Journal of Safety Research 34 (2003) 143 156 www.elsevier.com/locate/jsr www.nsc.

org

Mental models of safety: do managers and employees see eye to eye?

Gregory E. Prussia a,*, Karen A. Brown b, P. Geoff Willis c
b

Seattle University, 900 Broadway, Seattle, WA 98122, USA University of Washington, Bothell, 18115 Campus Way Northeast, Bothell, WA 98011-8246, USA c University of Central Oklahoma, 100 North University Drive, Edmond, OK 73024, USA Received 12 April 2002; accepted 30 September 2002

Abstract Problem: Disagreements between managers and employees about the causes of accidents and unsafe work behaviors can lead to serious workplace conflicts and distract organizations from the important work of establishing positive safety climate and reducing the incidence of accidents. Method and Results: In this study, the authors examine a model for predicting safe work behaviors and establish the models consistency across managers and employees in a steel plant setting. Using the model previously described by Brown, Willis, and Prussia (2000), the authors found that when variables influencing safety are considered within a framework of safe work behaviors, managers and employees share a similar mental model. The study then contrasts employees and managers specific attributional perceptions. Findings from these more fine-grained analyses suggest the two groups differ in several respects about individual constructs. Most notable were contrasts in attributions based on their perceptions of safety climate. When perceived climate is poor, managers believe employees are responsible and employees believe managers are responsible for workplace safety. However, as perceived safety climate improves, managers and employees converge in their perceptions of who is responsible for safety. Impact on Industry: It can be concluded from this study that in a highly interdependent work environment, such as a steel mill, where high system reliability is essential and members possess substantial experience working together, managers and employees will share general mental models about the factors that contribute to unsafe behaviors, and, ultimately, to workplace accidents. It is possible that organizations not as tightly coupled as steel mills can use such organizations as benchmarks, seeking ways to create a shared understanding of factors that contribute to a safe work environment. Part of this improvement effort should focus on advancing organizational safety climate. As climate improves, managers and employees are likely to agree more about the causes of safe/unsafe behaviors and workplace accidents, ultimately increasing their ability to work in unison to prevent accidents and to respond appropriately when they do occur. Finally, the survey items included in this study may be useful to organizations wishing to conduct self-assessments. D 2003 National Safety Council and Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Attributions; Accidents; Mental models; Safe behaviors; Safety climate

1. Problem Industrial workplace safety requires multilevel support and cooperation. Top-level managers must establish a positive safety climate, supervisors must demonstrate caring attitudes and good examples, maintenance people need to keep equipment operating safely, and operators must establish sustainable safe work habits (DeJoy, 1994; Thompson, Hilton, & Witt, 1998). Moreover, everyone must be involved in removing safety hazards and engage in postincident assessments (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998).

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-206-296-2514. E-mail address: gprussia@seattleu.edu (G.E. Prussia).

Although the most successful safety programs involve multilevel cooperation, years of history and traditional barriers across organizational lines can make it difficult. The human tendency for blame-casting, which has been described in the context of attribution theory (Brown, 1984; DeJoy, 1994; Mitchell & Wood, 1980), can lead to nonproductive finger-pointing and the deterioration of crosslevel relationships. For example, in postaccident reflection, the manager may focus on an employees carelessness in using equipment. In contrast, the injured employee is likely to identify poor equipment function or another factor external to him- or herself as the cause. If we examine this phenomenon in more depth, we are likely to find that even if carelessness is implicated, the behavior is likely to have been the outcome of the climate created by the organization

0022-4375/03/$ - see front matter D 2003 National Safety Council and Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0022-4375(03)00011-2

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(DeJoy, 1994). Attributions about safety have important implications for action: DeJoy (1994) has noted, actions to manage safety derive more from attributions than from actual causes (p. 3). Many of the conflicts associated with safety arise because of differences in perception. As in the fable of the blind men and the elephant, everyone has a tendency to see only part of the problem. One way to consider potential similarities/differences between managers and employees is to examine shared mental models, an organizational phenomenon that has been studied by a number of researchers (e.g., Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). This study examines safety-related perceptual/attitudinal differences between managers and operating-level employees using a shared mental model framework. It builds on a previous study (Brown, Willis, & Prussia, 2000) that focused on the factors underlying employees propensities to work safely or unsafely, but adds a managerial dimension for comparison. Stemming from the researchers interest in mental models and cross-level differences, two general research questions are addressed. First, do managers and employees share similar perceptions with regard to factors that lead to safe or unsafe work behaviors? Second, if they do share a general mental model, are there subtleties within construct relationships that differ across the two groups? In terms of this second question, the authors were interested, in particular, in attributional effects related to safety climate. Previous research has examined safety largely from the employees experience or perspective (e.g., Brown et al., 2000; Mottel, Long, & Morrison, 1995). However, we may gain a more complete understanding of workplace safety by comparing managers and workers perceptions regarding workplace safety. If workers and managers hold different perceptions about the intertwining causal factors that lead to unsafe behaviors and other causes of accidents, then the discrepancy can create a chasm between actions and the perceived need for actions. 1.1. Employee/manager safety perceptions Anecdotal remarks from Vukmirs (1999) anthology of steel worker interviews point out manager-versus-employee differences regarding responsibility for safety. For example, a retiree asked to comment about plant accidents recalled: . . .When a guy got hurt he had to go to the hospital. It happened, that happened to me. No it was human error, or. . .well, down there. . .the responsibility rests with the injured employee (p. 232). This and other narratives from Vukmirs book, The Mill, add human faces and emotion to the accident-related tensions between managers and workers. However, it should be noted that Vukmirs analysis was based on historical reflections from the 1930s to the 1970s. Many safety professionals would say that much has changed since then, but are the changes real and measurable? More specifically, do managers and employees see

