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Berlin on Liberty
Mario Ricciardi

\hat makes a contemporary classic 1he answer is seldom uncontroersial. Popularity,
originality, depth - each o these is proered in turn as the deining property o this elusie
class o arteacts. Disagreement is just as great among the experts: each connoisseur has his
own aourite classic. So it might come as a surprise that in the ield o political philosophy
ew would deny classic status to 1wo Concepts o Liberty` ,1CL,. Isaiah Berlin`s essay,
originally a lecture gien in Oxord in 1958, is widely recognised in the ield as one o the
outstanding achieements o twentieth-century political thought, almost eerybody`s choice
at or near the top o the list or an ideal anthology o contemporary political philosophy.
Part o the explanation or this amazing popularity, which spreads ar beyond those
sympathetic to Berlin`s political outlook, may be ound in its distinctie oice`.
1
In sharp
contrast to the dominant tendency o the age, which conceies the academic author as an
impersonal agency whose style, tastes and idiosyncrasies are better excluded rom the written
page, Berlin eatures prominently in his essay. Quite literally, he speaks his mind`. 1he result
is somewhat less transparent than the best contemporary philosophical prose, as exempliied
by authors such as John Rawls or 1homas Nagel, but has an unmatched capacity to capture
the reader`s attention. \e ind ourseles thrown into the middle o an intellectual battleield
which Berlin brings to lie with the same realism that one inds in Paolo Uccello`s resco 1be
attte of av Rovavo. \e can almost hear the clash o dierent understandings o liberty, eel
the power o ideas` as they take hold o our imagination and eeling ,L 16,.


1
Arthur C. Danto has aptly characterised this eature o those he calls star-philosophers`.
1hey hae pretty distinct oices, possibly in consequence o the act that so much o what they hae
written has been composed to be read beore audiences, and hence is illed with deices o a kind
calculated to hold an audience: turns o phrase, ingenuity o examples, sparks o wit, and an aura o
presumed intimacy between speaker and hearer` ,1999, 228,.
Ricciarai , 2

1o those amiliar with the golden period o Oxord philosophy, Berlin`s personal
approach is not a surprise. One inds the same quality in the writings o all the major authors
who belong to the generation and intellectual enironment notoriously dubbed our age` by
Maurice Bowra ,Annan 1990,. 1he same highly personal tone is present in the writings o
philosophers otherwise as dierse as J. L. Austin, Stuart lampshire and Iris Murdoch. 1o
the contemporary reader, trained in the strictures imposed on academic writing by the
practice o blind reereeing, the careree attitude those authors had to ootnotes,
bibliographic reerences and allusions to the ideas o other people ,oten identiied just by
surname, is sometimes maddening, but preseres the taste o a conersation.
2
1his is a style
o philosophical writing that bears the marks o philosophy`s oral, ace-to-ace origins.
Reading 1CL, one should always remember that the essay was conceied as a lecture,
that it is based on earlier lectures, and that een in its inal, reised, orm, it should be
thought o as addressed to a lay audience.
3
1hese eatures account or the complexity o the
text, which coers more ground than the title announces, and or the apparent
inconclusieness o some o the arguments. On issues such as coercion or reedom o the
will Berlin conines himsel to general remarks, sailing at a sae distance rom the low waters
in which more analytically minded authors requently ind themseles stranded. It is clear
that his aim is not analysis as such, but rather to gie his public a broad iew o the
intellectual landscape.
In his inaugural lecture Berlin draws an intellectual map, charting the terrain with its
slopes and asperities, tracing the paths ollowed by dierent authors and political
moements. 1he starting point is the distinction between negatie and positie liberty - a
distinction that, as Berlin points out, is not meant to be exhaustie o the dierent senses in
which this protean word` has been used in the history o mankind ,L 168,. Next, he assesses
dierent interpretations o positie liberty`, the implications o which can gradually lead to
results that turn out to be inimical to the enjoyment o reedom in the negatie sense. 1his is
the peculiar inersion` in the meaning o liberty` which Berlin denounces in the lecture


2
According to Danto, this contrasts sharply with the bottom-line iew` o philosophy that
underlies blind reiewing ,1999, 241,.
3
Berlin`s lecture is a distillation o material rom two preious sets o lectures, now
published as lIB and PIRA..
Ricciarai , 3

because it leads to an understanding o the political community that is the ery opposite o a
liberal society ,IBLP 68-1,. 1he remainder o the lecture deals with other aspects o
reedom that, though grounded in its ordinary use, are extensions o its core meaning to
dierent areas o experience. In the inal part Berlin puts orward an early ersion o his idea
o pluralism, and shows its critical connection to liberalism and to the idea o a political
regime that recognises an area o non-intererence with the actiities o its subjects. As this
highly compressed summary suggests, it is only an examination o the map as a whole that
can make sense o Berlin`s agenda.
Although it is ostensibly about a conceptual distinction, Berlin`s essay is relatiely
sketchy when it comes to analytical ine tuning. Neertheless, een a supericial glance at the
current literature on reedom reeals Berlin`s remarkable originality. le touches on seeral
points that are still at the oreront o the debate. 1hese aspects o Berlin`s approach are
worth mentioning because they help the newcomer to understand an otherwise puzzling
eature o Berlin`s attitude to the debate that took its lead rom 1CL. \ith ew exceptions,
to be ound in the Introduction to lie Lssays on Liberty` ,in L,, Berlin did not reply to the
criticisms o his own ormulation and deence o the distinction between negatie and
positie liberty. As time passed, a huge number o articles dealt with his treatment o
reedom, but the author himsel took a rather Olympian attitude towards the debate,
emerging rom his sel-imposed discretion only once, to issue a short reply to an article by
Daid \est.
4
Such sel-restraint is unusual, een in a writer who notoriously entertained
serious doubts about the alue o his own philosophical work.
1here is, o course, an easy explanation, supported by Berlin`s own statement that he
let philosophy or the ield o the history o ideas` ,CC ii-iii,. One might argue that
Berlin was not interested in the niceties o the analytical debate because he conceied o
them as belonging to philosophy, an intellectual actiity in which he no longer regarded
himsel as engaged by the time the debate reached its height. 1he ine-grained analyses o the
likes o lelix L. Oppenheim, J. P. Day or lillel Steiner
5
are as ar rom the history o ideas
as one can imagine. lence the lack o interest, and the silence.


