not. Of relations which imply potency some 2 further imply particular periods of time, e.g. that which has made is relative to that which has been made and that which will make to that which will be made. For
it

is

in

this

way

that a father

is

called father of his son

one has acted, and the other has been acted on in a certain way.^ Further, some relative terms imply privaHon of potency, i.e. 'incapable' and terms of this sort, e.g.
for the
'

25

invisible

'.

Relative terms which imply

all relative

number or potency, therefore,

in its

are

because their very essence includes

else,

nature
is

a reference to something
^

not because something else

Cf. e.

1051a 50.

1021* 22 read Xeyoi^ai (nw) TrpJ? T<. So perhaps Alexander. ' i.e. there need not be ^.ny present relation to justify the use of the relative form of words there is always the past relation.
*
;

1021^

METAPHYSICA
referred to it\ but (3) that which

30

thought
to
it.

is

called relative because

'

is measured or known or something else is referred

'

For that which

exists,

is

thought
is

implies that the thought

'

of

it

but the thought

'

not relative to

that of which

it is

the thought

for

we should
is
'

then have said the same

true

thing twice.
1021''
*

Similarly sight
it is

the sight of something, not

of that of which
;

the sight
is

(though of course

it

is

to say this)

in fact

it

relative to colour or to

else of the sort.

But according to the other way

the same thing would be said twice,

something of speaking

'

it is

the sight of that

which is the object of sight' Things that are by their own nature called relative are called so sometimes in these senses, sometimes because the classes that 5 include them are of this sort, e.g. medicine is a relative term because its genus, science, is thought to be a relative term. Further, there are the properties in virtue of which the things that have them are called relative, e.g. equality is relative
because the equal
things are relative
is,

and likeness because the

accident, e.g. a

like

is.

Other

by

man

is

relative because

10

he happens to be double of something and double is a relative term or the white is relative, if the same thing happens to be
;

double and white.

CHAPTER XVI
'The complete
sible to find
'

means
is is

(i) that

outside which
it,

it is

not pos-

even one of the parts proper to

that outside which

e.g. the

complete
in
its

time of each thing

15 find

it is

not possible to

any time which

e. g.

a part proper to

it.

(2)

That which
is

respect of excellence and goodness cannot be excelled in

kind,

a doctor

is

complete and a flute-player

complete,

when they
lence.

lack nothing in respect of their proper kind of excel-

And
call

thus

we transfer
i.

the word to bad things, and speak

of a complete scandal-monger and a complete thief; indeed

we even
30

them good^

e.

a good thief and a good scandala completion

is
it
;

monger.

And

excellence

is

for

each thing

is

complete and every substance its proper kind of excellence

magnitude.

complete,

when

in respect of
its

lacks no part of

natural

(3)

The

things which have attained a good end

A.

BOOK V
complete
in

1021'=

arc

called complete

for things are

virtue of
is

something ultimate, we transfer the word to bad things and say a thing has been completely spoilt, and completely destroyed, when it in no wise falls short of destruction and badness, but is This is why death is by a figure of speech at its last point. called the end, because both are last things. The ultimate purpose is also an end. Things, then, that are called complete
having attained their end.
Therefore, since the end

25

30

in virtue of their

man nature

are so called in

all

these senses,

some because they lack nothing in respect of goodness and cannot be excelled and no part proper to them can be found
outside, others in general because they cannot be
in their several classes

exceeded
outside
;

and no part proper to them

first

is

1022^

the otJiers are so called in virtue of these

two kinds,

because they either

are adapted to
it

or in

make or have something some way or other are

of the sort or
referred to the

things that are called complete in the primary sense.

CHAPTER XVII
'

Limit

'

means the

last point of

each thing,

i.e.

the

first
5

point beyond which

first

it is

not possible to find any part, and the

is
;

point within which every part

it

it is

applied to the form,

magnitude or of a thing that has magnitude, and to the end of each thing (and of this nature is that towards which the movement and the action are not that from which they are, though sometimes it is both, that from which and that to which the movement is and the final cause), a nd to the substance of each thing, and the essenc e of each for this is the limit of knowledge and if of knowledge,
whatever
be, of a spatial

may

'

10

of the thing also.

Evidently, therefore,
',

'

limit

has as

many
is

senses as

'

beginning

and yet more

is

for the

beginning

a limit, but not every limit

a beginning.

CHAPTER
'

XVIII

That

in virtue

of which

'

has several meanings, (i) the form

jjior is

substance of each thing, e.g. that in virtue of which a

man

15

good

is

the good
'

itself,^

(2) the proximate subject in which

ni'ro ayaQuv.

02c* 15 read KaQo oya^of,

'

1022^

METAPHYSICA
an attribute
is

naturally found, e.g. colour in a surface.

then, in

'

That

in virtue of which,'

the primary sense

is

the form, and

in a

substratum of each. In general

20

secondary sense the matter of each thing and the proximate that in virtue of which will
' '

for we say same number of senses as cause or for what end has he in virtue of what has he come ? come ? and in virtue of what has he inferred wrongly, or inferred at all ? or what is the cause of the inference, or of the wrong inference ? Further (3) kuOo is used in reference

be found
'

in the

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

which he stands or in which he walks for all such phrases indicate place and position. Therefore* in virtue of itself must have several meanings.
to position,
e. g.
'

in

'

'

'

25 It

applies to (1) the essence of each thing, e.g. Calliasis in virtue

;

of himself Callias and the essence of Callias

(2)

whatever

is

present in the

'

what

',

e. g.

Callias

is

in virtue of

himself an

animal. For 'animal'

Callias
is

is

present in the formula that defines

him

a particular animal.

(3)

Whatever

attribute a thing

30 receives in itself directly or in

is

one of its parts, e. g. a surface and a man is alive in virtue of himself for the soul, in which life directly resides, is a part of the man. (4) That which has no cause other than itself; man has more than one cause animal, two-footed but man
white in virtue of
;

itself,

35 is

man

in virtue of himself.

(5)

Whatever

attributes belong

to a thing alone

and

(^ua alone

hence also that which exists

separately

is

'in virtue of itself.

CHAPTER XIX
1022*'
'

Disposition

'

means the arrangement of

that which has

;

parts, in respect either

of place or of potency or of kind

for

there must be a certain position, as the

word

'

disposition

shows.

CHAPTER XX
5

had

Having ^ means (i) a kind of activity of the haver and the something like an action or movement. When one thing makes and one is made, between them there is a making so
' '

Aristotle here mentions the original local sense of Kn66.

'

No

English
state'.

word or phrase has quite the same ambiguity. ^ The word e,^ir does duty for having habit,' and permanent
',
*

'

'

A.

BOOK V

I022*

too between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is a having. This sort of having, then, evidently we cannot have for the process will go on to infinity, if we can have the having of what we have. (2) Having' or 'habit'
;

'

10

means a
is

disposition according to which that which

ill

is

disposed

either well or

disposed, either in itself or with reference to

health
is

something
position.

else, e.g.

a 'habit'; for
'

it

is
is

such a dis-

(3) We speak
;

of a

habit

'

if

there

a portion of
is

such a disposition
a
'

therefore the excellence of the parts

habit

'.

CHAPTER XXI
'Affection' means (i) a quality in respect of which a thing
15

can be altered,

e. g.

white and black, sweet and

all

bitter, heavi-

ness and lightness, and

actualized alterations.

others of the kind.

(2)

The already
and
20

(3)

Especially, injurious alterations

painful injuries.

movements, and, above

pleasant or painful
'

all,

(4) Experiences

when on a large

scale are called affections.

CHAPTER XXH
of ' privation (i) if something has not one of the which a thing might naturally have, even if this thing itself would not naturally have it, e. g. a plant is said to be 'deprived' of eyes. (2) If, though either the thing itself or its genus would naturally have an attribute, it has it not. 35 e. g. a blind man and a mole are in different senses deprived
'

We speak

attributes

'

of sight

the latter in contrast with

its

genus,- the former in

If, though it would would naturally have it, it has it not; for blindness is a privation, but one is not 'blind' at any and every age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one would naturally have it. Similarly a thing suffers

contrast with his

own normal

nature.

(3)

naturally have the attribute, and

when

it

privation

when

it

has not an attribute

in

those circumstances,

or

in that respect

and

in that relation

and

in that sense, in

'

1022**
i.

20 read rav
'.

v^ivtv

ca

\vTn)p5tv.
'

e.

'

quadruped

1022''

30 read eV a ar

7.


1022''

METAPHYSICA
which
it

would naturally have

is

it.

(4)

The

violent taking

away
?

of anything

called privation.

There are just as many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative prefixes or affixes for a thing is called unequal because it has not equality though it would naturally have it, and invisible either because it has no colour at all or 35 because it has a poor colour, and footless either because it has no feet at all or because it has imperfect feet. Again, a privative term may be used because the thing has little of the 1023^ attribute (and this means having it in a sense imperfectly), e.g.
;
'

kernelless
call

'

or because

it

has

it

not easily or not well

if
it

(e.

g.

we

a thing indivisible not only

if it

cannot be divided
;

cannot be easily or well divided) or because it has not the attribute at all for it is not the one-eyed man
but also
;

but he
is
is

who

is

sightless in both eyes that

is

called blind.

This

why

not every

man

is

good or bad,

just or unjust, but there

also an intermediate state.

chaptp:r XXIII
To
10

'have' or 'hold' means

many

things,

(i)

To

treat

a thing according to one's

own
is

nature or according to one's

own
(2)
is

impulse, so that fever

said to have a

man, and tyrants

to have their cities, and people to have the clothes they wear.

15

which a thing is present as in something receptive have the thing, e. g. the bronze has the form of the statue, and the body has the disease. (3) As that which contains holds that which is contained for a thing is said to be held by that in which it is contained, e.g. we say that the
in

That

said to

and the city holds men and the ship and so too that the whole holds the parts. (4) That which hinders a thing from moving or acting according to its
vessel holds the liquid
sailors
;

own impulse
20

is

said to hold

it,

as pillars hold the

incumbent

weights, and as the poets

make Atlas

hold the heavens, im-

plying that otherwise they would collapse on the earth, as some of the natural philosophers also say. In this way that which
holds things together
together, since they
to
its
is

said

to hold

the things

it

holds

would otherwise separate, each according

own

impulse.

A.

BOOK V
'.

1023^

Being
to
'

in

holding

something has similar and corresponding meanor having

'

'

'

25

CHAPTER XXIV
To come from something' means
(i)

to

come from somee. g.

thing as from matter, and this in two senses, either in respect

of the highest genus or in respect of the lowest species,
in a sense all things that in a sense the statue
first

can be melted come from water, but

moving

principle,

comes from bronze. (2) As from the e. g. the fight comes from abusive
is

30

language,' because this

the source of the fight.

shape, as the parts

(3)

From
the

the

compound of matter and

come from

whole and the verse from the /Had and the stones from the house; (the stones are to the house as part to whole,) for arrangement as a house is their end, and only that which
attains an
'

35

e. g.

man
is

end from

is
'

complete.

(4)
'

As

the form from

its
'

part,
;

two-footed

and

syllable

from

'

letter

for

this

a different sense from that in which the statue comes 1023''

;

from bronze
the form.

for the

sensible matter, but the

composite substance comes from the form also comes from the matter of

These, then, are some of the

meanings of 'coming

from something', but sometimes (5) one of these senses is applicable only to part of a whole, e. g. the child comes from its father and mother and plants come from the earth, because
they come from a part of those things.
after a thing in time,
e.

(6) It

means coming

g.

night comes from day and storm

from

fine weather,

these things

because the one comes after the other. Of some are so described because they admit of
;

change into one another, as in the cases now mentioned some merely because they are successive in time, e. g. the voyage took place from the equinox, because it took place
' '

10

after the equinox,

and the Thargelia come from the Dionysia,

' '

because after the Dionysia.

CHAPTER XXV
'

Part

'

means
;

that into which a quantity can in

any way

be divided

for
*

that

which

is

taken from a quantity gua

t)

1023* 30 read olov

r^r XoiSopias

ftaxfl*

'

1023^

METAPHYSICA
quantity
is

15

a sense a part of three.

sense, only those

always called a part of it, e. g. two is called in (3) It means, of the parts in the first

which measure the whole this is why two, though in one sense it is, in another is not, apart of three. (3) The elements into which the kind might be divided apart from
;

the quantity, are also called parts of

it;

for
(4)

which reason

we say
into
'

the species are parts of the genus.

The elements

20

the which the whole is divided, or of which it consists whole meaning either the form or that which has the form e. g. of the bronze sphere or of the bronze cube both the bronze i. e. the matter in which the form is and the
'

characteristic

angle

are

parts.

(5)

The elements

in
;

the
this
in

formula which explains a thing are parts of the whole

is

why

the

genus

is

called a part of the species,

is

though

25

another sense the species

part of the genus.

CHAPTER XXVI
J

'A
the

whole' means
of

(i)

that from which

is

absent none of

30

which it is said to be naturally a whole,! and (2) that which so contains the things it contains that they form a unity and this in two senses either as each and all one, or as making up the unity between them. For (a) that which is true of a whole class and is said to hold good as a whole (which implies that it is a kind of whole) is true of a whole in the sense that it contains many things by being
parts
;

predicated of each, and that each and

horse, god, are one, because
all

all

of them,

e. g.

man,
the

are living things.

But

(d)

continuous and limited

is

a whole,
it,

when
even

there
if

is

a unity con-

sisting of several parts present in

especially
if

only potentially,^ but, failing

actually.

this,

they are present they are present

Of these things themselves, those which are so by nature are wholes in a higher degree than those which are so
by
art, as

35

we

said

in the case of unity also,

wholeness being

in fact

a sort of oneness.

1024^

Again, as quantities have a beginning and a middle and an

end, those to which the position does not
are called totals,
^
i.

make a
^

difference

and those to which

it

does, wholes,

and those
1016*
4.

e. if

they are only distinguishable, not distinct.

Cf.

A.

BOOK V

1024^

which admit of both descriptions are both wholes and totals. These are the things whose nature remains the same after
I

transposition, but

whose form does

not, e.g.
;

wax

or a coat

they are called both wholes and totals

characteristics.
*

for

they have both

Water and all liquids and number are called totals, but the whole number or the whole water one does not speak of, except by an extension of meaning. To things,
'

'

'

which qua one the term total is applied, the term all is applied when they are treated as separate 'this total number/
to
'
' ' '

10

all

these units.'

CHAPTER XXVH
It is
'

not any chance quantitative thing that can be said to

'

be mutilated
is

it
'

not

'

mutilated

must be both divisible and a whole. For two if one of the two ones is taken away (for the

removed by mutilation is never equal to the remainder), for it is also necesis any number thus mutilated sary that the essence remain if a cup is mutilated, it must still be a cup but the number is no longer the same. Further,
part

nor in general

15

even
can

if

things consist of unlike parts, not even these things

all

be said to be mutilated,
e.

for in a sense a

number has

two and three. But in general of the things to which their position makes no difference, e, g. water or fire, none can be mutilated to be mutilated, things must be such Again, as in virtue of their essence have a certain position. they must be continuous for a musical scale consists of unlike parts ^ and has position, but cannot become mutilated.
unlike parts,
g.
;

20

Besides, not even the things that are wholes are mutilated

by

the privation of
neither those

any part. For the parts removed must be which determine the essence nor any chance parts, irrespective of their position e. g. a cup is not mutilated if it is bored through but only if the handle or a projecting part is removed. And a man is mutilated not if the flesh or the 5pleen is removed, but if an extremity is, and that not every extremity but one which when completely removed cannot
; ;

25

jrow again.

Therefore baldness
'

is

not a mutilation.

1024** 21

read <|

di'o/ioi'wj-.

1024^

METAPHYSICA

CHAPTER XXVIII
The term
30
'

race

'

or

'

genus

'

is

used

(i) if

there

is

continuous
e. g.
'

generation of things which have the same form,

the
race of

while
of

men

lasts

'

means

'

while

the

generation

them goes on continuously'.

(2) It

brought things into existence

for so

means that which first some are called Hellenes

by race and others lonians, because the former proceed from Hellen and the latter from Ion as their first begetter. And the word is used in reference to the begetter more than to
35

the matter, though people also get a race-name from the

female,
e.

g.

'

the descendants
'

of

Pyrrha.'
'

(3)

There
is

is

1024^ genus in the sense in which

figures

plane

is

the genus of plane

in the

and

'

solid

'

of solids

for

each of the figures

one case a plane of such and such a kind, and in the other and this is what underlies the differentiae. Again, in formulae their first constituent element, which is included in the essence, is the genus, whose differentiae the qualities are said to be. Genus then is used
a solid of such and such a kind
;

'

'

in all these

ways,

(1) in reference to

continuous generation of
first

the same kind, (3) in reference to the the same kind as the things it moves,
''

mover which
matter
;

is

of

(3) as
is

for that)

to which the differentia or quality belongs

the substratum,

which we
10

call matter.

whose ultimate and which are not analysed the one into the other nor both into the same thing (e.g. form anc matter are different in genus) and things which belong to
said to be
'

Those things are

is

other in genus

'

substratum

different,

different categories of being

for

some

of the things that are

said to
15

'

be

'

signify essence, others a quality, others the other

categories

we have

before distinguished

^
;

these also are not

analysed either into one another or into some one thing.

CHAPTER XXIX
'

The

false

'

means
is

(1)

that which

is

false as

a thing, and that

{a)

because

it

hot put together or cannot be put together.

^ Aristotle thinks that the male supplies the efficient and the formal the female the material cause of generation. ^ 1017* 24.

A.
^.
'

BOOK V
is
'

io24'

commensurate with the one of these is false always, and the other sometimes it is in these two senses that they are non-existent, (d) There are things which exist, but whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they are or to be things that do not exist, e. g. a sketch or a dream for these are something, but are not the things the appearance of which they produce in us. We call things
that the diagonal of a square
side
'

or

'

that

you are

sitting

for

20

false

in

this

way, then,

either

because they themselves do

-5

not exist, or because the appearance which results from them

is

that of something that does not exist.

(2)

false conception is
it

the conception

of non-existent
is
it

objects, in so far as
false
is

is

false.

Hence every conception

is false

when applied

to something other than that of which

true, e. g. the

conception of a circle
In a sense there
its
is

when applied

to a triangle.
thing,
i.

one conception of each

itself

e.

the conception of

essence, but in a sense there 30

are
in

many, since the thing

a certain

itself

and the thing

modified

somehow the same, e.g. Socrates and musical Socrates. The false conception is not the conception of anything, except in a qualified sense. Hence Antisthenes foolishly claimed that nothing could be described except by its own conception, one predicate to one subject from which it
are
;

way

followed that there could be no contradiction, and almost that

there could be no error.

But

it

is

possible to describe each 35

thing not only

by

its

own

conception, but also

by

that of

something
but
in

else.

This
it

some ways

may be done may be done

altogether falsely indeed,

truly, e. g. eight

may

be

described as a double
of two.

number by the use of the conception

These
a
false

things, then, are called false in these senses, but (3) 1025*
is

man
is

one who
at

is

ready at and fond of such concep-

tions,

not for any other reason but for their

own

sake,

and
5

one who

good
This

impressing such conceptions on other

things are false, which produce a false

people, just as

we say
is

appearance.

w hy the proof
is
(i.

in the

Hippias
it

'

that the

same man
he
is

is false

and true

misleading.
e.

For

assumes that
is

false

who can
'

deceive

the

man who knows and

Hippias Minor 373 C seqq.

io25^
wise)
10 is

METAPHYSICA
;

and further that he who

;

is

willmgly bad

is

better.

This
is

a false result of induction

for a

man who
;

limps willingly
'
'

better than one

'

who does

so unwillingly
',

means mimicking a limp

willingly,

for if

by Hmping Plato the man were actually lame

in this case as in the

he would perhaps be worse corresponding case of moral character.

CHAPTER XXX
f

'Accident' means that which attaches to something and

can be
e. g.
if t ruly

15

ass erted, but neither of necessity nor usually,

one

in

digging a hole for a plant found treasure.

This

the

finding of treasure
digs the hole
;

happens

man who

for neither docs the

by accident to the one come of

if

necessity from the other or after the other, nor,

man

plants,

30

does he usually find treasure. And a musical man might but since this does not happen of necessity nor be white
;

usually,

we

attributes

attach in

call it an accident. Therefore since there arej and they attach to a subject, and some of them a particular place and at a particular time, whatever;
it

attaches to a subject, but not because

this

is

this subject,

ati

25

30
,

be an accident. Therefore there is no definite cause for an accident, but a chance cause, an indefinite one. Going to Aegina was an accident,^ if i, e. the man went not in order to get there, but because he was; carried out of his way by a storm or captured by pirates. The accident has happened or exists,^ not in virtue of itself, however, but of something else for the storm was the cause of his coming to a place for which he was not sailing, and this was Aegina. Accident has also another meaning, i. e. what attaches to
time or
in

this place, will

'

'

each thing
its

in virtue of itself

but

is

not in

its

essence, as having

angles equal to two right angles attaches to the triangle.

accidents of this sort
is.

And

may

be eternal, but no accident

of the other sort

This

is

explained elsewhere.^

1025'"^

26 read (rwi^t) to
8fj
rj

els A'lyivav e\6(lp.

2
^

1025^^ 28 read
E. 2, 3, K. 8,

(an.
I.

An. Post.

75a

18.

BOOK
We

VI

(E)

CHAPTER
are seeking the principles

and the causes of the things For there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have principles and elements and causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, exact or indeterminate but
that are, and obviously of things qua being.
;

i025*

all

these sciences

mark

off

some

particular being

some genus,
lo

and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat but starting from the essence
;

some
as
a

making

it

plain

to the senses, others

assuming

it

hypothesis

they

then

demonstrate,

more or

less

cogently, the essential

attributes of the genus with

which

they deal.

It

is

obvious, therefore, from such a review of

is

the sciences,^ that there

of the essence, but

no demonstration of substance or
it.

some other way of exhibiting

And
it

15

similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus

with which they deal exists or does

that

not exist, because

it

belongs to the same line of thought to show what

it is.

is

and

And
itself to

since

natural science,

like

other

sciences,

confines
20

one class of beings, i.e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in
itself,

evidently

it

is

neither practical nor productive.

is

For
either

the principle of production

in

the producer

it

is

reason or art or
is

some potency, while the

viz. will,

principle of action
is

in

the doer
is

for that

which

done and that

is 25

which

willed are the same.

Therefore, if_al]_thought

sither^ractical or productive or theoretical, physics

\

must be

theoretical science, but

'

it

will theorize

about such being

Cf. K. 1064- 8
I

1025"
as admits of being

METAPHYSICA
stance which in respect of

moved, and only about that kind of sub its definition is for the most par not separable from matter. Now, we must not fail to notice th( nature of the essence and of its definition, for, without this

30 inquiry is

Of things defined, i. e. of essences, some And these diffe are like 'snub', and some like 'concave'. because snub is bound up with matter (for what is snub
but
idle.
' '

i;

a concave nose), while concavity

matter.

is

independent of perceptible
analogous to the snul
bone, and, in general
flesh,

If then all natural things are

1026^ in their nature e.g. nose, eye, face,

animal

leaf, root,

bark, and, in general, plant (for none o

these can be defined without reference to

movement
it

the)
i.e.

always have matter),

b
'

it is

clear

how we must

seek and define the

belong;
sc

what

'

in the case of natural objects,

and also why

to the student of nature to study soul to

some

extent,

much
then,

of

it

as

is

not independent of matter.

That

physics

10

is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations Mathematics also is theoretical but whether its objects arc immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear it is clear, however, that it considers some mathematical objects qua immovable and qua separable from matter. But something if there is which is eternal and immovable anc separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretica
;

science,

not,

however,

to physics (for

physics

deals

with

15

movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a sciencd prior to both. For physics deals with things which arc! inseparable from matter ^ but not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but probably not separable, but embodied in matter while the first science deals with things which are both separable and immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especertain
;

as appears to us.^

they are the causes of so much of the divine There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call
cially these
;

for

20

theology, since

it is

obvious that

if

the divine

is

present any-

where,
science

it

is

present in things of this sort.

And

the highesi

must deal with the highest genus, so that the theoretica

1

1026'''
i.

e.

14 read axi>pMia. the movements of the heavenly bodies.

E.

BOOK

VI
and
this to the other

I026*

sciences arc superior to the other sciences,

theoretical sciences.

One might
is

indeed raise the question

or deals with

whether
genus,
i.e.

first

philosophy

universal,

one
25

some one kind

all

of being; for not even the mathe-

matical sciences are

alike in this respect,

geometrj' and

astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by
nature, natural science will be the first science
is
;

but

if

there 3

an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior :md must be first philosophy, and universal in this way,
because
it

is

first.

And

it

will
it

belong to
is

this to consider

being qua being

both

what

and the

attributes

which

jelong to

it

qua being.^

CHAPTER
'

II

But since the unqualified term being has several meanngs, of which one was seen - to be the accidental, and another he true (' non-being being the false), while besides these here are the figures of predication, e.g. the what quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which 'being' nay have and again besides all these there is that which is
'
'

35

'

',

'

'

1026'*

)otentially or actually

since
it.

'

being

'

has

many meanings, we
fact
5

nust

first

say regarding the accidental, that there can be

treatment of

10 scientific

This

is

confirmed by the

hat no science
tself

practical, productive, or theoretical

troubles
come
;

about

it.

For on the one hand he who produces a

all
;

lOuse does

not produce

the attributes that

for these are

into

)eing along with the

house

innumerable

the

lOuse that

is

made may be
^
;

pleasant for

some

people, hurtful
it

o somC; and useful to others, and different

to put
And

shortly

from
lot

all

things that are

and the science of building does

attributes.
in the

aim

at producing

any of these

same

10

.ay the geometer does not consider the attributes which

*

With

ch.

I cf.

B.

955b 10-13, 997* 15-25.

Cf. ^. 7.

^ For the point of the last clause cf. 11. 12, The question as to 17, below. le identity or difference of various things was popular with the Sophists.

; '

1026"
attach

METAPHYSICA
thus
to
figures,

nor whether

'

triangle

'

is

different

from 'triangle whose angles are equal to two right angles'.

And
15

happens naturally enough for the accidental is mere name. And therefore Plato ^ was in a sense not wrong in saying that sophistic deals with that which is not. For the arguments of the sophists deal, we may say, above musical e. g. the question whether all with the accidental musical same, whether different or the and are and lettered Coriscus' and Coriscus' are the same, and whether everything
this
;

practically a

'

'

'

'

'

which

doxical conclusion

20

come to be ', with the paraone who was musical has come to be lettered, he must also have been lettered and have come and all the other arguments of this sort to be musical,
is,

but

is

not eternal, has

that
if

the accidental

is

obviously akin to non-being.

:

And

this

of things is clear also from arguments such as the following which are in another sense there is generation and decay, but of things which are accidentally there is not. But still
f

we must,
25

as far as

we

can, say, regarding the accidental,

what
it

is

its

nature and from

what cause

it

proceeds

for
is

will

perhaps at the same time become clear

it.

why

there

no science of
Since,

among

things which are,

some

are

always

in

the

30

and are of necessity (not necessity in the sense but that which means the impossibility of being otherwise), and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the existence of the accidental for that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call accidental. For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry and cold weather, we say
state

same

of compulsion

this

is

an accident, but not

is

latter
35

And

it

if there is sultry heat, because the always or for the most part so, but not the former. is an accident that a man is white (for this is neithei

always nor for the most part so), but it is not by accident thai he is an animal. And that the builder produces health is ar
1027^ accident, because
it is

the nature not of the builder but of the

doctor to do
'^

the builder happened to be a doctor Again, a confectioner, aiming at giving pleasure, may make something wholesome, but not in virtue of the confectioner';
this,
'

but
Cf.

Sophish's 237 A, 254 A.

E.

BOOK

VI

1027^

and therefore we say it was an accident, and while there in which lie makes it, in the full sense he does not make it. For some accidental results sometimes tend to be produced by alien potencies,^ but to others there corresponds no determinate art nor potency for of things which are or
art
is
;

a sense

come

to be

by

accident, the cause also

all

is

accidental.

There-

fore, since

not

things are or

come

to be of necessity

and
10

the majority of things are for the most part, the accidental must exist for instance a white man is not
;

always, but

always nor
happens,
it

for the

most part musical, but since this sometimes must be accidental. If not, everything will be

of necessity.

The

matter, therefore, which

it

is

capable of being

otherwise than as

usually

is, is

the cause of the accidental.

15

And we must
everything
is is
is

take as our starting-point the question whether

either always or for the

most

part.

Surely

this

impossible.
fortuitous

There is, then, besides these something which and accidental. But while the usual exists, can

nothing be said to be always, or are there eternal things ? This must be considered later,^ but that there is no science
of the accidental
is

obvious

for all science

is

is

either of that 20
part.

which

is

always or of that which

is

for the

most
?

For
thing

how

else

one to learn or 16 teach another

The

must be determined as occurring either always or for the most part, e.g. that honey-water is useful for a patient in a fever is true for the most part. But one will not be able to state when that which is contrary to the usual law happens, * for if one can say this, e.g. on the day of new moon on the day of new moon is itself the statement of a universal or a
'
'

'

35

'

usual law but the accidental is contrary to such laws. We have stated, then, what the accidental is and from what cause
;

it

arises,

and that there

is

no science which deals with

it.

CHAPTER

III

That there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible without ever being in course of being genearated or destroyed, is obvious. For otherwise all things will
^

30

1027a

read aXkai.
^

Cf. A. 7.

1027'* 25 Xtyfiv noTf,

otoi vovfiqi'ia.

1027^

METAPHYSICA
be of necessity, since that which is being generated or destroyed must have a cause which is not accidentally its cause. Whether is A to be or not ? It will be if B happens and if And B will be if C happens. And thus if time not, not. is constantly subtracted from a limited extent of time, one This man, then, will die will obviously come to the present. and he will do this if goes out he violence, by disease or if thirsty if something else haphe is thirsty and he will be
;

1027''

pens
or to

and thus we

shall

some past and he thirsty

; ;

event.
will
is

come to that which is now present, For instance, he will go out if he is be thirsty if he is eating something pun:

gent

and

this

either the case or not

so that he will of
similarly
if
;

necessity die, or of necessity not die.

And

one

jumps over to the past, the same account will hold good for is already present in somethis I mean the past condition

({

thing.
sity,

Everything, therefore, that

it

is

to be, will be of neceslives shall

e. g.

is

necessary that he

who

one day die

for already
10

some

link in the series has

in

been forged

e. g.

the

presence of contraries
dies

the same body.

is

But whether he

by

disease or

by

violence,

not yet determined, but

15

depends on the happening of something else. Clearly then the process goes back to a certain starting-point, but this no longer points to something further. This then will be the starting-point for the fortuitous, and will have nothing else as cause of its coming to be. But to what sort of starting-point and what sort of cause we thus refer the fortuitous whether to matter or to the purpose or to the motive power, must be
carefully considered.^
^ The doctrine of the chapter seems to be as follows. Events in general occur as the necessary result of a series of causes. E. g. death is the necessary result of the presence of contrary elements in every living body. But there are certain events which, while beginning a causal nexus, are not the result of a causal nexus. We can never say of them, their conditions are being fulfilled, and they are coming to be.' At one time they are not, and at another time they are. Therefore they come to be, But they never are coming to be. The events A. seems to be thinking o; are those which he would ascribe to free will, e. g. a man's eating pungeni food. Once this is done, his death in some determitiate way is certain till he does it, only his death is certain.
'

'

E.

BOOK

\'I

1027

CHAPTER
Let us dismiss the accidental
its
;

IV

for we have sufficiently But since that which is in the sense of being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination^ and separation, and truth and falsehood together depend on the decision betw^een the two sides of a contradiction (for the true judgement affirms where the subject and predicate really are combined, and denies where they are

determined

nature.

20

^separated, while the false

judgement predicates the contrahow it happens that we think things together or apart by together and apart I mean thinking them so that there is no succession in the thoughts but they become a unity for falsity and truth are not in things it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false but in thought while with regard to simple concepts and essences falsity and truth do not exist even in thought) we must consider later - what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or is not in this sense but since the combination and the separation are in thought and not in the things, and that which is in
dictory of this

it

is

another question,
' ;

'

'

25

30

this sense

is

a different sort of sense (for

are in

the

full
'

from the things that the thought attaches or removes either

'

being

'

the

''

what

or quality or quantity or one of the other cate-

gories), that

which

is

accidentally and that which is in the

sense of being true must be dismissed.

former

is

indeterminate, and that of the latter

For the cause of the is some affec-

and both are related to the remaining 1028* genus of being, and do not indicate any separate class of being. Therefore let these be dismissed, and let us consider *' It causes and the principles of being itself, qua being.
tion of the thought,
s
t

clear in our discussion of the various

'

meanings of terms,^
5

being' has several meanings.

read napa advBtviv.
-

1027'' 19

Cf. 6. lo.

'A.

7.

1027^

METAPHYSICA
be of necessity, since that which
stroyed must have a cause which
is

being generated or deits

;

is

not accidentally

cause.

Whether
not, not.
is

is

to be or not
will

It will
if

be

if

happens
thus

and
if

if

And B

be

happens.

And

time

constantly subtracted from a limited extent of time, one

1027^ will obviously

come

to the present.

This man, then, will die

;

and he will do this if something else haphe is thirsty pens and thus we shall come to that which is now present, For instance, he will go out if he is or to some past event. and he will be thirsty if he is eating something punthirsty gent and this is either the case or not so that he will of And similarly if one necessity die, or of necessity not die. jumps over to the past, the same account will hold good for is already present in somethis I mean the past condition

by

disease or violence, if
;

he goes out and he will be thirsty

if

1!
*

thing.
sity,

Everything, therefore, that

it

is

to be, will be of neceslives shall

e. g.

is

necessary that he
the

who

one day die

for already
10

some

link in the series has

in

been forged

e. g.

the

presence of contraries
dies

same body.
is

But whether he

by

disease or

by

violence,

not yet determined, but

15

depends on the happening of something else. Clearly then the process goes back to a certain starting-point, but this no longer points to something further. This then will be the starting-point for the fortuitous, and will have nothing else as cause of its coming to be. But to what sort of starting-point and what sort of cause we thus refer the fortuitous whether to matter or to the purpose or to the motive power, must be

carefully considered.^

The doctrine of the chapter seems to be as follows. Events in general occur as the necessary result of a series of causes. E. g. death is the necessary result of the presence of contrary elements in eveiy living body. But there are certain events which, while beginning a causal nexus, are not the result of a causal nexus. We can never say of them, their conditions are being fulfilled, and they are coming to be.' At one time they are not, and at another time they are. Therefore they come to be. But they never are coming to be. The events A. seems to be thinking o; are those which he would ascribe to free will, e. g. a man's eating pungeni food. Once this is done, his death in some determinate way is certain till he does it, only his death is certain.
-^

'

'

E.

BOOK

VI IV
:

1027''

CHAPTER
determined

Let us dismiss the accidental for we have sufficiently its nature. But since that which is in the sense of being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination ^ and separation, and truth and falsehood together

depend on the decision between the two sides of a contradiction (for the true judgement affirms where the subject 20 and predicate really are combined, and denies where they are iseparated, while the false judgement predicates the contradictory of this it is another question, how it happens that we think things together or apart by together and apart I mean thinking them so that there is no succession in the thoughts but they become a unity for falsity and truth are 25 not in things it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false but in thought while with regard to simple concepts and essences falsity and truth do not exist even in thought) we must consider later ^ what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or is not in this sense but since the combination and the separation 30 are in thought and not in the things, and that which is in this sense is a different sort of being from the things that are in the full sense (for the thought attaches or removes either the what or quality or quantity or one of the other categories), that which is accidentally and that which is in the sense of being true must be dismissed. For the cause of the former is indeterminate, and that of the latter is some affection of the thought, and both are related to the remaining 1028* genus of being, and do not indicate any separate class of being. Therefore let these be dismissed, and let us consider the causes and the principles of being itself, qua being. It jwas clear in our discussion of the various meanings of terms,^

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

that
'

'

being

'

has several meanings.

-

5
Cf. 6. lo.
'

1027'* 19

read napa aCpdeaiv.

A.

7.

BOOK
There
lo
'

VII
I

(Z)

CHAPTER
be
',

are several senses in which a thing

in

may be

said to

as

we pointed out previously

;^

our book on the various

'

senses of words
)

a thing

is

'

one sense the being meant is what or the individual thing, and in another sense it
for in
'
'
'

means that a thing is of a certain quality or quantity or has some such predicate asserted of it. While being has all
'

these senses, obviously that which

15

'is

'

primarily

is

the 'what',

which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say is, we say that it is good or beautiful,^ but not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man but when we say zv/ia^ it is, we do not say white or ' hot or three
of what quality a thing
;
' '

'

'

cubits long

',

but

'

man

'

or

'

God

'.

And

all

other things are

said to be because they are,

some of them,

quantities of that
it,

which
"

is

in this
it,

primary sense, others qualities of

others

20

and others some other determination of it. And so one might raise the question whether walking and being healthy and sitting are, each of them, existent or nonexistent, and similarly in any other case of this sort for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks
affections of
;

25

or

is

seated or

is

healthy that

is

an existent thing.
is

Now

these are seen to be more real because there

definite
;

something
'

individual,
'

sitting

'

which underlies them and this is the substance or which is implied in such a predicate for good or apart from that which sits or is good has no meaning.
;
'

Clearly then
30 others
II
is.

it

is

in virtue of this
is

category that each of the

is

(not

'

is

Now
first;

primarily and must be substance. there are several senses in which a thing is

Therefore that which

')

simply

something

said to be

but substance
'

is

first in

every sense
2

(i) in formula,

Cf. A. 7.

1 028=* 16

read koXov.

Z.

BOOK

VII
For
(3)

1028^

(2) in order of

knowledge,

(3) in time.

of the other

categories none can exist independently, but only substance.

And

(1) in

formula also this

formula of

is

first; for in

the formula of

35

must be present. And (2) we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e. g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is since
each term the
its

substance

1028'^

we know each of what the quantity

these predicates also,

or the quality
is.

only when we know

indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt,
viz.

And

what being
it

is,

is

just the question,

what

is

substance?

some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others And so we also must consider chiefly and priunlimited.
For
is

this that

marily and almost exclusively what that

sense.

is

which

is in this

CHAPTER
Substance
is

II
'

thought to belon g most obviously to bodies and so we say that both animals and plants and their parts are substances, and so are natural bodies such as fire and water

10

and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that arc parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e. g. the heaven and its parts, stars and moon and sun. But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or some of these and
fsome other things
'

are substances, or none of these but only 15

must be considered. Some think the imits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, nd more so than body or the solid. Further, some do not think there is anything substantial

ome

other things,

{besides sensible things,

but others think there are eternal subwhich are more in number and more real, e. g. Plato Etances >osited two kinds of substance the Forms and the objects of

20

Eathematics
^
)
)

as

well as a third kind, viz. the substance of

ij

1028^ 14 read
all

ro\n<j:>v

rivts n

'^ai

aWai.

The
(t)

possibilities

are

of these, (i) all of these some of these and some others,

and some others, (t') some others.

some of

these,

io28^
sensible bodies.

METAPHYSICA
And
Speusippus made
substance, beginning with the One, and
still more kinds of making principles for

each kind of substance, one for numbers, another for spatial

magnitudes, and then another for the soul

25

he multiplies the kinds of substance. And and numbers have the same nature, and other things come after them, e. g. lines and planes, until we come to the substance of the material universe and to sensible bodies. Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire which of
the

and in this way some say Forms

common

statements are right and which are not right,

30

and what things are substances, and whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and whether there is a separable substance (and if so why and how) or there is no substance separable from
sensible substances
;

and we must

first

sketch the nature of

substance.

CHAPTER
The word substance
*
'

III
if

is

applied,
;

not

in

more

senses,

still

at least to four

both the essence and the universal and the genus are thought to be the substance of,
for

main objects

35

each thing, and fourthly the substratum.

is

Now

the substratum
it is

that of which the others are predicated, while

itself

not

predicated of anything else. And so we must first determine 1029^ the nature of this for that which underlies a thing primarily
;

is

thought to be
is

in the truest sense its substance.

And

in

one
in

sense matter

said to

be of the nature of substratum,

another, shape, and in a third sense, the

By
6

the matter

the plan of

its

compound of these. mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape form, and by the compound of these (the
Therefore
if

concrete thing) the statue.

the matter and
also for

the form
^

is

prior te

more real, the compound the same reason.

that which
is

of both

will

be

prioi

We
that
it

have now outlined the nature of substance, showing

is

not predicated of a subject, but o

which
10

all else is
;

predicated.
for this is
^

But we must not merely

not enough.

stat(

the matter thus

The

statement

1029** 6 read t6 e| aiK^oiv.

Z.

BOOK

VII
becomes beyond our power taken away evidently

1029*

itself is

obscure, and further, on this view, matter

substance.
to say

For
else

if this is
is.

not substance,
all else
is

it is

what

When

For of the other elements some are affections, products, and potencies of bodies, while length, breadth, and depth are quantities and not substances. For a quantity is not a substance but the substance is rather that to which these belong primarily. But when length and breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left except that which is bounded by these, whatever it be
nothing but matter remains.
;
;

15

so that to those

who

consider the question thus matter alone

f

must seem
in itself is

to

be substance,

By

matter

mean

that which

||>

neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity

is

|
\.

nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being

determined.ti

For there
its

is

predicated, so that

being

something of which each of these is ^ is different from that of each of

while substance
is is

the predicates

for the predicates other than substance arc

1.

predicated of
matter.

substance,

predicated

of
^

Therefore the ultimate substratum

of itself neither

a particular thing nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise

positively characterized
;

nor yet negatively, for negations

follows that matter

25

also will belong to

If is

it

only by accident.
it

we adopt

this point of view, then,

substance.

But

this

is

impossible

for

both separability

and individuality are thought to belong chiefly to substance. And so form and the compound of form and matter would be
thought to be substance, rather than matter.

The substance
dis-

30

"^

jcompounded of both,
missed
;

i.

e.

of matter
its

and shape, may be

nature
is

for

it

is

posterior and

obvious.

And

'^

matter also

is in

a sense manifest.
;

the third kind of substance

It is

for

But we must inquire jnto this is the most difficult.

agreed that there are some substances

among
For

sensible
it

things, so that

we must look

first

among
is

these.

is

an
is

1029*' 3

advantage to advance to that which

earning proceeds for
less

more
is

intelligible.

For

all in this

way

through

that which

more intelligible ind just as in conduct our work is to start from what is good "or each and make what is good in itself good for each, so it
intelligible

by nature

to that which

1029"^ 22 read

wore to

tlvai.

1029''

METAPHYSICA
is

our work to start from what

intelligible

is

more

intelligible to oneself

and make what is by Now what is intelligible and primary

people
10 little
is

nature intelligible to oneself.

for particular sets of

often intelligible to a very small extent, and has

But yet one must start from that or nothing of reality. which is barely intelligible but intelligible to oneself, and try to understand what is intelligible in itself, passing, as has been said, by way of those very things which one understands.

CHAPTER
1

IV

Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we determine substance, and one of these was thought
to be the essence,

13

we must
it is
;

investigate this.

And
it.

first

let

us

make some
1

abstract linguistic remarks about

is

The

essence

of each thing
5

you

is

not being musical

musical.
essence.

^. For being you are not by your very nature What, then, you are by your very nature is your

what

said to be propter se

for

But not the whole of

that which
it

this is the essence of a

is

thing

not

is

propter se as a surface
is

propter se white,
^
'

because being a surface

not identical with being white.

CBut

again the combination of both

'

being a white surface

is

not the essence of surface.

IS

Why ?

Because

'

surface

it self

repeated

20 itself is

ine lormula, therefore, in which the term not present but its meaning is expressed, this is the
^

formula of the essence of each thing.

,

Therefore

if

to be

be a smooth surface ^, to be white and ; to be smooth are on e and the same .^ But since there are compounds of substance with the othei
a white surface
is

to

categories (for there

is

a substrate for each category,

e.

g. foi

25 quality, quantity, time, place,

and motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula of the essence of each of them, i. e whether to these compounds also there belongs an essence

* It seems convenient here to translate thus the phrase translated ii A. 18 as 'in virtue of itself '. ^ 1029^^ 18 read to im^avda \evKfj tlvai. ^ 1029'' 21 read tu enKfuivda ehni Xei'cr. Cf. Be Sensu 442^^ II (01

Democritus).

does not give the essence of surface (fo repeated) but it gives the essence of 'white', since this is no repeated but replaced by an equivalent.
i.

e.

this identification
is

'

'

'surface'

Z.
e. g.

BOOK

VII
Let the com-

1029

to white

man

the essence of white man.

'

pound be denoted by
it

X'} What
is

is

the essence of

^?

But,

may be

said, this also

not a propter se expression.

We
30

reply that there are just two

ways
se,

to be true of a subject propter

which a predicate may fail and one of these results from

in

the addition, and the other from the omission, of a determinant.

is

One kind of predicate is not propter sc because the term that being defined is combined with another determinant, e. g.
defining the

if in

essence of white one were to state the

;

formula of white

man

another because

in

the subject another

in

determinant
the formula,
define
is

is

e.

combined with that which is expressed g. if A^ meant white man, and one were
;

to

X as white
is

white

man

is

white indeed, but

its

essence 1030

not to be white.^

ably not."
attribute

But is being-^Y an essence at all ? ProbFor the essence is an individual type but when an asserted of an alien subject, the complex is not an
;

individual type,

e.

g.

white

man

is

not an individual type, since

individuality belongs only to substances.*

is

Therefore there
is

an essence only of those things whose formula

a defini-

//

tion.

But we have a

definition not

where we have a word and

all

a formula identical in meaning (for in that case

sets of
;

formulae or

words would be definitions for there will be some any set of words whatever, so that even the Iliad would be a definition "*), but where there is a formula of something primary and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one element in them qf another, alien element. Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence only species will have it, for in these the subject is not thought to participate in the attribute and to have it as an affection," nor to have it by accident but for everything else as well, if it has a name, there will be ^ formula

name

for

10
.

15

af its meani7igv\z. that this attribute belongs to this subject

^

'^'

3 read oXas ^ ov. point is that XevKov is one thing, avBpayiroi another, while (aov and (J/jToii/ are not distinct things but Thus hlivovv is only a form of fuof. 'iv6o<criTOi XtvKoi is not an individual type and cannot be defined, while ^inovv is an indivjdual type and can be defirjed. Sc. of the word Iliad'. Cf. 1037'* 14-2J for the interpretation of this.
;

'

1030^ 1030a

Aristotle expresses by arbitrarily taking the I read ov fxeirroi (^to^ tI ^v eivai \evKa ftvai.

word

'cloak'.

The

'

'

io30^

METAPHYSICA
or instead of a simple

formula
but there

we

shall

be able to give

a more accurate one

essence.

will

be no definition nor

But after all, definition/ like what a thing is,' has several meanings what a thing is in one sense means substance and the individual, in another one or other of the predicands, quango tity, quality, and the like. For as is is predicable of all things, not however in the same sense, but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in a secondary way, so too the what
' '

'

'

'

'

'

belongs

in

the

full

sense to substance, but in a limited sense

to the other categories.

For even
is

of a quality

we might ask
in the full

what
25

it is,

so that a quality also

'

what

',

not

sense, however, but just as, in the case of that

say,^
is

not

emphasizing the linguistic is simply^ but is non-existent.

which is not, some form, that that which is not

jj

||

i|

30

must inquire how we should express ourselves on still more how the facts actually stand. And so now also since it is evident what language we use, essence will belong, just as the what does, primarily and in the simple sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other cateeach point, but
' '

Now we

gories also,

not

essence in the

full sense,
it

but the essence

either

o:

must be a quahty or of a quantity. equivocation that we say these are, or by making and abstractions (in the way in which that which
For

by

ar

qualifications
is

not knowr

may be
35

said to be

known
'

^),

the truth being

'

that

we use

th<

1030''

word neither ambiguously nor in the same sense, but just a; we apply the word medical when there is a reference to on< and the same thing, not meaning one and the same thing, no yet speaking ambiguously for a patient and an operation anc an instrument are called medical neither by an ambiguity no
;

\\

with a single meaning, but with reference to a

common

end

But
5

it

does not matter

;

in

describe the facts

in the

this

which of the two ways one likes t< is evident, that definition and essenc

primary and simple sense belong to substances. Stii they belong to other things as well. For if we suppose thi it does not follow that there is a definition of every wor which means the same as any formula it must mean the sam
'*

Cf. PI.

Soph. 237. ^ 1030" 6 read

'

i.

e. it is

known

to

be unknown.

/cal

rinv

aWav

ofias.

ov yap dmyKrj.

Z.

BOOK
;

VII
this condition is satisfied
is

1030'^

as a particular kind of formula

if it is

and

a formula of something which

one, not

by continuity |
' ',

like the Iliad or the things that are

one by being bound together, but in one of the main senses of one which answer to the senses of is now that which is in one sense denotes an individual, in another a quantity, in another a
' '

10

'

quality.

And

so

there can be a formula or definition of

is

white man, but not in the sense in which there

either of white or of a substance.

a definition

CHAPTER V
It is |an
r

a difficult question,
is

if

one denies that a formula with

15

added determinant^

a definition, whether any of the

terms that are not simple but coupled will be definable.

For

we must explain them by adding a determinant. E.g. there is the nose, and concavity, and snubness, which is compounded out of the two by the presence of the one in the other, and it is not by accident that the nose has the attribute either of concavity or of snubness, but in virtue of its nature nor do
;

20

they attach to
'jrather as
(1

it

as whiteness does to Callias,

or

to

man

j(because Callias,
'

who happens
'

to be a

man,
'

is
'

white), but to quantity,

thei r

male

'

attaches to animal and

equal

as

all

so-called

att ributes propter se' attac h to

in

jects. -

And

such attributes are those

which

is

involved

formula or the name of the subject of the particular e.g. ittribute, and which cannot be explained without this h iit^ not female apar t .vhite can be explained apart from man, rem animal. Therefore there is either no essence and 4j hnition of any of these things, or if there is, it is in another
jither the
;

25

:.case,

as

we have

said.^

-'^f

But there is also a second difficulty about them. For if nub nose and concave nose are the same thing, snub and "oncavc will be the same thing but if snub and concave are .34 lot the same (because it is impossible to speak of snubness irt from the thing of which it is an attribute propter se,
;

30

Cf. 1029'^ 30.

In the sense of Kaff

1030'' 6.
MET.

amo explained
J^

in A?t. Post.

i.

73* -^7-'

5.

^
IR.

1030*'

METAPHYSICA
for snubness
is

concdLVxiy-in-the-nose), either
'

it

is

impossibk
will

properly to say

snub nose

'

or the
;

same thing

have

been said twice, concave-nose nose for snub nose will be concave-nose nose. And so it is absurd that such thing;
35

should have an essence

regress
;

if

they have, there

will
'

be an
nose
'

infinite

for in

snub-nose nose yet another

definable.

will be

involved.
1031*
f

For if the othei must be by addition of dejterminant, e.g. the qualitative is defined thus, and so the odd, for it cannot be defined apart from number nor car female be defined apart from animal. (When I say b} addition I mean the expressions in which we have to sa) the same thing twice, as in these instances.) And if this true, coupled terms also, like 'odd number', will not b<
Clearly then only substance
is

categories also are definable,

it

i:

'

'

i;

definable (but this escapes our notice because our formulae are not accurate).
in
10

But if these also are definable, either it some other way or, as we said, definition and essence mus be said to have more than one sense. Therefore in on sense nothing will have a definition and nothing will hav

i,

an essence, except substances, but in another sense othel things will have them. Clearly, then, definition is th formula of the essence, and essence must belong to substance either alone or chiefly and primarily and in the unqualifie
sense.

CHAPTER
15

VI
its

We
the

must inquire whether each thing and same or different. This is of some use
;

essence

ai

for the inquit

ni
tl

concerning substance
different

for

each thing

is

thought to be
is

from

its

substance, and the essence

said to be

substance of each thing.

Now
20

in the case of things with accidental attributes

tl

two would be generally thought to be different, e. g. whi man would be thought to be different from the essence white man. For if they are the same, the essence of man ai that of white man are also the same for a man and a whi
;

man
25

are the same, as

people say, so that the essence

white

man and

that of

man would be

also the same.


Z.

1031^

BOOK

VII

probably

it is

not necessary that a subject + an accident should

its

be the same as
not in the same

essence.

For the extreme terms are

with the middle
follow, that the

way

identified

term.

Perhaps

this

might be thought to

extreme
e. g.

terms, the accidents, should turn out to be the same,

the

essence of white and that of musical

but this

is

not actually a thing

'^

thought to be the case.^

But

in

the case of so-called self-subsistent things,

is

necessarily the

same

as

its

essence?

E.g.

if

there are

some
be
?

substances which have no other substances nor entities prior

to
If

them

substances such as
is

some

assert the Ideas to

30

the essence of good

to be different from the Idea of good,

and the essence, of animal from the Idea of animal, and the essence of being from the Idea of being, there will, firstly, be other substances and entities and Ideas besides those which are
asserted, and, secondly, these others will
if

1031''

be prior substances

the essence

is

substance.

And

if

the posterior substances are

severed from the prior, (i) there will be no knowledge of the

former (the things-themselves or Ideas), and (2) the latter (the essences) will have no being. (By 'severed I mean, if the Idea
'

good has not the essence of good, and the latter has not the jjproperty of being good.) For (i) there iskn owledge of eac h
of

thing only
*

wh en we know
in
II.

its

esse nce.
is
:

And

(2)

the case

is

the

The argument used

Essence of white

21-4

White man

= man.

man =

white man

essence of man. . Essence of white man = essence of man. 4 This is absurd, and Aristotle infers that essence of white man does ""'\ white man. ie next hints that the belief that it =. white man arises from the
aliment
:

Man =

essence of man. white man. By substitution, white man = essence of white man. i,at while man = essence of man ko^' alro, man = white man Kara trvfi'lt<07c';'r (ov yap waaiTcos ra axpa yiyvfrai Tairra). Nor is the argument any rt'etter if both the identities used are Kara avfx^^rjKos : Essence of white = white. White white man.
.

