Something Said: The Traditional Story or Tale

Bart A. Mazzetti A tale is a traditional story characterized by the presence of recurrent elements or motifs the number, kind, and order of which, when found to exist in more than one in stance, constitute the pattern or tale-type according to which such stories may be categorized.1 By traditional here I mean invented by persons unknown and handed down at first by word of mouth from generation to generation (Sir James Frazer, introduction to his edition of Apollodorus Bibliotheca). By story (cf. muthos) I mean the telling of a happening, or connected series of happenings, prescinding from whether they are true or fictitious; such a narrative consisting in the composition of the things done (or the way in which the things done are composed, sunthesin ton pragmaton, Aristotle, Poet. ch. 6, 1450a 4-5) where, by the things done (ta pragmata), I mean, with regard to the doers, their passions, as well as their actions (kai pathe kai praxeis, ibid. ch. 1, 1447a 27-28) that is, the things they suffer (or undergo or experience) as well as do. When a story relates what has happened (ta genomena), it pertains to historia (inquiry, research, or history); a story in this sense consisting in the setting forth [or exposition, ekthesis] not of one action, but of one [period of] time [chronou], and whatever happened during it, whether to one man or to many, of which each [thing happening] stands to the other just as it chances [hos etuchen], as Aristotle explains (Poet. ch. 23, 1459a 23-24).2
1

Cf. Gail De Vos and Anna E. Altmann, Introduction, New Tales for Old: Folktales as Literary Fictions for Young Adults (Englewood, CO: Libraries Unlimited, 1999), p. xx: The terms tale type and motif need some explanation. In 1910 Antti Aarne, a Finnish folklorist, published a classification scheme for folktales collected in Finland and northern Europe. His classification scheme established the tale types, basic patterns underlying different tales that allowed variants of the same type to be grouped together. Stith Thompson defines a type as follows: A type is a traditional tale that has an independent existence. It may be told as a complete narrative and does not depend for its meaning on any other tale. It may happen to be told with another tale, but the fact that it appears alone attests its independence. It may consist of only one motif or of many. (1977, 415 [= The Folktale (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 1 st ed. 1946)]) Cf. also Thompson, The Folktale, p. 415: [A] complete tale (the type) is made up of a number of motifs in a relatively fixed order and combination. 2 For manyindeed an infinite numberof things happen to one man, out of some of which no one thing arises [lit. there is no one thing, ouden estin hen]. So also there are many actions of one man out of which no one action results [ginetai] (ibid., ch. 8, 1451a 16-19), and the same is true for things done or suffered by many men: out of many of their actions and passions that is, the things they do and suffer no one thing arises or results, as, for example, the sea-fight at Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily took place at the same time without tending to the same end; so also in those things which take place in successive times, one thing may sometimes happen after another from which no one end results (op.cit., ch. 23, 1459a 29-30, tr. B.A.M.). In sum, the incidents comprising such a narrative whether they happened at the same time or in successive times, were done or suffered by one man or by many have an accidental or fortuitous connection, and so neither tend to one end, nor does one end result from them, nor do they give rise to some one thing, which thing would be a unified action. Still, as we explain elsewhere, insofar as he grasps their nexus, the historian may very well compose a narrative of events that are connected; for, as Aristotle makes clear (cf. Poet. ch. 9, 1451b 29-33), nothing prevents certain things that have happened from being the sort of things that are likely to happen; and, one might add, some will certainly be necessary, these being the three ways in which things happen: for, as Aristotle elsewhere observes: We say that everything either is always and of necessity (necessity not in the sense of violence, but that which we appeal to in demonstrations), or is for the most part, or is neither for the most part, nor always and of necessity, but merely as it chances [hos etuchen]; e.g. there might be cold in the dogdays, but this occurs neither always and of necessity, nor for the most part, though it might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, nor for the most part (Metaph., 11. 8, 1064b 361065a 2, tr. W. D. Ross). Now certainly things happening always and of necessity (the necessary), as well as those happening for the