eye to eye in a very dangerous work setting where disasters still happen? Although first-level workers find themselves at the front lines of production and are involved in the majority of industrial accidents, it is likely that many root causes are outside their control (Brown et al., 2000). Management is responsible for creating a system within which employees can operate safely. Unfortunately, although management may perceive the workplace and rules governing it as benevolent, employees may hold a contrary notion. Previous research has shown that differing and discordant beliefs concerning the workplace lead to dysfunctional effects on quality (Howard & Foster, 1999), corporate culture (Shadur, 1999), teamwork (Kirkman & Shapiro, 2000), customer service (Zerbi & Dobni, 1998), perceived fairness (Niehoff & Moorman, 1996), computer monitoring (George, 1996), organizational commitment (McElroy & Morrow, 1995), and personnel management (Toulson & Smith, 1994). These consequences highlight the need for a better understanding of the existence and extent of shared perceptionsshared mental modelswithin an industrial safety framework. 1.2. Shared mental models The notion of shared mental models (or collective mind) has received considerable attention in management and organizational psychology literature (e.g., Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Rousse & Morris, 1986; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Holyoak (1984) defined a mental model as a . . .psychological representation of the environment and its expected behavior. Rousse and Morris (1986) further noted that if a group shares a mental model, it serves as the basis for future event prediction and choice regarding courses of action. Such diagnoses and decisions are all fundamental to the safety process in any organization. For example, Weick and Roberts (1993) examined aircraft carrier processes and demonstrated that groups with shared models perform more effectively than those without a collective mind. Shared mental models are the result of selection, training, and experience, and they are more likely to exist under conditions of cohesiveness and membership stability. Furthermore, they are particularly important in environments requiring nearly continuous operating reliability: Organizations concerned with reliability enact mental processes that are more fully-developed than those found in organizations concerned with efficiency (Weick & Roberts, 1993, p. 357). In the current research, the authors place the mental model concept into the context of organizations that may not meet the high-reliability standard of aircraft carriers, but by their nature, have at least some of these characteristics steel mills. Perrow (1984) described steel plants as tightly coupled, fast-paced systems where even a small error in one place has ripple effects that can lead to disastrous outcomes throughout. Thus, safety is a critical issue in steel plants, and

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shared mental models within groups may be indicative of effective or ineffective behavior patterns. By exploring the existence and influence of these models, one may better understand the choices individuals and groups make about safe work practices. This research is built on a mental model first described by Brown et al. (2000). It depicts a set of constructs that predict employees self-reported propensities to work safely or unsafely. The model is, no doubt, part of a larger mental model, given that these collective mind networks are normally very complex and multilayered (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Brown et al. refer to this particular mental model as a sociotechnical model of factors predicting safe work behaviors. It is described briefly in the following section and serves as the foundation for determining whether and to what degree employees and managers share mental models pertaining to safe work behavior. 1.3. A sociotechnical model of safe work behaviors The model was developed using a balanced set of indicators that comprise a sociotechnical model of causal predictors of safe work behavior. Sociotechnical systems (STS) represent a broad area of organizational study that examines the interactions, synergies, and disconnects between the social or human factors and the technical work factors, such as layout, process design, equipment, information, and so forth. STS concepts were first introduced by Trist and Bamforth (1951), who have been followed by a veritable army of disciples and others interested in identifying principles that will optimize the human system match (e.g., Cherns, 1976; Huber & Brown, 1991).

The sociotechnical safety model, shown in Fig. 1, was empirically tested on employees of a specialty steel mill and served to confirm the reasonableness of a holistic approach to safe workplace behavior antecedents. The model and constructs are discussed in detail in Brown et al. (2000). Results demonstrated that employee decisions about safe behavior are driven by a mix of social factors, technical factors, individual attributes, and organizational conditions. Items used to measure each of these constructs are presented in Table 1, and short definitions of the constructs together with a description of their interrelationships follow. Safety hazards: Tangible factors in the work environment that may pose risks for possible injuries and accidents. Safety climate: Perceptions of the role of safety within the organization and whether or not safety is promoted and emphasized. Pressure for expediency over safety: Perceptions that unsafe behaviors result from inappropriate supervisory and organizational pressures. Cavalier attitude: The tendency for an employee to feel that he or she can ignore safety procedures without incurring an accident or injury. Safety efficacy: The individuals self-perceived confidence in his or her ability to work safely. Safe work behaviors: The frequency with which an employee reports that he or she follows safety procedures. Safe work behaviors represent the criterion variable in the model (see Fig. 1). They are important because of their

Fig. 1. Preliminary sociotechnical model predicting safe work behavior.

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G.E. Prussia et al. / Journal of Safety Research 34 (2003) 143156 Table 1 (continued ) Construct Safety efficacy Scale items I am very active in removing workplace safety and health hazards. I am confident in my ability to remove work place safety and health hazards. Employees feel they can do the job safely without following safety procedures. Employees ignore some safety procedures if they are trying to save time. Employees feel that the safety procedures are not necessary. What percent of the employees in your area follow all of the safety procedures for the jobs that they do? Summed item means (S.D.) 4.94 (1.45)