Man = Man =

White man

= man

{Kara a-vfi^f^rjKos).
(/caro o-v/i^f^^itoj).

Man =

musical

man

Musical man = musical. Musical = essence of musical. Essence of white = essence of musical.

loai''

METAPHYSICA
same good
for other things as for the
is

good

so that

if

the essence of

not good, neither

is

the essence of reahty real, nor the

all

essence of unity one.

10

And

essences alike exist or none

them does so that if the essence of reality is not real, Again, that which has not the neither is any of the others. property of being good is not good.^ / The good, then, must
of
;

15

be one with the essence of good, and the beautiful with the essence of beauty, and so with all things which do not depend on something else but are self-subsistent and primary. For it is enough if they are this, even if there are no Forms and perhaps all the more if there are Forms. At the same time
;

it is

clear that

if

there are Ideas such as

will

some people say there

;

are, the

substratum of them

not be substance

for thes6
;

must be substances, and not predicable of a substratum for if they were they would exist only by being participated in.-' 11 Each thing then and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding] 20 arguments and because to hioiv each thing, at least, is toj

know
it

its

essence, so that even

clear that

by the
'

exhibition of instance^

becomes
it

both must be one.

e. g. is
;

(But of an accidental term,

since
is

the musical

'

or

'

the white
it

',

has two meanings,

it

not true to say that

itself

identical

with

accidental quality belongs,

35 white, so that in

for both that to which the and the accidental quality, are a sense the accident and its essence are the
its

essence

same, and

in

a sense they are not

for the essence of white

it is

ij

not the same as the

man

or the white man, but

the sam<

as the attribute white.)

feo
\

The absurdity of the separation would appear also if on< were to assign a name to each of the essences for then would be another essence besides the original one, e. g. to th(
;

essence of horse there will belong a second essence.|t-vYe

\ \

why

should not some things be their essences from the

is

istarl
it
if

since essence
^

substance

But not only are a thing ana

this theory) the

Sc.
i.

and the essence of good has not (on

.*.

property
,

being good, and

^

is

not good.

'

immanent in particulars. ^ Sc. and so ad injiftittim. As an infinite process is absurd, why fak the first step that commits you to it why say that the essence of horie
e.

as

separate from the horse

Z.

ROOK
;

VII
is

1031^

essence one, but the formula of

clear even

them
for

also the same, as

is

from what has been said

it is

not by accident that 1032*

Further,
;

the essence of one, and the one, are one.

difterent, the

if

they were

process would go on to infinity

(2)

for

we should
5
.

have

(i)

the essence of one, and

the one, so that in their case

also the

would be found. Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as
infinite regress
its
I

same

essence.

Now

the sophistical objections to this position, and the

question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the

thing, are obviously
is

same

answered
in the

in

the

same way

for there

no difference either
^

standpoint from which the ques1

tion
it

would be asked, or in that from which one could answer We have explained, then, in what sense each hing is the same as its essence and in what sense it is not.
successfully.

CHAPTER

VII
ll

Of things that come to be some come to be by nature, ome by art, some spontaneously. Now everything that comes
o be comes to be by the agency of something and from some-

hing and comes to be something.

And
in

the something which

;

say

it

comes

to

be
'

may
this
'

ome
r

to be either a

any category it may or of some size or of some quality

be found
15

somewhere.

Now
ley
ley
le

natural comings to be are the comings to be of those

bings which

come

come come

to to

by nature and that out of which be is what we call matter j and that by which be is something which exists naturally and
to be
; ;

something which they come to be

is.
;

is

man

or a plant or

ne of the things of this kind, which

lything
"

All things produced either

for

we say ace substances if by nature or by art 20

And,
in

ave matter

each of them
is

is

capable both of being and

not being, and this capacity

the matter in each.-

;neral,

both that from which they are produced is nature, id the type according to. which they are produced is iture (for thatwhich is- produced, e.g. a plant or.an animal,
1

1032* 9 read iparrjcrdtv. 1032^ 22 read eVrlv iv fKaara.

1032^

METAPHYSICA
has a nature), and so
so-called
'

is

that

by which they
is
it

are produced

the,

formal

'

nature, which

specifically the
is

same

as the

nature of the thing produced (though

vidual)
25
;

in

another indiother pro-

for

man

begets man.
;

Thus, then, are natural products produced

ductions are called
'

all

from art

makings '. And all makings proceed either Some of them or from a potency or from thought.^

happen also spontaneously or by luck ^ just as natural profor there also the same things sometimes 30 ducts sometimes do Concerning are produced without seed as well as from seed. these cases, then, we must inquire later,^ but from art proceed (By 1032'' the things of which the form is in the soul of the artist. form I me an the essence of each thing and its primary s ubr'say form and not form or privation ', For even stance?) contrarirs have in a sense the same form for the substance of
;
' ' '

a privation

is

the opposite substance,

;

e.

g.

health

is

the sub*
;

stance of disease
5

for

it is

by
is

its

absence that disease exists

and health

is

the formula and the knowledge

in the

soul.

The
I

healthy subject, then,

;

produced as the result of the

is

following train of thought

since this

health,

if

the subject
|

is to be healthy this must first be present, e. g. a uniform state and of body, and if this is to be present, there must be heat
;

^^1
f^ K
10

the physician goes on thinking

thus until

he reduces the

matter to a
called a

final

step which he himself can take.

i.e.

Then

the

process from this point onward,

is
'

the process towards health,

it

making

'.

Therefore

follows that in a sense

health comes from health and house from house, that with

matter from that without matter; ('from health

of health and of the house
15
^

'

and

'

from

house',) for the medical art and the building art are the form
;

and ('from that without matter'.

for)

call

the essence substance without matter.

Of
and

prothe

ductions and

movements one

part

is

called thinking

other making,

that which
is

proceeds from the starting-poinl

the

and the form

final step

thinking,

and that which proceeds from

is

of the thinking

making.

And

each of the inter

Cf. E. 1025'^ 22.

^
''

For the theory of these

Cf. 1032^^ 23-30.

cf.

Phys.

ii.

5, 6.
*

1032'' 5

omit

hr)KovTnK.

1032^

read km

t]

fnitrri] fit].

Z.

BOOK

VII
I

1032*'

mean, for instance, must be made uniform. What then does being made uniform imply? This or that. And this depends on his being made warm. What does this imply? Something else. And this something is
is

mediate steps
the subject

taken in the same way.

if

is

to be healthy his bodily state

20

present potentially
in the physician's

and what

is

present potentially

is

already

power.

The

active principle then

process of becoming healthy

the soul, and
if

is, if it

and the starting-point for the happens by art, the form in

that,

spontaneously,

it is

whatever

it is,

which

is

the starting-point of his

art, as in

making ^

for the
is

man who makes by

25

healing the starting-point

this

perhaps the production

of warmth, and

the

physician produces
is

by rubbing.
is

Warmth

in the

body, then,

either a part of health or

followed (either directly or through several intermediate steps)

by something which is a part of health and this, viz. that which produces the part, is the last step, and is itself thus a part"^ of health, and so are, e.g., the stones a part of the house, and so in all other cases.
;

Therefore, as

we

say,

it

is

impossible that anything should 30

be produced

if

there were nothing before.

Obviously then
;

some part of the

matter
this
is

result will pre-exist of necessity for this

is

for the
it is

a part

present in the process and

becomes something. But are some also of the 1033* elements in the formula matter ? At least we describe in both ways ^ what bronze circles are we describe both the matter by saying it is bronze, and the form by saying that it is such and such a figure and figure is the proximate genus in which it is placed. The bronze circle, then, has its matter
that
;

in iis formula.^

And

as for that out of

said,

jome things are

^

when they have been produced,

cf. 11.

which as matter they are produced, to be

15-17.

Sc. not of his thought,

1032^ 29 read Kairh ovtwj

tiipos.
:

So perhaps Alexander.
:

From

the

jroportion established, warmth health :: stones house, and from the next paragraph, it would appear that warmth is treated as the matter which vhen specialized in a particular way becomes health. Yet Aristotle began 1. 241 by treating it as the efficient cause of health, and he gives no waning of the transition, nor is matter elsewhere identified with efficient cause. * 1033^ I read a\X' apa . Xoyoj dfi(f)oT(p(iis ye Xtyo/iei/. * i. e. the genus acts as matter, the differentia as form.
. .
;

1033^

METAPHYSICA
not
it

but of

it, e.

g.

the statue

is

not stone but of stone.

But

though what becomes healthy

the healthy product
is

is

a man,
from.

'

said to

come

man is not what The reason is that

'

lo

though a thing comes both from its privation and from its substratum, which we call its matter (e.g. what becomes healthy is both a man and an invalid), it is said to come rather from its privation (e. g. it is from an invalid rather than from a man
that a healthy subject
is

produced).

And

so the healthy

isubject

is

not said to de an invalid, but to be a man, and a

healthy man.
\

But as

for

the things whose privation

is

obscure and nameless,

e. g. in

bronze the privation of a par-

il

licular shape or in bricks

||nent as a house, the thing

and timber the privation of arrangcis thought to be produced /r(9w

Uhese materials, duced from an

said to be

as in the former case the healthy

invalid.

man

is

pro-

And
it

so,

as there also a thing

is
is

not

said to be that from which

comes, here the statue

not

wood but

is

said

by a verbal change

to be not

wood

20

but wooden, not bronze but of bronze, not stone but of stone, and the house is said to be not bricks but of bricks (though
if we looked at the produced from wood or a house from bricks, because its coming to be implies change in that from which it comes, and not permanence). For this

we should not say without

qualification,
is

matter carefully, even that a statue

reason, then,

we

use this

way

of speaking.

CHAPTER
Since anything which
25
is

VIII
is

produced

produced by something

(and this

I call

the starting-point of the production), and from

let this

something (and
the matter
;

be taken to be not the privation but

30

meanings we attach to these have already ^ been distinguished), and since something is produced (and this is either a sphere or a circle or whatever else it may chance to be), just as we do not make the substratum the bronze, so we do not make the sphere, except incidentally, because the bronze sphere is a sphere and we make the former. For to make a this is to make a this out of the general substratum. I mean that to make the bronze round is
for the

'

'

'

'

Cf. leas'* 8.

Z.

BOOK
in

VII
else,

I033

not to
i.

make

the round or the sphere, but something

this

something else as a medium. For if we make the form, we must make it out of something else for this was assumed.^ and 1033'' E. g. we make a bronze sphere this is bronze, make that in the sense that out of this, which we other, which is a sphere. If, then, we make the sphere itself, clearly we must make it in the same way, and the processes of making will regress to infinity. Obviously then the form also,- 5 or whatever we ought to call the shape of the sensible thing, is not produced, nor does production relate to it, the i. e. essence is not produced for this is that which is made to be
c.

to

produce

form

something else by art or by nature or by some potency. But that there is a bronze sphere, this we make. For we make it out of bronze and the sphere we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a bronze sphere. But if the essence of sphere ^ in general is produced, something must be produced out of something. For the product will always have to be divisible, and one part must be this and
in
;

ro

another that,
form.
is

mean

the one must be matter and the other

is
*

If

then a sphere

the figure whose circumference

at all points equidistant

the

medium
in

be

from the centre ', part of this will be which the thing made* will be, and part will that medium, and the whole will be the thing produced,
in

15

which corresponds to the bronze sphere.^ from what has been said that the thing,
or substance,
its

It
in

is

obvious then

the sense of form

is

not produced, but the concrete thing which gets

this
is

name from

produced, and that

is

in

everything which
is

:omes to be matter
T.atter
I

present,

and one part of the thing

and the other form.

20

Is there then a sphere apart from the individual spheres or house apart from the bricks ? Rather we may say that no ndividual would ever have been coming to be, if this had been

io.

The
'

'

form

'

however means the

;

'

this

a
'

definite thing

but the

artist

such and is not a makes, or the father

',

Or,

for this other

something was the underlying matter.'

*
* *

Sc. as well as the substratum. 1033'* 1 1 read i""^ ^^ <T(f>aipa (ivat.

1033'' 15 read eo-rat 6 noid.
' '

i. e. sphere must be a whole analysable into matter and form as bronze sphere is.

'

1033^'

METAPHYSICA
generates, a 'such' out of a 'this';

A
r

and when
the whole
'

it

has been
',

generated,

it is

'

this

such

'.^

And

this

CalHas

25 or Socrates, is analogous to

'

this

bronze sphere

',

but

man and

animal to

bronze sphere

'

in general.^

Obviously then the

cause which consists of the Forms (taken in the sense in which some maintain the existence of the Forms, i. e. if they are

30

something apart from the individuals) is useless with regard both to comings-to-be and to substances and the Forms need In not, for this reason at least, be self-subsistent substances. some cases it is even obvious that the producer is of the same kind as the produced (not, however, the same nor one in number, but in form), e.g. in the case of natural products (for
;

man

produces man), unless something happens contrary to

e.

by a horse. And even which would be found to be common to horse and ass, the genus next above them, has not received a name, but it would doubtless be both, as the mule 1034^ is both. Obviously, therefore, it is quite unnecessary to set up a Form as a pattern (for we should have looked for Forms in these cases if in any for these are substances if anything is so) the begetter is adequate to the making of the product and 5 to the causing of the form in the matter. /And when we have the whole, such and such a form in this flesh and in these
nature,
g.

the production of a mule

;

these cases are similar

for that

bones, this

is

Callias or Socrates
is

and they are

different),
[

diflercnt in

virtue of their matter (for that

but the same in

form

for their

form

is

indivisible.
j

CHAPTER

IX

The question might be raised, why some things are pro duced spontaneously as well as by art, e.g. health, while
10

others are not,

cases

e. g.

a house.

The

reason

is

that in

some
the
part

the matter which determines the production in making and producing of any work of art, and in which a
is

of the product
itself

present,

is

such as to be set
nature,
particular

some cases is not of this kind some can move itself in the
and
in

in motion by and of the formei

way

required

^ i.e. the artist, or the father, turns a merepieceof matter into a qualifiec piece of matter.

Z.

BOOK

VII
;

i034
for

while other matter

set in

is

incapable of this

many things

can be

some particular way, e. g. that of dancing. The things then whose matter is of this 15 sort, e. g. stones, cannot be moved in the particular way required,^ except by something else, but in another way they can move themselves and so it is with fire. Therefore some things cannot exist apart from some one w'ho has the art of making them, while others can exist without such a person for motion can be started by these things which have not the 20 art but can move of themselves, i. e. either by other things w hich have not the art or by a part of the product itself. And it is clear also from what has been said that in a sense
in
;

motion by themselves but not

everything
shares
its

is

produced from
its

(i)

another individual w^hich

the house produced

name
is

(natural products are so produced), or (2) a

part of itself which shares

name

(e. g.
;

by reason

produced from a house for the art of building is the form of the house), or (3) something which contains a part of it,^ if we exclude things produced by accident. For what directly and of itself causes the production is a part of the

25

product.

The
by a

heat in the
is

movement

causes heat in

the
is
it

body, and this

followed
is

either health, or

a part of health, or
itself.

part of health or

by health
is

And

so

said to cause health, because health

caused by that to
production,
;

which heat attaches as a consequence. Therefore substance * is the starting-point of

'

all

7.0

as of syllogism.

It is

from the

'

what

'

that syllogisms start

and from

it

also

we now

find processes of production to start.^

And
artist

things which are formed

as these products of art.

by nature are in the same case For the seed produces them as the
;

produces the works of art for it has the form potentially, and that from which the seed comes has in a sense the same name as the offspring only in a sense, for we must not expect all cases to have exactly the same name, as in the production
;

1034*'

of

'

can
^

human being from human being (for a woman also be produced by a man 'and so it is not from a mule
'
'

'

'

'

'

Sc. for building.

1034* 23 read v
TO etdos),
fj

iitpovs ofuavi'fiov {olov

f)

oiKin

('$

oiKias

fj

i-rro

vov'

r)

yiip T(\vr]
^
:

(k (tov^ fj^otToi ti fiepos.

Sc. of the rubber's hand.

i.

e.

essence.

Cf. to eiSos,

1,

24.

1034*'

METAPHYSICA
that a

mule

is

produced

'')
;

ofifspring is not
5 (like

an imperfect form.

we must expect this only if the The natural things which

some artificial objects) can be produced spontaneously whose matter can be moved even by itself in the way but those things which in which the seed usually moves it have not such matter cannot be produced except by parents. But not only regarding substance does our argument prove that its form does not come to be, but the argument applies
are those
;

10

15

i. e. quantity, quality, and the For as the bronze sphere comes to be, but not the sphere nor the bronze, and so too in the case of bronze itself, if it comes to be, it is its concrete unity that comes to be (for the matter and the form must always exist before), so is it as regards both what and quality and quantity and the other categories likewise for the quality does not come to be, but the wood of that quality, and the quantity

to

all

the primary classes alike,

other categories.

'

'

does not come to be, but the wood or the animal of that

size.

But we may learn from these instances a peculiarity of substance, that there must exist beforehand another actual substance which produces it, e.g. an animal if an animal is produced but it is not necessary that a quality or quantity
;

should pre-exist otherwise than potentially.

CHAPTER X
20

Since a definition

is

a formula, and every formula has parts,

and as the formula

is. to

the thing, so

is

the part of the

formula to the part of the thing, we are already faced by the question whether the formula of the parts must be present in
the formula of the whole or not.

For

in

some

cases the

25

formulae of the parts are seen to be present, and in some not. The formula of the circle does not include that of the segments, but that of the syllable includes that of the letters
yet the circle
is

divided into segments as the syllable

if

is

into

letters. And further

the parts are prior to the whole, and

righ't

the acute angle

is

a part of the

angle and the finger

a part of the animal, the acute angle will be prior to the right
^

Cf. 1033I' 33.

I
to

Z.

BOOK

VII
But the
latter are

1034'

angle and the finger to the man.

thought 30

be prior

for

in

formula the parts are explained by

reference to them, and in virtue also of their power of existing

apart from the parts the wholes are prior.

Perhaps we should rather say that

senses.

'

part

'

is

used

in several

One

of these
.

is

'

that which measures another thingf in

let this

respect of quantity

But

sense be set aside;

let

us

inquire about the parts of which substance consists.

If

then 1035^

matter
'^

ird,

one thing, form another, the compound of these a and both the matter and the form and the compound
is

substance, even the matter

is in

a sense called part of a

the
5

jthing, while in

a sense

it is not,

but only the elements of which

E. g. flesh (for this
is

the formula of the form consists.

which it is produced) is not a part of concavity, but and the bronze is a part of the concrete .of snubness it is a part statue, but not of the statue as form. (For each thing must be referred to by naming its form, and as having form, but never by naming its material aspect as such.) And so the formula of the
matter
in
;

circle

does not include that of the segments, but the formula of

;

the syllable includes that of the letters

for the letters are parts 10

of the formula of the form, and not matter, but the segments
are parts, in the sense of matter, on which the form supervenes
;

yet they are nearer the form than the bronze

is

is

when roundness
e. g. 15

produced

in bronze.

But

in a

sense not even every kind

of letter will be present in the formula of the syllable,

particular

waxen
its

letters or the letters as

sounds
if

in the air

for these also are part of the syllable only in the sense that

they are

perceptible matter.

For even

the line

when

divided passes

away

into its halves, or the

man

into bones

and muscles and flesh, it does not follow that they are composed of these as parts of their essence, but rather as matter and these are parts of the concrete thing, but not of the form,
i.e.

20

of that to which the formula refers; and therefore also

formulae of some things the formula of such parts will be present,^ but in others it must not be present, where the formula does not refer to the concrete object. For it is for
in the

this

reason that

some things have

as their constituent prin-

^ Ciples

parts into which they pass away, while

*

some have

not.

1035* 22 read koi iv toIs Xdyots

TV)v \ikv

iviarm.

liife

1035''

METAPHYSICA
which the form and the matter are taken together, e. g. the snub, or the bronze circle, pass away into these material parts, and the matter is a part of them but those things which do not involve matter but are without matter, and whose formulae are formulae of the form only,

25
/

Those things

in

30 in

do not pass away, either not at all or at any rate not Therefore these materials are principles and this way. parts of the concrete things, while of the form they are neither
parts nor principles.
into clay

And
^

therefore the clay statue

is

resolved

and Callias into flesh and circle into its segments for there is For circle ' a sense of circle ^ in which it involves matter. is used ambiguously, meaning both the circle in general and 1035^ the individual circle, because there is no name proper to the and the ball bones, and a^ain the
' '

into bronze

'

individuals.

The
it

truth has really

now been

stated, but

still

let

us state
parts

yet more clearly, taking up the question again.

The

which the formula is divided, are prior to The formula of the right angle, it, either all or some of them. however, does not include the formula of the acute, but the
of the formula, into

formula of the acute includes that of the right angle

for

he
is

who
'

defines the acute uses the right angle

for the acute

less

than a right angle

'.

The

circle

and the semicircle

is

also are in a like relation

10

for the semicircle

defined

by

and so is the finger by the whole body, for a finger is such and such a part of a man Therefore the parts which are of the nature of matter and into which as its matter a thing is divided, are posterior but those which are parts of the formula, and of the substance according to its
the circle
; '

'.

formula, are prior, either

15 soul of animals (for this

all
is

or

some

of them.

And

since the
is

the substance of living beings)

certain kind (at least
it

their substance according to the formula, i.e. the

form and

the essence of a
define each part,
its

body of a if we define

we

shall

well, not
it

without reference to
^),

function,

and

this

cannot belong to

without perception
all

therefore the parts of soul are prior, either

or

some

of

them, to the concrete animal, and similarly

^

in

each case of
34 read

1035^ 32 read koI

'

t)

crcjympa.

1035=*

os.

And

therefore not without soul.

Z.

BOOK

VII

1035"
30

ncrete whole
its

essential

and the body and its parts are posterior to substance, and it is not the substance but the
;

concrete thing that

is

divided into these parts as

its

matter.

To

the concrete thing these are in a sense prior, but in a

isense

they are not. from the whole for

:

finger of a living

For they cannot even exist if severed not a finger in any state that is the thing, but the dead finger is a finger only in
it is

name.
whole,
i.

Some
e.
i.

parts are neither prior nor posterior to the

25

those which are most important and in which the

e.

^^rmula,
_;.

the essential substance,

perhaps the heart or the brain

ich of the

two has

this quality.

immediately present, it does not matter But man and horse and
is
;

for

irms which

are thus applied to individuals, but universally,

arc not substance but something

composed of
Socrates
is

this particular
;

formula and this particular matter treated as universal

but

when we come
'

to the individual,
;

composed of

and similarly in all other cases. | A part may be a part either of the form (i. e. the essence), or of the compound of the form and the matter, or of the matter But only the parts of the form are parts of the formula,-*^-itself and the formula is of the universal for being a circle is the 1036* same as the circle, and being a soul is the same as the soul. But when we come to the concrete thing, e. g. this circle, i, e. one of the individual circles, whether sensible or intelligible (I mean by intelligible circles the mathematical, and by sensible circles those of bronze and of wood), of these there is no 5 pefinition, but they are known by the aid of intuitive reason or sensation and when they go out of our actual consciousness it is not clear whether at a given time they exist or not but they are always stated and cognized by means of the universal formula. But matter is unknowable in itself. And some matter is sensible and some intelligible, sensible matter 10 being for instance bronze and wood and all matter that is changeable, and intelligible matter being that which is present 1 sensible things not qua sensible, i.e. in the objects of matheaatics. We have stated, then, how whole and part, and prior |nd posterior, are related. When any one asks whether the right angle and the ircle and the animal are prior to that into which they are 15
ultimate individual matter
' ; '
' '

'

1036*

METAPHYSICA
we must meet the inquiry by saying that the question cannot be answered simply. For if the soul is the animal or ^ the living
divided and of which they consist,
i.

e.

the parts,

thing,2 or the soul of each individual

is

the individual

itself,
'

and being a
'

circle

'

is

the

circle,

and being a right angle and

'

the essence of the right angle

.

is

the right angle, then the

20
I

one sense must be called posterior to the part in one sense, i.e. to the parts included in the formula and to the parts of the individual right angle (for both the material right angle which is made of bronze, and that which is formed by

whole

in

individual lines, are posterior to their parts)

while the im-

material right angle

is

posterior to the parts included in the

formula, but prior to those included in the particular instance.

25

But the question must not be answered simply. If, however, is something different and is not identical with the animal, even so some parts must be called prior and others must not, as has been said.
the soul

CHAPTER
The
thing.

XI

question

is

naturally raised, what sort of parts belong

sort not to the form, but to the concrete

to the form

and what
if

Yet
;

this

is

not plain

it

is

not possible to define

j

anything
If then
30 of

for definition is of the universal

is

and of the form.

it

not evident which of the parts are of the nature

In the case of things which are found to

matter and which are not, neither will the formula of the

thing be evident.

occur in specifically different materials, as a circle

in

may

exist

bronze or stone or wood,

it

seems plain that

these, the

bronze or the stone, are no part of the essence of the circle, since it is found apart from them. Of things which are 7iot
35

seen to exist apart, there

e.

1036^ be true,

g.

even

if all circles

form)

none the less but it is hard to effect this severance in thought. E. g\_the fo rm of man is always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kmd are these then also parts of the form an d
bronze
;

(for

no reason why the same may not that had ever been seen were of the bronze would be no part of the
is

the_formula
^

?
it

No, they are matter

more widely
fffior 7 ffiyj/vxop.

but because

man

if

Sc. to put

so as to include the vegetable world.

1036* 17 read

Z.

BOOK

VII
arc unable to effect the

1036^

not found also in other matters

severance.

we

Since this
it is

is

thought to be possible, but

it is

not clear ivhen

10

the case,

some

are in doubt even in the case of the circle

and the triangle, thinking that it is not right to define these by lines and by continuous space, but that all these are to the
circle or

the triangle as flesh or bones are to man, and bronze

;

or stone to the statue

and they reduce

*

all

things to numbers,
'

and they say the formula of

those

line

'

is

that of
'

two

'.

And

of

who

assert the Ideas

some make two

;

'

the line

itself,

'and others Ithey

say the
e. g.
'

;same,
line
J
'

make it the form of the line for in some cases 15 Form and that of which it is the Form are the two and the Form of two but in the case of
'

they say this

is

no longer

so.

It follows

then that there

is

is

one P'orm

for

many

things

ose

Form

evidently different (a conclusion which con;

nted the Pythagoreans also)

ke one thing the very

ers are not

Form

of
all

Forms

but thus

and that it is possible to all, and to hold that the things will be one.

20

Now we
ins

have stated ^ that the question of definitions consome difficulty, and why this is so. Therefore to reduce
for

things thus to
jfcour
;

Forms and to eliminate the matter is useless some things surely are a particular form in a
a particular state.

rticular matter, or particular things in

comparison which Socrates the younger ^ used to ike in the case of animal ^ is not good for it leads away m the truth, and makes one suppose that man can possibly st without his parts, as the circle can without the bronze. the case is not similar for an animal is something pertible, and it is not possible to define it without reference to ivement nor, therefore, without reference to the parts and their being in a certain state. For it is not a hand in ty state that is a part of man, but the hand which can fulfil sjwork, which therefore must be alive if it is not alive it is
id the
* '

25

it

30

ft

a part.

Regarding the objects of mathematics, why are the formulae he parts not parts of the formulae of the wholes, e. g. why
'jCh. V.
lET.

Cf. PI. Theaet. 147 c; * Cf. 1036* 34-'' 5.

Soph. 218 B

Pol. 257 C.

1036*'

METAPHYSICA
are not the formulae of the semicircles parts of the formula of
tlie circle ?

It
'

cannot be said,
;

'

because these parts are per-

ceptible things
35 difference
;

for

But perhaps this makes no even some things which are not perceptible
for

they are not.

for there is

1037* must have matter

some matter
parts, not

in

everything

which

is

not an essence and a bare form but an individual,

The
circle,

semicircles, then, will

be

of the universal
;

but of the individual

is

circles,

as has been said before

is

foi

while one kind of matter

is intelligible.

perceptible, there

another which

It is clear also that

the soul

is

the primary substance and

both taken universally

and man or animal is the compound ol and Socrates or Coriscus if ever the soul of Socrates may be called Socrates,^ has two meanings (for some mean by such a term the soul, and others mean the concrete thing), but if Socrates or Coriscus means simply this particular souP and this particular body, th(
the

body

is

matter,

'

'

'

',

'

'

'

'

individual
10

is

analogous to the universal

in its composition.^

Whether there is, apart from the matter of such substances any other substance, and one should look for some substanc other than these, e. g. numbers or something of the sort, mus be considered later.* For it is for the sake of this that we ar
trying to determine the nature of perceptible substances, sine
in a sense the

inquiry about perceptible substances

is

th

15

work of physics, i.e. of second philosophy; for the physicii must not only know about the matter, but also about the sul stance in the sense of 'the formula', and even more tha
about the other. And in the case of definitions, how th elements in the formula are parts of the definition, and wh

30 the definition is

one formula
is

(for clearly

the thing
it

is

one,

bi

in virtue of %vhat

the thing one, although

later.^

has parts

?),-

this

must be considered
the essence
is

What
case,
* 2 ' *

and

in
in

has been stated universally

what sense it a way which

is
is

independer
true of eve

and also

why

the formula of the essence of

some

thin

1037a 8 read Cf. 1036* 16-17, H. 1043^^ 2-4. ^^vxh SwAcparr/y, hiTTov. 1037* 9 read djrAwy ^ '^^xh' i. e. as man = soul + body, Socrates = this soul + this body.
Cf. Z. 13, 14, A, Cf. Z. 12, H. 6.

M, N.
'

Z.

BOOK

VII

ioX3

contains the parts of the thing defined, while that of others

does not

and we have stated that

in the

formula of the sub25

stance the material parts will not be present (for they are not

even parts of the substance in that sense, but of the concrete substance but of this there is in a sense a formula, and in a
;

sense there
for this
is

is

not

for there is

no formula of
is

it

with

its

matter,

indefinite,

but there

a formula of the case of

it

with reference

to

its

primary substance

e.g. in
is

man the

formula of
derived

the soul
land the
e. g.

for the

substance

the indwelling form, from which

is

matter the so-called concrete substance

is
'

concavity
'

a form of this sort, for from this and the nose 30

'

se

snub nose and

snubness
;

'

'

nose

'

will

be found to be

involved twice in these terms)

p. g.

but in the concrete substance,

^nd we

will be present, have stated that the essence and the individual thing are in some cases the same i. e. in the case of primary sub- 1037^ Stances, e. g. curvature and the essence of curvature, if this is primary. (By a primary substance I mean one which does not imply the presence of something in something else, i. e. in a substrate which acts as matter.) But things which are of the fiature of matter or of wholes which include matter, are not 5 the same as their essences, nor are accidental unities * like that ii Socrates and * musical for these are the same only by
;
' '

a snub nose or Callias, the matter also

'

'

'

Iccident.

CHAPTER
Now
is

XII

let us treat first of definition, in so far as

it

ts-eated of

in the Analytics

for the

we have not problem stated in them

I

useful for
:

our inquiries concerning substance.

mean

this 10

problem which we

\vherein_CQnsists
call
is

the unity of that,_the formula of

a definition, as for instance in the case of man,

for let
this

'two-footed animal';
hy, then,
this one,
in

be the formula of man.

viz.
'
'

and not many,

'

animal
*

'

and two'

oted
1

'

For
it

the case of

man

and

white

'

there

is 15

plurality

when one term does not belong

to the other, but a

ity

when

does belong and the subject, man, has a certain

*

1037^
Cf.

read

ovi' fl
ii.

'

An. Post.

Kara avfi^f^rjKos. 92* 29.

L a

; ;

1037^
attribute
;

METAPHYSICA
then a unity
is
'

20

produced and we have the In the present case, on the other hand that of white man one does not share in the other animal and two-footed the genus is not thought to share in its differentiae for then for the differentiae the same thing would share in contraries are contrary. divided And even if the by which the genus is genus does share in them, the same argument applies, since
for
'.

' ' '

the differentiae present in

feet,

man

are

many,

e.

g.

endowed with
;

two-footed, featherless.

Why

are these one and not

for

many ?
butes.
25

Not because they

But surely
all

are present in one thing

on

this principle a unity

can be made out of any set of

attri-

the attributes in the definition must be

is

one; for the definition

substance, so that
for substance
'

a single formula and a formula of

it must be a formula of some one thing means a one and a this as we maintain.
'
'

',

must first inquire about definitions arising out of diviThere is nothing in the definition except the firstsions. The other genera are the 30 named genus and the differentia ^ first genus and along with this the differentiae that are taken with it, e.g. the first may be 'animal the next animal which and again animal which is two-footed and is two-footed and similarly if the definition includes more terms. featherless J 1038^ And in general it makes no difference whether it includes many
'

We

',

',

'

',

or few terms,

two
e. g.
6 is

nor, therefore, whether it includes few or simply and of the two the one is differentia and the other genus, animal is genus, and the other in two-footed animal
'

'

'

genus absolutely does not exist apart from the species which it as genus includes, or if it
differentia.

If then the

exists but exists as matter (for the voice

is

genus and matter,

it),

but

its

differentiae

make
is

the kinds,

i.

e.

the letters, out of

clearly the definition

differentiae.

the formula

which comprises the

But
10
'

it is

also necessary in division to take the differentia of

is

the differentia; e.g. 'endowed with feet'

a differentia of
'

animal

'

again
'

we must know

the differentia of animal en-

dowed with feet qua endowed with feet. Therefore we must not say, if we are to speak rightly, that of that which is endowed with feet one part has feathers and one is featherless
^

:a

1037^ 30 read

Ka\

r)

8ia(popd.

Z.

BOOK

VII

1038*

if
it

we say

this v.e

say

it

through incapacity; we must divide

;

qua^ cloven-footed or not-cloven

;

for these are differentiae

in the foot

cloven-footedness
to go

is

a form of footedness.

And
species
15

we always want

on so

till

we come

to the

that contain no differences.

And
in

then there will be as

many

kinds of foot as there are differentiae, and the kinds of animals

endowed with
If then this
is

feet will

be equal

number

to the differentiae.

so, clearly the last differentia will

its definition,

be the subnot right to

;

stance of the thing and

state the

since

it is

jo

same things more than once in our definitions for it for when we say animal is superfluous. And this does happen which is endowed with feet, and two-footed we have said nothing other than 'animal having feet, having two feet' and if we divide this by the proper division, we shall be saying the same thing many times as many times as thereare differentiae.
;

'

'

If

then a differentia of a differentia be taken at each step,

differentia
if

25

one
but

the

last

will be the form and the substance

c.

we

divide according to accidental qualities,

g.

if

we
.

were to divide that which is endowed with feet into the white and the black, there will be as many differentiae as there are Therefore it is plain that the definition processes of division. is the formula which contains the differentiae, or, according to
the right method, the last of these.
if

Ij

H
30

This would be evident,

change the order of such definitions, e. g. that animal which is two-footed and endowed of man, saying

we were

to

'

with feet
footed'
for

endowed with feet is superfluous when twohas been said. But order is no part of the substance;
'

for

'

'

how

are
?

other prior

of divisions,

to think the one element posterior and the Regarding the definitions, then, which arise out let this much be taken as stated in the first place

we

35

as to their nature.

CHAPTER
substance.

XIII
is

Let us again return to the subject of our inquiry, which

1038^

As

the substrate and the essence and the com-

pound of these are called substance, so also is the universal. About two of these wc have spoken about the essence and
;

'

103S* 14 read dXX* g to

/leV.

1038"

METAPHYSICA
about the substrate, of which we have said that
it

underh'es in

j6

lo

15

two senses, either being an individual thing which is the way which an animal underlies its attributes or as the matter underlies the complete reality. The univer sal also is thought by some to be in the fullest sense a c ause, and a principle therefore let us attack the discussion of this point also. For it seems impossible that any universal term should be the name of a substance. For primary substance is that kind of substance which is peculiar to an individual, which does not belong to anything else but the universal is common, since that is called universal which naturally belongs to more than one thing. Of which individual then will this be the substance ? Either of all or of none. But it cannot be the substance of all and if it is to be the substance of one, this one will be the others also for things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves also one. Further, substance means that which is not predicable of
in
,

a subject, but the universal

is

predicable of

some

subject

always.

__,

^'

But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in way in which the essence is so, can be present in this, e.g. 'animal' can be present in 'man' and 'horse'. Then clearly there is a formula of the universal. And it makes no differthe

ence even
20

if
;

there
for

is

not a formula of everything that

less
'

is in

the

substance

none the
'

the universal will be the subthe substance of the individual

stance of something.

Man

is
;

same will happen must be the substance of that in which it is present as something peculiar to it. And further it is impossible and absurd that the individual, i.e. the
in
;

man

whom

it

is

present

therefore the
',

again

for a substance, e. g.

'

animal

substance,
25

if it
is e.

consists of parts, should not consist of substances

individual, but of quality
;

nor of what
substance,
i.

for that

which

is

not

the quality, will then be prior to substance and

to the individual.

Which
;

nor in time nor in knowledge

to the substance

for neither in formula can the affections be prior for then they would be separable from it.
is
;

impossible
^

Further, in Socrates there will be a substance

30 stance, so that
^

in

a sub-

he

will

be the substance of two things.

Cf. 1028* 32.
^

And
'man'.

in

1038'' 27 read

oi/'re

yvi^ini oior.

Sc

Z.

BOOK

VII
things
is
^

i038'>

general

it

follows,

if

man and such

in their

are substances, that

none of the elements

thing, nor does
else
;

formulae

the substance of any-

it

exist apart from the species or in anything

' '

no animal exists apart from the particular animals, nor does any other of the elements present in formulae exist apart.
I

mean,

for instance, that

If,

then,

we view

the matter from these standpoints,

is

it

is

35

plain that no universal attribute

plain also from the fact that

a substance, and this

is

no common predicate indicates 039*

If not,

'

this

',

but rather a
'

'

such

'.

many

difficulties follow

and especially the

third man'.^

The
sent in

conclusion

is

sideration
it

that a substance cannot consist of substances preif

evident also (i) from the following con-

actually (for things that are thus actually

actually one, though

two are never they are potentially two, they can be

two halves potentially; for them from one another
it will

one, e.g. the double line consists of

the actualisation of the halves divides

therefore
if

the substance

is

one,

not consist of sub10

stances present in

it); and (2) according to the argument which Democritus states rightly he says one thing cannot come from two nor two from one for he identifies his indivisible magnitudes with substances. It is clear therefore that the
; ;

same
is

will
is

hold good of number,

said

if
'

number
is

is

a synthesis of

units, as

by some

for

'

two

either not one, or there

15

no unit present

in it actually.

The consequence
a
'

of this view involves a difficulty.

If no

substance can consist of universals because a universal indicates

such

',

not a

'

this

',

and

if

of actual substances, every substance so that there

no substance can be composed would be incomposite,

But
it is

it is

thought by

would not even be a formula of any substance. all and has been previously stated ^ that
;

either only, or primarily, substance that can be defined

30

yet

seems that not even substance can. There cannot, then, be a definition of anything or rather in a sense there can be, and in a sense there cannot. And what we say will be plainer from what follows.*
it
; *

now

Sc.

tiijiriiiie
'

species.
*

'

Cf. A. 990'' 17.

Cf.

1031* II.

Cf. Z. 15, H. 6.

1039^

METAPHYSICA

CHAPTER XIV
It is clear also

from these very

facts

what consequences con-

front those
35 apart,

who say

the Ideas are substances and can exist

and at the same time make the Form consist of the genus and the differentiae. For if the Forms exist and animal is present in man and horse it is either one and the same in number, or different. (In formula it is clearly

'

'

'

',

one
30 in

for

he

who

states the formula unfolds the If there

is

same formula
'

either case.)

'

man-in-himself

who

is

an

1039*'

and exists apart, the parts of which he consists, animal and two-footed', must indicate individuals and e. g. be self-existents and substances therefore animal as well as man must be of this sort. Now (1) if animal which is in the horse and in man is one and the same, as you are one and the same with yourself, how will the one in things that exist apart be one, and how will this 'animal' escape being .divided even from itself?^ Further, (a) if it is to share in 'two-footed' and 'manyindividual
' '
' ' ;

',

',

'

',

'

'

',

footed

',

an impossible conclusion follows

it

for contrary attriit is

butes will belong at the same time to

although
is
'

one and
?

an individual,
5

(d)

If

it

does not, what

'

the relation implied

or
'

when one says the animal

or are
'

is

two-footed

has
'

feet

'

But
',

perhaps these concepts are put together and are

'
'

in contact

mixed
(2)

'.

Yet

all

these expressions are absurd.

to be different in each species.

But

suppose the
'

Form
' ;

10

number of things whose substance is animal for it is not by accident that 'man' has 'animal' for one of its elements. Further, 'animal-initself will be many. For {a) the animal in each species will be the substance of the species for it is not dependent on anything else if it were, that other would be an element in man i.e. would be the genus of man. And further (b) all the elements of which man is composed will be Ideas. Now r^othing c an be the Idea of one thing and the s ubstance^ of another; this is imp ossible. Each, then, of the Ideas_ present m the species of animals wTm)eThe~ideal animal. Further, from what will these Ideas be derived how wilj
there will be practically, an infinite
' ' '

Then

'

',

'

'

039^'

read xP'f avjov.

Z.

BOOK
is

VII
^

1039''

they be derived from the ideal animal

of 'animal'

whose essence

? Or how can an Idea simply 'animal'^ exist apart

15

from the ideal animal?

follow.

Further,

in

the case of sensible

still

things both these consequences and others

If,

more absurd
which

then, these consequences are impossible, clearly

in the sense in

jhere are n ot Forms of sensible things some maintain their existence.

CHAPTER XV
Since substance
is

of two kinds, the concrete thing and the 20

is

formula

(I

mean

that one kind of substance

is

the formula

taken with the matter, while another kind

its

the formula in

generality), substances in the former sense are capable of

destruction (for they are capable also of generation), but there

is

no destruction of the formula

course of being destroyed
is
;

in

the sense that

is

it

is

ever
it

in

for there

no generation of

(the being of house

this house),

not generated, but only the being of

25

but without generation and destruction formulae

;

are and are not

for

it

has been shown

this

that no one produces

there
is

nor makes these.

For

reason,

also,

neither

definition nor demonstration of sensible individual substances,

because they have matter whose nature

capable both of being and of not being
the individual instances of
;

is

such that they are

for

which reason
If

all 30

them are

destructible.

then

demonstration

scientific process,

of necessary truths and definition is a and if, just as knowledge cannot be sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance,, but the state which varies thus is opinion, so too demonstration and definiis

vary thus, but it is opinion that deals with that which can be otherwise than as it is, clearly there can neither 1040^
tion cannot

be definition nor demonstration of sensible individuals.

perishing things are obscure to those

For

who have knowledge

;

of them,

when they have passed from our perception and though the formulae remain in the soul unchanged, there will no longer be either definition or demonstration. Therefore
at definition defines

when one of those who aim

1

any

individual,

1039^ 15 read

fwoj',

1039'' 15 read nvrov fwou; u ova\.a tovto oiVo.

Ch. VIII.

I040*

METAPHYSICA
he must recognize that his definition

may

always be over-

thrown

for

it is

not possible to define such things.

lo

any Idea. For the Idea is, as its supporters say, an individual, and can exist apart and the formula must consist of words and he who defines must not invent a word (for it would be unknown), but the established words are common to each of a number of things these then must apply to something besides the thing defined e.g. if one were defining you, he would say 'an animal which is lean' or 'white', or something else which will apply also to some one other than you. If any one were to say that perhaps all the attributes taken
is it

Nor

possible to define

15

apart

may

belong to

only to this one,

many subjects, but together they belong we must reply firstly that they belong also to
'

20

both the elements, e. g. two-footed animal belongs to animal and to the two-footed. And where the elements are eternal this is even necessary, since the elements are prior to and parts of the compound nay more, they can also exist apart, if rnan can exist apart. For either neither or both can. If, then, neither can, the genus will not exist apart from the
' ;
'

'

species

but

if it
'

does, the differentia will also.

*
' '

Secondly,

we

must reply that animal and two-footed are prior in being to two-footed animal and things which are prior to others
'
'

are not destroyed

when the others

are.

Again,

if

the Ideas consist of Ideas (as they must, since

it

elements are simpler than the compound),

will

be further

necessary that the elements of which the Idea consists, e.g.

*

animal

'

and

'

two-footed

',

should be predicated of

many
will

sub-

25 jects.

If not,

how

will

they be known?

For there

then

be an Idea which cannot be predicated of more subjects than one. But this is not thought possible every Idea is thought

to be capable of being shared.

As

has been said, then, people do not realize that

it

is

impossible to define in the case of eternal things, especially

those which are unique, like the sun or the moon.
30 err

not only
still
'

by adding
exist,

attributes after
'

For they whose removal the sun

'
'

would
hidden

(for

e. g. going round the earth or from their view it follows that if it stands

night-

still

or

is visible,^ it will

no longer be the sun

^

but

it is

strange

if this

Sc, at night.

1040'^

32 omit nei

Z.

BOOK

VII
;

1040*

is

means a certain substance) but also by the mention of attributes which can belong to another subject;
so
;

for

'

the sun

'

e. g.

if

another thing with the stated attributes comes into

it

existence, clearly
general.

will

be a sun

the formula therefore

is

But the sun was supposed to be an individual, like 1040^ Cleon or Socrates. Why does not one of the supporters of the Ideas produce a definition of an Idea? It would become clear, if they tried, that what has now been said is true.

CHAPTER XVI
Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances,
5

most are only potencies,

;

e.g. the parts of animals (for

and when they are separated, then they too exist, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire and air for none of them is one, but they are like a heap ^ before it is fused by heat and some one thing is made out of the bits. One might suppose especially that the parts of living things and the corresponding parts of the soul are
none of them exists separately
;

10

both,

i.e.

exist in

complete reality as well as

in

potency, because
;

movement in something in their flexures for which reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature, not by force or even by growing together, for such a phenomenon is an abnormality.
they have sources of

15

substance of that which

used like the term 'being', and the one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be the substance, but we seek zvhat the principle is, that we may reduce the
Since the term
'

unity'

is

is

20

thing to something
or

more
',

intelligible.

Now

of these concepts

'being' and 'unity' are

'

more

substantial

than 'principle'

but not even the former are substance, since in general nothing that is common is substance for substance does not belong to anything but to itself

element

'

or

'

cause

and to that which has

^

it,

of which

it

is

the substance.

'

1040''

040^ 9 read ofoi' 6 impos. 24 read 7 awrg re.


io40^
25

METAPHYSICA
one cannot be in many things at the which is common is present in many so that clearly no universal exis ts things at the same time \r,A\\nAn^U apa^t^ from t\]f
Further, that which
is

same

time, but that

But those who say the Forms

in

exist, in

one respect are

;

right,

saying the Forms exist apart, if they are substances but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one
30 in

many

is

a Form.

The

reason for their doing this

is

that

they cannot say what are the substances of this sort, the imperishable substances which exist apart from the individual and sensible substances. They make them, then, the same
in

kind as the perishable things

himself and the 'horse itself, adding to the Yet even if we had not sensible things the word 'itself. 1041^ seen the stars, none the less, I suppose, would there be so eternal substances besides those things ^ which we knew that now also if we do not know what eternal substances

know)

'man

(for this

kind of substance

we

there are, yet

ji

it is

doubtless necessary that

some should

exist.

'5

Clearly, then, no universal term is the name and no substance is composed of substances.

of a substance,

CHAPTER XVII
Let us state what should be said to be the genus and the
differentia of substance, taking another

starting-point

for

perhaps from this we shall get a clear view also of that substance which exists apart from sensible substances.
then, substance
10
is

Since,
it

a principle and a cause,

let

us attack
in this

from

this^standpoint.
'

The

'

why

'

is

always sought
'

form

For to inquire why does an attribute attach to a subject ? is either man, to inquire why the musical man is a musical as we have said why the man is musical,- or it is something else. Now why a thing is itself is doubtless a meaningless inquiry for (to give meaning to the question why ',) the fact or
'

'

'

the existence of the thing must already be evident the

(e. g.
is

that

moon

is

eclipsed),

but the fact that a thing

I'i.

itself is
|

1041"* 2 read nnp 1 041'' 13 read fiia ri o I'lvSpoonns povaiKos ((ttiv.

I
'

Z.

BOOK

VII
all

1041*

the single reason and the single answer to

such questions as

man, or the musical musical',^ unless one were to answer because each thing is inseparable from itself and its being one just meant this. This, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question. But we can inquire why man is an animal of such and such a nature. Here, then, we are evidently not inquiring why he who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then, why something is predicable of something that it is predicable must be clear for if not, the inquiry is an inquiry into nothing. E. g. why does it thunder ? This is the same as why is sound produced in the clouds ? Thus the inquiry is about the predication of one thing of another. And why are certain things, i. e. stones and bricks, a house ? Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is the end, e. g. perhaps in the case of a house or a bed, and in some cases is the first mover for this also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in the case of being
the
is
'

why

man

'

'

'

20

'

25

'

30

also.

The
term
is

object of the inquiry

is

most overlooked where one

^ (e.

not expressly predicated of another

g.

when we
?
'

1041*'

inquire

why man
'

is),

because we do not distinguish and do

these parts form this whole

not say definitely

why do
if

But

we must

distinguish the elements in the concept before

;

we
is

jegin to inquire
significant or

not,

it is

not clear whether the inquir>'

unmeaning.
it

Since

we must know

the existence
is

of the thing and

the matter
is

must be given, clearly the question

thing, e.g.

why
5
is

some individual
is

why

are these materials

a house
present.

Because that which was the essence of a house

And why
a

this individual thing, or this

body

in

this state,

man

Th erefore what we

seek

is is

the cause,

i.e..

the form,
thing'
in
;

by reason of whic h the matter

this is t ne

some
is

definite

y.
10

and

substance of the thing.

Evidently, then,
possible
;

the case ot simple terms no inquiry nor teaching

9ur attitude towards

them

is

other than that of inquiry.

* Sc. and therefore in this case, joestion as to the ' why '.
''

when the

fact is

known, there

is

no

1041* 33 read

Kotr dXXi/Xui'.

1041^

METAPHYSICA
As
regards
^

that which
is

is

compounded out
its

of something-

so that the whole

one
is

not hke a heap,

is

however, but hke

is

a syllable,

the

syllable

not

elements, ba
;

not the

15

and earth for when they e. the flesh and the syllable, no are dissolved the wholes, longer exist, but the elements of the syllable exist, and so do The syllable, then, is something not only its fire and earth. elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else and the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and Since, then, that somethe cold, but also something else.

same

as b and , nor

flesh fire
i.

20

thing must be either an element or composed of elements,

it

(i) if
;

an element the same argument will again apply for flesh will consist of this and fire and earth and something still while (2) if it further, so that the process will go on to infinity is a compound, clearly it will be a compound not of one but of
is
;

many
25 flesh

(or else

it

will

itself

be that one),^ so that again

'

in

this case

we can

use the same argument as in the case of

would seem that this other is something, and not an element, and that it is the cause which makes this thing flesh and that a syllable. And similarly
or of the syllable.

But

it

'

in all other cases.

And

this

is

the substance of each thing

its

for this is the

primary cause of

being

and

since, while

some
30
*

things are not substances, as

many

as are substances are

formed by nature,^ their substance would seem to be this An nature ',* which is not an element but a principle. element is that into which a thing is divided and which is present in it as matter, e. g. a and b are the elements of the
syllable.
^ Not even the protasis of the sentence beginning 1041^ 1 1 is ever completed the parenthesis beginning i? Se auXXa/Sij, 1. 12, is so long that the original construction is forgotten. ^ 1041^ 23 read izKnovav (^ eKuvo avTO eorot). ^ 1041^ 29 omit Kara (jivaiv Kai. * Sc. the formal cause.
;

BOOK
We

VIII (H)
I

CHAPTER

must draw our conclusions from what has been said, 104a* and sum up our results, and put the finishing touch to our inquir)'. We have said ^ that the causes, principles, and 5
elements of substances are the object of our search.

And
some
*=

some substances

are recognized

by

all

thinkers, but

have been advocated by particular schools.

recognized are the natural substances,
air,
i.

Those generally
earth, water,

e. fire,

&c., the simple bodies

secondly, plants and their parts,

;

and animals and the parts of animals and finally the heavens and the parts of the heavens while some particular schools say that Forms and the objects of mathematics are sub;

10

stances.^

And

it

follows from our arguments that there are

other substances, the essence and the substratum.^

Again,

in

another

way

the genus seems

more

substantial than the species,

15

and the universal than the particulars.* And with the universal and the genus the Ideas are connected it is in virtue of the same argument that they are thought to be substances.^ And since the essence is substance, and the definition is a statement of the essence, for this reason we have discussed definition and essential predication. Since the definition is a formula, and a formula has parts, we had to consider " with respect to the notion of part ', what are parts of the substance and what are not, and whether the same things are also parts of the definition. Further, then,* neither the universcd nor
;
^'

'

20

the genus

is

a substance

we must
;

inquire later
for

into the exist

Ideas and the objects of mathematics

apart from sensible substances.

some say these

But now

let

us resume the
-

discussion
^

of the generally
^ * Cf. z. 13. Cf. z. 10, II.

Cf. z. I.

'
*

Cf. z. 14.

1042* 21 read tn

Cf. z. 3, 4. Cf. z. 2. Cf. z. 4. 5, 12. roli-vy. Cf. Z. 13.

'

Cf.

and N.

1042^
25

METAPHYSICA
recognized substances. These are the sensible substances, and sensible substances all have matter. The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter
I

mean
a

that which, not

'this'),

being a

'

this

'

actually,

is

poten-

tially

and
'

in

another sense the forrnula or 'form

30

can be separately formulated), and thirdly the complex of matter and form, which alone is generated and
(which being a
'this

destroyed, and
existence
;

is,

without qualification, capable of separate

for of substances in the sense of

formulae some are

separable and some are noi.