When a story relates the sort of thing that might happen (an genoito) and is possible in accordance with likelihood or necessity (ta dunata kata to eikos e to anangkaion), it is poiesis (making, i.e. the making in which poetry consists, or simply poetry); 3 a story in this sense being an imitation of an action (mimesis praxeus, ibid. ch. 6, 1450a 4), where action is understood as the way in which men go through life or fare, whether well or badly;4 action so conceived constituting the life, and therefore the happiness or unhappiness, of those who experience it.5

most part (the likely or probable), will form some part of the subject matter of the historian, but they properly belong to the poetic art, as is clear from Poetics ch. 9, shortly to be cited. For the kind of history that aims for the universality proper to poetry, especially of the sort argued for by historians generally and by Polybius in particular, see my Paper Poetry and History. 3 Cf. Aristotle, Poet. ch. 9 (1451a 361451b 11) (tr. B.A.M.): But it is also apparent from what has been said that the task of the poet is to relate, not what has happened, but the sort of thing that might happen that is, what is possible in accordance with likelihood or necessity. For the historian and the poet differ not by [the one] speaking in verse [and the other] not, (for Herodotus put in verse would be no less a historian in verse than not in verse), but they differ in this, namely, that the o ne relates what has happened [= the telling of a happening or happenings], but the other the sort of thing that might happen. For this reason, poetry [poiesis] is more philosophical and more serious than history [historia]; for poetry relates rather the universal, whereas history, the particular. But universal, in fact, is the sort of thing a certain sort of man happens to say or do in accordance with what is likely or necessary, and poetry aims at this sort of thing when it assigns names; but particular is what Alcibiades did or suffered. Note that poetry is understood widely here to include dramatic as well as epic poetic art, whereas we typically reserve the name for its lyric species, as with the sonnets of Shakespeare or the odes of Keats. At present, when the narrative prose forms the novel and the short story predominate, the term fiction is most often used t o designate imitations of action. 4 Cf. Plato, Rep. X, 603 c (tr. Allan Bloom, slightly rev. B.A.M.) : Let us put it before ourselves in this way. Imitative art, we say, imitates men performing forced or voluntary actions, and, as a result of the action, supposing themselves to have fared well or badly [ eu oiomenous kaks pepragenai], and in all this feeling pain or pleasure. Cf. also Aristotle, Phys., II. 5, 197b 4 (tr. Glen Coughlin): Happiness is a certain action, for it is faring well; from which it follows that unhappiness is faring badly. Hence, as Aristotle explains, tragedy is an imitation not of men but of action [ praxeon], and of life [biou], and of happiness [or living well, eudaimonias]. For happiness, like unhappiness, exists in action, and the end is a sort of action, not a quality. Now men are of a certain sort by virtue of their characters, but by virtue of their actions they are happy or the reverse (Poet. ch. 6, 1450a 16-20, tr. B.A.M.). 5 For, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains (In IX Meta., lect. 8, n. 10): [W]hen there is not some work done beyond the action of the power, then the action exists in the agent as its perfection, and does not pass over into something outside for the sake of perfection; just as sight is in the one seeing as his perfection, and speculative activity in the one speculating, and life in the soul, such that by life we understand a work of life. And so it is obvious that happiness also consists in such an operation, which is in the one operating, which does not pass over into a thing outside, since happiness is a good of the happy man, and his perfection. For there is some life of a happy man, namely, his perfect life. And so just as life is in the living thing, so happiness is in the happy man. And thus it is clear that happiness consists neither in building, nor in any such action, which passes outside, but in understanding and willing. Acting [operari], so understood, is [thus] the actuality of an operative power or virtue (Qu. Disp. de Spirit. Creat., art. 11, c.), just as being itself [ipsum esse] is a certain actuality [actualitas] of the essence. (ibid.) But the act [actus, = energeia] to which an operative power is compared is an operation [ operatio, = praxis or ergon]. (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 54, art. 3, c.) For action [actio, = praxis] is properly the actuality [actualitas] of a virtue, just as being [or existence, esse] is the actuality of the substance or essence (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 54, art. 1, c.) (tr. B.A.M.), whereas passion means the action or alteration which results from an affective quality, as heat or cold in the body, or being pleased or pained in the soul, as with feelings of mirth or anger or fear (cf. Meta., V, 21, 1022b 15-17). Note that, with respect to these pathemata, Aristotle goes on to call passions (3) ...the alterations or motions which are rather harmful and, [20] and of these most of all those which are painful. (4) Also, misfortunes and pains of considerable magnitude are c alled passions (or sufferings) (ibid. 17-21); these last two being characteristic of tragedy, whereas comedy imitates a painless sort of mistake, by which mirth is excited, while the forms of romance take their rise from the marvelous and so bring joy.

