G.R. No. 159747 (Gregorio B. Honasan II vs.

The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano, and Hon. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo.) This refers to the (1) Urgent Clarification and Motion of our Resolution dated June 15, 2004 denying petitioner's motion to cite respondent Panel in contempt of court and the (2) Motion for Reconsideration as well as respondent DOJ Panel's comment thereto. We find that the motion for reconsideration was actually filed by registered mail on May 7, 2004 and therefore within the reglementary period of filing the same. Thus, the portion of our Resolution dated June 15, 2004 declaring our decision final and executory is set aside. However, a study of petitioner's motion for reconsideration shows that the arguments raised therein were already considered in arriving at our decision sought to be reconsidered and we find no cogent reason to reverse our earlier findings that respondent DOJ Panel has concurrent jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on the charge of coup d'etat filed against petitioner. Petitioner posits the view that we should not have refrained from ruling on the issue of whether or not the charge against petitioner is committed in relation to his office. We are not persuaded. The resolution of such issue should only be resolved after a hearing has been conducted by respondent Panel and petitioner has already presented his evidence to show that the crime charged was committed in relation to his office. We reiterate that we resolved not to dwell on said issue so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation being conducted by the DOJ Panel as to the questions (1) whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of the information against the petitioner and (2) to which court should the information be filed considering the presence of the other respondents in the subject complaint. Anent petitioner's allegations of marked bias and prejudice of the respondent DOJ Panel because of the utterances made by the President and other top officials of her administration prejudging his guilt, the Court finds the same to be lacking in factual foundation. The DOJ Panel is composed of lawyers whose sworn duty is to investigate the commission and prosecution of criminal cases and who are expected to fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice with fairness. Whatever remarks made in connection with the charge do not by itself prove that it would influence the minds of the members of the Panel on what their judgment would be after the whole evidence of petitioner's case shall have been examined and evaluated by them. Allegation of bias is not enough absent any viable proof thereof since it is not for this Court to assume in advance that the DOJ Panel would fail to discharge its manifest duty in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing is premature.1 Prejudice is not to be presumed especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.2 We likewise find unpersuasive petitioner's claim of alleged prejudicial acts committed by respondent DOJ Panel in the initial stages of the conduct of the preliminary investigation. WHEREFORE, acting on the motion for clarification, our Resolution dated June 15, 2004 is hereby amended only to the effect that petitioner's motion for reconsideration is timely filed. However, petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. (Same voting) REP. VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, petitioner, vs. HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ROMEO L. SANTOS, respondents. Virgilio P. Robles for and in his own behalf. Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for private respondent.

On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. He alleged, among others, that the elections in the 1st District of Caloocan City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during the counting of votes and during the canvassing of the election returns. He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts (pp. 1620, Rollo). On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer (pp. 22-26, Rollo) to the protest. He alleged as among his affirmative defenses, the lack of residence of protestant and the late filing of his protest. On August 15, 1988, respondent HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the revision of contested ballots on September 1, 1988 and directed protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total contested precincts which he desires to be revised first in accordance with Section 18 of the Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (pp. 76-77, Rollo). On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts, representing the initial 25% of all the contested precincts, was terminated. On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and on September 12, 1988, Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts (pp. 78-80, Rollo). No action on Robles' motion to suspend revision and Santos' motion to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts were yet taken by respondent HRET when on September 14,1988, Santos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest (pp. 81-85, Rollo). On September 19, 1988, Robles opposed Santos' motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest in an Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal (pp. 86-91, Rollo). On the same day, respondent HRET issued a resolution which, among others, granted Santos' urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest. The said resolution states: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Case No. 43 (Romeo L. Santos vs. Virgilio P. Robles). Three pleadings are submitted for consideration by the Tribunal: (a) Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision," dated September 8, 1988; (b) Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing," dated September 12, 1988; and (c) Protestant's Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, dated September 14, 1988. Upon the filing of Protestant's Motion to Withdraw Protest, the revision of ballots was stopped and such revision remains suspended until now. In view of such suspension, there is no need to act on Protestee's Motion. The "Motion to Withdraw Protest," has been withdrawn by Protestant's later motion, and therefore need not be acted upon. WHEREFORE, Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision" and Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The 'Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest' is GRANTED. The Secretary of the Tribunal is directed to schedule the resumption of the revision on September 26, 1988 and to send out the necessary notices for this purpose. (p. 84, Rollo). On September 20,1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation praying that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall dated September 19, 1988 be treated as a Motion for Reconsideration of the HRET resolution of September 19, 1988 (pp. 92-94, Rollo). On September 22, 1988, respondent HRET directed Santos to comment on Robles' "Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal" and ordered the suspension of the resumption of revision scheduled for September 26, 1988. On January 26,1989, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal denied Robles' Motion for Reconsideration (pp. 109-111, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition was filed on February 1, 1989 (pp. 1-14, Rollo). On February 2, 1989, We required the respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice of the petition (p. 118, Rollo). On February 9, 1989, petitioner Robles filed an Urgent Motion Reiterating Prayer for Injunction or Restraining Order (pp. 119-120, Rollo) which We Noted on February 16, 1989. Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Reply to Comment was granted in the same resolution of February 16,1989. On February 22, 1989, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition (p. 129, Rollo), this time questioning respondent HRET's February 16, 1989 resolution denying petitioner's motion to defer or reset revision until this Court has finally disposed of the instant petition and declaring that a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Rules was had with

MEDIALDEA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order assailing the resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET): 1) dated September 19, 1988 granting herein private respondent's Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, and 2) dated January 26, 1989, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.

private respondent Santos making a recovery of 267 votes (see Annex "C" of Supplemental Petition, p. 138, Rollo). It is petitioner's main contention in this petition that when private respondent Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. We do not agree with petitioner. It is noted that upon Santos' filing of his Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts on September 12, 1988, no action thereon was taken by respondent HRET Contrary to petitioner's claim that the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon, the records show that it was only on September 19, 1988 when respondent HRET resolved said motion together with two other motions. The questioned resolution of September 19, 1988 resolved three (3) motions, namely: a) Protestee's Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision dated September 8, 1988; b) Protestant's Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988; and c) Protestant's "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest," dated September 14, 1988. The resolution resolved the three (3) motions as follows: xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision" and Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" is GRANTED. xxx xxx xxx The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated (Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1). We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal when it held: We cannot agree with Protestee's contention that Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts" effectively withdrew the precincts referred to therein from the protest even before the Tribunal has acted thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant's Motion to Withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained. Since Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on the Unrevised Precincts" had not been acted upon by this Tribunal before it was recalled by the Protestant, it did not have the effect of removing the precincts covered thereby from the protest. If these precincts were not withdrawn from the protest, then the granting of Protestant's "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" did not amount to allowing the refiling of protest beyond the reglementary period. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28,1987,152 SCRA 378; Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16,1987,148 SCRA 564). This rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus: The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra ,at 162]. The exercise of the Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [ Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals

under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, "judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of respondent tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, a writ of certiorari will not issue. Further, petitioner's objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center mainly on procedural technicalities, i.e., that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of jurisdiction over the electoral protest. This argument aside from being irrelevant and baseless, overlooks the essence of a public office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. This is the reason why an electoral tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a constitutional body, unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of words. The case of Dimaporo v. Estipona (G.R. No. L-17358, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 282) relied upon by petitioner does not help to bolster his case because the facts attendant therein are different from the case at bar. In the said case, the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon before the resolution thereon was questioned. As regards petitioner's Supplemental Petition questioning respondent tribunal's resolution denying his motion to defer or reset revision of the remaining seventyfive (75) per cent of the contested precincts, the same has become academic in view of the fact that the revision was resumed on February 20, 1989 and was terminated on March 2, 1989 (Private Respondent's Memorandum, p. 208, Rollo). This fact was not rebutted by petitioner. The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when respondent tribunal rendered a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET rules and found that Santos made a recovery of 267 votes after the revision of the first twenty-five per cent of the contested precincts has likewise, no basis. The partial determination was arrived at only by a simple addition of the votes adjudicated to each party in the revision of which both parties were properly represented. It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest is impressed with public interest in the sense that the public is interested in knowing what happened in the elections" (Dimaporo v. Estipona, supra.), for this reason, private interests must yield to what is for the common good. ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED.. CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents. Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before this Court in a petition entitled "Carmelo F. Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections, Francisco R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G. Timbol," docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on January 25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELEC's

revocation of petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as HRET an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46. Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by private respondent. A. The Main Case This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeks the annulment and setting aside of (1) the resolution of the HRET, dated May 2, 1988, in Case No. 46, holding that the protest filed by private respondent had been filed on time, and (2) its July 29, 1988 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of the HRET while the private respondent filed his comment with a motion to admit counter/cross petition and the petitioner filed his consolidated reply. Thereafter, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition, taking the comments filed as the answers to the petition, and considered the case submitted for decision. Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in the HRET. Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent's election protest would have been filed out of time. On the other hand, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the protest would be timely. Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondent's protest had been seasonably filed. To support his contention that private respondent's protest had been filed out of time and, therefore, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it, petitioner relies on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides: Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. [Emphasis supplied.] Petitioner argues that even assuming that the period to file an election protest was suspended by the pendency of the petition to annul his proclamation, the petition was filed out of time, considering that he was proclaimed on May 27, 1987 and therefore private respondent had only until June 6, 1987 to file a protest; that private respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation on May 28, 1987 and the period was suspended and began to run again on January 28, 1988 when private respondent was served with a copy of the decision of the Court in G.R, No. 80007; that private respondent therefore only had nine (9) days left or until February 6, 1988 within which to file his protest; but that private respondent filed his protest with the HRET only on February 8, 1988. On the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit: Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each protestee,within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation. Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House of Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the tribunal as of the date of effectivity of these Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof. [Emphasis supplied.] Thus, ruled the HRET: On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed within fifteen (15) days from November 22, 1987, or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on September 15, 1987, the COMELEC acting upon a petition filed by the Protestant (private respondent herein), promulgated a Resolution declaring the proclamation void ab initio. This resolution had the effect of nullifying the proclamation, and such proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant

received a copy of the Supreme Court's decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents and purposes, therefore, Protestee's (petitioner herein) proclamation became effective only on January 28, 1988, and the fifteen-day period for Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from that date. Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January 28. The protest, therefore, was filed well within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of this Tribunal. (Rollo, p. 129.] The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in unambiguous terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election ofany Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973 Constitution there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC. That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)]. Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the election were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be emphasized, however, that such does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code to each and every aspect of that particular electoral exercise, as petitioner contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only one of several laws governing said elections. * An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to file election protests in the respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals' constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute. The Court is of the considered view that it may not. The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms: ... [The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177; emphasis supplied.] A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate and the House of Representatives under the Philippine

Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions]. Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it in this wise: See. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 1621. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 1401. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation that the jurisdiction over election contests involving members of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections for all elective national and local officials. That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, consonant with the return to the separation of powers of the three branches of government under the presidential system, is too evident to escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC's purely administrative powers, namely, the exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register political parties and accredit citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters and prosecute, where appropriate, violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power. In this sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code are fully applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution. Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself. Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.

B. Private-Respondent's Counter/Cross Petition Private respondent in HRET Case No. 46 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner herein from discharging his functions and duties as the Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the pendency of the protest. However, on May 5, 1988, the HRET resolved to defer action on said prayer after finding that the grounds therefor did not appear to be indubitable. Private respondent moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the HRET on May 30, 1988. Thus, private respondent now seeks to have the Court annul and set aside these two resolutions and to issue a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction on the premise that the grounds therefor are too evident to be doubted. The relief prayed for in private respondent's counter/cross petition is not forthcoming. The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. Necessarily, the determination of whether or not there are indubitable grounds to support the prayer for the aforementioned ancilliary remedies also lies within the HRETs sound judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007, where the Court declined to take cognizance of the private respondent's electoral protest, this Court said: The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Moreover, private respondent's attempt to have the Court set aside the HRET's resolution to defer action on his prayer for provisional relief is undeniably premature, considering that the HRET had not yet taken any final action with regard to his prayer. Hence, there is actually nothing to review or and and set aside. But then again, so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and "excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same." (Lachica v. Yap, supra, at 143.] As early as 1938 in Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429, 431 (1938)), the Court declared that '[the judgment rendered by the [Electoral] Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the Court's authority is made explicit. The power granted to the Court includes the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government (Art. VIII, Sec. 11. Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's collective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent's Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED. ROSETTE YNIGUEZ LERIAS, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ROGER G. MERCADO, respondent. Lino M. Patajo for petitioner. Brillantes, Nachua, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:p Politicians who are members of electoral tribunals, must think and act like judges, accordingly, they must resolve election controversies with judicial, not political, integrity. The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, (HRET, for brevity) as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld by this Court in many cases. (Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391; Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780). The power of the HRET, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of its members is beyond dispute. (Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution) Thus, judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the HRET is possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called "extra-ordinary jurisdiction" upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction

or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. (Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429, 431; Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, supra; Robles v. HRET, supra) Then only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown that the Court interferes with the HRET's judgment or decision. Accordingly, it is in this light that We shall proceed to examine the contentions of the parties in this case. Petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official candidate of the UPP-KBL for the position of Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections. In her certificate of candidacy she gave her full name as "Rosette Ynigues Lerias". Her maiden name is Rosette Ynigues. Respondent Roger G. Mercado was the administration candidate for the same position. During the canvass of votes for the congressional candidates by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Southern Leyte, it appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass from the Municipality of Libagon which had been questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been tampered with, the candidates who received the two (2) highest number of votes were Roger G. Mercado with 34,442 votes and Rosette Y. Lerias with 34,128 votes, respectively. In the provincial board's copy of the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received 1,811 votes while Mercado received 1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the canvass, Lerias would have received 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving Lerias a winning margin of 146 votes. But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used as basis of the canvass. The provincial board of canvassers rejected the explanation of the members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect the integrity of the certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all the nine (9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection. Lerias appealed the ruling of the provincial board of canvassers to the Comelec praying that the Commission order the provincial board of canvassers to use their copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon. At the scheduled hearing on June 5, 1987, Atty. Valeriano Tumol, then counsel for Lerias, agreed to use the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass provided that it be found to be authentic and genuine. A similar reservation was made by counsel for Mercado. The Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass was produced and when opened it showed that Lerias received only 1,411 votes in Libagon because in Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 she received in each of the said precincts 100 votes less than what she received as shown in the provincial board of canvasser's copy of the certificate of canvass. The alleged discrepancy is as follows:

There being no action taken by the Comelec on the said motion and since the term of office of the members of the House of Representatives would commence on June 30, 1987, Lerias filed on June 30, 1987 before this Court a petition (G.R. No. 78833) for the annulment of the Comelec resolution of June 6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado. Meanwhile, in SPC-87-488, the Comelec en banc required Mercado to file an answer. Instead of filing an answer, however, Mercado filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (a) the resolution dated June 6, 1987 had already become final because the motion for reconsideration filed by Lerias was ex-parte and did not stop the running of the period to appeal therefrom and (b) since Lerias filed with the Supreme Court a petition for the annulment of the Comelec's June 6, 1987 resolution and the subsequent proclamation of Mercado, she had abandoned her previous petition with the Comelec. At the scheduled hearing on June 16, 1987 of SPC-87-488, the members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon and the school teachers who served as inspectors of Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 were present and manifested that they were ready to testify and affirm that the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass was not authentic for it did not correctly state the number of votes received by the parties since Lerias actually obtained 1,811 votes in Libagon, not 1,411 votes. The Comelec did not want to hear the case on the merits opting instead to merely hear Mercado's motion to dismiss. The said witnesses were not given the chance to testify. On June 17, 1987, the Comelec resolved to dismiss SPC-87-488 because the petitioner had filed a case with the Supreme Court and had, therefore, abandoned her case with the Comelec. On July 22, 1987 Lerias filed with this Court a second petition to set aside not only the Comelec's resolution of July 6, 1987 but also the resolution of July 17, 1987. The petition was heard on oral argument and on September 10, 1987, this Court dismissed the petition because (a) the Comelec resolution of June 6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado had already become executory inasmuch as five days had elapsed from receipt of a copy of said resolution by petitioner and no restraining order had been issued by the Court citing Sec. 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, and (b) Lerias thru counsel had agreed before the Comelec (Second Division) during the hearing therein on June 5, 1987 to use the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass. Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, on October 1, 1987, she filed an election protest with respondent HRET. In her protest, Lerias contested the results of the election in Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon asserting that the total votes credited to her in the said four precincts (1,411 votes) were less than or short by 400 votes from that actually obtained by her (1,811 votes) and if the provincial board of canvassers' copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon were to be used as basis of the canvass instead of the Comelec copy, she would have garnered 35,930 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes or a winning margin of 146 votes. Thus, Lerias prayed that (a) precautionary measures be undertaken for the safekeeping and custody of the ballot boxes and election documents used in the protested precincts and that they be brought to the Tribunal to prevent tampering and to protect their integrity; (b) a recount of the votes cast in said precincts be immediately ordered; and (c) the proclamation of Mercado be set aside and that she be declared the duly elected Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte. She further prayed that Mercado be ordered to pay damages, attorney's fees and costs. Mercado filed his Answer with Counter-Protest, denying the material allegations of the protest and counter-protesting the results of the elections in 377 precincts. He alleged that the votes cast for him were (a) intentionally misread in favor of Lerias; (b) not counted or tallied, and/or counted or tallied in favor of Lerias; (c) considered marked or were intentionally marked and; (d) tampered and changed. The counterprotest also charged that blank spaces in the ballots were filled with Lerias' name; that various ballots for Lerias, pasted with stickers, were considered valid and counted for Lerias; that votes in the election returns were tampered with and altered in favor of Lerias, and that terrorism and massive vote-buying were employed by her. The initial hearing was scheduled for August 22, 1988, but on March 7, 1988 unidentified uniformed armed men raided the municipal building of Libagon and stole the ballot boxes for the 20 precincts of Libagon stored in the office of the municipal treasurer. Fortunately, these armed mem overlooked the ballot box which was kept in the office of the election registrar at the second floor of said municipal building. Said ballot box contained all the copies of the election returns of Libagon which were used in the municipal canvass. It is in the said office that said ballot box remained until a representative of the HRET went to Libagon on March 23 and 24, 1988 to take possession of the contents of the same particularly the election returns kept in said ballot box. On December 6, 1990, the Tribunal (by a vote of 5-4) promulgated its now assailed Decision, the pertinent portion of which reads: On the basis of all of the foregoing, and the supporting details as contained in ANNEXES A, B and C and in order to determine the final results of the elections for the position of

