Terrorism and European Security: An Analysis on Europols TE-SAT 2012

Cyril Thomas University of Aberdeen

cyril@criminologytoday.com

1|TE-SAT 2012: An Analysis

Terrorism and European Security: An Analysis on Europols TE-SAT 2012 Introduction to TE-SAT Since the creation of Europol in 1995 as a preventive measure to the opening of the European Unions internal borders of the Schengen Convention, its scope and potential was enormous. However, only after the 9/11 attacks, the European Union protracted its counter terrorism intelligence capabilities despite it had an existing structure. Even though Europol was specialized in counter terrorism it was not a priority till 2001, just after two months of the 9/11 attacks, the Member States provided financial and personnel support to Europols counterterrorism operations, thus the Counter Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) fully fledged its arms in the areas of terrorism and transnational crime. It should also be noted that it was under the shadow of 9/11 attacks Europol has been involved in the preparation of Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT). In 2006, Europol widened the data and intelligence gathering capabilities for the TE-SAT. In 2007, this new system was introduced and presented by the Europol, which was henceforth an unclassified document for the European Parliament and fully accessible to the public. 2012 TE-SAT The 2012 TE-SAT emphasize on the lone wolf actors and homegrown terrorism along with radicalization and cyber terrorism. Religious terrorism is also under the radar of TE-SAT despite its solid presence has not been evident as a statistical evidence.1 The TE-SATs intelligence gathering and data collection is based on the EU Council Decision on the exchange of information and cooperation among Member States however, it also heavily depends Eurojust.2 Rather than profiling the terrorists or their acts, or analyzing the factors of terrorism, TE-SAT presents the threat assessment in a conceptual and statistical fashion. Which is similar to the threat assessment concept developed by the United States Secret Service. The Secret Service threat assessment approach moves away from the idea of "profiling," and instead looks at the pathways of ideas and behaviours that may lead to a violent action.3 Categories of Terrorism in TE-SAT 2012 Europol identified different types of terrorism that have the potential to develop serious
1

According to the General Overview of the Situation in 2011, (N)ot one religiously inspired attack on EU

territory was reported by Member States, nor were any single-issue terrorist attacks registered. TE-SAT 2012, EU Terrorism and Trend Report, European Police Office, 2012 p.8
2

Ibid. pp.42-43, Apart from the methodology, it should be noted that TE-SATs dependence on SitCen and

Eurojust is a limitation. Since TE-SAT acquires data on arrests and convictions, Eurojust is an essential part of TE-SAT and offers a major share of its data.
3

Borum, Randy, Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, and John Berglund, Threat Assessment: Defining an Approach

for Evaluating Risk of Targeted Violence, Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 17: 323-337, 1999 p.327

2|TE-SAT 2012: An Analysis

threats to the European Union. 1. Lone Actors or Individual Cells 2. Religiously Motivated Terrorism 3. Ethno-nationalist and Separatist Terrorism 4. Socio-political and Anarchist Terrorism, and 5. Single Issue Terrorism. Trends in Terroirsm Ever since the 90s, four key trends have become apparent in modern terrorism, which are (1) an increase in the religiously inspired or motivated, attacks (2) expansion of lethalness,4 (3) decrease in overall attacks and, (4) growth in Western targets..5 Religiously Inspired Terrorism TE-SAT identified religious terrorism as a grave concern, despite the difficulties and debates in the academic and criminological communities about the definition of the term. The early governmental reports like the famous Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism6 which classified different categories of terrorism side stepped on the religiously inspired terrorism and extremist motivations. By the late 90s terrorism and security experts identified an inclination toward higher casualties in terror attacks. Religious terrorists often alienate themselves from secular laws, values, social system, and norms set by the society. When religious terrorists disregards social norms and conventional ethics for the sake of religious ideals, they can efficaciously depersonalize their future victims. Pape argues the taproot of terrorism is nationalism, a common bond that the members share of ethnic, linguistic, and historical characteristics7 and according to his study on Suicide
4

Jenkins once said, the terrorists wanted a lot of people watching not a people dead. However, later he

realized the trend changed when the fatatlities increased faster...tens in the 70s, upto hundreds in the 80s, frequent hundreds in the 90s and with 9/11 thousands of fatalities. See also, Jenkins, Brian M., The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, Santa Monica, CA: Rand P-7119, July 1985, p.6 Hoffman, Bruce, Rethinking Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Since 9/11, Studies in Conflict and Terrirsm, 25:303-316, 2002, Jenkins, Brian M., The New Age of Terrorism, The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, (ed.) David Kamien, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006.
5