4
\est 1993. Berlin`s reply ,1993b, is in the same issue o the journal.
5
Oppenheim 1961, Day 190 and Steiner 195.
Ricciarai , 4

Despite the authority that Berlin himsel has lent to such an explanation, there is a
better account o his attitude towards the analytic treatment o reedom, which sheds light
on 1CL as a whole.
1here is a dierence between the irst reactions to 1CL and the subsequent debate.
Larlier commentators such as Richard \ollheim and Gerald MacCallum raised speciic
points about Berlin`s presentation and deence o the distinction between negatie and
positie liberty that he ,quite reasonably, elt under an obligation to address, irrespectie o
their importance or his own intellectual agenda, but most later contributions mention the
essay without engaging in any sustained discussion or criticism o its content. \ith the sole
exception o a ootnote in which Berlin deals with the problem o the measurement o
reedom, the essay is treated as a classic, i somewhat superseded, statement o a conceptual
distinction still releant to the contemporary debate. Very little attention is deoted to the
oerall structure o the text and to its dierent strands o argument. It is almost as i what
ollows the introduction and discussion o the distinction - more than hal o the essay -
was just a ery long ootnote, an aterthought. I, as I suggest, Berlin had an oerall aim, he
might be excused or not haing elt the need to engage in this new phase o the debate. It is
not the philosophical character and style o the subsequent discussion that explains Berlin`s
silence, but rather its irreleance to his own intellectual agenda.

OVLR1URL: 1lL RLSI LI LNCL Ol POLI 1ICAL PlILOSOPl\
A brie surey o the structure o the essay illustrates my claim. As is customary with
inaugural lectures, the original ersion o 1CL included an oerture` whose aim was to show
the general releance o the topic and to pay the author`s respects to the preious holder o
the Chair. Berlin discharged his duties towards his predecessor as Chichele Proessor with
grace, acknowledging G. D. l. Cole`s multiple talents as teacher, thinker, writer and political
actiist. 1his latter, occasional, part o the text was omitted when the essay was published in
its inal orm in 1998 and in 2002 ,PSM, L,. 1he remainder o the oerture` reads like a
short maniesto or Berlin`s understanding o his mission as Proessor o Social and Political
1heory. It contains, in compressed orm, a deence o the releance o political philosophy
and a statement o method or the discipline, which together proide a preace to the essay.
Berlin warns the reader against the tendency to underestimate the power o ideas`. It is likely
that he had two dierent targets in mind in issuing such a warning. On the one hand,
Ricciarai , 5

historical materialism, with its dealuation o ideas and culture - the superstructure - as
contrasted with the material conditions o society - the structure. On the other, logical
positiism, with its dismissie attitude towards moral and political concepts. 1oday the
reader might ind such a coupling odd, but Berlin persuasiely pointed out a remarkable
similarity in their practical consequences in the ield o political philosophy:

1o neglect the ield o political thought, because its unstable subject-matter, with its
blurred edges, is not to be caught by the ixed concepts, abstract models and ine
instruments suitable to logic or linguistic analysis - to demand a unity o method in
philosophy and reject whateer the method cannot successully manage - is merely
to allow onesel to remain at the mercy o primitie and uncriticised political belies.
It is only a ery ulgar historical materialism that denies the power o ideas, and says
that ideals are mere material interests in disguise. ,L 16-8,

Seeing through dierences in style and orm o argument, Berlin recognised a common
trend in two o the most powerul intellectual moements o the age. 1he connection
becomes clearer i one considers the attitude prealent at the time among logical positiists.
A. J. Ayer comes most naturally to mind, but perhaps the writings o Margaret Macdonald
illustrate this attitude better. She was a student and teacher at Bedord College, London, and
attended \ittgenstein`s lectures in the 1930s. A pioneer in a world that was still male-
dominated, she wrote seeral papers on political and legal philosophy which were widely
read in the 1950s, as is shown by the act that two o them were included in a amous
anthology edited by Antony llew ,1951,. Almost completely orgotten now - she died in
1956 - Macdonald was a bold writer and thinker whose approach to political language was
marked by complete scepticism towards its cognitie content. She subscribed to a ersion o
the subjectiist theory o alue, popular among logical positiists, which held that human
choice is the only source o alue.
6
Dealing with the problem o the oundation o political
obligation, she wrote that there is an indeinite set o aguely shiting criteria, diering or
dierent times and circumstances` ,1951, 185-6,. Linked to a determinist explanation o


6
According to Macdonald, alue utterances are more like records o aeci.iov. than
propositions` ,1956, 49,.
Ricciarai , 6

preerences, this theory o political obligation was remarkably close to the thoroughgoing
historicism o some o the Marxist thinkers o the time. Political judgement is reduced to the
selection o the most eicient means to achiee ends chosen on ideological grounds. 1he
consequences or political philosophy were momentous. According to Macdonald, 1he
alue o the political theorists |.| is not in the general inormation they gie about the basis
o political obligation but in their skill in emphasising at a critical moment a criterion which
is tending to be oerlooked or denied` ,1951, 186, - an ancillary, almost technical role,
whose aim seems to be persuasion rather than knowledge.

Gien such premisses, it is not surprising that, two years beore the publication o
Berlin`s essay, Peter Laslett announced the iolent death o political philosophy, naming
logical positiism as the culprit ,1956, ii-ix,. Laslett`s denunciation is still quoted today, but
it was ar-etched. A surey o what was published and taught in Britain at the time shows
that political philosophy was still alie and well in the late 1950s. Although it was more
marginal in the philosophical community than it was until the early 1940s ,see O`Sullian
2004, 20-40,, its alue was not negligible - not at least i thinkers such as Michael
Oakeshott, John Plamenatz or J. D. Mabbott qualiy ,as seems reasonable, as political
philosophers o outstanding ability. Neertheless, Laslett`s announcement is eidence o a
widespread prejudice, with which Berlin meant to take issue in his lecture. Berlin`s bellicose
attitude is not simply the natural reaction o somebody who has just been elected to a chair
in political theory and is eager to show that his own calling is not deoid o interest or the
academic community and the general public. 1he methodological remarks at the beginning
o the essay should be read as the outcome o his eolution as a thinker, and were put
orward as serious arguments against the dealuation o political philosophy. In order to
understand, and not merely explain away, political disagreement, one should put words,
concepts and deeds in their proper context. 1his context, as the content and structure o the
essay show, has to be historical. Otherwise, as Berlin says, our own attitudes and actiities
are likely to remain obscure to us`. 1o make sense o political problems, we should
understand the dominant issues o our own world` ,L 168,. 1he phrasing is not accidental.
1he shallow image o political theorists as caretakers o ideologies is swept aside to be