Precinct

Provincial Board of Canvassers's Copy 162 votes 123 " 132 " 156 "

Comelec Copy

"6 " 10 " 18 " 19

62 votes 23 " 32 " 56 "

Nevertheless, the Comelec, (Second Division) in its Resolution dated June 6, 1987, directed the provincial board of canvassers to complete the canvass by crediting Mercado 1,351 votes and Lerias 1,411 votes, the votes received by them, respectively, as shown in the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvas. So, on June 7, 1987, the provincial board of canvassers reconvened, resumed the canvass and proclaimed Mercado, as the winning candidate, having received the highest number of votes 35,793. Lerias, his closest rival, received 35,539 votes or a difference of 254 votes. On June 7, 1987, Lerias filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the reconsideration of the June 6, 1987 resolution. She prayed that the members of the municipal board of canvassers be summoned to testify on the authenticity and veracity of the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass and statement of votes submitted to the Comelec and that the election returns for precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 be produced. On June 15, 1987 Lerias filed with the Comelec a petition (SPC No. 87-488) for the annulment of the canvass and proclamation of Mercado, praying that the ballot boxes of precints 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon be ordered opened and the votes therein recounted. On June 21, 1987, she filed a motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation of Mercado.

Member of the House of Representatives, representing the lone district of Southern Leyte, a full and final RECAPITULATION is hereunder provided:

SO ORDERED. (pp. 136-137) The Chairperson of the Tribunal, the Honorable Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera dissented, in this wise: It becomes only too obvious then that by sheer force of numbers; by overturning, at the post-appreciation stage, the rulings earlier made by the Tribunal admitting the claimed ballots for Protestant Lerias; by departing from the interpretation of the neighborhood rule heretofore consistently followed by the Tribunal; by injecting `strange jurisprudence,' particularly on the intent rule; the majority has succeeded in altering the figures that reflect the final outcome of this election protest and, in the process, thwarting the true will of the electorate in the lone district of Southern Leyte. Premises Considered, I vote to declare Protestant Rosette Y. Lerias the winner in this election protest. To the plurality of 20 votes obtained by her in the counter-protested precincts according to the outcome of the appreciation of ballots, must be added the 400 votes that should have been counted in her favor in the municipality of Libagon. All told, Protestant Lerias should, therefore, be credited with a total of thirty six thousand eight (36,008) votes as against thirty five thousand five hundred eighty eight (35,588) votes for Protestee Mercado, or a margin of four hundred twenty (420) votes. (pp. 169-170 Rollo) Likewise, the Honorable, Justice Isagani Cruz, concurring with the dissent of Justice Herrera stated:

FINAL TABULATION Mercado Votes per tally of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, used to PROCLAIM protestee Mercado deduct: Votes per Election Returns from 81 protested precincts UNCONTESTED VOTES Add: Votes per REVISION (physicalcount) Totals Revision Results: deduct: Rejected Ballots (objected) Totals add: Claimed and ADMITTED Ballots 26 273 362 252 2,287 35,926 6,867 35,521 2,154 33,639 6,885 28,654 35,793 35,539 Lerias

I cannot help noting that, as in several earlier cases, all the five members representing the majority party are again voting together in favor of the Protestee, who also happens to belong to their party. Whatever this coincidence may import, I repeat my observation in the Ong cases (HRET Nos. 13 and 15, Nov. 6, 1989) that `although the composition of the Tribunal is predominantly legislative, the function of this body is purely judicial, to be discharged on the basis solely of legal considerations, without regard to political, personal and other irrelevant persuasions. (pp. 258-259, Rollo) The Honorable, Justice Emilio Gancayco (now retired) concurred with the dissent of Justices Herrera and Cruz. Another member of the Tribunal, Representative Antonio H. Cerilles, also in his dissent, stated: Going over all the foregoing facts and circumstances, Ihonestly fear that the majority decision will open the Tribunal to a charge of grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the protest and disallowing the admission of the results of Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18 and 19 of the Municipality of Libagon, Southern Leyte, as reflected in the election returns, and the overwhelming documentary and testimonial evidences introduced, supported by well-settled jurisprudence. The same grave abuse of discretion may be said of the replacement of the results of the Screening Committee where protestant Lerias was originally a winner by twenty (20) votes over Mercado on the counter-protest alone, but which tabulation was reconsidered and ultimately replaced with a revised tabulation which altered the result, this time with protestee Mercado winning by forty-two (42) votes over Lerias, without any Identification and ocular review of the ballots of the protestant thus rejected and no proper showing of the grounds for such rejection. All these considered, I feel compelled to register my dissent to this shameful and blatant disregard of the evidence, the law, and the rudiments of fairness. I regret that the majority decision will lend truth to the suspicion that a protestant from an opposition party cannot secure substantial justice from this Tribunal. It is the perception of many that the odds are stacked against such party mainly because of the composition of the Tribunal, and no evidence, no law, no jurisprudence, not even elementary principles of fair play, equity or morality can outweigh a determined demonstration of party stand, partiality and bias. I will not be party to such travesty of justice. This is not the first time and it certainly will not be the last when I as the lone opposition member of this Tribunal joined the three Justices of the Supreme Court in dissent. But I do so guided no less by the pronouncement of Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a member of this Tribunal, when he said: `Whatever this division may imply, it is worth stressing that although the composition of the Tribunal is predominantly legislative, the function of this body is purely judicial, to be discharged, on the basis

35,564

35,269

35,590 add: Restored Votes FINAL RESULTS 0

35,542 2

35,590

35,544

(Protestee Mercado wins by a plurality of 46 votes) ACCORDINGLY, THE PROTEST of protestant Lerias is dismissed; and by virtue of the results of revision of the eighty one (81) counter-protested precincts, the Tribunal declares that protestee Mercado is the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte, by a plurality of FORTY SIX (46) votes; having garnered a total of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY (35,590) votes as against the THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR (35,544) votes of protestant Lerias. No pronouncement as to costs. WHEREFORE, as soon as this Decision becomes final, notice and copies of the Decision shall be sent to the President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to the Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Section 28.

solely of legal considerations without regard to political, personal and other irrelevant persuasions. 1 (Emphasis supplied) I now indicate that I favor the admission of the results of the election returns of Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18, and 19 of the Municipality of Libagon, Southern Leyte, and to return to protestant Lerias the 400 votes which was fraudulently taken away from her. Likewise, the original revision results of the screening of the ballots of the counter-protested precincts, as submitted to and previously approved by the Tribunal, which reflected that Lerias was ahead of Mercado by 20 votes, should be upheld. Protestant Lerias should thus be credited with a totality of 36,008 votes as against 35,588 votes of protestee Mercado, in a final untarnished count. Protestant, should, therefore, be declared the winner in the May 11, 1987 election for the Lone District of Southern Leyte, having obtained a majority of the valid votes cast in the said election, with a plurality of four hundred twenty (420) votes over the protestee, and thus, further declare protestant Rosette Y. Lerias as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Southern Leyte. (Rollo, pp. 287-189) Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado also filed a partial motion for reconsideration. Acting on the said motions, the Tribunal, on January 31, 1991 promulgated its assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved to DENY protestant's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Protestee's Partial Motion for Reconsideration, is hereby GRANTED. The Tribunal also DIRECTS motu propio the appropriate correction of the `Votes per Revision' of the Protestant, pursuant to the verified errors committed, so as to reflect the true and correct votes actually garnered by the protestant and the protestee. ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Tribunal promulgated on December 6, 1990 is hereby amended and modified, by declaring protestee Mercado as the duly elected Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Southern Leyte, by a plurality of SIXTY SEVEN (67) VOTES,having garnered a total of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY FIVE (35,595) VOTES, as against the THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (35,528) VOTES of protestant Lerias. (pp. 344, Rollo) In her revised Dissenting Opinion, (pp. 346-353 Rollo) the Honorable Justice Herrera made the following clarifications: Interpolating the necessary corrections, therefore, the final tabulation of votes obtained by the parties in the counterprotested precincts should be revised as follows:

Deduct: Rejected ballots TOTAL 363 35,568 (formerly 35,563)

Add: Claimed ballots admitted (as corrected) Add: votes restored TOTAL VOTES 25 0

35,593 (formerly 35,588)

Plurality of Protestant Lerias 12 votes (instead of20 in the original dissent) To this plurality of twelve (12) votes obtained by Protestant Lerias in the counter-protested precincts must be added the 400 votes obtained by her in the four contested precincts in Libagon. Protestant Lerias should, therefore, be credited with a total of thirty six thousand five (36,005) votes as against thirty five thousand five hundred ninety three (35,593) votes for Protestee Mercado, or a margin of four hundred twelve (412) votes, instead of the 420 votes in the original dissent. PREMISES CONSIDERED, in so far as the undersigned's dissent is concerned, Protestee Mercado's Partial Motion for Rreconsideration is denied, and I reiterate my vote to proclaim Protestant Rosette Y. Lerias as the fully elected Representative for Southern Leyte. (pp. 351-353, Rollo) Justice Cruz maintained his original dissent. Representative Cerilles filed a "Dissenting Opinion on Denial of Protestant's Motion for Reconsideration" (pp. 355-357 Rollo) stating that : In sum, Protestant should therefore be declared winner in the May 11, 1987 election for the Lone District of Southern Leyte having obtained a plurality of four hundred four (404) votes over the Protestee, and thus further declare Protestant Rosette Y. Lerias as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Southern Leyte. (pp. 356-357, Rollo) We have read and examined, with utmost interest and care, the contentions of the parties, the majority opinion of the five members of the Tribunal as well as the separate dissenting opinions of the chairperson and some members of the electoral LERIAS tribunal, and the Court arrived at the conclusion, without any hesitation, reservation, or doubt, that the Tribunal (the majority opinion) in rendering its questioned Decision and Resolution had acted whimsically and arbitrarily and with very grave abuse of discretion. It is for this reason that We cannot bring ourselves to agree with their35,539 decision. The Protest Lerias contended that in the four (4) protested precincts of Libagon where her votes were determined to be 1,411 only, the same were allegedly reduced by 100 votes in each precinct, thus totalling 400, the details of which reduction are as follows: 2,154 6,885 Prec inct 33,639 28,654 Prot este d Ler ias' Ler ias ' Cla im ed Vo tes 16 2 12 3 13 2

MERCADO Votes per proclamation Deduct: Votes in 81 counter-protested precincts VotesUncontested precincts Add: Votes per revision (physical count, as corrected 2,292 (formerly 2,287) 35,931 (formerly 35,926) 35,793

Cre dit ed Vot es 62

No. 6 No. 6,851 (formerly 10 6,867) No. 35,256 (formerly 18 35,521)

23

TOTAL

32

No. 19

56

15 6

Should her claimed votes as aforestated be sustained Lerias' total votes from the municipality of Libagon shall be 1,811 votes. In such an eventuality, Lerias shall have been able to recover 400 votes, more than sufficient to overcome the winning margin of Mercado, thereby prevailing by a plurality of 146 votes. To prove her contention, Lerias submitted original copies of the certificate of canvass of the municipal board of canvassers and the provincial board of canvassers. She also invoked the original copy of the election returns for the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon. These documents, particularly the election returns showed that Lerias received 162 votes in Prec. No. 6, 123 votes in Prec. No. 10, 132 votes in Prec. No. 18 and 156 votes in Prec. No. 19 to give her a total of 1,811 votes in the entire municipality of Libagon. Upon the other hand, Mercado relied mainly on the xerox copy of the certificate of canvass for the Comelec. This certificate showed that Lerias received 62 votes in Prec. No. 6, 23 votes in Prec. No. 10, 32 votes in Prec. No. 18 and 56 votes in Prec. No. 19. The HRET majority opinion rejected the election returns and sustained the certificate of canvass because (1) the Comelec found that the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass is "regular, genuine and authentic on its face" and said finding of the Comelec had been sustained by the Supreme Court; (2) the protestant (meaning Lerias) had agreed during the pre-proclamation proceedings to the use of the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass; and (3) the authenticity of the election returns from the four (4) disputed precincts had not been established. The reasons given by the majority for doubting the authenticity of the election returns are: (a) the non-production of the election returns during the entire preproclamation proceedings definitely creates much doubt as to their authenticity especially so when they surfaced only almost a year later after the ballots had been stolen; (b) during that time, the election returns may have been tampered with and "doctored" to Lerias' advantage; (c) no proof whatsoever was offered to show that the integrity of the ballot box in which they were kept was not violated; and (d) thewitnesses presented by Lerias had shown their partisanship in her favor by executing affidavits to support her protest. The foregoing findings and pronouncements of the HRET (majorirty opinion) are totally bereft of any support in law and settled jurisprudence. In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. Where it has been duly determined that actual voting and election by the registered voter had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resulting disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the voting. Canvassing boards, the Comelec and the HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and may do so only upon the most convincing proof that the returns are obviously manufactured or fake. And, conformably to established rules, it is the party alleging that the election returns had been tampered with, who should submit proof of this allegation. At this juncture, it is well to stress that the evidence before the HRET is the original copy of the election returns while the Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass, is merely a xerox copy, the original thereof had not been produced. Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court. The exceptions are not present here. Moreover, the xerox copy of the certificate of canvass is inadmissible as secondary evidence because the requirements of Sec. 4 of the same Rule have not been met. (Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 254) Besides this certificate of canvass had been disowned by the chairman and members of the municipal board of canvassers, claiming that the same was falsified since their signatures and thumbmarks appearing thereon are not theirs and the number of votes credited to Lerias in the municipality of Libagon had been reduced from 1,811 to 1,411. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1988 AM, pp. 74-78; TSN, Sept. 13, 1988 PM, pp. 41-46; Dissenting Opinion, Rep. A.H. Cerilles, p. 2) The finding of the Comelec in the pre-proclamation proceedings that its copy of the certificate of canvass is "genuine and authentic" and which finding was sustained by this Court (G.R. No. 78833; 79882-83) is not binding and conclusive. The HRET must be referring to the following portion of the decision of this Court Public interest demands that pre-proclamation contests should be terminated with dispatch so as not to unduly deprive the people of representation, as in this case, in the halls of Congress. As the Court has stressed in Enrile v. Comelec, and other cases, the policy of the election law is that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and proclamation should be delayed as little