Table 1 Construct scale items, means, and standard deviations (item format for managerial subjects) Construct Back hazards Scale items Employees stand for long periods. Work surface heights are not correct for employees. Employees work in physically awkward positions. Employees lift objects that are too heavy. Employees lift objects that are too bulky or large. Employees work on elevated surfaces or walkways. Employees work in confined spaces. Employees work near electrical current. Employees work near open flames. Employees are exposed to toxic chemicals. Employees are exposed to infectious agents. Employees are exposed to toxic gas. Employees are exposed to radiation. Employees sit in the same place for long periods. Employee chairs are uncomfortable. Employee chairs are not sturdy. Safety equipment is not within easy reach. Safety equipment does not work very well. Tools or equipment do not work the way they should. Employees do not have the correct tool for the job. Employees work with equipment that vibrates a lot. Employees work with tools that are awkward to hold. Tools/equipment are too cold to hold comfortably. Tools/equipment are too hot to hold comfortably. Top management believes work place safety and health are very important. The union/company safety committee is effective in improving workplace safety and health. The company is concerned about the safety and health of employees when they are away from work. Overall, this is a safe place to work. Employees take safety shortcuts when they feel pressure to work fast. It is difficult for employees to do their tasks while following all of the safety rules. Employees are encouraged to take shortcuts in safety procedures. I am skilled at helping employees to avoid the dangers of work place hazards. Summed item means (S.D.) 7.09 (3.31) 6.92 (3.58) 7.72 (3.76) 8.31 (3.57) 7.32 (3.59) 6.78 (3.77) 5.93 (3.64) 8.75 (4.10) 7.23 (3.97) 7.49 (4.03) 3.74 (2.71) 5.64 (3.91) 3.55 (2.63) 6.67 (2.91) 5.89 (3.54) 5.07 (3.48) 4.70 (2.85) 4.44 (2.61) 6.74 (3.09) 5.81 (3.01) 6.72 (3.64) 6.26 (3.42) 3.51 (1.81) 5.72 (3.53) 5.97 (1.47) 5.69 (1.30)

5.25 (1.21)

Cavalier attitude toward safety procedures

3.89 (1.75)

4.08 (1.73)

3.43 (1.68) 53.36 (28.47)

Industrial hygiene hazards

Safe work behavior

Sitting hazards

Equipment unavailability hazards

Equipment handling hazards

Managerial safety climate

5.08 (1.66)

link with workplace accidents (Mottel et al., 1995; Thompson et al., 1998). They have gained increasing attention in recent years with the safety communitys growing interest in behaviorally based safety programs. This variable was selected in lieu of accidents because of difficulties with frequency of occurrence, flaws in selfreporting of accidents, and the proactive nature of addressing behaviors rather than reacting to accidents. Thompson et al. (1998) provide further arguments for behavior rather than accidents as a useful criterion variable. The constructs on the left side of Fig. 1 (i.e., hazards, climate, pressure) are predominantly system-level attributes. These system factors are predicted to influence person-level factors (cavalier attitude and safety efficacy) and only indirectly affect safe work behavior. In contrast, the person-level constructs are expected to directly influence ultimate safe work behaviors. Brown et al. (2000) tested this sociotechnical safety behavior model using data from a survey completed by 551 operating-level employees in a steel mill. By testing several other models with competing perspectives, they found this particular model to be the best-fitting relationship configuration. However, they did not examine whether employees and managers shared this mental model. 1.4. Hypotheses The purpose of the present study is to extend previous research examining the extent to which managers and employees see eye to eye on important safety issues. It was expected that managers and employees would share a mental model about general safety relationships, the sociotechnical model in Fig. 1, for two reasons: (a) shared mental models are particularly important in environments

Pressure

5.58 (1.26) 4.05 (1.60) 3.24 (1.66)

1.66 (1.08) 5.05 (1.24)

Safety efficacy

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requiring nearly continuous operating reliability (Weick & Roberts, 1993); (b) as discussed previously, groups that have worked together over time and who share commitment to organizational goals tend to exhibit less variance in their mental models of system functions, behaviors, and casual sequences. The focal organization in the current research had just implemented a company-wide behaviorally based safety program in the preceding 3-year period. (Although the authors have witnessed situations in which behaviorally based programs inappropriately shift responsibility for safety onto the shoulders of employees, the system implemented in this organization was based on a strong sense of managerial responsibility and employee manager partnership.) Additionally, turnover in the plant was almost nonexistent; most employees had spent their entire careers with the company. Consequently, managers and employees within this context were expected to share general beliefs regarding important safety relationships. Although managers and employees possibly share an overall mental model, they are more likely to differ regarding specific safety characteristics and the strength of their relationships. These differences may be the result of unique attributions made by managers and employees. Researchers have previously documented the tendency for an observer to blame a person when an unfortunate event occurs even when such blame is inappropriate (Brown, 1984; Mitchell & Wood, 1980). This blame-casting bias is labeled the fundamental attribution error. Furthermore, the tendency to externalize problems or take undue credit for success is termed the self-serving bias. These attribution biases may explain why managers and employees sometimes view safety issues differently. For example, DeJoy (1986, 1994) noted that when employees perceive expediency-oriented pressures, they are more likely to cut corners. However, it is doubtful that managers share employees perceptions about either the existence of such pressures or their possible antecedents. Indeed, managers might make self-serving attributions to avoid blame associated with accidents resulting from pressure-induced shortcuts. Based on these tendencies, managers and employees were expected to differ in their perceptions of the individual constructs depicted in the sociotechnical model. Finally, while managers might attempt to foster a safe work environment, specific employee perceptions regarding the influence of safety climate on important safety outcomes may differ from those maintained by managers because of differences in attributions. Managers have great control over safety climate (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Perrow, 1984; Vaughan, 1996), but whether they exercise that control and whether it ultimately influences safe behavior and perceptions of responsibility varies among organizations. However, given the tendency for blame casting within a safety context (e.g., DeJoy, 1994) together with the inclination toward self-serving biases, we expect employees and man-

agers to differ in their mental models concerning important safety climate effects. In sum, expected that managers and employees in a steel plant would share a general mental model regarding the factors that predict employee safe behavior. However, based on the authors understanding of attribution theory and safety climate, authors predicted that a more fine-grained analysis would reveal differences between the two groups. The hypotheses were tested using a field study, as described in the following.