A motif is the smallest component recurrent in tales because there is something unusual or striking about it (Stith Thompson, The Folktale, p. 415).6 Such an element is found to persist in tradition either because it is expressive of some primary fact of human existence (like love at first sight) or because it is a prodigy of some sort (like a cap of invisibility). A motif may pertain to plot, to character, to thought, to language, or to setting and the like. For instance, a motif may be an incident composing the action (like the creation of the world or the transformation of a pumpkin into a coach), an agent of it (like a dying and reviving god or a wicked stepmother), or something pertaining to an incident or action (like the golden apples guarded by a dragon or a fairy-godmothers wand), and it is the combination of such components which not only produces the tale-type, but which also gives it its unity of theme.7 From the foregoing remarks, it is clear that a tale-type is the form participated in by two or more stories according as they are characterized by a certain number of motifs, which are of a certain sort, and are arranged in a certain order, especially with respect to the incidents comprising their respective plots. When a particular telling of the tale departs from the type with respect to one or both of the first two differences while remaining the same with respect to the third (insofar, namely, as this consists in its complication and resolution), it is called a variant, as a tale belongs to the Cinderella type when the fairy godmother is replaced by the spirit of the heroines dead mother, but the tale is otherwise the same in its essentials (a humble maiden, unjustly thrust into servitude, unexpectedly finding happiness in marriage to a prince); it being the complication and resolution of stories which makes them the same or different.8
6

Cf. Stith Thompson, in Maria Leach. (ed.) Standard Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology, and Legend (1972), s.v. Motif: While the term motif is used very loosely to include any of the elements going into a traditional tale, it must be remembered that in order to become a real part of tradition an element must have something about it that will make people remember and repeat it. It must be more than commonplace. A mother as such is not a motif. A cruel mother becomes one because she is at least thought to be unusual. The ordinary processes of life are not motifs. To say that John dressed and walked to town is not to give a single motif worth remembering; but to say that the hero put on his cap of invisibility, mounted his magic carpet, and went to the land east of the sun and west of the moon is to include at least four motifs the cap, the carpet, the magic air journey, and the marvelous land. Each of these motifs lives on because it has been found satisfying by generations of tale-tellers. Cf. also Philip Mayerson, Classical Mythology in Literature, Art and Music (Waltham, Mass., 1971), p. 18: The psychologist, for example, has made much over the motifs of violence and cruelty that persist in mythological forms, but as Stith Thompson has astutely perceived, ordinary life processes do not develop into folk motifs; there must be something within that process that people will remember and respect. In short, motifs develop from the dramatic, from the more than commonplace action. Cf. also William Harmon and C. Hugh Holman, A Handbook to Literature, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1996), s.v. motif (motive), p. 330: In literature, recurrent images, words, objects, phrases, or actions that tend to unify the work are called motives. 7 By theme here I mean the main point a poet or storyteller wishes to make: it is the central insight, concept, or controlling idea of the work, a kind of argument which the author intends to establish by moving the reader to the understanding of reality he has, as Chesterton holds Cinderella to mean exaltavit humiles. Cp. also M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 4th ed. (New York, Holt, Rinehart, & Wilson: 1981), s.v. motif and theme, p. 111: Theme is sometimes used interchangeably with motif, but the term is more usefully applied to an abstract claim, or doctrine, whether implicit or asserted, which an imaginative work is designed to incorporate and make persuasive to the reader. 8 Cf. Aristotle, Poet. ch. 18 (1456a 7-10) (tr. B.A.M.): But in nothing so much as the plot is it right to speak of a tragedy as different and the same; but this [is the case with those] of which there is the same complication and resolution. Cf. also Wilhelm Grimm, Kinder- und Hausmrchen (1856), tr. Margaret Hunt, Grimms Household Tales (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884), II, p. 575 : The resemblance existing between the stories not only of nations widely removed from each other by time and distance, but also between those which lie near together, consists partly in the underlying idea and the delineation of particular characters and partly in the weaving together and unraveling of incidents.