as possible. The powers of the COMELEC are essentially executive and administrative in nature and the question of fraud, terrorism and other irregularities in the conduct of the election should be ventilated in a regular election protest and the Commission on Elections is not the proper forum for deciding such matters; neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the COMELEC or the board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of elections returns to look beyond the face thereof `once satisfied of their authenticity'. We believe that the matters brought up by petitioner should be ventilated before the House Electoral Tribunal. Unlike in the past, it is no longer the COMELEC but the House Electoral Tribunal which is `the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications' of the members of the House of Representatives. In opting to go by the COMELEC copy which on its face did not show any alteration, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, specially since both parties agreed to the COMELEC using its own copy (Copy No. 3). Accordingly, the Court resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack ofmerit. The temporary restraining order issued on July 23, 1987 is hereby LIFTED effective immediately. (Rollo, pp. 264-265) It would appear, therefore, that this Court sustained the use of the Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass instead of the copy of the provincial board of canvassers only to establish prima facie (but not actually) the winner (as called for by the summary nature of pre-proclamation proceedings), without prejudice to a more judicious and unhurried determination in an election protest, and because Lerias' thru counsel had previously agreed conditionally and qualifiedly to its tentative use for pre-proclamation proceedings. The decision of this court was merely an affirmance of the action of the Comelec and it cannot be relied upon as a final adjudication on the merits, on the issue of the genuiness and authenticity of the said certificate of canvass. Besides, the use of said Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass by the board of canvassers did not foreclose the right of Lerias to prove that the votes attributed to have been received by her as stated, in said certificate of canvass is not correct. Acceptance of a certificate of canvass as genuine and authentic for purposes of canvass simply means that said certificate of canvass is genuine and authentic for the purpose of determining the prima facie winner in the election. But the very purpose of an election contest is to establish who is the actual winner in the election. Anent the pronouncement of the HRET (majority opinion) that having agreed to the use of the Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass, Lerias is now estopped from assailing it, suffice it to state that Lerias agreed to the use of said copy because she was not aware then that the figures therein had been altered. It is a matter of record that she immediately objected after she discovered the discrepancy. At any rate, she cannot be estopped from protesting a falsification of the voters' will because such estoppel would contravene public policy. (Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 5) Moreover, as indicated in the discussion hereinabove, under the circumstances relating to pre-proclamation, estoppel certainly cannot apply. As to the delay in presenting the election returns because these were not presented during the whole pre-proclamation proceedings, it must be noted that at that time, the four ballot boxes of Libagon with their correspondidng ballots were still intact and as these would have provided the best evidence, resorting to the election returns was uncalled for. It is for this reason that Lerias had asked for a recount of the ballots and this would have obviated the need for the election returns. Under these circumstances the failure of Lerias to ask for the production of the election returns during those times that the ballots were still available cannot be considered as ground for considering said election returns as of dubious character. The "suspicion" of the HRET (majority opinion) regarding the possible tampering of the election returns are at best merely speculative and dispelled by the incontrovertible evidence in the case. On its face, these election returns have no traces of tampering. Even the majority decision admits that said election returns "appear to be originals and on their faces, authentic." (Decision, p. 21) The authenticity of said returns, particularly those of Precincts 6, 10, 18, and 19, the four disputed precincts, had been further established by the testimonies of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of said precincts during the hearing before the Tribunal and before the hearing officer designated to hear the case. More importantly, examination of said returns conclusively established the Identity of said returns as the very same ones prepared by the respective Board of Election Inspectors during the counting of the votes. The election returns for Precinct 6 was marked as Exhibit "F"; that of Precinct 10, Exhibit "AA"; Precinct 18, Exhibit "U", and Precincts 19, Exhibit "P". The election returns for Precinct 6 bears Serial No. 0138; for Precincts 10, No. 0142; for Precinct 18, No. 0150; and for Precinct 19, No. 0151. The minutes of voting for each of said precincts which were submitted to the Comelec and later on presented in evidence before the Tribunal, indicated the serial numbers of the election returns for said precincts and they corresponded to the serial numbers of election returns for the four precincts. The NAMFREL reposts, (copy from the National Headquarters) which were presented during the initial hearing before the HRET by a representaive of the national headquarters of NAMFREL, as well as the copies of said reports of Bencouer Gado, the municipal coordinator of NAMFREL in Libagon, also indicated that the election returns for Precinct 6 bears Serial No. 0138; Precinct 10, Serial No.

0142; Precinct 18, Serial No. 0150 and Precinct 19, Serial No. 0151. 2 The envelopes wherein said election returns were originally placed by the Board of Election Inspectors from said precincts, when they turned over said election returns to the election registrar, were the very same envelopes which contained the election returns from said precincts at the time that they were turned over to Luspo (the Tribunal's representative) on March 24, 1988. The Identity of said envelopes had been conclusively proven by the fact that the serial numbers that they bear and the Comelec paper seal sealing said envelopes are the same. The serial numbers of said envelopes had been noted in the minutes of each of said proceedings. The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 6 bears Serial No. 042366 and the Comelec paper seal thereof bears Serial No. 017318. The envelope containing the election returns for Precincts 10 bears Sereial No. 042370 and the Comelec paper seal thereof bears Serial No. 0173226. The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 18 bears Serial No. 04373 while the Comelec paper seal thereof bears Serial No. 0173326. The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 19 bears Serial No. 042379 while the Comelec paper seal thereof bears Serial No. 173332. When the chairmen of each of said precincts testified before the Hearing Officer designated by the Tribunal, they all Identified their respective signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the envelopes for said four precincts. Ruego, the chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers and acting election registrar during the election, also Identified his signature on the envelopes acknowledging the receipt of said envelopes containing the election returns for said precincts. The four chairmen of said precincts also positively Identified that the election returns shown to them for their respective precincts taken from the custodian of the Tribunal and placed inside Envelopes A and B were the very same election returns prepared by them. They Identified their own signatures and thumbmarks and those of the other members of the board of election inspectors in their respective precincts. On the basis of the election returns from the four disputed precincts, the votes of Lerias and Mercado in said precincts were as follows:

and E for Precinct 6; Exhs. V and UU for Precinct 18; Exhs. L and M for Precinct 19); 3. The certified result of the canvassing prepared by watchers of UPP-KBL (Exhs. G for Precinct 56; Exh. DD for Precinct 10; Exh. Y for Precinct 18 and Exh. O for Precinct 19); 4. The Municipal Board of Canvassers' copy of the certificate of votes and its supporting statement of votes (Exh. LL); 5. The Provincial Board of Canvassers' copy of the Certificate of Canvass and its supporting statement of votes (Exh. LL); 6. The letter report to Comelec, Manila, dated May 18, 1987, of Manuel Paler, OIC Mayor of Maasin as municipal chairman of Lakas ng Bansa (Exh. J); 7. The letter report to Comelec, Manila, dated May 18, 1987, of Rito B. Go, PDP-Laban Chairman for Southern Leyte (Exh. I); and 8. The tally board (photograph taken by photographer Rodriguez (Exh. NN). According to NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075576 for Precinct 6, both the national headquarters' copy and the copy of the NAMFREL municipal coordinator, Bencouer Gado (Exhs. H and CC), protestant got 162 votes while protestee got only 45 votes. NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075580 prepared by NAMFREL representative Edna Pajo, duly certified by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10 after verifying its accuracy, checking the same against the election returns and the tally sheet, both national headquarters' copy and the copy of the municipal coordinator, showed that in said Precinct 10 protestant received 123 votes while protestee received 79 votes (Exh. CC and Exh. FF). NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075590 for Precinct 18 prepared by NAMFREL watcher Rito Lopina, certified by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of said precinct after verifying if they tally with the results as shown in their tally board showed, that in said precinct protestant received 142 votes as against protestee's 46 votes (Exh. X). NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075589, prepared by NAMFREL watchers assigned to Precinct 19, duly certified to by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of said precinct, after checking whether the votes of the candidates contained in said OQC report tally with the election returns in the tally sheet showed, that protestant obtained in said precinct 156 votes while protestee received 24 votes (Exh. N). The certificate of votes (CE Form No. 13) issued to the watchers of the political parties (Exhibits E, D, V, WW, L and M), as well as the reports prepared by the watchers of UPP-KBL (Exhibits G, DD, Y and O) also showed the same votes received by protestant and protestee in the four disputed precincts as reflected in the election returns for said precincts. The tally board used in the canvass remained displayed in the session hall of the municipal building of Libagon for several months after the elections. Pictures of said tally board were taken by Rudy Rodriguez, a professional photographer (Exh. NN, TSN Sept. 12, 1988, p. 48). According to said tally board the votes of protestant and protestee were the same as those shown in the election returns. If they were erroneous, Mayor Paitan of Libagon who has his office on the same floor who saw said tally board every day, would have complained about the entries particularly for Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19, which were the subject of the raging election contest between protestant and protestee. The reports of Manuel Paler, OIC Mayor of Maasin and chairman of Lakas ng Bansa to the chairman of the Commission on Elections dated May 18, 1987, received by the Law Department of Comelec on May 20, 1987, and the report of Rito Go, chairman of PDP-Laban for Southern Leyte, to the chairman of the Commission on Elections dated also May 18, 1987 and received by the Law Department on May 20, 1987 (Exhibits J and I), similarly reflected that Lerias received 1,811 votes in Libagon while Mercado obtained 1,351 votes. In the entire congressional district Lerias obtained 35,937 votes while Mercado obtained 35,795 votes. These are reports coming from Lakas ng Bansa and PDPLaban, political parties who had their own candidates. They would not have filed said reports admitting that Lerias obtained more votes than their own candidates unless the same were actually the votes obtained by her as verified by their own representatives. The Municipal Board of Canvassers' copy of the Certificate of Canvass and supporting statement of votes as well as the Provincial Board of Canvassers' copy of said reports showed that Lerias obtained 1,811 votes in Libagon. True, that the Provincial Board of Canvassers rejected their copy of said Certificate of Canvass because of certain erasures and alterations therein. But the members of the

Prec incts No.

L e ri a s 1 6 2 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 5 6

Mer cad o

45

10

79

18

46

19

24

It would appear then that the votes of Lerias as indicated in the Comelec copy of the Certificate of Canvass (Exh. 22) had been systematically reduced by 100 votes in each of the four precincts. With the correction of the votes of Lerias in said four precincts as reflected in the election returns it would result that in the entire Municipality of Libagon protestant received 1,811 votes while Mercado received only 1,351 votes. Consequently, the total number of votes Lerias received in the entire congressional district would be 35,939 votes (400 votes more than what was credited to her in the Comelec copy of the Certificate of Canvass which was the basis of the proclamation of Mercado) while Mercado received 35,793 votes giving a margin in favor of Lerias of 146 votes before the revision of the ballots in the precincts involved in the counter-protest of protestee. The number of votes received by protestant and protestee in the four disputed precincts of Libagon as shown in the election returns for said precincts is substantiated by the following documentary evidences: 1. The NAMFREL Operation Quick Count (OQC) reports, national headquarters' copies and copies of the municipal coordinator of NAMFREL in Libagon (Exhs. EE, FF, GG, HH, H, CC, X); 2. The certificate of votes of the candidates (CE form 13) issued to the representatives of the political parties (Exhs. D

Municipal Board of Canvassers explained to the Provincial Board of Canvassers that the corrections made by them were merely to correct certain clerical errors. It should be pointed out here that the corrections and erasures made did not refer to the votes of the congressional candidates. The votes of Lerias and Mercado in Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 of Libagon bear no corrections or erasures. And in the canvass for the senatorial candidates, the Provincial Board of Canvassers' copy which the board rejected in the congressional canvass, was used as basis of the canvass. The board would have rejected the same were it not authentic.The fact that said copy of the Certificate of Canvass was used in the senatorial canvass conducted after the congressional canvass would indicate that the board considered the same authentic. (Dissenting Opinion of Rep. Cerilles, pp. 13-19) The fact that the members of the board of election inspectors in the disputed precincts had executed affidavits in support of the claim of Lerias cannot be considered as partisanship since it is the duty of saidmembers of the board to inform the Comelec, of the actual results of voting in their respective precincts. In any event, the test of whether or not the testimonies of said election officials should not be believed because they are biased or prejudiced would be the tenor of their respective terstimonies or affidavits, whether the same are credible and corroborated by other evidence. The testimonies of these election inspectors that the election returns were the very same election returns prepared by them were corroborated by the documentary evidence which had not at all been disputed such as the NAMFREL reports, the statement of votes given to the representatives of the other parties, the tally sheets, the certificates of canvass, both the municipal board and provincial board of canvassers' copies (not the Comelec copy which reflected a different result). In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. in G.R. Nos. 78833, 79882-83 entitled "Lerias v. Comelec et al", is very pertinent: Another inexplicable act of the COMELEC is the refusal to even hear the members of the Libagon municipal board of canvassers and the election board of inspectors of the four disputed precincts who expressed willingness to testify as to which certificates are genuine. When the very persons whose signatures appear on the questioned certificates attest that those are not their signatures because the correct copies are the two copies carrying their corrections, it is the height of incongruity to even refuse to hear them. They are the persons in the best position to state what they did, what they entered on the various election forms, etc., but they were unceremoniously ignored. To say that these persons were either purchased or coerced is not only unkind, to say the least, but irrational and without basis. First, their testimonies could be rejected if perceived as not truthful. But they should be heard. Second, these personnel manning the election precincts and canvass boards are all government employees. The head of the municipal canvass board is a COMELEC employee. The rest of the canvassers are other government officials. The precincts are manned totally by school teachers. Why should they be summarily rejected as the most competent of all possible witnesses? (Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx The tactic of `win the proclamation and delay the protest' is even more rampant than when it first surfaced. The ruling in Espino v. Zaldivar (21 SCRA 1204, 1213) that we should not wink at a brazen form of wrongdoing to subvert the people's will and in mockery crown the loser with victory; the genuine returns must be ascertained and the obvious forgery disregarded remains as true now as it was then. (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 279-280, Rollo) But more importantly, another xerox copy of the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass exactly the same as the xerox copy of the Comelec copy submitted to the HRET is attached to the joint affidavit of the Chairman and members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon, to show that their signatures and thumbmarks appearing in the Comelec copy before the HRET are not their own signatures and thumbmarks. For purposes of comparison, they affixed their respective signatures and thumbmarks on the margin of said xerox copy of the supposed Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass. Therefore, the Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass used by the Comelec and sustained by the Tribunal`s majority opinion is not only a xerox copy but is a xerox copy of a falsified and forged document. This being the case, it should not be given any evidentiary value. It is incredible that the majority opinion in the HRET decision would deliberately use forged signatures and thumbmarks simply in their desire to produce an infamous political decision. Surely this is pure anathema to all rules of fair play. All told, the Court is of the considered opinion that the HRET (majority opinion) had no basis at all in considering the election returns from Precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 as not authentic. And considering the overwhelming and indubitable evidence presented by Lerias in support of her protest, more particularly the election returns which in the absence of the ballots would constitute the best evidence, the actual

number of votes received by Lerias and Mercado in the four (4) contested precincts are as follows:

Pre cinc t No. 6

L er ia s 1 6 2 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 5 6

Mer cado

45

10

79

18

46

19

24

and that in the entire municipality of Libagon, Lerias obtained 1,811 votes while Mercado obtained 1,351 votes. Based solely on the protest, in the whole congressional district, Lerias obtained 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving her a winning margin of 146 votes. The Counter-Protest After the Tribunal had screened and appreciated both the "objected to" and "claimed" ballots from the 81 precincts subject of the counter-protest of Mercado, the result was 363 ballots of Mercado and 249 ballots of Lerias were rejected and 25 ballots claimed by Mercado and 334 ballots claimed by Lerias were admitted. Two ballots were also restored to Lerias after it was found out that her name written thereon was tampered with or erased by another person and the name of Mercado written in its place. This gave Lerias a winning margin of 20 votes over Mercado as shown in the following tabulations:

L E R I A S Votes Per Procla matio n 3 5 , 5 3 9

ME RC AD O

35, 793

Votes Count erprote sted precin cts 6 , 8 8 5 2,1 54

Votes Unco ntest ed precin cts 2 8 , 6 5 4 33, 639

Votes -Per Revisi on of ballot 6 , 2,2 87

8 6 7 3 5 , 5 2 1 35, 926

The aforementioned departures from the application of the "neighborhood rule" laid down in "Nograles v. Dureza" (HRET Case No. 34, June 16, 1990) are unwarranted and clearly designed by the majority to reduce the claimed votes to be admitted for Lerias and make Mercado eventually the winner. Under Subsec. 1 of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, a ballot where only the first name of a candidate or his surname is written is considered a vote for such candidate as there is no other candidate with the same first name or surname for the same office.The majority opinion, therefore, which did not count the ballots cast where only the first name of Lerias was written "Rosette", "rosit" or "roset" is contrary to said subsec. 1 of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code. In her certificate of candidacy, Lerias gave her full name as "Rosette Yniguez Lerias." It is for this reason that the Tribunal during the appreciation of the ballots in its executive sessions admitted as votes for Lerias ballots containing, "Yniguez R", "Yniguez L", Yniguez Roset", "R. Yniguez" or "L. Yniguez" written on the first line of senators for it is very clear that said ballots were intended to be cast for Lerias. Under Subsec. 3 of Section 211 of the OmnibusElection Code, said ballots should be counted as votes for Lerias inasmuch as there is no other candidate for the same position of Representative who is an incumbent. Subsec. 3, Sec. 211 reads: 25 3. In case the candidate is a woman who uses her maiden or married surname or both and there is another candidate with the same surname, a ballot bearing only such surname shall be counted in favor of the candidate who is an incumbent. (p. 315, Rollo) In said particular ballots they cannot be considered as votes cast for senatorial candidate Yniguez inasmuch as in the same ballot Yniguez had also been voted for as senator in the proper space for senators. Some of the ballots rejected by the majority also contain the name "Lerias" on line 1 for Senator. These ballots were written by assistors, and therefore, were admitted as valid. (Timbol v. Lazatin, HRET Case No. 46, 22 March 1990). The majority rejected these ballots by discounting the applicability of the "neighborhood rule".