This is one of the major trend analyses, see Rand-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism. From

Rand-St. Andrews data base, it is evident that before 1968 there were no terrorist organizations could be deemed religious; in 1980 there were only two (out of 64) and by the 1995 the number rose into 25 (out of 58).
6

Disorders and Terrorism, National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Washington,

D.C., 1976, The Task Force divided terrorism into six categories civil disorders, political, non-political, Quasi, limited political, and official or state terrorism. pp. 3-7
7

Pape, Robert A., Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: Random House, p. 79

Pape also noted the core theme of suicide terrorism is not a religious one but a specific secular and broader strategic objective. pp.4-7

3|TE-SAT 2012: An Analysis

Terrorism, religion play a role when there is a religious difference between the nationalist actors.8 Jurgensmeyer identifies religion can be a primary player or motivational factor,sometimes combined with other factors, induce terrorism.9 Hoffman points out, the terrorists can use religion combined with modernity and technology as a weapon10 and merge it into an ideological force,11 successfully demonstrated by bin Laden. Hoffman also acknowledges that secular and religious terrorism have radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and (a) Manichean world view...with a sacramental or providential view on violence.12 TE-SAT 2012 replaced the term Islamic terrorism to religiously inspired terrorism without shifting the core structure, this change is positive as it alleviate some religio-political criticism of targeting specific religious groups and communities. Criticism and Neutrality The primary criticism of TE-SAT 2012 is the lack of empirical or statistical evidence of jihadist attacks from the media.13 The publication of the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security's report Muslim-American Terrorism: Declining Further enhances the critical view of the media towards TE-SAT 2012. This report used TE-SAT reports to formulate a comparison between Europe and American situations. While showing the dramatic drop in jihadist activities,14 TCTHS report is also depends on Europol's arrests and conviction database against the foiled plots and international situation and more importantly a shift in al-Quaeda's policy changes and its dynamic nature.15 Even though empirical numbers failed to support Europols assessment of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, other reports like

8 9

Op. cit., p.80 Jurgensmeyer, Mark, Terrori in the Mind of God:The Global Rise of Religious Violence, London: University of Hoffman, Bruce, Rethinking Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Since 9/11, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,

California Press, 2001 p.6

10

Vol. 25 Issue 5, Septmeber 2002, p.307

11 12

Op. cit. p. 308 Hoffman, Bruce, Hoffman, Bruce, "Holy Terror": The Implications of Terroirsm Motivated by a Religoius For example, The main criticism fromt the media and the web regarding TE-SAT 2012 is that it exclusively

Imperative, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 18, Issue 4, 1995, p.272
13

concentrate on Islamic and Jihadist threat despite Europe has seen only once recorded attack in 2011. Noting that even reporting the threat assessment in London Olympics, TE-SAT refrain from mentioning IRA threats instead focus exclusively on al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists (T-SAT 2012 p.32) thus opening a can of worms biased reporting.
14

Kurzman, Charles, Muslim American Terrorism: Declining Further, Triangle Center on Terrorism and Rollings, John (Co-ord.), Al Quaeda and Affilitates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, adn Implicaitons

Homeland Security, Duke-UNC-RTI, February, 2013, p.8

15

for U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Srevice, June, 2011 pp.29-32

4|TE-SAT 2012: An Analysis

Home Office Statistical Bulletin supports the predictive reasoning of TE-SAT in their review.16 TE-SATs assessment of lone actor attacks and homegrown terrorism is one of the indicators of its strength and predictive capabilities. After TE-SAT gone to the press, Toulouse prefecture and Montauban Bastide in Midi-Pyrnes region of France, Mohammed Merah, a French-Algrerian Islamist targeted French soldiers and Jewish civilians in a series of gun attacks which left seven people dead and five injured. It was the textbook example of the prophetic warning of TE-SAT regarding lone actor terrorists going solo without any support or affiliation to militant or terrorist groups. Even media then considered the "lone wolf" category is Western law enforcement's worst nightmare.17 One of the core strengths of TE-SAT reports are its evaluation of potential threats to security which often goes against the popular notions, media speculations, lay perspectives and even independent academic reviews. TE-SAT 2012 is concerned about the access and use of improvised explosive devices (IED) and improvised incendiary devices (IID) by terrorists, ideological extremist groups, and lone actors.18 While other studies, minimizing the threat by suggesting that a sustained campaign of successful IED attacks over a significant period is limited, without the larger assistance of terrorist groups, an extended period of attacks - even a successful single attack is severely limited.19 Studies like this disregard the availability of alternative substances and guidance 20while TE-SAT identify those potential factors as a threat with examples of Brieviks access to tonnes of ammonium nitrate based fertiliser to produce explosives21 and animal right groups access to IEDs and IIDs22 thus clearly delineating the lone actor and ideological groups.