A myth is a traditional story, at one time believed to be true, the motifs of which are primarily concerned with divine things,9 or with things divine and human,10 understood as the first principles of things, and so considered to be the truth or true things, which it conveys symbolically for the purpose of leading to something virtuous,11 doing so by the arousing of wonder,12 especially the wondering fear called awe.13
9

Cf. Clement of Alexandria, The Stromata, or Miscellanies V, 4 (ed. ANF, Vol. II), All then, in a word, who have spoken of divine things, both Barbarians and Greeks, have veiled the first principles of things, and delivered the truth in enigmas, and symbols, and allegories, and metaphors, and such like tropes. But those, taught in theology by those prophets, the poets, philosophize much by way of a hidden sense. I meanthose in this fashion wise [or possessed of wisdom]. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Meta., lect. 11, nn. 3-4 (tr. B.A.M.): n. 3 ...Concerning the first, one must consider that among the Greeks, or natural philosophers, there were certain men pursuing wisdom who meddled with the gods themselves, hiding the truth of divine things under a certain covering of fables [ qui deis se intromiserunt occultantes veritatem divinorum sub quodam tegmine fabularum], as did Orpheus, Hesiod, and certain others; as Plato also hid the truth of philosophy under mathematics, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the Predicaments.... Those followers of Hesiod, then, named the first principles of things gods; and they said that these among the number of the gods who have not tasted a certain sweet food called nectar or manna are made mortal; but those who have tasted it are made immortal. Cf. Aristotle, Meta., XII. 8 (1074b 1-14) (tr. W. D. Ross): [1074b] Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth [ en muthou schemati], that these bodies are gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form [ ta de loipa muthikos ede prosektai] with a view to the [5] persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. Note that the first part of my definition embraces the first member of Aristotles division, while the last part is most proper to his second species; cf. the text of St. Thomas on fabula, shortly to be cited, which will be seen to apply especially to this latter (and later) form of myth. 10 Cf. the traditional definition of wisdom as knowledge of things divine and human (Cicero, De. Off. 1.153); myth being the original embodiment of such wisdom. 11 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Proem, In I Post. An., lect. 1, n. 6 (tr. B.A.M.): And poetic [poetica] is ordered to this; for it belongs to the poet to lead to something virtuous [ inducere ad aliquod virtuosum] through some becoming representation [decentem repraesentationem]. As the text cited in the next footnote makes clear, St. Thomas understands poetica widely to include myth or fable. 12 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super I ad Thim., cp. 4, lect. 2 (tr. B.A.M.): For a fable [fabula], according to the Philosopher, is composed of wonders [composita ex miris, cf. Meta. I. 2, 982b 19], and they were invented in the beginning (as the Philosopher says on Poetry) because it was the intention of men that they would lead to the acquiring of virtues and the avoiding of vices [ad acquirendum virtutes, et vitandum vitia]. Simple men, however, are better led by representations than by arguments. And so in a wonder well-represented pleasure [delectabilitas] appears, because reason is pleased in comparison. And just as a representation in deeds is pleasing, so is a representation in words: and this is a fable, namely, something called representing, and by representing moving to something. For the ancients used to have certain fables accommodated to certain true things [accommodatas aliquibus veris], which truth [veritas] they used to disguise in fables. So there are two things in a fable, namely, that it contain a true sense, and that it represent something useful [utile; opp. inanis, pointless, inane, and therefore useless]. Again, that it be appropriate [conveniens; opp. inepta, foolish, silly] to that truth. If, then, a fable be proposed which cannot represent a truth, it is pointless [inanis]; but what does not properly represent is foolish [inepta], like the fables of the Talmud. In sum, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, a fable is a representation in words, composed of wonders accommodated to certain true things; being suitable to conveying that truth insofar as it properly represents it, and useful insofar as it leads to the acquiring of virtues and the avoiding of vices; doing so by reason of its delightfulness; i.e. something called representing, and by representing, moving to something. In other words, a fable is a fictitious narrative symbolically conveying a truth natural or divine by imitating in words an action that is stimulative of wonder, and so leading men to virtue. (For a detailed exegesis of this passage, see my paper Excursus on Myth.) 13 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 41, art. 4, ad 4 (tr. B.A.M.): To the fourth it must be said that not every kind of wonder [admiratio] and amazement [stupor] are species of fear, but the wonder which regards a large-scale evil [magno malo], and the amazement which regards an unwonted evil [malo insolito]. Or it may be said that just as shrinking recoils from the labor of doing an outward work, so wonder