Reject ed Ballot s Claim ed Ballot s Admit ted

2 4 9

363

3 3 4 3 5 , 6 0 6

35, 588

Votes Resto red to Lerias 2 3 5 , 6 0 8 Plurali ty of Lerias 2 0

On this point, the Honorable Chairperson, J. Herrera in her dissent aptly ruled: Strangely enough, according to the majority, the 'neighborhood rule' liberalizes the `proper space' rule because the voter may not be literate, `but should find no applicability where the ballots are filled by assistors who themselves appear illiterate' (p. 37, Majority Opinion). This pronouncement has been plucked from thin air and appears nowhere in electoral jurisprudence. What is settled is the guideline adopted in the case of Nograles v. Dureza (HRET Case No. 34, June 16, 1990), and on the basis of which the Tribunal admitted the ballots in question. Thus: 2. Ballots where the name of a candidate was written on line 1 for Senators or in the shaded box immediately above the line for Representative, were counted in favor of that candidate, provided, that (1) the line for Representative had been left blank, and (2) no other name of a candidate for Representative was written on other lines for Senators, in the same ballot (Mandac v. Samaoante, 54 Phil. 706 [1903]. (Decision, p. 17) This rule does not distinguish between ballots written by the voter himself or assisted by another. (p. 168, Rollo) Finally, there are 170 ballots of Lerias with stickers which had been rejected. Again, the majority had committed an error in rejecting said ballots, Justice Cruz, in his dissent stated: In addition to the above observations, I will also express my objections to the rejection of the 170 ballots cast for the Protestant which were considered marked with stickers by the majority. As long as the stickers were pasted on a blank space on the ballot, I agree that the ballot should be invalidated under Section 211, Rule 20, of the Omnibus Election Code. But I maintain that where the stickers appeared to have been hastily and surreptitiously stuck on other parts of the ballots (mostly diagonally and without any uniform location), this was done by persons other than the voters themselves, precisely to invalidate the ballots. It is illogical for a voter to take the trouble of writing down the names of his candidates, sometimes laboriously, only to nullify the ballot (and all his votes) by pasting a sticker on it. (pp. 257-258, Rollo) But, what is more revealing are the following observations of Rep. Cerilles in his dissent, as follows:

This was disregarded by the majority and in the revised tabulation reflected in the majority decision, Mercado no longer lost by 20 votes. Instead he already won by a plurality of 42 votes over Lerias. This came about through the simple expedient of reducing the already admitted claimed ballots of Lerias by 57 votes (from the original 334 to 277); invalidating 3 more ballots of Lerias (from 249 to 252) and adding 1 more to the claimed ballots of Mercado (from 25 to 26) at the same time rejecting 1 more ballot of Mercado (from 363 to 364). The modification consisted in: 1. Where only the first name of the candidate is written on line 1 for senator, the neighborhood rule will not apply. According to the majority the neighborhood rule itself is but an exception to that accepted rule on appreciation that the candidate's name placed in another line not the proper space for the position he is aspiring is a stray vote, and being already an exception the same must be applied most rigidly and very strictly. (Decision, p. 35) Thus, according to the majority, ballots with "Rosette" or "roset" or "rosit" written on line 1 for senators, even if the space for congressman is blank and no other candidate for congress is written on the ballot, were rejected and denied admission by the majority. 2. The same principle of strict application of the intent or neighborhood rule was applied to votes placed on line 1 for senator, which merely reflects the initials of the first name of a candidate but whose surname or maiden surname happens to be the same surname of a legitimate candidate for senator. Under this application of the neighborhood rule, votes for protestant cast as "R. Iniguez" or "Yniguez R." or L. Yniguez" or Yniguez L" were also rejected. 3. A ballot where the name Lerias is written on line 1 for senator is rejected where it appears that it is written by an assistor. 4. Where the only entry in the space for Representative was Yniguez, said ballot is considered as a misplaced vote for senatorial candidate Yniguez since there was an Yniguez who was a candidate for senator who is at the same time an official.

Based on the evidence presented, I am thoroughly convinced that Lerias was systematically cheated of one hundred (100) votes in each of the four precincts of Libagon. The majority of the Tribunal refuse to reinstate these 400 votes of Lerias inspite of the overwhelming weight of evidence and the laws and jurisprudence in point. And now that she won by twenty (20) votes in the original tabulation on the counter-protest submitted before the Tribunal, inspite of the dismissal of her protest, the majority simply decided to change the results with Mercado coming out with a plurality of forty-two (42) votes. All told, the results of this election have been magically changed twice and, in both instances, always against the protestant Lerias. This is definitely bad precedent. It may be that in the future candidates will no longer believe in the counting of votes for, after all, the results can easily be changed, or otherwise replaced, substituted, modified or altered as in this case, by the sheer force of the majority, no matter how erroneous, arbitrary and legally unjustified that judgment may be. Although I recognize the reality of the composition of this Tribunal, stilI I am tempted to ask whatever happened to our conception and application of the Rule of Law? Having asked that question, I entertain serious doubt about the legality of the action undertaken by the majority especially so since the winner in the original tabulation suddenly became the loser. Clearly, it was an afterthought on the part of the majority. This, to say the least, is anomalous because the result of the screening of ballots had already been approved previously by the Tribunal after a random checking was made in accordance with established procedures. In effect, therefore, the majority re-opened what was already approved and simply reconsidered their previous ruling thus rejecting fifty-seven (57) ballots claimed by the protestant which were already admitted in her favor, and invalidating three (3) more from her valid ballots. This action is arbitrary because these already admitted ballots were reconsidered and rejected without the benefit of an ocular review by the members of the Tribunal. And it becomes all the more irregular because these ballots were just deducted from the total ballots claimed by the protestant and already admitted without Identifying which ballots these are. Absent such Identification, it is downright unfair to have these ballots rejected on the mere say-so of the majority without the benefit of the examination. Might is not necessarily right. (pp. 283-284, Rollo) This was the same observation made by the Honorable Justice Herrera, when she stated in her dissent, thus: In the executive session of 15 November 1990, the reappreciation of some of the ballots was sought. Some members of the Tribunal firmly opposed any re-opening of the case on the ground that it would entail delay in its resolution, besides the fact that all observations/objections should have been raised and ruled upon during the appreciation state. Attention was also called to the fact that rulings on the ballots appreciated were made by at least a majority vote of the members present in meetings where there was a required quorum, hence, the resolutions arrived at were valid and official acts of the Tribunal. When the issue was subsequently put to a vote, a majority of the members voted to overturn the previous rulings of the Tribunal, even as the other members urged that the rulings made by the Tribunal during the appreciation of ballots should no longer be disturbed as the case had already been submitted for decision. It becomes only too obvious then that by sheer force of numbers; by overturning at the post-appreciation stage, the rulings earlier made by the Tribunal admitting the claimed ballots for Protestant Lerias; by departing from the interpretation of the neighborhood rule heretofore consistently followed by the tribunal; by injecting `strange jurisprudence', particularly on the intent rule; the majority has succeeded in altering the figures that reflect the final outcome of this election protest and, in the process, thwarting the true will of the electorate in the lone district of Southern Leyte. (pp. 168-169, Rollo) Conclusion Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes fraudulently taken away from Lerias should be returned to her. So that in the entire municipality of Libagon, she received 1,811 votes. From the original 35,539 votes, Lerias should be

credited with 35,939 votes as against the 35,793 votes of Mercado giving her a margin of 146 votes. Whatever the results of the review of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts would be, (wherein Mercado won by 67 votes according to the majority, or as found by the dissenting members, Lerias won by 12 votes (dissent of J. Herrera) or by 20 votes (dissent of Rep. Cerilles) Lerias would still be the winner. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Honorable Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court declares that petitioner Rosette Yniguez Lerias is the duly elected representative of the Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte. [G.R. No. 135996. September 30, 1999] CARUNCHO III VS COMELEC Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of the Liberal Party for the congressional seat in the lone district of Pasig City at the May 11, 1998 synchronized elections. The other candidates were: Arnulfo G. Acedera, Jr. (LakasNUCD-UMDP); Marcelino P. Arias (Nacionalista Party); Roberto C. Bassig (Independent); Esmeraldo T. Batacan (PDR-LM Coalition); Henry P. Lanot (LAMMP); Francisco C. Rivera, Jr. (PRP/PDR); Elpidio G. Tuason (Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal Party/LAMMP). At 9:00 oclock in the morning of May 12, 1998, respondent Pasig City Board of Canvassers composed of Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr. as Chairman, Atty. Grace S. Belvis as Vice-Chairman, and Dr. Florentina Lizano as Member, started to canvass the election returns. The canvass was proceeding smoothly when the Board received intelligence reports that one of the candidates for the congressional race, retired General Arnulfo Acedera, and his supporters, might disrupt and stop the canvassing. At exactly 6:00 oclock in the evening of May 14, 1998, General Acedera and his supporters stormed the Caruncho Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City, where the canvassing of election returns was being conducted. They allegedly forced themselves into the canvassing area, breaking a glass door in the process. As pandemonium broke loose, the police fired warning shots causing those present in the canvassing venue, including the members of the Board and canvassing units, to scamper for safety. The canvassing personnel exited through the backdoors bringing with them the Election Returns they were canvassing and tallying as well as the Statement of Votes that they were accomplishing. They entrusted these documents to the City Treasurers Office and the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO). Election documents and paraphernalia were scattered all over the place when the intruders left. The following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units recovered the twenty-two (22) Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the Treasurers Office and the PESO. However, page 2 of each of the 22 election returns, which contained the names of candidates for congressmen, had been detached and could not be found. An investigation was conducted to pinpoint liability for the loss but it yielded negative result. Hence, the Board secured proper authority from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),[1] through Election Director for the National Capital Region Atty. Teresita Suarez, for the reconstitution of the missing page by making use of the other copies of the election returns, particularly the provincial copy or the copy in the ballot boxes placed therein by the Board of Election Inspectors. At 2:40 a.m. of May 17, 1998, the Board, satisfied that it had finished canvassing the 1,491 election returns from as many clustered precincts, proclaimed Henry P. Lanot as the winner in the congressional race for the lone district of Pasig.[2] The votes obtained by the leading three candidates were: Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes; Emiliano R. Boy Caruncho III 42,942 votes, and Arnulfo Acedera 36,139 votes. The winner, Lanot, led his closest rival, Caruncho, by 17,971 votes. However, on May 21, 1998, petitioner Caruncho filed a Motion to Nullify Proclamation on the Basis of Incomplete Returns[3] with the COMELEC. He alleged that the Board had proceeded with the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winning congressional candidate even though one hundred forty-seven (147) election returns involving about 30,000 votes, were still not canvassed. He prayed that the COMELEC en banc declare the proclamation null and void and that the Board of Canvassers be directed to convene and reopen the ballot boxes to recount the votes of the candidates for the House of Representatives and thereupon proclaim the winner. On June 1, 1998, petitioner filed an amended motion to correct some errors in the listing of precincts under paragraph 10, pages 2 and 3, and paragraph 12, pages 3 and 4, of the original motion.[4] On June 8, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued an Order requiring respondent Pasig City Board of Canvassers to comment on the amended motion to nullify Lanots proclamation. In his comment filed on June 23, 1998, respondent Atty. Casiano G. Atuel, Jr. admitted the disruption and stoppage of the canvass of election returns on May 11, 1998 but asserted that there were only twenty-two (22) election returns, not 147 as claimed by Caruncho, that were missing but these were eventually recovered. The Board stated in part: x x x. Contrary to the insinuation of Atty. Irene D. Jurado, only 22 Election Returns were reported missing. On the following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units have recovered the 22 missing Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the Treasurers Office and from the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO). There are no missing election returns. That to the surprise of the Board and of the 22 canvassing units, they found out that Page 2 of the 22 Election Returns they recovered were detached and missing. We wish to inform the Commission that Page 2 of the Local Election Returns contained the name of candidates for Congressman. We conducted investigation on who did

the detachment of Page 2 of the 22 Election Returns. However, nobody from the Treasurers Office nor from the PESO admitted that they committed such election offense. It is impossible that 147 Election Returns were missing. The COMELEC Instruction is very specific that only Election Returns to be canvassed are suppose(d) to be brought out from the Ballot Boxes containing still uncanvassed Election Returns. The instruction further stated that once it was read by the Board, it will be stamped `READ and then deliver the same (sic) to the 22 sub-canvassing units. Subcanvassing units cannot get another Election Returns unless the same is finished, tallied, stamped as `CANVASSED, and submit the same to the Secretariat and placed inside a separate ballot boxes with stamped `READ and `CANVASSED (sic) sealed with metal seals, padlocked, chained and padlocked again. It was at this time where (sic) the sub-canvassing units will get another Election Returns from the Board for tally and so on. Sub-canvassing units are not allowed to canvass 2 or more Election Returns at one time. This was the very reason why only 22 Election Returns were reported missing but were recovered without Page 2. That at the very start of the proceeding, the leading candidates for Congressman were as follows: HENRY LANOT FIRST THIRD SECOND

CANVASS said authentic copy of the election returns and include the results thereof with the tally of all election returns previously canvassed and, thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning candidate; and 3. Orders the Law Department of this Commission to investigate candidate Arnulfo Acedera and if after the investigation, the evidence so warrant, to file the necessary charges against him. SO ORDERED. Subsequently, on June 26, 1998, respondent Board filed a Supplemental Comment raising the following matters: (a) the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case under Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code; (b) petitioner failed to record his objections to the elections returns and the certificate of canvass in the minutes of the proceedings of the Board, and (c) the winning candidate, Henry Lanot, was not impleaded in the motion to nullify his proclamation.[8] On July 8, 1998, proclaimed winning candidate Henry Lanot filed a motion for leave to intervene in the case.[9] He also prayed for the reconsideration of the June 24, 1998 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and for referral of the case to the COMELEC en banc. In his motion for reconsideration[10] that was attached to said motion to intervene, movant Lanot argued that failure to notify him of the case was fatal as he was a real party in interest who must be impleaded therein. He also alleged that under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7166, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case and that the Resolution of June 24, 1998 was not based on facts. That same day, petitioner, represented by new counsel,[11] filed a motion praying for the formation of a new Board of Canvassers on account of the June 24, 1998 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.[12] The following day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an order setting the case for hearing and postponing the reconvening of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City.[13] On July 15, 1998, movant Lanot filed an opposition to the motion for the formation of a new Board of Canvassers on the ground that the Resolution of June 24, 1998 is null and void for the following reasons: (a) he was not notified of the proceedings and therefore his right to due process was violated; (b) said resolution had not become final and executory by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, and (c) the case was no longer a pre-proclamation controversy but an electoral protest under the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, not the COMELEC.[14] At the hearing on July 21, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the filing of memorandum. Movant Lanot, however, manifested that he was no longer filing a memorandum. Thus, the COMELEC, ruled that with or without said memorandum, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.[15] Meanwhile, on July 27, 1998, petitioner filed an opposition to Lanots motion for reconsideration[16] after which Lanot filed his comment on the opposition.[17] On September 28, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division granted Lanots motion for intervention and elevated his motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.[18] Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc[19] promulgated a Resolution dated October 1, 1998 reconsidering the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and dismissing petitioners amended motion (petition) to nullify the proclamation on the basis of incomplete returns for lack of merit.[20] Relying on facts narrated by the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in its comment on the motion to nullify the proclamation, the COMELEC en banc found: Thus, the board of canvassers did everything to have all election returns accounted for, and finished canvassing all the election returns of 1,491 clustered precincts of Pasig City. On the basis of the canvass, the board proclaimed the winning candidates for local positions. As to the winning candidate for congressman, the results were as follows: Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes 42,942 votes

EMILIANO CARUNCHO ARNULFO ACEDERA -

As the canvass goes on, Henry Lanot was leading Caruncho by thousands. Very few Election Returns have Caruncho leading and even if leading, the lead was only a few votes. Proper authorities from the Commission on Elections was secured through Atty. Teresita C. Suarez, Election Director for National Capital Region for the purpose of making use of other copies of the Election Returns particularly the Provincial Copy or the Copy in the Ballot Boxes. Fortunately, the authorities arrived on time so that the Board of Canvassers waste(d) no time in opening the Ballot Boxes to retrieve the copies from the Board of Canvassers left inside the Ballot Boxes by the careless Board of Election Inspectors. Provincial copies were used as well in the reconstitution of the missing page 2 of the 22 recovered Election Returns. That there was no truth on the insinuation made by Atty. Irene D. Jurado that there were 147 Election Returns which were not canvassed which will affect the result of election for Emiliano Caruncho. The Board did everything to have all election returns accounted forth (sic). We let no stone unturned before we finally come to the conclusion. That we have finished canvassing the 1,491 Election Returns and proclaimed the winning candidates. That granting without admitting that there were missing Election Returns which were uncanvassed, and if ordered canvass(ed), the more Lanot will widen his lead because the trend was that Henry Lanots lead swollen (sic) as more election returns were canvassed. That for the first time, I am revealing this shocking fact to the Commission on Elections that on two (2) occasions, an unidentified persons (sic) talked to me at the unholy hours of the night 2 days while canvassing was going on and offered me TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS in cold cash just to proclaim `BOY as the elected Congressman. I declined the offer and told the man that I am a straight man, I am on the level, I have a family and I am about to retire. x x x. That at 2:40 A.M. of May 17, 1998, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed all the winning candidates for Local positions. As to the Congressman, the following results are as follows: HENRY LANOT 60,914 votes