2. Method and results 2.1. Sample Data were collected from a specialty steel company in the southeastern United States using a survey instrument and supporting observational study. The organization had engaged in a comprehensive effort to improve safety climate and behavior during the 5 years before the study. The safety program was comprehensive and involved employee input. Survey participants included operating-level employees as well as managers or supervisors. For the present study, two separate data sets were used: a manager only data set and a combined data set (employees and managers). The combined data set included some of the variables used in the Brown et al. (2000) study, but the current data and analysis are unique because (a) they include managers, (b) they allow for an examination of manager-specific data as well as comparisons between managers and employees, and, (c) they include variables not considered in previous research. Survey items were developed based on extensive interviews in several plants across several industries, including the facilities where the survey was administered for this study. The survey was pilot-tested with both operating-level personnel and management-level personnel from both of the plants where the study was to be conducted. Survey introduction to managers, conducted by one of the authors and embellished with supporting commentary from top management, took place in the company auditorium. A total of 121 managers out of 190 responded to the survey for a response rate of 64%. Five hundred and fifty-one out of 800 operating-level employees from 19 departments returned usable surveys resulting in a response rate of 69%. Respondents represented a cross-section of departments and shifts and included those who supervised or conducted work in the areas of equipment operation, maintenance, quality control, and others. Given the two objectives of this research, the data were considered in two stages. In Stage 1, the structural modeling analyses was used to examine the extent to which the sociotechnical model that was tested previously on employee data yielded similar results with a different popula-

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tionmanagers. This analysis would indicate whether managers and employees perceive a similar set of important safety relationships when considered simultaneously. Next, in Stage 2, the analysis was narrowed to specific variable relationships. This more fine-grained analysis examined differences between employees and managers regarding perceptions of important safety outcomes. The influence of climate on the perceptions of safety outcomes was also a focus of the second analysis. 2.2. Stage 1: Structural modeling analyses Initial structural modeling procedures involved the manager-only data set to assess fit with the previously established sociotechnical model. If the model fit, this would suggest that managers and employees share a similar mental model concerning the measures and overall constellation of relationships leading to safe work behavior. Subsequent analyses in Stage 1 used the combined data set and focused on the equivalency of modeled relationships across manager and employee subgroups. If relationships were equivalent, this would provide added evidence regarding the degree to which both groups share a mental model when considering safety relationships simultaneously. To answer these questions, we applied structural modeling procedures to the model presented in Fig. 1. 2.2.1. Measures All the constructs specified in the model (and their associated indicators) were previously derived and tested using the employee-only data set (Brown et al., 2000). Similar latent constructs were created and indicators from the manager data set were pinpointed to enable model testing and facilitate group comparisons. Using latent variables allowed the authors to avoid problems associated with measurement error (James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982). Items included in both employee and manager surveys were virtually identical, although items in the manager surveys indicated how the managers felt these factors affected employees. For example, an employee item, such as Tools that I need are difficult to reach, was modified for the manager survey to Tools that employees need are difficult to reach. All measures in the employee and manager surveys reflect this subtle difference unless otherwise indicated. The following measures were derived from the manager-only data set. 2.2.1.1. Safety hazards. Twenty-four items represented workplace hazards in the plant. Managers were asked to rate the extent to which they considered each item to be a serious hazard for employees and the frequency with which it occurred. Responses for the hazard seriousness items ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great extent), and responses on the corresponding frequency items ranged from 1 (never) to 7 (very often). An importance score was calculated for each hazard item by summing its seriousness

rating with its frequency rating. This approach reduces problems associated with magnifying error through multiplication of two items (Schmidt, 1973). Just the same, separate factor analyses were run on the hazard variables using both multiplicative and additive models. Using a scree plot and an eigenvalue of 1 as a cutoff, results showed that the components of each eigenvector were identical and the largest value in the additive analysis was the same as the largest value in the multiplicative analysis. Thus, no differences were found based on the approach used. The additive model was used heeding Schmidts (1973) warnings about stability and theoretical soundness. Because of the summing procedure, the possible score for each item ranged from 0 (if it was not applicable) to 14 (if it received the highest possible rating of 7 for each of the item subcomponents). The higher the rating, the more serious and more present the hazard. To be consistent with the Brown et al. (2000) measures from employee data, the same five hazard factors were drawn from the manager-only data to indicate safety hazards. Specifically, these five factors included back hazards, hygiene hazards, sitting hazards, equipment unavailability hazards, and equipment handling hazards (see Table 1 for items included within each category). Cronbachs alpha for the scales represented by each of the five factors ranged from .76 to .87. In a further move toward data reduction, importance scores were averaged for individual items within each factor to conserve degrees of freedom in model estimation and for the sake of parsimony (James et al., 1982). 2.2.1.2. Safety climate. Four items representing perceptions of upper managements influence on workplace safety served as indicators of the Safety Climate construct. An example is, Top management believes workplace safety and health are very important. Coefficient alpha for the items was estimated at .88. Although these items were previously included as an aggregated scale indicator of safety climate (see Brown et al., 2000), in this study, each item was used as a separate indicator because the manager survey did not include other items representing supervisory safety climate. All items were rated on 7-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). These items are similar to those Zohar (1980) included in his examination of industrial safety climate; however, the individual rather than the organization was used as the unit of analysis. The authors focused on the individual for three reasons. First, observations at the study site led the authors to believe there were safety climate differences across departments. Second, the model originally proposed and tested by Brown et al. (2000) emphasized the effects of employees cognitive interpretations on the person-based outcomes highlighted in the model. Safety climate was measured at the individual level in that study to be consistent with other measures in the model. Third, according to Klimoski and Mohammed (1994), mental models and other cognitive constructs have