16

Based on Home Offices SB, the number terrorist / extremist prisoners in Britain by self-defined ethnicity of

Asian, Asian British, Black or Black British as at 31st March 2011 comprise of the majority, of that Asian (41), Black (23) compared to White (17), Mixed (7) and Chinese or other (5) p. 35 also the self-defined adherence to religion among terrorist / extremist prisoners in Britain, Islam has the marked difference (80) than other religions for example Church of England (1), Roman Catholic (1), Pagan (2), No religious affiliation (4), Buddhist (1) - See Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stops and Searches, Great Britain 2010/11, October 2011. P.38
17

Sydow, Christoph, Murders in Toulouse: Authorities Helpless to Prevent Lone Wolf Attacks, Der Spigel, TE-SAT 2012, op.cit. p.10 See, Bale, Jeffrey M., Jihadist Cells and "IED" Capabilities in Europe: Assessing the Present and Future Threat After the significant shift in terrorism to individual clandestine cells and homegrown terrorism, industrial

March 21, 2012 see also, Roy, Oliver, Lone, Looser, Killer, New York Times, March 23, 2012
18 19

to the West, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, U.S. Army War College: SSI, November 2012 p. 120
20

cleaning materials, fertilizers and seemingly innocuous substances were used to create explosive items with the help of easily accessible internet resources, various terrorist manuals, survivalist guide books like Anrachists Cook Book, Poor Mans James Bond etc.
21

TE-SAT 2012, Loc. cit.

5|TE-SAT 2012: An Analysis

Cyber Terrorism, Virtual Networks, and Social Media TE-SAT 2012 identifies cyber world as a potential accessory to both lone actors and terrorist cells. The restricted user platforms of blogs, exclusive boards, and encrypted communication systems have great potential for terrorists to exchange information and cyber world is an established facilitating factor for the terrorists.23 Cyberspace and Usergroups are viable for terrorist organizations to promote their agenda, propagandize, fund raise, coordinate and cooperate with other groups and recruit members. 24 Europols scrutiny on recent developments points a convergence of social and technological factors combined with ideological motivations can pave multiple forms of cyber attacks including harvesting financial and personal data, automated intrusions, and providing excessive traffic to saturate servers, sites, and networked services until they cease to function.25 On cyber terrorism the report noted accurately that the distinction between organized crime and terrorism and /or violent extremism is increasingly blurred even with the lone actor hackers using cyber crime tools to strew their frustrations and anger.26 Even though European Union have not targeted for a large scale cyber attack from terrorist organizations, the looming threat is a priority in TE-SAT. Separatist and Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism While religiously inspired terrorism is a key concern, separatist and nationalist terrorism show a curve that is declining, especially the violence and terrorist acts by the Basque Nationlist-Separatist group Basque Homeland/Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) notoriously known by its acronym ETA. The threat to EU Member States of Islamist as well as ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism maintained at a high level . A notable link established by the TE-SAT was the premise of previous assessments that such terrorist groups were gaining finances by resorting criminal activities. In 2009, TE-SAT acknowledged the link between counterfeiting of goods and terrorist financing.27 Single Issue Terrorism TE-SAT considers single issue terrorism is an active concern. It should be noted that regarding single issue terrorism Europols analysis is more inductive in nature and affiliate single issue terrorism to left wing extremism despite low statistical evidence. Here the
22 23 24 25 26 27

Loc. cit. Loc. cit. Op. cit. pp. 10-11 Op. cit. p.11 Op. cit. p.12

Ridley, Nick, Terrorist Financing: The Failure of COunter Measures, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2012 p.134.

Ridley collected most of his research data and information from condifential sources within the Europol, SOCA, and other law enforcement major crime enforcement agencies.