Emiliano `Boy Caruncho Arnulfo Acedera EMILIANO `BOY CARUNCHO ARNULFO ACEDERA 42,942 votes -

36,139 votes

36,139 votes

The lead of Henry Lanot from Emiliano Caruncho was 17, 971 votes. xxx xxx x x x.[5]

However, granting arguendo that there were missing twenty-two (22) election returns involving about 4,400 votes, the same no longer affect the results of the election as candidate Henry P. Lanot obtained the highest number of votes, with a lead of 17,971 votes over his closest rival, Emiliano `Boy Caruncho. The board of canvassers duly proclaimed candidate Henry P. Lanot as the winning representative of the lone district of Pasig City. Consequently, we find without basis petitioners allegation that the proclamation of Henry P. Lanot was based on an incomplete canvass. We carefully examined the Comelec copies of the Statement of Votes and found no truth to the assertion that there were one hundred forty seven (147) election returns not canvassed. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner seeks to nullify respondent COMELEC en bancs Resolution of October 1, 1998, contending that said body acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in overruling his claim that 147 election returns involving about thirty thousand (30,000) votes were not canvassed. Petitioner argued that it was enough reason for contesting the proclamation of Lanot as winner under an

On June 24, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division[6] promulgated a Resolution[7] decreeing as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission: 1. Declares that the proclamation of the winning congressional candidate of Pasig City as NULL AND VOID; 2. Orders that the respondents-Members of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City to RECONVENE at the Session Hall of the Commission and use the Comelec copy of the one hundred forty-seven (147) election returns above-mentioned and

incomplete canvass. However, as in the proceedings before the COMELEC, petitioner failed to implead in the instant petition the proclaimed winning candidate, Lanot. The petition must be dismissed. Petitioner initiated this case through a motion to nullify the proclamation of Lanot as the winner in the congressional race in Pasig City. Named respondents in the motion were the individual members of the Board of Canvassers in that city. The proclaimed winner was not included among the respondents. For that reason alone, the COMELEC should have been forewarned of a procedural lapse in the motion that would affect the substantive rights of the winning candidate, if not the electorate. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing.[21] The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of the motion to set aside his proclamation.[22] It was only the intervention of Lanot in SPC 98-123, which the Second Division of the COMELEC allowed, which cured the procedural lapse that could have affected the popular will of the electorate. However, petitioner again failed to implead Lanot in the instant petition for certiorari. In this connection, Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.[23] As the winning candidate whose proclamation is sought to be nullified, Henry P. Lanot is a real party in interest in these proceedings. The COMELEC and the Board of Canvassers of Pasig City are mere nominal parties whose decision should be defended by the real party in interest, pursuant to Rule 65 of the said Rules: SEC. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents. Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. (Underscoring supplied.) Hence, quasi-judicial agencies should be joined as public respondents but it is the duty of the private respondent to appear and defend such agency.[24] That duty cannot be fulfilled by the real party in interest such as the proclaimed winning candidate in a proceeding to annul his proclamation if he is not even named as private respondent in the petition. Ordinarily, the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party in interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the petition.[25] However, this being an election case which should be resolved with dispatch considering the public interest involved, the Court has not deemed it necessary to require that Henry P. Lanot be impleaded as a respondent in this case. A crucial issue in this petition is what body has jurisdiction over a proclamation controversy involving a member of the House of Representatives. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. Article VI thereof states: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x. The foregoing constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, to wit: RULE 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. In the recent case of Rasul v. COMELEC and Aquino-Oreta,[26] the Court, in interpreting the aforesaid constitutional provision, stressed the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over its members, thus: Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code provide that (t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x. In Javier v. Comelec (144 SCRA 194), this Court interpreted the phrase election, returns and qualifications as follows:

The phrase election, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscore the exclusivity of the Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members. Inasmuch as petitioner contests the proclamation of herein respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner. x x x. In the same vein, considering that petitioner questions the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winner in the congressional race for the sole district of Pasig City, his remedy should have been to file an electoral protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).[27] Even granting arguendo that the thrust of petitioners case is to question the integrity of the election returns or the validity of the incomplete canvass as the basis for Henry Lanots proclamation, and not the proclamation itself, still, the instant petition is devoid of merit. The factual question of how many election returns were missing as a consequence of the disruption of the canvassing of election returns has been definitely resolved by the COMELEC en banc. Thus, raising the same issue before this Court is pointless because this Court is not a trier of facts.[28] The facts established below show that all the legal steps necessary to carry out the reconstitution of the missing page 2 of the twenty-two (22) election returns have been followed. Proper authorization for the reconstitution of that page was secured from the COMELEC. The reconstitution was based on the provincial copy of the election returns that was retrieved from the sealed ballot boxes. For his part, petitioner failed to have the anomaly recorded in the minutes of proceedings of respondent Board as required by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166. Respondent Board, therefore, observed the following provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: SEC. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. In case its copy of the election returns is missing, the board of canvassers shall, by messenger or otherwise, obtain such missing election returns from the board of election inspectors concerned, or if said returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission, and forthwith direct its representative to investigate the case and immediately report the matter to the Commission. The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns have been received by it, may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of the available election returns if the missing election returns will not affect the results of the election. Granting that the proclamation was made without taking into account the twenty-two (22) election returns, still, the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion. The election returns represented only 4,400 votes. That number cannot affect the result of the election because Henry Lanots lead over his closest rival, herein petitioner, was 17,971 votes. As the second paragraph of Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code aforequoted states, the Board of Canvassers could have totally disregarded the twenty-two (22) election returns and legally proclaimed Lanot as the winner in the election in Pasig City for Member of the House of Representatives. An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation.[29] A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is omitted.[30] However, this is true only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election. It bears stressing that in the case at bar, the COMELEC has categorically found that the election returns which were not counted by respondent canvassers represented only 4,400 votes. To be sure, this number will not affect the result of the election considering that Lanots lead over petitioner was already 17,971 votes. On the whole, this Court finds that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution of October 1, 1998 dismissing petitioners motion to nullify the proclamation of Henry P. Lanot as Member of the House of Representatives for the lone district of Pasig City. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Perez vs COMELEC MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated May 10, 1998, of the First Division of the Commission on Elections, dismissing petitioner Marcita Mamba Perezs petition for the disqualification of private respondent Rodolfo E.

Aguinaldo as a candidate for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections, as well as the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, dated June 11, 1998, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The facts are not in dispute. On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution. In support of her claim, petitioner presented private respondents certificates of candidacy[1] for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections; his voters affidavit[2] which he used in the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1997 elections; and his voter registration record dated June 22, 1997,[3] in all of which it is stated that he is a resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel, Municipality of Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of Cagayan. Petitioner alleged that private respondent filed an application[4] for the transfer of his registration as voter from Gattaran, Cagayan (First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (Third District) only on December 17, 1997 and that said application was approved only on January 7, 1998. Petitioner prayed that in the event the case was not finally decided before the elections and private respondent obtained the highest number of votes, the latters proclamation be suspended. In his answer, private respondent claimed that while he had been a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan in 1990, he transferred his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting an apartment at No. 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in order to hide his mistress from public view because, at that time, his marriage to his former wife was still subsisting. In support of his claim, he presented the affidavit[5] of the owner of the apartment, Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, in which it is stated that private respondent had been his lessee since July 1990. In addition, private respondent presented the contract of lease[6] of another residential apartment at Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996, between him, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor; his marriage license dated January 7, 1997;[7] the marriage certificate between him and his present wife, Lerma Dumaguit, dated January 18, 1998;[8] the birth certificate[9] of their daughter, Geniah Laureen D. Aguinaldo; and various letters,[10] all of which show that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year before the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,[11] dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan. On May 11, 1998, private respondent was elected Representative of the Third District of Cagayan, with 65,058 votes over his rival Manuel N. Mambas 58,507 votes.[12] Accordingly, on May 16, 1998, he was proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office. On May 22, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating her allegation that private respondent lacked the requisite residency in the Third District of Cagayan and arguing that the proclamation of private respondent was not a legal impediment to the continuation of the hearing on her motion in view of R.A. No. 6646, 6. Her motion was, however, denied by the COMELEC en banc in its resolution of June 11, 1998. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondent had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan since July 1990 when he rented an apartment there in order to hide his mistress. Petitioner contends that transfer of residence to the place where private respondent is keeping his mistress cannot amount to a change of domicile because ones domicile is the place where one and ones legitimate family resides. She also argues that private respondent could not have changed his residence to Tuguegarao in 1990 considering that his certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections, as well as his voter registration records, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997, indicate that he is a resident of Gattaran, which is in the First District of Cagayan. Petitioner avers that in the absence of clear and positive proof, ones domicile of origin should be deemed to continue and that to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must prove an actual change of domicile, a bonafide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and of establishing a new one, and unequivocal acts which correspond with the intention. On the other hand, private respondent asks that the instant petition be dismissed. He argues that after his proclamation on May 16, 1998 and his assumption of office on June 30, 1998, the COMELEC lost jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications for the office of Representative. He argues further that this case should have been filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. In a supplemental pleading,[13] petitioner replies that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction over the case because she filed the petition for disqualification on March 30, 1998, before the elections on May 11, 1998, and that pursuant to R.A. No. 6646, 6, the COMELEC could continue the proceedings for the determination of the disqualification of private respondent. The threshold issue, therefore, is whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and eventually pass upon private respondents eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan. Petitioner, in sustaining the affirmative side of the question, invokes the following provision of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of petitioners action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, 17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondents ineligibility. As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[14] The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear and complete. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners remedies should have been (1) to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for the issuance of an order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event the motion was denied before the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of private respondent; or (2) to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as Representative-elect on May 16, 1998.[15] Obviously, neither of these remedies can be availed of now. In any event, even assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to resolve the instant petition for certiorari, we find no merit in petitioners allegation that private respondent is ineligible for the office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan. Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution states: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement were explained recently in our decision in Aquino v. COMELEC,[16] as follows: . . . *T+he place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed his residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis of the following: (1) the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the contract of lease between private respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996; (3) the marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998, between private respondent and

Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the certificate of live birth of private respondents second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to private respondent and his family, which all show that private respondent was a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections on May 11, 1998. There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the merit of this factual finding. Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was a resident of Gattaran, at least until June 22, 1997, is shown by the following documentary evidence in the record, to wit: (1) his certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections; (2) his voters registration records, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997; and (3) the fact that private respondent voted in Gattaran, Cagayan, in the elections of 1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995. The contention is without merit. The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino,[17] this Court held that the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence. Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran. Under the law,[18] what is required for the election of governor is residency in the province, not in any district or municipality, one year before the election. Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC:[19] It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the province of Cagayan. As always, the polestar of adjudication in cases of this nature is Gallego v. Vera,[20] in which this Court held: *W+hen the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. In this case, considering the purpose of the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that private respondent is qualified, having been governor of the entire province of Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as Representative of that provinces Third District. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Garcia vs. HRET Facts: On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period from respondentHarry Angpings proclamation as duly elected Representative for the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly registered voters in the district, filed a petition for quowarranto[1 before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) againstCongressman Harry Angping. Petitioner questioned the eligibility of CongressmanAngping to hold office in the House of Representatives, claiming that the latterwas not a na tu ral-b orn citizen of th e Ph ilipp ines, a cons titu tiona l requiremen t. They prayed that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to assume or holdoffice as member of th e House of Rep re sen ta tives an d for the can did ate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates to beproclaimed the winner.Upon filing of the their petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filingfee.On June 10, 1998, however, the HRET issued a Resolution dismissing the petitionfor quo warran to for fa ilure to pay th e P5,000.00 cas h dep os it requ ired by itsRules. A fter receiving a copy of the afores aid Resolu tion, petition ers pa id theP5,000.00 cash deposit on June 26, 1998 and attached the corresponding receiptto th e Motion for Recons ide ra tion th ey filed with the HRET on th e s ame day.Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filingfees for quo warranto cases.Issues:1. THE RESPONDENT HRET COMMITTEDGRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONIN DENYING THE PETITION BELOW DESPITE ACTUAL PAYMENT BY HEREIN PETITIONER (ALBEITLATE) OF THE REQUIRED CASH DEPOSIT OF P5,000.00, THEREBY STRICTLY ANDLITERALLY CONSTRUING THE HRET RULES IN CONTRAVENTION OF RULE 2 (OF THESAME RULES)ENJOININGA LIBERALCONSTRUCTION THEREOF.2 . T H E R E S P O N D E N T H R E T C O M I T T E D G R A V E A B U S E O F D I S C R E T I O N I N DISMISSING THE PETITION BELOW UPON A MERE

TECHNICALIT Y EVEN AS THEE V I D E N C E A N D / O R D O C U M E N T S A T T A C H E D T H E R E I N C L E A R L Y S H O W T h e i NELIGIBILITY OF RESPONDENT ANGPINGTOHOLDAND/ORCONTINUE TOASSUMEOFFICE AS MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.H o l d i n g : W H E R E F O R E , t h e p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i i s h e r e b y D I S M I S S E D . N o pronouncement as to costs.Under the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating tothe elections, returns and qualifications of its members. This does not, however,bar us from enterta ining petition s wh ich charge th e HRET w ith grave a bu se of discretion. Indeed, in Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, weexplained our assumption of jurisdiction in election related cases involving theHRET as follows:In Rob les vs . H RET (181 SCRA 780), th e Cou rt has explain ed tha t w hile th e judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so,however, but only in the exercise of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction,u pon a d etermin ation that th e Tribu nals d ecis ion or reso lu tion was rend eredw i t h o u t o r i n e x c e s s o f j u r i s d i c t i o n , o r w i t h g r a v e a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n o r paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident useby the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon adetermination of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such graveabuse of discretion, that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. This leads us to the second issue of whether or not the HRET has committed graveabuse of d is cretion in s ummarily dism iss ing the petition for quo warran to of petitioners and in refusing to reinstate the same even after the payment of therequired Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit. Rule 32 of the 1998 Rulesof the HRET provides:RULE 32. Cash Deposit. - In addition to the fees prescribed in the preceding Rule,each protes tan t, coun ter-protes tan t or peti tion er in quo warran to sha ll make acash deposit with the Tribunal in the following amounts:(1) in a petition for quo warranto, Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos;(2) if the protest or counter-protest does not require the bringing to the Tribunal of ba llot box es a nd other election d ocuments an d pa rap hern alia from th e d is trictconcerned, Five Thousand (P5,000.00)Pesos;(3) if the protest or counter-protest requires the bringing of ballot boxes and otherelection documents and paraphernalia, Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos for eachprecinct involved therein; Provided, that in no case shall the deposit be less than Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)Pesos;(4) if, as thus computed, the amount of the deposit does not exceed Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos, the same shall be made in full with the Tribunalwithin ten (10) days after filing of the protest or counter-protest;(5) if the depos it ex ceeds S eventy Five Thou sand (P75,000.00 ) Pesos, partialdeposit of at least Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos shall be made withinten (10) days after the filing of the protest or counter-protest. The balance shall bepaid in such installments as may be required by the Tribunal on at least five (5)days advance notice to the party required to make the deposit.Rule 21 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET governing summary dismissal of electioncontests provides, to wit:RULE 21. Summary Dismissal of Election Contest. An election protest or petition forquo warranto may be summarily dismissed by the Tribunal without the necessityof requiring the protestee or respondent to answer if, inter alia:(1) the petition is insufficient in form and substance;(2 ) the petition is filed beyon d the period provided in Rules 16 an d 17 of thes eRules;(3) th e filing fee is not pa id with in the period provided for filing the p rotest orpetition for quo warranto;(4) in case of protests where a cash deposit is required, the cash deposit or thefirst P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within ten (10) days after the filing of theprotest;(5) the petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunalare not clearly legible. (underscoring ours)Rule 33 of the Rules likewise provides:RULE 33. Effect of Failure to Make Cash Deposit. If a party fails to make the cashdeposits or additional deposits herein provided within the prescribed time limit,the Tribunal may dismiss the protest, counter-protest, or petition for quo warranto,or take such action as it may deem equitable under the circumstances. Th erefore, w e find tha t the HRET d id n ot commit grave abus e of discretion ina p p l y i n g i t s R u l e s s t r i c t l y a n d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e p e t i t i o n f o r q u o w a r r a n t o . Accordingly, the instant petition for certiorari cannot prosper.Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicialfunction s ha s a cted without or in ex cess of jurisd iction or with gra ve abu s e of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal,nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for thepurpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a capricious,arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper. To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial orquasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari underRule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show thatthe public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exactdefinition, but generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment asis equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent andgross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform aduty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power isexercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of