But clearly matter also is substance for n all the opposite c hanges that orr.iir th^ ;-^ is snniethino- which underlies the changes, e.g. in respect of place that which is now here and again 35 elsewhere, and in respect of increase that which is now of one size and again less or greater, and in respect of alteration that 1042^ which is now healthy and again diseased and similarly in respect of substance there is something that is now being generated and again being destroyed, and now ^ underlies the process as a this and again ^ underlies it as the privation of In this last change the others are involved. positive character. for 5 But in either one or two of the others this is not involved it is not necessary if a thing has matter for change of place that it should also have matter for generation and destruction.
;

"

'

'

CHAPTER
The
difference
in

II
in

between becoming

the

full

sense and

becoming
Physics.^
as matter

a qualified sense has been stated in our works on

generally recognized, and this
that which exists

Since the substance which exists as substratum and

is

is
is

10 potentially, it
_

remains for us to say what

the substance, in

the sense of actuality, of sensible things. Democritus seems to think there are three kinds of difference between things the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but

they
'.stion,

differ either in

rhythm,

i.

e.

shape, or in turning,

i.

e.

posi-

or in inter-contact,
differences
;

i.e. order.*

But evidently there are

are characterized

many
^

for instance,

some things
^

"

Cf. Phys. V. I,

Sc. in the case of destruction. De Gen. et Corr.

i.

2, 3.

Sc. in the case of generation. " Cf. A. 985^ 13.

H.

BOOK

VIII

104a*'

by the mode of composition of their matter, e. g. the things by mixture, such as honey-water; and others by being bound together, e. g. a bundle and others by being glued together, e. g. a book and others by being nailed together, e. g. a casket and othei s in more than one of these ways and others by position, e.g. the threshold and the lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way); and others by time, e. g. dinner and breakfast and others by place, e. g. the winds and others by the affections
formed
;

20

proper to sensible things,

e.

g.

hardness and softness, density

;

and

rarity,

dryness and wetness

defect.
;

and some things by some

all,

of these qualities, others by

them

and

in

general

some
'

by excess and some by

has just as
it

Clearly then the word

is

is

'

25

many meanings

a thing

a threshold because

its being means its means having been solidified in such and such a way. And the being of some Aings will be defined by all these qualities, because some parts of them are mixed, others are fused, others are bound together, others are solidified, and others possess the other differentiae e. g. the hand or the foot requires such complex definition. We must grasp, then, the kinds of differentiae (for
lies

in

such and such a position, and

lying in that position, while being ice

30

these will be the principles of the being of things), e.g. the

things characterized

by

the

more and the

less,
;

or

by the dense

ind the rare, and by other such qualities

zharacterized
:haracterized

for all these are

by excess and defect. And everything that is 35 by shape or by smoothness and roughness, is determined by the straight and the curved. And for other hings their being will mean their being mixed, and their not 1043* Jeing will mean the opposite. It is clear then from these acts that if its substance is the cause of each thing's being, we
nust seek in these differentiae the cause of the being of each )f these things. Now none of these differentiae is substance,

ven when coupled with matter, yet

nalogous to substance
lefinitions also
I
;

in

each there

is

something
is 5

and as
is

in

substances that which

itself,

redicated of the matter

it is

the actuality

in all

other
E.
g.

what most resembles

',

full actuality.
'

we had
AR.

to define a threshold,

such and such a position

UET.

we should say wood or stone and a house we should define as

2^1

1043^
bricks

METAPHYSICA
and timbers
'

(or we may name the purpose as well in some cases), and if we define ice I' we say water frozen or solidified in such and such a way 10 and harmony is such and such a blending of high and low
in

such and such a position

'

',

'

'

and similarly in all other cases. Obviously then the actuality or the formula
the matter
is

is

different

when

different

for in

some

cases

it is

the juxtaposition,

in others the

mixing, and in others some other of the attributes

we have named.
15

And

so, in defining,

those

who define a house

define
it

as stones, bricks,

and timbers, are speaking of the potential

;

house, for these are the matter

but those
^
;

who

as a

covering for animals and chattels, or add some other similar

differentia,

speak of the actuality

and those who combine

20

both of these speak of the third kind of substance, which is composed of matter and form. For the formula that gives the differentiae seems to be an account of the form and the actuality, while that which gives the components is rather an
account of the matter.

And

the

same

is

true with regard to

;

the definitions which Archytas used to accept

for

they are

E. g. what is still Absence of motion in a large extent of air air isi the matter, and absence of motion is the actuality and subWhat is a calm ? Smoothness of sea the material 25 stance. substratum is the sea, and the actuality or form is smoothness. It is obvious then, from what has been said, what sensibl e substance isandJiovjMtexists^one^ of it as matter, an othe r as fo rm or actuality while the third kind is that whichis _^ ^composed of these two.

accounts of the combined form and matter.

weather?

CHAPTER
We
30

III
it is

must not forget that sometimes

e. g.

not clear whetl

name means
a

the composite substance, or the actuality

'

form,
'

whether

house

'

is

a sign for the composite thing

a covering,' and whethe:
',

covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus anc

'

thus,' or for the actuality or form,

a line
35''

is
is

'

twoness
'

in length

'

or
'

'

twoness
'

animal

a soul in a body
1

or
Tr]V

a soul
evipyeiav.

'.

and whether ar For soul is th<

1043* 18 read

U.

BOOK

VIII
;

1043^
'

substance or actuality of
I

some body
same

but

animal

'

might be

applied to both, not that both are definable

thing.
is

by one formula
this question,*

jbut because they refer to the

But

while important for another purpose,

the inquiry into sensible substance
;

of no importance for

for the essence certainly 1043*'

''

For soul and to be soul are the same, but to be man and man are not the same, unless indeed the soul is to be called man and thus on one interpretation the thing is the same as its essence, and on
attaches to the form and the actuality.
'
'

'

'

'

'

another
If

it is

not.
is

we

consider 2

the letters
tion.

we find that the syllable + juxtaposition, nor is the house

this is right
;

not produced by

bricks + juxtaposi-

And

for the juxtaposition or

it

mixing

is

not
the not
,

produced by those things of which

mixing.

is

the juxtaposition or
e. g. if
is

And
is

the

same

is

true in the other cases,

hreshold

characterized

by

its

position, the position

is

produced by the threshold, but rather the latter

produced by he former. Nor is man animal + biped, but there must be something besides these, if these are matter, something which s neither an element in the whole nor produced by an element, )ut is the substance, which people state when- they eliminate he matter. If then this is the cause of the thing's being, and f the cause of its being is its substance,^ they must be stating he substance itself.

10

vithout being ever in course of being destroyed,

must be destructible and must lave come to be without ever being in course of coming to be. Jut it has been proved and explained elsewhere * that no one
This, then,
either be eternal or
it

must

15

lakes or generates the form, but

lade,
i.

it

is

the individual that

is

is

e.

the complex of form and matter that

generated.
io

Vhether the substances of destructible things can exist apart,

not yet at
1

all

clear

except that obviously this

is

impossible
exist apart

some

cases

in the case of things which cannot

e. g.

om

the individual instances,

house or

utensil.

Perhaps
for

either these things themselves, nor

any of the other things

;

hich are not formed

*
* '

by

nature, are substances at all

one

'

Sc. whether the name means the form or the concrete thing. Aristotle returns to the subject discussed in Chapter II. * Cf. Z. 8. 1043'' 14 read ovaia toCto, avTtiV. Cf, .i. IOI7'' I4-I5,

'

io43^

METAPHYSICA
might say that the nature
in

natural

objects

is

the

only

substance to be found in destructible things.

Therefore the difficulty which was raised by the school of

25

Antisthenes and other such uneducated people has a certain

30

what cannot be defined but of what ^) sort a thing, e. g. silver, is, they thought it possible to explain, not saying what it is but that it is like tin. Therefore one kind of substance can be defined and formulated, i. e. the composite kind, whether it be the object of sense or of reason but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be defined, since a definitory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other that of form.
appropriateness.
(for

They stated

that the

'

'

the definition so called

is

'

long formula

'

It

is

also obvious that,

if

all

substances are in a sense

^^

numbers, they are so

in this sense

and

not, as

numbers
35 is

of units.

For

definition

is

a sort of

some say, as number for (i) it

;

and into indivisible parts (for definitory formulae are not infinite), and number also is of this nature. And (2) as when one of the parts of which a number consists has beer taken from or added to the number, it is no longer the samej number, but a different one, even if it is the very smallest
divisible,

1044^ part that has been taken

away

or added, so the definition anc

the essence will no longer remain

taken away or added.

thing in virtue of which

And
it is

(3)

the

when anything has beer number must have some

^

one, while our opponents canno

it is

say what makes

or
if

it

one

(for

not one
it is

but a sort of heap

lo

makes one out o and the definition is one, but similarly they canno say what makes it one. And this is natural for the sam< reason is applicable, and substance is one in the sense whicl we have explained, and not, as some say, by being a sort o unit or point each is a complete reality and a definite nature And as number does not admit of the more and the less neither does substance, in the sense of form, but if any sub stance does, it is only the substance which involves matt
it is,
;

we ought

to say

what

that

many)

^ Sc. and therefore cannot give the essence, which contemptuous meaning oi fxuKpos Xo'yos- cf. N. 1091* 8. 2 1044* 4 read ripi els' eh yap ova iariv.

is

simple.

For

I
if all

H.

BOOK

VIII

1044^

this

then suffice for an account of the generation andi

destruction of so-called substances

and in what sense impossible to number.

what sense possible and of the reduction of things]

in
it is
I

CHAPTER

IV
15

Regarding material substance we must not forget that even things come from the same first cause ^ or have the same things for their first causes, and if the same matter serves as starting-point for their generation, yet there is a matter proper to each, e. g. the sweet or the fat is the proximate matter of phlegm, and the bitter, or something else, that of bile though perhaps these come from the same original matter. And there come to be several matters for the same thing,

20

when the one matter is matter for the other, e. g. phlegm comes from the fat and from the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet and it comes from bile by analysis of the bile into For one thing comes from another in its ultimate matter. because it will be found at a later stage of either senses, two
;

development, or because
into
its

it is

produced

if

the other
is

is

analysed
2^

original constituents.

When

the matter

one, different

things

moving cause, ^g. from wood may be made both a chest and a bed. But wjfie different things must have their matter different, e. g. 1 saw could not be made of wood," nor is this in the power of he moving cause for it could not make a saw of wool or of .vood. But if, as a matter of fact, the same thing can be Tiade of different material, clearly the art,a. e. the moving 30 for if both the matter and the moving Dfinciple, is the same jrinciple were different, the product would be too. When one inquires what is the cause, one should, as causes are spoken of in several senses, state all the possible. :ause s. E. g. what is the material cause of man ? The nensts. What is the moving" cause? The sevieti. The 35
in the
;

may

be produced owing to difference

'

brmal cause? His essence. The final cause His end. Jut perhaps the latter two are the same. We must state 1044* he proximate causes. W^hat is the material cause ? Not

ire

or

eai-th,

but the matter peculiar to the thing.

'

Sc. material cause.

1044^'

METAPHYSICA
really these

Regarding gencrable natural substances, if the causes are and of this number and we have to learn the causes, we must inquire thus, if we are to inquire rightly.

But

in

the case of natural

but eternal substances another

account must be given. For perhaps some have no matter, or not matter of this sort but only such as can be moved in Nor does matter belong to those things respect of place.

which exist by nature but are not substances

is

their

substratum
eclipse
?

the substance.
is

E.

g.

lo

What
which

its

matter?
eclipse.^
?

what There

is is
is

the

cause of an

suffers

What
The

none; the moon is that the moving cause which

extinguishes the light

earth.

The
is

final

cause perhaps

does not exist.

but this
is

The formal
if it
?

principle

the definitory formula,

obscure

does not include the cause.^

E.
'

g.

what
15

is

eclipse

Deprivation of light.
',

But

if

we add
it is

by

interposition of the earth

this

is
it

the formula which includes

is

the cause.

In the case of sleep

not clear what

that

proximately has this affection. Surely the animal, it will be Yes, but the animal in virtue of what, i. e. what is the said.

20

proximate subject? The heart or some other part. Next, by what is it produced ? Next, what is the affection that of the proximate subject, not of the whole animal ? Shall we say that it is immobility of such and such a kind ? Yes, but to what process in the proximate subject is this due ?

CHAPTER V
j

Since some things are and are not, without coming to be

and ceasing to
in

be,

e.

g. points, if

they can be said to

it is

be,

general forms and shapes (for

to be

not 'white

'

that

and comes

to be, but the

25

wood comes to be white, if everything that comes from something and comes to be something), not all contraries can come from one another, but it| is in different senses that a white man comes from a black!' Nor jms. everything^ man, and white comes from black. matter, but only those things which come to be and changej
comes
' i.e. the substratum of a substance is^bare matter, but the substratum of an attribute is a determinate substance such as the moon. ' Sc. the efficient cause.

H.
into one another.

BOOK

VIII

1044*

in course of changing, are or are not,

Those things which, without ever being have no matter.

There
thing
is

is

difficulty in the question

its

how

the matter of each

g. if the body is 30 and disease is contrary to health, is it potentially both healthy and diseased ? And is water potentially wine and vinegar ? We answer that it is the matter of one in virtue of its positive state and its form, and of the other in virtue of the privation of its positive state and the

related to

contrary states.

E.

potentially healthy,

corruption of

it

contrary to

its

nature.

It is also

hard to say

why wine
tially

is

not said to be the matter of vinegar nor potenis

vinegar (though vinegar

produced from

it),

and

why

35

the living

man

is

not said to be potentially dead.

In fact
1045"

they are not, but the corruptions

in question are accidental,

is

and
its

it is

the matter of the animal that

itself^ in virtue of
it

corruption the potency and matter of a corpse, and

is

is

water that
the

the matter of vinegar.

night

other as

from day.

And

For the one comes from all the things which

change thus into one another must be reduced to their matter, from a corpse is produced an animal, the corpse is first reduced to its matter, and only then becomes an animal and vinegar is first reduced to water, and only then becomes
e. g. if

wine.

CHAPTER
To
respect to definitions and numbers,

VI
what

^r^

return to the difficulty which has been stated

is

with

the cause of the

unity of each of them

several parts

In the case of all things which have ? which the whole is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the totality is something besides the parts, there is a cause^fjjnii^ for as regards material things contact is the cause in some cases, and in others viscidity or some other such quality. And a definition is a set of words which is one not by

and

in

10

being connected together, like the Iliad, but by dealing with one obiect.:r-\\^at then is it that ma kes man one why is he one and not many, e. g. animal + biped, especially if there are,
;

15

as

some
'

say,

an ideal animal and an ideal biped?

read
oiV;j.
*

Why are

1045a

Cf. Z. 12, H. 1044=* 3-6.

'

io45^

METAPHYSICA
not those Ideas the ideal
participation not in

%
men would
exist

man ^
in

so that

by

man, nor

20

25
*

30

and biped ? And in than one thing, animal and biped. Clearly, then, if people proceed thus in their usual manner of definition and speech, they cannot explain and solve the difficulty. But if, as we say one element is matter and anothe r is form, and one is jpotentially and the ot her actuall y^ For this the question will no longer be thought a ditticulty^ difficulty is the same as would arise if 'round bronze' were the definition of i^ for this symbol would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question is, what is the cause of the unity of round and bronze ? The difficulty What disappears, because the one is matte r, the other form then is the cause of this the reason why that which was what except, in the case of things potentially is actually, which are generated, the agent? For there is no other reason
,

one Idea, but in two, animal general man would be not one but more

'

'

'

'

why

the potential sphere becomes actually a sphere, but this

either.^

was the essence of

reason,
35

Of matter some

is

the object of
is

some of

sense,
is

and part of the formula

is

always
a figure

matter and part

actuality, e.g. the circle

(i)

which

(2) is plane.*

1045'' either for

reason or for sense, each

,

a kin d of unity as

it

But of the things which have no matter, is by its nature essentially is essentially a kind of being individual

"substance, quality, or quantity.

I

And

so neither

'

existent

'

nor

'one'

is

present in definitions, and an essence

it is

is

by
This

its is

very

nature a kind of unity as

a kind of being.
itself for

why

none of these has any reason outside

5 for

being one, nor

being a kind of being

for each

is

by

its

nature a kind of

being and a kind of unity, not as being

or
' '

in the

genus

'

being

one nor in the sense that being and unity can exist apart from particulars. Owing to the difficulty about unity some speak of partici'
'

' ^

1045** 17
'

X'

is

read avTodudpcowos. used to represent the Greek inanov,

lit.

'

cloak.'

Cf. Z.

1029'
t^
'

28,

dt;

//iL 18*9.

' i.e. it was the essence of form to unite with matter, and of matter unite with form. * The definition is incomplete, but sufficient to show the presence

matter (genus) and form

(differentia).

H.
ition

BOOK

VIII

1045

tion
'

', and raise the question, what is the cause of participaand what is it to participate and others s^eak of communion ',' as Lycophron says knowledge is a communion of knowing with the soul and others say life is a composition or connexion of soul with body. Yet the same account applies to all cases for being healthy will be either a communion or a connexion or a composition of soul and health, and the fact that the bronze is a triangle will be a composition of bronze and triangle, and the fact that a thing is white will be a composition of surface and whiteness. The reason is that people look for a unifying formula, and a difference, between potency and complete reality. But, as has been said, the proximate matter and the form are one a nd the same thing, the one potentially, the other actually. Therefore to ask the cause of their being one is like asking the cause of unity in general for each t hing is a unity, and the poten tial and the actual are somehow oneT Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is something which caused the moyement from potency into actuality. And all things which haye ;/<' mattef are zcitJioiit qualification
:

10

'

'

'

'

15

essentially unities.
*

1045'' 10

omit

"^v-xji^.

BOOK
We
which
30

IX

(0)
I

CHAPTER
have treated
all

of that

which

is

primarily

and to

the other categories of being are referred

i.

e.

of

substance.

For

it

is

in virtue of the

concept of substance

that the others are said to be

like
;

quantity and quality and the

And
since
'

for all will

be found to involve the concept of substance,

first

as

we
in

said in the

part of our work.^

'

being

'

is in
is

one way divided into

another

what

',

quality,

and quantity, and

way

distinguished in respect of potency and

let

complete
35

reality,

and of function,

us discuss potency and

reality. First let us explain potency in the strictest which is, however, not the most useful ^ for our present 1046^ purpose. For potency and actuality extend further than the mere sphere of motion. But when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality^ explain

complete

sense,

the other kinds of potency.

have pointed out elsewhere *' that potency and the word can have several senses. Of these we may neglect For all the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. some are called so by analogy, as in geometry and ^ we say things can be or cannot be because in some definite way they
'
'

We

'

'

are or are not.

But
10

all

potencies that conform to the

same type are

starting-

on^ primary_kind_ points, and of potency, which is a starting-point of change in another thing For one kind is a potency of or in the thing itself qua other. being acted on, i. e. the principle in the very thing acted on,
are called potencies in reference to

which makes

it

another thing or by
*

capable of being changed and acted on by and another kind itself regarded as other
;

' "

Cf. r. 1003* 33 and Z. I. Cf. e. 1048* 27. 1046* 7 read colon after ytwutTpla.

1045^ 36 read xpW^H^^'rdTT]. Cf. A. 12. Cf. A. 1019'' 22-33 and note.
^
*

a BOOK
-

IX
change
In
for

1046^

state of insusceptibility to

the worse and

itself

to destruction
other, i.e.
is

by another thing or by the thing

principle of change.
in
all

qua
|;i

by a

these definitions

implied the formula of potency

the primar}- sense.

And

again these so-called potencies are potencies either of acting

merely or of being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that even in the formulae of the latter the formulae
of the prior kinds of potency are
,

somehow
be
'

implied.

Obviously, then in a sense the potency of acting and of being

acted on
it

is

one

(for

a thing

may

capable

'

either because 20

can be acted on or because something else can be acted

on by it), but in a sense the potencies are different. For the it is because it contains one is in the thing acted on a certain motive principle, and because even the matter is a motive principle, that the thing acted,, on is acted on, one thing by one, another by another for that which is oily is iiiflavunable, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed -y^ and similarly in all other cases. But the other 25 potency is in the agent, e. g. heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build. And so in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things. And want of potency, or powerlessness, is the privation which is contrary- to potency of this sort, so 30 that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding want of potency. Privation has several senses for it means (i) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either [a) in general or {b) when it might naturally have it, and either (i) in some particular way, e. g. when it completely fails to have it, or (ii) when it in any degree fails to have it. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they 35
:

suffer privation.
'
i.

e. is

What

the event would .not happen if the passive factor were different. oily cannot necessarily be crushed, nor what is yielding burnt.

1046^

METAPHYSICA

CHAPTER
'

II

Since some such principles are present in soulless things,

in things

and others
rational

possessed of soul, and

in soul

and

in

the

1046^ rational part of the soul, clearly

and some

will
is

some potencies will be nonbe accompanied by knowledge of a

yJ)

rational formula. This

why

all arts,
;

i.

e. all

productive forms

of knowledge, are potencies

in

they are principles of change

another thing or in the artist himself considered as other./

And
5

each of those which are accompanied by reason

the hot
is

is

alike capable of contrary effects, but

one non-rational power

capable only of heating,

produces one effect

e. g.

but the medical art can produce both disease and health.

The
same
10

reason

is

that science

is

a rational formula, and the a thing and

in
its

rational formula explains

privation,

only not in the same

way

and

a sense

it

applies to both,
fact.

but

in

a sense

it

applies rather to the positive

Therefore

15

must deal with contraries, but with one in virtue of their own nature and with the other not in virtue of their nature for the rational formula applies to one object in virtue of that object's nature, and to the other, in a sense, accidentally. For it is by denial and removal that it explains the contrary for the contrary is the primary privation, and this is the entire removal of the positive term. Now since on the
such sciences
; ;

one hand contraries do not occur in the same point of reality, but on the other hand science is a potency which depends on the possession of a rational formula, and the soul possesses a principle of movement therefore, on the one hand, the
;

wholesome produces only health and the

20

calorific

only heat and

the frigorific only cold, but the scientific man, on the other

For there is a effects. which applies to both, though not in the same way, and it is in a soul which possesses a principle of movement so that the soul will start both processes from And the same principle, applying them to the same object.
hand, produces both the contrary
rational formula
;

so the things

whose potency

is

according to a rational formula

is

act contrariwise to the things

whose potency

non-rational

for

the products of the former arc included under one principle, the rational formula.

0.
It is

BOOK

IX

1046*
25

obvious also that the potency of merely doing a thing

it

done to one is implied in that of doing it or having it done icell. but the latter is not always implied in the former for he who does a thing well must do it, but he who does it merely need not do it well.
or having
:

CHAPTER
There are some who
a thing
'

III

say, as the

Megaric school does, that

acting,
3

acting

and when it is not he who is not building cannot build, but only he who is building, when he is building and so in all other cases. It is not hard to see the absurdities that
can
'

act only
'

when

it

is

it

'

cannot

act, e. g.

attend this view.

For

it is

clear that

on

this

view a

man

will not
is

be a builder

to be able to build), and so with the other arts. If, then, it is impossible to have 35 such arts if one has not at some time learnt ^ and acquired them, and it is then impossible not to have them if one has not sometime lost them (either by forgetfulness or by some 1047^ accident or by time for it cannot be by the destruction of the object itself,- for that lasts for ever), a man will not have the art when he has ceased to use it, and yet he may immediately build again how then will he have got the art ^ ? And similarly with regard to lifeless things nothing will be either
is
;

unless he

building (for to be a builder

cold or hot or sweet or perceptible at all

if

people are not

perceiving

it

so that the upholders of this view will have to

maintain the doctrine of Protagoras. But, indeed, nothing will

even have perception

perception.
it
If,

if it

is
is

not perceiving,

i.

e.

exercising

its

then, that

blind which has not sight though

would naturally have it, when it would naturally have it and when it still exists, the same people will be blind many times in the day and deaf too. Again, if that which is deprived of potency is incapable, that

10

1046^ 37 read yMBovra.

object of knowledge is always a form, which is eternal. The matter which makes things perishable is no object for knowledge. ' The protasis here states facts, the apodosis states a conclusion which follows from the Megaric theory, and the final question states a difficulty which follows from the apodosis.
*

The

1047^

METAPHYSICA
^ will be incapable of happening but incapable of happening which is that it is he who says of that or will be will say what is untrue for this is what incapacity meant. Therefore these views do away with both movement and becoming. For that which stands will always stand, and if it is sitting it will not get that which sits will always sit up for that which, as we are told, cannot get up will be incapable of getting up. But we cannot say this, so that evidently

which

is

not happening

15

but these views make potency and actuality are differen t the same, so that it is no small thing potency and actuality
;

they are seeking to annihilate.

possible that a thing may be capable of and capabl e of not being and yet be, and simiit may be capable of larly with the other kinds of predicate walking and yet not walk, or capable of not walking and yet And a thing is capable of doing something if there is walk.^ nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which

Therefore

it

is

being a nd not
1

be,

25

Jt

is

said to have the capacity.

is

mean

for instance,
it
;

if

thing

capable of sitting

and

it is

open to

to

sit,

there will

30

and similarly if moving or of standing or making to stand or of being or coming to be, or of not being or not coming to be. The word actuality which we connect with complete reality', has, strictly speaking, been extended from movements to other things for actuality ^ in the strict sense is And so people do not assign identified with movement. movement to non-existent things, though they do assign some
be nothing impossible
it

in its actually sitting

is

capable of being

moved

or

'

'

',

other predicates.
35

E.g. they say that non-existent things are

objects of thought and desire, but not that they are

moved

and
1047''

ex hypothesi they do not actually exist, they would have to exist actually if they were moved. For of non-existent things some exist potentially but they
this because, while
;

do not
^
'^

exists

because they do not -exist

\n

complete

reality.

1047* II read yivo/ifvor. 1047* 23 read km fir] ^aSiCeiv tvmrop 1047^ 32 read fj tvfpyna.

umL

^adlCop, following A. BuUinger.

0.

BOOK

IX

1047

CHAPTER
If
in
it

IV
^

what we have described^ so far as the two things are

is

identical with the capable

logically convertible, evidently

cannot be true to say 'this is capable of being but will not be ', a view which leads to the conclusion that there is

nothing incapable of being.

(one

Suppose,

for instance, that a

man

who

did not understand the meaning of 'incapable of

is

being ') were to say that the diagonal of the square

capable

of being measured but will not be measured, because a thing

may be
that
if

capable of being or coming to be, and yet not be or

be about to be.

But from the premises this necessarily follows, we actually suppose that which is not, but is capable

10

of being, to be or to have

come

to be, there will be nothing

zvill

impossible in this

but the result

be impossible, for the

actual measuring of the diagonal

For the false and the impossible are not the same that you are standing now is false, but that you should be standing is not impossible. At the same time it is clear that if, when A is real, B must be real, then, when A is possible,^ B also must be possible. For if B need not be possible, there is nothing to prevent its not being possible. Now let A be supposed possible. Then, when A is possible, nothing impossible would follow \{ A were supposed to be real and then B must of course be real. But we supposed B to be impossible. [Let it be impossible, then. If, then, B is impossible, A also must be so. But A was supposed possible therefore B also is possible.]* If, then, A is possible, B also will be possible, if they were so related that if A is real, B must be real. If, then, A and B being thus related:^ B is not possible on this condition,^ A and B will not be related as was supposed." And if when A is possible, B must be possible, then if A is real, B must also be real. For to say that B must be possible, if A is possible,
is

impossible.
;

15

ao

25

1047'' 3 read t6 dpijfUvop t6 Swaroy. 1047^ 15 readoi^os thai tov'A. * 1047*" 20 eoTO) 22 B apa is probably spurious. * Sc. so related that if the reality of implies the reality of the possibility of implies the possibility of B.
'

Cf. 1047* 24-26.

'

'

Sc. if is possible. Sc. so related that the reality of

implies the reality of B.

'

io47^

METAPHYSICA
means that
if

is

real

both at the time when and

real,

in

the

way
must

30 in

which then and

it

was supposed capable of being

also

in that

way be

real.

CHAPTER V
come by power of playing the flute, or by leati3J.ng, like artistic potency, those which come by practice or by rational formula we must acquire by previous exercise, but this is not necessary with those which are not of this nature and which imply passivity. Since that which is capable is capable of something and 35 1048* at some time and in some way with all the other qualifications which must be present in the definition and since some things can work according to a rational formula and their
all

As

potencies are either i nnat e, like the senses, or

practice, like the

'

'

potencies involve a formula, while other things are non-rational

and their potencies are non-rational, and the former potencies must be in a living thing, while the latter can be both in the
5

living

and

in

the

lifeless

as regards potencies of the latter kind,

when

the agent and the patient meet in the

way appropriate

to the potency in question, the one

must act and the other

10

be acted on, but with the former kind of potency this is not For the non-rational potencies are all productive of one effect each, but the rational produce contrary effects, so that if they produced certain effects necessarily they would produce contrary effects at the same time but this is impossible. That which decides, then, must be something else; For whichever of two things I mean by this, desire or will.
necessary.
;

the animal desires decisively,

it

will do,

when it

is in

the circum-

stances appropriate to the potency in question and meets the

passive object.

Therefore everything which' has a rational

it

potency,

when

desires that for which

it

it

has a potency and

passive object

in

the circumstances in which

has the potency, must do

this.
is

And
act.
is
is

it

has the potency

is

in

question
;

when the
not
it

present and

in a certain state
'

if

will

not be able to
it

To add

the qualification
;

if

nothing external prevents

not further necessary

a potency of acting,

for

it it

has the potency

is

in so far as this

and

this not in all circumstances

a BOOK
but on certain conditions,
sion of external hindrances;

IX
will

1048*

among which

be the exclu-

for these are barred

by some

ao

of the positive qualifications.

things at

rational wish, or an appetite, to

so even if one has a do two things or contrary the same time, one cannot do them for it is not on
;

And

these terms that one has the potency for them, nor

is it

potency of doing both. at the same time, since one the things which it is a potency of doing.

will

do just

CHAPTER
Since

VI
is 25

we have

treated
let

of the kind of potency which

its

related to
its

movement,

us discuss actuality,

genus and
it

differentia.

In the course of our analysis

will

also

become
thing

clear,

with regard to the potential, that

whose nature it is to moved by something else, either without qualification or in some particular way, but also use the word in another sense, in the pursuit of which we have discussed these previous senses. Actuality- means the existence of th e thin^^ot in the way which we express by potentially' we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and we call even the man who is not
ascribe potency to that
else,

we not only move some-

or to be

30

'

studying a

man

of science,

if

he

is

capable of actually studying

a particular problem.ticular cases

Our meaning can be seen in the par- 35 by induction, and we must not seek a definition of

everything but be content to grasp the analogy,

that as that
is

which

is

building

is

to that which

is

capable of building, so
is

1048*'

the waking to the sleeping, and that which

seeing to that
is

which has

its

eyes shut but has sight, and that which

shaped

out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been

wrought up to the unwrought. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the 5 other. But all things are not said in the same sense to exisr actually, but only by analogy as ^ is in 5 or to B, C is in
' '

or to Z?
as

movement to potency, and determinate substance to some sort of matter.

:

for

some

are as

the others-

Cf. e. 1-5.
J^

1048" 35 read rofk.

KH. MET.

I048''

METAPHYSICA
The
infinite

lo exist

potentially

and the void and all similar things are said to and actually in a different sense from that

in which many other things are said so to exist, e. g. that which sees or walks or is seen. For of the latter class these predicates can at some time be truly asserted without qualification for the seen is so called sometimes because it is being But the seen, sometimes because it is capable of being seen.
;

infinite

does not exist potentially

in
;

the sense that

separateness

it

will ever

actually have separate existence

15

its

is

only

in

knowledge.
but not that

For the
it

fact that

division

never ceases to be

possible gives the result that this actuality exists potentially,

exists separately.
is

Since of the actions which have a limit none

all

an end but
'

are relative to the end,

e. g.

'

the process of making thin

is

of

20 this sort

\ and the things themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e. without being already
that at which the
least not a

movement
is

aims), this
it

is

not an action or at
;

complete one
is

(for

is

not an end)
E.
g.

but that

in

which the end

present

an action.^

at the same time

we

are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have

:

understood, are thinking and have thought

that at the

but

it is

not true

25

30

same time we are learning and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured. At the same time we are living well and have lived well^ and are happy and have been happy. If not, the process would have had sometime to cease, but, as it is, it does not as the process of making thin ceases cease we are living and have lived. Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other For every movement is incomplete making thin, actualities. learning, walking, building these are movements,^ and incomFor it is not true that at the same time we plete movements.
:

are walking and have walked, or are building and have built,

coming to be and have come to be, or are being moved and have been moved, but if we are being moved and have been moved, what is moving us is different from what has
or are
^ 1048^ 19 read olov t) laxfauia. larxvaaia a means to health. * 1048^ 22 read (Keivr] Knl Trpa^n. fi ' 1048'' 30 read avrni 8rj Kivfjcreis.
.

is

presumably viewed as


0.

BOOK

IX
that at the

1048^

moved

us.
is

But

it is

the
is

same thing

same time has

seen and

seeing, or

thinking and has thought.

The latter

sort of process, then, I call an actuality,

and the former a

movement.

CHAPTER
The genus and
distinguish

VII

the differentia of the actual

may be

taken as

?5

explained by these and similar considerations.

But we must
it

when a thing

exists potentially

and when
is

does

not

for

it is

not at any and every time.

man ? No but rather when it has already become seed^ 1049^ and perhaps not even then, as not everything ^ can be healed by
tially a

E. g.

earth poten-

the medical art or

by

luck, but there

it,

is

a certain kind of thing

and only this is potentially healthy. And (i) the definition of that which as a result of thottght comes to exist actually from having existed potentially is that when it has been willed it comes to pass if nothing external hinders it, while the condition on the other side viz. in that which is
is

which

capable of

healed
there
i.

is

is

that nothing in

it

hinders the result.

Similarly

is

potentially a house,

if

nothing

in

the thing acted on

10

e.

in

the matter

prevents

it

there

nothing which must

;

from becoming a house, and if be added or taken away or

is

changed
of
is

this is potentially

a house, and the same

true

all

other things for which the source of their becoming

external.
is

And
in

(2) in

the cases in which the source of the

all

becoming
be
it

the very thing which suffers change,

those

things are said to be potentially something else, which will

of themselves
is
if

nothing external hinders them.

E. g.
15

the seed

not yet potentially a

in a foreign
it

man

for

it

must further

undergo a change
its

medium.

But when through

own motive

principle

has already got such and such already potentially a

attributes, in this state

in
is

it is

man

while

the former state

it

needs another principle, just as earth

it

not yet potentially a statue, for

must change

in

order

to

become
It

brass.call

seems that when we

2

a thing not something else but

1049*

read

ttrtoy,

wtrTrep oide.

classes marked by (i) respectively, but at the end (2)

^

The

and
is

(2) are the works of art illustrated by an example

and of nature from (i).


1049^
'

'

METAPHYSICA
of
that something
is

(e. g.
'

a casket

is

not

'

wood but
'

'

of

wood
'

',

20

and wood
haps

not

earth

but

'

made

of earth

',

and again per^

in the

same way earth

is

not something else

is

but

made

always- potentially (in the full sense of that word) the thing which comes after it in this series. E. g. a casket is not earthen nor earth but wooden for wood is potentially a casket and is the matter of a casket, wood in general of a casket in general, and this
'

of

that something), that something

'

'

',

'

'

particular
first

wood of
'

this particular casket.

And

if

there
else,
is
'

is

thing, which

25 said

to be
air is

of

it

',

no longer is called after something this is prime matter e. g. if earth

;

and

airy

and
is

'

fiery

',

but

fire

is

not thus called after anything

if it

else, fire^ is

prime matter; while the ultimate substratum,

is is

an individual,

not matter but substance.

differentiated

For the subject *

is

or substratum

by being an individual or
an individual
is

not being one; the substratum of accidents

such as a man,
30
'

i.

e.

body and
'
'

soul,
'.

while the accident

(The subject is called, music but musical and the man is not whiteness but white and not ambumoving lation or which or movement but walking
something like musical or white when music is implanted in it, not
'
' ' '

'

',

'

',

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

',

is

another instance of the derivative predicate.)

then,

Wherever
but
or individual

this is so,
,

the

ultimate subject
is

is

a substance;

when

this is

not so but the predicate

is

form

3|5

character, the ultimate subject

stance.
'

matter and material subacci-

And

it

is

only right that the derivative term should

1049''

be used with reference both to the matter and to the

dents
;

both are indeterminates."* We have stated, then, when a thing is to be said to exist potentially and when
for
it

is

not.

* 1049* 21 read et fKcivo. 1049^ 20 read yr] d ovtwj fifj aXXo, 1049^ 26 read dtjp nvpivos, to Se rrvp [xrj /car' rtXXos to nvp. So perhaps Alexander. * 1049^ 27 read to KaQ' ol, following O. Apelt. Cf. r. 1007^ 34. S Aristotle points out that there are two kinds of derivative predicates those derived from the matter of the subject, like fiery ', and those formed from the accidents of the subject, like musical '. Matter and accidents have this in common, that they are indeterminate i. e. not confined to one He mentions at the same special subject as essential predicates are. time that there are two kinds of substratum the bare matter which underlies form or essence, and the complete individual which underlies Cf. Z. 1038^ 5. accidents. ^

'

'

; '

0.

BOOK

IX
VIII

1049''

CHAPTER
We
L

have distinguished

the various senses of 'prior', and

is

is

clear that actuality

prior to potency.

And
is

mean

by potency not only that

re garded as other, but in

definite kin d

which

said to be

a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself

gene ral every principle of movement is m the same genus as potency for it is a principle of movement not, however, in something else but in the thing itse\( qtm itself. To all such potency, then, actuality is prior both in form ula and in substance and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another not. (i) Clearly it is prior in formula; for that which is in the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible for
or of rest.

For nature

also

10

it

to

become

actual, e. g.

mean by capable
'

of building
'

that which can build,

can

see,

and by 'capable of seeing that which and by 'visible' that which can be seen. And the

15

same account applies to all other cases, so that the formula and the knowledge of the one must precede the knowledge of
the other.
(2)

In time
is

it

is

prior in this sense: the actual

member
same

of a

species

prior to the potential

member

of the

species,

though the individual is potential before it is actual. I mean that the matter and the seed and that which is capable of seeing, which are potentially a man and corn and seeing, but
not yet actually
so,

20

are prior in time to this particular

man

and to the corn and to the seeing subject but they are po sterior in time to other actually existing things, from which they were produced For from the potential the actual is always produced by an actual thing. e. g. man by man, musician by musician there is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually We
exists actually,
; . ;
.

who now

25

is

have said in our account of substance- that ever>-thing that produced is something produced from something and by something, and that the same in species as it. This is why it is thought impossible to be a builder if one
if

has built nothing or a harper

1

one has never played the harp

-

30

Cf. A. II.

Cf. z. 7, 8.

1049*'
for
it,

METAPHYSICA
he who learns to play the harp learns to play it by playing and all other learners do similarly. And thence arose the

sophistical quibble, that

be doing that which

35 is
is

learning

it

one who does not know a science will the object of the science for he who does not know it. But since, of that which
is
;

some part must have come to be, and, of is changing, some part must have 1050^ changed (this is shown in the treatise on movement ^),Jie wh o is learning m ust, it wou ld seem, know some part of the science
to be,

coming

that which, in general,

It

is

surely clear, then, in this way, that the actualit y

,

is

this sense also, viz. in order of

becoming and of time prior

firstly,

to

the potency.

But
5

(3) it is also prior in substantiality

because the
to

things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form and in

substantiality,
e. g.

man

is

prior to
its

boy and human being

seed

for the

one already has

an end.

form, and the other has not.

Secondly, because everything that comes to be moves towards

10

15

For that for the sake of which a and the becoming is for the sake of the end and t he actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired. For animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have sight that they may see. And similarly men have the art of building that they may build, and theoretical science that they may theorize but they do not theorize that they may have theoretical science, except those who are learning by practice and these do not theorize except in a limited sense, or else they have no need to theorize.^ Further, tpatter exists jp a pote ntial stat e, just because it may attain to its form and
a prmciple,
is, is
;

i.

e.

thing

its

principle,

wlien

It

exists actually^ then

it is

in its

form.
in

And
fTiink

the

same holds good

in cases

which the end

is

m ovement,

a s well as in all others.

Therefore as teachers

they have achieved their end

when they have exP'or if this

;

hibited the pupil at work, so also does nature.

is

not the case,

it

20 for
1

will

have Pauson's Hermes over again be hard to say about the knowledge, as about the
shall

we

Phys. vi. 6. 1050* 14 omit mi. So perhaps Alexander. Sc. if they theorize in the full sense, they already have the e|iy and do not need to theorize in order to obtain it.
Cf.
'

0.
statue,

BOOK
is

IX
For the action
is

1050*

whether
actuality

it

is

within or without.^
the action.
'

the end, and the actuah'ty

ivord
*
'

Therefore even the

',

is

derived from

action

and points to the

complete

reality.

And
(e. g. in

while in some cases th e^ ex ercise

sight the ultimate thing
is

the ultimate thin g seeing, and no other product

is
f

besides this results from sight), but

follow s
(e. g.

rom some things a product

less the act is in the

25

from the art of building there results a house as

well as the act of building), yet

none the

former case the end an d

in

the latter

more o? an end than the

mere potency
is

is.

being

built,

For the act of building is in the thing that and comes to be and is at the same time as

the house.

Where,

then, the result

is

is

something apart from the exercise

is
is

30

the actuality
of building

in in

the thing that the thing that

is

being

mad e,

e.g. the act

is

being built and that of

in all
is in

weaving
is

in the thing that

being woven, and similarly

other cases, and in general the

movement
is
,

the thing that

being moved

Jput

when
is

there

no product apart from the

actuality, the actuality

is in

in

the agents e.g. the ^ct of se eirig-ag

the seeing subject and that of theorizing in the theorizing

life
is

subject and the

also
;

in

the soul (and therefore well-being 1050**

life).

for

it is

a certain kind of

Obviously, therefore, the substance or form

is

actuality.-

From
!

this

stantial

argument it is obvious that actuality is prior in subbeing to potency and as we have said,^ one actuality
;

always precedes another

the eternal prime mover.

in

time right back to the actuality ofj

for

But actuality

is

prior in a higher sense also

eternal

things are prior in substance

to perishable things, and no

eternal thing exists potentially.

The

reason

is this.

Every
;

potency
for,
^

is

at

one and the same time a potency of the opposite

is

while that which

Alexander
to

not capable of being present

ma

sub-

tells us that Pauson made a statue of Hermes, about which say whether it was made in the ordinary way or enclosed in a transparent substance; how could it be 'without', when the surface looked smooth, or ' within ', when the surface showed no trace of a
it

was hard

joining

This follows from 1050^

parenthetical. ' 1049'' 17-29.

16,

and what intervenes

is

to

some

extent

io5o^
lo ject

METAPHYSICA
cannot be present, everything that is capable of being may That, then, wh ic h is capable of beingmay either be or not be the same thmg, then, is capable both
possibly not be actual.
;

o? being and of not being.

And
;

that which

is

capable of not
possibly not

being

may

possibly not be

and that which

may

15

be is perishable, either in the full sense, or in the precise sense in which it is said that it possibly may not be, i. e. either in respect
of place or quantity or quality
; '

in
is

the

full

sense

'

means

'

in

substance
able
is

'.

Nothing, then, which

the
full

in the full sense imperishis

in

sense a potential beinp;^ (though there

its

nothing to prevent

being so

in

some

respect,
;

e. g.

potentially

of a certain quality or in a certain place)

th en, exist actual ly.

igi^eris hable thing s,

is

Nor can anything which

;

of necessity
if

be potential
20 if

yet these things are primary

for

these did

not exist, nothing would exist.

there be
it
'

Nor does
;

eternal_movement.

<;nrVi^pvisf- p(^i-pnti;^]]y

and,

if

there

is

an eternal
its

mobile^
'

is

not potentially in motion (except in respect of

'
'

whence and whither

it

there

is

nothing to prevent

having

matter which makes

tions).

capable of

movement

in various direc-

Therefore the sun and the stars and the whole heaven
is

are ever active, and there

no fear that they

may sometime
Nor do
Cor

stand
25

stillTas

the natural philosophers fear they may.

they

tire

in this activity; for

it

mo vement

does n ^f- imply

them, as
for

does for perishable things, the potency of opposites.

so that the continuity of the

it is

movement should be
is

laborious

that kind of substance which

matter and potency,

that are involve d

not actuality, that causes this.

Imperishable th ings
in

are imitated
fire.

by tho se

change,

e. g.

earth and

For these

also are ever active

30

they have their movement of themselves and in themselves.^ But the other potencies, according to the distinction we have drawn above,^ are all potencies of opposites for that which can move another in this way can also move it not in this way, i.e. if it acts according to a rational formula. But the same
for
;

non- rational potencies can produce opposite results only

their presence or absence.
If,
^

by

then, there are

any

entities or substances

such as the
^

Sc. the heavenly bodies.

i.

e.

they are both movers and moved.

Cf. G. 2.

a BOOK
scientific

IX
must be something much

1051^

dialecticians say the Ideas are, there

35

than the Idea of science and something more more mobile than the Idea of movement for these will be more of
;

the nature of actualities, while the Ideas of science and move-

ment are potencies of

prior both to potency

these.^

Obviously, thefl. acluali ty

is

and to

everv^ principle of chanp-e.

CHAPTER

IX

That the good actuality is better and more valuable than the good potency is evident from the following argument. Every- 5 thing of which we say that it can do something, is alike capable of contraries, e.g. that of which we say that it can be well is the same as that which can be ill, andhas both potencies at once for one and the same potency is a potency ot health and illness, of rest and motion, of building and throwing down, of being built and being thrown down. The capacity for contraries is present ro but contraries cannot be present at the same at the same time time, and the actualities also cannot be present at the same Therefore one of them must be time, e. g. health and illness.
; ;

the good, but the capacity

neither
;

is

both the contraries

alike, or
15

the actuality, then,

is

things, the end or actuality

for that

better. And in the case of bad must be worse than the potency
alike.

which
is

'

can

'

is

both contraries

Clearly, then, the

for

bad does not exist apart from bad things

nature posterior to the potency.-

the bad

in its

And
20

therefore

the beginning,

whi ch are fro m nothing h ad, nothing defective, nothing per\"erted (for perversion is some-

we may
i.

also say that in the things

in

e.

eternal things, there

is

thing bad).
It
is

by
;

actualization also that geometrical relations are

for
it is

discovered

by dividing the given

;

figures that people

discover them.

If they

had been already jlivided, the relations

but as
it is

would have been ob\ious

'

the divisions are present

Idea, being the universal apart from its special manifestations, be a potentiality, and will therefore be inferior to the corresponding particulars e.g. the Idea of science will be inferior to particular acts of
will
scientific thought.
-

The

Sc. while the eternal

and substantial must be better than the potency.

i05i

METAPHYSICA
only potentially.

Why

are the angles of the triangle equal to

25

two right angles ? Because the angles about one point are equal If, then, the line parallel to the side had to two right angles. been already drawn, the theorem would have been evident to any one as soon as he saw the figure. Why is the angle in
a semicircle in
are equal
all

cases a right angle

Because

if

three lines

the two which form the base, and the perpendicular

the
conclusion
is

from the centre

evident at a glance to one

who knows
30 discovered

this premise.^

Obviously, therefore, the potentially existing relations are

by being reduced
is

to actuality (the reason being

^)
;

that thinking
is

the actuality of thought

so that potency
it

by an act of construction that people acquire the knowledge), though the

discovered from actuality (and therefore
is

single actuality

is

later in generation

than the corresponding

potency.

CHAPTER X
The terms
'

being

'

and

'

non-being

35 with reference to the categories,

are employed firstly and secondly with reference

'

to the potency or actuality of these or their non-potency or

1051**

non-actuality, while being and non-being in the strictest sense

'

The

figures required for the

two theorems are

:-

to be any point on the Euclid gives a more direct proof by supposing is perpensemicircle. But probably the symmetrical case in which dicular to the diameter was what first suggested the theorem, and with Aristotle's construction the proof may be made quite general if we remember that all angles in the same segment are equal. ^ The argument apparently is that, since thinking is an actuality, its object must be an actuality.

CD

0.
are truth and falsity ^
their being

BOOK

IX
is

1051^

The

condition of this in the objects

combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error. This being so, when is what is 5 calledt ruth _Q r falsity p resent, and when is it not? We must consider what we mean by these terms. It is not because we think truly that you are white, that you are white, but because you are white we who say this have the truth. If, then, some things are always combined and cannot be separated, and 10 others are always separated and cannot be combined, while
others are capable
'

either of combination or of separation,

'

being

'

is

being combined and one, and

;

not being

'

is

being

combined but more than one regarding contingent facts, then^ the s ame opinioQ or the same statement comes to be false and true and it is possible at one time to have the truth and at another to be in error b ut regarding things that cannot be otherwise opinions are not at one time true and at another false, but th e same opinions are always true or always
not
,
;

__

false.

With regard
' '

to incomposites,

what

is

'

being
is

'

or

'

not being

',

and truth or falsity ? so as to be when it

separated, like
'

A
is

thing of this sort

not composite,
to
'

compounded, and not

'
'

be

'

if it is

the white
' ;

wood or the incommensurability

and
falsity

ao

of the diagonal
the

nor

will truth

be

still

present in

same way as in the previous cases. In fact, as truth is not the same in these cases, so also 'being' is not the same but (i)
;

truth or falsity

is

as follows

contact andassertion
as affirmation),
it is

are truth
is

(assertion not being the

same

and ignorance

non-contact.

say

'

ignorance', for

not possible to be in

25

\error regarding the question

dental sense
site

what a thing is, save in an acciand the same holds good regarding non-compoit is

substances (for

not possible to be in error about them).

;

And

they

all

exist actually, not potentially

;

for otherwise
it
is,

they would come to be and cease to be

but, as

being

' The last clause is very difficult. The natural sense, which is given above, contradicts E. 1027'' 31, and is not in keeping with Aristotle's usual doctrine. Yet we can hardly translate while sometimes they mean truth or falsity in the strictest sense ', for there is no point here in a distinction between the strictest and other senses of ' truth '.
'

1051^
itself

METAPHYSICA
does not come to be (nor cease to be) for if it did it would have to come out of something. About the things, then, which are essences and exist in actuality, it is not possible
;

30

to be in error, but only to think

'
'

them or not

to think them.

Inquiry about their what takes the form of asking whether they are of such and such a nature or not.^
^

(2)
in the

As

regards

'

being

'

in

the sense of truth and

'

not being

'

35

sense of falsity, in one case there is truth if the subject and the attribute are really combined, and falsity if they are not combined in the other case, if the object is existent it
;

1052^ exists
it

in

a particular way, and

all ^
;

if it

does not exist

in this

way

does not exist at

and truth means

is

thinking these

objects,

and

falsity

does not exist, nor error, but only ignorance,

and not an ignorance

is

which

like blindness

for blindness

akin to a total absence of the faculty of thinking.

It is evident also that

about unchangeable things there can

if

be no error
changeable.

in respect

of time,

we assume them

to be un-

E. g.

if

we suppose

that the triangle does not

change,

suppose that at one time its angles are equal to two right angles while at another time they are not
shall not
(for that

we

would imply change).

It is possible,

however, to sup-

pose that one

member

of such a class has a certain attribute

and another has

10

not, e. g. while we waf suppose that no even number is prime, we i;iay suppose that some are and some are not. But regarding a single number not even this form of error is possible for we cannot in this case suppose that one
;

instance has an attribute and another has not

but whether
is

our judgement be true or

eternal.
^

false, it is

implied that the fact

105

1''

Sc. not simple), but

'
i.

e.

but

A,

32 read ro t/ e'art. what elements their essence can be resolved into (for it is what other things it is like. Cf. H. 1043^ 23-28. we have not here and B, which may or may not be combined, which if it exists at all exists as A. 1051'J 35 read e'lntp oi>,

OVTCOS f'oTlV.

BOOK X
CHAPTER

(I)

have said^ previously, in our distinction of the various meanings of words, that one has several meanings while it is used in many senses, the things that are primarily and
'

We

15

'

of their own nature and not accidentally called one may be summarized under four heads, (t) There is the continuous, either in general, or especially that which is co ntin uous by nature and not by contact nor by artificial union and of jo these, those things have more unity and are prior, whose movement " is more indivisible and simpler. (2) That which is a whole and has a certain shape and form is one in a still higher degree and especially if a thing is of this sort by nature, and not by force like the things which are unified by glue or nails or by being tied together, i.e. if it has in itself something which is the cause of its continuity. A thing is of this sort because its movement is one and 25 indivisible in place and time so that evidently if a thing has by nature a principle of movement that is of the first kind (i.e. local movement) and the first in that kind (i.e. circular movement), this is in the primary sense one extended thing. The things, then, which are in this way one are either continuous ^ or whole, and the other things that are one are those whose formula is one. Of this sort are the things the 30 thought of which is one, i.e. those the thought of which is indivisible and it is indivisible if the thing is indivisible in kind or in number. (3) In number, then, the individual is indivisible, and (4) in kind, that which in intelligibility and in knowledge is indivisible, so that that which causes substances One,* then, to be one * must be one in the primary sense.
;
; : ; '

Nature is defined (A. ioi5= 13) as 'the substantial being of the things which have a source of movement in themselves qua themselves'. 2 * 1052* 29 read iv 17 awixis. So. the form.

\ *

A. 6.

1052^

METAPHYSICA
has
all

these meanings

the

naturally continuous, the whole,

35

the individual, and

the

universal.

And

all

these are one

because
1052''

in

some

cases the
is

movement,

in others the

thought
sort of

or the formula,

indivisible.

But
is

it

must be observed that the questions, what

and what
is
'

things are said to be one, and on the other hand

to be one

what

it

the formula of

it,

should not be

assumed
5

to be the same.