Berlin elaborates his criticisms o this way o conceiing political philosophy in Does
Political 1heory Still Lxists`, in CC, 152-3, 156.
Ricciarai ,

replaced with the traditional idea o philosophy as sel-understanding, conjugated in the
historical mood.
8

Berlin recognises the importance o words and their meanings or the understanding
o politics, but disagrees with the selectie attitude o most o his contemporaries towards
the proper starting point or conceptual inestigations. le suggests that the best among
them look with disdain upon a ield in which radical discoeries are less likely to be made,
and talent or minute analysis is less likely to be rewarded` ,L 16,. 1he adjectie minute` is
interestingly ambialent. lor people such as Austin and his ollowers it had a positie
resonance, pointing towards the careul and patient ieldwork that they regarded as an
essential part o a philosophical analysis o language, but or Berlin it clearly had a more
critical connotation. 1here may be an allusion to R. G. Collingwood`s sharp criticism o
those he called minute philosophers` ,1939, 15-21,. 1hese were people such as l. A.
Prichard and l. \. B. Joseph, who, under the inluence o their teacher and mentor John
Cook \ilson, pioneereed the kind o painstaking analysis o ordinary language commonly
associated with Austin and his school.
Berlin was a close riend and associate o Austin, and had a leading role in shaping
the actiity and intellectual agenda o what he himsel later called Oxord Philosophy` ,PI
130-45,. Neertheless, by the time he deliered his inaugural lecture as Chichele Proessor
he was completely out o tune with the direction in which Oxord Philosophy was heading.
lis published letters show that een in the early 1930s he was critical o the utility o the
wrangles indulged in by |his| colleagues, young especially`. lence the determination to read
a lot o legel, Marx, Lngels & the Russians in order to climb out into a dierent een i not
wider unierse` ,L1 43,. A careul examination o Berlin`s early philosophical writings bears
witness to such an attitude. lis critique o eriicationism, and his deence o the autonomy
and signiicance o areas o ordinary language, such as metaphor, that were looked on with
suspicion by most o his Oxord contemporaries, are eidence o a growing dissatisaction
with their way o doing philosophy.
1here is a continuity between Berlin`s deence o a pluralistic approach in the
philosophy o language and his account o the dierent uses o the word liberty` ,CC 56-
80,. 1he meaning o this word is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems


8
1his eature o Berlin`s treatment o reedom went unnoticed, surprisingly, in Skinner 1984.
Ricciarai , 8

able to resist` ,L 168,. lere, again, the choice o words is not accidental. 1he use o porous`
is likely to be an allusion to lriedrich \aismann`s thesis on the porosity` o ordinary
language ,1945, 41-5, 1946, 95-,. According to \aismann, porosity` should be
distinguished rom agueness`. Vagueness can be reduced by sharpening deinition, but
porosity is an inherent eature o concepts, not just a matter o how they are used in ordinary
parlance. Our eorts to discipline language, to reduce it to a precise instrument, are bound
to be rustrated by this characteristic o the words we use. As the epithet porous` suggests,
\aismann alludes to a disposition to absorb and retain matter that should properly be
regarded as external to the nature o the item in question. Like sponges, our words carry with
them contents that exceed their core meaning. lence eery deinition stretches into an open
horizon` ,1944, 44,. \aismann`s highly personal approach encouraged the kind o large-scale
account o areas o experience and thought that people such as Austin were likely to
consider wild, almost charlatanesque, lights o the imagination.

CONCLP1S AND CA1LGORI LS
Berlin`s lecture is ostensibly about two concepts` o liberty, but ery little attention has been
deoted to what exactly he meant by concept`. A surey o the text shows that the answer to
this question cannot be taken or granted. Berlin employs, somewhat promiscuously,
dierent words and expressions that are not obiously synonymous. le talks about political
words and notions`, meaning`, and the sense o the word`. \hat is clear is that he thinks
that the same word can be used in dierent ways and that, among these dierent uses, some
hae suicient stability to be regarded as expressing concepts ,or conceptions` or notions`:
Berlin seems to use such terms interchangeably,. In the case o liberty` ,or reedom` -
Berlin treats the two as synonymous, the ery same word expresses at least two dierent
concepts, negatie` and positie`. In our post-lregean era such liberality in the choice o
terminology might appear a sign o sloppy thinking, but it was not necessarily so at the time
Berlin wrote his lecture. Philosophers o outstanding distinction such as Gilbert Ryle and l.
L. A. lart employed the word concept` with the same liberality to inestigate ery large
areas o experience. Readers o 1be Covcet of Miva ,1949, or 1be Covcet of ar ,1961, who
open these books in search o something like a clear-cut deinition, a set o necessary and
jointly suicient conditions or the use o a word, will be seerely disappointed. 1hey will
ind instead a careul analysis o the uses o the words mind` or law`, and o seeral other
Ricciarai , 9

words connected with them in dierent ways. Besides, both books contain an impressie
array o interrelated philosophical arguments and explanations concerning the dierent
things and eents about which all these words are used in ordinary language. lor Berlin`s
contemporaries, to write a book or a paper on the concept o X` was to put orward a
philosophical account o X.
Neertheless, in Berlin`s writings there are traces o a general account o concepts
that is worth examining, gien its importance or the proper understanding o 1CL. Berlin
himsel gae a hint o what he meant by concept` in a conersation with Bryan Magee,
where he described concepts as the structural units o our thinking`. 1he two concepts o
liberty examined in the lecture are indeed something like structural units in so ar as they are
the items around which dierent debates and political disagreements seem to cluster. Berlin`s
conersation with Magee is interesting also or the qualiication that immediately ollows this
characterisation o concepts. According to Berlin, we make use in our thinking not only o
structural units but also o structures`. 1hese structures

are oten called models`. lor example, when talking about society some people will
think o it as a sort o machine, put together by man to accomplish certain tasks, in
which all the arious moing parts connect up with each other in certain ways. But
others will think o it as a sort o organism, something that grows like a liing thing,
in the way an oak tree deelops out o an acorn. Now whether you think o society
as a sort o machine or as a sort o organism will hae enormous practical
consequences, because - depending on which o these models is dominating your
thinking - you will derie signiicantly dierent conclusions and attitudes regarding
goernment, politics and social questions, not least regarding the relationships o the
indiidual to society. \ou will also hae a dierent attitude towards the past, and to
the arious ways in which change can come about. ,Magee 198, 38,