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traditionally been considered at the individual-level of analysis (p. 406). Examining mental model differences between just two groups almost necessitates an individuallevel focus. 2.2.1.3. Pressure. Pressure was assessed to value expediency over safety with three separate item indicators. For example, managers rated the extent to which Employees take safety shortcuts when they feel pressure to work fast. Responses ranged from 1 (never) to 7 (very often). Coefficient alpha for the three-item scale was only .58 (it had been .69 for similar items in the employee survey), but each item was used as a separate indicator so the authors could be consistent with the previous measurement model and avoid relying on a single indicator for the pressure construct. 2.2.1.4. Cavalier attitude. Three items measured the extent to which the managers believed employees held what was termed a cavalier attitude toward safety procedures. For example, managers assessed the degree to which Employees feel that they can work safely without following safety procedures. Again, responses ranged from 1 (never) to 7 (very often). Coefficient alpha for this threeitem scale was estimated at .87. Similar to the way in which the pressure construct was handled, three items were used to serve as unique indicators of the cavalier construct. 2.2.1.5. Safety efficacy. Based on Banduras (1986) recommendation regarding the measurement of efficacy perceptions, three items were used that assessed safety efficacy strength. An example item was, I am confident in my ability to remove workplace safety and health hazards. Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). These items were different from employee items in that they did not capture managers impressions of employees, but rather managers beliefs about their own abilities/ behaviours. Coefficient alpha was .85, but for modeling purposes, the authors used each item as a separate indicator of the safety efficacy construct. 2.2.1.6. Safe work behavior. Although the employee data included two items to assess safe work behavior, the managers assessed only one of the two items. Thus, the authors used a single item as an indicator of this criterion variable. The item asked managers: About what percent of the employees in your area (or in the plant if you do not supervise operating personnel) follow all of the safety procedures for the jobs that they do? Possible responses ranged from 0% to 100%, in 10% increments. Because the construct was assessed using a single indicator, the researchers corrected for measurement error using the formula provided by Williams and Hazer (1986). Specifically, the square root of the reliability estimate of the indicator (estimated at .85) was used to fix the measurement parameter. Furthermore, the error variance was fixed to 1 minus the

reliability multiplied by the item variance. This procedure is common in covariance structure analysis (e.g., Farkas & Tetrick, 1989; Prussia & Kinicki, 1996; Wayne & Ferris, 1990), and the resulting parameter estimates are accurate and unbiased (see Netemeyer, Johnston, & Burton, 1990). All constructs and indicators were specified such that analogous measures existed for both manager and employee data sets. This facilitated the eventual creation of the combined data set. 2.2.2. Analyses Initial Stage 1 analyses focused on the manager-only data. Before examining structural relationships in the model, the authors wanted to see if the measures made sense and whether the various constructs were theoretically independent. Thus, a confirmatory factor analysis of the proposed measurement model was run initially. This established a baseline measurement model. Next, the researchers evaluated the theoretical independence of the proposed constructs by comparing the baseline measurement model to a collapsed model that specifies perfect correlation among all latent variables. Structural model relationships were examined after measurement model propriety was established. Subsequent Stage 1 analyses involved the combined data set on which the authors made multiple group comparisons using a procedure in EQS (Bentler, 1995). More specifically, both data sets were included in a model in which the structural paths were freely estimated. This model was then compared to a model in which the structural paths were constrained to be equivalent across subgroups. Model chisquare values were then compared to determine whether the models were significantly different. If the constrained model did not significantly differ from the freely estimated model, it would suggest that employees and managers view important safety relationships similarly. Covariance structure analysis (Bentler, 1995; James et al., 1982) was used to examine the proposed model initially with the manager data only and then with the combined data set. CFI and IFI values of .90 and greater indicate adequate model fit (Bollen, 1989). PFI values of .60 and greater are suggested as a rule of thumb criterion for model retention (Williams & Podsakoff, 1989). RMSEA values of .08 or less indicate reasonable error of approximation, and values of .05 or less indicate a close fit (Browne & Cudek, 1992). Individual model paths were evaluated for significance, and the sequential chi-square difference test (James et al., 1982) was used to evaluate model comparisons. All models were tested using procedures in Bentlers (1995) EQS program. 2.2.3. Measurement model results Means, standard deviations, and indicator correlations are provided in Table 2. The results of the confirmatory factor analysis appear in Fig. 2. The figure highlights the factor loadings of the indicators associated with each of the six latent constructs included in this model. The measurement model fit the data well, v2(138) = 190.17, p < .05, and

150

Table 2 Descriptive statistics and interrelationships among indicators Indicator Mean S.D. Correlations 1 1. Back hazards 2. Industrial hygiene hazards 3. Sitting hazards 4. Equipment unavailability hazards 5. Equipment handling hazards 6. Top management safety belief 7. Union/Company safety effectiveness 8. Company concern about safety 9. Overall safe place to work 10. Pressure for shortcuts 11. Cumbersome rules 12. Supervising encouragement 13. Skill at avoiding dangers 14. Active in removing hazards 15. Confident in removing hazards 16. Work safely without rules 17. Ignore rules to save time 18. Safety procedures not necessary 19. Percent of time rules followed * P<0.5. ** P<0.1. 7.19 2.68 6.13 2.62 5.88 2.7 5.42 2.23 .69** .52** .69** 2 .37** .62** .50** 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