One' has
'

all

these meanings, and

each of those things to which one of these kinds of unity

10

sometimes mean being one of these things, and sometimes something else,^ which is even nearer to the meaning of the tvord one *, while these other things approximate to its denotation. This is also true of element or cause if one had both to specify the things of which it is predicable and to give the definition of the word. For in a sense fire is an element (and doubtless the indefinite or something else of the sort is by its own nature
belongs
will

be one

but

to be one

'

will

'

'

'

'

',

'

'

the element), but in a sense

it

is

not

for

it

is

not the same

15

and to be an element, but while as a particular thing with a nature of its own fire is an element, the name means that it has this attribute, that there is element something which is made of it as a primary constituent. And For this so with 'cause' and 'one' and all such terms. reason to be one means to be indivisible (being essentially
thing to be
fire
'
'
'

'

'

a
or

" this "

in

and capable
or

of existing apart)
'

either

in

place,

form
'

thought
it

or

perhaps
'

'

to

be whole and

\2o

25

measure and above all of quantity for it is from this that For measure is it has been extended to the other categories. and quantity qna quantity that by which quantity is known is known either by a one or by a number, and all number is known by a one Therefore all quantity qna quantity is known by the one, and that by which quantities are and so the one is the primarily knowr. Is the one itself And hence in the starting-point of number qua number. other classes too measure means that by which each is first known, and the measure of each is a unit in length, in breadth,
indivisible
;

but

means

especially

to be the first

of a kind

',

'

'

'

'.

'

'

Cf. 10521^ 18.

I.

BOOK X
(The words
;

1052"
'

in
*

depth,
'

in

weight, in speed.

weight

'

speed

are

common

has two

means both that which has any amount of gravity and that which has an excess of speed both that which has any amount of gravity, and for and that which has an excess of movement movement even the slow has a certain speed and the light a certain
meanings,
*

weight
'

to both contraries^
'

for each of

and them

'

30

weight.)

In

all these,

then, the

measure and starting-point

is

some-

thing one and indivisible, since even in lines

indivisible the line a

we
;

treat as

foot long.

as the measure something one and indivisible

For everywhere we seek and this is

Now 35 that which is simple either in quality or in quantity. take away impossible or thought to to add, there where it is Hence that of number is most exact the measure is exact. and in all 1053* for we posit the unit as absolutely indivisible
;

other cases

we

imitate this sort of measure.

case of a furlong or a talent or of anything large

or subtraction might

For in the any addition

thing from
5

more

easily escape our notice than in

;

the case of something smaller

so that the

first

which, as far as our perception goes, nothing can be subtracted,

all

men make

the measure, whether of liquids or of solids,

;

whether of weight or of size and they think they know the quantity when they know it by means of this measure. And
they

know movement
;

too

by

the simple

movement and the

therefore in astro-

quickest

for this occupies least time.

'

And

nomy

one of this sort is the starting-point and measure (for they assume the movement of the heavens to be uniform 10 and the quickest, and judge the others by reference to it), and in music the quarter-tone (because it is the least interval) and in speech the letter. And all these are one in this sense not that one is something predicable in the same sense of all of these, but in the sense we have mentioned. But the measure is not always one in number some- 15
a
'

'

'

times there are several

e.g. the quarter-tones (not to the car,

but as determined by the ratios) are two, and the articulate

sounds by which we measure are more than one, and the

heavy and

Sc.

light, fast

and

slow.

io53^

METAPHYSICA
diagonal of the square and
quantities,
its

side are

and so are

all

spatial magnitudes.^

measured by two Thus, then,

the one

is

the measure of

all

things, because

the elements in the substance

30 in

respect of quantity or in
just

we come to know by dividing the things either respect of kind. The one is
first

indivisible
is

because
it is

the

of

each class of things

indivisible.

But

not in the same

;

way

that every
is

'

one

'

is

indivisible, e.g. a foot

visible,

and a unit
^

the latter

absolutely indi-

while the former

is

placed

among

things which are

undivided in perception, as has been said already,^

perception, for doubtless every continuous thing
is

only

to

divisible.

25

30

The measure is always homogeneous with the thing measured the measure of spatial magnitudes is a spatial magnitude, and in particular that of length is a length, that of breadth a breadth, that of articulate sounds an articulate sound, that of weight a weight, that of units a unit. (For we must state the matter so, and not say that the measure of numbers is a number we ought indeed to say this if we were to use the corresponding form of words, but the supposition does not really correspond it is as if one supposed that the measure of units is units, and not a unit, for number is
; ;

a plurality of units.)

and perception, we call the measure of things, for the same reason, because we know something by them, while as a matter of fact they are measured rather than measure other things. But it is with us as if some one else measured us and we came to know how big we are by

Knowledge

also,

seeing that he applied the cubit-measure a certain

35

number of
'

1053''

But Protagoras says man is the measure of all or the man things, meaning really the man who knows respectively have who perceives and these because they knowledge and perception, which we say are the measures
times to
us.
' ' *
'

',

^ Alexander thinks this means that a line may be measured either by the ideal measure (e. g. the standard yard), or by the particular imperfect measure (the yard-wand, which slightly differs from the standard yard).j This sense does not agree with the context, and perhaps the meaning is| that as the diagonal and the side are incommensurable they must be'

measured by
*

1053* 23 read t6
Cf. 1052*' 33.

different units. But what of 'all spatial magnitudes' S' eh ddiaipsTa nfjos rfjv aicrdriaiv riOerai.

.-

'


I.

BOOK X

1053^

of objects.
to be saying

He

is

saying nothing, then, while he appears

something remarkable. n the strictest sense, if we define j it according to the meaning of the word, is a measure, and especially of quantity, and secondly of quality And some things will be one if they are indivisible in quantity, and others if they are indivisible in quality therefore that which is one is indivisible, either absolutely or qua one.
Evidently, then,, unity
.

CHAPTER
With regard
that

II

to the substance and nature of the one w^e

it

must
10
viz.

ask in whic h of two ways

exists.

Th is

is

the very question

we reviewed

in

our

discussion

of

problems,

what the one is a nd how we must conceive of it, whether we must take the one itself as beings a substance (as both the Pythagoreans say in earlier and Plato in later times), or and if so, how it is there is, rather, an underlying nature to be explained more intelligibly and more in the manner of the physical philosophers, of whom one says the one is love, another says it is air. and another the indefinite.If then no universal can be a substance, as has been said ^ in our discussion of substance and being, and if being itself cannot be a substance in the sense of a one apart from
'

15

the

many

(for

it is

common
also

cate,

clearl y unity

to the many), but is only a predicannot be a substance l for being

23

and unity are the most universal of all predicates. on the one hand, classes are not certain entities and substances separable from other things and on the other hand ^he one cannot be a class, fo r the same reasons for which being and substance cannot be classes. Now Further, this must hold good in all categories alike. being and unity have an equal number of meanings so that
;
' '

Therefore,

^o

'

'

since in the sphere of qualities the

one

is

something definite

some entity
i

and

similarly in the sphere of quantities, clearly

^
-

B.

The

looi* 4-''25. three thinkers

referred

to

are

Empedocles,

Anaximenes,

Anaximander.
'

Z. 13.
.VR.

MET.

1053''

METAPHYSICA
what unity is, as we must ask what being is, since it is not enough to say that its nature is just to be unity or being. But in colours the one is a colour, e. g. white, if the other colours are observed to be produced

we must

also ask in general

30

out of this and black, and

if

black
is

is

the privation of white,

as darkness of light (for darkness

fore
if all

privation of light).

There-

existent things were colours, existent things

would

35

have been a number, indeed, but of what ? ^ Clearly of colours and the one would have been a particular one e. g. white. And similarly if all existent things were tunes, they would have been a number, but a number of quarter-tones, and and the one their essence would not have been number would have been something whose substance was not to be
' ' '

',

1054^ one but to be the quarter-tone.

And

similarly

if all

existent

things had been articulate sounds, they would have been a

number

of letters, and the one would have been a vowel.

10

And if all existent things were rectilineal figures, they would have been a number of figures, and the one would have been the triangle. And the same argument applies to all other classes.| Since, therefore, while there are numbers and a one both in| affections and in qualities and in quantities and in movement,? in all cases the number is a number of particular things and the one is one something, and its substance is not to be one, the same must be true of substances for it is true of all cases alike. That the one, then, in every class is a definite thing, and in no
;

case

is

its

nature just this

viz. unity, is

evident
is

colours the one-itself which

we must seek
is

but as in one colour, so

;

too in substance the one-itself

one substance.

And
I"

that in a sense unity

it

clear from the fact that

means the same as being is follows being by having just as

is

many meanings
15
i

as there are categories, and

not comprised

within

but

is

\that in

any category, e. g. neither in substance nor in quality, related to them just as being is and from the fact one man nothing more is predicated than in man',
;
'

'

'

just as being

is
^

nothing apart from substance or quality or

to be one
1

quantity

and

is

just to

be a particular thing.
rivcov,
ipi.

1053'^'

33 read oVra,'nXXa

1054'* 18

read

nocrup' Kal tu

I.

BOOK X
III

1054'

CHAPTER

The one and the many are opposed in several ways, of which one is the opposition of the one and plurality as indivisible and divisible for that which is either divided or divisible is called a plurality, and that which is indivisible or not
;

20

divided

is

called one.

Now

since opposition

is

of four kinds,
25

and one of these two terms is privative in meaning, they must be contraries, and neither contradictory nor correlative in meaning.^ And the one gets its meaning and explanation from its contrary', the indivisible from the divisible, because plurality and the divisible is more perceptible than the indivisible, so that in

formula plurality

is

prior to the indivisible,

because of the conditions of perception.

as

To

the one belong,

of the con- 30

we

indicated graphically in our distinction

traries,-

the same and the like and the equal, and to plurality

belong the other and the unlike and the unequal. The same has several meanings (i) we sometimes mean * the same numerically again, (2) we call a thing the same if
' '

'

one both in formula and in number, e.g. you are one with yourself both in form and in matter and again, (3) if the 35 formula of its primary essence is one e. g. equal straight 1054^ lines are the same, and so are equal and equal-angled quadrilaterals there are many such, but in these equality constiit

is

tutes unity.

Things are

like

if,

not being absolutely the same, nor

concrete substance, they are the
5

without difference

in their

same in form, e.g. the larger square is like the smaller, and unequal straight lines are like they are like, but not absolutely the same. Other things are like, if, having the same form, and being things in which difference of degree is Other things, if possible, they have no difference of degree. they have a quality that is in form or kind one and the same ^e. g. whiteness in a greater or less degree, are called like 10 because their form is one. Other things are called like if
;

^
!

Two

of the kinds, contrariety

and

privation, are not mutually ex-

clusive, for contrariety is the relation between privation. Cf. r. 1004'' 27, I. 1055'' 26.
^

a form and

its

complete

Cf. r. 1004^ 2.

1054^

METAPHYSICA
the qualities they have in

common

are

more numerous than

gua white, and
have several

those in which they differ

the prominent qualities,
gold-^
is

either
'

the qualities in general or

e.

g. tin is like silver,

like fire, gtia

'

yellow and red.

other

Evidently, then,

and

'

unlike
is

'

also

meanings.
15

And
else).

the other in one sense

is

the opposite of the

as or other than

same

(so that everything

either the

same

everything

In another sense things are other unless

both their matter and their formula are one (so that you are other than your neighbour). The other in the third sense is
exemplified
'

in

the objects of mathematics.^

Other

'

or

the

same can be predicated

thing
20

of everything with regard to every-

else,
is

but only

if

the things are one and existent, for the

;

other
is

not the cotitradictory of the same

It is

which
'

is

why
;

it
'

not predicated of non-existent things (while

so predicated).

not the same

is
if

predicated of

all

existing things
it

for

a thing

is

in its

nature both existent and one,

else.

is

either

one or not one with anything

The

other, then,

and the

same are thus opposed. But difference is not the same

and that which
25
it

as otherness.

For the other

is

other than need not be other in

exists
is

some

definite

respect (for everything that

either other

or the
is

same), but
in

that

which

is

different

from anything

different

thing identical
is

some respect, so that there must be somewhereby they differ. And this identical thing
;

genus or species for all things that differ differ either genus or in species,^ in genus if the things have not their matter in common and are not generated out of each other (i. e. if they belong to different figures of predication),"^ and
in

30 in species if

they have the same genus

contraries are different,

('

genus' meaning that

which
alike).

is

essentially predicated of both the different things

and contrariety is a kind That we are right in this supposition is shown by induction. For they are all seen to be different they are 35 not merely ^ other, but some are other in genus, and others 1055^ are in the same line of predication,* and therefore in the same
of difference.
;

And

*
''

1054^ 12 read dpyvpco " Cf. ^ 35-^ 3.

fj
'

XevKor, X9^^^'
*

So perhaps Alexander. See note on 1057''

'^

See note on A. 986* 23.

1054^ 34 read

(paiueTai

mi

36. ov fiovov.

'

I.

BOOK X
We
have distinguished ^
in

1055^
else-

genus, and the

same

in genus.

where what

sort of things are the

same or other

genus.

CHAPTER
Since things which differ
or
less,

IV
from one another more
I

may

differ

there

isjils q

a greatest difference, and this

call

con5

Trariet>\

That contrariety is the greatest difference is made For things which ditter m ^e;i!is~ have no clear by induction^ way to one another, but are too far distant and are not comparable and for things that differ in species the extremes from
;
;

and the which generation takes place are the contraries and therefore that between the distance between extremes

contraries

is

the greatest.
10

But that which is greatest in each class is ^coniplete. For that is greatest which cannot be exceeded, and that is comFor the complete plete beyond which nothing can be found. difference marks the end of a series (just as the other things which are called complete are so called because they have attained an for in everything end), and beyond the end there is nothing it is the extreme and includes all else, and therefore there is nothing beyond the end, and the complete needs nothing
;

15

further.

From

this, then, it is clear

:

tha t contrariety

is

com^

DJ ete difference

and as contraries are so called in several

will

senses, their

modes of completeness

answer to the various

modes

of contrariety which attach to the contraries.

This being so, evidently one thing cannot have more than one contrary, for neither can there be anything more extreme than the extreme, nor can there be more than two extremes And in general if contrariety is a differ:^ for the one interval. ence^ and if a difference must be between two things, then the complete difference must be so too.

20

And

the other

commonly accepted
For
in

definitions

are also

necessarily true of all contraries.

plete difference
is

each case the com-

the greatest difference.

We
'

cannot get

25

anything beyond it, whether the things differ in genus or in species for it has been shown - that there is no difference
;

A. 9.
Cf. 1054'' 25-27.

But how can we reconcile

this with 1054^ 27-30, 35

1055^

METAPHYSICA
between anything and the things outside its genus and ( the things which differ in <:p(>rifi^ tVip rnmplpfe ^^i^^^^f.^ycp^ is the greatest, and the things in the same genus which differ m ost are contraries for the complete difference is the greatest
; i

among

difference

things in
30 trary
;

between species of the same genus. And (3) the the same receptive material which differ most are conmatter
is

for the

the same for contraries.

And

(3)

of

the things which are dealt with by the

different are contrajy
;

same

faculty the

most

35

for one science deals with one class "bf and in these the complete difference is the greatest. The primary contrariety is that between positive state and privation not every privation, however (for privation has several meanings), but that which is complete. And the other contraries must be called so with reference to these, some

things,

'

because they possess these, others because they produce or tend

to produce them, others because they are acquisitions or losses

Now if the kinds of oppoand privation and contrariety and 1055^ relation, and of these the first is contradiction, and contradiction admits of no intermediate, while contraries admit of one, clearly contradiction and contrariety are not the same. But privation is a kind of contradiction for what suffers privation, either in general or in some determinate way, is either that 5 which is quite incapable of having some attribute or that which, being of such a nature as to have it, has it not here we have already a variety of meanings, which have been disof these or of other contraries.
sition are

contradiction

tinguished

elsewhere.

Privation, therefore,
is

is

a contradic-

tion or incapacity

which

determinate or taken along with

is

the receptive material.

times does everything

This

the reason why, while contraequal or not equal, but not

if it is, it
is

diction does not admit of an intermediate, privation some10

;

for everything

is

is

equal or unequal, or
is

only within the

If,

sphere of that which

receptive of equality.

then, the

changes which happen to the matter start from the contraries, and proceed either from the form and the possession of the

15

form or from a privation of the form or shape, clearly all conBut certainly not all privation is trariety is a privation. that that which suffers privation reason being contrariety, the

I.

BOOK X

1055"

may suffer it in several ways. It is only the extretnes from which changes proceed that are contraries. And this is obvious also by induction. For every contrariety involves, as one ^ of its terms, a privation. But not all cases are alike inequality is the privation of equality and unlikeness of likeness, and on the other hand vice is the privation of virtue. But the cases differ as has been said - in one case we mean simply that the thing suffers privation, in another case that it does so at a certain time or in a certain part (e. g. at a certain age or in the proper part), or throughout. This is
; ;

20

why

in

some cases there

is

mean

(there are
is

men who

are

neither good nor bad), and in others there

not (a number
25

must be either odd or even). Further, some contraries have have not. Therefore it is evident priv^t^n^p is alway^ that one of the contraries but it is enough
their subject defined, others

if

this

IS

true ot tne
;

first

i.

e.

the generic

contraries,

e. g.

the

one and the many

for the others

can be reduced to these.

CHAPTER V
iiow the one

we might raise the question opposed to the many and the equal to the great and the small. For if ^ we use the word whether only in an antithesis, e.g. 'whether is it white or black? and 'whether is it white or not white?' (we do not say 'whether is it a man or white ? unless we are proceeding on a prior assumption and asking something analogous to this, whether was it Cleon or
Since one thing has one contrary,
is

30

'

'

',

'

'

35

But this is not a necessary disjunction in any class of things. Yet even this is an extension from the case of opposites for opposites alone cannot be present together and we assume this incompatibility here in asking which of the two came for if they might both have come, the question 1056^ would have been absurd. But if they might, even so this falls that of the one and the many, just as much into an antithesis if, then, the i.e. 'whether did both come^ or_one of the two? '): question whether is always concerned with opposites, and
Socrates that came?'
;

'

'

'

1055^ 18 read
'

darepoi'.

1055^4.

loss** 32 read

el

yap to norfpov.

1056^
5

METAPHYSICA
we can say 'whether
equal?
to both
;

is

it

greater or less or equal

'

the opposition between the greater

and the

less,

what is and the

The
for

equal

is

not contrary either to one alone or

it

why

should

be contrary to the greater rather

is

than to the
\

less ?

Further, the equal

if it is

contrary to the tmless,

equal.
it

Therefore

contrary to the greater and the

10

be contrary to more things than one. But if the unequal means the same as both the greater and the less together, the equal ivill be opposite to both (and the difficulty supports those who say the unequal is a two ^), but it follows that one thing has two contraries, which is impossible. Again, the equal is evidently intermediate between the great and the small, but no contrary is either observed to be intermediate, nor, from its definition, can be so for it would not be a perfect contrary if it were intermediate between any two things, but rather it always has something intermediate between itself and something else.
will
'
'

15

It

remains, then, that

It

it is

opposed either as negation or as

;

privation.

cannot be opposite to one of the two

for

why

to the great rather

than to the small

Therefore also
'

It is
'

then the privative

is

negation of both.

whether
(e. g.
'

said with referit

ence to both
or equal
?
'

not to one of the two

'

whether is
')
;

greater

or

whether
it is

is it

equal or

less

there are always

;

20 three cases.

But
is

not a necessary privation

is

for not every1

thing which

not greater or less

equal, but only the things

25

which are of such a nature as to have these attributes. The equal, then, is that which is neither great nor small and is naturally fitted to be either great or small and it is opposed to both as a privative negation (and therefore is also intermediate). And that which is neither good nor bad is opposed to both, but has no name (for each of these has several meanings and the receptive material is not one) but that which is neither white nor black has more claim to a name. Yet even this has not one name, though the colours of which
; ;

this

negation

is

privatively predicated are in a

way

limited

30

the kind.

they must be either grey or yellow or something else of Therefore it is an incorrect criticism that is passed by those who think that all such phrases are used in the same
for
^

This

is

a Platonic doctrine;

cf.

N. 1087^ 10.

I.

BOOK X

1056^

way, so that that which is neither a shoe nor a hand would be intermediate between a shoe and a hand, since that which is neither good nor bad is intermediate between the good and the bad, as if there must be an intermediate in all cases. This result does not necessarily follow. For the combined

35

denial of opposites applies

when
;

there

is

an intermediate

and a certain natural interval but in the other case there is no 'difference'^ for the things, the denials of which are 1056* combined, belong to different classes, so that the substratum
;

is

not one.

CHAPTER
We
many.
the

VI
about the one and the
will

might

raise similar questions

if

For

the

many

are absolutely opposed to the one,

certain impossible results follow.

One

then be few

for 5

many

are opposed also to the few.

Further, two will be

*
*

many, since the double is multiple, and double derives its meaning from two therefore one will be few for what is that in comparison with which two are called many, except one, which must therefore be few ? For there is nothing ^ fewer. Further, if the much and the little are in plurality what the long and the short are in length, and whatever is much is also many, and the many are much (unless, indeed, there is a difference in the case of an easily-bounded continuum)^, the little (or few) will be a plurality. Therefore one is a plurality, if it is few and this must be so, if two are many. But perhaps, while the 'many' is in a sense said to
' ' ;

10

15

be

'

much
'

',

it is

with a difference,

e.

g.

water

is

much but

not

many. But many is applied to the things that are divisible; in one sense it means a plurality which is excessive either absolutely or relatively (while few is similarly a plurality which is de'

'

'

Cf. 1054'' 25-27.

is oXiyov ^ 6\iya, which, it might seem, should be transor a few'. But the singular oXiyov is used only because of difficulty of predicating the plural oXiya of one '. On the other hand, xii and TToXXo are used in the really distinct senses of 'much' and many '. oXiyov has been translated few in this chapter except where it is opposed to noXv and must be translated little '. ^ * i.e. a fluid. 1056*' 10 read In i i>s. Cf. I. 16.

The Greek
little

jd 'a

'

'

'

'

'


1056''

METAPHYSICA
ficient),

and
is
if

20

alone
just as

it

in another sense it means number, in which sense opposed to the one. For we say one or many ', one were to say one and ones or white thing and
*
'

'

'

white things', or to compare the things that have been

25

measured with the measure.^ It is in this sense also that multiples are so called. For each number is said to be many because it consists of ones and because each number is measurable by one and it is 'many' as that which is opposed to one, not to the few. In this sense, then, even two is many not however in the sense of a plurality which is
;

excessive
plurality.

either

relatively

or

absolutely

it

is

the first

30

But tvithout qualification two is few; for it is the first plurality which is deficient. For this reason Anaxagoras was not right in leaving the subject with the statement ^ that all things were together, boundless both in multitude and in smallness where by and in smallness he meant and in fewness for they could not have been boundless in fewness,

'

'

'

since

it is

not one, as some say, but two, that

is

make

a few.

opposed then to the many in numbers as measure and these are opposed as relatives which to thing measurable are not from their very nature relative. We have distinguished ^ elsewhere the two senses in which relatives arc so called': (2) as knowledge to thing known, a term 35 (i) as contraries 1057^ being called relative because another is relative to it. There is nothing to prevent one from being fewer than something,

The one

e. g.

than two
is

rality

as
is

it

Plufor if it is fewer, it is not therefore few. were the class to which number belongs for
;

number
5

plurality measurable

by

one.

And one and number

we have
said

are in a sense opposed, not as contrary, but as

;

for inasmuch as one is some relative terms are opposed measure and the other measurable, they are opposed. This e. if the thing is why not everything that is one is a number, But though knowledge is is indivisible it is not a number.
i.

similarly

spoken of as related to the knowable, the

relation does

not work out similarly, for while knowledge might be thought

10

to be the measure, and the knowable the thing measured, the

fact
^

is

that

all

knowledge
^

is

knowable, but not

^

all

that

is

know-

1056^ 22 omit

Kai TO ijKTprjTov.

Fr.

I,

Diels, Vorsokratiker.

A. \o2\^ 26.

1.

BOOK X
in a sense
is

1057^

able

is

knowledge, because

knowledge

is

measured

by
(the

the knowable.

Plurality

contrary neither to the few

many being

contrary to this as excessive plurality to plu-

rality exceeded),

nor to the one

in

every sense
said,

but in one sense

is

they are contrary, as has been

divisible

because the former

plurality

and the

latter indivisible, while in

is

another sense they

if
is

15

are relative (as knowledge

to

knowable),

number and the one

is

measure.

CHAPTER

VII

Since contraries admit of an intermediate and in some cases have it, the intermediate must be composed of the contraries. For (i) all intermediates are in the same genus as the things between which they stand. For we call those things intermediates, into which that which changes must change first e. g. if we were to pass from the highest string to the lowest

20

by

we should come sooner to the intermediate notes, and in colours if we are to pass from white to black, we shall come sooner to crimson and gray than to
the shortest way,

25

black

and similarly in all other cases. But to pass from one genus to another genus (e. g. from colour to figure) is not posIntermediates, then, must sible except in an incidental way. be in the same genus as one another and as the things they
;

stand between.

But
kind
;

(2) all

intermediates stand between opposites of

some

30

for

only between these can change take place

nature.

in virtue

of their

own

Therefore an intermediate
;

is

impossible

between things which are not opposite for then there would be change which was not from one opposite towards the other. A mong opposites, contradictories admit of no middle term for contradiction is this an opposition, one or other side of which
;

must attach to anything whatever, e. which has no interme- 35 diate. Of other opposites, some are relative, others privative, contrary. Of relative terms, those which are not conothers The reason is that they are not trary have no intermediate. in the same genus. For what intermediate could there be between knowledge and knowable ? But between great and io57
i.

small there

is

one.

ji

1057''

METAPHYSICA
(3) If intermediates are in the same genus, as has been shown, and stand between contraries, they must be composed of these contraries. For either there will be a genus including the contraries or there will be none. And if {a) there is a genus in such a way that it is something prior to the contraries, the differentiae which constitute the contrary species of the genus will be contraries prior to the species for spe5ia,_are com^^Tg. if white and posed^ of_thp genus and the differentiae. black are contraries, and one is a piercing colour and the other a compressing colour,^ these differentiae piercing and compressing are prior so that these are prior contraries of one another (though indeed the species which differ by contrariety are more truly contrary^). And the other species, i. e. the intermediates, must be composed of their genus and their differentiae. E. g. all colours which are between white and black must be said to be composed of the genus (i. e. colour) and certain differentiae. But these differentiae will not be the primary contraries otherwise every colour would be either white or black. They are different, then, from the primary contraries and therefore they will be between the primary contraries; the primary differentiae are 'piercing' and compressing Therefore it is (d) with regard to these contraries which do not fall within a genus that we must first ask of what their intermediates are composed. (For things whi(ih are in the same genus must be composed of terms in which the genus is not an element, or else be themselves Now contraries do not involve one another in incomposite.^) but the their composition, and are therefore first principles
;

'

'

10

'

'

15

'

'.

20

1 ^

Cf. PI.

Twi.67Eff.

difficult clause seems to mean that the species are more Of the differentiae one is properly contraries than the differentiae. obviously just the negation of the other, and they might be regarded a; but each of the species has a positive nature of its own e^is and arepria-is and is a true ivavriov. ^ Aristotle has first (et /xeV, 1. 4) considered the case of contraries ir a genus, and shown that they involve prior contraries which are not in the genus, but when added to the genus constitute its species. These an the primary contraries, and it is primarily of them that we must ask Of what are their intermediates composed ? The sentence, 11. 20-22, ii which he reverts to contraries in a genus must be parenthetical. A specie; in a genus must either contain an element (sc. the differentia) which doe: not itself contain the genus, or (which is incompatible with its beinj a species) be an unanalysable term.

This very

I.

BOOK X

1057"

all incomposite, or none of them. But there is something compounded out of the contraries, which is such that there can be a change from a contrary to it sooner than to the other contrary for it will have less of the quality in question than the one contrary and more than the other. This also,^ then, will come between the contraries.

intermediates are either

25

All the other intermediates also, therefore, are composite

that which has
is

for

another

more of a quality than one thing and less than compounded somehow out of the things than which And it is said to have more and less respectively of the quality. since there are no other things prior to the contraries and homogeneous with the intermediates, all intermediates must be compounded out of the contraries. Therefore all the inferior classes, both the contraries and their intermediates, will be compounded
out of the primary contraries.^
(i )all in

50

Clearly, th en, intermedia tes are

the same s^enus and (2 )intermediate between rnntrarips

and

(3)

compounded out of the

contraries.

CHAPTER
That which is other in species something, and this must belong
animal other

VIII
is

other than something in

^
;

35

to both

e. g.

if it

is

an

in species, both are animals. The things, then, which are other in species must be in the same genus. F or by genus I mean that one identical thing which is predicated o f

i.

e.

this

differentiae,

intermediate differentia comes between the extreme as the intermediate species comes between the extreme

species.

This seems to mean that each extreme as well as each intermediate is compounded out of both the extreme differentiae. E. g. white would have to be to some extent 'compressing' as well as 'piercing'. But this is not in itself a likely doctrine, and it can hardly be said to be proved in the present passage the meaning probably is that each extreme species contains one differentia as a logical element, the other element being the genus while each intermediate contains both the
-

species

^ differentiae.
^

It

might seem that the respect

in

which things

differ is just
:

what

J
3
j5j

;(j

]j

does not belong to both. But Aristotle's meaning is this If differs from D, it must be a different something, and this something is the genus common to both. Horse and man are different animals. And when two things differ in their essence, they differ just in that in which {in another sense of ' in') they agree. Difference in a genus makes the genus itself
qther (1055=* 7-8).
Cf. 1054'' 25-28.

1058^

METAPHYSICA
bot h and
is

differentiated in

conceived as matter or otherwise.

no merely accidental way, whethe r For not only must the

this

common

nature attach to the different things, e.g. not only

must both be animals, but

different for each
(e.

very animality must also be

nature
is

g. in

the one case equinity, in the other

humanity), and therefore this

5

common

specifically

different for the

two

things.

One then

will

be

in virtue of its

own

nature one sort of animal, and the other another,

a horse and the other a man.

an otherness of the genus. in the genus to an otherness which makes the genus
' '

e. g. one This difference then must be For I give the name of difference

itself

other.

10

shown also by and it has by been proved that contraries are in the same genus K For contrariety was seen ^ to be complete difference and e very differThis, then, will be a contrariety (as can be
induction).

For

all

things are divided

opposites,

ence

in species is
is

a difference from something in something

is

so that this

the same for both and

their genus.

(Hence

also all contraries which are different in species and not in -genus are in the same line of predication,^ and other than for the difference is com15 one another in the highest degree plete and cannot be present along with one another.) The

difference, then,

is

a contrariety.
in the

This, then,
species

is

the meaning of calling two things other in

that they are contrary, being

',

same genus and

'

being indivisible^ (and those things are the same in species, which

have no contrariety, being indivisible

visible
20

^)

we say being

indiin

for in the process of division contrarieties arise

even

the intermediate stages before

we come

to the indivisibles.*
is

Evidently, therefore, with reference to that which

genus, none of the species which belong to
^

called the
is

the genus

either
is

the same as
indicated

it

or other than

it

in species (for the

is

matter

by

negation,''^

and the genus

the matter of that of

which it is called the genus, not in the sense in which we speak of the genus or family of the Heraclidae, but in that in
1055a

Ch.

iv.

16.

^ ^

Cf. 1054I' 35

* Sc. infimae species. 986^ 23. * 1058* 23 read TrpocrrjKovTav. Sc. individuals. i. e. by eliminating the form which characterizes the concrete thing.

and note on

A.

I.

BOOK X

1058'

which we speak of a genus in nature^), nor is it so with reference to things which are not in the same genus, but it will
differ in

25

genus from them, and

in species

from things

in the

same genus. For the difference betwpen thinp-s u-hirh differ in species must be a contrariety and this belongs only to things in the same genus.
:

CHAPTER
from

IX
does not
differ

and male being contrary, and their difference being a contrariety and why a female and a male animal are not different in species, though this difference belongs to animal in virtue of its own nature, and not as whiteness or blackness does; both 'female' and 'male' belong to it qua animal. This question is almost the same as the other, why one contrariety makes things different in species and another does not, e. g. with feet and with wings do, but whiteness and blackness do not. Perhaps it is because the former are modifications peculiar to the genus, and the latter are less so. And since one element is formula and one is matter, contrarieties which are in the formula make a difference in species, but those which are in the concrete material thing do not make one. Therefore whiteness in a man, or blackness, does not make one, nor is there a difference in species between the white man and the black man, not even if each of them be denoted by one word. For man plays the part of matter, and matter does not create a difference for it does not make individual men species of man, though the flesh and the bones of which this man and that man consist are other. The conspecies, female
;
' '

One might man in

raise the question,

why woman

30

'

'

35
*

1058*'

'

'

crete thing

is

other, but not other in species, because in the

is

formula there
visible kind.
is

Callias
it

no contrariety, and man is formula + waZ/^r

is

is
;

the ultimate indi-

'white man', then,

is

ic

so also, because

the individual Callias that

white

is white only incidentally. Nor do a brazen and a ^ wooden circle differ in species and if a brazen triangfe and a wooden circle differ in species, it is not because of the

'man', then,

Cf. A. 28.

'

1058*" 13 read

kcCi

IvXtvor, ovbi.

1058"
15

METAPHYSICA
matter, but because there
is

a contrariety in the formula.

things other in species,

But
it

does the matter not

make

when
it

is
?

other in a certain way, or

is

there a sense in which

does

For why
their

is

this horse other than this

is is

man

in species,

although

matter

included with

their

formulae?

Doubtless

becau se there

20

'

25

For while there t\\Q forimda. is a contrariety also between white man and black horse, and it is a contrariety in species, it does not depend on the whiteness of the one and the blackness of the other, since even if both had been white, yet they would have been other in species. And male and female are indee d modifications peculiar to animal not however in virtue of its essence but in the matt^l","'!. y.* the body. This is why the same seed becomes female or male by being acted on in a certain way. We have stated, then, what it is to be other in species, and why some things differ in species and others do not.
a contrariety in
'

',

CHAPTER X
Since contraries are other in form, and the perishable and
the imperishable are contraries
(for

privation

is

a deter-

30

minate incapacity^), the perishable and the imperishable must be different in kind.^ Now so far we have spoken of the general terms themselves, so that it might be thought not to be necessary that every imperishable thing should be different from every perishable
thing in form, just as not every white thing
is

different

in

form from every black thing. For the same thing can be both, even at the same time if it is a universal (e.g. man can be both white and black), and if it is an individual it can
^

1058^ 27 read aBwafxln

bicopia^fir}.
' '

translate yevos and elBos as genus and * species ' makes nonsense of the argument of this chapter. They have therefore been rendered ' kind ' and ' form '. The only trace of the technical distinction is found in the last sentence of the chapter, and there it is not justified by what precedes. It looks as if the first part of the chapter had been written
^

To

before the distinction was drawn, and 11. 10-14 (or perhaps only 1. 14) added under the supposition that a generic difference between the perishFor the absence of disable and the imperishable had been proved. tinction between yeVos and e'Sos of. 1071^^ 25 with 27, Cat. 8^27 with 9* 14, Hist. An. i. 490^ 16 with 17, Pol. iv. 1290^ 33 with 36. To read ilhn in 1058^ 28 is useless in view of 1059* 10-14.

I.

BOOK X

1058''

still be both for the same man can be, though not at the same time, white and black. Yet white is contrar}' to black. 35 But while some contraries belong to certain things by accident (e. g. those now mentioned and many others), others cannot, and among these are both perishable' and imperishable For not hing is by accident perishable. What is acci- 1059^
; ' '

'.

dental
is

is

capable of not being present, but perishableness

one of the attributes that belong of necessity to the things to which they belong or else one and the same thing may be perishable and imperishable, if perishableness is capable of 5 not belonging to it. Perishableness then must either be the essence or be present in the essence of each perishable thing. The same account holds good for imperishableness also; for both are attributes which are present of necessity. The characteristics, then, in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing is perishable and another imperishable, are opposite, so that the things must be different
;

in kind.

Evidently,

then, there

cannot
^

be Forms such as some

another
-

10

maintain, for then one

imperishable.

man would be perishable and

said

Yet the Forms are

to be the

same

in

form with the individuals and not merely to have the same

name

but things which differ in kind

are further apart than

those which differ in form.

^
^
- The ideal man. The sensible individual. As the perishable and the imperishable have been shown to do.

'jr
BOOK
That Wisdom
is

XI

(K)
I
first

CHAPTER
a science of

principles,

is

evident

20

which we have raised objections to the statements of others about the first principles but one might ask the question whether Wisdom is to be conceived as one science or as several. If as one, it may be objected that one science always deals with
from the introductory chapters^
in
;

contraries, but the

is

first

principles are

not contrary.
it

If

it

not one, what are these sciences with which

'^

is

to be

identified

Further,

is

it

the business of one science or of more to

principles of demonstration
If
?

examine the
25

first

If of one.

why

of this rather than of any other?

? ^

of more, which

must these be said to be

If

Further, does philosophy investigate

all

substances or noti
if,

not

all,

it

is

hard to say which

all, it is

but

being one,

i1

investigates

them

doubtful

how

the same science car

embrace several subject-matters.*

Further, does
'30
it

deal with substances only or also wit!

i;

their accidents?
possible,
in

If in the case of attributes demonstration

that

of substances

sciences are

different,

what

is

But if the twc, each of them and which

it

is

not.

i;

Wisdom ?

If

the accidents

we think of it is Wisdom, but

as demonstrative, the science o

if

as dealing with
title.^

first

principles

the science of substances claims the

But again the science we are looking for must not b supposed to deal with the causes which have been mentionec
35 in

the Physics.^
is

For

(i)

it

does not
is

deal''^

with the
in

fina

cause (for this

action and
^
3

the good, and this

;

found
first
2

the

field c

movement

and

it

is

the

mover

for

tha

Cf.

Bk. A.
^

Cf. B. 996"^

26- 9973' 15. 1059* 32 read ^ fxev yap

fj

cf B gg6 18-^ 26. Cf. B. 997a 15-25.

rj

aTTO^aKTiiir], ao(j>ia

rrepl

ra avjx^e^tjKOTa,
ii.

rj

77(p\ TCI TTpcora,

* ^

tS>v ov<nS)v.

Cf. B.

The

material, formal, efficient,

ovre.

997^ 25-34. and final causes (P/iys.

3).

1059* 35 read

K.

BOOK

XI
unmov-

lOSQ'-^

is

the nature of the end

is

but

in the case of things

it is

hard to with whether for deals the science we are now looking say perceptible substances or not with them, but with certain If (a) with others, it must deal either with the Forms others.
able there
first

no

mover),^ and (2) in general

1059**

or with the objects of mathematics.

Now

(i)

evidently the

Forms do not exi.st. (But it is hard to say, even if one suppose them to exist, why the same is not true of the other things
of which there are Forms, as of the objects of mathematics.
I
5

mean

that the Platonists place the objects of mathematics

between the Forms and perceptible things, as a third class of things besides the Forms and the things in this world but there is not a third man or horse besides the ideal and the individuals. If on the other hand it is not as they say, with what sort of things must the mathematician be supposed to deal ? Certainly not with the things in this world for none
;
;

10

of these

is

the sort of thing which the mathematical sciences

inquire into.)

Nor

(ii)

does the science which

;

we

are

now
/

seeking treat of the objects of mathematics

for

none of them

can exist separately.

perceptible substances
;

But again

(d)

it

does not deal with

for they are perishable.

In general

we might

raise the question, to

difficulties

which science

it
15

belongs to discuss the

objects

about the matter of the

of mathematics.

Neither to physics (because the

is

whole inquiry of the physicist

chemselves a principle of
science
^/lis
is

movement and

about the things that have in rest), nor yet to the

:

which inquires into demonstration and science for It remains subject which ii investigates. :hen that it is the philosophy which we have set before
just the ourselves that treats of those subjects.^

20

One might
yy

discuss the question whether the science

we

are

;eeking should be said to deal with the principles whicli are

some

called

elements.

All
;

men suppose
it

present

in

concrete

things

but

these to be might be thought that

;

;he science

we seek should

treat rather of uuiversals

is

for 25

ivery formula

and not >f ittfimae species^ so that as far as this goes it would deal vith the highest classes. These would be being and unity
and every science
of universals
;

Cf. B.

996* 21-^

I.

Cf. B. 997a

34-998*

19.

'

Cf. B. 998'" 15.

P 2

1059"
for

METAPHYSICA
these

things
30

that

might most of all be supposed to contain al] are, and to be most like principles because

they are

first

by nature
;

for

if

they perish

all

other things are

35

But and are one. inasmuch as, if one is to suppose them to be genera, they must be genera predicable of their differentiae, and no genus is predicable of any of its differentiae, in this way it would seem that we should not make them genera nor principles. Further if the simpler is more of a principle than the less simple, and destroyed with them
for all things are

the ultimate

members

of the

genus
into

(for

they are

indivisible,

genus are simpler than the but the genera are divided

many and
are

differing species), the species

the principles, rather than the genera.

species

might seem to be But inasmuch as the

that

involved
like

in the

destruction of the genera, the

;

genera are more

principles
is

for

1060^ another

in its

destruction

a principle of

it.^

which involves These and

others of the kind are the subjects that involve difficulties.

CHAPTER
Further, must
things, or
is
it

II

we suppose something apart from indvidua these that the science we are seeking treat;
is

of
5

The

objection to the latter view

that the individual;

But the things that are apart fron and the science w< [the individuals are genera or species inow seek treats of neither of these. The reason why thi;|
are infinite in number.^
;

is

Iv
I
'

impossible has been stated.^ It is in general hard to saj whether one must assume that there is a separable substance
besides the sensible substances
(i.e.

the substances in this world]

is

or that these are the real things and philosophy

concernet

10

15

For we seem to seek another kind of substance and this is our problem, e. to see if there is something whicl can exist apart by itself and belongs to no sensible thing. Further, if there is another substance apart from and corre sponding to sensible substances, which kinds of sensibL substance must be supposed to have this corresponding t( them ? Why should one suppose men or horses to have i1
with them.
i.
,

^
"^

998^ 20-999* 23. 1060'* 4 Alexander reads 1059'' 21-1060* I.

Cf. B.

^Bapra for aneipa, and this

may

be right.

K.

BOOK

XI
all

io6o
lifeless

and not the other animals or even

in

things?

On

the other hand to set up other and eternal substances equal

number

seem to
principle

fall

and perishable substances would beyond the bounds of probability. But if the we now seek is not separable from corporeal things,
to the sensible

what has a better claim to the name than matter ?

however, does not exist in actuality, but exists
in

This, 20

potency,

would seem rather that the form or shape is a more important principle than this but the form is perishable,^ so that there is no eternal substance at all which can exist apart and independent. But this is paradoxical for such a principle and substance seems to exist and is sought by nearly all the best thinkers as something that exists for how is there to be order unless there is something eternal and independent and permanent ?
and
it
;
;
;

'5

"^

Further,

if

there

is

a substance or principle of such a nature

now seeking, and if this is one for all and the same for eternal and for perishable things, it is hard to say why, if there is the same principle, some of the things that fall under the principle are eternal, and others are not eternal this is paradoxical. But if there is one principle of perishable and another of eternal things, we shall be in a
as that which
things,

we

are

30

like difficulty if the principle of perishable things, as well as

that of eternal,

is

eternal

for

are not the things that

fall

why, if the principle is eternal, under the principle also eternal ?

if it is perishable it must have another principle, and must have yet another, and this will go on to infinity.^ 35 If on the other hand we set up what are thought to be the most unchangeable principles, being and unity, firstly, if each of these does not indicate a this and a substance, how 1060'' Yet we expect the will they be separable and independent ? if each of them But eternal and primary principles to be so. does signify a this and a substance, all things that are are

But

that

'

'

'

'

substances

for
;

being

is

predicated of

all

things (and unity

is false.

also of some)

but that

all

things that are are substance

right

Further,
^

how can they be

who say that

only stating
'

the

first

principle

It

must be remembered that A.

999^ 24-" 24.

is

common

opinions and
3.

the consequent difficulties.

-

Cf. B.

Cf. B.

1000* 5-iooi

io6o^
is

METAPHYSICA
unity
first

and

this

is

substance,

and generate number

'

as

the
lo

product from unity and from matter, and assert

that

number is substance ? How are we to think of two ', and each of the other numbers composed of units, as one ? On this point neither do they say anything nor is it easy But if we suppose Hnes or what comes to say anything. after these (I mean the primary plane figures) to be
separable substances, but
sections

principles, these at least are not

15

and divisions the former of surfaces, the latter of and solids (while points are sections and divisions of lines) and all these are further they are limits of these same things Further, how are we in other things and none is separable. unity and the point ? of substance to suppose that there is a
; ;

Every substance comes

the point does not
20
is
;

into being

by a gradual

process, but

for the point is a division.^

A further

difficulty is raised
'

by the
such
',
'

fact that all

knowledge

of universals and of the

is

but substance does not

this
'

belong to univerSals, but

so that if there
is

rather a

a separable thing,
first

knowledge about the

are

principles, the

question arises,

how

we

to suppose the

first

principle to

be substance
Further,
is

there anything apart from the concrete thing

(by which
25
'

mean
?

the matter and that which

If not,

is

joined with
that

matter), or not
all
is

we

are

met by the objection

perishable.

things that are in matter are

But

if

there

must be the form or shape. It is hard to determine in which cases this exists apart and in which for in some cases the form is evidently not it does not
something,
it
;

separable,

e. g. in

the case of a house.^

Further, are the principles the

30 If in

same

in

kind or

in

number

number,

all

things will be the same.^

CHAPTER

III

Since the science of the philosopher treats of being qua being universally and not of some part of it, and being has
*
'

1 '

Cf. B. 1001=1 4-1002'' II.

^ "

Cf. B.

1003a

S-17.
4.

Cf. B. 999!^ 15-20, 1002^ 12-32.

Cf. B.

999^ 24-icco^

K.

BOOK

XI
it

1060*
follows that
nature,
it

many
is

senses and

is

not used in one only,

in virtue

if it

used equivocally and

fall

of no

common
used

does

not

under one science

;

(for there is

no one

class in the

case of equivocal terms)

but

if it

is

in virtue

of some

35

common

under one science. The term seems to be used in the way we have mentioned, like medical' and 'healthy For each of these also we use in many senses and 1061^ each is used in this way because the former refers somehow
nature,
it

will fall

'.

Other terms each term refers to one identical concept. For a prescription and a knife are called medical because the former proceeds from medical science, and the latter is useful to it. And a thing is called healthy
latter to health.

to medical science

and the

refer to other central concepts, but

in the

same way

one thing because

productive of

it is

indicative of health,

another because
in the

it is

it.

And
then,
'

the same
is

is
'

true
'

other cases.
;

Everything that
is

is,
'

said to
it is

this

same way

each thing
of

said to

be

because

be in a modi10

fication of

being qtta being or a permanent or a transient state

it,

or a

movement

or something else of the sort.

ever}^thing that

is

may be

referred

nature, each of the contrarieties also

first

And since to some one common may be referred to the

and contrarieties of being, whether the first and unity or likeness and unlikeness, or some other differences let these be taken as already discussed. It makes no difference whether that which is be referred to being or to unity. For even if they are not the same but different, they are convertible for that which is one is also somehow being, and that which is being is one. But as every pair of contraries falls to be examined by one and the same science, and in each pair one term is the privation of the other (though one might regarding some contraries raise the question, how they can be privatively related, viz. those which have an intermediate, e.g. unjust and just; in all such cases one must maintain that the privation is not of the whole definition, but of its extreme form e.g. if the just man is by virtue of some permanent disposition obedient to the laws ', the unjust man need not have the whole definidifferences

differences of being are plurality

15

20

'

25

tion denied of him, but will be

'

in

some

respect deficient in

obedience to the laws

',

and

in this respect the privation will


io6i^
attach to

METAPHYSICA
him
;

and similarly
all

in all

other cases)

and

since, as

the mathematician investigates abstractions (for in his investi30

gation he eliminates
lightness, hardness

the sensible qualities,

its

e, g.

weight and

and

contrary, and also heat and cold

and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three dimensions, and the attributes of 35 things qua quantitative and continuous, and does not consider them in any other respect, and examines the relative positions of some and the consequences of these, and the commensur1061*' ability and incommensurability of others, and the ratios of others but yet we say there is one and the same science of all these things geometry), the same is true with regard to of this in so iar as it is being, and the (for the attributes ^b^eing 5 contrarieties in it qua being, it is the business of no other science than philosophy to inves tigate \ox~Xo~physics one would assign t he study of things not qua being, but rather qua sharing" i n movern ent while dialectic and sophistic deal with the attributes of things that are, but not of things qua being, and not
;

10

with being
far as

itself in

so far as

it is

being)

therefore

it

remains
in so
'

that the philosopher studies the things

we have named,
is is

they are being!

Since

all

that

said to

'

be

in

virtue of one

common
first

character though the term has

in

many

meanings, and contraries are

referred to the
15

the

contrarieties

same case (for they are and differences of being),

and things of this

sort

can

fall

under one science,^the_diffiUky

'

we stated at the begi nning^ is solved. I mean the question how there can be one science of th ings which are many and
differen t in genus.

CHAPTER
in
20

IV

Since even the mathematician uses the

a special application,
exarriine

sophy to

common axioms only must be the business of first philoThat the principles of mathematics also.
it

when
is
^

equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal,

to all quantities^ but mathematics
Cf. r. I, 2.

common

marks

off a part

1059* 20-23.

The

question raised in 1059* 29-34 has

also incidentally

been answered.

'

K.

BOOK
it

XI
separately, e.g. lines or

1061'

of

its

proper matter and studies

some other kind of quantity not, howqua being b ut in so far as each of them is contmuous in one or two or three dimensions but philosophy does not 25 inquire about particular subjects in so far as each of them has such and such attributes, but considers each subjec t in rela tion to beinf qua being Physics is in the same position as mathematics for physics studies the attributes and the principles of the things that are, qita movin g and not qua being, wh ereas the primar^^ science, we have said, cTeals 30
angles or numbers or
ever,
;
.

with

these, only in

so far as the

underlying subjects are

and not in virtue of any other character. Therefore both physics and mathematics must be regarded as paris_^{
existent,

Wisdom. ^

CHAPTER V
There
is

a principle in things, about which

we cannot be

deceived, but must always, on the contrary, recognize the truth, 35

same time be admit any other similar pair of opposites. About io6a^ such matters there is no proof in the full sense, though there is proof ad hmninevi. For it is not possible to infer this truth itself from a more certain principle, yet this is necessary if there is to be proof of it in the full sense.- But he who wants 5 to prove to the asserter of opposites that he is wrong must get from him an admission which shall be identical with the principle that the same thing cannot both be and not be at one and the same time, but shall not seem to be identical for thus alone can he demonstrate his thesis to the man who says that opposite statements can be truly made about the same sub- 10 ject. Those, then, who are to join in argument with one another must to some extent understand one another for if this does not happen how can they jom m argument with one another? Therefore every word must be intelligible and signify something, and not many things but only one and if it 15 signifies more than one thing, it must be made plain to which of these the word is being applied. He, then, who says this is
viz. t hat

the same th ing c annot at o ne and the

and not

be, or

'

Cf. r.

1005*

ig-** 5, K.

1059* 23-26.

Cf. r. 1006=^ 5-18.

1062^

METAPHYSICA
and
signifies,

denies what he affirms, so that what the word he says it does not signify and this is impossible. Therefore if this is signifies something, one cannot truly
'

is

not

'

'

'

assert the contradictory predicate of the

20

same

subject.^

Further,

if

the word signifies something and this can be

it,

truly asserted of
it is

this

connexion must be necessary

is

and

not possible that that which

it is

necessary should ever not

the opposed assertions

be

not possible therefore to

make

truly of the

25

same subject.^ Further, if the affirmation is no more true than the negation, he who says 'man' will be no more right than he who says not-man It would seem also that in saying the man is not a horse we should be either more or not less right than in saying he is not a man, so that (on
'

'.

the view

we

are opposing)
is

we
it

shall

be right

in

saying that the

then that

same person

a horse

for

was assumed

to be possible to

make
the
30

opposite statements equally truly.

is

It follows

35

1062''

man and a horse, or any other animal.^ no proof of the axiom in the full sense there is a proof which may sufifice for one who will make these suppositions. And perhaps if we had questioned Heraclitus himself in this way we might have forced him to confess that opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects But, as it is, he adopted his opinion without understanding what his statement involved.'* But in any case if what is said by him is true, not even this itself is true viz. that the same For thing can at one and the same time both be and not be. as, when the statements are separated, the affirmation is no more true than the negation, in the same way the complex statement being like one affirmation its negation will be no
same person
a

While, then, there

is

less
if it

true than the whole taken as an affirmation.^

is

Further,

not possible to affirm anything truly, this itself will be

assertion that there
is

false

the
who

no true affirmation.
is

But

ii

a true affirmation exists, this appears to refute what

10

said by

those

raise such objections

and utterly destroy rationa

discourse.'^
1

Cf. r. 1006''^ i8-ioo7'i2o.

Cf. r.

^
'

Cf. r. 1006^ 28-34.

Cf. r. 1005*^

^
^

1007^ i8-ioo8' 2. 1062^ 6 read ovbev t^ttov Cf. r. 1012^ 13-18.

*
jj

23-26.

a7^o'0ao^s.

"

Cf. r. 1008"' 4-7.

K.

BOOK

XI

1062*

CHAPTER
The saying
tioned
;

VI
views we have menall things,

of Protagoras

is

like the

he

said that

man

is

the measure of

meaning
is.

simply that that which seems to eacn

this
is
is so, it

man

assuredly
is

If 15

follows that the

same thing both

and

is

not,

and

bad and good, and that the contents of

all

other opposite

statements are true, because often a particular thing appears

each
in

and that which appears to may be solved by considering the source of the opinion. It seems to have arisen
beautiful to

some and ugly

the measure.

to others,

man

is

This

difficulty

20

some cases from the doctrine of the natural philosophers, and in others from the fact that all men have not the same views about the same things, but a particular thing appears pleasant to some and the contrary of pleasant to others.^ That nothing comes to be out of that which is not, but everything out of that which is, is a doctrine common to
nearly
all

25

the natural philosophers.

Since, then, a thing can

in

become

not-white, having been perfectly white and

no

come from that which is not not-white ^ so that a thing must come to be out of that which is not (so they argue), unless the same
respect not-white, that which becomes not-white must
;

But it is have said in our works on physics ^ in what sense things that come to be c ^me to he from tha t which is not, and m what sense from that which is.*
thing was at the beginning both not-white and white.