passion and hostility.It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed toa court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writof certiora ri may not b e u sed to corre ct a low er tribuna ls eva lua tion of th e evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule45 of the Rules of Court. RAMONITO TANTOY, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 150 RTC-Makati City and ABNER DREU, respondents. RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: Assailed before us is the Decision[1] dated November 14, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67476, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition below, for being moot and academic. The present controversy stemmed from the administrative complaint filed in the Office of the Ombudsman by respondent Barangay Councilor Abner Dreu against petitioner Barangay Captain Ramonito Tantoy, Sr. The complaint was referred to the City Council of Makati, which in due course issued a Resolution[2] recommending the removal of petitioner from office. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, which granted the appeal and set aside the cited resolution. The City of Makati, then, moved for reconsideration on May 7, 2001. For his part, herein respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Preliminary Injunction[3] on May 8, 2001 against the enforcement of the decision of the Office of the President, on the ground that there was still a pending motion for reconsideration. Initially the trial court denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction.[4] However, upon motion by respondent, the trial court reversed itself and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[5] Petitioner sought for reconsideration, but it was denied. On October 11, 2001, the motion for reconsideration before the Office of the President was denied for lack of merit.[6] Citing the denial, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the trial court. However, pending action on said motion to dismiss, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[7] before the Court of Appeals. But subsequently, the trial court lifted the order of preliminary injunction and dismissed the case based on the resolution of the Office of the President of the motion therein for reconsideration.[8] Due to this fact, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being moot and academic. Hence, this petition for review, assigning the following errors: 1. RESPONDENT JUDGE ZEUS C. ABROGAR HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. 2. THE PETITION OF PETITIONER DID NOT BECOME MOOT DESPITE THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 01-698, BECAUSE MEANWHILE THE VOID WRIT OFPRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS ENFORCED.[9] Simply put, we are asked to resolve the issues of (1) whether the trial court has jurisdiction to issue and dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction, and (2) whether the case is already moot and academic. Petitioner asserts that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against a co-equal body whose decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeals or to this Court. Petitioner avers that the trial court dismissed the case, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but, due to the denial by the Office of the President of the motion for reconsideration. He maintains that the issue of its lack of jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction was never resolved. Petitioner claims he suffered damages while the writ was in effect because he was deprived of the compensation and other benefits due him as barangay captain. Hence, the issue of the validity of the issuance of the writ must still be resolved properly to allow him to obtain redress for the injury he suffered. On the second issue, petitioner cites Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[10] and contends that the trial court could no longer dissolve the writ because the matter in dispute has already been elevated to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, private respondent maintains that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction because it was not issued against the Office of the President. Rather, it was against the Department of the Interior and Local Government, which was poised to enforce the decision of the Office of the President, despite the fact that there was a pending motion for reconsideration. Respondent now counters that the instant case has already become moot and academic due to the dismissal of the civil case before the trial court and to the subsequentbarangay election where petitioner lost but the herein respondent won. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.[11] We note that the case before the Court of Appeals was a

petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, which sought to annul respondent judges order granting the issuance of a writ of injunction. Considering that respondent judge had already lifted the writ of injunction, there is nothing left for the Court of Appeals to annul or act upon. The appellate court, then, was correct in ruling that the case had become moot and academic, notwithstanding the petitioners claim of damages. The claim should have been directed against the injunction bond.[12] Anent the other issue before us, the Court of Appeals was correct when it said that a finding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction entails a ruling that the writ and all the proceedings held for that purpose are null and void.[13] Such ruling would render not only the writ of preliminary injunction without force and effect but also the injunction bond posted for the purpose, legally non-existent. Petitioner could no longer legally claim for damages against said bond. Any ruling on this issue would not serve the purpose for which this petition was filed, i.e. to claim for damages. As to petitioners contention that the trial court could no longer dissolve the writ because the issue has already been raised to the appellate court, his reliance on Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[14] would not support his cause. In Joy Mart, the respondent was adjudged guilty of forum-shopping for filing a petition for certioraribefore the Court of Appeals and a petition to dissolve writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court. In the same manner, petitioner hereby violated the rule against forum shopping, for having filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals without waiting for the resolution of his motion to dismiss the case and to dissolve the writ filed before the trial court. It was because of his motion that the trial court lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the case. Certainly, petitioner could not cry foul over something he himself caused. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 14, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67476 is AFFIRMED.

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO J. UNICO, Respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 filed by Liwayway Vinzons-Chato seeking to nullify the Resolution2dated March 17, 2006 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPC No. 04-096. The assailed resolution affirmed the Resolution3 dated April 13, 2005 of the COMELEC (First Division) dismissing petitioner Chatos "petition to correct/nullify the election returns in the municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, due to illegality of the proceedings before respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo and for manifest errors in the election returns; to declare null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of respondent candidate; and to declare and proclaim petitioner as the candidate with the highest number of votes received for the lone congressional district of the Province of Camarines Norte." The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. In her petition filed with the COMELEC, petitioner Chato alleged that during the canvassing of the election returns before the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo (MBC Labo) from May 10 to 12, 2004, her counsel raised several objections and pointed to manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the election returns from various precincts of the municipality of Labo. Prior to the suspension of proceedings on May 12, 2004, the MBC Labo gave her twenty-four (24) hours, or until 6:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004, to prove her allegations. Allegedly in violation of the procedure prescribed in Section 204 of Republic Act No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and For Other Purposes), before the expiration of the period granted and without notice to petitioner Chato or her counsel, the MBC Labo concluded the canvassing of votes and hastily forwarded the results of its canvass to the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Camarines Norte. At that time, which was around 4:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004, petitioner Chatos counsel was supposed to deliver to the MBC Labo her letter enumerating the election returns allegedly containing manifest errors and discrepancies. Petitioner Chatos counsel was thus constrained to appear before the PBC and moved for the suspension of its proceedings on the ground that there were still pending incidents before the MBC Labo. The PBC, however, denied the said motion. Upon instruction of the PBC, petitioner Chato filed therewith a letter-petition for reconsideration of the denial of her request to remand the matter to the MBC. However, on May 14, 2004, at around 10:00 a.m., petitioner Chatos counsel received a Resolution, of even date, of the PBC denying with finality her letter-

petition for reconsideration. In so ruling, the PBC stated that pre-proclamation controversy was not allowed for the election of Members of the House of Representatives. It noted that the matters raised by petitioner Chato, which formed part of the proceedings of the PBC, were proper for an election protest before the competent tribunal. Further, according to the PBC, it had no authority to direct the MBC Labo to reconvene for the purpose of receiving petitioner Chatos written objections and supporting documents and re-canvassing the election returns. Likewise on May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the PBC proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte.1awphi1.nt Petitioner Chato forthwith filed with the COMELEC a Petition alleging manifest errors in that 1) Total number of ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots is more than the number of voters who actually voted in Barangays Anamea[m], Bagong Silang III, Bakiad, Malangcao Basud and Submakin; 2) Total number of votes counted is less than the number of voters who actually voted in Barangays Gumamela, Pinya, Dalas, Anameam, Baay, Bagacay, Bagong Silang I, II & III, Bakiad, Bautista, Bayan-Bayan, Bulhao, Cabusay, Calabasa, Cabatuhan, Canapwan, Daguit I, Dumagmang, Exciban, Fundado, Gumacutan, Guisican, Iberica, Lugui, Mabilo I & II, Macogon, Mahan-hawan, Malanggan Masalong, Napaod, Pag-asa, Pangpang, San Antonio, Sta. Cruz, Submakin, Talobalib and Tulay na Lupa; 3) The entries in some election returns coming from different precincts in Barangays Tulay na Lupa, Baay and Lugui, all of Labo, Camarines Norte, appear to have been written by one person;1a\^/phi1.net 4) No data on number of voters who actually voted and of ballots found in compartment for valid ballots from Barangays Bulhao, San Antonio, Tulay na Lupa, Daguit, Pinya, Cabusay, Napaod, Pag-asa and Dalas; and 5) One election return is supposedly an election return from Barangay Del Carmen, Labo, but there is apparently no Barangay Del Carmen and does not appear to be part of the series of election returns assigned to Labo.5 Petitioner Chato insisted that correction of manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns, questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the boards of canvassers, or noting of objections on election returns or certificates of canvass were allowed before the MBC. She further claimed that with all the manifest errors and obvious discrepancies appearing on the face of the election returns, it could not be said that the canvassing of votes in Labo reflected the true and correct number of votes that she received in the said municipality. On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted the said order on the ground that respondent Unicos proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal. Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005, dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that the MBC is precluded from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass involving the positions of President, VicePresident, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives and Party-List. The COMELEC (First Division) found that the relief sought by petitioner Chato was actually for the re-counting of votes, not merely correction of manifest errors in the election returns. Further, in seeking to nullify respondent Unicos proclamation, petitioner Chato alleged manifest errors in the election returns and that they were tampered with and prepared under duress. Addressing these contentions, the COMELEC (First Division) explained that a recount of votes is not within the province of a pre-proclamation controversy, which is generally limited to an examination of the election returns on their face. It observed that under Section 316 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669 (General Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Board of Canvassers in connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections), objections to the election returns or certificates of canvass were to be specifically noted in the minutes of the board. With respect to the manifest errors alleged by petitioner Chato, the COMELEC (First Division) stated that her objections were general in character as they failed to specify the election return(s) containing these alleged manifest errors as well as the precinct(s) from which they came. Under the circumstances, the MBC Labo could not immediately rule on petitioner Chatos bare allegations for to do so would have resulted in a fishing expedition. The COMELEC (First Division) mentioned that even her petition for reconsideration filed with the PBC was bereft of evidence to support her claim of manifest errors. It

was only in her petition filed with the COMELEC that petitioner Chato specifically enumerated the election returns that allegedly contained infirmities or manifest errors. However, according to the COMELEC (First Division), the resolution of the matters raised by petitioner Chato, e.g., correction of the votes garnered by the candidates and reflected in the election returns, would require the opening of the ballots. This could only be done in an election protest considering that petitioner Chato likewise alleged fraud, substitution, and vote padding. The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC or PBC had no discretion on matters pertaining to the proclamation of the winning candidates because they were simply performing a ministerial function.1vvphi1.nt Absent a lawful order from the COMELEC to suspend or annul a proclamation, the PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular, was mandated to comply with its duties and functions including the proclamation of respondent Unico as the winning candidate for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. The decretal portion of the Resolution dated April 13, 2005 of the COMELEC (First Division) stated: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter LACK OF MERIT. SO ORDERED.7 Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was elevated to the COMELEC en banc for resolution. In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner Chatos motion for reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the fact that respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th) Congress. It reasoned, thus: In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993), the Supreme Court made a categorical pronouncement that: The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide the preproclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate. The Honorable Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling in the recent case of Aggabao vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it held that: The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Considering that private respondent Renato Unico had already taken his oath and assumed office as member of the 13th Congress, the Commission had already lost jurisdiction over the case. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated last April 13, 2005 is affirmed. SO ORDERED.8 Petitioner Chato now seeks recourse to the Court alleging that: THE SOLE ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IS WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION ON MARCH 17, 2006.9 Petitioner Chato essentially contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that it had already been divested of jurisdiction upon respondent Unicos assumption of office as a Member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner Chato vigorously asserts that respondent Unicos proclamation was void because it was based on doctored election documents and not through the legitimate will of the electorate. As such, it can allegedly be challenged even after respondent Unico had assumed office. Petitioner Chato further submits that the COMELEC possesses the authority to pass upon issues involving manifest errors in the certificates of canvass and the composition of the board or its proceedings. It also has the authority to pass upon the nullity of what otherwise is a null and void proclamation.

With respect to petitioner Chatos case, the MBC allegedly violated Section 20 of RA 7166 by failing to rule on her objections during the canvassing of votes. The PBC allegedly confounded this error by refusing to correct the alleged manifest errors in the election returns or certificate of canvass before it. The COMELEC, for its part, allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not annul the proclamation of respondent Unico even as it allegedly possessed such authority as well as to correct manifest errors in the election returns and certificates of canvass, and order the re-counting of the ballots. Petitioner Chato emphasized that the COMELEC has the power of supervision and control over boards of canvassers, including the power to review, revise and/or set aside their rulings. Although the COMELEC, through the First Division in its earlier order suspending the effects of respondent Unicos proclamation, ordered the examination of the evidence and documents submitted by the parties, petitioner Chato avers that the COMELEC never disclosed the outcome of this supposed examination. She thus urges the Court to order the COMELEC to direct the examination of the election returns of the municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, or release the results thereof if one had already been undertaken; constitute and convene a new MBC, and direct the same to prepare a new election return, accomplish a new certificate of canvass and submit it to the PBC; direct the PBC to reconvene and canvass the new certificate of canvass, and subsequently proclaim the winning candidate for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. The petition is bereft of merit. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is selfevident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the peoples mandate.15 Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chatos election protest against respondent Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.16 Petitioner Chatos remedy would have been to file an election protest before the said tribunal, not this petition for certiorari. The special civil action of certiorari is available only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (1) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for certiorari to prosper.17 All told, the COMELEC en banc clearly did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006 holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon respondent Unicos proclamation and oath-taking as a Member of the House of Representatives. On the contrary, it demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. G.R. No. 173609 March 7, 2007

SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. Construing this provision in Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that: x x x The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). x x x With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.11 Further, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" has been interpreted in this wise: The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.12 (Emphasis supplied). The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.13 Stated in another manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.14 In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chatos petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unicos proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unicos proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
10

ANUAR J. ABUBAKAR, Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and NUR G. JAAFAR, Respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: The petition in G.R. No. 173310 seeks to nullify Resolutions Nos. 06-047 and 06-053, dated June 8, 2006 and June 29, 2006, respectively, issued by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 04-017. Resolution No. 06-047 denied petitioner Anuar Abubakars motion to conduct technical examination and to photocopy his ballots subject of the election protest filed by respondent Nur G. Jaafar against petitioner in connection with the May 10, 2004 congressional elections in the Province of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. Resolution No. 06-053 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 06-047. On the other hand, the petition in G.R. No. 173609 seeks to nullify the Decision dated June 30, 2006 in the election protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Tawi-Tawi Province in the May 10, 2004 elections and annulling petitioners proclamation, and to nullify the Resolution dated August 3, 2006 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Decision. The facts are: In the May 10, 2004 elections, Abubakar and Jaafar were among the candidates for Representative in the Lone District of Tawi-Tawi Province. On May 22, 2004, Abubakar was proclaimed winner garnering 37,720 votes against Jaafars 35, 680 votes; thus, winning by a margin of 2,040 votes. On June 1, 2004, Jaafar filed an election protest with the HRET impugning the election results in ten municipalities of Tawi-Tawi Province. Jaafar alleged that fraudulent and illegal acts were employed by Abubakar, his supporters, the Board of Election Inspectors and some military personnel by preventing his (Jaafars) supporters from voting through the use of force, violence, intimidation, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation and other machinations such as asking the voters to simply affix their thumbprints on sheets of paper without giving them any ballot, and massive substitute voting and substitution of ballots with ready-made ballots in the name of Abubakar. Abubakar filed an Answer with Counter Protest denying Jaafars allegations, and counter protested the election results in 160 precincts in nine of the ten municipalities of Tawi-Tawi on the following grounds: illegal reading and counting of ballots; presence of multiple ballots prepared by either one and the same person or individual ballots accomplished by two persons; illegal reading and counting of fake, unauthorized or unofficial ballots containing the protestants name; misreading and/or misappreciation of ballots in protestants favor; illegally considering the votes cast for protestee as stray votes; and prevalent erroneous counting in the election returns of the protestees votes as votes for protestant. During the preliminary conference conducted on February 3, 2006, the following issues were agreed upon for resolution: (1) Mutual charges of election irregularities, fraudulent and illegal acts committed in favor of protestant or protestee, such as substitute or impostor voting, alteration or tampering of ballots and/or election