5.56 2.45

.77**

.61** .21* .19*

.49** .10 .01

.77**

.64**

G.E. Prussia et al. / Journal of Safety Research 34 (2003) 143156

5.97 1.47 .26* 5.69 1.3 .08

.37** .23** .35** .14

5.08 1.66 .19*

.28** .06

.37** .24**

.59**

.63**

5.58 1.26 .23* 4.05 1.6 3.24 1.66 1.66 1.08 .30** .34** .25**

.29** .08 .15 .27** .20* .01 .12 .11 .26** .41** .16 .19* .04 .22* .02 .14 .10 .17

.36** .33** .25** .20* .31** .18* .17 .14 .19* .11

.65** .12 .13

.67** .11 .12

.70** .09 .06 .12 .29** .42** .30** .21* .15 .18*

.14 .15 .06 .29** .29** .34** .63* .67** .08 .65** .11 .09 .18 .00 .02 .04 .76** .71** .59**

.29** .19* .31** .35** .33** .18* .39** .46** .41** .22* .17 .14

5.05 1.24 .02 4.94 1.45 .14 5.25 1.21 .14 3.89 1.75 4.08 1.73 3.43 1.68 .36** .48** .34**

.46** .04 .47** .13 .46** .08 .24** .24** .22* .39** .57** .35**

.27** .02 .24** .20* .27** .15 .22* .32** .23** .16

.24** .17 .20* .23** .11 .21*

.32** .37** .17 .26**

.39** .20* .20* .19*

.33** .03 .28** .07

53.36 28.47 .11

.05

.03

.04

.05

.23*

.24*

.15

.23*

.06

.00

.03

.06

.08

.10 .34** .31** .27**

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however, managers feel that a strong safety climate can diminish perceptions of pressure ( .31). Results further show that managers believe system factors affect safe behaviors indirectly through person factors. Specifically, pressure is positively related to cavalier attitude (.72) and negatively related to safety efficacy ( .35). Thus, managers feel that when there is more pressure to ignore safety rules and guidelines, employees may develop cavalier attitudes. Furthermore, as they see this pressure rising, managers have less confidence in their own abilities to work safely. Finally, managers believe that a cavalier attitude, a person-level factor, results in less safe behavior ( .24). The structural paths along with overall model fit are very similar to results derived from the employee-only data (see Brown et al., 2000). Subsequent tests involving the combined data set indicated that the two subgroups did not differ when the model paths were constrained to be equal. Specifically, the model in which the paths were constrained to be equivalent, v2(299) = 623.56, p < .05, was not a significantly worse fit compared to the model in which the paths were freely estimated, v2(292) = 615.17, p < .05. This was demonstrated using the sequential chi-square difference test, v2(7) = 8.39, p>.10. Together with the results from the initial structural model analyses, these results demonstrate that the sociotechnical model fits for both employee and manager subgroups. More specifically, employees and managers share a general mental model when multiple relationships are considered simultaneously. 2.3. Stage 2: Specific variable relationships
Fig. 2. Baseline measurement model results.

all standardized factor loadings were significant (M=.79). Furthermore, the model in which proposed constructs were collapsed, v2(153) = 876.05, p < .05, was a significantly worse fit to the data when compared to the baseline measurement model as seen from the chi-square difference test, v2(15) = 685.88, p < .05. There are two implications of these results. First, when compared to previous findings (i.e., Brown et al., 2000), these results suggest that managers and employees interpret the measures similarly; thus, they can be considered separately or together. Second, the results provide evidence regarding the discriminant validity of the specified constructs. 2.2.4. Structural model results Initial structural model tests show that the model fit the data well when the manager data alone was used (see Fig. 3). Results from this model show that managers believe the presence of safety hazards can lead to increased pressure on employees to value expediency over safety (.46). Ironically, this suggests that the presence of hazards may lead to a reduced emphasis on safety, perhaps due to an impression that safety is a low organizational priority. In contrast

Following Stage 1 analyses, the authors wanted to examine specific differences between employees and managers regarding safety constructs. To do this, the authors first compared employee and manager perceptions regarding the constructs specified in Stage 1 analyses. The researchers next focused on perceived safety climate differences. Specifically, the authors wanted to determine if the relationship between climate and important safety outcomes differed between employees and managers. The authors focused on perceived climate differences because managers have great control over the existence and ultimate effects of a safe climate (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Perrow, 1984; Vaughan, 1996) and climate affects attitudes and behaviors (Hoffmann & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 1980). All Stage 2 analyses used the combined data set. 2.3.1. Measures Indicators of Stage 1 constructs were averaged to create separate aggregated variables to compare employee manager perceptions of the safety constructs in the model. For example, the three items used as indicators of climate in Stage 1 were averaged to create a single climate variable for Stage 2 analyses. Similar procedures were used to create aggregated hazard, pressure, efficacy, and cavalier attitude

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Fig. 3. Structural model results.

variables. Thus, five aggregated variables were created. The single item safe work behavior measure was the same as the one used in Stage 1. In addition, a measure not used in Stage 1 represented a second important safety outcomeresponsibility for safety. This item asked all respondents, Who is responsible for workplace health and safety? Respondents then indicated, using a maximum of 100 points, the percentage of responsibility they attributed to employees (M = 39.90 for the combined sample). Finally, a variable labeled position reflected whether the respondent was an employee (0) or a manager (1). 2.3.2. Analyses Initial analyses evaluated differences between managers and employees on the aggregated constructs. T tests using pooled variance estimates were conducted to examine group differences. Next moderated regression (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989) was used to examine differences regarding the influence of safety climate on important safety outcomes. Specifically, two regression equations tested the extent to which the influence of climate on safety outcomes is dependent on whether the respondent is an employee or manager. In the first equation, safe work behavior was regressed on safety climate, position, and a climate/position interaction term. In the second equation, responsibility for safety was regressed on safety climate, position, and a climate/position interaction term. The aggregated climate measure was used in both equations.