6|TE-SAT 2012: An Analysis

emphasis is not on actors or groups but broad characteristics.28 These groups expertise in using communications and managing the cyber world along with attracting radical, idealistic individuals willing to use violence to make them more dangerous. TE-SAT recognizes the potential threat from single issue terrorism from isolated attacks from leftist ideological groups to lethal attacks and terrorist access to nuclear devices. Where the Limitation is the Strength However, sterile judicial statistics are both the strength and the limitation of TE-SAT. Ordinarily TE-SAT do not venture into the interpretation of terrorism, it has even been stated in the early TE-SAT reports29 that the report is based on contributions from Member States complemented with open source materials.30 When the reports were made unclassified it clearly stated that the report neither analyze the root causes nor assess the threat posed by terrorism31 a tradition TE-SAT continued till the latest report.32 European Commission, Council Secretariat, Eurojust, European Parliament, FRONTEX, CEPOL, and Interpol are partner agencies33 to Europol and influence TE-SAT. This influence is not often visible in the statistical attribute of TE-SAT but its threat assessment reflects the influence from the partner agencies. Limitations TE-SAT is not free from limitations, yet these limitations are minimal compared to the strength and neutrality in understanding and predicting terrorist challenges and forming threat assessments. The Achilles heel of the report is interpreting ideological terrorism, which is not easy to classify or delineate. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, domestic groups and state sponsored cells and lone actors continued their espionage and terrorist activities and kept Left-wing terrorism alive.34 Current domestic terrorist threat within the United States is

28 29

TE-SAT, 2012 p.30 For example, the 2004 TE-SAT acknowledges that the report is to outline terrorism situation and analyse the

past years trends in terrorism. Yet, the analysis on the terrorism situation is not free for open delineation rather extensive data interpretation is the core of TE-SAT.
30

Terrorist Activity in the European Union: Situation and Trends Report (TE-SAT), October 2003 -17th October

2004, Hague, December, 2004 p.4 also Terrorist Activity in The European Union Situation And Trends Report (TE-SAT) October 2004 October 2005, Europol, Hague, May 2006
31 32 33

TE-SAT 2007, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007, Europol, Hague, March 2007. p.8 TE-SAT 2012, EU Terrorism and Trend Report, European Police Office, 2012 p.8 Disley, Emma, Barrie Irving, WIlliam Hughes, Bhanu Patruni, Evaluation of the Iplementation of the Europol Seger, Karl. A, U.S. Department of Engergy Office of Safeguards and Security, Washington D.C., April 2001.

COuncil Decision and of Europol's Activities, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012.
34

p.ii

7|TE-SAT 2012: An Analysis

focused on right wing extremists and white supremacists35 in ideological crimes, Europe follows the same pattern. Right Wing and Left Wing Terrorism TE-SATs venture into the political and ideological field poses some problems. Firstly, Europol explicitly admitted that the report is not viable to open probe and TE-SAT is not an analysis of the root causes of terrorism. Yet, in almost all cases, TE-SAT interpreted most xenophobic crimes as right wing attacks even when there is no sufficient evidence or conservative traits in such attacks.36 Though there is a marked shift of right wing politics from group affiliations to individual actors37, this transition is not fully supported by empirical evidence. TE-SAT flocked xenophobic crimes and violence as a result of economic distress as right wing extremism based on public perception and reports from the Member States.38 The ideological and political crimes, whether the left and the right wing violence or hate crimes are open to a wider debate. Primarily because these ideologies have certain characteristics and bound to follow certain trails and traits39 and self-defined value systems.40 English noted, that (M)any existing explanations contain significant flaws and there is the problem of establishing what is the best way of explaining or understanding terrorism.41 TE-SATs focus in relating xenophobic background and hate crimes in the same band of politically motivated ideologies even when admitting that in most cases, violent attacks appears to bethe result of an accidental encounter or reciprocal provocation.42 TE-SATs attempt to congregate different crimes under the same classification, and its attempt to interpret these crimes without substantial evidence makes it a potential tool for political
35 36

Loc. cit. TE-SATs dependence on Member States reports are obvious when it comes to political crimes, in one

column TE-SAT uses the words suspected and alleged more than once, still moved into an interpretation despite its stated neutrality.
37

Vohryzek-Bolden, Miki, Right-Wing Terrorists and the Threats They Pose for Americans in the 21st Century, TE-SAT 2012, op.cit. p.28

Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 27, No. 2, 2003, p.91

38 39

Conservative traits, traditionalist label, overtly idealistic framework, and strict adherence to certain moral

codes are some of the characteristics identified in a right-wing ideology, where the left wing ideology purposely give individuals only secondary status while giving predominance to state and centralized hierarchy of the government in a socialistic framework. However, under the condition of economic crisis, multiculturalist impacts, unemployment or instability of employment, and discontent to a political or governing system may drive individual or group actors to act independently against the ideological label.
40 41 42

P.Martin, Gus, Understaanding Terrorism,: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, London: Sage, 2010, p.434 English, Richard, Terrorism: How to Respond, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p.28 TE-SAT 2012, op.cit. p.28