returns, misreading or miscounting of votes, use of spurious ballots, use of genuine ballots but prepared by either one or the same person or by two persons; (2) Re-count and re-appreciation of the ballots contested; (3) Whether to dismiss the protest for lack of merit; and (4) Whether to dismiss the protest for insufficiency in form and substance and for lack of cause of action. 1 On March 17, 2005, a preliminary hearing was conducted on the affirmative defenses raised by protestee, thus: (1) The petition fails to state a cause of action, and (2) the petition is insufficient in form and substance. Acting on the affirmative defenses of protestee, HRET issued Resolution No. 05-120 dated April 14, 2005 denying the prayer for dismissal of the protest for lack of merit. Protestees Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Defer Revision Proceedings were denied by HRET in Resolution No. 05-131 dated April 28, 2005. From November 15, 2004 to December 8, 2004, HRET, through its representatives, collected all ballot boxes of the involved precincts in the protest and counterprotest, and some election documents and paraphernalia from the municipalities of Tawi-Tawi Province. Upon their return to office, HRETs representatives reported that the concerned election officers in the municipalities failed to turn over the Election Day Computerized Voters Lists and Book of Voters and merely surrendered the Book of Application Forms for Registration of Voters for the 2004 elections. HRET, thereafter, ordered the revision of ballots of the 409 single and clustered contested precincts. Thus, from April 26, 2005 to May 9, 2005, revision of ballots was conducted over the 251 precincts exclusively protested by Jaafar, the 148 counter protested precincts, and the ten precincts commonly protested by Jaafar and Abubakar. On May 31, 2006, Abubakar filed a Motion (1) to Conduct Technical Examination and (2) to Photocopy Protestees Ballots. In Resolution No. 06-047 dated June 8, 2006, HRET denied the motion. In support of its denial, HRET citedTanchangco v. Oreta (HRET Case 92-017, April 28, 1994), where it was held: Neither expert testimony nor technical examination of the questioned ballots is necessary for the Tribunal to properly pass on the validity of the objections and claims. The Tribunal in its evaluation and appreciation of the ballots, which are the best and conclusive evidence in respect to the claims of markings, spuriousness and other defects therein, may determine for itself which claims are duly established. 2 HRET thus stated, "The Tribunal sees no need for the conduct of technical examination in this case, the ballots subject of this protest case having been each fully scrutinized by its members." Moreover, HRET noted the report of the failure of the collection team, tasked to retrieve the ballot boxes and other election documents from the province of Tawitawi, to collect the Voters Registration Records and Computerized Voters Lists from the respective offices of the election officers concerned. Only the Application Forms of the Registrants in the May 2004 elections were turned over to them. Thus, HRET stated that even if granted, technical examination to be conducted by signature and handwriting experts would be useless in the absence of sufficient basis for comparison. Abubakars motion for reconsideration was denied by HRET in Resolution No. 06053 dated June 29, 2006. HRET ruled thus: The decision of the Tribunal to grant or deny a motion for technical examination as provided for under Rule 43 of the HRET Rules is discretionary depending on the circumstances obtaining in each case. For instance, in the case of Mangotara v. Dimaporo, HRET Case No. 01-041, the Tribunal granted the motion for technical examination because the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questioned ballots because there were no ballots but only election documents to consider. For this reason, the Tribunal found it necessary to permit protestant to engage an expert to assist him in the prosecution of his case. Thus, the Tribunal through its appreciation of all protested and counter-protested ballots, including those subject of the objections and claims by each party and even those not claimed or objected to, can ascertain the grounds invoked by the parties such as the genuineness of the ballots, identity or similarity of handwritings, and whether such ballots are spurious or tampered without the necessity of an expert or technical examination. As regards the photocopying of ballots, the Tribunal, in almost all case, has allowed the photocopying of ballots and other election documents. However, in pursuit of its duty to preserve and safeguard the sanctity of the ballots at all times, the Tribunal has adopted stringent measures in allowing the photocopying of ballots and other election documents. Thus, it should be simultaneous with the revision proceedings. 3 On June 30, 2006, HRET rendered its decision on the election protest, thus:

The plurality of votes belongs to protestant [Jaafar] who garnered 27,257 votes as against protestee [Abubakar] who obtained 25,705 votes. Considering that the results of final count after revision and appreciation of the ballots show that the number of votes for protestant had overcome protestees presumptive lead of two thousand and forty (2,040) votes as proclaimed, the Tribunal DECLARES protestant Nur G. Jaafar as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Tawi-Tawi Province in the May 10, 2004 elections and consequently, ANNULS the proclamation of protestee, Anuar J. Abubakar. 4 On July 10, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. On July 18, 2006, Abubakar filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, TRO or Status Quo Order on the interlocutory orders of HRET or Resolutions Nos. 06-047 and 06-053 denying petitioners motion to conduct a technical examination and to photocopy his ballots. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 173310. In a Resolution dated August 3, 2006, HRET denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated June 30, 2006. On August 7, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, TRO or Status Quo Order against the HRET Decision declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Tawi-Tawi Province. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 173609. In a Resolution dated September 12, 2006, the Court resolved to consolidate the two cases. G.R. No. 173310 The subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. 173310 is the interlocutory order of HRET or Resolution No. 06-047 denying petitioners motion to conduct a technical examination and to photocopy his ballots, and Resolution No. 06-053, which denied his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner points out that the subject matter of this case is distinct and separate from his motion for reconsideration of the Decision of HRET dated June 30, 2006. Although petitioner admits that the grant of the motion to conduct a technical examination is discretionary on the part of HRET, petitioner still insists that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the twin motions, and that he was denied due process. Petitioner prayed that this Court (1) immediately issue a writ of preliminary injunction, TRO or Status Quo Order enjoining HRET from resolving with finality his motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated June 30, 2006 annulling his proclamation and declaring private respondent Jaafar as the Representative of Tawi-tawi; (2) direct HRET not to do anything that would render this petition moot; (3) Nullify Resolutions Nos. 06-053 and 06-047; and (4) direct HRET to conduct a technical examination and allow petitioner to photocopy his ballots. The petition lacks merit. As admitted by petitioner, the allowance or disallowance of the technical examination is discretionary on the part of HRET as provided by its rules; 5 hence, there was no denial of due process. Here, petitioner seeks to compel HRET to determine whether or not the 7,966 ballots of petitioner were prepared by one person or prepared by assistors. It must be pointed out that the 7,966 ballots for petitioner were rejected since they were considered to be written by one person either because the Minutes of Voting in the pertinent precincts did not indicate the existence of assisted-voting or did not contain the names of the illliterate voters and their assistors in violation of the HRET rules and guidelines. Further, HRET rendered its decision on the election protest on June 30, 2006, and petitioner received a copy of the decision on the same date. Thus, when petitioner filed a petition for certiorari on July 18, 2006 questioning the interlocutory orders of HRET issued in the main case, that is, the election protest that had already been decided, the petition had become moot. G.R. No. 173609 The subject matter of G.R. No. 173609 is the Decision of HRET in the election protest. The main issue is whether or not HRET acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated June 30, 2006, which annulled petitioners proclamation and declared private respondent as the duly elected Representative of Tawi-Tawi Province. Petitioner also raised the following ancillary issues:

First, petitioner argues that the Decision promulgated on June 30, 2006 is void for having been promulgated outside a regular session. Considering that members of the HRET met for its regular session on June 29, 2006, the decision should have been promulgated on the same day, not the next day. The argument is without merit. The pertinent provisions of the HRET Rules regarding the rendition and promulgation of the questioned Decision are as follows: Rule 69. Votes Required. In passing on all questions submitted to the Tribunal, all the Members present, including the Chairman, shall vote. For the rendition of decisions and the adoption of formal resolutions, the concurrence of at least five (5) Members shall be necessary. Rule 71. Procedure in Deciding Contests. In rendering its decisions, the Tribunal shall follow the procedure prescribed for the Supreme Court in Sections 13 and 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. Rule 73. Promulgation and Notice of Decisions. After the judgment and dissenting opinions, if any, are signed, they shall be delivered for filing to the Secretary of the Tribunal who shall forthwith indicate thereon the date of promulgation and cause true copies thereof to be served upon the parties or their counsel, personally or by registered mail. In its Resolution dated August 3, 2006, HRET satisfactorily explained that it conducted its regular meeting on June 29, 2006 and deliberated and voted on the challenged decision with six members present, and signed by five members. The decision was, however, given for promulgation on June 30, 2006 because one member, who was present during the meeting, left due to an emergency without having been able to affix his signature on the decision. After the consent of said member to issue the decision even without his signature was obtained on June 30, 2006, the decision was forthwith given to the Secretary of the Tribunal for promulgation and release to the parties. The Decision had the required number of votes under Rule 68 of the HRET Rules since it was signed, as of June 29, 2006, by five members of the HRET, namely, Supreme Court Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Congressmen Salacnib F. Baterina, Laurence B. Wacnang and Ruy Elias C. Lopez. The Court agrees with the Tribunal that the duty of the Secretary of the Tribunal to indicate the date of promulgation and thereafter serve copies thereof to the parties as mandated by Rule 72 of the HRET Rules is ministerial after the decision, signed by the members present, is delivered and filed with the Secretary of the Tribunal so that copies thereof can be furnished to the parties involved. Second, petitioner contends that the testimonies of the nineteen Chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) were wrongfully disregarded. The contention lacks merit. HRET resolved objections regarding ballots written by one person by applying the following rule: 1. Multiple Ballots Written By One Person Pairs or groups of ballots clearly prepared by one (1) person are invalid, except where the Minutes of voting show that illiterate or physically disabled persons voted with the aid of assistors. In the latter case, the ballots are valid, provided the handwriting thereon was similar to the signature of a registered assistor found in the Minutes of Voting, it being presumed that similarly written ballots were prepared by the assistor, one for himself and for not more than three (3) illiterate or disabled voters, unless the assistor was a member of the Board of Election Inspectors, in which case, the numerical limitation is not applicable. 6 (Emphasis supplied.) It is noted that the nineteen BEI chairpersons presented by petitioner as witnesses served in only two 7 of the ten municipalities in Tawi-Tawi. Although the BEI witnesses declared that there were illiterate voters who voted in their respective precincts and that it was reflected in the Minutes of Voting of the nineteen precincts, HRET found that such claim of assisted voting was indicated in the Minutes of Voting of only ten precincts. However, the Minutes of Voting of the ten precincts failed to state the names and signatures of the alleged assisted voters and their respective assistors in violation of the aforecited HRET rule. Thus, the ballots written by one (WBO) in said precincts were rejected. On the other hand, since the Minutes of Voting of the nine other precincts did not state any assisted voting therein, the WBO-ballots in the said precincts were also rejected. As between the testimonies of the BEI Chairpersons and HRETs actual findings per appreciation of the ballots and the documents inside the ballot boxes, particularly the entries in the Minutes of Voting, HRET correctly gave the latter greater weight. As stated by HRET, the presumption of regularity in the public officials performance of his duty holds true only when it is not found to be inconsistent with the facts. Third, petitioner contends that invalidating 7,966 ballots in his favor, which were allegedly written-by-one person, goes against the presumption of validity of votes and, in effect, 7966 voters were unable to vote.

The contention is untenable. HRET aptly stated that the general rule that all ballots are presumed to be valid is applied when there is doubt in their appreciation, but not when clear and sufficient reasons justify the nullification of the ballots. The 7,966 votes were correctly invalidated as written by one person because aside from the observation that the ballots bore similar/identical handwritings, the Minutes of Voting in numerous precincts had no entries as to the names of the illiterate voters and their respective assistors, contrary to the aforecited rule applied by HRET. Fourth, petitioner contends that since there is unusual discrepancy of votes stated in the election returns and physical count of ballots, the election returns and not the ballots should prevail. Moreover, if more than 50% of the votes are rejected, then election returns, not the ballots should be used to establish the votes of parties. The contention is without merit. HRET correctly considered the examination of ballots as the best evidence. In this case, the ballots were available and their integrity was unquestioned. In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. 8 It is only when the ballots cannot be produced or are not available that recourse is made to the election returns as evidence. 9 Petitioner further alleged that 515 ballots in seven precincts in the Turtle Islands were not appreciated in his favor as they were still in the custody of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tawi-Tawi because of two pending local election protests. Petitioner attached to his petition a certified true copy of the Minutes of the Revision Proceedings (Annex "G") for the Counter-Protest for the mayoralty (Jihim v. Tang, EP Case No. 43-5) and vice-mayoralty (Laurel v. Samindih, EP Case No. 44-5) candidates before the Regional Trial Court of Tawi-Tawi to prove that the ballots are with the Regional Trial Court. In its Resolution dated August 3, 2006, HRET already denied the allegation, thus: As regards the 515 ballots, in Precinct Nos. 2A, 7A, 8A, 9A, 10A, 11A, 12A, all of Turtle Islands, which protestee alleged are still in the possession and official custody of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tawi-Tawi because of two (2) pending local election protests, records will show that all ballot boxes in the contested precincts in Turtle Islands (Protested Precincts: Precinct Nos. 2A [Poblacion], 7A, 8A, 9A [Sitio Bacungan], 10A, 11A, 12A [Sitio Buan]; Counter-Protested Precincts: Precincts Nos. 1A, 3A, 4A, 5A/6A [Barangay Dambila Poblacion], 13A, 14A, 15A [Barangay Likud Bakkao]) have been collected by the Tribunal from the RTC of Tawi-Tawi. There was no report on record that some ballots in said precincts were left in the RTC of TawiTawi. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by the protestant, a comparison of the Minutes of Revision Proceedings in the RTC of Tawi-Tawi (Exhibit 30) and the Revision Reports of the Tribunal failed to show any discrepancy in the number of official ballots inside the ballot boxes of said precincts. 10 The Court notes that the certified true copy of the Minutes of the Revision Proceedings (Annex "G") in the RTC of Tawi-Tawi, which was submitted by petitioner to prove that the 515 ballots for petitioner were allegedly unappreciated in his favor by HRET, is dated "12-01-04." The Decision of HRET on the election protest of private respondent was promulgated on June 30, 2006, showing that there was enough time for HRET to collect the questioned ballots from the RTC of Tawi-Tawi. Thus, the Court gives credence to the confirmation of HRET that it collected all ballot boxes in the contested precincts in Turtle Islands from the RTC of Tawi-Tawi. This Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. 11 The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 12 It is absent in this case. The declaration of HRET that private respondent is the duly elected representative of Tawi-Tawi is based on the result of the revision and appreciation of ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts. The HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring private respondent Jaafar as the duly-elected Representative of Tawi-Tawi Province and in annulling the proclamation of petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 173310 is DISMISSED for mootness, and the Resolutions dated June 8, 2006 and June 29, 2006 of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 173609 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 30, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 3, 2006 of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondents. Bito, Misa & Lozada for private respondent.

P32,504.96. The club protested claiming the assessment to be without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos. The veto message reads: MALACAANG Manila Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

MEDIALDEA, J.: In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 83250, September 26, 1989, We overruled a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals which declared the collection of caterer's tax under Section 191-A of Republic Act No. 6110 illegal because Sec. 42 of House Bill No. 17839, which carries that proviso, was vetoed by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos when the bill was presented to him and Congress had not taken any step to override the presidential veto. We held thus: The power of the State to impose the 3% caterer's tax is not debatable. The Court of Tax Appeals erred, however, in holding that the tax was abolished as a result of the presidential veto of August 4, 1969. It failed to examine the law then, and up to now, existing on the subject which has always imposed a 3% caterer's tax on operators of restaurants. Since the Manila Hotel operates restaurants in its premises, it is liable to pay the tax provided in paragraph (1), Section 206 of the Tax Code. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Hotel Corporation and the Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 83250, September 26, 1989) The petition now before Us presents an identical question: whether the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipts of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel or resthouses. Reference to the Manila Hotel case, therefore, might have been sufficient to dispose of this petition were it not for the position of the CTA that a chief executive has no power to veto part of an item in a bill; either he vetoes an entire section or approves it but not a fraction thereof. Herein private respondent, Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock corporation. True, it maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar and dining room, but these facilities are for the exclusive use of its members and accompanied guests, and it charges on cost-plus-expense basis. As such, it claims it should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of R.A. No. 6110, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Tax Law." Section 191-A reads: Sec. 191-A. Caterer. A caterer's tax is hereby imposed as follows: (1) On proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors and other eating places, including clubs, and caterers, three per cent of their gross receipts. (2) On proprietors or operators of restaurants, bars, cafes and other eating places, including clubs, where distilled spirits, fermented liquors, or wines are served, three per cent of their gross receipts from sale of food or refreshments and seven per cent of their gross receipts from sale of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or wines. Two sets of commercial invoices or receipts serially numbered in duplicate shall be separately prepared and issued, one for sale of refreshments served, and another for each sale of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or wines served, the originals of the invoices or receipts to be issued to the purchaser or customer. (3) On proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other eating places which are maintained within the preferences or compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse, cockpit, race track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or day club by means of a connecting door or passage twenty per cent of their gross receipts. Where the establishments are operated or maintained by clubs of any kind or nature (irrespective of the disposition of their net income and whether or not they cater exclusively to members or their guests) the keepers of the establishments shall pay the corresponding tax at the rate fixed above. (Emphasis supplied) Republic Act No. 6110 took effect on September 1, 1969. By this virtue, petitioners assessed the club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurants, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December 1970 in the amount of I have the honor to inform you that I have this day signed H.B. No. 17839, entitled: AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED Pursuant to the provisions of Section 20-(3), Article VI, of the Constitution, however, I have vetoed the following items in this bill: xxx xxx xxx pp. 44, SEC. 42. Inserting a new Section 191-A which imposes a caterer's tax of three percent of the gross receipts of proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors and other eating places; three percent of gross receipts from sale of food or refreshment and seven percent on gross receipts from the sale of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or wines, on proprietors or operators of restaurants, bars, cafes and other eating places, including clubs, where distilled spirits, fermented liquors, or wines are served; and twenty percent of gross receipts on proprietor or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other eating places maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse, cockpit, race track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or day club, or which are accessible to patrons of said establishments by means of a connecting door or passage. The burden of petition will be shifted to the consuming public. The development of hotels, essential to our tourist industry, may be restrained considering that a big portion of hotel earnings comes from food sale. . . . This bill, H.B. No. 17839, has become Republic Act No. 6110., [Emphasis ours] The protestation of the club was denied by the petitioner who maintains that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotels, motels, resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry. This in fact was the position of the House Ways and Means Committee which reported, to wit: When Congress decided to split Section 191 into two parts, one dealing with contractors, and the other dealing with those who serve food and drinks, the intention was to classify and to improve. While the Congress expanded the coverage of both 191 and 191-A, it also provided for certain exemptions. The veto message seems to object to certain additions to 191-A. What additions are objectionables can be gleaned from the reasons given: a general reason that this sort of tax is passed on to the consuming public, and a particular reason that hotel developments, so essential to the tourist industry, may be restrained. These reasons have been taken together in the interpretations of the veto message and the deletions of such enterprises as are connected with the tourist industry has therefore been recommended. To interpret the veto. message otherwise would result in the exemption of entities already subject of tax. This would be absurd. Where the Congress wanted to exempt, it was so provided in the bill. While the President may veto any item or items in a revenue bill the constitution does not give him the power to repeal an existing tax. (2nd Indorsement dated December 9, 1969, Chairman on Ways and Means, Sixth Congress of the Republic of the Phil.) (Exhs. 14, p. 85, B.I.R. rec.). (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