A folktale is a traditional story, at no time believed to be true, the motifs of which are concerned essentially with the life, problems and aspirations of ordinary people, the folk14that is, with exclusively human things, the purpose of which is to entertain.15 Some stories, of course, may be difficult to categorize; the tale of Perseus and Andromeda, for instance. This story is part of Greek myth; yet it conforms to a folktale type, The Dragon-Slayer, which is the first story-pattern listed in Aarne and Thompsons The Types of the Folktale (i.e. AT 300). Nevertheless, the broad outlines of this division are clear: for, just as in nature there are certain forms of life difficult to categorize as plant or animal so, too, among narratives there are stories difficult to assign to myth or folktale without the distinction between them being undermined.
and shock recoil from the difficulty of the contemplation of something great and unwonted, whether it is good or evil, such that in this way wonder and shock stand to the act of the understanding just as shrinking to an outward act. Hence, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, a certain kind of good or evil can be magnus, or it can be insolitus. Magnus is what is great or large-scale, such as the evil of an earthquake or tidal wave which devastates an entire region and causes untold deaths. Taken in this sense, we may translate St. Thomass term admiratio more accurately as shock, as one is shocked to learn of so many deaths. Insolitus is what is unwonted or outside the usual course of events, like the sudden appearance of a comet or of a new strain of virus. Taken in this sense, we may better translate stupor as horror. Of course, one and the same object may be both large-scale and unwonted. When a great and good object of wonder causes one to feel his own smallness, the sensation is one of awe, such as Moses felt in the presence of the divine apprehended in the Burning Bush. Now certain myths will arouse these species of emotion, for instance, tales of Hades and eternal punishment and the like, such as were characteristic of the ancient pagan religion, and so coming under the civil or political theology as explained by the Roman Varro. On tales of this sort, cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, Life of Plato. Translated by C. D. Yonge (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853): XLIV. In his dialogues he (Plato) used to speak of justice as a kind of law of God, as being of influence sufficient to excite men to act justly, in order to avoid suffering punishment as malefactors after death. Owing to which he appeared to some people rather fond of mythical stories [muthikoteros], as he mingled stories of this kind with his writings, in order by the uncertainty of all the circumstances that affect men after their death, to induce them to abstain from evil actions. And these were his opinions. Cf. also Critias fr. 25 DK (from Sisyphus, satiric play; tr. Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 157-158): Then, when the laws forbade them to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear (of the gods) for mortals, that there might be some means of frightening the wicked, even if they do anything or say or think it in secret. Hence he introduced the Divine (religion), saying that there is a God flourishing with immortal life, hearing and seeing with his mind, and thinking of everything and caring about these things, and having divine nature, who will hear everything said among mortals, and will be able to see all that is done. And even if you plan anything evil in secret, you will not escape the gods in this; for they have surpassing intelligence. In saying these words, he introduced the pleasantest of teachings, covering up the truth with a false theory [ yeudei= kalu/ysaj th\n a)lh/qeian lo/g%, lit. hiding the truth with/by an untrue story/accountB.A.M.]. 14 G. S. Kirk, The Nature of Greek Myths (Middlesex: Penguin, 1974), p. 33. Kirk goes on to add that [f]olktales tend to be realistic but at the same time impersonal; they are set not in the timeless past, as myths often are, but in specific but anonymous time and place, and their characters usually have generic names. These tales are designed for the people, and for Everyman, and they are kept as general and as universal as possible. Ingenuity and unexpected success: these are the qualities that bring amusement and excitement into ordinary lives, and they are applied to ideal people in ideal landscapes simply because nothing quite like that ever happens at home. (ibid. p. 34). Cf. also De Vos and Altmann, op.cit, p. 9: All of the force of a folktale is in the plot, which is laid out as a straightforward, linear string of events. The characters have no inwardness or complexity. They are typesof goodness, beauty, wickedness, sloth, cleverness, power, or innocence. Note that while every fairy tale is a folktale, not every folktale is a fairy tale; the latter being characterized by its fulfillment of the hearts desire, as with Cinderella or Sleeping Beauty, whereas this characteristic is ab sent from non-Mrchen folktales such as The Juniper Tree in Grimm. 15 Cf. Mayerson, op. cit., p. 17: [A] great number of traditional tales were told principally and simply for the sake of amusement. Cf. also Sir James Frazer, in the introduction to his edition of Apollodorus Bibliotheca, as cited by Mayerson, p. 17: [F]olktaleshave no other aim than the entertainment of the hearers and make no real claim on his credulity....