2.3.3. Results T tests revealed significant differences ( p < .05) between managers and employees on four of the aggregated constructs as well as the safe work behavior variable. Relative to employees, managers perceived greater levels of two of the three system-level constructs. Managers perceived significantly stronger safety climate (M = 5.58) and believed employees were significantly more likely to react to pressure (M = 2.98), in contrast to employees beliefs about themselves (M = 4.99 and M = 2.48, respectively). No significant differences were found for hazard perceptions between managers (M = 5.51) and employees (M = 5.66), suggesting the two groups interpret the physical work environment similarly. For the person-level constructs, managers were significantly less confident (safety efficacy) than employees in their ability to work safely (M = 5.07), but believed that employees were significantly more cavalier ( M = 3.80) than employees believed themselves to be (M = 5.36, M = 2.08, respectively). Finally, employees estimated the frequency with which they engage in safe work behaviours to be much higher than what managers attributed them (respective means were 82.15% and 53.36%). These results suggest that although employees and managers share a mental model of the factors affecting safe employee behaviors, they also maintain unique perspectives (i.e., lack a shared mental model) when more fine-grained comparisons on attributions are made. Results for both regression equations are displayed in Table 3, and interaction plots are given in Figs. 4 and 5. The regression of safe work behavior on safety climate and

G.E. Prussia et al. / Journal of Safety Research 34 (2003) 143156 Table 3 Regressions on important safety outcomes (N = 672) Independent variables Dependent variables Safe work behavior Safety climate (b1) Position (b2) Safety Climate Position (b3) F R2 * p < .05. .12* .90* .40* 61.97* .28 Responsibility for safety .10* .56* .47* 4.72* .03

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position, together with the climate position interaction term, revealed a statistically significant model explaining 28% of the variance in safe work behavior. The main effects of safety climate and position were both significant as was the interaction term. The interaction plot appears as Fig. 4 and demonstrates that levels of safety climate have a different impact on front-line workers than on managers. Under conditions of poor climate, managers and employees appear to disagree about the extent to which employees engage in safe work behaviors. However, as safety climate improves, managers are more likely to report higher percentages of safe worker behavior. While the same holds true for workers, the effect is noticeably diminished. A stronger safety climate apparently influences the degree of convergence or shared perception between employees and managers. The prediction of responsibility for safety based on safety climate, position, and the climate/position interaction term also yielded statistically significant results for all three terms in the model. The models F statistic is significant, but the R2 term suggests that the predictor variables do not capture the majority of the variance in responsibility. Just the same, the interaction plot (Fig. 5) illustrates the significance of the climate/position interaction term. Under poor climate conditions, managers and employees differ in their attributions for responsibility, but the two groups converge in their

Fig. 5. Interaction plot of safety climate predicting percent employee responsibility for safety.

opinions as safety climate improves. It appears that managers may be less likely to make fundamental attribution errors when the safety climate is strong.

3. Discussion/limitations This study addressed two research questions: First, do managers and employees share similar perceptions with regard to factors that lead operators to engage in safe or unsafe work behaviors? Second, if they do share mental models, are there subtleties within construct relationships and beyond these models that differ across the two groups? Within the second question, specific queries about (a) whether the role of safety climate and its interaction with position on perceptions about safe work behaviors were addressed and (b) the role of safety climate as an influence on manager versus employee perceptions of safety responsibility. Regarding the first question, results demonstrate that managers and employees, in this particular setting, share an embedded mental model about the factors that influence safe behavior decisions. The authors expected that the two would agree about how things work based on the authors understanding of the tendency for mental model sharing in tightly coupled systems (Weick & Roberts, 1993), and on the fact that there was little or no turnover in the organization, allowing for years of shared experience. In addition, the authors believed that the strong safety climate derived from the recently implemented safety programs and observed through ethnographic study would contribute to an overall shared mental model between the two groups. The fact that managers and employees shared this overall mental model provides testimony for the value of wellimplemented safety programs. Analyses designed to answer the second question and its subsets demonstrate that, in spite of an embedded mental model about systematic human and technical relationships

Fig. 4. Interaction plot of safety climate predicting employee percent safe behaviour.

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managers and employees disagree to some extent on their perceptions of most of the safety constructs that were measured. The one exception was safety hazards; the two groups agreed about the presence of hazards. Hazards, mostly identified as physical conditions, are less subject to interpretation than other, more socially oriented variables. Thus, the pattern of agreement across hazard construct sets made sense. On the other hand, differences (e.g., managers generally viewed employees as more cavalier about safety than employees believed themselves to be) are best explained by the na ve attributional biases so pervasive in human nature. Beyond the simple contrasts, regression analyses suggest that perceived safety climate differentially influences manager and employee perceptions of the percent of the time that employees engage in safe or unsafe work behaviors. As perceived climate improves, managers believe there will be fewer unsafe behaviors. Employees reported safer behavior when climate improved, but the relationship was not as strong, suggesting that managers may overestimate the beneficial effects of climate on employees perhaps an example of self-serving bias. There also were differences in the way managers and employees attribute responsibility for safety, and these differences were influenced by safety climate. In the parts of the plant where people felt safety climate was poor, managers and employees disagreed significantly in their attribution assessments (managers believed employees were responsible and vice versa). In areas where climate was better, they tended to make similar attributions for responsibility. This suggests that the establishment of a better climate diminishes the effects of the fundamental attribution error. Similar to the prediction of safe work behavior, as safety climate improves, employee and manager perceptions apparently converge and the two groups share perspectives. In sum, shared mental models, such as the sociotechnical model of workplace safety, allow employees and managers to operate within a common paradigm. However, although general relationships among a constellation of constructs may be shared, managers and employees differ significantly regarding specific perceptions as well as attributions resulting from safety climate effects. Just the same, organizations can operate more effectively when employees and managers share mental models pertaining to safety. Furthermore, a well-run safety program may be a precursor to mental model sharing within and between groups. DeJoy (1996) noted that the safety climate could serve as a guiding paradigm for cause and effect within the context of workplace safety. The authors believe that to establish a multilevel shared mental model around safety, managers should establish and improve safety climate. Based on observations from the focal plant in this research, managers may take a number of actions to engender a positive safety climate. Although experience in many organizations demonstrates that the potential list of initiatives is much longer, four factors seem to stand out about the safety program at this research site: (a) Focus on behaviorsthe company in