Berlin`s conersation with Magee was recorded or the BBC in the mid-190s. le had
already gien a more detailed account o models` or paradigms` in two essays published in
the early 1960s, Does Political 1heory Still Lxist` and 1he Purpose o Philosophy` ,both in
CC,. lere the large-scale` items o our intellectual endowment are distinguished rom
categories` - central eatures o our experience that are inariant and omnipresent, or at
Ricciarai , 10

least much less ariable than the ast ariety o its empirical characteristics` ,CC 165,.
According to Berlin, reedom is one o the basic categories in terms o which we conceie
and study man and society. le does not use the word concept` ery much in these earlier
methodological relections, but it does not seem unreasonable to think that concepts are the
historical building-blocks out o which models or paradigms are composed. One might say
that the two concepts examined in the lecture are among the interpretations o the basic
category o reedom that emerge rom what Oakeshott calls the conersation o mankind`.
9

In the light o such eidence, and i my account o its signiicance is correct, the thesis that
in 1958 Berlin was doing harmless` history o ideas instead o philosophy should be rejected.
Many years ater his supposed retirement` rom the philosophical proession, Berlin
articulated and deended, in his conersation with Magee, the same approach he had adopted
in 1CL.
In the study o the external world, what counts as a category seems to be determined
by inariable, though metaphysically contingent, properties o human beings, but when we
come to the study o society and politics categories appear more liable to change. 1his might
happen as the result o a slow, almost imperceptible, shit in the way people talk and think,
or as the outcome o radical, reolutionary, subersions o perspectie. 1he publication o
the two texts
10
rom which 1CL was distilled has sharpened our understanding o the
lecture, showing the crucial background role that the romantic reolution` and its
consequences play in the conrontation between negatie and positie accounts o reedom.
Berlin`s decision to introduce the two concepts as deeloped out o the possible answers to
two dierent questions is designed to bring to light this dramatic` dimension o the
philosophical and ideological approach to reedom. 1he passage is worth quoting in ull:

1he irst o these political senses o reedom or liberty |.|, which ,ollowing much
precedent, I shall call the negatie` sense, is inoled in the answer to the question
\hat is the area within which the subject - a person or group o persons - is or
should be let to do or be what he is able to do or be, without intererence by other


9
Oakeshott 1991, 488-541.
10
lIB, or all its many dierences rom PIRA, is essentially a re-presentation o parts o the
same body o material.
Ricciarai , 11

persons` 1he second, which I shall call the positie` sense, is inoled in the answer
to the question \hat, or who, is the source o control or intererence that can
determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that` ,L 169,

Some commentators hae pointed out that Berlin`s deployment o interrogaties to elucidate
what is inoled in, or presupposed by, the use o a concept bears a striking resemblance to
the role that the logic o question and answer` plays in Collingwood`s search or absolute
presuppositions`.
11
1he comparison is indeed suggestie, and inds urther backing in the
Prologue to PIRA, where the intellectual debt to Collingwood is explicitly acknowledged
,13,. In any eent, this interpretation o Berlin`s method is certainly releant to the reading
o 1CL, and is a major component o a comprehensie understanding o its signiicance or
contemporary political theory.
According to Berlin, models and paradigms shape the way people think and talk in a
way that can be, and at the ordinary leel is ery likely to be, unconscious ,CC 154,. 1hey
exercise a hold on the imagination mainly through metaphor ,CC 158,. 1he task o
philosophy is to attend to such modes o expression so as to sharpen our awareness o their
presuppositions. Since this kind o inestigation deals with assumptions that hae slowly
taken their current orm with the passing o generations, its method should be alert to the
peculiarities o historical analysis. O paramount importance among these is a sensitiity to
the relatie instability o models and paradigms, to the constant strain to which they are
subject under the pressure o experience, and to their consequent susceptibility to change
,CC 9-11,.
12
Philosophical understanding is something that should not be taken or granted,
once and or all.
1hese eatures o Berlin`s method explain an otherwise puzzling peculiarity o 1CL
that has requently been misunderstood. Many commentators hae complained about the
supposed lack o rigour in the analysis o negatie and positie liberty. But such a criticism
ought to be seen as misplaced once one has understood that Berlin is not merely analysing
the logical connections between dierent uses o a word. \hen, or example, he warns that


11
1he irst to point out such a similarity was Bernard \illiams ,CC x-xii,. Recently, the
matter has been inestigated urther in Skagestad 2005.
12
CC 9-11. See Collingwood 1940, 48 note, 350-5.
Ricciarai , 12

some interpretations o positie liberty can lead to conclusions incompatible with reedom
understood in the more basic, negatie, sense, his thesis should not be read as i it were the
discoery o a logical possibility. A statement about positie liberty does not entail` any such
consequences ,L 198,. It is the play o political imagination, the power o ideas`, that can
lead to such conclusions.
13
1his also explains why some o the analytical criticisms o the
lecture are undamentally wrongheaded. 1hey ail to take seriously Berlin`s oerall
undertaking on its own terms, which are basically those o Collingwood.
1his objection certainly applies to Gerald MacCallum, possibly the most inluential
o the early critics o 1CL. According to MacCallum there is just one concept o reedom,
since eery statement about liberty can be reduced, by means o analysis, to the ollowing
ormula: an agent, , is ree rom preenting conditions`, ,, to do something ,or to become
something,, . By preenting conditions` MacCallum means constraints`, restrictions`,
intererences` and barriers`. In this way, controersies concerning the deinition o
reedom` can be restated as disagreements oer the interpretation o the three ariables
,agents, restrictions and actions or modes o being, - or example, oer whether restrictions
are natural or social, whether agents are indiidual or collectie ,MacCallum 196,. 1he
success o MacCallum`s deinition is due in great part to John Rawls, who uses it in the
ormulation o his principles o justice ,191, 202,. But despite its clarity and useulness,
MacCallum`s ormula ails to capture all the shades o meaning o liberty`. Most notably, it
obliterates the opposition between the two concepts o reedom that Berlin meant to
clariy.
14
1his, o course, is not an objection to the adoption o a triadic` deinition o
reedom` when it suits one`s needs. But it is a crucial consideration in assessing the merit o
MacCallum`s criticisms o Berlin`s essay. MacCallum`s ormula may still be alid or the