30

not hard to solve this difficulty

for we

But to lend

oneselt'
is

equally to the opinions and the fancies

foolish
;

of disputing parties

i|

one of them must be mistaken. And this is evident from what happens in sensa- 35 tion for the same thing never appears sweet to some and bitter to others, unless in the one case the sense-organ which 1063^ incriminates the aforesaid flavours has been per\-erted and iured. And if this is so the one party must be taken to be
for clearly
;

ithe

measure, and the other must not. And I say the same of good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, and all other such qualities. For to maintain the view we are opposing is just like
'

Cf. r.

'

P/tfs.

i.

1009* 6-16, 22-30. 8, De Gen. et Corr.

'
i.

1062^ 28 read
*

e/t fir}

ovtos

fiq Xtvicov.

si;** 14.

Cf. r. 1009* 30-36.

1063^

METAPHYSICA
maintaining the truth of what appears to people
finger under their eye

who put

their

lo

and make the object appear two instead of one, i. e. like saying that it is two (because it appears to be of that number) and again one (for to those who do not interfere with their eye the one object appears one).^
In general,
this earth are
it is

absurd to make the fact that the things of

in

observed to change and never to remain

our judgements about the truth.

the

same
15

state, the basis of

For

in pursuing the truth

always

in the

same
;

state

one must start from the things that are and suffer no change. Such are the

heavenly bodies

for these

do not appear to be now of one

nature and again of another, but are manifestly always the

20

no change.^ is movement, and something moved, and everything is moved "out of something and into something, it follows that that which is moved must first be in that out of which it is to be moved, and then not be in it, and move into the other and come to be in it but it follows that the conin

same and share

Further,
if

there

tradictory statements are not true /

///r

sav/e time, as our

opponents assert they

are.^

And

if

the things of this earth continuously flow and

move

in

25

one were to suppose this, although it is not true why should they not endure in respect of quality? For the assertion of contradictory statements about the same thing seems to have arisen largely from the belief that the quantity of bodies does not endure, which, our opponents hold, justifies them in saying that the same thing both is and is not four cubits long. But the essence depends on
respect of quantity
if

quality,
'

and

this is of

determinate nature, though quantity

orders people to take
it ?

is

indeterminate.*

Further,

when the doctor

some par
;

30 ticular food,

why do

they take
'

It is
*

respect

'

this is

bread

is

truer than

hard to see in what so this is not bread

'

th at it wou ld make no difference whether one ate or not. _J3ut as a matter of fact they take the food which is offered assumi ng that they know the truth about it and that it i^
^

^ *

Cf. r. 1010^ 1-26, ioii' 31-^ I. 1063'* 21 read avrov%. Cf. r. loio** 35-^
Cf. r. loio'* 22-25.

Cf. r. ioio' 25-32.

i.

K.

BOOK
all

XI
were no fixed constant
for ever.^

1063^
'

bread.

Yet they should

if

not, if there

natule in sensible things, but

moved and flowed

Again,

we

are always changing and never remain the 35

is
it

same, what wonder

if

to us, as to the sick, things never

also,

appear the same ?

For to them

because they are not

in

1063^

the same condition as when they were well, sensible qualities

selves

do not appear alike; yet, for all that, the sensible things themneed not share in any change, though they produce
5

And the different, and not identical, sensations in the sick. same must surely happen to the healthy if the aforesaid- change But if we do not change but remain the same, takes place.
there wll be something that endures.'

As

for those to

whom

these difficulties are suggested

for everj'thing,
it

by the

supposed necessity of a reason

posit
is

is

not easy

to solve the difficulties to their satisfaction, unless they will

something and no longer demand a reason for it for it all reasoning and all proof is accomplished if they posit nothing, they destroy discussion and all reasoning. Therefore with such men there is no reasoning. But as
;

10

only thus that

for those
it

who

are perplexed

by the

traditional difficulties,

is

easy to meet them and to dissipate: the causes of their

perplexity.

This

is

evident from what has been said.

15

from these arguments that contradictory statements cannot be truly made about the same subject at one time,* nor can contrary statements, because every contrariety depends on privation. This is evident if we
It is manifest, therefore,

reduce the formulae of contraries to their principle.^

no intermediate between contraries can be presame subject, of which one of the contraries is predicated. If the subject is white we shall be wrong in saying it is neither white nor black, for it would 'follow that it is and is not white: for the first of the two terms |we have put together^ would be true of it, and this is the
Similarly,

dicated of one and the

contradictory of white."

We
1
'

could not be right, then, in accepting the views either

^ of Heraclitus or of

An axagoras.
'
* *

If

we

were,

it

would follow

::5

Cf. r. 1008^ 12-27. Cf. r. 1009* 58-^ 33. Cf. r. loii^ 15-22.

Cf. 1063^ 35. Cf. r. 1009* 16-22,

ioii 3-16.
"^

Sc. 'not white'

and 'not black'.

Cf. r. 7.

1063''

METAPHYSICA
that contraries

would be predicated of the same

a part of everything
it is

subject, Jbr_

when Anaxagoras says

he says nothing
present
30
is

is in

everything,

sweet any more than

bitter,

and so with
is

any other pair of

not

contraries, since in everything everything

potentially only, but

all

actually and

separately.

And

similarly

statements cannot be false nor

other
difficulties

all true,

both

because of
arising

many

from

this position,
all

be true even to say

35

which might be deduced as and because if all are false it will not are false, and if all are true it will not

be

false to

say

all

are false.^

CHAPTER
Every science seeks
1064*
its

VII
and causes
for

certain principles

each of

objects

e. g.

medicine and gymnastics and each of the

mathematical.
itself

other sciences, whether productive or

each of these marks off a certain class of things for

busies itself about this as about something existing

For and

and
is

real,

not however qua real

distinct
5

the science that does this

another

from these.
the
'

somehow

Of the sciences mentioned each gets what 'J n some class of things and tries to prove

the other truths, whether loosely or accurately.

clear from

Some
;

get the
its

'what' through perception, others by hypothesis

is

so that

an induction of
i.

this sort that there is

no demojt-

stration of the substance,

10

e.

of the

'

what

'.

There
different

is

a science of nature, an d evidently

it

must be

both from practical and from productive science.

in the

For

in the case of productive science the principle of prois

duction

producer and not in the product, and

is

either

an art or some other potency.

science the
15
i

And

similarly in practical
in

movement
But
t

is

not in the thing done, but rather

pViilo'^ftphf'r

the doers.

he science of the natural

deals

with the things that have in themselves a p rinciple of nrtpve. ment. It is clear from these facts, then, that natural science

m ust
must

be neither practical
fall

r|or

productive, but theoretica l (for

classes).
'

it

into

one of these

And
'

since each of the

20 sciences

must somehow know the what and use this as a principle, we must not fail to observe how the natural philosopher should define things and how he must state the formula
1

Cf. r. 8.

K.

BOOK
as

XI
to
*

1064'

of the essence

whether
;

akin

snub

'

or rather

to

'concave*.
t he

For of these the formula of the 'snub' includes

'

matter of the thing, but that of the

conc ave
in

'

is

indepen25

dent of the

m atter
its

tor

'

snubness

'

is

found

a nose, so that

we
*

look for
'

snub

is

formula without eliminating the nose, for the a concave nose. Evidently then the formula of

flesh

and the eye and the other parts must always be stated
is

without eliminating the matter.

Since there
existing apart,

a science of being qua being and capable of

we must

consider whether this

is

to be regarded

as the

same

as physics or rather as different.

Physics deals 30
in

with the things that have a principle of

selves
;

movement

them-

mathematics

is

theoretical,

and

is

a science that deals

with things that a re at

there

rest,

but

its

subjects can not exist apart.

is

Therefore about that which can exist apart and

is

unmovable
there
is

a science different Irom both of these,

if

a
35

sub stance of this nature (I mean separable p nH ijpfpnvahlp\ as weshall try to prove there is.^ And if there is such a kind
of thing in the world, here must surely be the divine, and this

must be the

first

and most Jmp ortant

principle.

Evidently, 1064**

then, there are three kinds n^ the nretiVal ;ripnre<;

pViy;irg

mathematics, theology.

The

class of theoretical sciences is

t he last

the best, and of these themselves

it

named

is

best

fo r
5

deals with the highest of existing things, a nd each science

called better or

is

worse

in virtue of its

proper object.

One might raise the question whether the science of being qua being is to be regarded as universal or not. Each of the mathematical sciences deals with some one determinate class
of things, but universal mathematics applies alike to
if
all.

Now
10

natural substances are the

;

first

of existing things, physics

must be the first of sciences but if there is another entity and substance, separable and unmovable, the knowledge of it must be dififerent and prior to physics and universal because
^t is prior.^

CHAPTER
Since
'

VIII
is 15

'

being' in general has several senses, of which one

',

being by accident

we must

consider
2

first

that which

is

in

Cf. A. 6, 7.

cf. E. I, K.

1059^ 26-29.

1064''

METAPHYSICA
this sense.
itself

Evidently none of the traditional sciences busies

will

For neither does architecture conhappen to those who are to use the house (e. g. 20. whether they will have a painful life in it or not), nor does weaving, or shoemaking, or the confectioner's art, do the like but each of these sciences considers only what is peculiar to it, i. e. its proper end. And as for the question whether the musical is also lettered, or ^ the argument that when he who is musical becomes lettered he will be both at once, not having and that which is, not having always been, 25 been both before must have been coming to be therefore he must have been this none of the at once becoming musical and lettered
about the accidental.
sider

what

'

',

recognized sciences considers, but only sophistic

alone busfes
itself

for this

about the accidental, so that Plato was not ^ that the sophist spends his time on he said when wrong
non-being.

30

That a
be evident

s cience
if

of the accidental

is

not even possibl e,

will

we

try to see

say that everything either

^35

what the accidental really is. We is always and of necessity (neces-j

which we appeal
is

sity not in the sense of violence, but that

in

to

demonstrations), or

is

for the

most

part, or

neither for
it

the most part, nor always and of necessity, but merely as

chances
1065^ though

e.

g. there might be cold in the dog-days, but

thi5

occurs neither always and of necessity, nor for the most part
The^^accidental, then, is it might happen sometimes. what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, n or for the mosi Now we have said what the accidental is, and it is part. obvious why there i s no science of such a thin g fJorj-J] sdepce gj^nf fh^, t vvhirh is always or for the most part, but the acci;

dental

is in

neither of these classes.

Evidently there are not causes and principles of the acci for i dental, of the same kind as there are of the essential
;

there were, everything would be of necessity.

is,

If

is

when L

10

is, and if C exists not by chance but o which C was cause will exist of necessity down to the last cmisaium as it is called (but this was sup posed to be accidental). Therefore all things wifl be o

and

is

when C

necessity, that of

linger.

1064^ 23 read ovS' ft to Cf. E. 1026'' 16.

ixovotikov koX ypafifxaTiKov, ovBe,

^

Cf. Sophistes

following A. Bul 237 A, 254 A.

K. necessity,

BOOK

XI

1065^

and chance and the

possibih'ty of a thing's either

occurring or not occurring are removed entirely from the range of events. And if the cause be supposed not to exist

but to be coming to be, the same results will follow

thing will occur of necessity.
[occur if

every-

15

occurs,
if

and

i(

For to-morrow's eclipse will occurs, and B i( C occurs and

;

n this
o\v

way

we

subtract time from the limited time betvveen

shall

and to-morrow we

come sometime

to the already
20

xisting condition.
ifter this will

Therefore since this exists, everything occur of necessity, so that all things occur of
'

lecessity.

As

to that which

is

'

in the sense of

being true or of being

>y accident, the

md

in thought an affection of thought (which is the reason why it the principles, not of that which *is' in this sense, )Ut of that which is outside and can exist apart, that are ought) and the latter is not necessary but indeterminate I mean the accidental) and of such a thing the causes are nordered and indefinite.^ Adaptation to an end is found in events that happen by luck when one of ature or as the result of thought. It is lese events^ happens by accident. For as a thing may exist,
is
;

former depends on a combination

25

'

D it

may be
is

a cause, either

by

its

own

nature or

by

accident.^ 30

.uck
)

a cause accidentally effecting such events adapted

will.

an end as are usually effected by

without thought.

Therefore luck and

;

lought are concerned with the

<ist

same sphere
;

for will cannot

The

causes from which lucky results

"H.ight
J

happen are indeterminate therefore luck is obscure to 4man calculation and is a cause by accident, but in the unIt is good or bad luck ialified sense a cause of nothing.* ken the result is good or evil and prosperity or misfortune en the scale is large.^
;

35

ince nothing accidental

is

prior to the essential, neither 1065*

If,

accidental ca uses prior.

then, luck or spontaneity

^''^

is

use of the material universe, reas on and natur *"

re
it.'

^^hcpc-

Cf. E. 2-4. Sc. which happen usually ij^Cf. Phys. ii. 196^ 21-25. jCf. Phys. ii. 197* 25-27.
lET.

by nature or as the
*

result of thought.

Cf.
Cf.

Phys. Phys.

ii.

ii.

197* 5-14. 198* 5-13.

1065''

METAPHYSICA

CHAPTER
5

IX
some
this
',

Some
another

things exist only actually,

;

potentially, somi

potentially and actually

falls

one

is

'

another a quantity

10

15

one of the other categories.^ There is n( is always according to the categories of being and there is nothing common t( but each of the categoric these and in no one category belongs to all its subjects in either of two ways (e. g. this positive form and the othe for one kind of it is ness as regards and quality one kind is white privation is and the other black and as regards quantity one kind complete and the other incomplete and as regards spatia movement one is upwards and the other downwards o one thing is light and another heavy ') so that there ar Eac as many kinds of movement and change as of being. kind of thing being divided into the potential and the con: pletely real, I call the actuality of the potential as such, movt ment. That what we say is true, is plain from the followin
in

movement

apart from things; for change

;

'

'

'

',

'

'

'

'

',

'

'

'

',

'

'

'

',

'

'

'

facts.

When

the
',^

'

buildable

',

in so far as
it

it is

by

buildable

exists actually,

is

being

built,

what we mea and this

takii

the process of building.

20 rolling,

Similarly with learning, healing, an

walking, leaping, ageing, ripening.^

the complete

Movement
and

place

when

reality itself exists,

neith'

earlier nor later.*

exists potentially,

The complete reality, then, of when it is completely real and

is

that whic
actual, n

qua
25

itself,
is

but qua movable,

movement. By qua
;

mean

thi

bronze

potentially a statue
is

.but yet the complete reality

bronze, qua bronze,

not movement.

For
If

it is it

not the sar

were absolute the same in its definitory formula, the complete reality bronze would have been a movement. But it is not the sam This is evident in the case of contraries for to be capable
to be bronze and to be a certain potency.
;

health and to be capable of illness are not the same

^ ^

for

Cf.
i.

Phys.

iii.

200^ 26-28.

much matter, but as matter capable of being made ii a building. ^ Cf. Phys. iii. 201^ ^ Cf. Phys. iii. 200^ 32-201* 19. 6, 7 1065^ 28 perhaps we should read toCto, 'but its complete real is not movement.'
e.

not as so

K.

BOOK

XI

1065"
(It is 30

they were, health and illness would have been the same.
that

which underlies and is healthy or sick, whether it is moisture or blood, that is one and the same.) And since they are not the same, as colour and the visible are not the same, [t is the complete reality of the potential as suc/i, that is movehient.
;his
^

Evidently

it

is

this,

complete reality
is

exists,

and movement takes place when 35 and neither earlier nor later. For 1066^
;

ach thing
:.

capable of being sometimes actual, sometimes not,

'

and the actuality of the For the actuality is building or the house. But when the /louse ither this buildable xists, it is no longer the buildable is what The actuality then must be the building^ and s being built. he building is a movement. And the same account applies o all other movements. That what we have said is right, is evident from what all thers say about movement, and from the fact that it is not asy to define it otherwise. For firstly one cannot put it in nother class. This is evident from what people say. Some all it difference and inequality and the unreal none of these, owever, is necessarily moved, and further, change is not to iiese nor from these but rather from opposite to opposite,
g.

the

'

buildable
^//rt

qua

'

buildable
'

'

buildable'

'buildable

is

building.

'

'

'

'

10

'he reason
.

why

people put movement

of contraries
^

in these classes is that

is

thought to be something
'

indefinite,
'

and the principles on

are indefinite because
either a
'

15

no side of the

list

are privative, for none of

them

is

this

'

or a

Iiey juch

'

or in any of the other categories.

is

And
is

the reason
it

hy movement
ituality, for

thought to be indefinite

that

cannot

classed either with the potency of things or with their

neither that which

is

capable of being of a

^rtain quantity,
y, is

nor that which

is

actually of a certain quanis

moved

of necessity.

And movement
;

thought to be
it

20

actuality, but incomplete

the reason

is

that the potential,

is

;v

lose actuality

it is, is

incomplete.
is
;

And
it

therefore

hard
either

grasp what
1065'' 35
'

movement
avrr].

for

must be classed

read

The argument is that the house cannot be the evepyfia of when the house exists the buildable has ceased to exist
Cf.

the buildable, therefore its

tpyfui

must be the process of building. note on A. 986* 23.

io66^

METAPHYSICA
with privation or with potency or with absolute actuality, bu
evidently none of these
is

35

is

possible.

Therefore what remain

that

it

must be what we said

in

the sense

we have

defined

which

actuality and not actualitj

is

hard to understam

but capable of existing.^

movement is in the movable for it is th complete realization of this by that which is capable of causinj
evidently
;

And

movement.
causing
30

And

the actuality of that which

is

is

capable

no other than that of the movable. For i must be the complete reality of both. For a thing is capabl of causing movement because it can do this, and is a move because it is active but it is on the movable that it is capabh
;

movement

of acting, so that the actuality of both alike

is

is

one, just as then

the same interval from one to two as from two to one,

am

as the steep ascent

of them
similar.^

is

and the steep descent are one, but the beinj not one the case of the mover and the moved i
;

CHAPTER X
35

The

infinite is either that

it is

which

is

incapable of being

tra

versed because

not

its

nature to be traversed (this corre;

'

sponds to the sense in which the voice is invisible '), or tha which admits only of incomplete traverse or scarcely admit of traverse, or that which, though it naturally admits c
traverse,
is

not traversed or limited

further, a thing

may

infinite in respect

of addition or of subtraction or of botl

1066^ The

For magnitude nor plurality, it is neither a spatial a but infinit itself is its substance and not an accident, it will be indivisibk But if ir for the divisible is either magnitude or plurality.
infinite

cannot be a separate, independent thing.

divisible,

it is

not

infinite, this,

except as the voice

is

invisible

bi

people do not mean

infinite,

nor are
unless

we examining

this sort

but the

infinite as untraversable.^

Further,

how

ca

an

infinite

exist

by
if

itself,

number and magnituc

is

also exist

by themselves,
Further,
qiia

since
Phys.
ill.

infinity
is

an attribute
things,

these

? *

the infinite
infinite
cf.

an accident of somethir
in

10 else, it
^

cannot be
iii.
iii.

an element

as

tl:

With 1065^ 22-1066^27

Cf.
Cf.

^
*

Phys. Phys.

202* 13-21. 204* 17-19.

201* 27-202*^ 3. ^ Cf. Phys.

iii.

204^* 3-14.

K.
Invisible
invisible.^
is

BOOK

XI
is

1066''

not an element in speech, though the voice

And

evidently the infinite cannot exist actually.

For then any part of it that might be taken would be infinite for to be infinite ' and the infinite are the same, if the infiTherefore nite is substance and not predicated of a subject.
*

'

'

it

is

either indivisible, or
;

if it

is

seeable,

it

is

divisible into

ever divisible parts

infinites,

but the same thing cannot be

is

many

15

yet as a part of air

infinite, if
it

air,

so a part of the infinite

would be
Therefore

the

infinite is

a substance and a principle.

indivisible.

must be insecable and

indivisible
;

actually infinite
tity.

cannot be it Therefore infinity belongs to a subject incidentally.

for
so,

But the must be a quanis

But

if

as

we have

said,

it

cannot be

it

that

a principle,

20

but rather that of which

it is

an accident
but that the

the air or the even

infinite is

number.-

This inquiry

is

universal

not

among
If
',

sensible thitigs, is

evident from the following argument.

the definition of a
Jiere cannot

body

is

'

that which

is

bounded by planes

be an

infinite
infinite

body

either sensible or intelligible

number, for number or that which has a number can be completely enumerated.^ The truth is The infinite vident from the following concrete argument. For (i) it cannot be :an neither be composite nor simple.
lor a separate

and

25

^or the contraries

:

composite body, since the elements are limited in multitude. must be equal and no one of them must be nfinite for if one of the two bodies falls at all short of the
)ther in potency, the finite will be destroyed by the infinite. \nd that each should be infinite is impossible. For body is

30

hat which has extension in

all directions,

and the

infinite is

he boundlessly extended, so that the infinite body will be Nor (2) can the infinite body be Bfinite in every direction.
iie
ipart

and simple neither, as some say, something which is 35 from the elements, from which they generate these* for everyK)r there is no such body apart from the elements ning can be resolved into that of which it consists, but no uch product of analysis is obser\'ed except the simple bodies), For apart from the 1067^ ibr fire nor any other of the elements.
;

^ ^

Cf. Cf.

Phys. Phys.

iii. iii.

204* 14-17204* 34-'' 8.

* *

Cf. Phys. Cf. Phys.

iii. iii.

204^* 20-32.

204^' 10-24.

1067^
question
is finite,

METAPHYSICA
how any of them could be infinite, the All, even if cannot either be or become one of them, as Heraclitus says ^ all things sometime become fire. The same argument applies to the One, which the natural philosophers
ii

posit besides the elements.

For everything changes from

cold.^

thi.

contrary,

e. g.

from hot to

10

somewhere, and whole and e. g. the whole earth and part of the earth. Therefore if (i) the infinite body is homogeneous, it will be unmovable or it will be always moving But the latter is impossible for why should it rather move down than up or anywhere else ? E. g. if there is a clod which is part of an infinite body, where will this move oi rest ? The proper place of the body which is homogeneous with it is infinite. Will the clod occupy the whole place
Further, every sensible
is

body

part have the same proper place,

then

And how

(This
? ^

is

impossible.)

What

then

is

itj

rest or its

then
15

it

movement cannot move

;

It will either rest

it

everywhere, anc
ii

or

will

move everywhere, and then

cannot be still. But (2) if the infinite body has unlike parts the proper places of the parts are unlike also, and, firstly, th(

body of the All

is

not one except

finite

by

contact, and, secondly

the parts will be either

Finite they cannot be
nite in quantity
;

or infinite in variety of kindj

will

for

then those of one kind

be

infi
i

20

and those of another will not (if the All or water would be infinite, but such an infi nite part would be destruction to its contrary.^ But if thi parts are infijiite and simple, their places also are infinite an( the elements will be infinite and if this is impossible, and th' places are finite, the All also must be limited.'"' In general, there cannot be infi nite bodyapd also
infinite), e. g. fire
;

^ *

Fr. 30, 31, Diels, Vorsokratiker. 1067* 13 read ^ \xovri kcCi fj Kivrfcrn.
Cf.

Cf. Phys.

iii.

204^'

32-205*

from which it appear a finite number of kinds is to mak an infinite whole, at least one kind must be infinite in extent. The cannot all be infinite, for they limit one another. But if one is infinit and another finite, the former destroys the latter and there ceases to b the variety of kinds within the whole which is at present presupposec Aristotle omits to mention that the supposition of a finite kind co-existin with an infinite kind is in itself absurd, because the finite limits th infinite. But this would only make his case stronger. ^ Cf. P/iys. iii. 205^ 29-32.
PAys.
ill.

205* 10-25.
is

Cf.

1066'' 28-34,

that the

argument

as follows.

If

K.

BOOK

XI

1067=

if every sensible body has either For it must move either towards the middle or upwards, and the infinite either the whole or the half cannot do either for how will you divide it ? Or how will part of the infinite be up and part down, or part extreme and part middle ? Fur ther, every sensible body is in a place, and there are six kmds of place,^ but these cannot exist in an

proper place for

all

bodies,

weight or lightness.

25

infinite

body.

In general,

if

there cannot be an infinite

infinite place,) for that

body

there cannot be an infinite place, 30 (and there cannot be an

;

which

is in

a place

is

somewhere, and
directions,

this

means

either

up or down or in one of the other

is

and each of these

a limit.-

The infinite is not the same in the sense that it is one thing whether exhibited in distance or in movement or in time, but the posterior among these is called infinite in virtue
of
its

35

relation to the prior,

virtue of the distance

alteration or growth,

movement is called infinite covered by the spatial movement

i.

e.

in

or

and a time
it."

is

called infinite because of

the

movement which occupies

CHAPTER
like that in

XI
in

Of things which change, some change

which
in
'

an accid^nfa] gppgp r^ R^b

,

the musical

'

may

be said to walk, and

to change, because

others are said, without

qualification,

something
;

them changes, i.e. the things that change in parts the body becomes healthy, because the .eye does. But there is something which is by its own nature moved primarily, and this is the ^sentially movable The same 5 istinction is found in the case of the mover for it causes
.
:

itiovement either in an accidental sense or in respect of a part

There is something that primarily and there is something that is moved, also J ne time in which it ^ is moved, and that from which and that ito which it is moved.^ But the forms and the affections nd the place, which are the terminals of the movement of loving things, are unmovable, e.g. knowledge or heat it is 10
f

itself

or essentially.
;

:auses

movement

\ ^

Sc.

up and down,
en
iv

right

and
7.

left,

before

and behind.
' '

Cf, P/i_ys. iii. 1067** 8 read

205^ 24-206^

Cf.

xpo*'<?'

^f-

PAfs. ^^ys.

iii.

v.

207'' 21-25. 224* 21-35.

1067^ not heat that

not accidental
traries,
is

METAPHYSICA
a movement, but heating.^

Change which

is

is

found not

in all things,

but between con-

and their intermediates, and between contradictories. convince ourselves of this by induction.^ That which changes changes either frnm positive into 15 positive, or from negative into negative, or from positive into negative, or from negative into positive. (By positive I mean Therefore that which is expressed by an affirmative term.) there must be three changes for that from negative into for the terms are neither contraries 20 negative is not change The nor contradictories, because there is no opposition. change from the negative into the positive which is its contradictory is generation absolute change absolute generation, and partial change partial generation and the change from po sitive to negative is destruction absolute change absolute destruction, and partial change partial destrucIf, then, 'that which is not' has several senses,' 25 tion. and movement can attach neither to. that which implies putting together or separating,^ nor to that which implieji potency and is opposed to that which is in the full sense' (true, the not-white or not-good catt be moved incidentbut that which ii ally, for the not-white might be a man not a particular thing at all can in no wise be moved), tha' 30 which is not cannot be moved, and if this is so, generatior for that which is not is generated cannot be movement For even if we admit to the fullest that its generation is acci

We may

dental, yet

it

is

true to say that 'not-being'

is

predicabl

of that which

is

generated absolutely.^

(Similarly rest canno

belong to that which

35

is not.) These difficulties, then, follow and also this, t hat everyt hi ng that is moved is in a place^ bu for then it would b that which is not is not m a place somewhere. Nor is destruction movement for the contrar
;

^
*

2 cf pfiys^ V, 224^ 28-30. Cf. Phys. V. 224^ 11-16. Cf. E. 1026^^ SS-'' 2, 1027^ 18-19. i. e. to that which is not ' in the sense of ' the judgement which is false i. e. a thing cannot be moved when it does not exist actually, bi
'

exists potentially.
i. e. even if the not-being (privation) which is the starting-point generation can exist only as an accident of prime matter, still not-bein is the starting-point of absolute generation (i. e. generation of a: substanci not of a quality).
(

K.

BOOK
or

XI
but the contrary of deis

1067^

of

movement
is

is

movement

rest,

truction

generation.

Since e very movement

chang e^ 1068^

and th e kinds of change are "the three n amed above, and of th ese those in the way of gen eration and destruction are not movements, a nd these are the changes fro m a thing to its contradict orv% only the change from positive into positive can be mo vement. And the subjects are either contrary' or intermediate for even privation must be regarded as contrary, and naked or toothless' ^ is expressed by a positive term, e.g.
;

'

'

'

or

black

'.

CHAPTER
If

XII

the categoiJs-are classified as substance, quality, place,

acting or being acted on, relation, quantity, there must be

three kinds of

movement

of

quality, of quantity, of place*

There
is

is

no movement
possible that

in respect

of substance (because there 10

in relation changes,

nothing contrary to substance), nor in respect of relation

it

(for

is

if

one of two things

the relative term which was true of the other thing ceases to be
true,^

though
is

this other

does not change at

all,

so that

their

and patient, nor of mover and moved, bec ause there is no mov^ement of movement nor generation of ^ener^ tinn, nor, in genprnl, change o f 15 change For there might be movement of movement in two senses (1) movement may be the subject moved, as a man is moved because he changes from white to black, so that in this way movement might be either heated or cooled But this is impossible for or change its place or increase. change is not a subject Or (2) some other subject may 2 change from a change into some other species of change (as a man changes from disease into health). But this also is not For every movement is change possible except incidentally. from something into something. (And so are generation and destruction but Ranges into things opposed in certain 25

movement

accidental), nor of agent

ways
'

are not
'

m ovements.^) A
is

thing changes, then, at the

in

Toothless

more obviously n^^ative

form than the correspond-

:.g
ap

Greek word,

li

^ 1068* 12 read /zo-o^aXXoiTOf ^r\ aXijdevfadai. So, apparently, Al. apud ISimpl. in PA^s. Cf. N. 1088* 34. * 1068* 25 read i>Si 17 iil ov Kit^ds. Change between contraries is I

1068^

METAPHYSICA
same time from health
itself

into illness,

and from

this

change

into another. Clearly, then,^ if it has become ill, it have changed into some change or other (though it may ^ be at rest), and, further, into a determinate change each time and that new change will be from something definite
will
;

into
30

some other

definite

thing

therefore

opposite change, that of growing well.

We

will be the it answer that this

happens only incidentally,

to ivhich the

e.g. there is a

change from the pro-

cess of recollection to that of forgetting, only because that

process attaches

is

changing,

now

into a state of

knowledge, now into one of ignorance.-'

Further, the process will go on to infinity,
if

there

is

to

35

be change of change and generation of generation. If the change produced is change of change, the change that produces it must be so too e. g. if the simple coming to be was once
;

1068'^

coming to be, that which was coming to be it was also once coming to be therefore that which was simply coming to be it was not yet in existence, but something which was coming to be coming to be it was already in existence.* And this was once coming to be, so that there must have been a time at which it was not yet. Now since of an infinite number of
;

terms there
5

is

not a

first,

the

first in this series will

not exist,

and therefore no following term

can either come to be or
has a

will exist.

Nothing, then,!

move

or change.

Further, that which

10

also the contrary movement and rest, and comes to be also ceases to be. Therefore that which is coming to be is ceasing to be when it has come to be coming to be for it cannot cease to be at the very time at which it is coming to be coming to be, nor after it has come Further, to be for that which is ceasing to be must be.^

movement has

that which

movement, change between contradictories

tion.
^ ^

is

generation or destruc-

^
*

1068^ 27 read fijjXov hi]. This is possible, though excluded by the theory in question. 1068'^ 33 read ety ayvoiav. 1068^ I read kui t6 yiyvofievov iyiyvtro' wore oiVw rfv to yiyvoixevov

anXais
^

nWa yiyvofieuov
.'.

rt t]v

yiyvoyavov

rjbrj. it

If that

be.
'

When

which comes to be comes to be coming to be, ? Not when it is only coming to be coming to
; '

also ceases to
it is

be, for then

cannot cease to be nor after it has come to be, for then also that which comes to be is not and .*. cannot cease to be. .*. It is ceasing Which is absurd. to be, at the very time when it is coming to be.
not and

K.

BOOK

XI
comes to be and becomes movement or
?

1068*

there must be a matter underlying that which

changes.

What
is
it

will

it

be, then, that

generation, as

body or

soul

is

that which suffers alteration

into
?

And

what

that they

move

For

their

movement

must be the movement of a

definite C, not

definite

from a definite

into a

movement without
fulfilled
?

qualification.^

How,

then,

can this condition be

learning,

There can be no learning of

generation.'^

and therefore no generation of

is

Since th ere
in respect

not

movement

either of substance
it

or of

relation or of activi ty
IS

and passivi ty,

re mains that
;

movement

of qualify ^n ^ quantity and plarp for e ach of ^hese admits of contrariety. By quality I mean not that

which

is

in

the substance (for even the differentia

is

a quality),
is

Ibut the passive quality, in virtue of which

a thing

said

to be acted on or to be incapable of being acted on.^

The

20

unmovable is either that which is wholly incapable of being moved, or that which is moved with difficulty in a long time or begins slowly, or that which would naturally be moved, but cannot be moved when and where and as it would naturally be moved. This alone among unmovables I describe as being at rest forrest is contrary to movement, 25 so that it must be a privation in that which is receptive of
;

nKn'cinent.^

Things which are in one place (in the strictest sense) are and things which are in different places are apart. Things whose extremes are together touch. That at which the changing thing, if it changes continuously according to its nature, naturally arrives before it arrives at the extreme That which is most into which it is changing, is between?
together in place,

distant in a straight line

sive

is

contrary in place.

That

is

succes- 30

which

is

after the beginning (the order being

in
it

determined by

position or

form or
line,

^ame class between

succeed a

some other way) and has nothing of the and that which it succeeds, e.g. lines

units a unit, or one house another house.

There
'

is

nothing to prevent a thing of some other class from

With
*

1068** 14 read Klvtiaiv, fir} Kivijaiv airXois. 1068^ 14 read /Mdrjais t^s (mBijaecos, uxtt ^hys. V. 225^ 3-226* 16. Cf. Phys. V. 226^ 23-29. ^ Cf. Phys. V. 226^ 21-25.
-

1067''

14-1068^ I5
226" 10-16.

cf.

Cf.

Phys.

v.

1068^ being between.)

35

METAPHYSICA
something
touches,
is

later

For the successive succeeds something and is one does not succeed two nor the first
'

'

'

',

1069^ day of the month the second.

contig2ious.

That which, being

all

successive,
.

between opposites and these are either contraries or contradictories, and there is no middle term for contradictories, clearly that which is

S ince

change

is

between
5

is

between contraries.

The

contimioiis
;

is

a species

two things are called continuous when the limits of each, with which they touch and are kept together, become one and the same, so
of the contiguous or of that which touches

that plainly the continuous

is

found
in

in

the things out of

of their contact.
;

which a unity naturally

arises
is

virtue

And
10

plainly the successive

the

first

of these concepts

for

the successive does not necessarily touch, but that which touches
is
it

successive.

And
is is

if

a thing

is

continuous,

it
;

touches,

and in no touching, there is no organic for unity. Therefore a point is not the same as a unit contact belongs to points, but not to units, which have only: succession and there is something between two of the former, but not between two of the latter.^
but
if

touches,

it

not necessarily continuous

things in which there

'

Cf. Phys. V. 226^ 32-227^^ 31.

BOOK

XII

(A)

CHAPTER

SUBSTAN'CE is the subject of our inquiry for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances. For
;

if

the universe
part
;

is

of the nature of a whole, substance

is

its

first

and

if it

coheres merely by virtue of serial succes- ao

is first,

sion,

on

this

view also substance

full

and

is

succeeded by

quality,

and then by quantity.

it,

At

the same time these latter

are not even being in the

sense, but are qualities

and
e. g.

movements of
straight
*

or
^
'.

else
;

even the not-white and the not-

would be being
a not-white

at least

we say even

these are,

there

is

Further, none of th e categories other

(than substance can exi st apart.

also

And
it

the old philosophers

35

enect testify to this

they sought the principles

thinkers of the present
stances (for genera are

was of substance that and elements and causes. The

;

for

day tend

to rank univerlals as sub-

universals,

and these they tend to

describe as principles and substances, owing to the abstract

nature of their inquiry)

but the old thinkers ranked partie. g. fire

cular things as substances,

is

and

earth, but not

what
30

common

to both, body.

There are three kinds of substance one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is eternal and another is perishable, and which all recognize, as comprising e. g. plants and animals), of this we must grasp the elements, whether one or many and another that is immovable, and this certain

thinkers assert to be capable of existing apart,

it

some

div^iding

combining the Forms and the objects of mathematics into one class, and others believing only in the mathematical part of this class.'^ The former two kinds of substance are the subject of physics (for they imply moveinto two, others
^

35

This

is

an implication of the ordinary type of judgement,

is

not

ivhite.'
^ The three views appear to have been held respectively by Plato, Xenocrates, and Speusippus.

io69^
;

METAPHYSICA
ment) but the third kind belongs to another science, is no principle common to it and to the other kinds.
Sensible substance
is
if

there

changeable.

No w

if

c hange

pro-

ceeds from opposite s or from intermediate points, and not

5

from
must^

all

opposites (for the voice

is

not-white<, but
t

not therefore change to white)), but from

it does he contrary, there

trary state

something underlying which chanp^es into the confor the contraries do not change.
;

CHAPTER
Further,
persist
viz.
'

II

som ething
is,
.

persists^

but the contrary does not

there

then,

some

third thing besides the contraries,

the matter

Now

since changes are of four kinds

either
is

in respect of the essence or of the quality or of the

quantity

10

or of the place,
is

and change

in respect

of the individual nature

in

simple generation and destruction, and change

quantity

increase
is

be from given states into those contrary to them in these several respects. The matter, then, which changes must be capable
'<= ,

and diminution, and change alteration, and chan ge in pl p^*"

in respect of

an affection

rnr>f^Ti^rV>angf>g will

15

of both states.

And
is

since

'

that which

is

'

has two senses,

is

we

may say that

everything changes from that which

actually, e.g.

potentially

to that which

from the potentially white to

the actually white, and similarly in the case of increase and

diminution.

Therefore not only can a thing

come
,

to be,
j

incidentally, out of that

which is not, but also allthings^came to be out of that which is. but is potentiallYL and is not

20 actually.

AndlHisisthe One
'

'

of Anaxagoras
' '

for instead

of

'

all

things were together and the Mixture

'

of

Empedocles

and Anaximander and the account given by Democritus, it is better to say all things were together potentially but not Therefore these thinkers seem to have had some actually.^
notion of matter.

Now
^

all

things that change have

matter, but

different

oil XfvKov yap r) (fecovfi, 1069^ 21 read tV ^fKnov yap ^ ofiav ndvra Koi 'Epw. to fuypta nai Ava^. Koi y ^VP^' 4'W^^> V^ Ofiov TTiivTa Svfd/iet, ivfpyfia 8' ov, following in part H. Jackson, y. o/P. xxix. 139. ^ 1069^ 24 read aXX' irepap.

1069^' 5 I'Cad

A.

BOOK

XII

1069*
25

and of eternal things those which are not generable movable in space have matter not matter for generation, however, but for motion from one place to
matter
;

but

are

another.

(One might
If,

raise the question

;

from what sort of non-being

*

generation proceeds

for

non-being

has three senses.^)

still it

then, a thing exists potentially,

is

not potentially
different

any and
together

ever>' thing, but different things

is
it

come from
'all

things; nor
'

satisfactory to
differ

say that

things were

for

they

in

their

matter, since otherwise 30

why

come to be, and not one thing ? ^ is one, so that if matter also is one, that must For reason have come to be in actuality which the matter was in potency." The causes and the principles, then, are three, two
did an infinity of things
'

being the pair of contraries of which one is definition and form and the other is privation, and the third being the
matter.

CHAPTER
Next we must observe
to b
-vo<^

III
1'^'^

form 35 For everj'^thing that changes is something and is changed by something and into something. That by which it is changed is the im- 1070* mediate mover that which is changed, the matter that into which it is changed, t he form.. The process, then, will go on to infinity, if not only the bronze comes to be round but also the round or the bronze comes to be therefore there must be a stop at some point. Next we must observe that each substance comes into being 5 -* out of something that shares its name. (Natural objects and other things both rank as substances.) For things come into being either by art or by nature or by luck or by spontaneity. Now art is a principle of movement in something other
j^jt^^^*-

miiftf r nor the

comes

i.

e.

the proximate matter and form.

senses
-

Alexander points out that oTropijo-etf ov refers to 1. are probably the absolutely non-existent, the
. . .

20.
false,

The

three

and the

potential.

words, iravra
^

Sc. the vois of Anaxagoras' doctrine, summarized by D. L. in the ^pTjfiara ^v o/iov' dra voDr fXdotv aiTO 8if KoiTfir^fv. Sc. an undifferentiated unity.

1070*

METAPHYSICA
than the thing moved, nature
(for
is

a principle in the thing

itself

man

begets

man

^),

and the other causes are privations

^^ o.iKcf^|^f

of these two.

There are
10

t hree

kip ^'i
^

the

matter, which

acquires individuality

by being perceived (for"aTrthings that

are
;

are characterized

by contact and not by organic unity

the nature
(i. e.

matter and substratum)

racter) that
it

the individual cha-

moves towards, which

Socrates or Callias.

is

a positive state
is

again, thirdly, the particular subs tanc e which

these two,

e. g.

Now

in

and composed of some cases the

;

individual character does not exist apart from the composite

15

substance, e.g. the form of house does not so exist, unless

the art of building exists apart (nor

destruction of these forms, but
it

is

there generation and

is in

another

way

that the
of art,

house apart from

exist

its

matter, and health, and

;

all ideals

and do not

exist)

but

if

the individual character exists

it

apart from the concrete thing,

objects.

is

only

in the case of

natural

there are
(if

And so Plato was as many Forms as

Forms
;

not far wrong when he said that

there are kinds of natural things

there are

at

all),

though
is

not of such things

as

20 fire, flesh,
is

head

for all these are matter,

and the

last

matter
effects,

the matter of that which

causes

in the fullest sense substance.

The moving
their effects.
;

exist as

things

preceding the

but causes in the sense of formulae are simultaneous with

25

For when a man is healthy, then health also and the shape of a bronze sphere exists at the same time as the bronze sphere. But we must examine whether any form also survives afterwards. For in some cases this may be so, e. g. the soul may be of this sort not all soul
exists

but the reason

for doubtless

it

is

impossible that all soul

^ This is not a good instance of what A. says about nature, for the The definiprinciple of generation is not in the child but in the father. tion of nature applies better to other natural functions, such as growth. The note avOpairos yap avOpamov yevva is hastily thrown in because A. is thinking mainly of his favourite thesis of yivecris k crwavvfiov. Hence Alexander says tovto avi>fx^^ ^'*''" ^V M^''" ravra prjriov on enacrrr] fK <Tvvu)VVfxov yiverai ovaia. ^ Only a quasi-individuality, it is to be observed. ' 1070** ov for MS. Sk\a or ak\d seems oh tovtohv. 19 read But there is much to riKiVTala is to be kept here. necessary if olov be said for Alexander's proposal to transfer these words to 1. 11, after

aW

dW

vnoKdp.ivov.

A.

BOOK

XII
is

1070^

should survive.

ground

no necessity, on this For man is begotten by man, each man by an individual father; and
at least, for the existence of the Ideas.
;

Evidently then there

similarly in the arts

of health.

for the
'

medical art

is

the formal cause

30

CHAPTER
The
a sense different, but in a sense,
analogically, they are the
if

IV

causes and the principles of different things are in

one speaks universally and

all.

same
and

for

For we might

raise

the question whether the principles and elements are different

and similarly But it is paradoxical 35 that they should be the same for all. For then from the same elements will proceed relative terms and substance. What then will this common element be ? For (i) (a) there is 1070'' nothing common to and distinct from substance and the other categories, viz. those which are predicated but the element is prior to the things of which it is an element. But again (6) substance is not an element in relative terms, nor is any of
or the
for substances
for relative terms,

same

in the case of

each of the categories.

these an element in substance.

Further, (2)

how can

all

things
5

have the same elements

the

same as that which a cannot be the same

ligibles,^
e. g.

is

For none of the elements can be composed of the elements, e. g. ^ or

(None, therefore,^ of the
is

as da.

intel-

unity or being,

an element

for these are

predicable of each of the

compounds

as well.)

None

of the
;

lements then would be either a substance or a relative term

but
it

must be one or other.

All things then have not the

in a sense

same elements.
Or, as

we

are

wont
;

to

put

it,

they have and in a

10

sense they have not

e. g.

perhaps the elements of perceptible

in

bodies are, as

form, the hot, and

;

another sense the cold,

which
ire

is

tht privation

and, as matter, that which directly and

;

of itself is potentially these perceptible bodies

and both these

is

substances and also the things composed of these, of

.vhich these are

^

the principles

(i.

e.

any unity which

produced
terms

1070^ 7 read ovbh dt). This is apparently almost a technical name vhich are found in all the categories alike.
* T.

for the abstract

1070"
15

METAPHYSICA
out of the hot and the cold, e.g. flesh or bone); for the product must be different from the elements. These things

then have these elements and principles, but different things

20

and if we put the matter thus, all have not the same elements, but analogically they have i. e. one might say that there ar e three principl es the But each of these is form, the privation, and the matter different for each class, e. g. in colour they are white, black, and surface. Again, there is light, darkness, and air and out of these are produced day and night.
have
different elements
;

things
;

Since not only the elements^present in a thing are causes,

but also something externa l,

while
*

i.e.
'

the moving cause, clearly

'

principle
'

'

and

'

element

are different both are causes,

;

25

3<j

and principle is divided into these two kinds ^ and that which moves a thing or makes it rest is a principle and a substance. Therefore analogically there are three elements, and four causes and principles but the elements are different in different things, and the proximate moving cause is different for different things. Health, disease, body; the moving cause is the medical art. Form, disorder of a particular kind, bricks the moving cause is the building art.^ And since the moving cause in the case of natural things is, for instance, man, and in the products of thought it is the form or its con;

trary, there are in a sense three causes, while in a sense there

are four.

For the medical

is

art

is in

some

sense health, and the

building art

the form of the house, and

is

man

begets

man

further, besides these there

35

thaJUivh ifH-a&- fi r st of all thingj

moves

all

things.

CHAPTER V
Some
things can exist apart and

some

cannot, and

it

is tht

1071^ former that are substances.

And

therefore all things hav<

the same causes,^ because, without substances, affections an(

^
"^

e. the principles which are elements and those which are not. 1070^ 29 omit Ka\ apxT). i. e. the efficient cause is identical with the formal. i. e. the causes of substance are the causes of all things. Read tuvt
i,
. . .

in 1071'*

I.

A.

BOOK

XII

1071'

movements do not exist. Further, these causes will probably be soul and body, or reason and desire and body. And in yet another way, analogically identical things are principles, i.e. actuality and potency; but these also are not only different for different things but also apply in different
senses to them.

For

in

some

cases the

same thing

exists at

one time actually and at another potentially, e. g. wine or flesh or man does so. (And these too fall under the above-named For the form exists actually, if it can exist apart, causes.^

and so does the complex

e. g.

darkness or the diseased.

;

ally

for this

is

form and matter, and the privation, But the matter exists potentithat which can become both the actual things.)
of

10

But the

and potentiality applies differently to cases where the matter of cause and of effect is not the same, in which cases the form also is not the same but
distinction of actuality different;
(viz. fire

e.g. the cause of

man

is

(i)

the elements in
form),

man
15

and earth as matter, and the peculiar

it is,

and the

external cause, whatever these the sun and

its

e. g.

the father, and (2) besides

oblique course, which are neither matter

nor form nor privation of

him, but moving causes.^

man

nor of the same species with

Further, one must observe that

in universal terms,

some causes can be expressed

and some cannot. The proximate prinproximate individual, and another individual thing which exists as a potency.^ The
ciples of all things are the actual
^ i. e. the division into potency and actuality stands in a definite relation to the previous division into matter, form, and privation, to e| dfj.(f)oiv is not strictly in point, but is suggested by the frequent division of uicria into vXrj, fi8os, and TO (^ ilfi(f>oiv. - Aristotle distinguishes two ways in which things may be related as Bivafiii and eVep-yeia. (i) The same thing is Swdfiti what it later comes to be fiffpyda. The bivafjus may be the same as the ivepyeia in form But (2) one (e. g. father and son) or in matter (e. g. wine and vinegar). thing may be called Svvafiis and another (vepyeia though they have agent and nothing in common. Here bvvafus and ivipyna practically patient, and Bvvafus is the Siva/xi? Kara Kivr]<Tiv XfyofjLffi] (transeunt potentiality or rather power) spoken of in 6. i. The movement of the

is the cause of generation and decay {F/iys. ii. Gen. et Corr. ii. 336* 15, 31) and is thus a transeunt each man who is bom, while the material, formal, and proximate efficient causes are Siva/Kts of him in the other sense. ^ e.g. the proximate causes of a child are the individual father (who on Aristotle's view is the efficient and contains the formal cause) and the germ contained in the individual mother (which is the material cause).

13, hvvap.1% of

sun 194^

in

the

ecliptic

De

1071^
20

METAPHYSICA
universal causes, then, of which

we spoke do

not

the individual
is

is

the source of the individuals.

exist. For For while man

;

the cause of
is

man

universally, there is

no universal man
in general

but Peleus

the cause of Achilles, and your father of you,

and

this particular b of this particular ba,

though b

is

the cause of ba taken without qualification.

Then we must take account

stances.
25

of the various species of sub-

And

different
;

things have different causes

and

elements, as was said

the causes of things that are not in the

same
in the

class, e. g. of colours,

sounds, substances, and quantities,

;

are different except in an analogical sense

and those of things

same

species are different, not in species, but in the sense

that

the causes of different individuals are different, your

matter and form and moving cause being different from mine,
while in their universal formula they are the same.
30

And

if

we

what are the principles or elements of substances and relations and qualities whether they are the same or different, clearly when the terms principle and element are used in several senses the principles and elements of all are the same,
inquire
^

'

'

'

'

but when the senses are distinguished the causes are not
the same but different, except that in a special sense the causes of
all

are the same.

They

are in a special sense the

matter, form, privation,
all

same,

i.e.

(i)

by analogy, because

and the moving cause are common to

the causes of substances
things in this sense, that
35

things

and

(2)
all

may
which

be treated as causes of
are

when they
things.

removed
in

all

things are

removed
reality
is

further, (3) that

is first in

respect of complete

the cause of
first
^

all

But

another sense there

are different
\

causes, viz. all the contraries

which are
things
are

neither stated as classes nor grouped under

'

some ambiguous

term

and, further, the

matters of

different

1071*' different.

have stated, then, what are the principles -of and how many they are, and in what sense they are the same and in what sense different.
sensible things
29 read rh 8e C^reiv. First is now taken in the sense of ' proximate ', not of ultimate as in TO npcoTOV fT\e)((iq, ^ Sc. but taken as individual qualities. All things include ddos and
^

We

1071'^

'

'

'

aTfpr}(Tis,

but each thing has a distinct el8os and

a-Ttprjcris

of

its

own.

A.

BOOK

XII

1071''

CHAPTER

VI
/
|
'

Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them

physical and one unmovable, regarding the latter
assert '.hatQt
is

we must
5

nec es sary that there should be an etern al

unmovable substance. For substances are the first of existing and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible. But it is impossible that mo vement shoul d either come mto being or cease to be tor it igustahvaysnTa v'e existed.^
things,

Nor can time come

also
is

into being or cease to

if

be

for there could

not be a before and an after

time did not

in

exist.

Movenigiit
;

which time is for time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute of movement. And there is no continuous m ovement except movement in place, and of this only that which is circula r is continuous/ But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting on them, but is not actually doing so, there will not necessarily be movement for that which has a potency need not exercise it. Nothing, then, is gained even if we
cont inuo us, then,
in

the sense

10

suppose eternal substances, as the believers

unless there
is

in the

Forms

do,

to be in

them some
;

principle which can cause 15

is

movement
will

and even

this is

not enough, nor

for if
it

another subact,

stance besides the

Forms enough

does not

there

be no movement. Further, even be enough, if its essence is potency

if it

acts, this will not

for there will

not be

eternal

which is potentially may possibly not be. JThere must, then, be such a principle, whose very Further, then, these substances must be essence is a ctualitywithout matter for they must be eternal, at least if anything

movement

for that

else

IS

eternal.
is

Therefore they must be

a difficulty
;

actueility.-

Yet there
that acts
is

for

it

is

thought that everything

is

able to act, but that not ever>'thing that

able to

But if this is so, nothing is prior. might exist; for it is possible for all things to be capable of existing but not yet to exist. Yet if we follow the mythologists who generate the world from night, or the natural philosophers who say that all things were together, the same
act acts, so that the potency
at all
^

25

1071^ 12 read

ei

fort kivjjtikov.

1071^ 22 read

(vipytia.


1071"

METAPHYSICA
impossible result ensues.
there
is

For how

will there

be movement,

if

no actual cause

Wood
it

will surely not

;

move

itself

30

the carpenter's art must act on

nor will the menses nor the

earth set themselves in motion, but the seeds must act on the earth and the semen on the menses.

This

is

why some suppose

2
;

eternal actuality

e.g.

Leucippus^

for they say there is always movement. But why and Plato and what this movement is they do not say, nor, if the world moves in this way or that, do they tell us the cause of its Now nothing is moved at random, but there must 35 doing so.^ be some cause,* e. g. as a matter of fact a thing moves in one way by nature, and in another by force or through the influence of reason or something else. Further, what sort of moveiQJit is primar y ? This makes a vast difference. But again Plato, at least, cannot even say what it is that he some1072^ times supposes to be the source of movemen t that which moves itself; for the sonl is later, and simultaneous with the

'^

heavens, according

to

his
is

account.^

To

suppose potency
in a sense not

prior to actuality, then,

in a sense right,
senses.'^

and

and we have specified these

6

That actuality
'reason'
love and
is

is

prior

actuality^)

is testified by Anaxagoras (for his and by Empedocles in his doctrine of is

strife,
e. g.

and by those "who say that there

Leucippus.

always

movement,
I '

Therefore chaos or night did not exist for an

but
the

infinite time,

same things have always existed (either passing through a cycle of changes or obeying some other law),^^5inc
actuali ty
cycle,
is

prior to potency

If,

then, there

is

a constant

10

And

something must always remain,^ acting in the same way. there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else ^^ which is always acting in different ways. This must, then, act in one way in virtue of itself, and in another
if
^

Cf.