this study ended its emphasis on recordable accident statistics, switching instead to an emphasis on safe behaviors that included daily safety meetings. However, they made clear their understanding that management held significant responsibility for safety. (b) Involve employeesemployees were brought into the decision process for workplace safety. (c) Use symbolsone day, a safety manager handed out a silver dollar to every employee who was wearing a seat belt while driving through the gate at the end of the day. (d) Remove hazardsmanagers showed a sincere concern about hazards and took great efforts to remove them. Industrial safety scholars have advocated these activities for several years. However, this research goes beyond anecdotal reports to demonstrate that safety climate has a real and measurable effect on safety behaviors, and that it is critical to creating a shared mental model of safety between employees and managers. Although this study adds to the understanding of shared mental models regarding safe work behaviors, the authors acknowledge three specific limitations of this research. First, the data were collected from a single firm in a single industry. Thus, these results may be generalizable only to other firms within the steel industry that have implemented safety-oriented programs. Clearly, future research should attempt to replicate these findings in other environments. A second limitation involves the use of same-source data; common method bias can lead to spurious relations among modeled variables. However, the study tried to mitigate this potential problem by (a) including multiple groups in these analyses, (b) measuring the indicators with different types of response categories, and (c) using observationally based validity checks. Furthermore, the authors tested a collapsed measurement model and found support for the multidimensional nature of these constructs. The poor fit of the collapsed model provides evidence that these results are not due to a common method factor. Finally, the authors recognize that correlation does not imply causation, and these data limit the inferences that can be made. However, these results indicate that the causal relations depicted in the sociotechnical model cannot be rejected. Just the same, the authors hope future research would replicate these findings using methods from which causal inferences are more appropriate.

4. Impact on industry In the aftermath of an industrial accident or near miss, there is a natural tendency for employees to blame the system (including management) and managers to blame employees. Managers must be aware of these biases when diagnosing and responding to accidents. In spite of these differences, it appears that in a tightly coupled industrial setting, such as a steel plant, managers and employees may share causal mental models, perhaps out of necessity in keeping a complex system running effectively. Managers in

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more decoupled systems may wish to use tightly coupled and necessarily high-reliability systems as benchmarks when they try to increase agreement and mental model sharing across organizational levels. When organizations improve safety climate, they can move employees and managers closer together in their perspectives about safety responsibility. Given the importance of attributions about responsibility in shaping postaccident response, an organization and its employees can benefit from such a convergence in perspectives. The survey items included in this study provide research insights, but they also may be useful to those who wish to conduct safety self-assessments within their organizations. For example, a manager may wish to measure safety climate and/or perceived safety hazards before and after a major safety improvement initiative. In sum, the authors believe that examining the existence and extent of shared mental models can lead to improvements in organizational safety. This research represents a modest investigation of this pursuit in a defined population. Future research should further examine the importance of shared mental models and determine their application across safety contexts.

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G.E. Prussia et al. / Journal of Safety Research 34 (2003) 143156 Geoff Willis is an assistant professor of operations management in the College of Business Administration at the University of Central Oklahoma. He holds BS degrees in biomedical engineering and mathematics from Vanderbilt University and MS and PhD degrees in production and operations management from Texas Tech University. Prof. Willis has published articles in Journal of Operations Management, International Journal of Production Research, Quality Engineering, and Journal of Clinical Engineering. He has conducted research at Texas Instruments, Lubbocks University Medical Center, Seattle Public Schools, the City of Seattle, and Seagate Technology on quality issues related to product development and process improvement.

toward improved causal analysis. Research in Organizational Behavior, 11, 247 292. Zerbi, W. J., & Dobni, D. (1998). Promoting employee service behaviour: the role of perceptions of human resource management. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 15, 165 179. Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: theoretical and applied implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65, 96 101. Gregory E. Prussia is an associate professor of management in the Albers School of Business and Economics at Seattle University. He teaches undergraduate and graduate teambuilding and leadership classes as well as principles of management classes. He has a BA in economics and an MBA from California State University, Chico, and a PhD in human resource management from Arizona State University. His publications appear in several journals including Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Journal of Applied Psychology, and Journal of Operations Management. He is a member of the Academy of Management, the American Psychological Association, and the Decision Sciences Institute, and serves on the Editorial Board for the Academy of Management Journal. Karen Brown is a professor of operations and project management at the University of Washington, Bothell. She also serves as a visiting professor at the China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in Shanghai, China, and at IESE in Barcelona, Spain. Dr. Brown holds BS, MBA, and PhD degrees from the University of Washington. She serves as an associate editor of the Journal of Operations Management and is a vice president of the Decision Sciences Institute. Her research focuses on sociotechnical systems and has appeared in Journal of Operations Management, Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Human Relations, Journal of Applied Psychology, Business Horizons, and other journals. Her recent work on workplace safety has grown out of her previous work in the healthcare field.