8|TE-SAT 2012: An Analysis

parties and pressure groups to advance their own agenda. Crime Classification Manual clearly states that it is difficult to classify violence involving an extremist group into a single category43 as political, economic, religious or social system can be the motivator and the offender can be a lone actor whose actions are endorsed by the group or multiple offenders.44 CCM rightly notes that predominant motive is the denominator for classification as extremist violence can rarely be isolated to a single typology.45 Hence, asserting terrorist acts as ideological crimes need criminological and psychological evaluation of the motivational factors along with sociological analysis. Since TE-SATs stated purpose is more or less a judicial analysis for trend pronouncement and threat assessment to assist the law enforcement , the additional evaluations were not conducted according to Europols own admission, which severely limits TE-SATs credibility in classification of offenses. Another limitation of TE-SAT is the inability to identify and incorporate cleanskins46 with terrorist situations. This is due to the fact that the TE-SAT heavily depends on the judicial records to form their study. Radicalization among students and lay people with no previous convictions or criminal records are often free from general profiling and statistical scrutinies. These figures are neither static nor mutable in TE-SAT report because they do not exist (till the commission of the crime or terrorist act). TE-SAT is almost silent regarding the threat convergence and hybrid organizations, where threats and organizational structure began to interpolate into divergent areas for smoother operations. Though the report acknowledges the evolutionary changes in terrorist and organized crime organizations into a hybrid structure, threat convergence is much ignored not only in the report but the contemporary research on terrorism, for conventional approach and categorizations.47 The appearance of non-state actors using organized crime structure to substitute the state sources of funding started the development of hybrid organizational structure. While TE-SAT reports acknowledged terrorist financing and its adherence to organized crime structures they are silent on prioritizing threat and organizational

43

Douglas, John E.; Burgess, Ann W.; Burgess, Allen G.; Ressler, Robert K., Crime Classification Manual: A

Standard System for Investigating and Classifying Violent Crimes(2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass., 2006 p.250
44 45 46

Loc. cit. Op. cit. p. 251 Since 7/7 London Bombings, in security terminology the term cleanskin changed from undercover officer

with no prior police record or undercover experience to terrorist with no previous conviction - is the meaning of the term implied here.
47

3/11 Madrid bombings is an example of threat convergence where the law enforcement and investigative

agencies suddenly found themselves in a dilemma of non-state actors using declarative terrorist labels and following transnational and organizational crime structure.

9|TE-SAT 2012: An Analysis

convergence as a key factor and a major threat in the nearby future.48 Conclusions TE-SAT report provides a stable and predictive view on the surge of a new sphere of terrorism which is constantly evolving and dynamic. It correctly identified that modern terrorism is highly diverse yet also cling to the traditional definition that the ultimate aim is to achieve political goals. The explosion of the lone or solo actor entry and the radicalization of individuals and groups even without human contact are potential scenarios presented in TESAT. Ideological crimes,with the focus on right wing extremism, is one of the major concerns of TE-SAT, according to the report a lone actor can be motivated by the ideological indoctrination without direct organizational help or affiliations to a particular group. Europol acknowledges the cyber world is swarming with terrorist propaganda, communications, and a common platform for the terrorists across the globe and presents itself as a potential tool for electronic attacks. Despite a few weaknesses in its organizational structure as a law enforcement tool of data sharing than an analytical tool for the investigative support, these weaknesses cannot be avoided, yet these weaknesses often augment the natural quality of the report and helps it to focus the immediate concerns. As a valuable investigative support tool and analytical report based on an extensive database on judicial and criminal records, the value of TE-SAT is multifold. It has the potential dimensions and practical approaches to law enforcement support, transnational crime monitoring, threat convergence screening, evaluating trends in both organizational and offender characteristics, analytical comparison of terrorist organizations and organized crime syndicates, evolutionary changes in criminal and terrorist organizations, and also act as an indispensable tool for social scientists.

48

For a discussion on threat convergence see Defense Science Board, Summer Study Task Force on DoD

Responses to Transnational Threats (two volumes), Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997. DoDs report is probably the first analytical and comprehensive look at the problem of organizational convergence. Dishman, Chris, The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28/3, 2005, Dishman, Terrorism, Crime and Transformation, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24/1, 2001. Also Wang, Peng, The Crime - Terror Nexus: Transformation, Alliance, Convergence, Asian Social Science, Vol.6, No. 6 - June, 2010. Hbschle, Annette, From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Organized Crime-Terror Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, No. 3-4, 2011

10 | T E - S A T 2 0 1 2 : A n A n a l y s i s