^ Cf. Timaeus, 30 A. De Caelo, iii, 300^ 8. 1071^ 34 read olb^ el wSi ^ wSt, rrjv nlrlavi 1071^ 35 read del n 8ia tI vwapxeiv, following H. Jackson,/. 0/ P.

xxix. 141. Cf. Phaedrus, 245

^

C Laws, 894 E. Timaeus, 34 B. Cf. 1071^ 22-26. * 1072* So perhaps Alexander. 5 read ivepyeia. i. e. the sphere of the fixed stars. ^" i. e. the spheres of the sun, moon, and planets, Cf. de Gen. 336^23.
;

Cf.

''

et Corr.

ii.

A.
in virtue of

BOOK

XII
agent, therefore,

1072^

something

else
it

either of a third

or of the first

otherwise this

must be in virtue of the first. For again causes the motion both of the third agent ^
'

But

and of the second. Therefore it is better to say the first For it was the cause of eternal movement and something else is the cause of variety, and evidently both together are
'.
;

15

the cause of eternal variety.

to seek for other principles

This, accordingly,

is

the character

which the motions actually exhibit.

?

What need

then

is

there

CHAPTER
Since
if it

VII

(i) this is

a possible account of the matter,

andCj)

were not
'

true, the

world would have proceeded out of

'

and out of non-being, these ao is, then, something unceasing motion, which is which is always moved with an motion in a circle and this is plain not in theory only but ' in fact. Therefore the first heavens - must be eterna l. There is And since that therefore also so mething which moves them which is moved and moves is intermediate, there is a mover ^ ^hich moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, i^ and a ctuality. And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the^real^ good is the primary object of rational desire. But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire for the
night and
all

things together

difficulties

may be

taken as solved. There

thinking

is

the starting-point.

And

thought
list

is

moved by the
* is in

30

object of thought, and one side of the

itself

of opposites

and in this, substance is first, and which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same for one means a measure,
the object of thought
;

in substance, that

'

'

but
^

'

simple

'

means

that the thing

itself

has a certain nature.)

i.

1072^ 14 read airrcS. e. the outer sphere of the universe, that in which the fixed stars are
(<rri.

set.
'
*

Cf. note

1072* 24 read Kivoiv futrop, kivovv on A. 986* 23.

1072^

METAPHYSICA
But the good, also, and that which same side of the list and the
;

is in itself

desirable are on
class
is

35 this

first in

any

always

1072**

analogous to the best.^ That the fina l ca use may be somethin g ungiflj^iahlp, is..shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is
best, or

something for whose good the action is done, and (d) something at which the action aims and of these the latter T he final cause^ is unmovable though the former is not. then,^ produces motion by being loved, and by that which Now if something is all other things. it moves, it moves
(a)
;

moved
if

it is

capable of being otherwise than as

is

it is.

Therefore

primary motion, then in so far as they are in motion, in t/izs respect they are capable of being otherwise, in place,^ even if not in substance. But since there is something which moves while itself, unmoved. existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion and this
the actuality of the heavens

10

the

first

vao\&x produces.^

The
it

fir_s^

mover, then, ofji ecessitv^

existsj^

and

in

so far as

is

"tKIssense a
senses

first

principle.
is

necessary, it" is ^oj^,'^ and in For the necessary has alL^these

it is

that which

necessary perforce because

contrary
is

to the natural impulse, that without which the

sible,

good
is

impos-

and that which cannot be otherwise but

absolutely

necessary.

On

such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world

of nature.

And

its

life

is

such as the best which we enjoy,

^ Sc. where there is no best in the strict sense. The argument for the identity of the primary forms of rh opeKTov and to votjtov is not very clearly The opeKTov is the koXov. (In stated, but seems to be as follows. parenthesis it is stated that desire depends on thought rather than thought on desire.) The positive side of the hst of contraries is the object of thought, and the first term on this side (which must be the primary object of thought) is simple actual substance. But the object of desire, which we have seen to be the Ka\6v, is on the same side of the list, and therefore the first member of that list (the primary object of

thought) must be the primary object of desire. 2 1072^ 3 read Kivel 8r]. ' 1072^ ivipyna eariv, fj Kivfirai ravrr] y iudexfrai 5 read el <popa Trparrj nXXo)? 'ix^'-^i Knra tottov, * If it had any movement, it would have the first. But it produces this and therefore (on the principle that one movement belongs to one thing) cannot share in it. i. e. it is necessary in the sense of ov ovk avev t6 (v, and is .. good.
fj

A.

BOOK
since
it;;

XII
For
it is

1072^

and enjoy
(which

for but a short time.

be),

ever in this state

i<

15

we cannot
therefore

actuality

a1gr>

pj^f^ciir/.

^ are waking, perception, and thinking most and hopes and memories are so because of their reference to these.) And thought in itself d^als with that which is best in itself, and that which is thought in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And

(And

pleasant,

20

thought thinks
of thought
;

itself
it

because

it

shares the nature of the object

becomes an object of thought in coming and thinking its objects, s o that thought an d object ot thought are the same. For that which is capable of r eceiving the object of thought i. e. the e ssence, is thought
for

into c ontact with

And
latter

it is

active

when

it

possesses this object.

Therefore the

(p osses sion) rather than the former (receptivity)"- is the divine element which though t seems to contain, an d the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder and if in a better this compels it
;

'

25

yet more.

And God
God
;
:

is

in

a better

state.

And
is life
,

life

also

belongs to
is

for the actuality of

thought
l

and

G od

and God's essentig prtnaUtyL-ig Ufp most We say therefore"^ that God is a living \\ g ood and ftrrn?i' being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God for this is God. Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans * and Speusippus ^ 3 do, that supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the beginning, because the beginnings both of plants and of animals are causes, but beauty and completeness are in the effects of these,^ are wrong in their opinion. For the seed comes from 35 other individuals which are prior and complete, and the first thing is not seed but the complete being, e.g. we must say 1073* that before the seed there is a man, not the man produced from the seed, but another from whom the seed comes. It is clear then from what has been said th at there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from
that actuality
;

*
*

Sc. because they are activities or actualities. * \oy2^ 28 read f^Mfitv 8^. 1072'' 23 read (ndvov /xaXXop roirro. Cf. N. 1091* 34.
Cf. Z. 102S'' 21, N.
i.

1091* 34, 1092*

is

1.

e.

the animal or plant

more

fair

and

perfect than the seed.

1073^
5

METAPHYSICA
sensible things.
It

has been shown

is

also that this substance

indivisible.

cannot have any magnitude, but

without parts an d
infinite time,

For

it

prod uces rnr>vpmpnf- through

infinite

but nothing
is

finite

has

power.

And, while every magnitude

either

10

above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all. But it is also clear that it is impassive and unalterable for all the other changes are posterior to ^ change of place. It is clear, then, why the first
infinite or finite, it cannot, for the
;

mover has these

attributes.

CHAPTER
We
15

VIII
to

must not ignore the question whether we have

if
;

suppose one such substance or more than one, and

the latter,

how many

we must

also mention, regarding the opinions

expressed by others, that they have said nothing, that can

even be clearly stated, about the number of the substances. For the theory of Ideas has no special discussion of the
subject
2o
;

for those

who

believe in Ideas say the Ideas are

numbers, and they speak of numbers now as unlimited, now

as limited

by the number lo

but as for the reason

why

there

should be just so

many numbers,

nothing

is

said with

any

demonstrative exactness.

We
first

however must discuss the

subject, starting

from the

presuppositions and distinctions

principle or p rimary being

we have mentioned.
is

The
in

not

mo vable

either

25 itself

or accidentally, but jjroducesthe primary eternal -an^

movement. And since that which is moved must be by something, and the firs t mover m u st be in itsej f unmovable, and eternal movement must be produced by sometHmg eternal and a single movement by a single thing, and since we see that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe, which we say the fir st and unmovable substance
single
iiioved
-.^

produce s, there ar^ othe r spatial movemen ts those of the planets which are eternal (for the body which moves in we have proved these a circle is eternal and unresting

* ^

Cf.
i.e.

Phys.

viii.

267^ 17

De

Caelo,

i.

275^ 22.

impossible without.

A.

BOOK
^),

XII
each of these movements
^

1073^

points in the physical treatises

also

must be caused by a substance unmovable in itself and eterna l. For the nature of the stars ^ is eternal, being a kind of substance, and the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance.
Evidently, then, th ere must be substan ces which are of the

35

same numb er as the movements of the sta rs, and in their nature eternal, and in themselves unmovable, and without
nagnitude, for the reason before mentioned.^

That the movers are substances, then, and that one of these and another second according to the same order as he movements of the stars, is evident. But in the numbe r )f movements we r each a problem w hich must be treated "rom the standpoint of that one of the mathematical sciences vhich is most akin to philosophy viz. of astrononry for this
s first

1073''

cience speculates about substance which

iternal,

is

perceptible but
i.

but the other mathematical sciences,

e.

arithmetic '

md

geometry, treat of no substance.

That the movements are

is

nore numerous than the bodies that are moved,

evident to
;

hose

who have

given even moderate attention to the matter

.

more t han one movement But ts to the actual number of these movements, we now to give ome notion of the subject quote what some of the mathemaicians say, that our thought may have some definite number o grasp but, for the rest, we must partly investigate for ouror each of the planets has

10

elves, partly learn

from other investigators, and

if

those

who

15

form an opinion contrary to what we have low stated, we must esteem both parties indeed, but follow

tudy

this subject

he more accurate.

Eudoxus supposed
phere of the fixed

that the motion of the sun or of the

moon
the
20

nvolves, in either case, three spheres, of which the

stars,

first is

and the second moves in the circle /hich runs along the middle of the zodiac, and the third in the ircle which is inclined across the breadth of the zodiac but the
;

which the moon moves is inclined at a greater angle han that in which the sun moves. And the motion of the
ircle in
'

'

Cf. Phys. viii. 8, 9 De Caelo, i. 2, ii. 3-8. This is to be understood as a general term including both fixed stars
;

nd planets. ' Cf. 1073*

5.

1073^

METAPHYSICA
planets involves, in each case, four spheres, and of these als

the
25

first

and second are the same as the

the sphere of the fixed stars
is

first
is

above
all

(for

two mentioned that which move

thi
i

the other spheres, and that which

its

placed beneath

and has

movement
all),

in

the circle which bisects the zodiac

common

to

but the poles of the third sphere of eac

circle

planet are in the

motion of the fourth sphere

30 at

which bisects the zodiac, and th is in the circle which is incline an angle to the equator of the third sphere and the pole
;

of the third spheres are different for the other planets, bu

those of Venus and Mercury are the same.

Callippus

made

the position of the spheres,

i.

e.

the orde

of their intervals, the same as

assigned the same
35

number as more spheres should be added to th sun and two to the moon, if we were to explain the observe facts, and one more to each of the other planets. But it is necessary, if all the spheres combined arc
Saturn, he thought two
t

Eudoxus did, but while h Eudoxus did to Jupiter and t

1074* explain the phenomena, that for each of the planets theii should be other spheres (one fewer than those hitherto a:
signed) which counteract those already mentioned and brin back to the same position the first or outermost sphere of th star which in each case is situated below ^ the star in questior for only thus can all the forces at work produce the observe motion of the planets. Since, then, the spheres by which tl planets themselves are moved are eight for Saturn and Jupit

and twenty-five

for the others,

is

and of these only those by whi(

first

the lowest-situated planet

moved need not be counteracte

or outermost tv

the spheres which counteract those of the

planets will be six in number, and the spheres which cou

10 teract

those of the next four planets will be sixteen, and

of
all

t!

number

those which

those which move the planets And be counteract these

the spheres
will
fifty-five.

ai

if oi

were not to add to the moon and to the sun the movemer we mentioned, all the spheres will be forty-nine in number.! Let this then be taken as the number of the sphen
^ i.e. inwards from, the universe being thought of as a system concentric spheres encircling the earth. 2 1074a 13 Sosigenes' conjecture Ivvia appears to be necessary.

A.
that both the

BOOK

XII

1074^

unmovable and the perceptible substances

;

15

be taken as just so many the ssertion of necessity must be left to more powerful thinkers. If there can be no spatial movement which does not :onduce to the moving of a star, and if further every being

nd

principles

may probably

nd every substance which

is

immune from change and

in
20

irtue of itself has attained to the best must be considered an nd, there can be no other being apart from these we have lamed, but this must be the number of the substances. For f there are others, they will cause change as being a final :ause of movement but there cannot^ be other movements
;

resides those mentioned.

And
for the

it

is

reasonable to infer this

"rom a consideration of the bodies that are

everythi ng that

moved
nViVh

for
rflftY'?';

if 35

moves

is

sake o f

^"^-^^

movement belongs to something that is moved, lo movement can be for the sake of itself or of another novement, but all movements must be for the sake of the stars. For if a movement is to be for the sake of a moveuid every
ment, this latter also will have to be for the sake of something
Ise
;

so that since there cannot be an infinite regress, the 30

will

nd of every movement
Evidently there
is

be one of the divine bodies which

move through the heaven.^

For if there are many heavens as there are many men, the moving principles, of which each heaven will have one, will be one in form but in number many. But all things that are many in number have matter. (For one and the same formula applies to many things, e. g. the formula of man but Socrates is oner) But
but onehea\in.
;

for it is complete reality. 35 one both in formula and in also that which is moved always and continuously is one alone therefore t here is one heaven alone. Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down 1074*

the primary essence has not matter

So the unmovable number therefore

;

first

mover

is

^ The argument is Each unchangeable perfect substance is an end and must ws opfrrov produce a distinct motion. But ever)' motion is ultimately for the sake of a (f)fp6fifvov, and as we have enumerated the motions necessary for the (fitpofifva, there can be no more motions and therefore no more unchangeable perfect substances. ^ i. e. the Adyos is common to all men, so that it must be matter which
:

gives Socrates his uniqueness.

1074^'

METAPHYSICA
to

us their posterity a tradition, in the form

of a

myth,

that these substances are gods

and that the divine encloses

of the tradition has been

the whole of nature.

The

rest

lo

form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. But if we were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone that they thought the first substances to be gods, we must regard this as an inspired utterance, and reflect that, while probably each art and science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished^ these opinions have been preserved until the present, like relics of the ancieni

added

later in mythical

treasure.

Only thus

far,

then,

is

the opinion of our ancestors

and our

earliest predecessors clear to us.

CHAPTER
15

IX

The
by
is

natu re o f the divine thought involves certain problems

for while
us,

thought

is

held to be the most divine of things observec

it

the question what

character involves

difficulties.

must be For if

in
it

order to have tha

thinks nothing,

wha

20

one who sleeps. An* if it thinks, but this depends on something else, then (as tha which is its substance is not the act of thinking, but a potency it cannot be the best substance for it is through thinking tha
there here of dignity?
It is just like
;

its

value belongs to

it.

Further, whether

its

substance

is

th

25

what does it t hink Either itself or something else and if something else, eithe the same always or something different. Does it matte then, or not, whether it thinks the good or any chanc thing ? Are there not some things about which it is ir
faculty of thought or the act of thinking,
;

credible that

it

should think

Evidently, then,

it

thinks

which

most divine and precious, and it doe s not change for change would be change for the worse^and this would b already a movement.^ First, then, if thought is not the ac
is
'

'

Sc. while vovs

is

ex hypothesi unmovable.

A.
jf

BOOK
it

XII

1074'

would be reasonable to suppose :hat the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, :here would evidently be something else more precious than For both thinking and 30 :hought, viz. that which is thought. Jie act of thought will belong even to one who has the worst Df thoughts. Therefore if this ought to be avoided (and it Dught, for there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best Df things. Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks {since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and 35 understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way. Further, if thinking and being thought are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought ? For the act of thinking and the object of thought have not the same essence. We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive 1075^ sciences (if we abstract from the matter) the substance in the sense of essence, and in the theoretical sciences the formula or the act of thinking, is the object. As, the n, thought an d th e object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, they will be the same, i. e. the divine 5 t hinking will be one with the object of its thought. A further question is left whether the object of the divine thought is composite for if it were, thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole. We answer that everything which ha^ not matter is indivisible.
thinking but a potency,
'

As human
objects,
is

thought,

or rather

the thought
(for it

of composite

in a certain period

of time

does not possess

the good at this

moment or at that, but its best, being something different from it, is attained only in a whole period of time), so throughout eternity is the thought which has

10

itself for its object.

1075^

METAPHYSICA

CHAPTER X
We
/

must consider

also in

which of two ways the nature

itself,

of

the universe contains the good or the highest good, whether

as something separate
parts.

and by

or as the order of the

Probably
is

in

both ways, as an army does.

in

For the
it

good
15 in

found both

the order and in the leader, and more

the latter; for he does not depend on the order but

depends on him. And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike, both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do

with another, but they are connected.

together to one end.

For

all

are ordered

(But

it

is

as in a house, where the

all

20

freemen are least at liberty to act at random, but

things

or most things are already ordained for them, while the slaves

and the beasts do little most part live at random

all

for the
;

common
is

good, and for the

for this

the sort of principle that

I mean, for instance, that must at least come to be dissolved into their elements,' and there are other functions similarly in which all share for the good of the whole. ^^^it^ We must not fail to observe how many impossible 01

constitutes the nature of each.)

paradoxical results confront those

who hold

different views

from

our own, and

All
*

thinkers,
culties.

what views of the subtlei and which views are attended by fewest diffiare

the

make
'

all

things
*

out

of
'

contraries.
is

Bui

neither

all

things

nor

out of contraries
in

right

nor dc

they

tell

us

30 present

can be

how the things made out of

which the contraries an

;

the contraries

for contrarie;

_^

by one another. Now for us this difficult) is solved naturally by the fact that there is a third factor. These thinkers however make one of the two contrarie matter this is done for instance by those who make th<
are not affected
;

unequal
the one.

matter

for

the

equal,

or

the

many

matter
;

fo

But matter which

this also is refuted in the

is

same way

for th'

one

for all things

is

contrary to nothing

^ Sc. in order that higher forms of being binations of the elements. ^ i. e. the substratum.

may be produced by new com!

i

A.

BOOK
;

XII

1075*

on the view we are one of the two elements. But the other school does not treat the good and the bad even as principles yet in all things the good is in the highest degree a principle. The school we first mentioned is right in saying that it is a principle, but how the good is a principle they do not say whether as end or as mover or
Further,
all

things, except the one, will,

evil

criticizing,

partake of

for the

bad

is itself

35

as form.

Empedocles ^ also has a paradoxical view for he identifies 1075** the good with love. But this is a principle both as mover (for brings things together) and as matter (for it is part of it :he mixture). Now even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still the being, 5 In which respect then is at least, of the two is not the same.
;

love a principle

?
;

It

is

paradoxical also that

strife

should

be imperishable

strife is

the very nature of the bad.

;

reason

Anaxagoras makes the good a motive principle for moves things, but moves them for an end, which must be something other than it, except according to our way Df stating the case; for, on our view, the medical art is
n a sense health.
1

It

is

paradoxical also
to reason.

not to suppose
all

10

contrary to the good,

into

i.e.

Df the contraries

make no

use

bring their views

perishable

shape.

who speak of the contraries, unless we And why some things are
But
;

Tiake

all

and others imperishable, no one tells us existing things out of the same principles.
;

for

they

Further,

some make existing things out of the non-existent

:o

and others

15

avoid the necessity of this

Further,

make

all

things one.

ihe cause of

should there always be becoming, and what is becoming ? this no one tells us. And those who suppose two principles must suppose another, a superior for principle, and so must those who believe in the Forms vhy did things come to participate, or why do they participate, n the Forms ? And all other thinkers are confronted by the

why

20

lecessary consequence that there

is

something contrary' to
;

Wisdom,
For there

i.

e.

to the highest

knowledge

but ive are not.

is

is

nothing contrary to that which

^ Cf.
"

primary

(for all

A. 985^ 4.

1075'' 19

read

ti

0XX7

ap-xii

Kvpiarfpa,

1075"

METAPHYSICA
contraries have matter and

are potentially the same)

and

the ignorance which

is

contrary to philosophy would need a

is

contrary object
25

but what

primary has no contrary.

Again,

if

besides sensible things no others exist, there will

principle,

be no
as

first

no order, no becoming, no heavenly

it,

bodies, but

each principle will have a principle before

in the accounts of the mythologists

philosophers.

But

if

and all the natural the Forms or the numbers are to exist
;

they

will

be causes of nothing

or

if

not that, at least not

ol

movement.
Further,

how

is

extension,

i.

e.

a continuum, to be produced
will

out of unextended parts?

30

For number
is

not, either as

mover or
principle

as form, produce a continuum.

also

cannot be any contrary that

;

But again there a productive or moving

35

would be possible for it not to be.^ Oi at least its action would be posterior to its potency The world then would not be eternal. But it is; one o; these premises, then, must be denied. And we have said how this must be done.^ Further, in virtue of what the numbers or the soul and the body, or in general the form and the thing are one of this no one tells us anything nor can any on* tell, unless he says, as we do, that the mover makes them one And those who say * mathematical number is first and go 01 to generate one kind of substance after another and giv
for
it

1076^ different

principles

for

each,

make

the

substance of th
n-

universe a

mere

series of episodes (for

one substance has

influence on another

by

its

existence or non-existence), an^

;

they give us

many

governing principles
not good

but the world mus

the
^

not be governed badly.

5
*

The

rule of

many

is

one

is

ruler.'

The passage is very difficul Alexander's, gives a tolerab sense. If there were an ignorance contrary to philosophy, it would ha^ an object contrary to to npcorov, which is the object of philosophy. B' TO TTpwTov has no contrary. * Since contraries must contain matter, and matter implies potentiali: and contingency. 3 Cf. loyi^ 22. " Cf. z. 1028^ 21, N. 1090^ 13. 1076^^ 5 omit eoTctf. Cf. Iliad, ii. 204,
' 1075^ 23 read ayvoia but this reading, which

fo-Tai

tov ivavriov.

may have been

**

BOOK
We

XIII
I

(M)

CHAPTER
have stated what
later
2

is

the substance of sensible things,

^

dealing in the treatise on physics

stratum, and
existence.

with the material sub-

with the substance which has actual

is

Now

since our inquiry

whether there

is

or

is lo

not besides the sensible substances any

and eternaL and, if there what is said by others, so

say wrongly,
while,
shall
if

is,

what
if

it

is,

wh ich is immovable we must first consider

anything which they
the same objections,
to

that,

there

is

we may not be
is

liable to

there

any opinion

common

them and
;

us,

we
one
15

not quarrel with ourselves on that account

for

must be content to state some points better than one's predecessors, and others no worse.
objects of mathematics

Two

opinions are held on this subject

i.

it is

said that the

e.

numbers and

lines

and the

like

are

substances,
since (i)

and again that the

Ideas

are

substances.

And

some recognize these as two different classes the Ideas and the mathematical numbers, and (2) some recognize both as having one nature, while (3) some others
say that the mathematical substances are the only substances, we must consider ^ the objects of mathematics, not qualifying

20

them by any other characteristic not asking,

whether they are Ideas or
principles
not,

for instance,

or

whether they are the

and substances of existing things or not,,but_only 25 whether as the objects of mathematics they exist or not, ^ nd if they do, how they exist then after this we must separately consider * the Ideas themselves in a general way, and for most of only as far as systematic treatment demands
;
;

what we have
w^orks.

to say has been repeatedly stated in popular

^

And
i.

the greater part of our account

2
*

must attack the

Phys.

6-9.
Cf. ch. 4,
5.

Met. ZHe.

Cf. ch. 2, 3.

Cf. ch. 6-9.

S a

1076^
30

METAPHYSICA
inquiry already mentioned/ viz. whether the substances and
the principles of existing things are numbers and Ideas
after
;

for

the discussion of the Ideas this remains as a

third

inquiry.
If the objects of

mathematics
objects,

exist,

then they must exist

separate from

either

in

sensible

as

some
is

say, or

35 sensible objects (and this also

by some), or if they exist in neither of these ways, either they do not exist, or they exist only in some special sense. So that the subject
said

of our discussion will be not whether they exist but

how

they exist.

CHAPTER
That
question
it

II
ifi

is

impossible for mathematical objects to exist

sensible things and at the

is

same time that the doctrine

has been said already
reasons being that
it is

in

a fanciful

one,
^,

in

our

1076^ discussion of difficulties

sible
for

the

impos-

10

be in the .same place, and that according to the same argument all the other powers and characteristics also ^ should exist in sensible things none o] them existing separately. This we have said already. But further, it is obvious that on this theory it is impossible foii any body whatever to be divided for it would have to bt divided at a plane, and the plane at a line, and the line ai a point, so that if the point cannot be divided, neither car the line, and if the line cannot, neither can the plane nor th< solid. What difiference then does it make whether sensibh things are such indivisible entities, or, without being so them selves, have indivisible entities in them ? The result will b(
solids

two

to

the same
divided.

if

the sensible things are divided the others wi

else not

be divided too, or
But, again,
separately.
it

even the sensible things can

b'

is

not possible that such entities should exis

other solids

For if besides the sensible solids there are to b which are separate from them and prior to th
it

sensible solids,
^

is

plain that besides the planes also ther

^ Cf. B. 998^ 7- 9. TioTfpov dpxai, &C. 1 nevertheless the theory in question represents as Ideas apai from sensible things.

Cf.

1.

24

Which

M.
.w.st be other

BOOK

XIII
;

1076^
15

and separate planes and points and lines for But if these exist, again besides consistency requires this. the planes and lines and points of the mathematical solid there must be others which are separate. For the incomposite and if there are, prior to the is prior to the compound sensible bodies, bodies which are not sensible, by the same argument the planes which exist by themselv^es must be Therefore prior to those which are in the motionless solids. these will be planes and lines other than those that exist along with the mathematical solids to which these thinkers
;

20

assign separate existence

for the latter exist

along with the

mathematical
matical solids.
lines,

solids,

while the others are prior to the mathewill be,

Again, there

belonging to these planes,

25

argument, other

and prior to them there will have to be, by the same lines and points and prior to these points in the prior lines there will have to be other points, though there Now (i) the accumulation will be no others prior to these. becomes absurd for we find ourselves with one set of solids
;
;

apart from the sensible solids

the sensible planes

three sets of planes apart 30

which exist apart from the from sensible planes, and those in the mathematical solids, and those which exist apart from those in the mathematical solids four sets of lines, and five sets of points. With which of these, Certainly not then, will the mathematical sciences deal? with the planes and lines and points in the motionless solid for science always deals with what is prior. And (2} the same account will apply also to numbers for there will be another set of units apart from each set of points, and also apart from
; ;

those

35

each set of

realities,

from the objects of sense

;

and again

from those of thought so that there will be various classes of mathematical numbers.^
Again, how
is it

possible to solve the questions which

difficulties
^ ?

we
1077^

enumerated

in

our discussion of

For besides

the sensible things there will be, on similar principles, the

things with which astronomy and those with which geometry
deals
;

but

how

is

it

possible that a heaven and

its

parts

or indeed anything which has

*

movement

should

exist apart

1076^ 38 read

oi-ra,

ra aladrjTd.
'

'

1076^ 39 omit awdpa,

B.

997^ 12-34.

1077^

METAPHYSICA
Similarly also the objects of from the sensible heaven ? optics and harmonics will exist apart for there will be voice
;

and sight besides the sensible or individual voices and sights. Therefore it is plain that the other senses as well, and the
other objects of sense, will exist apart
set of
;

for
if

why

should one
animals

them do so and another not

And

this is so,

also will exist apart, since the senses will.

Again, there are certain mathematical theorems of a unilo

beyond these substances. Here have another substance intermediate between, and separate from, the Ideas and the intermediates,^ a substance which is neither number nor points nor spatial magversa! character, extending

then

we

shall

nitude nor time.

And

if

this

is

impossible, plainly

it

is

also

impossible that the former substances should exist separate

from sensible things.

15
\

And,

in

general, conclusions contrary alike to the truth

and to the usual views follow, if one supposes the objects of mathematics to exist thus as separate entities. For if they exist thus they must be prior to sensible spatial magnitudes, for the incomplete but in truth they must be posterior spatial magnitude is in the order of generation prior, but in
;

the order of substance posterior, as the lifeless

20

is

to the living,

Again, what
tudes one
?

in the

world
in

will

make

mathematical magniir

For things
^

our perceptible world are one

are not present, the

virtue of soul, or of a part of soul, or of something else, reason-

ably enough

when

these

thing

i.'

a plurality, and splits up into parts.

But

in the case of the

subjects of mathematics, which are divisible

and are quantities

?

what

is

the cause of their being one and holding together

Again, the modes of generation of the objects of mathe For the dimension firs matics show that we are right.
25

generated

is

length, then
is

comes breadth,
If,

lastly depth, anc

is

the process

complete.
is

then, that which

posterior

ii

the order of generation

solid will

prior in the order of substance, th(

line.

be prior to the plane and the

it

And

in thi
it

way

also

is

more complete and more whole, because

cai

^ A Platonic expression for ra fiadijfiariKd, which were regarded a intermediate between Ideas and sensible things. I ' 1077* 20 read nVi Kai nor. ^ 1077^ 22 read nvl, eiXoyw!

M.

BOOK

XIII

I077

become animate.
a plane

be animate?
is

How, on the other hand, could a Kne or The supposition passes the power of 3
a sort of substance
;

our senses.

Again, the solid

in

for

it

already has

be substances? Neither as a form or shape, as the soul perhaps is, nor as iiKitter, like the solid for we have no experience of anything that can be put together out of lines or planes or points,
lines
;

a sense completeness.

But how can

35

while

if

these had been a sort of material substance,

we should

have observed things which could be put together out of them. Grant that they are prior in formula. Still not all things 1)077^ which are prior in formula are prior in substance. For those things are prior in substance which when separated from other
things surpass

them

in the
in

power of independent

existence,

but those are prior

formula out of whose formulae the

;

formulae of other things are compounded

properties are not co-extensive.
*

and these two

from their sub-

For

if

attributes, such as 5

moving' or 'white', do not

white
is

exist

apart

stances, the

prior

to
it

the white

man

in

formula,
is

but not in substance.

thing

For

cannot exist separately, but

;

always along with the concrete thing

I

and by the concrete

it

10

mean

the white

man.

Therefore

is

plain

that

neither is the result of abstraction prior nor that which is produced by adding determinants posterior for it is by adding a determinant to the white that we speak of the white man.
;

been sufficiently pointed o ut that the objects of mathematics are not substa nc es in a higher sense than "bodies are, and that they are not prior t o sens[bj^es in_beiflg^
It has, then,

but only

in

formula, and that th ev cannot in any

way

exist

.^

But since they could not exist in sensibles either, it IS plain that they either do not exist at all or exist in a special sense and therefore do not 'exist' without qualificaFor exist has many senses. tion.
separately.
*
'

15

1077''

METAPHYSICA

CHAPTER

III

Just as the universal part of mathematics deals not with

objects which exist separately, apart from extended magni-

tudes and from numbers, but with magnitudes and numbers,

not however qua such as to have magnitude or to be divisible,*

20 clearly it is

25

possible that there should also be both propositions and demonstrations about sensible magnitudes, not however qjia sensible but qua possessed of certain definite qualities.^ For as there are many propositions about things merely considered as in motion, apart from the essence of each such thing and from their accidents, and as it is not therefore necessary that there should be either a mobile separate from sensibles, or a separate mobile substance in the sensibles, so too in the case of mobiles there will be propositions and sciences which treat them not qua mobile but only qua bodies, or again only qua planes, or only qua lines, or qua divisibles, or qua indivisibles having position, or only qua
indivisibles,

30

Thus

since

it

is

true to say without qualification that not

only things which are separable but also things which are
inseparable exist
,

for instance, that

And
what
it is

mobiles

exist,

it

is

true

also to say, without qualification, that the objects of

mathe-

mat ics exists and with the

mathematicians.
subject
white,

charactet*

ascribed to

them by

true to say of the other sciences

too, without qualification, that

35

they deal with such and such a

it

not with
if

is

accidental to
is

(e.g.

not with the

the subject
things qua

the white thing

its
^

healthy, and

the science has

is

the healthy as
healthy, with
if its

subject), but with that

which
it

1078^ of each science

subjects

with

the healthy

if

treats

man

if qua man. So too is it with geometry happen to be sensible, though it does not treat

them qua

sensible,

the mathematical

sciences

will

not for

that reason be sciences of sensibles

nor,

on the other hand,

of other things separate from sensibles.

1

Cf, E. 1026'* 25,

i.

M, 1077a

9,

as universal mathematics abstracts from the distinctions between different kinds of fiadrjixariKa, so geometry abstracts from the sensible characteristics of magnitudes and attends only to their spatial relations. * 1077^ 36 read el to XevKov vyidvoi', fKeivov ov iariv fKacrrr].
^

e.

M.

BOOK

XIII

1078^

Many

properties attach to things in virtue of their

diflferentia
;

own

nature as possessed of some such

attributes peculiar to the animal
' '

e.g.

there are

qua female or qua male, yet there is no female nor male separate from animals. And so also there are attributes which belong to things
*
'

are dealing
simpler, our

merely as lengths or as planes. And in proportion as we with things which are prior in formula and

knowledge will have more accuracy, i.e. simplicity. Thus a science which abstracts from the magnitude of things and is more precise than one which takes it into account
;

10

a science
if it

is

most precise

if it

abstracts from movement, but

it is

takes account of movement,

most precise
is

if it
;

deals

with the primary movement, for this

of this again uniform

the simplest

and

movement

is

the simplest form.

;

The
15

same account may be given of harmonics and optics for neither considers its objects qua sight or qua voice, but qua but the latter are attributes proper to the lines and numbers too proceeds in the same way. mechanics And former. Thus if we suppose attributes separated from their fellowattributes and make any inquiry concerning them as such, we shall not for this reason be in error, any more than when one draws a line on the ground and calls it a foot long when
;

it is

not

for the error

will

is

not included in the premises.

in

20

Each question

be best investigated
is

this

way

by
-^^

supposing separate what

not separate, as the arithmetician

and the geometer do. For a man qua man is one indivisible thing and the arithmetician supposes one indivisible thing, and then considers whether any attribute belongs to a man qua indivisible. But the geometer treats him neither qua man nor 25 qua indivisible, but as a solid. For evidently the attributes which would have belonged to him even if he had not been indivisible, can belong to him apart from these attributes.^ Thus, then, geometers speak correctly they talk about existing'H for being has two forms things, and their subjects do exist it io
;

exists not only in

complete

reality but also as matter.

v^U/^

Now

since the

good and the

implies

beautiful are different (for the

former always
beautiful
^

conduct

as

its

subject,

while the

is

found also in motionless things), those

and humanity.

who

assert

Sc. indivisibility

1078* 28 omit to hwarov.

io78^

METAPHYSICA
that the mathematical sciences say nothing- of the beautiful

or the
35

For these sciences say and prove for if they do not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or
in_rroi:

good are

a very great deal about them

their defining formulae,

it

is

not true to say that they

tell

us

nothing about them.

1078

The

chief forms of beauty are order

and

symmetry and

definiteness,

which the mathematical sciences

demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle
5

also
shall

(i.e.

the beautiful) as in

some sense a
^

cause.

But

vve

speak more plainly elsewhere

about these matters.

CHAPTER
So much then
for

IV
;

10

the objects of mathematics we have and in wh at sense they exists, and in what sense they are prior and in what sense not prior. Now, regarding the Ideas, we must first examine the ideal theory by itself, not connecting it in any way with the nature of numbers^ but treating it in the form in which it was originally understood by those who first maintained the existence of Ideas. Thei supporters of th e ide^l theory were led to it because the^
said that they exist

were persuaded of the truth of the Heraclitean doctrine

15 all

thai

sensible things are ever passing a way, so that

is

if

kno\vle dg(

have an object, there must be some o the: apart from those which are sensible Tor there can be no knowledge of things which are in a stat<
or thought
to

and permanent

entities

of flux.

Socrates occupied himself with the excellences o

20

25

them became the first t( problem of universal definition s for in the realm physics the problem was only touched on by Democritus, wh' while the Pytha defined, after a fashion, the hot and the cold goreans had before this treated of a few things, whose definition they connected with numbers e.g. opportunity, justice, or ma)( riage^. But it was natural tha t Socrates should s eek the csscii For he was seeking t o sylj ogize, and t he essence is the starting point of syllogisms. For there was as yet none of the dialectic
character,^ and^iiT" connection with
raise the

Cf. A. 7.

1072* 34, 10, N.

4.

Cf. Diels, Vorsokratiker, p. 270,

M.
t^-^-wer

BOOK

XIII

lovs**

which enables people even without knowledge of the essence to speculate about contraries and inquire whether the

same science deals with

be
fairly

contraries.

For

tw^o

things

may
'

ascribed

to

Socrates

inductive
apart
;

arguments and
30

universal dehnition, both

of which are concerned with the

starting-point
universals

of science.

But S ocrates did not make th e

exist
his

or

the

defin itions

successors,

however, gave them

separate existence, and this was the kind

of thing they called Ideas.

"^Therefore

it

followed for them, almost

by the same argu-

ment, that there must be Ideas of all things that are spoken of universally, and it was almost as if a man wished to count
certain things, and while they were few thought he would not be able to count them, but made them more and then counted them for the Forms are almost more numerous than the
;

35

groups of sensible things, yet it was in seeking the causes of 1079^ sensible things that they proceeded from these to the Forms.

For to each
has the same
to

set of substances there

answers a

Form which

name and

pxists a part fro

^

the substances, and

so also in the other categories

there is one character common whether these be sensible or eternal. Again, of the ways in which it is proved that the Forms exist, none is convincing for from some no inference necessarily follows, and from some it follows that there are Forms even

many

individuals,

of things of which the Platonists think there are no Forms.

For according to the arguments from the sciences there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences, and according to the argument that there is one attribute common to many things there will be Forms even of negations, and according to the argument that thought has an object when
the individual object has perished, there will be Forms of Again, perishable things for we can have an image of these.
;

10

of the

most accurate arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations, of which the Platonists say there is no independent third man '.class, and others involve the difficulty of the And in general the arguments for the Forms destroy that for whose existence the assertors of Forms are more anxious than
'

'

1079* 3 read olcrias, Ta>v T aXXai: Cf. K. 1059^ 8 and Plato, Parmem'des, 131 E.

1079^
15

METAPHYSTCA
for the existence of the Ideas
;

for

it

follows that not the

is

dyad

but number

is

first,

and the

relative
all

prior to the absolute^

and
theory.

besides this there are

the other points on which

certain people,

by following out the opinions held about the

conflict with the principles

Forms, have come into

of the

Again, according to the assumption on which the belief in

20

the Ideas rests, there will be

also of

Forms not only

concept

of substances but
single,

many

other things

for the

is

not only

in the case of substances,

but also

in that of

non-substances,
;

and there are sciences of other things than substance and a thousand other such conclusions also follow. But according
to the necessities of the case
25

and the opinions about the

they can b e shared J n there must be Ideas of substances only. For they are not shared in incidentally, but each Form must be shared in as something not predicated of a
if

Forms,

subject.

(E. g.
'

if
',

a thing shares in

'"the

double

itself,
'

it

shares

also in
30

eternal

but incidentally
tVi^

for

'

the double

happens to

be eternal.)

Therefore

Forme: will be ^llb^^^*^^^

And

the

same names indicate substance in this and in the ideal Y^nrlrl (or what will be the meaning of saying that there is something apart from the particulars
if

the one over many

:

?}.^

And
'

the Ideas and the things that share in

them have the same

Form, there will bc'Something common for why should 2' 35 be one ^ and the same in all the perishable 2's, or in the a's which are many but eternal,^ and not the same in the '2 itself as in the individual 2? But if they have not the 1079^ same Form, they will have only the name in common, and il is as if one were to call both Callias and a piece of wood 'man without observing any community between them.^ But if we are to suppose that in other respects the commor formulae apply to the Forms, e. g. that plane figure anc
',
' '

^ i. e. number, which is relative, is prior to the dyad, which the idea theory supposes to be absolute. ^ This seems to be an enthymeme, the conclusion to be supplied beinj that the Forms, since they are substances, must be <?/" substances. ' 1079* 35 omit elvat. * Sc. the abstract (eternal) 2's of which we can say e.g. 2 + 2 = 4, i.e TO. fJLfTa^v, which like the Ideas are eternal, but like sensible things anf

many.
'

With 1078^ 32-1079^ 3

cf.

A. 990* 34-991^

8.

M.

BOOK
it is

XIII
circle-in-itself,

1079"

the other parts of the formula apply to the

but the

name
what

of that of which

the

Form
centre
all
'

is

to he added,*

we must
For
to
to
all

inquire whether this

will this

is
?
?

not absolutely meaningless.

be added

To

'

or to

'

plane

'

or

the parts of the formula

For

the elements in the

Further,
'

essence are Ideas, e.g. 'animal' and 'two-footed'.

the added notion must be an Idea, just as
'

plane

must be
all
its 10

a definite entity which will be present as genus in

species.

CHAPTER V
Above all one might discuss the question \vhat on earth tjie Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those which come into being and cease to be for they cause n pj^h^*' rnnvpmpn t nnr any change in them. But agam they hel p in no wise to w^'''^*' *^^^ hn,y::<h(f^p r,^ r&\\f-r
;

15

things (for they are not ev gp the snhstanre nf thpsp, else they

would have been

that sense
^

in

them), nor towards their being, at least

in

if

they are not in the individuals which share

of the white thing in which

them
^

though

in

white might be thought to cause

first

the whiteness

which was used

his

it is mixed. But this argument, by Anaxagoras, and later by Eudoxus in discussion of difficulties and by certain others, is too easily
;

20

upset

for

it

is

easy to collect

many

insuperable objections to

such a view.

But further all other things cannot come from the Forms in any of the ways that are usually suggested. And to say that they are patterns and the other things share in the m is to nsp 2; ^mpty words and poetical metaphors. For what is it that works, looking to the Ideas ? And any thing can both be and come into being* without being copied from something else, so that, whether Socrates exists or not, a man like Socrates might come to be. And evidently this might be so even if 30
Socrates were eternal.
^

And

according to the Platonic prin'

circumference

that the definition of * ideal circle would be ' a plane figure whose is at all points equidistant from the centre, and which is the Form of individual circles '. * Sc. as present in the individual. ' 1079^ 18 read olTla to^aev av tlvai to Xcvjcov.
*

So

lo79*

28 omit ofUHov.

loyg*'

METAPHYSICA

ciples there will

be several patterns of the same thing, and

therefore several Forms, e.g. 'animal' and 'two-footed', and also

'man-himself,
selves also,
;

will

be Forms of man.
is

Again, the Forms are

patterns not only of sensible things, but of things-in-theme. g.

the genus

the pattern of the species of the

genus therefore the same thing will be pattern and copy. Again, it might be thought impossible that substance and 35 1080* that whose substance it is should exist apart how, therefore,
;

could the Ideas, being substances of things, exist apart

In the Phaedo
^

it is

stated in this

way

causes both of being and of becoming.

exist,
still

that the Forms are Yet though the Forms

10

come into being, unless there is someand many other things come into being (e. g, a house or a ring), of which they say there are no Forms. Clearly therefore even the things of which they say there are Ideas can both be and come into being owing to such causes as produce the things just mentioned,^ and not owing to the Forms. But regarding the Ideas it is possible, both in this way and by more abstract and more accurate arguments, to collect many objections like those we have considered.
things do not
;

thing to

move them

CHAPTER
Since

VI
it

we have

discussed these points,

is

well to consider

again the results regarding numbers which confront those

who
ol

say that numbers are separable substance s and

15

first

causes
is

things.

If

number
a

is

a real thing

and

its
it

substance

nothing

other than just number, as

(i)

some

say,

follows that eithei

different ir

there

is

first ^ in
is

it

and a second, each being

(2)

kind, and this

20 unit
is

true of the units without qualification, and anj.

inaddible to any unit,* or

they are

all

directly
ii

successive,

and any of them are addible

;

to any, as they say

the case with mathematical

number no

unit

is

in

number for in mathematica any way different from another. O

"^

With 1079b 12-1080^ 8 cf. A, QQi'^ 8-^^ 9. 1080^ 17 read npaTov n. * Aristotle begins rjroi though the first main divisior . koI tovto rj, as were to be subdivided, and then he were to come to the second mail division. But really the subdivisions of the first division cover the who! ground, and it is clearer to make simply four divisions.
3
.
.

Moo D.

M.
(3)

BOOK

XIII

1080*

some units must be addible and some not, e.g. 2 is first i and then comes 3 and then the other numbers, and the units in each number are addible, e. g. those in the first
after
,

25

2 are addible to one another, and those

in
;

the

first

3 to
in

one
the

another, and so with the other numbers

2
itself

but the units

successive

are not addible to those in the '3 itself;

in

and
30

similarly

the

case

of

the

other
is

numbers.

Therefore while mathematical number

1,

counted thus
t\vo),

after
and 3
i,

2 (which consists of

another
i

besides the former

i),

(which consists of another

besides these
is

and the other

numbers
distinct 2

similarly, ideal

number

counted thus

after

which does not include the first i, and a 3 which does not include the 2, and the other numbers similarly. Or (4) one kind of number is like the first that was named, one like that which the mathematicians speak of, and that which we have

35

named

last

must be a third kind.

Again, these numbers must either be separable from things,

not separable but in sensible things (not however in the 1080^

way which we

first

considered,^ but in the sense that sensible

things consist of

numbers which are present in them) either some of them and not others, or all of them.These are of necessity the only ways in which the numbers
can exist.

And

of those

who say

that the

is

the beginning

and substance and element of all things, and that number is formed from the i and something else, almost every one has described number in one of these ways only no one has said a// the units are inaddible. And this has happened reasonably enough for there can be no way besides those mentioned. Some say both kinds of number exist, that which has a before and after ^ being identical with the Ideas, and mathematical
;

10

different from the Ideas and from sensible and both being separable from sensible things and others say mathematical number alone exists, as the first of realities, separate from sensible things. Now the Pythago reans, a lso, believe in one kind of number the mathematical only they say it is not separate but

number being
things,

15

^
"

Cf. 1076*38-'' II. 1 080*" 3 read aicr6r}Td

i.

f)

Tov

fiiv avToiV

dvai top di

ftrf rj

narras

tivai.

e. in

which the numbers

diflfer

in kind.

loSo''

METAPHYSICA
sensible substances are formed out of
it .

Foi;J;hey constru ct

the whole universe out of numbers

\

only not

numbers conas

sisting
20 spatial

of abstract

units

they suppose the units to have

first i

magnitude

But how the

was constructed so

to

have magnitude, ,they seem unable to say. Another thinker says the first kind ol number, that of the Forms, alone exists, and some say mathematical number is

identical with this.

The

case of lines, planes, and solids

is

similar.

For some
and of those

think that those which are the objects of mathematics are

25 different

from those which come

in a

after the Ideas

;^

who
not

express themselves otherwise some speak of the objects of

mathematics and

mathematical

way

viz.

those

who do

make
;

the Ideas numbers nor say that Ideas exist; and

others speak of the objects of mathematics, but not mathe-

matically

for

they say that neither

All

is

every spatial magnitude

divisible into magnitudes,

30

nor do any two units taken at rani

dom make

3.

who
but

say the

is

an element and principle

nnifc;^

of things suppose

numbers to
;

consist nf ahsfrarf

eyrepf-

suppose the numbers t o have ma gnitude, as has been said before. It is clear from this statement, then, in how many ways numbers may be described,
the Pythagoreans
^/lef

35

and that

all

the ways have been mentioned

and

all

are

impossible, but

some perhaps more than

others.

CHAPTER
First let us inquire
if

VII
if

the units are addible or inaddible, and

1081^ inaddible, in which of the two

is

ways we

distinguished.^
it is

For

it

possible that

any unit

is

inaddible to any, and

possible
3,

that those in the ideal 2 are inaddible to those in the ideal

and, generally, that those in each ideal

5

number are

inaddible tc

those in other ideal numbers,

(i) If all units are

addible and

we get mathematical number and this alone, and the Ideas cannot be the numbers. For what sort of number will the ideal man or animal or any other Form be ? There is one Idea of each thing, e. g. one of ideal man and anothei
without difference,
1

Cf. A.

992^ 13-18.

"

Cf. io8o' 18-20, 23-35.

M.
'^

BOOK

XIII

io8i^
lo

but the similar and undifferentiated many, so that any particular 3 is no c the ideal man than any other 3. But if the Ideas are ii: numbers, neither can they exist at all. For from what principles will the Ideas come ? Number comes from the i ind the indefinite dyad, and the principles and the elements .re said to be principles and elements of number, and the
of ideal

animal;

bers are infinitely

15

deas cannot be ranked as either prior or posterior to the

lumbers.

But

(2) if

the units are inaddible, and inaddible in the sense

hat none can be added to any other,

number

of this sort

annot be mathematical number; for mathematical number :onsists of undifferentiated units, and the truths proved of it iuit this character. Nor can it be ideal number. For 2 will lot come first after i and the indefinite dyad, and be followed lirectly by the successive numbers, as we say 2, 3, 4 (for the
'

20

'

mits in the ideal 2 are generated at the

IS

same

time, whether,

the

first

holder of the theory said, from unequals

these were equalized

nto being
>ince, if

when

or in some other way)

coming
;

25

one unit is to be prior to the other, it will be prior for when there is one thing prior :o the 2 composed of these md another posterior, the compound of these will be prior to )ne and posterior to the other.^ Again, since the ideal i is first, and then there is a particular 3 which is first among the others and next after the ideal i, and igain a third which is next after the second and next but one ifter the first i, the units must be prior to the numbers by .vhich they are named in counting -, e. g. there will be a third unit in 2 before 3 exists, and a fourth and a fifth in 3 before the numbers 4 and 5 exist. None of these thinkers has said 35 the units are inaddible in this way, but according to their principles even this way is reasonable, though in truth it is impossible. For it is reasonable that the units should have 1081'' priority and posteriority if there is a first unit and a first i, and
;

of ideal number holds that 2 comes next after the original ' But if all units indefinite 2 is the source of number. are different in species, one of the units in 2 is prior to the other and .'. to 2, and comes next after the original i. Similarly between 2 and 3 there will be the first unit in 3, and so on. 1081* 25 read fWi v.. * 1081=* 33 read Xiyovrat.
^

The theory

I,

which with the

'

loSi''

METAPHYSICA
the 2's also
if

there

is

first 2

for after the first

it is

reasonabh
i

and necessary that there should be a second, and if a second, (And to say botl third, and so with the others successively. at the same time, that a unit is first and another unit is seconc after the ideal i, and that a a is first after it, is impossible. But they make a first unit and i, but not a second and a third and a first 2, but not a second and a third.
Clearly, also,
it is

10

not possible,

if all

the units are inaddible

;

and similarly in th< that there should be an ideal 2 and 3 For whether the units are un case of the other numbers.
differentiated or each differs
1

by

addition, e.g.

from each, number must be countec by adding another one to the one, 3 b}

20

25

30

adding another one to the two, and 4 similarly. This beinj so, numbers cannot be generated, as they generate them, fron for 2 becomes part of 3, and 3 of / the dyad and the i and the same happens in the case of the succeeding numbers but they say 4 came from the first 2 and the indefinite 2,which makes it two 2's other than the ideal 2^ if not, th ideal 2 ^ will be a part of 4 and one other 2 will be addec And similarly 2 will consist of the ideal i and another i bi fc if this is so, the other element cannot be an indefinite 2 it generates one unit, but not, as the indefinite 2 does, a def Again, besides the ideal 3 and the ideal 2 how ca nite 2. there be other 3's and 2's ? And how do they consist of pri( and posterior units ? All these doctrines are mere fictio: and there cannot be a first 2 and then an ideal 3. Yet the: must, if the i and the indefinite dyad are to be the element But if the results are impossible, it is also impossible th.
; ; ; ;

these are the generating principles.

If the units, then, are differentiated,
35 results

each from each, the

and others

similar to these follow of necessity.

(3) if

those in different numbers are differentiated, but those

the same

number

are alone undifferentiated from one anoth<

less.

1082^ even so the difficulties that follow are no

ideal 10 there are ten units,

E. g. in t
^

and the 10

is

composed both
is

them and of two

^

5's.

But since the

ideal 10

not

ai
t

The

indefinite 2 being bvonoios produces

it is

ideal 2,
^ '

and

these two 2's

two 2's by operating on which are distinct from the ideal 2.

1081^ 23 read alrrj. 1082* 3 read aurij.

M.

BOOK

XIII

1082=

hance number nor composed of any chance 5's or, for that latter, units the units in this 10 must differ. For if they do

ot differ,
>ut

neither will the 5's of which the 10 consists differ;

since they differ, the units also will differ.

will there

But

if

they

[iffer,
>r

be no other
?

5's in

the 10 but only these two,

is

will there
if

be others

If there are not, this

paradoxical

nd

there are, what sort of 10 will consist of

them

For

10

here

is

no other 10

in the

10 but

itself

But

it is

also necessary
;

hat the 4 should not consist of

"mite 2, as
ts

any chance
took.

2's

for the inde2's

;

they say, took the definite 2 and

it

made two

for

nature was to double what

Again, as to the 2 being a thing apart from the two units,

15

md

the 3 a thing apart from the three units, how is this possible ? Either by one's sharing in the other \ as * white man is
'

from white and man (for it shares in these), or one is a differentia of the other, as man is different Again, some things are one rom ' animal and two-footed intermixture, contact, some by some by position none of yy which relations can belong to the units of which the 2 or the but as two men are not a unity apart from both, 13 consists so must it be with the units. And their being indivisible will make no difference to them for points are indivisible, but yet a pair of them is nothing apart from the two. But this consequence also we must not forget, that it follows that there are prior and posterior 2's, and similarly with the other numbers. For let the 2's in the 4 be simultaneous yet these are prior to those in the 8, and as the 2 generated them, they generated the 4's in the ideal 8. Therefore if the first 2 is an Idea, these 2's also will be Ideas. And the same account applies to the units for the units in the
iifferent
' '

'

'

.vhen

'

'

'

'

'.

20

25

30

first 2

generate the four in

4,

so that

all

the units
of

come

to

be
35

Ideas

and an Idea
e.

will

be composed

Ideas.

Clearly

therefore those things also, of which these are Ideas, will be

composite,
animals,
if

g.

one might say that animals are composed of

1082
differentiate

there are Ideas of them.

In general, to

the units in any

way
is

is

an

absurd

fiction

and by a
*

fiction I

mean

that which
in

in forcibly to suit

a hypothesis.

For neither
2

brought quantity nor in

1082* 17 read darepov darepov.