13
Berlin himsel clariied his position by saying that, when he wrote the lecture, he saw the
idea o inner` or real` reedom characteristic o the positie account o liberty as a metaphor,
although he did not emphasise the point. Political reedom is an altogether dierent matter, and
directly concerned with coercion, whateer its relation to the impregnable lie o reason` ,1993b,
29,.
14
It is surprising that Berlin`s rather hal-hearted reply to MacCallum does not point this out.
Berlin instead conines himsel to minor obserations on what is or is not the case when persons or
peoples struggle against their chains or enslaement ,L 36,.
Ricciarai , 13

category o reedom, despite its ailing to coney the contrasts between the dierent shades
o meaning o the historical concepts o liberty. I Berlin`s aim was to bring to light these
dierent shades o meaning he was right to reject MacCallum`s criticism. One might say that
Berlin and MacCallum were working at dierent leels o abstraction.

NLGA1I VL LI BLR1\: DLSI RLS AND MLASURLMLN1
Berlin introduces the notion o negatie liberty by pointing out that, in ordinary discourse,
people are said to be ree to the degree to which no man or body o man intereres` with
their actiity. lence, political liberty, is simply the area within which a man can act
unobstructed by others`. \hat counts as obstruction is explained as ollows: I I am
preented by others rom doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unree, and i
this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being
coerced, or, it may be, enslaed` ,L 169,. 1his, howeer, is a reision o the original text o
the lecture. In the irst ersion, political liberty was characterised as not being preented
rom doing what one wants to do ,1958, ,. As was pointed out by Richard \ollheim, liberty
or the absence o it are in this way dependent on desire. 1his would lead to the
counterintuitie result that i somebody has no desire to do what he is preented rom
doing, he is neertheless not unree ,\ollheim 1959, ,. So a perectly contented slae
would turn out to enjoy perect reedom.
In ovr ..a,. ov ibert, ,1969,, Berlin recognises the error and the text o 1CL is
modiied accordingly. In the introduction he elaborates on the relation between liberty and
desire, reerring to the Stoic` iew o reedom, according to which reedom consists in
consciously adjusting one`s desires to what it is possible to achiee. 1he discipline o desire`
o the desert athers, the contented slae`, and what in contemporary economics are called
adaptie preerences` are all instances o this psychological deice. Berlin recognises that
allowing reedom to be dependent on desire would rule out a non-subjectie criterion o
political liberty. Being ree or unree would become a matter o eeling onesel to be so. 1his
would render meaningless any criticism o a political regime or suppressing liberty, so long
as its subjects were psychologically adapted to their condition. 1he releance o this point to
understanding Berlin`s liberalism has seldom been underlined, but is neertheless o the
utmost importance. It is clear rom his reaction to \ollheim`s criticisms, and also to those o
Macarlane ,1966,, that Berlin is determined to presere reedom, or the lack o it, as a iable
Ricciarai , 14

standard or the ealuation o a political regime. I the presence or absence o liberty in a
gien situation were a matter o perception, such a goal would be unattainable.
Being negatiely ree or unree, then, is or Berlin a matter o act. 1his its with a
plausible interpretation o a large class o quantitatie statements and judgements, in political
theory as well as in ordinary discourse. 1he most important o these are comparatie. One
might say, or example, that John has more reedom than Paul, or that the aerage Aghan
citizen has less reedom than the aerage British subject. O course, such comparisons, i
taken literally, need a unit or a standard o measurement.
15
Berlin was aware o the releance
o this issue or a theory o negatie liberty, and proposed his own account o the measure
o reedom in a long ootnote to the text o 1CL. le enumerates ie aspects o reedom
that are releant or its measurement:

1he extent o my reedom seems to depend on ,a, how may possibilities are open to
me ,although the method o counting these can neer be more than impressionistic,
possibilities o action are not discrete entities like apples, which can be exhaustiely
enumerated,, ,b, how easy or diicult each o these possibilities is to actualise, ,c,
how important in my plan o lie, gien my character and circumstances, these
possibilities are when compared with each other, ,a , how ar they are closed and
opened by deliberate human acts, ,e, what alue not merely the agent, but the general
sentiment o the society in which he lies, puts on these arious possibilities. ,L 1,
note 1,

1his statement has raised a heated controersy in the literature.
16
One thing strikes
the reader immediately: Berlin`s account brings together dimensions o reedom o dierent
sorts. 1he number o possible actions open to one ,a, and their relatie diiculty ,b, are
clearly quantitatie standards that, at least in principle, could be expressed mathematically,
the importance ,c, or alue ,e, o such actions are more aptly classiied as qualities.


15
1his iew is not shared by all liberals. loweer, such authors admit that its rejection
implies the rejection o the idea o liberty as a undamental alue. See Dworkin 19, 20 and Gray
1995, 2..
16
lor a surey o the debate, see Carter 1999.
Ricciarai , 15

Dimension ,a ,, on the other hand, concerns a prerequisite or the application o the concept
o reedom rather than a standard o measurement. 1he heterogeneity o the items in this list
has gien rise to the criticism that Berlin is aggregating incommensurables. 1he remainder o
the ootnote shows that he was aware o this objection, but his response to it is tentatie,
and ar rom clear. le says that all these magnitudes must be integrated, and a conclusion,
necessarily neer precise, or indisputable, drawn rom this process`, and then qualiies this by
saying that It may well be that there are many incommensurable kinds and degrees o
reedom, and that they cannot be drawn up on any single scale o magnitude.` le seems
thereby to deny the possibility o aggregatie comparatie judgements, while granting that o
simple comparatie ones. 1he ootnote ends with what sounds like a compromise: the
agueness o the concepts, and the multiplicity o the criteria inoled, are attributes o the
subject-matter itsel, not o our imperect methods o measurement, or o incapacity or
precise thought`. As it stands, this compromise is ar rom persuasie, because it ails to
address the objection that it was meant to oercome, and, thereore, to ulil the requirement
that negatie reedom should proide an independent standard o ealuation.