A legend16 is a traditional story having a foundation, however slight, in fact.17 A saga is a form of legend written in Iceland, and in the language of that country.18 A romance is, in the first place, a legend from the age of chivalry elaborated toward the marvelous,19 although the name has been extended to include any tale of love or adventure involving the marvelous (especially the kind of marvel satisfying the hearts desire), and characterized by a happy ending.20
16

From the Latin legenda, what is to be read, as with Saints Lives. Cf. Shalom Spiegel, Introduction to Legends of the Bible. By Louis Ginzberg (The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia: 1956), p. xi: The word legend is derived from the Latin legenda meaning to be read. The term originally applied to narratives of the Middle Ages, such as lives of the saints, which had to be read as a religious duty. However what the word suggests need not be limited to its ecclesiastical usage. In a broader sense, legend may be taken to imply whatever will come to be read by successive ages into an event or record of the past: the evernew and ever-changing rereading of old sources by new generations of men. Great events and great books have a posthumous story of their own. Each following period pours its inner life into the patient and pliant texts of old. In turn the familiar documents reward and surprise new inquirers with new answers . 17 Cf. Mayerson, op. cit., p. 17: Legends or sagasthe Scandinavian word saga is often used, since legend has also acquired the very general meaning of story or narrativeare those tales which contain an element, no matter how minimal and tenuous, of historical fact. Unlike myths, the main characters of these narratives are human; the events described (a famous raid, a great migration, a dangerous hunt) have a basis in fact. But as the story passes from generation to generation, from singer to singer, and is ultimately put into writing, the original version has been so elaborated and so modified that it bears little resemblance to the actual event. A good illustration of the legendary narrative is Homer s Iliad. It has its setting in a very real war of the Late Bronze Age, the Trojan War, but the causes of the war, the intervention of the gods in its conduct, and the military strategy described by Homer, have no bearing on the historical facts of the war. Strabo, a geographer and historian during the reign of Augustus, appositely remarks : Homer took the Trojan War, a historical fact, and decked it out with his fanciful stories . Cf. also Thompson, The Folktale, p. 21: Sometimes the expression wonder tale or fairy tale is applied to stories filled with incredible marvels, in contrast to legends, which are presumably based upon fact. 18 Cf. W. A. Craigie, LL.D., The Icelandic Sagas (1913), Chap. 1, The Origin of the Sagas: The general title of Icelandic Sagas is used to denote a very extensive body of prose literature written in Iceland, and in the language of that country, at various dates between the middle of the twelfth century and the beginning of the fifteenth; the end of the period, however, is less clearly marked than the beginning. The common feature of the works classed under this name, which vary greatly in length, value, and interest, is that they have the outward form of historical or biographical narratives; but the matter is often purely fictitious, and in many cases fact and fiction are inseparably blended. Both in the form and in the matter there is much that is conventional, and many features of style and content are quite peculiar to the special Icelandic mode of storytelling. The word saga (of which the plural is sgur) literally means, something said, and was in use long before there was any written literature in Iceland. From an early period it had been a custom, which in course of time became an accomplishment and an art, to put together in a connected form the exploits of some notable man or the record of some memorable event, and to relate the story thus composed as a means of entertainment and instruction. It was out of these oral narratives, augmented and elaborated during the course of several centuries, that the written saga finally arose. 19 In which case, the task of the storyteller is to relate not what is possible, strictly speaking, but only on an hypothesis (ex hupothesi)the assumption in question being granted by the listener only to the extent that it is found pleasing; the sequence of incidents related being in accordance with what is likely or necessary, given the initial postulate. In sum, one might say that the romancer relates what is impossible, strictly speaking, but (seemingly) possible by virtue of his treatment of it, the reby rendering it likely and hence believable. Cf. Aristotles observation (Poet. ch. 24, 1460a 17-18) that when recounting a story, everyone adds something in order to gratify his hearers; people being willing to grant literary belief to impossible fictions solely insofar as they find them psuchogikethat is, engaging or otherwise entertaining. 20 Cf. Sir Walter Scott, Essay on Romance (First published in the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1824):