1082"
5

METAPHYSICA
quality do we see unit differing from unit, and number mus be either equal or unequal all number but especially tha which consists of abstract units so that if one number neither greater nor less than another, it is equal but what equal and in no wise differentiated we take to be the sam( when we are speaking of numbers. If not, even the 2's ir this ideal 10 will be differentiated though they are equal fo] what reason will the man who says they are not differen

i;

ii

10

tiated be able to allege

Again,

if

every unit

another unit makes two, a unit fron

the ideal 1 and one from the ideal 3 will and will this consists of differentiated units
;

make
it

2.

Nov
th(

be prior to

15

3 or posterior?

It rather
is

one of the units

in general
e. g.
i

must be prior; fo simultaneous with the 3, and the other

seems that
it
i

simultaneous with the

3.

And

we, for our part, suppose tha

i

whether the things are equal or unequal, man and a horse bu 2, those who hold these views say that not even two unit
i,

and

the good and the bad, or a

are

2.

If the

number of the
;

ideal 3

is

not greater than that of thi

is

ao 2, this is surprising

and

if it is, is

clearly there

a number in

equal to the

2,

so that this
if

not different from the ideal

is

'i

ber.^

25

and a second num For in this particulai point they are right who claim that the units must be different For th< if there are to be Ideas, as has been said before.

But

this is

not possible,

there

first

Nor

will the

Ideas be numbers.

Form

is

unique

but

if

the units are not different, the

2's

am

the 3's also will not be different.

30

35

numbers be generate< from the indefinite dyad, nor can a number be an Idea fo one Idea will be in another, and all the Forms will be part of one Form. Therefore with a view to their hypothesis the; for their view are right, but absolutely they are wrong very destructive, since they will admit that this question itsd affords some difficulty whether, when we count and say But we d 2, 3,' we count by addition or by partitions.^
;

when we count thus number for if we do,

Therefore they must say tha

not add to the previou

'

i, 2,'

we do

neither will the

i.e. if

there

^ i.e.

(as

is a difference of kind between the numbers. Alexander explains) by starting with the notion of

10,

an

M.
both
[^nce
;

BOOK

XIII
differ-

1082*'

therefore

it is

absurd to infer from this so great a

of essence.

CHAPTER
First of all
a
it is

VIII
what
is

well to determine
if it

the differentia of 1083^

number

and

of a unit,

has a differentia.
;

Units must

Jiffer ei ther in

quanti ty or in quality

and neither of these seems

5

to

be possible.*
if

But number
in

qiia

And
the

the units also differed in quantity,

from number, though equal

first

number differs in quantity. number would differ number of units. Again, are
and do the
later

units greater

or

smaller,

ones

increase or diminish?

All these are irrational suppositions.

differ in quality.

But neither can they

attach to them
after quantity.
;

For no
is

attribute can

for

even to numbers quality

said to belong 10

Again, quality could not come to them either

from the

or from the

dyad

for the former has

;

and the
'things to

latter gives quantity

for its nature

is

no quality, what makes

they
if

be many.

If the facts are really otherwise,

15

should above

all state this at

the beginning and determine

possible, regarding the differentia of the unit,

exist, and, failing this,

why

it

must

what

differentia

they mean.
in

Evidently then,
not
the
all

if

the Ideas are numbers, the units caneither of

20

be addible, nor can they be inaddible

two ways.^ But neither is the way in which some others speak about numbers correct. These are those who do not think there are Ideas, either without qualification or as
identified

with certain numbers, but think the objects of mathematics exist and the numbers are the first of real things, and the ideal i is the starting-point of them. It is paradoxical 25 that there should be a 1 which is first of I's, as they say, but not a 2 which is first of 2's, nor a 3 of 3's for the same
;

reasoning applies to

all.

If,

then, the facts with regard to

number
must

are so, and one supposes mathematical

i

number alone
30

to exist, the
differ

also be a 2

is not the starting-point. For this sort of i from the other units and if this is so, there must which is first of 2's, and similarly with the other
;

taking i, 2, 3, S:c., successively, as parts of it. Or the meaning may be simply 'by splitting up a whole into its parts'. ^ ' Cf. 1080* 18-20, 1083^ 4 read indpxfiv. 23-35.

io83^
successive numbers.

METAPHYSICA
But if the i is the starting-point, th( truth about the numbers must rather be what Plato used tc say, and there must be a first 3 and 3, and the numbers musi not be addible to one another. But if on the other hand one
supposes
follow.
this,

35

many

impossible results, as

we have

said

But either this or the other must be the case, so thai if neither is, number cannot exist separately. 1083^ It is evident from this that the third view ^ is the worst, For twc that ideal and mathematical number is the same. mistakes evidently meet in the one opinion, (i) Mathematica
5

to spin

number cannot be of this sort, but the holder of this view hai it out by making suppositions peculiar to himself
(2)

And
those

he must also admit

all

the consequences that confron*

'

who speak of number in the sense of Forms The doctrine of the Pythagoreans in one way affords fewe; difficulties than those before named, but in another way ha;
'.

10

others

peculiar to

itself.

For not thinking of number

a:

capable of existing separately removes many of the imposbut that bodies should be composed o sible consequences
;

numbers, and that

impossible.

this

should be mathematical number,

i:

15

For it is not true to speak of indivisible spatia magnitudes and however much there might be magnitude; of this sort, units at least have not magnitude and how cai a magnitude be composed of indivisibles ? But arithmetica number, at least, consists of abstract units, while these thinker; at any rate they apply thei. identify number with real things
;

propositions to bodies as
If

if

they consisted of those numbers.

if

then
that

it
it

is

necessary,

number

is

a self-subsistent rea

20 thing,

should be conceived in one of these ways whicl

if it

have been mentioned, and

these, evidently

cannot be conceived
as

in

any o
wh(

number has no such nature

i

t hose

m ake

it

separable construct for

t.

Again, does each unit come from the great and the small
equalized, or one from the small, another from the great
25 (i)
'.

If the latter, neither

does each thing contain

;

all

the ele

ments, nor are the units without difference

is

for in
is

one then
it;

the great and in another the small, which

contrary in

nature to the great.

Again, how
1

is

it

with

the units in th(

Cf.

1080^ 22.

M.
,

BOOK

XIII

1083*

There is one over. But perhaps it is for this reason that i the middle place in odd numbers.^ (2) But if each of the two units consists of both the great and the small, equalized, how will the 2, which is one thing, consist of the great and the small ? Or how will it differ from the unit ?
ideal 3
?

they give the ideal

30

Again, the unit

the 2
since
is

is

prior to the 2
It

for

when

it

is

destroyed

destroyed.

must, then, be the Idea of an Idea

it is
it.

prior to an Idea,

and
?

before

From

what, then

it must have come into being Not from the indefinite dyad,

35

for its function

was to double. Again, number must be either

infinite or finite

for these

thinkers think of

number
it

as capable of existing separately, so

that

it is

not possible that neither of those alternatives should

Clearly

be true.
neither

cannot be infinite

for infinite

number

is

1084^

odd nor even, but the generation of numbers is always the generation either of an odd or of an even number, when I operates in one way - on an even number, an odd number is produced, and when 2 (or an odd number) operates in the other way,-' the numbers got from i by doubling (or the other even numbers) are produced. Again, if every Idea is an Idea of something, and the numbers are Ideas, infinite number will

be an Idea of something, either of some sensible thing or of something else. Yet this is not possible in view of their hypothesis any more than it is reasonable in itself, if they
conceive* of the Ideas as they do.

But

if

number

\^

finite,

how

far

does

it

go

With regard to
But
if

10

this not

only the fact but the reason should be stated.

to 10, as
if
?

number goes only up

will

some

say, firstly the

soon run short

e. g.

is

man-in-himself, what

Forms number
15

will

be the horse-in-itself

The numbers which

;

are Ideas of

the several things go up to 10. It must, then, be one of the numbers within these limits for it is these that are substances and Ideas. Yet they will run short for the various forms of animal will exceed them. At the same time it is clear that if in this way the 3 is the Idea of man, the other 3's are so also (for those in the same number are similar), so that there will be
:

^
"^

Cf. Diels, Vorsokratiker, ed. 2, p. 270, 2. ^ Sc. multiplication. Sc. addition. 1084'* 10 read ranovvtl y\

io84^
20

METAPHYSICA
an
infinite

number .of men, and

if

if

each 3
if
is

men
men.

will

be man-in-himself, and
the smaller

an Idea, each of the not, they will at least be

is

And

number
is

part of the greater (being

number
'

of such a sort that the units in the

if
'

same number

are
of
2.

addible), then

the ideal 4
',

horse

'

or of

white

man

will

an Idea of something, e. g. be a part of horse, if man is

25 It is

paradoxical also that there should be an Idea of 10, but not of II, nor of the succeeding numbers. Again, there both
are and

come

to be certain things of which there are no

also
?

Forms
30

why, then, are there not Forms of them

We
if

infer that the

Forms

are not causes.

is

Again,

it is

paradoxical

the number-series up to 10

more

of a real thing and a

Form ^

thing,

no generation of the former as one But they try to form a theory on the assumption that the series of numbers up to 10 is a
than 10
itself
is

There
is

and there
series.

of the

latter.

complete

At

least

they generate the derivatives

the

and the others of this kind within For some things, e. g. movement, rest, good, bad, 36 the decade. they assign to the principles, and the others to the numbers. This is why they identify i with the odd for if the odd implied 3, how would 5 be odd ? ^ Again, spatial magnitudes and all such things are explained without going beyond a 1084^ definite number, e. g. first comes ^ the indivisible line,* then the 3, then the others up to 10.^ Again, if number can exist separately, one might ask which is prior Inasmuch as the i, or a number such as 2 or 3 ? 5 number is composite, i is prior, but inasmuch ^s the universal and the form is prior, the number is prior for each of the units is part of the number as its matter, and the number acts
void, proportion, the odd,
;
.

as form.

And
it is

in

a sense the right angle

is

prior to the acute,

because
but
in

definite

and

in virtue of its
is

explanatory formula
it

a sense the acute

is

prior,

because

is

a part and the

right angle
10

divided into acute angles.

As

matter, then, the

acute angle and the element and the unit are prior, but as
1084* 29 read 6 dpi^/xo? 6 /if'xP* ''"^^ deKuSos jjmXXov ti ov koi el8os. e. to account for the oddness of odd numbers they identify the odd with the I, which is a principle present in all numbers, not with the 3, which on their theory is not present in other numbers. ^ 1084'' I omit Tj. * Cf. A. 992^ 22. ^ Cf. N. 1090^21-24. I answers to the point (the indivisible line '),
^

i.

'

2 to the line, 3 to the plane, 4 to the solid,

and

4=

10.

M.

BOOK

XIII
'

1084^

regards the form and the substance (in the sense of

the for-

mula '), the right angle, and the whole consisting of the matter and the form, are prior for the concrete thing is nearer the form and the object formulated, but in generation it is later.
;

How

then

is i

the starting-point

Because

it is

not divisible,

they say.

But both the universal, and the particular or the

15

element, are indivisible; but in different ways, one in formula

and the other

point
?

in time.

In which

way

then

is i

the starting-

As

has been said, the right angle

is

thought to be

prior to the acute,

one.

and each is But this is impossible. For one kind of starting-point is the form or For each of the I's substance, the other the part or matter.
and the acute
to the right,

They make

the starting-point in both ways.

20

in 2 exists in
if

a sense
is

in truth

it

exists potentially (at least

i.

the

number

a unity and not like a heap,

e.

if

different

numbers consist of
actually.

differentiated units, as they say), but not

The cause of the mistake they fell into is that they conducted their inquiry at the same time from the standpoint of mathematics and from that of universal formulae, so that (1) from the former standpoint they treated unity, their first
principle, as a point
;

25

for the unit

is

a point without position.

They put

things together out of the smallest parts, as

some

nhers^ have done.

Therefore the unit becomes the matter of

.mbers and at the same time prior to 2

2 being treated as a whole, a unity,

and again posterior, and a form. But (2)

;

3o

because their inquiry was universal they treated the unity

which can be predicated of a number, as in this sense also ^ a part of the number. But these characteristics cannot belong at the same time to the same thing.
If

the

ideal

must only
I's

fulfil

this condition, that

it

it

is

without a place in any particular number (for

differs in

nothing from other

except that

it

is

the starting-point),

and the must be

^

is

divisible but the unit is not, the unit

i

must be
it,

liker the ideal

than the 2

is.

But

if

the unit

is

liker

it 35

liker to the unit

than to the

therefore each of the

Sc. the atomists. i.e. they treated the unity which is predicable of a the unit in a number, as a part of the number.
-

number, as well as

1084''

METAPHYSICA
units in %

must be
is

prior to the
first.

1085^ least they generate the 2

2. But they deny this at Again, if the ideal 2 is a unity

;

and the
is

ideal 3

one
?

also,

both form a

2.

From what,

then,

this 2

produced

CHAPTER

IX

Since there is not contact in numbers, but the units between which there is nothing, e. g. those in 3 or in 3, are successive, one might ask whether they succeed the ideal i or not, and whether, of the terms that succeed it, 2 or either of the
units in 2
is

prior.

Similar
posterior
P'or
10

difificulties

occur with regard to the classes of things

to

number,
lines
',

the
' '

line,

the

plane,

and the
'

solid.

some
' ;

construct these out of the species of

great and
*

small

e. g.

from

long and short

',

planes from
' ;

broad

and narrow
species of
'

masses from
'.

deep and shallow

which are

great and small

And
And

the principle of the geoi ^

metrical forms which answers to the

describe in different ways.
bilities,

different Platonists

in these also the impossi-

and the contradictions of all proba15 bility are seen to be innumerable. For (i) the geometrical forms are severed from one another, unless the principles of these imply one another in such a way that the broad and narrow is also long and short but if this is so, the plane will be a line and the solid a plane.^ Again, how will angles 20 and figures and such things be explained ? And (2) the same happens as in regard to number for long and short &c., are attributes of magnitude, but magnitude does not cotisist of these, any more than the line consists of straight and curved or solids of smooth and rough '? All these cases share a difficulty which occurs with regard
the
fictions,
'

'

'

'

'

',

'

',

'

to species of a genus,
25

when one

posits

the universals,

viz.

whether

it

is

the ideal animal or something other than the

is

ideal animal that

in animals.

True,

if

the universal
if

is

not

separable, this will present no difficulty; but

the

and the
i

^ i. e, that which is to the geometrical forms as the primary (according to the Platonic theory) to numbers.

is

With

1085'^ 7-19 cf. A. 992"' 10-19. Cf. A. 992'^' 1-6, N. io88 15-21.

M.

BOOK

XIII

1085^

numbers are separable, as those who express these views say, is not easy to solve the difficulty, if one may call the impossible not easy '. For when we apprehend the unity in or in general in a number, do we apprehend a thing-in- 30 2, ^ itself or something else ? Some, then, generate spatial magnitudes from matter of this sort, others from the point and the point is thought by them to be not i but something like i and from other matter like plurality, but not identical with it about which principles none the less the same difficulties occur. For if the matter is 35 one, line and plane and sohd will be the same for from the same elements will come one and the same thing. But if the matters are more than one, and there is one for the line 1085'' and a second for the plane and another for the solid, they either imply one another or not, so that the same results will
it
'

follow even so
it

for either the

plane will not contain a line or

will

be a

line.

A gain,
they
rase, the

how number make no attempt

can consist of the one and plurality,

to explain
;

at least as

they state the

same objections arise as confront those who con:ruct number out of the one and the indefinite dyad. For the one view generates number from the universally predicated plurality, and not from a particular plurality and the
;

other generates
for 2 is said to

it

from a particular
'

plurality, but the first

'.

be a

first

plurality

Therefore there

is 10

practically

no

difference, but the

same

difficulties will follow,

is

it

intermixture or position or fusion

or generation?

and so on.
unit
is

Above

all

one,

what does
It

the one-in-itself.

one might press the question, if each come from ? Certainly each is not must, then, come from the one-in-itself
it

and

plurality, or a part of plurality.

is

To

say that the unit

;

is

a
it

15

plurality

impossible, for

it is

indivisible

and to generate
;

(i)

from a part of plurality involves many other objections for each of the parts must be indivisible (or it will be a plurality

and the

unit will

be
;

divisible)

be the one
plurality

?ind plurality

for

and the elements will not the single units do not come from
(2)

20

and the one.

Again,

the holder of this view does

;

nothing but presuppose another number

*

for his plurality of

;

1085* 31 read

votl

17

trtpop

1085^
indivisibles
this
25
is

METAPHYSICA
a number.

Again,

(3)

we must

inquire, in

view of

theory

also,^

whether the number

is infinite

or

finite.

For

first, as it seems, a finite^ plurality, from which and from the one comes the finite number of units. And pluwhat sort rality in itself is different from infinite plurality of plurality, then, is the element which co-operates with the one? One might inquire similarly about the point, i.e. the element out of which they make spatial magnitudes. For at any rate, then, surely this is not the one and only point

there was at

let

30

them say out of what each of the other points is formed. Nor Certainly not of some distance + the point-in-itself.
again can parts of a distance be indivisible parts, as the parts

of plurality out of which the units are said to be

indivisible
;

made

are

for

number

consists of indivisibles,

but spatial
evident

magnitudes do not.^
I

35

All these objections and others of the sort

that

make

it

number and
is

spatial

ma gn itudes
it

cannot exist apart froni

things^ Again, the fact that the chief thinkers disagree about

1086^ numbers
those

a sign that

is

the incorrectness of the alleged

facts themselves that brings confusion into the theories.

For

who make

the objects of mathematics alone exist apart

difficulty

from sensible things, seeing the

and
5

their fictitiousness,

mathematical.
at the

about the Forms number and posited But those who wished to make the Forms

abandoned

ideal

same time numbers, but did not see, if one assumed ^, how mathematical number was to exist apart from ideal, made ideal and mathematical number the same in name, since in fact mathematical number is dethese
principles

stroyed
10

for

they state hypotheses peculiar to themselves

and not those of mathematics. But he who first supposed that the Forms exist and that the Forms are numbers and that the objects of mathematics exist, naturally separated the two. Therefore it turns out that all of them are right in some And they themselves respect, but on the whole not right.
^ 1085^ 24 omit mi 1083^ ^b. point cannot have for an element of it {a) a distance, for this would destroy the simplicity of the point or [b) part of a distance, for the part of a distance must be a distance. * 1086'^ 7 read ravras.
^

Cf.

The

M.
confirm
this, for their

BOOK

XIII
conflict.

1086^

statements

The cause

is

that
15

and their principles are false. And it is hard to make a good case out of bad materials, according to Epicharmus-^-' as soon as 'tis said, 'tis seen to be wrong.' But regarding numbers the questions we have raised and the for he who is conclusions we have reached are sufficient already convinced might be further convinced by a longer discussion, but one not yet convinced ^ would not come any
their hypotheses
;

ao

nearer to conviction.

But regarding the first principles and the pnma.ry causes and elements, the views expressed by those who discuss only sensible substance have been partly stated in our works on but nature,^ and partly do not belong to the present inquiry
;

the views of those

who say

there are other substances besides

25

the sensible must be discussed next after those we have been mentioning. Since, then, some say that the Ideas and the

numbers are such substances, and that the elements of these are elements and principles of real things, we must inquire regarding these what they say and in what sense they say it. Those who posit numbers only, and these mathematical, must be considered later*; but as regards those who believe in the Ideas one might survey at the same time their way For they of thinking and the difificulties into which they fall.
at the

30

same time

trea t

the Ideas as universal substances,

and again as separa blg,.and individual. That this isn ot_ possible has be en shown befo re.^ The reason why those who 35 say the Ideas are universal combined these two views in
one,
is

that they did not

with sensible things.

make the Ideas substances identical They thought that the sensib le particular s
1086*'

were

in

state of flux alid

that the universal

none ot them rem ained^ but was apart from t hese and differe nt. And

Socrate s gave the impulse to this theory, as we said before,^ by means of his definitions, but he did n ot separate t hem fr^m the
particulars
;

and
is

in this

them
^

This

plain from the results

he thought rightly, in not^separating for without the universal

;

^ < ^

Fr. 14. Diels, Vorsokratiker. Phys. i. 4-6, ii. 3 De Caelo, ill. N. 1090* 7-15, 25-30, 35-^ 20. M. 4.
;

'

3,

De

1086* 20 read ^17 TreTTfiTfievos. Gen. et Corr. i. I, ii. 5. ' B. I003 5-17, M. 4, 5.

io86^
it is

METAPHYSICA
not possible to get knowledge, but the separation
as necessary,
is

the

cause of the objections that arise with regard to the Ideas.

His successors, treating

it

if

there are to be

substances besides the sensible and transient substances, that

they must be separable, had no others, but gave^ separat e

,'

10

existence to these universally predicated subs tances, so that

it

/
i

iollowed tnat universals and individuals were almoST; the

sort of thing.
in

same

This

in

itself,

then,

would be one

difficulty

the view we have mentioned.

CHAPTER X
Let us now mention a point which presents a certain both to those who believe in the Ideas and to those who do not, and which was stated at the beginning among If we do not suppose substances to be the problems.^ separate, and in the way in which particular things are said to be separate, we shall destroy that sort of substance which
difficulty

15

we wish
principles
20

to maintain

but

if

we

conceive substances to be

separable,
?

how

are

we

to conceive their elements

and

their

If

they are individual and not universal,

(i) real

things will be

just of the

25

same number as the elements, and (2) the elements will not be knowable. For (i) let the syllables in speech be substances, and their elements elements of substances then there must be only one ba and one of each of the syllables, if they are not universal and the same in form but each is one in number and a this and not merely possessed of a
;
'

'

common name (and again they suppose each thing-in-itself And if the syllables are unique, so are the parts to be one ^).
of which they consist
one, nor
30

there will not, then, be more 's than more than one of any of the other elements, on the
;

same

principle on which none of the other syllables can exist

in the plural

number.

But

if this is so,

there will not be other

things existing besides the elements, but only the elements.

(2)

Again, the elements

will

not be even knowable

is

for
is

they
clear

are not universal, and knowledge

1 ^

of universals.

This

999^ 24, 1003* 5. This gives a further reason

B.

why each element must be

a single

individual.

M.

BOOK

XIII
;

1086*'

both from demonstrations and from definitions for we do not conclude that this triangle has its angles equal to two right
angles, unless every triangle has
its

angles equal to two right 35

angles, nor that this

man

is

an animal, unless every

man

is

an

animal.

But if the principles are universal either the substances composed of them are universal, or ^ non-substance will be 1087^ for the universal is not a substance, and prior to substance the element or principle rs universal, and the element or
;

principle

is

prior to the things of

which

it

is

the principle

or element.

All

t hese

difficulties follow naturally,

when they make

the

Ideas out of elements and at the same

time claim that Ideas

should be separate unities, apart from the substances which

have the same form. But if, e.g., in the case of the elements of speech, the ^'s and the d's may quite well be many and there need be no ideal a and ideal d besides the many, there may be, as far as this goes, an infinite

number of
l

similar syllables.

Th e^

statement that

all

know also

10

edge be universal and not separate substances, presents indeed, of all the points we have mentioned, the greatest diffi culty, but yet the statement is in a sense true, although m a sense it is not. For kno\vl edge, like the verb to know means two 15 Th o^pothings, of which one is potential and one actual. tenc^jjicing, as matter, universal and indefinite, deals with the but the actuality, ^eing definite,^ ^universa l and indefinite it deals with a/ deal s with a definite object, being a this
is
'

universal, so that the principles of things

must

',

'

',

'

this

'.

But

per accidens sight sees universal colour, because ao

this individual colour

which

it

sees

is

colour
is

and
a.

this indi-

vidual a which the grammarian investigates

principles

an

For

if

the

must be

universal,

what

is

derived from
^
;

them must
this is so,

also be universal,

as in demonstrations

and

if

there will be nothing capable of separate existence

substance.

i.

e.

no

^
35

But evidently
it is

in a sense

knowledge

is

universal,

and

in

a sense
^

not.

1087*

read K.a66\ov, ^ tarai.

'

Sc. universal premises cannot give singular conclusions.

BOOK XIV
CHAPTER
Regarding
be taken as
this
sufficient.
:

(N)
I

kind of substance, what we have said must

All philosophers

make

the

first

prin-

30 ciples contraries

as in natural things, so also in the case of

unchangeable substances. But since there cannot be anything

first principle of all things, the principle cannot be the principle and yet be an attribute of something else. To suggest this is like saying that the white is the first principle, not qua anything else but qita white, but yet that it

prior to the

is

predicable of a subject,
else
all
;

i.e.

has whiteness as an attribute of

are generated from th eir coiVv^
;

35

something
prior.

this

is

absurd, for then that subject will be

But

things

w hich

tra des involve

1087**

an underlymg subject
if

a subject, then, must be

present in the case of contraries,

anywhere.
is

All contraries,
exist

then, are always predicable of a subject,

apart.

and none can

to substance,
is

But appearances suggestThat'there and argument confirms this.

is

nothing contrary
contrary, then,
first

No

the

first

principle of all things in the full sense; the

principle

something

different.

But these thinkers make one of the contraries matter, some making the unequal which they take to be the essence of plurality matter for the one, which is the equal, and others making plurality matter for the one. (The former generate numbers out of the dyad of the unequal, e. of the great and small, and the other thinker we have referred to generates them

i.

out of plurality, while according to both

essence of the one.)

it is

generated by the

10
I

For even the philosopher who says the unequal and one are the elements, and the unequal is a dyad composed of the great and small, treats the unequal, or the great and the small, as being one, and does not draw the distinction that they are one in formula, but not in number. But they do not describe rightly even the principles which they call elements, for some name the great and the small

N.

BOOK XIV

loS?**

with the one and treat these three as elements of numbers, two being matter, one form while others name the many and few,
;

15

because the great and the small are more appropriate

nature to magnitude than to
the universal character

in their

number
'.

common

and others name rather to these that which exceeds

;

'

and that which

is

exceeded

None

of these varieties
of,

of

opinion makes any difference to speak

;

in

view of some
20

of the consequences they affect only the abstract objections, which these thinkers take care to avoid because their own

demonstrations are abstract,

with
;

this exception, that

if

the

exceeding and the exceeded are the principles, and not the great
small, consistency requires that number should come from the elements before 2 dqes for number is more universal than 2, as the exceeding and exceeded are more universal than the great and small. But as it is, they say one of these things but do not say the other. Others oppose the

and the

25

and the other to the one, and others oppose plurality But if, as they claim, things consist of contraries, and to the one either there is nothing contrary, or if there must be something it is plurality, and the unequal is contrary to the equal and the different to the same and the other to the thing itself, those who oppose the one to plurality have most
different

to the one.

30

claim to plausibility, but even their view

is

inadequate, for the

is

one would on their view be a few

fewness,
'

for plurality

opposed to

and the many

'

to the few.

it is

The one evidently means a measure^. And in every case some underlying thing with a distinct nature of its own,
the scale a quarter-tone, in spatial magnitude a finger 35

e.g. in

or a foot or something of the sort, in

rhythms a beat or
a definite weight
indivisible, in the
;

a syllable

and

in

and similarly the same way in

;

in
all

gravity

it

is

cases, in qualities a quality, in 1088^

quantities a quantity (and the

measure

is

former case
stance.

in kind,

and
is

in the latter to the sense)

which
\

implies that the one

not, in

any
; '

instance, in itself a sub'

'

And this is reasonable for the one means the measure of some plurality, and number means a measured plurality and a plurality of measures. Thus it is natural that one is not a number for the measure is not measures, but
'

i.

e.

a unit or standard.

AR.

MET.

Mfe'

'

io88*

METAPHYSICA
both the measure and the one are starting-points. The measure must always be something predicable of all alike, e.g. 'if the and if they are things are horses, the measure is horse
'

',

10

men, man ^ If they are a man, a horse, and a god, the measure is perhaps living being and the number of them If the things are man will be a number of living beings. and white and walking ', these will scarcely have a number, because all belong to a subject which is one and the same in number, yet the number of these will be a number of classes',
'

'

'

',

'

'

'

'

'

or of
15

some equivalent term. Those who trea.t the unequal as one an indefinite compound of great and
far

thing,

small, say
(1)

and the dyad as what is very

from being probable or possible. For

these are modifica-

tions and accidents, rather than substrata, of

numbers and

20

magnitudes the many small of magnitude like even and odd, smooth and rough, Again, (2) apart from this mistake, the straight and curved. great and the small, and the like, must be relative to some-

and few of number, and the great and

-*

thing

but the relative

is

least

of

all

things
is

of

all

the
tc

categories

real

thing or substance, and

;

posterior

25

and the relative terms in question are accidents of quantity, as was said, but not its matter, since something with a distinct nature of its own must underlie both For there the relative in general and its parts and kinds.
quality and quantity
ij

nothing either great or small,

relative,

many

or few, or, in general

few, great or small, or relative to

30

which without having a nature of its own is many oi something else. A sign tha: the relative is least of all a substance and a real thing is th(i fact that it alone has no proper generation or destruction o: movement, as in quantity there is increase and diminution, ii
quality alteration, in place locomotion, in substance simpl<

generation and destruction.

35 for,

without changing, a thing

if

The relative has no proper change will be now greater and now les
it

or equal,

that with which

is

compared has changed

ii

1088^ quantity.
j

And

the matter of each thing, and therefore o

is

substance, must be that which

potentially of the nature

ii

'

question

but the relative

is

neither potentially nor actualb

substance.
^

It is strange, then, or rather impossible, to

lirnoiy

mak

1088* 9 read u

to fierpov 'innos, k1

iiv6j)a)T:oiy

uvOpionos.

N.

BOOK XIV
in,

1088''

not-substance
all

an element

and prior

to,

substance

for

the categories are posterior to substance.

Again,

(3)

the

elements are not predicated of the things of which they

are elements, but

many and

few are predicated both apart and

line,

together of number, and long and short of the

and

both broad and narrow apply to the plane. If there is a plurality, then, of which the one term, viz. few, is always
2 (which cannot be many, for if it were many, would 1 be few), there must be also one which is absolutely many, e.g. 10 is many (if there is no number which is greater

predicated/ e.g.

10

than
of

10),

or io,oco.

How
?

then, in view of this, can

number

consist of few
it,

and many
;

Either both ought to be predicated

or neither

but according to the present account only

is

the one or the other

predicated.

CHAPTER n
We
consist of elements.

must inquire generally, whether eternal things can If they do, they will have matter for
;

15

everything that consists of elements

a thing must have
consists (even
if,

is

composite.

Since, then,

come into being out of that of which it though it came into being, it exists for ever), and since everything comes to be what it comes to be out of that which is it potentially (for it could not have come to be out of that which had not this capacity, nor could it consist of such elements), and since the potential can be either actual or npt, this being so, however everlasting number or anything ao else that has matter is, it must be capable of not existing, just as that which is any number of years old is as capable of not existing as that which is a day old if this is capable of not existing, so is that which has lasted for a time so long that it has no limit. They cannot, then, be eternal, since that which is capable of not existing is not eternal, as we had occasion to show in another context-. If that which we are now 25 saying is true universally that no substance is eternal unless it is actuality, and if the elements are matter that underlies

^ 1088^ 9 read axet, oXiyov or perhaps Alexander seems to have done. ^

oXi-yoi' aitt

or am, ro oXryor, as

Cf. e. 1050^' 6,

De

Caelo,

i.

12.

1088"

METAPHYSICA
substance, no eternal substance can have elements present in
it,

of which

it

consists.

30

There are some who describe the element which acts with the one as the indefinite dyad, and object to the unequal
'

',

reasonably enough, because of the ensuing

difficulties

but they

have got rid only of those objections which inevitably arise from the treatment of the unequal, i.e. the relative, as an element those which arise apart from this opinion must confront even these thinkers, whether it is ideal number, or 35 mathematical, that they construct out of those elements. There are many causes which led them off into these explanations, and especially the fact that they framed the 1089^ difficulty in an obsolete form. For they thought that all things that are would be one viz. Being itself, if one did not join issue with and refute the saying of Parmenides ^ For never will this be proved ^, that things that are
;

not
not

are.'
it

They thought
5 is
;

necessary to prove that that which

for only thus

of
'

that which

is

and something

else

is

could the things that are be composed,

'

10

if they are many. But firstly, if being has many senses (for it means sometimes substance, sometimes quality, sometimes quantity,; and at other times the other categories), what sort of 'one' are all the things that are, if non-being is to be supposed not to be ? Is it the substances that are one, or the affections and all the other categories as welP so that the 'this' and the such and the so much and the other categories that indicate each some class of being * will all be one ? But it is

'

'

'

'

strange, or rather impossible, that the calling into play of one

thing

should bring
'

it

about that part of that which

*

is is

'this',

part a a place

such

',

part a

so

much

',

part

'

in

such and such

'.

Secondly, of what sort of non-being and

15
I

things that are consist?

since
'

being has
'

being do the For 'non-being' also has many senseS; and not man means not being a certain
*
'

substance,
^

'

not straight

'

not being of a certain quality,

-^
*

'

not

Fr. 7, Diels, Vorsokratiker. 1089* 10 read oixoias anavra.

i.

1089* 3 read tovto Saixjj. 1089^^ II read ocra ov ri.

e.

non-beine.

N.
three cubits long
'

BOOK XIV
What
sort

1089*

not being of a certain quantity.

of being and non-being, then, by their union pluralize the things that are? This thinker means by the non-being, the union of which with being plurah'zes the things that This is also are, the false and the character of falsity.^ why it was said that we must assume something that is false, as geometers assume the line which is not a foot long to be a foot long. But this cannot be so. For neither do geometers assume anything false (for the proposition in

20

question

is

extraneous to the inference), nor are the things that

in

are generated from or resolved into non-being in this sense.

But since non-being

'

'

the various cases

has as

many senses

as there are categories,

to be
latter,

and besides

this the false is said not

and so

is

the potential, generation proceeds from the

that which is not man but potentially man, and white from that which is not white but potentially white, and this whether it is one thing that is generated or many.

man from

30

The

question evidently
is

is,

how

being, in the sense of

'

the

substances ',

many
lines

for the things that are

solids.
It is
is

generated are

numbers and
being
in the

and

strange to inquire

how

many, and not how either For surely the indefinite 35 qualities or quantities are many. dyad or the great and the small are not a reason why there should be two kinds of white or many colours or flavours or shapes for then these also would be numbers and units. 1089'' if they had attacked this point, they would have seen But
sense of substance
;

the cause of the plurality in substances also the

for the cause

is

same or analogous.
in

This aberration

is

the reason also

.

why

seeking the opposite of being and the one, from which

and being and the one the things that are proceed, they posited the relative term (i. e. the unequal), which is neither the contrary nor the contradictory of these, but is one kind of being as substance and quality are. They should have inquired also how relative terms are many and not one. But as it is, they inquire how there are many units besides the first i, but do not go on to inquire how there Yet they use them are many unequals besides the unequal.
^

5
j

:!r^
10

io8q* 20 read Xiyuv.

Cf.ll. 16-18.

Cf. PI.

Soph, lyj A, 240.

'


1089*

METAPHYSICA
and speak of great and small, many and few (from which
proceed numbers), long and short (from which proceeds the line), broad and narrow (from which proceeds the plane), deep

and shallow (from which proceed solids) and they speak of yet more kinds of relative term. What is the reason,
;

15

then,

why

there

is

a plurality of these

It is necessary, as

we

say, to presuppose for each thing

;

that which

io

and the holder of these views which is potentially a this and a substance but is not in itself being viz. that it is the relative (as if he had said the qualitative '), which is neither potentially the one or being, nor -the contradictory of the one nor of being, but one among beings. And it was much more necessary, as we said, if he was inquiring how beings are many, not to inquire about those in the same category
is
it

potentially

further declared

what that

is

'

'

'

how

there are

many
some
is

substances or

many

qualities

but
how

how
some
there

beings as a whole are

modifications,
25

many

for

some

are substances,

relations.

In the categories other than

substance

there

another

way

of explaining

can be plurality,
their substrate

viz. that, since

they are not separable from

substances, qualities and quantities are

many

only because
oti-/i^

becomes and
But

is
;

many.
only
it

Yet there

to

be a matter for each category

cannot be separable
it

from substances.
'

in the case of individual substances,

is

possible

to explain
is

how

the individual

is

many

things,

30 unless

a thing

to be treated as both an individual

general character ^
')
'

The

difficulty arising

and a from these facts

substances and

is
^
.

rather this,

how
if

there are actually

many

not one.

But
same,

further,

the 'this' and the quantitative are not the

how and why the things that are are many, but how quantities are many. For all number means unless it means merely a measure, 35 a quantity, and the unit ("means the indivisible in quantity. If then the quantitative 1090^ and substance are different, we are not told whence or how but if any one says they are the same, substance is many ^ inconsistencies. he has to face many One might fix one's attention also on the question, regarding
we
are not told
'

'

'

',

>-

Which,

Aristotle thinks, the Platonists assert the Idea to be.

N. the numbers,

BOOK XIV
they
exist.

1090^

what

justifies the belief that

To the
t

believer in the Ideas they provide a cause for existing things,

an Idea, and the Idea is to other things somehow or other the cause of their being for let this supposition be granted them. But as for him who does not
since
is
;

each number

hold this view because he sees the inherent objections to the Ideas (so that it is not for this reason that he posits numbers),

but

who

posits mathematical

number,

why must we

believe 10
is
it

his statement that such

number
?

such number to other things

exists maintain that
it it is

and of what use Neither does he who says

exists,

the cause of anything (he rather says

nor is it observed to be the cause of theorems of arithmeticians will all be found true even of sensible things, as was said.^
is

a thing
;

in itself),

anything

for the

15

CHAPTER
Those who suppose the Ideas to
to each, try at least to explain

III

exist

and to be numbers,
it is

according to the theory which gives a separate existence

somehow why

possible to

one thing apart from the many.^ Since their reasons, however, are neither conclusive nor in themselves possible, one must not. on this account at least,
is
^

assume that each

But the Pythagoreans. 30 because they saw many attributes of numbers belonging to sensible bodies, supposed real things to be numbers not separable numbers, however, but numbers of which real thinJH,,- But why? Because the attributes of numbers are consist. present in a musical scale and in the heavens and in many other things.^ But those who say that mathematical number 25
assert

the

existence

of number.

alone exists cannot according to their hypotheses say anything

of this sort
;

nay, they used to say that those applied numbers

could not be the subject of the sciences.

But we maintain that

evident that the objects
if

they

are, as

we

said before.*

And

it is
;

of mathematics do not exist apart

1

for

they existed apart

Cf.

M.

3.
ti Zkcuttov ir(ipS>v-

^
to.'l

1090* 17 read kKaoTov, napa to iroXXa ^aii^vdv to tv

-yf

\fytiv

TTojy

8ta ri fori''.
*

Cf. A. 989''

29-990* 29.

Cf.

M.

3.

logo^
30 their attributes

METAPHYSICA
Pythagoreans
in this point are

would not have been present in bodies. The open to no objection but in
;

that they construct

natural bodies out of numbers, things

that have lightness and weight out of things that have not

weight or lightness, they seem to speak of another heaven and other bodies, not of the sensible. But those who make number separable assume that it exists and is separable because the axioms would not be true of sensible things, while the statements of mathematics are true and delight and similarly with the spatial magnitudes of the soul 1090*' mathematics. It is evident, then, both that our rival theory will say the contrary of this, and that the difficulty we raised just now, why if numbers are in no way present in sensible
.35
;

things their attributes are present in sensible things,

for those
5

is

solved

who hold our views.^ There are some who, because

line,

the point

is

the limit and

extreme of the
^

the line of the plane, and the plane of the

10

We must examine this argument too, and see whether it is For (i) extremes are not substances, not remarkably weak. but rather all these things are mere limits. For even walking, and movement in general, has a limit, so that on their theory this will be an individual and a substance. But that is absurd. (2) Even if they are substances, they will all be the
solid,

think there must be real things of this sort.

therefore

substances of particular sensible things

the argument applied.
existing apart
?

for

it is

to these that

Why

then should they be capable of

Again,
15 all

if

we

are not too easily satisfied,

we may, regarding

number and
;

the objects of mathematics, press this difficulty,

that they contribute nothing to one another, the prior to the

posterior
for if number did not exist, none the less spatial magnitudes would exist for those who maintain the existence of the objects of mathematics only, and if spatial magnitudes did not exist, soul and sensible bodies would exist. Byit the

observed facts show that nature

is

not a series of episodes, like

in

^
^-

2 3

bad tragedy.
;

The

believers

the

Ideas

escape this

difficulty

for

they construct spatial magnitudes out of matter

1090^ 3 read Xverat.

and number,

lines out of %, planes doubtless out of 3, solids

^

N.

BOOK XIV

1090"

makes no differmagnitudes be Ideas, or what is their manner of existence, and what do they contribute to things ? These contribute nothing, as the objects of mathematics conout of
ence.
4.

or they use other numbers, which

will these

But

25

But not even is any theorem true of them, change the concepts of mathematics and invent doctrines of our own. But it is not hard to assume any random hypotheses and spin out a long string of conclusions. 30 These thinkers, then, are wrong in this way, in wanting to unite the objects of mathematics with the Ideas. And those who first posited two kinds of number, that of the Forms and the other which is mathematical, neither have said nor can say in the least how mathematical number is to exist and of what it is to consist. For they place it 35 between ideal and sensible number. If (i) it consists of the great and small, it will be the same as the other ideal number. But of what other ^ great and small than the great and small can it consist ? For he ^ makes spatial magnitudes out oi one other great and smal!.^ And if (2) he names some 1091^ other element, he will be making his elements rather many. And if the principle of each of the two kinds of number is a I, unity will be something common to these. And we must inquire how the one is these many things, while at the same time number, according to him, cannot be generated except from one and the indefinite dyad. = All this is absurd, and conflicts both with itself and with the probabilities, and we seem to see in it Simonides' long story * for the long story comes into play, like those which slaves tell, when men have nothing sound to say. And the very elements the great and the small seem to cry out against the violence that is done to them for they cannot in 10 any way generate numbers other than those got from i by
tribute nothing.

unless

we want

to

'

'

doubling.
It is

strange also to attribute generation to eternal things, or

rather this

is one of the things that are impossible. There need be no doubt whether the Pythagoreans attribute genera-

1090^ 37 read

'|

SWov

Se

nVor yuKpov

Ka\ fifyaXov
3

2
^

Sc. Plato. Sim. Ceius, Fr. 189, Bergk.

cf lo^b

21, 22.

logi*

METAPHYSICA
tion to them or not for they obviously say that when the one had been constructed, whether out of planes or of surface or of seed or of elements which they cannot express, immedi;

15

20

began to be constrained and limited by the limit. But since they are constructing a world and wish to speak the language of natural science, it is fair to make some examination of their physical theories, but to let them off from the present inquiry for we are investigating the principles at work in tinchangeable things, so that it is numbers of this kind whose genesis we must study.
ately the nearest part of the unlimited
;

CHAPTER

IV

25

These thinkers say there is no generation of the odd number, which evidently implies that there is generationof the even and some say the even is produced first from unequals the great and the small when these are equalized. The inequality, then, must belong to them before they are If they had always been equalized, they would equalized. not have been unequal before for there is nothing before that which is always. Therefore evidently they are not giving their account of the generation of numbers merely as a logical
;

account.^
30

difficulty,

and a reproach to any one who

contained in
the question

finds

it

no

difficulty,

are

how

the elements

and the principles are

the difficulty
is

35
I

related to the good and the beautiful whether any of the elements is such a thing as we mean by the good itself and the best, or this is not so, but these are later in origin than the elements. The mythologists seem to agree with some thinkers of the present day, who answer the question in the negative, and say that both the good and the beautiful appear in the nature
this,

of things only

when

that nature has

made some
first

progress.

This they do to avoid a real objection which confronts those

1091*

who
first

say, as

some

do, that the

one

is

principle.

(The

objection

arises

not from their ascribing goodness to the

principle as an attribute, but from their

^

making the one

Cf.

De

Caelo,

i.

279^'

32-280^

10.

N.

BOOK XIV

logi'^

a principle

and

a principle in the sense of an element

and
5

generating number from the one.)

time,

And

the old poets agree

with this inasmuch as they say that not those

e. g.

who

are

first in

Night and Heaven or Chaos or Ocean, reign and rule, but Zeus.^ These poets, however, speak thus only because they think of the rulers of the world as changing for those of them who combine two characters in that they do not - use mythical language throughout, e. g. Pherecydes and
others,

some

make

the original generating agent the Best,

lo

and so do the Magi, and some of the later sages also, e. g. Empedocles and Anaxagoras, of whom one made friendship an element, and the other made reason a principle.

Of

those

who maintain
its
is

the existence of the unchangeable

itself is

substances some say the one

the good
its

itself;

but

they thought
This, then,
is

substance lay mainly in

the problem,
It

unity.

which of the two ways of 15 would be strange if to that which is primary and eternal and most self-sufficient this very quality self-sufficiency and self-maintenance belongs primarily in some other way than as a good. But indeed it can be for no
speaking
right.

other reason indestructible or self-sufficient than because

nature
is

its
is

good.

Therefore to say that the

;

first

principle

good
one

is

probably correct

but that this principle should be the ao

is

or, if

not that, an element, and an element of numbers,

Powerful objections arise, to avoid which some have given up the thtory (viz. those who agree that the one is a first principle and element, but only of mathematical number). For on this view all the units become identical
impossible.

35

with species of good, and there

is

a great profusion of goods.

all

Again,

if

the

Forms

are numbers,

the

Forms are

identical

with species of good.

But

let

man assume

Ideas of anything

he pleases. If these are Ideas only of goods, the Ideas will not be substances; but if the Ideas are also Ideas of substances, all animals and plants and all individuals that share in Ideas will be good. These absurdities follow, and it also follows that the
contrary element, whether
i.

it
is

is

plurality

or the

unequal,

e.

the
^

great and

small,

the

bad-itself.
'

Hence
/cat.

one

Cf. 1071^ 26.

1091^ 8 omit

logi''

METAPHYSICA
thinker avoided attaching the good to the one, because
it

would necessarily
35

follow, since generation

is

from contraries,
Others

that badness

is

the fundamental nature of plurality.

the nature of the bad
;

say inequality
all

is

it

follows, then, that

things partake of the bad except one the one itself, and that numbers partake of it in a more undiluted form than 1092^ spatial magnitudes, and that the bad is the space in which the good is realized, and that it partakes in and desires that which tends to destroy it; for contrary tends to destroy contrary. And if, as we said, the matter is that which is potentially each thing, e. g. that of actual fire is that which
I
}

is

potentially

fire,

the bad will be just the potentially good.

All these objections, then; follow, partly because they make

every principle an element, partly because they
traries

make
the

con-

principles,

partly

because

they

rnake

one a

they treat the numbers as the first substances, and as capable of existing apart, and as Forms.
principle, partly because

CHAPTER V
If,

then,

it is

equally impossible not to put the good

among
way,

first

principles

and to put
substances.

it

among them

in

this

10

evidently the principles are

not being correctly described,

nor are the

correctly
if

first

Nor do we conceive

the matter

we compare

the principles of the universe to that

of animal sand plants, on the ground that the more complete

always comes from the indefinite but incomplete

which

is

what leads
15 thing.

this thinker to say that this

is

also true of the

first

principles of reality, so that the one itself is not even an existing

This

is

incorrect, for even in this

world of animals and

are complete
is
;

plants the principles from which these

it is

come

for

man

that produces a man, and the seed

not

first.

It is strange, also, to

generate place simultaneously with the

(for place is peculiar to

mathematical solids^
things,
20

the individual

and hence they are separable in place, but mathematical objects are nowhere), and to say that they must be somewhere, but not say what the place is. Those who say that the things that are come from elements
^

1092* 18 read

rois (TTepeolt m'ls na6r]fiaTLKo?s.

N.

BOOK XIV

1092^

and that the first of things that are are the numbers, should have first distinguished the senses in which one thing comes from another, and then said in which sense number comes from its
elements.

But not everything is capable of interis produced by it is different from its elements, and on this view the one will not remain separate 25 or a distinct entity but they want it to be so. By juxtaposition, like a syllable? But then (i) the elements must have position and (2) he who thinks of the one and plurality must think of them apart number then will be this a unit and plurality, or the one and the unequal. Comins^ from certain things means in one sense that these are still to be found in the product and in another that they are not in which sense does number come from these 30 elements? Only things that are generated can come from elements which are present in them. Does number come from its elements as from seed ? But nothing can be excreted from that which is indivisible. Does it come from its contrary, its contrary not persisting ? But all things that come in this way come also from something else which does persist.^ Since, then, one thinker places the i as contrary to plu- 35 rality, and another places it as contrary to the unequal, treating the i as equal, number is treated as coming from 1092'' contraries. There will then be something else that persists, from which and from one contrary the compound is or has come to be. Again, why in the world do the other things that come from contraries, or that have contraries, perish (even when all of the contrary is used to produce them), while number does not ? Nothing is said about this. Yet whether 5
intermixture ?
mixture, and that which
; ;

By

present or not present in the

it,

compound the contrary destroys

mixture
'

e. g.
is

'

strife

'

destroys the
it is

'

(yet

it

should not

for

it

not to that that

contrary').

Once more, it has in no sense been determined in which way numbers are the causes of substances and of being whether

(i)

as limits (as points are of spatial

magnitudes).

This
(e. g.

is 10

how Eurytus
^

decided what was the number of what

Cf.
Cf.
.\.

of

'

1069^ 3-9, Phys. i. 7. Empedocles, Fr. 1 7, Diels, Vorsokratiker.

1092''

METAPHYSICA
man, or of
triangle
horse), viz.

by imitating the

figures of living things*

with pebbles, as some people bring numbers into the forms of

and square.
is

Or

(2) is

it

because harmony
?

is

a ratio

15

But how are the attributes white and sweet and hot numbers? Evidently the numbers are not the essence ^ nor causes of the form
of numbers, and so

man and

everything else

is

for the ratio

the essence, while the number

is

is

the matter.
in this

E. g. the essence of flesh or bone

'

number only
^

way,

three parts of
it is, is

fire

and two of

earth.'

And

a number, what-

ever
30

of

fire

or earth or of units

always a number of certain things, either of parts but the essence is that there is so
;

much
this
is

of one thing to so

no longer a whether these are corporeal or of any other kind. Number, then, whether number in general or the number which consists of abstract units, is neither the cause as agent,
25

much of another in the mixture and number but a ratio of mixture of numbers,
;

nor the matter, nor the ratio and form of things.

course,
is
it

Nor, of

the final cause.

CHAPTER
One might
:

VI

J,

'^ c/

what the good is that numbers because their composition is expressible by a number, either by one which is easily calculable or by an odd number. For in fact honey-water is no more wholesome if it is mixed in the proportion of three times three, but it would do more good if it were in no particular ratio but
also raise the question

things get from

30

well diluted than if it were numerically expressible but strong. Again, the ratios of mixtures are expressed by the adding of numbers, not by mere numbers, e. g. it is three parts to two ',
'

not

'

three times two

'.

For the same genus must underlie

;

things that are

multiplied together

therefore

the product

35

must be measurable by i, and 4x5x7 by 4, and therefore all products into which the same factor enters must be measurable by that factor. The number of fire, then, cannot be 2 X 5 X 3 X 7, and at the same time that of water 3x3. If all things must share in number, it must follow that many
1

1x3x3

Eurytus

may have used

(/jura in this
'

does.
"^

ordinary Aristotehan sense 1092'' 17 read ovula.

The

plants

wider sense, as Plato sometimes would be difficult here. Cf. Empedocles, Fr. 96, Diels.
'

N.
things are the

BOOK XIV

1093'

same, and the same number must belong and to another. Is number the cause, then, and does the thing exist because of its number, or is this not certain? E.g. the motions of the sun have a number, and 5 again those of the moon, yes, and the life and prime of each Why, then, should not some of these numbers be animal. squares, some cubes, and some equal, others double? There is no reason why they should not, and indeed they must be comprised within these descriptions, since all things were assumed to share in number and things that differed might fall under
to one thing

the same number.

number had belonged to certain things, these would have been the same as one another, since they would have had the same form of number But why are e.g. sun and moon would have been the same. these numbers causes ? There are seven vowels, seven strings
Therefore
if

the same

10.
I

or scales, the Pleiades are seven, at seven animals lose their

teeth (at least some, though

some do

not),

and the champions

Is
it

15

-who fought against Thebes were seven.

the

then because

number

is

what

it is,

that the champions were seven or the

Pleias consists of seven stars?

Surely the champions were

seven because there were seven gates or for some other reason,

and the Pleias

ive

count as seven, as

we count

the Bear as

twelve, while other peoples count

more

stars in both.

Nay,

20

they even say that H, ^, and are concords, and because there are three concords, the double consonants also are three. They quite neglect the fact that there might be a thousand such letters for one sign might be attached to TV But if they
;
.

say that each of these three

is

equal to two of the other letters,

and no other

and if the cause is that there are three parts of the mouth and sigma is applied singly to each, it is for
is

so,

this reason that there are

only three, not because the concords

are three; since as a matter of fact the concords are

more
25

than three, but of double consonants there cannot be more.

These people are

like the old

Homeric

scholars,

who

see small
there are

resemblances but neglect great ones.

Some say that

many ^
^

such cases, e.g. that the middle strings are represented by nine and eight ^ and that the epic verse has seventeen
1093" 28 read rwa on ttoXXo. ratios corresponding to the fourth and the to 6 and 9 to 6.
-

The

fifth

are respectively 8

1093^
30 syllables,

METAPHYSICA
which
is,

is

equal in

number

to the

two

strings

and
and

the scansion

in the right half of the line nine syllables,

1093'' in the left eight.

And

they say that the distance in the

is
^,

letters

from alpha to omega

equal to that from the lowest note of

the flute to the highest

5

and that the number of

this

note

is

equal to that of the whole system of the heavens.