NLGA1I VL LI BLR1\ VLRSUS ABI LI 1\ AND SLLl-GOVLRNMLN1
1he success o Berlin`s essay depends in good part on the success o the distinction between
negatie` and positie` reedom. As we hae seen, or Berlin, negatie reedom has to do
with the space within which a person can be or do certain things without intererence,
whereas positie reedom concerns who goerns, that is, who or what determines that a
person does something or pursues a certain project. 1he latter notion should not be
conused with that o ability, in the sense o haing the power to do something`. lreedom as
ability, or eectie reedom`, has a supericial resemblance to the idea o reedom in the
sense o autonomy, but it is not the same. In the debate ollowing the publication o Berlin`s
essay one encounters two dierent, not necessarily related, ersions o positie reedom. 1he
irst might be called sel-determination` ,not being goerned by others,, and the second,
Ricciarai , 16

ability` ,namely, the power to do something,.
1
Both ersions o positie reedom display
what Berlin called porosity` to the highest degree, absorbing certain natural or social
characteristics alongside the true eatures o liberty. Negatie reedom, on the other hand,
depends strictly on external conditions, and in particular on actions by other persons that
may interere with one`s opportunity to act.
1he austerity o Berlin`s understanding o negatie liberty was ery likely to prooke
criticism rom the Let, and it did. Socialists complained that to describe a person depried
o physical or inancial means as ree is prooundly misleading. One might as well say that a
tramp is ree` to dine at the Ritz - a statement that, though not meaningless, raises obious
problems. It was easy or these critics, in particular the Marxists, to relate Berlin`s own social
situation to his understanding o liberty: they were reassured in their belie that lreedom or
an Oxord don` is indeed a ery dierent thing rom reedom or an Lgyptian peasant` ,L
11,. Neertheless, Berlin held his ground. In so ar as the criticisms bore on conceptual
analysis, he rebutted some o them, while also conceding that political consequences did not
ollow automatically rom the conceptual autonomy o negatie liberty ,L 11-4,. Returning
to this point in 1969, he added a helpul clariication, distinguishing liberty rom the
conditions in which it can be exercised ,L 38,. Although haing the inancial means to do
something is a condition or the successul perormance o an action, it is a condition whose
absence does not amount to preention. Conusing liberty with its conditions does not
oster the cause o emancipation or equality, and is ery likely to gie rise to dangerous
illusions. A careul reading o the lecture shows that exposing this kind o conceptual
conusion was one o Berlin`s aims. Lerything is what it is`, and nothing is gained by a
conusion o terms` ,L 12,.
Berlin`s responses to the standard socialist objections to the liberal understanding o
reedom might appear to today`s reader the most outdated part o the lecture. Berlin himsel
has explicitly recognised that the historical situation in which the essay was conceied and
written inluenced the internal organisation o the text, and the relatie emphasis gien to
dierent parts o his analysis. lad he written the lecture today, the search or status` would


1
Berlin, howeer, did not hae the second sense in mind, and has been requently
misquoted in this respect, especially by economists, who in act take their lead rom Amartya Sen. See
or example Sen 198.
Ricciarai , 1

no doubt hae been allotted a much larger role. 1he increased attention that nationality and
the struggle or recognition` receie in Berlin`s later writings can be traced back to his
inaugural lecture. But it would be misleading to say that Berlin`s deence o the conceptual
autonomy and meaningulness o negatie liberty rests only on contingent motiations. I, as
I hae argued, the lecture should be read as a contribution to philosophy, Berlin`s theoretical
preoccupations should be taken at ace alue. Among these, the determination to dispel
conusion and promote understanding is clearly paramount ,IBLP 1-2,. 1he same
considerations apply when Berlin underlines the importance o agency or the identiication
o those instances o preention that create unreedom. I the impossibility o doing
something depends on natural accidents ,as when one is preented rom crossing the road
by a tree that has been elled by lightning,, clearly such preention lies beyond the pale o
reedom.
18

Another notion that Berlin is eager to keep distinct rom liberty is sel-goernment.
lrom the point o iew o the history o ideas it is easy to see why these notions are
conused in ordinary parlance. 1he struggle or sel-rule has oten ound its expression in the
language o liberty. 1his issue was raised by Charles 1aylor in a seminal contribution ,199,,
and has been reied recently by Quentin Skinner. According to Skinner, Berlin`s
understanding o negatie reedom as non-intererence does not rule out the possibility that
reedom is compatible with non-democratic goernment. Starting rom Berlin`s premisses,
one has to deny that there is a logical connection between reedom and democracy, a
conclusion Skinner regards as untenable. As eidence or the prosecution, Skinner quotes
1CL, mentioning the passage where Berlin distinguishes liberty rom other alues, such as
equality or sel-goernment ,Skinner 1998, 113-15,. According to Berlin, negatie reedom is
indeed compatible with autocracy or with the absence o sel-goernment ,L 16,. 1his
conclusion might sound shocking to some, but it is only a consequence o the idea that being


18
Miller 1983. Bernard \illiams has pointed out another aspect o the importance o agency
that is compatible with Berlin`s approach. According to \illiams, the restriction o our actiities by
the intentional actiities o others, as contrasted with the ubiquitous limitations we ace in nature, can
gie rise to a quite speciic reaction, resentment, and i resentment is not to express itsel in more
conlict, non-cooperation, and dissolution o social relations, an authoritatie determination is
needed o whose actiities should hae priority`. \illiams 2001 82.
Ricciarai , 18

ree or unree is a matter o act, contingent on the degree o other people`s intererence.
1he outcome o such intererence, in so ar as it amounts to preention, is clearly logically
independent o the kind o political regime one happens to lie under.
Skinner regards Berlin`s solution as lawed. Accordingly he has put orward what he
sees as a third concept o liberty. 1his neo-Roman` theory o reedom ,the name is a tribute
to the republican tiberta. o the Romans, can be summed up by saying that ,i, there is a
connection between the reedom o an indiidual and the reedom o the community to
which he or she belongs, and that ,ii, there is a urther connection between the reedom o
an indiidual and the act that he or she is not subordinated to an arbitrary power. I these
two conditions are not ulilled, a person cannot be said to be politically ree ,Skinner 1998,
23-5,. Skinner`s objection seems to rely on the alse assumption that 1CL is meant as a
complete list o the legitimate uses o the word reedom`. On the contrary, there are
passages in the lecture where Berlin comes close to the acknowledgement o non-
domination as a reasonable extension o liberty.
19