A fairy tale or Mrchen (the preeminent form of folktale), [i]n its written form tends to be a narrative in prose about the fortunes and misfortunes of a hero or heroine who, having experienced various adventures of a more or less supernatural kind, lives happily ever after. Magic, charms, disguise and spells are some of the major ingredients in such stories, which are often subtle in their interpretation of human nature and psychology.21 Or again, [a] Mrchen is a tale of some length involving a succession of motifs or episodes. It moves in an unreal world without definite locality or definite characters and is filled with the marvelous (Stith Thompson, The Folktale, p. 7). Hence, the motifs of fairy tale characteristically deal in magic and the fantastic, in spells, curses and wishes (usually in threes), in astonishing transformations (Beauty and the Beast), in giants, witches, ghosts, monsters and spirits, and in story-types like the kings son or daughter who is lost in the wild country (forest or mountain), looked after by animals (or by dwarfs) and eventually rediscovered to live happily ever after. Heroes are good and infinitely resourceful; heroines beautiful and ill-starred, and wicked characters keep cropping up in the same roles, for example, the wicked stepmother or the witch.22 In the text just cited, the author is professedly speaking of folk-tale; but as Stith Thompson points out (in The Folktale, p. 4):
Although the term folktale is often used in English to refer to the household tale or fairy tale (the German Mrchen), such as Cinderella or Snow White, it is also legitimately employed in a much broader sense to include all forms of prose narrative, written or oral, which have come to be handed down through the years. In this usage the important fact is the traditional nature of the material. In contrast to the modern story writers striving after originality of plot and treatment, the teller of a folktale is proud of his ability to hand on that which he has received. He usually desires to impress his readers or hearers with the fact that he is bringing them something that has the stamp of good authority, that the tale was heard from some great story teller or from some aged person who remembered it from old days.

As for the primary division of tales made evident by the study of folklore, Thompson states that World-wide also are many of the structural forms which oral narrative has assumed. The hero tale, the explanatory legend, the animal anecdotecertainly these at least are present everywhere (ibid., p. 5). He goes on to say:
Dr. Johnson has defined Romance, in its primary sense, to be a military fable of the middle ages; a tale of wild adventures in love and chivalry. But although this definition expresses correctly the ordinary idea of the word, it is not sufficiently comprehensive to answer our present purpose. A composition may be a legitimate romance, yet neither refer to love nor chivalryto war nor to the middle ages. The wild adventures are almost the only absolutely essential ingredient in Johnson s definition. We would be rather inclined to describe a Romance as a fictitious narrative in prose or verse; the interest of which turns upon marvellous and uncommon incidents; being thus opposed to the kindred term Novel, which Johnson has de-scribed as a smooth tale, generally of love; but which we would rather define as a fictitious narrative, differing from the Romance, because the events are accommodated to the ordinary train of human events, and the modern state of society. Apropos the happy ending, in the same place Scott, comp aring the sacred form of romance to the profane, remarks: Lastly, the conclusion of the Romance, which usually assigns to the champion a fair realm, an abundant succession, and a train of happy years, consigns to the martyr his fane and altar upon earth, and in heaven his seat among saints and angels, and his share in a blessed eternity. That the marvels of romance (and, eo ipso, of fairy tale) are of the sort which satisfy the hearts desire is evident both from a perusal of instances and from the requirements for a happy ending; it being those things which surpass the limitations of the mortal stateprimarily suffering and deathwhich make us happy. 21 J. A. Cuddon, A Dictionary of Literary Terms (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 258. 22 [No Author Given (no year given)]: Notes on Greek Tragedy [WWW document] http://www.craigflower.supanet.com/tragnotes.htm [10/7/04]