We

must
such

observe that no one could find difficulty either

analogies or in finding

in stating

them

in eternal things, since

they can

10

be found even in perishable things. But the lauded characteristics of numbers and their contraries, and generally the mathematical relations, if we view them as some do, making them causes of nature, seem to escape us for none of them is a cause in any of the senses that have been distinguished in reference to the first principles.^ Yet if mathematical objects be conceived as these thinkers conceive them, evidently goodness is predicable of them, and the odd, the
;

straight, the equal, the potencies of certain

numbers, are

in the

catalogue
15

of the beautiful.
;

For the seasons and a particular

number go together
lect

and the other agreements that they colfrom the theorems of mathematics all have this meaning.* Hence they are like coincidences. For they are accidents, but
For
in

the things that agree are appropriate to one another, and one by

analogy.
20

each category of being an analogous term

line
is

is

found
face,

as the straight

in length, so is the

plane in sur-

perhaps the odd in number, and the white in colour. Again, it is not the ideal numbers that are the causes of musical phenomena and the like (for equal ideal numbers differ from one another in form so for even the units do) that we need not assume Ideas for this reason at least.
; ;

These, then, are the results of the theory, and yet more
25

might be brought together. The

fact that our

opponents have

much
in
j i

trouble with the generation of ideal numbers and can

no

way make
say,

a system of them, seems to indicate that the

principle s.

objects of mathematics are not separable from sensible thin gs,

as
^

some

and that t hey are not the

3

first

2 *

1093^ 3 omit vtaTr\v. Cf. A. I, 2.

So perhaps Alexander.
Cf. note

Sc. that numerical relations are

found

in things,

on A. 986^ 23. but are not the cause

of anything that happens.

; ;

INDEX
o 93'>=
a privative, its

looo*

1093^

meanings 22
3,

32.

61* 29; )( qualification 982* 27, 30* 33, 77^ 10. Accident, accidental A. 30, E. 2, 3, K. 8, 7*15,22-^16. 13^34-14*21, 15** I7> 17*7? 27^33; notknowable 26'' 3, 64^ 30, 65* 4 its cause matter 27* 13; twofold 31^ 22 the same by accident 37^ 6 nothing accidentally perishable 59* I )( essential 65^ 6. Action, concerned with individuals " 981* 17 ; )( motion 48* 18.
Abstraction
36^
23,
; :
;

16, 9* 27, 12* 26, 63^ 26-30, 20, 31, 72* 5, 75^ 8, 79'' 20, 9i*ii; quoted 7^ 25, 9^ 25, 56^^28. Anaximander 69^ 22 ; referred to

991*
69I'

52^ 10,
30,

53*^ 16.
;

Anaximenes 984*

5 referred to 988* 996* 9, 53^ 16. Antisthenes 24^ 32 hisschool 43'' 24.
;

Appearance

{(f)aiv((Tdai, fpain-aaia.) T.

5,6, 980^ 26, 70* Archytas 43* 22. Aristippus 996* 32

10.

Cf.

Image.

referred to 78*

33Aristotle, references to
;

Actuality (Jvipyna) 6. 6-9, K. 9; )( potency 3* i, 7^ 28, 69^ 16, 71* 6, ** 22 ; coni. substance, form,

An. Post. Phys- 983* 33, 25* 34 (?), 37'' 8 985* 12, 986I' 30, 988* 22, 993* 1 1, 42^ 9 ?), 49^ 36, 59 34, 62> 3 1 (?),
(

43* 18, 2, 51^31, 7i 25, 28, 31,50*16, 1^ 21, 8 ). matter 43* 6, 45* 35, 7 differs with different 76* 10 matter 43* 12 the actual identical with the potential 45'' 21 ; coni. complete reality (fWeXex**") 47* )( knowledge 48^ 15.; 30, 50* 23 coni. action 50* ){ motion 48'' 28 23 ; God's actuality pleasure 72^ ^ 16; actual, syn. individual 14*21. Addilale numbers M. 6-8. Affection, modification (Trd^os), its meanings A. 21 )( substance 983''
definition, essence
10,
>
; ; ; ; ; ;

42^

73*5{?).32(?),76*9,86*23;

De

Coelo 9:86* 12 (?), 989* 24 (?), 73* 5(?),32(?),86*23(?), 88^24;/?/? Gen. et Corr. 989* 24 (?), 42^ 9 (?), 62'' 31 (?), 86* 23 (?) Met. A. 995> 5,996i>8,i4,997''4,59*i9; B.993* 76b I, 77* I, 86* 26, 4*32, l-^ 10, 34(?),^i5; r. 45b 32 (?j; A. 26 34, 28* 4. II, 46* 5, 49^ 4, 52* 15.
;

55*2,^7,

56*'

35; E.2534(?);Z.

10, 985'' n, 38'' 2ZyJfi^-T\ coni. states 986* 17, 20* 19; coni. acci-

movements 989^ 3, 7^^ i substratum 49* 29; essential, proper affections 4^ 6, 58*37, ^ 22, 78* 16; change in respect of 69^ 12. Alcmaeon 986* 26.
dents,
)(

42* 4, 18, 20, 43^^ 16, 45 7 (?), ^32(?),49''27,53*i7;H.37*2o(?), 39*22(?); e. 17^9,21*20,27^29, 88b 24 (?) ; K. 25 34 (?) ; A. 27* 19, 37'' I3(?),6436, 78'' 5 (?) M. 37* I3(i>), 42* 22(?), 90* IS, 28; N. 37* I3(?), 42* 22(?), 7^ 5(?), 86* 30; Eth. Nic. 981'' 25 lost works 986* 12 (?), 4* 2, ^ 34,
;

54'' 30.

Arithmetic 982* 28, 5* 31, 90* 14

arithmetical

All {iravra), coni. total 24* 8. Alteration 989* 27, 42=* 36, 69^ 12. 88* 32. Analogy 43* 5, 48* 37, i* 7, 89'' 3, 93^ 19; the same by 16^ 32, 18* 13, 70* 32, ^ 17, 71* 4, 26, 93'' 18. Anaxagoras 984* 11-16, ^ 18, 985* 18-21, 988* 17, 28, 989* 30-b 21,

Art 980'' 28

number 83'* 16. comes by experience

; ;

981* 3 ; )( science 981'' 26 )( exgeneraperience 981* 25, ''8, 31 tion by art, reason, potency, spontaneity Z. 7, 8, 25' 22, 34* 9 ; comes by form 34* 2^ 70* 15 learning 46'' 37, 47^*33 ; )( nature

; ;

INDEX
32* 12, 70* 6, 17 architectonic arts 13* 14. Assertion, syn. afifirmation 8** 4-^ i,
;

)( affirmation, syn. contact 5 1^ 24.

62^24;

Astronomy 989^
998^
6,

33,

997^
5,

53^ 10, 73^

^T

1 6, 2.

35,

Attribute ) ( substance 99 5^ 20, 3** 2 5 Axioms 996^ 26, 5^ 20, ^ 34, 90* 36.
Beautiful, syn.
)(

good

78"*

good 13* 22, 91* 31 an original prin31

; ;

ciple 72^ 32.

Becoming, v. Generation. Being (ov) A. 7, 19^ 5, 28*

21, 42^ 26,
;

10, 30*

45^ 32, 61* 8, 78"* 30, 89"^ 6 not a genus 998'' 22, 45^ 6 and unity I. 2, 986^ 15, 998^ 22, 40b 16, 45^ 6, 53^ 33, 1=^ 5, 3^^ 22, being ^ua being, in general, 25 without qualification )( particular being r. 1-2, E. i 60^ 3 1 accidental being E. 2, 3, I7' 7 being in as truth E. 4, 0, 10, 65* 21 full sense 27^ 31, 51^ I primary being, substance 28=* 14, 30; being of a thing 29^ 22, 52^ 11, 75^ 5 being not the substance of things i 5, 40^ 18; completely real )( material 78* 30; non-being /.$ nonbeing 3^10; subjectofsophistic26^ 14 as falsity E. 4, e. 10 source of becoming 62^ 26, 69^ 18 three kinds 69^ 27; ambiguous 89*16; proof of its reality (Platonic) 89*^ I. Between, v. Intermediate.
; ;

984* 22, 69^ 36 from opposite to opposite or intermediate 11'' 34, 57* 21, 31, 69^ 3; contraries do not change 69^7; coni. non-being, substratum, matter, potency ID* 15, 42*33, 69^ 14, 24; four kinds 42^32, 69^ 9, 72^ 8 changeable substance 69^ 3. Complete A. 16, 23* 35 def. 55* 1 1 said to proceed from incomplete 72^ 34, 92* 13. Compound (avvOeTov) 23* 3I, I, 29^ 23, 43^ 30, 75^ 8, 881^ 16. Concrete (crvvokov) 995^ 34, 999* 33, 29* 5, 35^ 20, 37* 26, 30, T]^ 9. Contact 2* 34, 14^ 22, 68^ 27, 70* syn. intuitive 10, 82* 20, 85* 3 thought 51^ 24, 72^ 21. Contiguous 69=* I. by nature, Continuous, def. 69* 5 art, force 16* 4, 23^^ 34, 40^ 15 in one, two, three dimensions 61''' 33;
; ; ; ; ;
;

Broad and narrow (Platonic)

12, 88^
8.

992^^

Callippus 73^ 32. Categories 4* 29, 17* 23, 24''' 13, 26* 36, 27^31, 28* 13, 33, 29^ 23, 34^ 10, 51a 35, 55a I, s8a 14, 70^ I, 88* 30, 89* 27, ^ 24. Cause A. 2, 13* 16, ^ 9, 26* 16; philosophy a study of first causes 981^ 28 of all causes? 995^ 6, 996* 18 primary 983* 25, 3* 31 proximate 44^ i four causes 983* 26, 70^ 26 formal = final 44^ I efficient 70^ 26 causes not infinite in number a, 2, 74* 29 cause of accident accidental 27* 8, 65* 6 ; generable without being generated E. 3. v. End, Essence, Final, Form, Formula, Matter, Motive, Principle.
;
; ;

continuity )( form 16'' 9. Contradiction, law of r. 3-6, K. 5, 6; no intermediate r. 7, 55^^ I, 69* 3 )( privation, contrariety 55^ I. Contrary I. 4, 5, 7, 13^ 12, 18^ 25, 54* 25, ^ 31, 58^ 26, 92* 2 contraries said to be principles of being 986* 22, ^ I, 4^ 30, 75* 28, 2,j^ 30 knowledge of them one 996* 20, 61* 19, 78^ 26 reducible conto one principle 4* i, ^ 27 trariety )( difference, otherness, contradiction, privation 4* 20, 54^ one of two contraries 32, 55^ I always privative 4^ 27, li^ 18, 55^ 14, 27, 61* 20, 63^ 17 contraries incompatible li^ 17, 63^ 26; coni. negation 12*9; contraconriety in substance 18^ 3 not traries have same form 32'' 2 produced from, compounded of, affected by one another 44^25, 57^ 22, 69^ 7, 75* 30; contrariety greatest, complete difference 55* one term one con4, 16, 58* II trary 55* 19; contraries relative 56^ 36 intermediate composed which contraof contraries I, 7 rieties make difference of species
;
; ;
;

I.

sensible contrarieties 61* 32 in place 68'' 29 contraries in)( opposite 69^ 4

12,
*>

9 61*

prime contrarieties
5,

in

being

13
;

Change, by something to something

volve matter 75^ 22, 87^

i.

INDEX
mter-earth 9S6*
12.

Dyad
30*

(two), indefinite 987'' 26, 33,

Coupled term

(avvSfbvaa-fievop)

16, 31'' 6, 43" 4Cratylus 987* 32, 10* 12.

Definition Z. 10, 11, H. 6, 31* 2, 43* starting-point of discussion 21 12* 22, ^ 7 coni. essence 30* 7,
; ;

988* 13, 8i 14. 22. ^ 21, 32, 82* 85I' 13, ^ 30, 83^ 36, 7, 87^ 7, 88" 28,89*35,91*5; ideal 36'' 14, 81* the 23, ^ 27, 82" 9, 12, 20. 22 first number 999* 8, 85" 10, gS'' 9.
;

Egypt 981"
75^
15.

23.

not of the concrete and sensible 36* 2, 39'' 28 ; of the universal 36" 28 ; why one Z. 12, \l. 6; definition by division 37^ 28 scieniific 39^ 32 no Idea detinable 40* 8 coni. number 43^ V. Formula. 34, 45^ 7. Democritus 985^ 5-20, 9^ 27, * il, 15. 39* 9> 42^ 12, 69*' 22, 78^ 20
; ; ; ;

31*11, 44* 2

Eleatics referred to 986" 10, i*

Element A.

3,

M.

10,

989*

4,

992"

19,

referred to 84'' 27.

Demonstration 992*' 31 principles of 993i> 28, 996^ 26, s*" 9, II, 13,
;

18, 22,

62^ 3

not everything de;

monstrable 997^ 7, 6* 8, II* 13 essence not demonstrable 25^ 14, 64* 9; sensible things not demonstrable 39^ 28 demonstration of necessary truths 39'' 31 absolute and ad hominem 62* 2 demonstrative science 997* 5-30.
; ;

1*18, 59" 23, 88" 4; whether only potential 2" 33; coni. principle, cause 41" 31, 70" 25, 87*2,91*31 four elements (Empedocles) 984* 8, 985* 32,998*30 ;of Ideas 987" 19, Empedocles 984* 8, 985* 2-10, 21-" 4, 988* 16, 27, 989* 20-30, 993* 17, 996* 8, 998* 30, o* 24" 20, I* 12, 69" 21, 72* 6, 75" 2, 91" II quoted o* 29, " 2, 6, 14, 9" 17, 14" 37; referred to 4" 33, 50" 24 (?, 53" 15,92^7.
;

End, syn.
13*
33>

shape 51*15.

cause 994" 9, 16, 59* 37, 74"^ 3; coni. 23* 34; coni. actuality
final

Epicharmus lo*

Destructible, destruction 994^* 6, o*

5,

22, 27, ^ 25, 27^ 29. 42* 30,

67I' 15. 44^ 36, 59* I, 24, '' II, 70* 15.

43^ 69* 31,

Dialectic 987'> 33, 995'' 23, 4* 17,

6, 86* 16. Equal, def. 2i* 12, 56* 22, 82'' 7 how opposed to great and small I. 5 syn. one (Plato) 87" 5. Equivocal, equivocation 3* 34, 30* 32, 35" 25, 46* 6, 6o> 33, 86" 26.
;

78^ 25. Diflferentia, difference 985'' 13,998'' 23, 4* 13, 20* 11, 35, 2, 15,

Eristic 12* 19.

42 16;

its meanings 18* 12; )( otherness, contrariety 4* 20, 54'' 23- 55** 4> 16, 58* II; opposite, prior, contrary differentiae 16*25, 57^ 6, 1 1 ; generic, specific 18* 26, 54^ 28, 58* 7 definition by 42^ 32,
;

Error )( ignorance 52* 2. Essence (W j]v tlvaC) z. 4-6, 8, 993* 18, 994"i7,25"29. 38"i4, 45"3; coni. definition 30^ 7 coni. form
;

33'' 5-

Eternal 987" 16, 15" 14, 50" 7, 51* 20 ; eternal sensible substance 69*
31, " 25
;

necessity of an eternal

43* 19 what makes it 1. 9 matter does not make it 58** 6 first differences 61^ 14; of numbers, units M. 6-8; three differences
;
; ;

(Democritus) 985^ Diogenes 984* 5.

13, 42'* 12.

substance A. 6; time eternal 71" 7 eternal things, whether composite 88" 14; ungenerated 91* 12. Eudoxus 991* 17, 73" 17, 79" 21.
;

Disposition :l. 19. Divine, the 26* 20, 64=* 37 not jealous 982^ 32 encloses the universe 74^ 3 visible divine bodies 26^ 18 the divinest knowledge 983^ 5Division, mathematical 994^ 24, 2* 19, ^ 3, 10, 48^ 16, 60b 14, 19; logical n"^ 28.
;
;

Eurytus 92*^ lo. Even (Pythagorean) 986*

9,

18, 990* 91* 24. Evenus 15* 29. Evil, none apart from particular bad things 51* 17 none among eternal things 51* 20; said to be a first principle 75* 35, 91" 34 ;
;

caused by 984^ 32.

2

strife

(Empedocles)

INDEX
Excess and defect 992* 6, 4* 12, 42^ 25, 35, 52^ 30, 57'* 13, 87^
18.

'From', its meanings A. 24, 991^ 994* 22, 44* 23, 92* 32. Full (Democritus) 985^ 5, 9^ 28.

19,

Experience 980^ 29 art 981* I, '^ 31

coni. science,

=
its

knowledge

of individual facts 981^ 15.

Falsity, def. 11^ 25; non-being A. 29
;

meanings,

sense of e. 10; )( impossia first principle bility 47^ 14 (Plato) 89* 20. Female sex. coni. matter 24^ 35 not a species I. 9. Final cause (ov tvaca) 983* 31, 994'' ^ 26, 44"^ I, 50a 7, 9, n"" 21, 33, 59* 36, 72^ 2. V. End.
in
falsity

E.

4,

Generation, is of the concrete thing 42a 43b Z. 8, 981a 17^ 34b 7^ 30, 21, 69b 35, 70^ 15; 17, 44^ posterior in generation, prior in nature, form, substance 989* 15, 50=^ 4, 77^ 27 two types 994''* 22 from non-being, matter, privation, contraries, the potential 994^ 27, 32^ 20, 33^ 9, 55^ II, 62b 26, 69b 91b of something 18, 88^ 17, 34
; ; ;

from
24,

something by something
24,
;

999^ 6, lo* 21, 32^1 13, b 31, 33a 49b 28 by nature, art, 44b
spontaneity Z. 7, 9 )( making 32* 26 the generated must be divisible 33b 12, 49b from a member 35 of the same species 34* 21, 49^ absolute and partial 29, 70=^ 5 42b 67b 22, 69b 10, 88*^ 33. 7,
;

First,

its

meanings

28''

31.

v.

\:

Primary. Form, things referred to by naming more real than, their form 35* 8
;

cause of, matter 29=^5, 41^ 7; coni. essence 32^^ i, 33^ 5, 35^ 32; syn. shape 999^ 17, IS'' 6, 17^ 25, 33^ = 52* 23, 60=^ 22, ^ 26 5, 44^ 22, art 34''' 24, 7o'>' 1 5 not generated 34^ 7, 42a 30, 43I' 17, 44^ 21, 69^ 35, yo^ 15; coni. definition, formula 16^ 9, 35*^ 21, 36*^ 28, ^ 5, 42* 28, 43'-' 19, 44^ 12, 69^ Z2>, 84^ 10; syn. substance 32^ i, 41^ 8, 50^ 2, 84^ 10 syn. positive state 44^ 33 )( )( becoming 50^ 4 matter 50* 15, 70* I, 84^ 10 )( privation 44^ 33, 70^ 12 its parts v. Shape, Species. Z. 10, II.
;
;

Genus

A. 28, 54^ 30, 57* 26, ^ 38, 59^ 27 proximate, ultimate 995b 998b 16, 999* 31, 23=^ 27, 29, 59b 27; whether 34'"^ I, 37^
;

30,

genera are
21,

first

principles
14,

14b

II,

42=^

69*

998* 28;

part of species 23^ 24 ; coni. definition, difi'erentia, species Z.

998b 5, 13-999=^ 23, 14b 10, 16* 24, b 32, 22*^ 27, 23b 18, 37b 59I' 54b 57b 39'' 36
12,
19,

26,

27,

7,

Forms (Platonic), v. Ideas. Formula (Xdyo?) 987'' 31,

;

l&^ 33, b ^ 26, 9, 28^ 34, 42* 28, 43* 19, 47 34j 50^ 33 principles in the formula of the essence 996* I is one 998^ 12 )( word, coni. definition 6^ I, 30^ 7; parts of Z. 23b 23, 33* 2; 10, II, 16* 35, prior in 18^ 31, 28* 32, 38^ 27,
;

being and unity not genera 998'' 45b 6 is matter of species 22, other in genus 24 8, 38* 6 24b 9 ; )( universal 28^ 34 not
; ; ;

substantial Z. 13, 42' 21, 53^ 21 otherness of the genus 58"* 7.

Geometry

983=^ 20, 9928' 21, 997^ 6ib 27, 998^ 2, S^ II, 31, 51'' 21, 3, 78=^ 25, 89^ 21. God, a first principle gS^'^S His life
;

49i>

II, 54'^ 28, 77^1,78* 10; )( concrete individual, matter 39^20, 74a 58i> 10, 17, 64* 23, 34 separfinal cause 44'' I able in 42* 29 = efficient 70^ 30 coni. science 46^ 7, 59b 26 analysis of 63^ 18 indicause as formula 70* 22 visible in formula, in time, 84'' one in formula, in number 1 5 ; 87b 12.
; ;

72b 14; identified with the One by Xenophanes 986^ 24 gods 74b the in human form 997^ 10, 5 stars held to be gods 74^ 2. Good, syn. final cause 983* 31, 59^^ 36; syn. beautiful 13^ 22, 91*^31 )( apparent good 13^ 27; how a first principle 75'^ 12, 38; whether beautiful 78* 31 )( discussed by mathematics 78* 31 ;
;
;

Friendship (Empedocles) 985*3,24, 988*33,0'^ II.

related to first principles Idea of 996* 28. 30, 92* 9 Great and small, how opposed to

how
91a

; ;

INDEX
equal I. 5; (Plato) ^7^ 20, 26, 988* 26, 992* 12, 998^ 10, 83*> 23, 32 kinds of 992* 1 1, 85* 9.
;

Ircomposite entities 51^

Increase
69>

17, 27.

42*

35

)(

diminution

11,88*32.

Habit, having, state (tlu) A. 20, 986^ 17, 15^34, 44^ 33. 46* 13, 70* 12 )( privation 55** 13. Harmonics 997 '^ 21, 77=* 5, 78* 14, 93^ 22.
;

Have, hold, its meanings A. Hearing 980^ 23. Heaven, only one 74* 31.
Heraclitus 984*
;

23.

7, 987* 33, 5* 25, lo 13, 12* 24, 34, 62 32, 63^ referred to 989* 2, 25, 78^ 13

Individual (oro^or) 995^ 29, 999* 12 ; {Koff fKaarof) action concerned with individuals 981* 17; there anything apart from is individuals ? 999* 26, 6o 3 ; syn. numerically one 999^ 33 ; are the first principles individual ? M. 10, 3* 7, 71* 20; syn. actual 14* 21 ; prior in order of perception 18^ 33 ; (to8 Ti) 30* 5, 70* V. * This'. 10.
Indivisible {abiaiptTov) I. quantity, in kind 999* 3,
I
;

in

i^'iS. Hermotimus 984'' 19.

996*9,

14* 27,

16* 19, 21
84''
;

in formula, in
lines,

time

Hesiod 989* 10, o* 9 referred to 983^ 28 quoted 984'' 23. Hippasus 984* 7.
;

15

{aro^ov)

magni-

Hippo 984*

3.
;

Homer

9* 28

quoted 76*

4.

984* 14. Hot, the (Pannenides) 987* i. Hypothesis )( necessary principle

5^ 15-

Homoeomerous

tudes 992* 22, 83'' 13, 84** I species, form 998^ 29, 34* 8, 58* 18; indivisible in genus 18^ 6. Induction )( demonstration, definition 992^ 33, 48* 36; used 25*

Ideas (Platonic) A. 6, 9, B. 6, Z. 6, 988b 1, 997b 2, 999 6, 14, M. 4, 5, 36b 13, 30, I* 4, 28^ 20, S3^ 27, 42^ II, 59* 10, 70* 27, 73 18, 75^ 18, 76* 31, 83^ 34, 86 31, ^ 14,90* 16,^20, 91'' 28; elements of 987^ 19; of negations 990'' 13, 79* 9; of relations 990^ 16, 79* 12; of manufactured objects coni. 991^ 6, 60^ 28, 70* 14 numbers 991^ 9, 76=* 20, So^ 12, 22, 81* 21, 83'' 3, 86* 4, 88^ 34, 90'' 33, 35, 91* 26 participable 990^ 28, 40^ 27 eternal sensibles 997^ 12 ; as causes 33^ 26 how related 39^ 4 ; indefinable 40* 8 transcendent 40* 9, 86* 33 xmiversal 42* 15, 86* 33. Ignorance )( falsity, error 52* 2. Iliad, an artificial unity 45* 13. Image {(fxitTaafta) ggo^ 14, 79* il.
;

54^33,55*6, ^ 17,58*9,64* Socratic 78^ 28. as subInfinite, the a. 2, K. 10 stance and principle 987* 16, 990* composed of great and 9> 4^ 33 small 987'' 26 ; causes not infinite in number a. 2, 74* 29; not thinkable 994'' 22, 30, 999* 27; by addition 994^ 30 how potential 48^ 9 ; has no separate existence 48^ 1 5 ; infinite regress 994* ^ 4, o'' 28, 6* 9, 10* 22, 3, 8, 20, 12* 12, ^ 22. 22 9, 30'* 35, 32* 33I' 4, 41^ 22, 60* 36, 70* 2, 3, 74* 29 ; no infinite magnitude 73* 10; whether number is in15.
;

finite

83**

36; principles
)(

infinite
13.

in

number (Anaxagoras) 984*

sensible

Intelligible

990*

31,

999b 2, 36* 3, ID, 45* 34Intermediate, def. 57* 21, 68^ 27; no intermediate between contra55b I, 69* dictories ii'>23, 12* I, composed of contraries I. 7 3 Platonic 9S7* 16.
;
;

Appearance. Imitation (Pythagorean)

V.
;

987** 11.
47'' 14.

Imperishable I. 10, 40'* 31. Impossible 19^ 22 )( false ' In,' its meanings 23* 24. Inaddible numbers M. 6-8.
Incapacity,
29.
its

Intuition (yoi/o-tr), coni. sensation, v. Thinking. definition 36* 6. Italian school 987* 10-31, 988* 26. ' Itself,' used to signify Ideas 40^ 34-

Knowledge, desired by all 980* 21 springs from sensation 980* 28

15,

meanings 19^

46*

)( art 981^26; theoretical, productive, practical 982* I, * 9, 993^

; ;

INDEX
pure, applied, 20, 25^ 21, 46^ 2 superior, ancillary 982^ 15, 30, ^ 4, 27, 996^ 10; its highest
;

many of one species 2^ 14; whether substances M. 1-3, 42^* II, 69^ 35 not separable 59"^
90^ 27
;

object 982^ I, 996^* 13 divinest knowledge 983* 5

;

the is of

causes 983* 25, 993^ 23, 994^ 29, 25^ 6 not of the sensible or accidental Z. 15, 987'* 34, 26^ 3, 27a 20, 64b 65a 30, 5, ^f' 35 knowledge of contraries one 996"^ 20, 61^ 19, 78^ 26; is of species, form998^7, 31^6, 35a'8; )( sensation 999^ 3 of universals, individuals 994^ 21, 3^ 14, 59^ 26, 60^ 20, 86^ 6, 87a 15; one science
;
;

mathematical matter 992^ 2, 59^ 16; language 995* 6, 80^^ 26; parts of mathematics 4*^ 7.; mathematical sciences )( producmathematical number tive 64* I
13
; ;

one genus 3^ 10, 55^* 31; )( opinion 8^ 28, 30, 39'*' 33 prior in 18^ 30, 28''^ 32, 38^ 27(?); ratiocinative 25^ 6; not of matter 36^ 8 coni. formula 28=^ 32, 46^ 7, 59^ 26 )( actuality 48^ 15 how a measure of objects 57^ 9 its two meanings 87^ 15.
to
; ;

985'' 4, 71^ 32, 72^* 7; referred to 84^ 27. Like, def. 18* 15, 218' 11, 54^ 3; said to be known by like o^ 5. Limit, its meanings A. 17 of bodies 2^ 10, 60^ 16 (Pythagorean) 987'
;
;

Leucippus

M. 6, 76* 20, 86'' 5. Matter H. 3, 4, 983^ 7-984^ 18, 998'' 23,15^8, 17=^3,42^*25, 58^6,14; def. 29^ 20 syn. substratum 983=* 29, 985^ ID, 988''' 12, 992^ 1, 22=* 18, 24''8, 42*26, 32,^9, 61^22, 70^*11; a principle 983^ 7, 986^ 17, 46^ 23 )( formula, form, complete reality, actuality 986^ 20, 29^ 5, 35* 8, 38^ 45a 6, 41' 7, 43^ 6, 35, 50^ 15,70'' 1, 71^ 21, 74=^ 34, 76=^ 9, 78=* 30, 84^ 9 coni. female sex 24^^ 35 genus matter of species 24^ 8, 38=^ 6 coni. motion 26* 3 cause of accident 27* 13; whether substance Z. 3, 42=^ 27, 49^ 36, ']']^ 36 necessary, to explain generation and change 32* 17, 42=^ 32, 44^ 27, 69^ 3 parts of matter )( of defini;
; ; ;

tion Z. 10, II ; unknowable in itself 36*^ 8 sensible )( intelligible 36^ 9, ^ 36, 45^ 34 indefinite 37''
; ;

15,990^8,4^33.
Line 2*
5,

16'^ 26, 36''

12,
i
; ;

perceptible lines 998=* posed of points 1^ 18

line

43^ 33 not com;

27, 49^^ I ; coni. potency 39^ 29, 42^ 27. ^ 10, 49^ 23, 50** 15, 60*^ 21, 69" 14, 70^ 12, 7i' 10, 88^ I,

indivisible

992^ 22, 84^

I.

Logic {avaKvriKo) 5^ 4. Love (Parmenides) 984^ 24, 988^

34.

Luck

981^ 5, 984^ 14, 32'* 29, 65* 30 generation by nature, art, spontaneity, luck Z. 7, 49^ 3,
[rvxr])
;

70!* 6.

Lycophron 45^

10.

Magi 91^ 10. Making )( generation

thinking 32^ 15. Male and female I.
9.

32^^

26;

)(

92* 3 not perishable 42^ 30 matter for locomotion, generation, &c. 42* 34, ^ 6, 69^5 26 actuality proximate varies with it 43'' 12 matter 44=^ 18 )( substratum 44^ proximate matter = shape 45^^ 9 18; of mathematical objects 992^ 2, 59^ 16; different things have different matter69^25 individual involved in appearance 70* 10 in contraries 75^ 22, 87^ i. Measure,def. of unity 52^ 18, 87^33; accurate, homogeneous with thing measured, indivisible 52^ 36, 53*
; ;

25, 88* 2
;

how knowledge
;

is

Many

one 1. 3, 6, 87^^ 28 )( much 56^ 1 5 matter of the one 75*^ 33 and few (Platonic) 87^ 16. Mathematics 981^ 24, 985^ 24, 992^
)(
; ;

measure 57* 9
Megaric school

man the measure

ofallthings53*36,62^I4, 19,63*4.
46^^ 29.

32, 996* 29, 4* 9, 26* 7, 9, 12, 19, 61^28, 1' 32, 64^ 32, 77^^18, 78*^33; mathematical objects )( perceptible 989^ 32, 990* 15, 36^4; )( Ideas B. 6, 28'* 20, 76^^ 20, 83^^ 23,

Melissus 986'' 19. Memory 980* 29. Middle, excluded r.

7.

Mind

9, 70* 26; in nature 984'' 15 human 993^ 11, 75* 7 )( art, potency -2.^ 32
(i/oOy)

A.

7,
;

; ;;

;; ;

INDEX
acts by contact 72^ 21 ; divinest of things 74'' 16 ; (Anaxagoras)
16, 989^ 15, 17, 6g^ 31; (Parmenides) 9^ 23. Mixture 989^2, 42^29, 82*21, 92* 24. Monists 986'' 21.

tion 56* 17, 29 ; Ideas of negations 99o' 13, 79* 9.

984*'

Non-rational potencies 46^

4, SO** 33-

2,

48*

Number M, 6-9,
57* 3
;

N. 1-3,

5, 6,

20* 13,

Motion
matter
)(

((cuijcrir),

coni.

sensation,
3,

989'* 32, 26*

36^ 29

rest 4'* 29, 10* 36, 12^ 23, 25^ 21, 49^ 8 ; coni. activity, action 2o* 20, 22* 7, ^ 5, 23* 18 ; coni.

nature

)( actuality

20 )( action 48'' 18 eternal 49^ 48^ 28 simple, continuous, 35, 71^ 7, 33 unresting, uniform motion 53* 9,
25''
;

7i'>io, 72* 21, 78* 13.

Motion, spatial {<t>opa} 69** 12, 26, 72^ 5 the first kind of change 72^ 8, 73* 12 simple 73* 29; of
; ;

the planets A.

8.

Motive cause

A. 3, 4, 983* 30, 984* 996b 7^ 13b g^ 24, 70* 27, 988^ 27,

21 ; necessity of 991^ 5, 80* 4 prior to the moved 10^ 37, 7o 21

unmoved prime mover

A. 7, 12''
;

numerical ratio 985^ 32, 991^ 13, 17, 19, 993= 17, 1*30. 53* said to be 16, 61^ I, 92^ 14, 31 limited by ten 986* 8, 73* 20, 84* elements, attributes, genera1 2 tion of number 986=* 17, 4^ 10, 84* 28,87^' 14, 89''l2, 90*21, 91*23, 28; numbers as principles, substances 985' 26, 986* 17, 987* 19, ^ 24, I* 25, ^ 26, 36'' 12, 76* 31, 8o 13, 83* 23, 9<^ 3, 21, 92^ 16, 26; prime numbers 987^ 34 ; sensible )( intelligible, ideal 990* 32, 90** 35 coni. Ideas 991^ 9, 76* 20, So** 12, 81* 7, 21, 83" 3. 86* 4.. 88* 34, 90* 16, ^ 33, 91* 26; wherein does its unity consist? 992* I, 44* 2, 45* 7 numerical unity 999'' 25, 32, 16^ 31, 18* 13, 33^ 31. 39* 28, 54* 34, 60^ 29, 87I' 12;
; ; ;

31 ; fire a motive cause 984^* 6 the self-mover (Platonic) 72* I. Mutilated A. 27. M)th 982* 18, 983^ 29, 995* 4, o 9, 18, 71^ 27, 74^ I, 4, 75^ 26, 91* 34.

unity the origin

and measure

of

number

le**

18, 52'' 24;

quality,

differentia of number M. 6-8, 20^ 3 ; coni. definition 43** 34, 45*

Nature,

its

meanings

A. 4

)(

habit,

spontaneity, luck, thought 981'* 4, 32* 12, 65* 27, 7o> 30, 71b 35; not the )( generation 989* 15 syn. whole of reality 5* 34 matter 14^ 33, 24* 4 ; )( force 15^ that which 15, 52* 23, 71^ 35 contains its principle of motion in itself 14^ 18, 25*' 20, 49^ 8, 70^ 8; by nature )( to us 29* 7; )( art 32 12, 70* 7, 17; syn. form, complete reality, positive state 32* 24, 44^ 9, 70=' II the only substance in destructible things 43^ 23 )( potency 49^ 8 ; natural objects, bodies, substances 28b ID, 42=^ 7, 7o 5, I4> 19, 33, 90* 32 )( unnatural 33^ 33. its meanings Necessity, def. 6*> 31 26^ 28, 64^ 33 necessary, its meanings A. 5, 72^ 1 1 ; )( usual, accidental 25=* 15, 18, 20, 26^ 28, 64^ 33 objects of demonstration necessary truths 39** 31. Negation )( privation 4* 12 coni. contrariety 12* 9 privative nega; ; ;

7 ; addible )( inaddible M. 6-8 mathematical, arithmetical number 76* 20, 80* 21, 31, '' 13, 83b 3, 16, 86* 5, 90*' 34, 91* 24 ; related as prior and posterior 80* 12;

number composed

of abstract units 39* 13, 80*' 19, 30, 82'' 6, 83^

16; infinite or finite? 83'' 36; powers of two 84^ 6 )( formula 87^ 12 one not a number 88* 6 numerical succession 85* 4 square, cube 93* 7.
;
: ;

Odd
9,

(Pythagorean) 986* 18, 990*

91* 22. I. 1-3
; ;

One

its meanings A. 6, 52* one in many 990* 7, 13, 991* unity and being I. 2, 2, 40* 29 998** 22, I* 5, 3* 22, 40^ 16, 45* 6 not a genus 998* 22, 45^ 6; = in indivisible 999* 2, 41* 19 quantity', species, number, genus, by analogy 999* 2, * 25, 32, 16*

17

31, 18* 13, 33> 31, 39* 28, 54* 34,

60'' 29,

87^ 12

unity of

common

reference, of succession, of common predicability, of meaning, 3* 6'* 15; one in continuity, 33, 5*11,

; ;

INDEX
origin and form, formula 16'' 9 measure of number 16'' 1 8, 52^24; the one not substance I. 2, 40^^ 18 unity of number and of definition Z. 12, H. 6, 992* I, 448' 3; the one a measure 52^ 18, 87^ 33; one and many I. 3, 6, 87^ 28 ; )( simple 72* 32 the many, matter of the one 75* 3^ o"^ by contact, mixture, &c. 82* 20 primary one 83* 25 in what sense a principle 84^ 18; one in formula, in number 87^ 12; not a number 888' 6;
;

K. 3

has distinct parts ^^

dialectic, sophistic

2,
4**

26*
17
;

%
:^

18;

)(

(Pythagoreans) 986* 20, 987* 18, (Eleatics) 986^ 15, i 89a 2; (Plato) M. and N. 33, passim, 987^ 21, 992* 8, I* 5 (Anaxagoras) 989^ 17.
27, 1* 10;
;

)( knowledge 8^ 28, 30, 39^ 33Opposition, its kinds A. 10, 54'* 24, 5 5* 38, 57* 33 change to opposites 11" 34, 57' 31, 69 4 opposite differentiae 16* 25 ; potency of opposites 50^ 8,30; opposite )( contrary 69^ 4. Order 984'' 15, 98 s'' 14 not in substance 38* 33. Other, def. 18* 9 its meanings 54^ 14; in species I. 8, 9, 18^ i; in otherness of the genus 24^ 9 genus 58* 7 otherness )( difference 54^ 23.

Opinion

&c. E. i\'% first philosophy 26* 24 the philosopher fond of myth 982^ 18 can speculate about anything 4* 34. Phrynis 993^ 16. Physics 986^ 14, 989^ 30, 990* 3, 7, 992^4, 995* 18, \^ 12, 5" 31, 34, ' I, 6* 2, 25^ 19, 26, 26* 5, 12, 37* 14, 16, 59^ 16, 61b 6, 28, 62^ 22, 26, 69* 36, 71^ 27, 75^ 27, 78^ 19. Place 92* 1 7 change of 42^ 34, 69^ 1 3. Planets A. 8. Plato A. 6, 9, 988* 26, 990* 6, 30, 9968' 6, ! 9, 19a 4, 28^ 19, 53^ I3j 83!* 32; referred to Z. 14, M, and 'H.passwi, 995^ 16, 997^ i, 998^ 9, i^ 19, 2* II, 12, 31* 30, 33^27, 34=* 2,44^8, 50^^35, 51^ 19, 59 10, ^ 3, 60^ 6, 69* 26, 70* 27, 71^ 15, 73'' 17, 75^ 19. 27; his works quoted, Hippias Minor 25* 6, Laws y2^ i (?), Phaedo 991^ 3, 80* 2, Phaedrtis 72* i (?), Sophistes 26^ 14, 30'* 25, 64^ 29, 89* 20, Theaetetus 10^ 12, Timaeus 19** 4 (?), 71^ 32, 72* 2. Platonists referred to M. and N. passim, 998* 7, 17, 28^ 15 (?), 24, 31a 31, 36^ 13, 40*' 2, 45a 16, 56=^ 69a 75a 32, l> 10,
theoretical, practical,
; ; ;

35,

37.

Plurality

Parmenides 984^
! 32
; ;

986^ i8-987a 2, quoted 984 25, 9^ 21, 89*

3,

20*
first

57"* 3, 8, 54'^ 22 ;

87^
)(

5,

91^ 34;
4'

def.
;

unity

10, 16

plurality 85^ 9.

referred to 4^ 32. 3 Part, its meanings A. 25, 34^ 32 parts of definition, of matter Z. 10,
II.

Participation 987^ 13, 991* 14, ^

5,

30^13, 31^18, 37^18, 45*18,^8, 79^ 18; Ideas participable 990^ 28, 40* 27, 79* 25.

Point 992^19,16^26,60^18,85^28. Polus 981a' 4. Position 985^ 15, 16'' 26, 22^ 2, 42^ 19, 77^ 30? 84!^ 26. Possible e. 4, 191^ 28. Potency, power, def. A. 12, e. 1-9; whether the elements exist in potency 2^ "ili potency or actu\

Pauson 50*
Perishable,

20.
v.

Destructible. Petitio principii 6* 17, 20.

ality prior e. 8, 3* I )( actuality 7^ 28, 69^ 16, 71* 6, ^ 22 ; power in geometry 19^ 33, 46* 7 )(
;
;

Pherecydes 91^ 9. Philosophy is knowledge desirable for its own sake, most accurate, communicable, most divine and honourable A. 2 starts from wonder 982^ 1 1 turned into mathematics 992* 32 is knowledge of the truth 993^ 20 treats of the axioms r. 3, K. 4, 995^ 8 treats of being as being r. i, 2,
; ;

reason, art, nature 25^ 22, 27^^ coni. 6, 33^ 8, 49^ 8, 64* 13 matter 39^ 29, 42'* 27, ^10, $d^ 15, eo^' 21, 69^* 14, 70^ 12, 71* 10,
;

irrational, rational I, 92=* 3 e. 2, 47^31, 50^33 the potential and the actual are one 45^21 in what sense the infinite and the void are potential 48^ 9 when a thing primary pois in potency G. 7
; ; ;
;
;

88^

; ;

INDEX
the potential not eternal qo^ 7; potency is of opposites 50 8, 30, 51* 6, 71^ 19. Practical knowledge 993^ 21, 25^

tency 49* 13

Primary 30*

10,

37

3,

75" 24

syn.

self-subsistent 31^ 14; substance 32* I ; coni. categories 34* 9. v.

14 ; pernegation, contrarietj', 4* 12, 55* 33 ; privative negation 56* 17, 29. Production, v. Generation. Productive knowledge 982* i, ^ li, 25^ 21, 25 ; )( mathematical
46'*
)(
;

13, 70'' 12 ; fect 55 35,

primary 6i 20

64a

I.

First.

Prime numbers 987^

Principle,

beginning
i
;

34. (apx^),

Proof, negative {^tyx'^^^ 6* 11. Protagoras r. 5, 6, K. 6, 998* 3, 7*

its

22, 47* 6, 53 35.

material 983* 7, 24, 9^4* 6, 986 17, 987* 4, 46* 23 ; efficient 984* 27, 46* 14, ^3, 49^* 7 70* 7. ^ 25 final 50* 7 formal 69* 28, 76* 24, 80^6, 32 God a first principle 983* 8 contrary principles 986* 22, ^ i, 4^ 31, 75* 28, 87* 30; principles of
; ; ;

meanings A.

Pythagoras 986* 30 f ?). Pythagoreans 9S5*> 23-986^ 8, 987* 13-27, i* II, 23, 31, 989'' 29-990* 29, 996* 6, i ID, 36^ 18, 53* 12, 72^ 31, 78b 21, 80^ 16, 31, 83^ 8referred 19, 90* 20-35, 91* '3. 23 to 998* 7 (?), 2 1 1, 4^ 31, 17b 20, 28'' 16, 75*36, ''28, 76* 17.
;

demonstration 993^ 28. 996^ 26, 5^9, II, 13, 18,22, 6 5, 62*3; a fiirst principle necessary a. 2; whether genera are first principles 998* 21, 42* 14: whether one in kind or in number ^V. 4-5, whether the 999^ 24, 60^ 29
;

Qua,

def. 65** 24.

Quality A. 14, 28* 15, 68* 19; of number 20* 3 ; definite 63* 27 change of 69^ 10; posterior to quantity 83* II. Quantity -^. 13; attributes of 20*
19
;

same

for things perishable

;

and

known by a measure
;

52''

imperishable o* 5 whether potential or actual 2^ 32 whether universal or individual M. 10, 3a 7, 60^ 20, 69* 26-30, 71* 20; of being as such r. i, E. i, K. i ; the simple a principle 59* 34; )f element 41^ 31, 70 25 in what sense unity is a principle 84^ 18 the principles, how related to the good 91* 30, 92* 11; infinity' of principles (Anaxagoras) 984* 13 ten (Pythagorean) 986* 22.
; ; ; ;

indefinite 63* 27 change of 69* 10 ; prior to quality 83* 1 1 ;

20

motion and

time

incidentally

quantitative 20* 29.

its meanings A, 11 ; in generation, nature 989* 15; in knowledge, formula, perception 18^ 30; in formula, knowledge, time 28*32, 38* 27(?j ; in formula, substance, time 49^ 1 1 ; in generation, form, substance 50* 4; in formula 54* 28, 78* 10; in formula, substance 77^ i ; no Idea of a class which includes prior and posterior members 999* 6 numbers related as prior and posterior 80^ 12. Privation 4* 12, 19^ 7, 58^27; its meanings A. 22, 46* 3 1 one of two contraries privative 4^ 27, 1 1** 18, 11^ 14, 27, 6i 20, 63b 17; )( state, form 19* 7, 44* 32, 55^

Prior,

Ratio (Aoyof) 985* 32, 991* 13, 17, 19. 993* 17, I* 30, 53 16, 61* I, 92* 14, 31Reality, realization, complete (ewXe'xfta) )( matter 38** 6, 78* 30 separates 39* 7 coni. substance 44* 9 ; )( actuality 47^ 30, 50* 23. Reason, v. Mind.
;

Relative, the A. 15, 56** 34, Sg** 7, 14 ; Ideas of 990* 16, 79* 12 ; )(

absolute 990'' 20 ; least substantial of the categories 88* 22, 30.

Same, the 995* 21, 2i 11 its meanings A. 9, 54* 32 in species l8> 7, 49^ 18, 29, 58* 18; by
; ;

accident 37* 6. Scale 985'' 31, 986* 5 ; seven scales 93' 13. Science, v. Knowledge. Sensation, sense (aiadrifxa) 10* 32,

63* 4 ; (aiadrjais) sight our most precious sense 980* 23 ; sensation the source of all knowledge 980* 28 ; )( wisdom 981* 10 ; )( know-

;;

INDEX
ledge 999^3 a physical alteration 9^ 13 special sensation always true 10^ 2 conflict of sensations 10^4, 1 1** 25 coni. intuition 36^6. Sensible 987* 33, 997^ 12, 10* 3, 42* 25, 69'' 30, ^ 3, 78^ 16 )( mathematical 989^ 32, 990* 15 ; no knowledge of sensible things Z. 15. 987^ 34; )( intelligible, ideal 990* 31, 999^ 2, 36a 3, 10, 45^1 34, 90 35 are there non-sensible substances 997* 34, 2^ 12, 59* 39;
; ;

in species

I.

8, 9,

18^

i,

genus part of species genus matter of species species composed 6 and dififerentiae 39* 26, Speusippus 28^^ 21, 72^ 31
;

54b 28 23^ 24 24^ 8, 38*

;

of genus 57^ 7. referred to 75* 36, ^ 37, 80^ 14 {?), 21 (?),

;

91*34,92*

II.
A. 8.

Spheres of the stars

coni. motion 989'' 32, 36'' 29 contrarieties 61* 32.

Sense-organ 63^ 2. Separable 17^ 25, 25^ 28, 26* 9, 59I' 60a 8, 78^ 28'^ 34, 40^ 13, 9, in formula )( without 30, 86* 33 qualification 42* 29 in actuality
;

Spontaneity, coni. luck, )( nature, art 984^ 14, 32* 13, ^ 23, 34* ID, ^ 4, 70* 7Stars A. 8 their nature y^'^ 34. State, V. Habit. Strife (Empedocles) o* 27.
;

Substance Z

and

passim
;

meanings
13,

A. 8, A. i ultimate subject 983^ 10, 2* 3, 7* 31, 17^

)(

its

)(

in

knowledge

48^^ 15.
3,

Separate (verb) 989^

31,

40^ 28, 78^

86^.

Separate (adj.) 40^ 6. Seven (Pythagorean) 93^^ 13. Shape, coni. end 23* 34 coni. formula 42*^ 28 coni. actuality 43a 25, 28, 31 = proximate matter 45^ 18; coni. form 999*^ 1 7, 15*6, 17'' 25, 33^ 5, 44^ 22, 52'-'
;

19*5, 29*8, 38^15, 42*26; accident 983^ 10, 985^ 10, 7* 31, 38^ 28, 71* I material 985^ 10, 992^^ i, 42^ 9, 44* 15, 49* 36, IT^ 36; are numbers substances? 987* 19, i^ sensible sub26, 36'' 12, 76* 31 stance 997* 34, 42* 25, 69* 30, = form 9871^ 21, 993* 18, ^3 32I' 41I' I, 35^ 22, 37* 29, 38^ 14,
affection,
;
;

9,

50^* 2

are there non-sensible

22, 60^^ 22, ^ 26. Sight, the most

9808' 23.

precious

sense

Simonides 982^ 30, 91* 7. Simple, coni, necessary 15^

coni.

substances? 997* 34, 59* 39; universals not substance z. 13, 3* 7) 53^ 16, 60^ 21, 69* 26-30, 87* 2 primary being 28* 14, 30;
;

)( 35 72* 32 bodies 984* 6 ; concepts, substance 27^ 27, 41^ 9, 72'*' 32; movement 53^ 9, 73* 29; generation 69^ 10, 88* 33. Snub Z. 5, 25^ 31. Socrates 987^ 1-4, 78^ 17-31, 86^ 3. Socrates the younger 36^* 25. Sophistic 4^ 18; concerned with non-being 26^ 14; sophistical objections 32* 6, 49^^ 33. Sophists 996* 32, 4^ 17, 26^ 15. Sophocles 15* 30. Soul, partly falls within scope of physics 26* 5 substance of living things 35^ 14, 43* 35 its essence 36* 2, 43^ 2 )( soulless things 46* 36; )( reason, not all soul can survive death 70* 26. Species 998^ 7 indivisible 998^ 29, 34* 8 one in species 999* 2, 16^ 31,18^7, 49^18, 29, 58* 18; part of genus 999* 4, 23^ 18, 25 ; other
; ; ;
;

principle

59^^

12; one

prior

in

formula,
;

knowledge,

time 28* 32 alone separable 28* 34 four notions of it 28^ 33; whether matter is substance Z. 3, 42* 27, 49* 36, "jy^ 36 syn. individual 30* 19 primary 32^ i = matter, form, and concrete thing 35* I, 70^ 13 )( concrete thing i^ 22, 17^ 29; )( genus 42* 21, 53^ 21 being not the substance of things 40^ 18 unity not the substance I. 2, 40^ 18 a principle and cause 41* 9, ^ 30> 43^* 2 generally recognized substances 42* 6 natural 42* 8, 70* 5 mathematical objects as substances M. 1-3, 42* li, 69* 35 coni. actuality, complete reality 42^^ 10, 43* 23, 35, 44* 9, soi> 2, 72* 25 ; prior in 49^ II, 50* 4, incomposite 51^27 conT]^ I crete 54^ 4 eternal, unmovable substance A. 6 why are there many substances ? 89'' 31.
;
; ; ; ;

INDEX
Substratum, def. aS** 36 ; two meanings 38^ 5. 49 28 (?) ; syn. matter 983* 30, 98 s*" 10, 992^ I, 22 18, proximate, ultimate 16* 70* II 20, 23, 17'' 24, 24^ 10 ; )( matter 44^9Successive, def. 68^ 31 ; )( identical 5* II in numbers 85* 4. Syllogism, starts from the 'what' 34*31,78'' 24; primary' syllogisms
; ;

point Unit, def. i6' 25, 89^ 35 without position 84^ 26 specifically the same, addible, M, 6-8,
; ;

991''

24

specifically

different,

inaddible M. 6-8, 992* 3 ; differentia of 83* I unitary numbers

;

So'* 19, 30, 82'' 6.

Universal
23^*

14^

2.

Ten, limit of the number-series

ten 20, 84* 12 ; 8, 73* principles (Pythagorean) 986* 22. Thales 983^ 20, 984* 2 ; referred to

9S6

S6 33; def. not substance Z. 13 3* 7. 53^ 16, 60'' 21, 69* 26-30, 87* I ; whether the first principles are M. 10, 3* 7, 60'' 19, 69* 26-30, 71'* 20; object of knowledge 3* 14, 36* 28, 59'* 26, 6o'> 20, 87* 15 ; essential (Kaff avra) \T^ 35 ; prior in
29,
38^*

42*

15, II ;

996*

9.

Theology 26* 19, 64'' 3. Theoretical knowledge E. i, 993^20. Thinking {vorian) )( making 32* 15
coni. formula 52* 29, ^ i, 75* 3 ; )( faculty of thought A. 7, 9 ; )(

formula \& 32 ; ){ genus 28'' 34. Universe, not disjointed 76* I. Unlike, its meanings l8 19.

Void

48''

9; (Democritus*

9S5'' 5,

^28.
'What'
25'3i,

desire 72* 26 72* 27.

its

primary object
26* 36,28316,30*17;
;

Third man 'This' 17^

'

ggo** 17, S9^ 8. V. Indtv/dua/. 25.

'

parts of the 22* 27

starting-point

Thought
Time,

(vovs), V.

Mind.

quantitative incidentally 2o 29 ; prior in 28* 32, 38^ 27, 49^ II eternal 71^ 7.
;

Timotheus 993^
Total
{js'av) )(

15.
all

whole,

24*

I, 8.

Truth 993*

30, ^ 20, 9 I, ^ 2 ; def. e. 10, 11^ 25; absolute, relative 11^ 3 ; being as truth E. 4, 9, 10, 65* 21.
V.

of syUogism 34* 31, 78'' 24. Whole 13^* 22, 52* 22 ; its meanings A. 26 )( total 24* I. Wisdom, philosophy (<ro^ia) A. I ; with what principles it deals A. 2, K. I, 2, 995'' 12, 926'' 9; with first causes 981'* 28.
;

Two,

Dyad.
87''
;

Xenocrates referred to So'' 14 21 (?), 91^35Xenophanes 986'' 21-27, 10* 6.

(?),

Unequal, the

5,

88^ 32, 89^

^^Si 9^^

35

inequality i^ 23.

Zeno Zeus

i'' 7. 91'' 6.

\0^viP

OXFORD
PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS BY HORACE HART, M.A. PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

'JUN 1 7 1988

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE

CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF

TORONTO LIBRARY

r^Wri^^Mm