Recently Skinner has returned to the third concept o liberty in a lecture that is more
sympathetic towards the complexity o Berlin`s arguments ,2002b,.
20
But he has not altered
the substance o his position or the undamental character o his criticisms. In particular, he
assumes too straightorward a connection between Berlin`s analysis and deence o negatie
liberty and his liberalism. 1hese are certainly related in so ar as Berlin is coninced that the
recognition o an area o protection rom intererence is a necessary eature o a liberal
regime. loweer, according to Berlin, this is not a suicient condition o liberalism. A social
and cultural enironment that is riendly towards a ariety o lie-plans, liestyles and modes


19
According to George Crowder, 1his can be done either by extending negatie liberty to
include the absence o dependence, or by interpreting the positie idea to embrace non-domination
as an aspect o authentic sel-direction, or by conceiing o non-domination as a dierent kind o
reedom altogether`. IBPL 88. Berlin`s approach leaes all these options open but the structure o the
lecture suggests that he would hae regarded those as analogical extensions, not as expressions o the
core meaning o liberty.
20
Berlin is ambialent about whether to count collectie sel-determination as a species o
reedom. IBPL 1-2.
Ricciarai , 19

o thought is a urther condition whose satisaction is not guaranteed simply by non-
intererence.
Contrary to widespread opinion, Berlin`s deence o the conceptual autonomy o
negatie liberty should not be interpreted as i it were a straightorward political statement.
1he distinction between the two concepts o liberty is, in the irst instance, a contribution to
the understanding o the category o reedom. Only ater we hae reed ourseles rom
conused notions o reedom can we examine the rial merits o dierent social
arrangements. According to Berlin, a liberal regime, which includes a measure o negatie
reedom, is better than the alternaties, including those based on positie liberty. 1his,
howeer, is not suicient to show that Berlin is a negatie libertarian`, as Skinner seems to
suggest ,2002b, 264-5,, i that means that negatie liberty is oerriding.

NLGA1I VL VLRSUS POSI 1I VL LI BLR1\
1he distinction between negatie and positie reedom is paradigmatic in contemporary
political theory, and it bears witness to the impact o 1CL that Berlin is oten credited with
its introduction. 1his widespread impression, as Berlin himsel says, is historically
inaccurate.
21
1he remote origin o the distinction is in Kant, who uses negatie` and
positie` to describe two dierent ways o deining practical reedom. In the irst sense,
reedom is said to be negatie because it is characterised negatiely as independence o
determination by sensible impulses. In the second sense, reedom is said to be positie
because it is characterised positiely as determinability by the moral law.
22
1his is not the
place to pursue the complex issues o interpretation that the Kantian doctrine o practical


21
lor educated readers raised in the irst hal o the twentieth century the distinction was
amiliar because it was used by the British Idealists, and through their inluence had entered the wider
social and political debate. See Green 1895, 2-2, and Bosanquet 1899, 124-40. Among Berlin`s
contemporaries in Oxord, the distinction had already been employed by John Plamenatz ,1938, 68,.
1he distinction is also used by de Ruggiero ,1925, 338-9, 350 in the Lnglish translation,. Although
Berlin does not mention de Ruggiero`s book, it is ery likely that he knew it through Collingwood, its
Lnglish translator.
22
Immanuel Kant, Critiqve of Practicat Rea.ov ,188,, part 1, book 1, chapter 1, section 8,
theorem 4.
Ricciarai , 20

reedom has prooked ,see Lngstrom 2002, 294-8,. Neertheless, there is one aspect o
Kant`s treatment o reedom that is worthy o attention because it sheds urther light on
Berlin`s essay. Kant says that it is not possible to grasp the essence ,!e.ev, o reedom
through the negatie deinition. 1he positie deinition, on the other hand, lows rom the
negatie and is richer and more ruitul. 1his way o characterising the dierence between
the two kinds o reedom is ery likely to be the origin o Green`s and Bosanquet`s
assumption that positie liberty should be seen as the real`, hence superior, ersion o
reedom. As his discussion o positie liberty shows, Berlin was aware o the intuitie appeal
o such a thesis.
1he undamental problem Berlin neertheless saw in the positie deinition was as
ollows. I liberty consists in not being a slae to someone, such a deinition also applies
relexiely. One can be at the mercy o one`s own desires, een i also aware o good reasons
to resist them. A smoker knows he must quit because smoking is bad or him, but cannot
resist a cigarette. Such a situation, as Berlin pointed out, gies credibility to the idea o a
diided sel, one part claiming control oer its actions and one part shunning such control ,L
180,. In the case o the hypothetical smoker in conlict with himsel, control is not exercised,
as it should be, by the rational part that orders him to quit, but by the irrational part that
preers the pleasure o a cigarette and ignores the damage caused by smoking. But what is it
that the rational part o the sel does Gien common presuppositions about rationality, it is
natural to say that it applies uniersal criteria or the selection o goals. 1his capacity,
howeer, is not uniormly spread among the population, because we know that some people
do not act rationally. Gien this premiss, then i one is absolutely coninced that one knows
the real goals at which a person`s actions should aim, one can eel authorised to compel
others to realise their proper goals. Can one say that a person who compels someone else to
do something is a liberator Does that not inole a paradox according to which real`
reedom consists in being compelled to act in one`s best interest lor Berlin, historical
experience suggests, as a natural deelopment o such an idea, that a person who is
compelled in this way is no longer treated as autonomous, but instead as part o a collectie
being whose rational soul must impose its own ree will on its recalcitrant limbs. \ith this
last conceptual slide, we reach the bottom o a slippery slope. 1he idea o reedom seems to
justiy totalitarianism, with its complement o torture, censorship and iolence.
Ricciarai , 21