Of all words used to distinguish the class of prose narrative, myth is the most confusing. The difficulty is that it has been discussed too long and that it has been used in too many different senses. The history of such discussion is interesting but inconclusive. As used in this book myth will be taken to mean a tale laid in a world supposed to have preceded the present order. It tells of sacred beings and of semi-divine heroes and of the origins of all things, usually through the agency of these sacred beings. Myths are intimately connected with religious beliefs and practices of the people. They may be essentially hero legends or etiological stories, but they are systematized and given religious significance. The hero is somehow related to the rest of the pantheon and the origin story becomes an origin myth by attachment to the adventures of some god or demi-god. Whether hero legend and origin story generally preceded myth or whether they became detached from it, the fundamental difference between these forms is reasonably clear. (The Folktale, p. 9)

Not only is a definition of myth difficult to arrive at, so is the primary division of tales. In a separate discussion, Thompson remarks:
Most of the writers whom we read in this seminar do at least refer, generally speaking, to stories that have become traditional. But of those traditional stories, which ones shall be called myth, which ones legends and traditions (the German Sagen), which shall be called folktales, and which animal talesall of that never seems very clear to the reader of many books on mythology. Among the writers of the present symposium, there seems, however, to be some agreement. All agree that stories about the gods and their activities in general are myths.23

In the same address, he further elaborates on this point:

Whether we use the strict definition of myth suggested or include hero tales and those of animal origins, there is a point at which any confusion between folktale and myth ceases. The European fairy tales, for example Cinderella and Snow White, have few of the usual characteristics of myth. They are filled, of course, with the supernatural, but most narratives going back a long way are filled with the supernatural. In Europe, at least, they generally function as pure fiction and are not the subjects of real belief. Yet there is a difficulty in any such assertion, because stories with exactly the same plots are frequently told among tribes where they seem to be implicitly believed in. The attempts to define Mrchen or fairy tale turn out to be almost as unsatisfactory as those to make a strict definition of myth. The two forms continually flow into each other, and it is likely that the distinction between Mrchen and other types of folk narrative is largely confined to Western culture.24

In The Folktale, Thompsons primary division is into Animal Tales, Ordinary Folktales, and Jokes and Anecdotes, with fairy tales being understood to come under Folktales. Putting together these various accounts, we observe that Thompson sees the traditional story as divided into (1) the hero legend, or legends and traditions (the German Sagen), (2) the explanatory legend or myth proper (stories about the gods and their activities in general), (3) animal tales, (4) ordinary folktales, and (5), jokes and anecdotes. In collaboration with Antti Aarne, his detailed division of the last three is as follows:
23

Stith Thompson, Myth and Folktales (1955), in Myth: A Symposium, ed. Thomas A Sebeok (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press: 1974), p. 170. 24 ibid., pp. 175-176. As noted above, however, the fact that there are cases difficult to categorize as one form or another does not undermine the distinction between species. After all, we are dealing with works of art, not nature.

I. Animal Tales a. Wild Animals b. Wild Animals and Domestic Animals c. Man and Wild Animals d. Domestic Animals e. Birds f. Fish g. Other Animals and Objects II. Ordinary Folktales a. Tales of Magic 1. Supernatural Adversaries 2. Supernatural or Enchanted Husband Wife or other Relatives 3. Superhuman Tasks 4. Supernatural Helpers 5. Magic Objects 6. Supernatural Power or Knowledge 7. Other Tales of the Supernatural b. Religious Stories c. Novelle (Romantic tales) d. Tales of the Stupid Ogre III. Jokes and Anecdotes a. Numbskull Stories b. Stories about Married Couples c. Stories about a Woman (Girl) d. Stories about a Man (Boy) e. Tales of Lying f. Formula Tales g. Unclassified Tales (Aarne, Antti A., and Stith Thompson. The Types of the Folktale: A Classification and Bibliography. Folklore Fellows Communications no. 184. Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica, l96l. Revised edn. 1964. Second revision, Helsinki: Soumalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1981.)

*** (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All Rights Reserved. N.B. See also my paper Poetry and History (Papers In Poetics 7) as well as my Excursus on Myth.