As this highly compressed summary o Berlin`s critique o positie liberty suggests,
Kant is the leading character in the intellectual drama. Kant`s ideas on liberty, as authors
such as Green and Bosanquet show, can lead to conclusions that are inimical to the ery
possibility o leading an autonomous lie. Under a regime in which a rationalist`
interpretation o positie liberty is paramount, a person might end up being treated as a
means, not as an end in itsel ,L 183-4,. laing realised, on the basis o the historical
eidence, that the concept o positie liberty is particularly liable to distortion, Berlin turned
to negatie liberty in search o an antidote to liberalism`s paternalist disease. As his treatment
o the measurement o reedom shows, he is coninced that negatie liberty, whateer its
deects rom other points o iew, is less ulnerable to such distortions.
23
1he peculiar
objectiity` o negatie liberty relies in its being a act, something whose existence depends
ultimately on causal interactions among bodies.
Berlin inerts Kant`s order o priority between the two concepts:

1he undamental sense o reedom is reedom rom chains, rom imprisonment,
rom enslaement by others. 1he rest is extension o this sense or else metaphor. 1o
strie to be ree is to seek to remoe obstacles, to struggle or personal reedom is to
seek to curb intererence, exploitation, enslaement by men whose ends are theirs,
not one`s own. ,L 48,

A moment`s relection on the paradigmatic case o unreedom - being preented rom doing
something by the intererence o others - brings out the reason or this inersion. Negatie
liberty is undamental` because it is closer to the basic experience o bodily interaction,
which Berlin rightly regards as belonging to the solid background o the objectie material


23
According to Berlin, negatie liberty is not immune rom distortions. loweer, his
reconstruction o the thought o positie libertarians like Rousseau, legel and lichte shows that he
regarded their understanding o reedom as more likely to lead to conclusions that are incompatible
with the deence o an area o non intererence in the actiities o a person.
Ricciarai , 22

world.
24
\ith positie liberty we enter a dierent realm, whose intentional dimension opens
up the possibility o a much wider range o interpretations.
As the subsequent debate has shown, Berlin`s reliance on the objectiity o negatie liberty
loses its strength progressiely as one moes urther rom the paradigmatic case. As he
recognise in 1CL, the extent to which the stockbroker`s action preents the shopkeeper
rom doing something is highly disputable, and depends on larger issues such as the
susceptibility o dierent kinds o eent to dierent kinds o explanation.
25

Berlin`s equiocation on the topic o measurement opened up a gap in his deence o
negatie reedom as a political standard - a gap that Charles 1aylor exploited to put orward
a new ersion o the idea o positie liberty ,199,. A crucial step in 1aylor`s argument relies
on comparatie judgements between dierent people or societies. In an underdeeloped
country with a dictatorial regime that imposes atheism there is no reedom o religion, but
neither are there traic-lights that restrict the reedom o motorists. A democracy in an
industrialised country, on the other hand, will probably hae a system that recognises the
reedom o all orms o religion, but also roads ull o traic-lights. A quantitatie
understanding o negatie reedom seems to lead to the conclusion that there is more
reedom under the dictatorship than under the democratic regime. lor 1aylor, the intuitie
implausibility o such a conclusion suggests that purely quantitatie criteria are inadequate
or the assessment o reedom. 1his means that we should look elsewhere. Restrictions on
the circulation o traic are not particularly signiicant rom an ealuatie point o iew, and
are thereore o little releance to our reedom.
26

1aylor`s solution to the problem o assessing degrees o liberty relies on the idea that
the notion o reedom has a built-in reerence to purposes. le claims that our judgements
about reedom are a unction o purposes and their relatie ealuations. But this amounts to
a rejection o the whole notion o negatie reedom. 1he alternatie, teleological, account o


24
Bernard \illiams suggests to call this basic sense o reedom primitie`. According to
\illiams, this is the place to start because |primitie reedom| inoles a quite basic human
phenomenon, and that phenomenon already points in the direction o politics`. \illiams 2001 8-83.
25
1CL . Gray 1980.
26
1his part o 1aylor`s argument, howeer, assumes a ersion o negatie liberty that is
dierent rom Berlin`s understanding o such notion.
Ricciarai , 23

reedom deeloped in 1aylor`s essay is close to the traditional understanding o positie
liberty. 1aylor claims that once this link between reedom and purpose is accepted, we are
compelled to slide a air way down the slippery slope that so preoccupied Berlin. In
particular, we need to recognise that internal restrictions are real` ,there is such a thing as
acting against one`s own best judgement,, and also that there are goals that hae objectie
alue. loweer, 1aylor thinks it is still an open question whether the truth o these
contentions justiies a slide towards totalitarianism.
1aylor`s argument has been criticised by pointing out that he conlates the
measurement and ealuation o reedom ,Carter 1999, 148-65,. 1his, or those who do not
subscribe to his objectie theory o alues, is clearly a mistake. \hether this might also hae
been Berlin`s reply is not clear, at least i one takes seriously his unclarity about the
qualitatie dimensions o reedom. Neertheless, his scepticism towards the idea o objectie
reason, which has a crucial role in his criticism o positie liberty, is incompatible with
1aylor`s iews on purpose. Berlin was certainly not a perectionist. le belieed in the
objectiity o at least some undamental human alues, but his pluralism allows that such
alues can be legitimately combined in many ways, thus ruling out thicker` theories o the
human good such as 1aylor`s.
One might grant that a reconstruction o reedom as a political alue should leae
room or arguments o the same orm as 1aylor`s ,\illiams 2001, 81,. loweer, is diicult
to deny that recognising the plurality o alues and the creatie role o human choice in
interpreting them requires a distribution o areas o indiidual liberty where each person can
pursue his or her projects without intererence ,Gray 1995, 31,.
1CL is neither the last nor the ullest statement o pluralism in Berlin`s thought.
loweer, it is here that its connection with liberalism is made explicit or the irst time. 1he
ultimate motiating orce o Berlin`s classical statement o liberalism is the possibility that a
distortion o the concept o liberty may lead to a society that systematically obstructs the
plurality o alue. Berlin could hae adopted Montaigne`s description o lie as un
mouement ingal, irrgulier et multiorme`
2
as the epigraph or his inaugural lecture. Its
contribution to our understanding o this eature o humanity, and o the conditions or its
preseration, guarantees its lasting alue.


2
Montaigne