It was by reason of this interpretation of the Committee that R.A. No. 6110 was published in Volume 66, No. 18, p. 4531 of the Official Gazette (May 4, 1970) in such a way that Section 191-A was included in the text save for the words "hotels, motels, resthouses." As already mentioned, the Court of Tax Appeals, upon petition by the club, sustained the latter's position reasoning that the veto message was clear and unqualified, as in fact it was confirmed three years later, after much controversy, by the Office of the President, thus: Mr. Antero M. Sison, Jr. San Martin Building, 1564, A. Mabini, P.O. Box 2288 Manila, Philippines Dear Sir: With reference to your letter dated July 14, 1972, we wish to inform you that Section 42 (which contains Sec. 191-A) of House Bill No. 17839, now R.A. 6110 was one of the Sections vetoed by the President in his veto message dated August 4, 1969, vetoing certain sections of the said revenue bill. (p. 49, Rollo) As mentioned earlier, We have already ruled that the presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. But, as mentioned earlier also, the CTA opined that the President could not veto words or phrases in a bill but only an entire item. Obviously, what the CTA meant by "item" was an entire section. We do not agree. But even assuming it to be so, it would also be to petitioner's favor. The ineffectual veto by the President rendered the whole section 191-A as not having been vetoed at all and it, therefore, became law as an unconstitutional veto has no effect, whatsoever. (See Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valeria No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). However, We agree with then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore, the President has the power to veto. An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates the persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word "item" as referring to the whole section would tie the President's hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be prevented in giving the President the power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile (See Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 55 LRA 882 [1901]). ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 2630 is set aside. Section 191-A of RA No. 6110 is valid and enforceable and, hence, the Manila Golf & Country Club Inc. is liable for the amount assessed against it. EXECUTIVE DEPT: TECSON V. COMELEC1 G.R. NO. 161434, 3 MARCH 2004 FACTS: The case at bar is a consolidated case filed by petitioners questioning the certificate of candidacy of herein private respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) party. He represented himself in said certificate as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, which reason that petitioners filed a petition before the Comelec to disqualify private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino when in truth his parents were foreigners and he is an illegitimate child. The Comelec dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. HELD: Before discussing on the issue at hand it is worth stressing that since private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was born on August 20, 1939, the applicable law then controlling was the 1935 constitution. The issue on private respondents citizenship

is so essential in view of the constitutional provision that, No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter is governed by the provisions of the 1935 Constitution which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate. SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988] Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.

(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of

law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counteraffidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counteraffidavits if he is so minded.

jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED. G.R. No. 119903 (August 15, 2000)

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

FACTS: Upon recommendation by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, respondent was reassigned as superintendent in another school. Respondent filed a petition for prohibition against the Secretary on the ground that his indefinite reassignment violated his security of tenure. The Secretary argued that the filing of the case violated the immunity of the President from suit. HELD: The contention is untenable. The petition is not directed against the President. Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts. Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of (2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,RAMONGONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME ANDCORRUPTION,GRAFTFREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION,INC.,LEONARD DE VERA,DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTOB. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents .[G.R. No. 146738. April 3,2001]JOSEPHE. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent. Facts Petitioner filed a Motion of Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion on the Supreme Courts decisions in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and G.R. No. 146738 of March 2, 2001.Certain events had transpired, leading to the build up of irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign.This includes exposes and speeches, motions to impeach, demanding letters by the church, mass resignations, impeachment proceedings, prosecutors walkou t and resignation, postponement of impeachment proceedings, EDSA rally, withdrawal of support from the AFP and PNP, and petitioners agreement to snap elections, amongst others.These accounts were highly manifested and publicized through the media.In establishing intent of petitioner to resign, the Courts used the Angara Diary, as well as press releases,final statements issued after oath taking of respondent Arroyo, and subsequent abandonment of theMalacanang Palace. The Supreme Court contends that these are overt acts which leave no doubt as to the petitioners intent to resign. Petitioner claims that said resignation was due to duress, and that an involuntary resignation is noresignation at all. Petitioner further alleges that the Courts use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of resignation violates the rule against admission of hearsay evidence, alsocontending that its use violates the rule on res inter alios acta : The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as herein provided in Section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.Use of Angara Diary is also said to have violated the rules on Proof of Private Writings and Best EvidenceRule.Petitioner also argues that a reading of Section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment, according to law will tell us thatpetitioner must first be convicted before he could be criminally prosecuted. Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out during the impeachment proceedings should be considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal , further concluding that Dismissal of a case for failureto prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy. Petitioner also argues that even a sitting president is entitled to absolute immunity from suit during histerm of office.Lastly, petitioner claims that he has been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. Issue(s) 1. Whether or not President Estrada is entitled to immunity from suit2. Whether or not he was acquitted in the impeachment proceedings, and therefore cannot becriminally prosecuted3. Whether or not the use of Angara Diary is admissible as evidence SC Ruling Held Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion are DENIED for lack of merit. President Estrada, in the case at bar, is not entitled to absolute immunity from suit . We look into thediscussions of the Constitutional Committee, in particular, a discussion between Fr. Bernas and Mr.Suarez on the deletion of the first sentence, that the President should be immune from suit during histenure, and then we differentiate tenure from term. A term means the time during which the officermay claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the incumbent actually holds office. Tenure, on the other hand, represents the term during which the incumbent actually holdsoffice.The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit isconcurrent only with his tenure and not his term.And in this case, the President had already resigned and abandoned the Malacanang Office, whicheffectively terminated his tenure.He was not merely a President-on-leave , as petitioner so vehemently claims. Looking at the AngaraDiary, and other overt acts committed by petitioner, it is clear that his intent was to resign.As for the issue on The Angara Diary, it has been held that a mans acts,

G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3,2001]JOSEPHE. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.

conduct, and declaration,wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume thatthey correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. ( U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23Phil. 578, 583 )The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of aparty: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statementthat he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue).I just want to clear my name, then I will go. The use of the Angara Diary is also not a violation of the res inter alios acta, since one of its exceptions isprovided in Section 29 of Rule 130, with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent, which Angara isto Estrada.As to whether or not the petitioner was acquitted during the impeachment proceedings, we look at therecords of the proceedings.The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of theimpeachment cases when by a vote of 1110, the Senator-judges refused to open the second envelopeallegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The next day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to the Speaker of the House tendering their resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearancewith the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief Justice Davide, Jr. Before the Housecould resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January 20, 2001, petitioner relinquishedthe presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic. Thus, on February 7,2001, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio. Petitioners claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court. G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) andthe PEOPLEof the PHILIPPINES, respondents .FACTS: The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commissionon Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before theanti-graft court charging the accused with violation of Section 5, Republic ActNo. 3019,5 as amended. That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, inMetro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,Alfredo T. Romualdez, brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former Presidentof the Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within thethird civil degree, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evidentbad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the NationalShipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned andcontrolled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company(BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned byformer President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferredand conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests overall equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters,houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at theEngineerIsland known as theEngineerIsland Shops including some of itsequipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte neededby BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00. ISSUE: Whether the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated for notspecifying the acts of intervention that he supposedly performed. HELD: The Court did not agree with the petitioner's contention.When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, whichwequote:"Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, movefor a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or informationand the details desired."The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense withsufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are beingcharged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. Theparticularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence mayimmediately know what is meant by the information.While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged intheinformation, matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the factsessential to the nature of the offense -need not be averred. Whatever factsand circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined byreference to the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that theelements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently.Likewise, the allegations describe the offense committed by petitioner withsuch particularity as to enable him to prepare an intelligent defense. Detailsof the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged inthe Information. MACALINTAL VS COMELEC

FACTS:This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of thePhilippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 ) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual andmaterial legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properlyand lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.ISSUES:A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who areimmigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing anaffidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residencyrequirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winningcandidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and theVice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of theConstitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall beproclaimed as winners by Congress?C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve theImplementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgatewithout violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of theConstitution?HELD:In resolving the issues , the application of the rules in Statutory Construction must be applied 1. All laws arepresumed to be constitutional2. The constitutionmust be construedas awhole 3. In caseof doubt in the interpretationof the provision of the constitution, suchmeaning must be deduced from thediscussions of themembersof theconstitutional commission. A . DoesSection5(d) ofRep. ActNo. 9189 violate Section 1, ArticleV of the 1987 Constitution of theRepublic of the Philippines? Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit: SEC. 4. Coverage . All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualifiedby law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president,vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives.which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailedlaw which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:SEC. 5. Disqualifications . The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledgedallegiance to a foreign country;c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal ofan offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those whohave committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code , such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon oramnesty: Provided , however , That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shallautomatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service ofsentence; Provided , further , That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgmentsissued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to theformalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country,unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by theCommission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in thePhilippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act.Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanentresident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanentdisqualification to vote in absentia .e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent bycompetent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies,consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such competent authoritysubsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence inanothercountry impliesrenunciationof ones residence inhis country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register asvoter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicilein pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that " all citizens ofthe Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrageand, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physicalresidence in the Philippines is

required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution tomandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution ? Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote forpresident, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. . . . . . . . . .18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winningcandidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof.Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in aparticular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been renderedimpossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, inwhich events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of theCommission. (Emphasis supplied)SEC. 4 . . .The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board ofcanvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to thePresident of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of theSenate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates inthe presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and theCongress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the mannerprovided by law, canvass the votes.The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case twoor more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith bechosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, votingseparately.The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.. . .Such provison gives the Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winningcandidates for president and vicepresident.It was held that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII ofthe Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winningSenators and party-list representatives but not the President and Vice-President. 41 The phrase, proclamation of winning candidates , in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far toosweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidencyand the vicepresidency.clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that thereturns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board ofcanvassers to Congress. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionallybelongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass thevotes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions."The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamationof the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in thehands of Congress.C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution ?Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil ServiceCommission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.SEC. 17. Voting by Mail . 17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not morethan three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee.Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion forfraud;b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would precludemultiple or proxy voting; andc) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulatesand other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval ofthe Joint Congressional Oversight Committee . . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)Such provision is unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independenceof constitutional commissions.The phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentenceof Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than threecountries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the JointCongressional Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section areunconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countrieswherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditionsprovided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds ofits constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.

constituted a Joint Committee of both houses to conduct a preliminary canvass on the votes for Pres. And VP, and submit the final report to the Joint Public Session for approval. ISSUE:WON CONGRESS MAY DELEGATE THE PRELIMINARY COUNT OF VOTES FOR PRES AND VP TO A JOINT COMMITTEE? HELD:SEC. 4 Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution expressly empowers congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of COC for Pres.And VP. The Congress may delegate the preliminary canvassing to a joint committee provided that the committee will submitCommittee Report for the approval of Congress as a body. Pimentel vs. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice-President in the 10 May 2004 Elections Facts: By a Petition for Prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgmentdeclaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress(Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass andpreliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 10 May 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on 11 June 2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the JointCommittee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to theRules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing. Issue [1]: Whether legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress supports Pimentels arguments against to the existence and proceedings of the JointCommittee of Congress after the sine die adjournment of Congress. Held [1]: NO. Pimentels claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary orcompulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and VicePresident not later than thirty days afterthe day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move tostop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on 25 May 1992. On 16 June 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President. Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the NationalBoard of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada asPresident and Vice-President, respectively. Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sinedie on 25 May 1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and VicePresident on 27 May 1998. The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on 29 May 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo asPresident and Vice-President, respectively. Issue [2]: Whether the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, illegal andunconstitutional following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their regularsessions on 11 June 2004. Held [2]: NO. The term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine dieof the regular session of both Houses on 11 June 2004. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution (which provides that "The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, andshall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before theopening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.") does not pertain to the term of Congress, but toits regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 aredeclared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL: LOPEZ VS. SENATE AND HOUSE GR NO. 163556 (2004) FACTS:The joint Public Session of Congress adopted the Rules on canvassing on the Pres. And VP on May 10, 2004 election. TheJoint session

recess before the opening of its nextregular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time). Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "the term of office of the Senatorsshall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "the Members of the House of Representativesshall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon onthe thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence." The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournmentof its regular sessions on 11 June 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as thatof being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished itspurposes. Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes andproclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the JointCommittee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the jointpublic session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the Presidentto a special session. RONALD ALLAN POE a.k. a. FERNANDO POE, JR.VS. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYOP.E.T. CASE No. 002. March29, 2005 Facts: In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) wasproclaimed the duly elected President of the Philippines.Thesecond-placer in the elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed anelection protest before the Electoral Tribunal. When theProtestant died in the course of his medical treatment, his widow,Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a motion tointervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She claimsthat there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute forher late husband to ascertain the true and genuine will of theelectorate in the interest of the Filipino people. The Protestee,GMA asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not theproper party to replace the deceased protestant since a publicoffice is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs.Protestee also contends that under the Rules of the PresidentialElectoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest theelection of the president. Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who diedduring the pendency of the latters protest case? Held: Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-Presidentof the Philippines who received the second or third highestnumber of votes may contest the election of the President or theVice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petitionwith the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty(30) days after the proclamation of the winner.An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to theprotestant or to the protestee, hence, substitution andintervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. Notethat Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to the office of Presidentbut rather stresses that it is with the paramount public interestin mind that she desires to pursue the process commenced byher late husband. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in anelection protest. In such intervention, the interest which allows aperson to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigationand of such direct and immediate character that the intervenorwill either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In thisprotest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit fromthe outcome should it be determined that the declared presidentdid not truly get the highest number of votes doromal vs sandiganbayan FACTS:Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the Tanodbayan. A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter. ISSUES:Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution. Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the same subject matter. Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation. HELD:Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court. RATIO:(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest." Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, VicePresident, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business. (2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution. Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted. (3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation. Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive SecretaryG.R. No. 83896 February 22,1991 FERNAN, C.J.: Facts: The constitutionality ofExecutive Order No. 284 issued bythenPresidentCorazonAquinois being challenged by petitioners on the principal submissionthat itadds exceptions toSection 13, ArticleVII other than those provided in theConstitution.According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase"unlessotherwise provided in thisConstitution," the only exceptionsagainst holding any other office or employment inGovernmentare those provided in theConstitution.Petitionersmaintain that thisExecutive Orderwhich, ineffect, allows members of theCabinet, their undersecretariesand assistant secretaries tohold othergovernmentoffices or positions inaddition totheir primarypositions, albeit subject to the limitationtherein imposed, runs counter to Section13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: WhetherExecutive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. Held: Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlyingtheprovisionunder consideration. TheCourt in construing aConstitution shouldbear inmind the object sought to be accomplishedby itsadoption, and the evils, ifany, soughttobe prevented or remedied.AlthoughSection7, Article I-XB already contains ablanketprohibitionagainst theholding ofmultipleoffices or employment in the government subsuming bothelectiveand appointive public officials, the ConstitutionalCommission should see it fit toformulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting thePresident,Vice-President, members of theCabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding anyother office or employment during their tenure, unlessotherwise provided in theConstitution itself. Evidently, from thismoveaswellas in the different phraseologies of the constitutionalprovisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitutionwasto imposea stricterprohibitionon thePresidentandhis official familyin so far as holdingother offices oremployment in thegovernment or elsewhere isconcerned.It is awell-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitutionis to beseparated from all the others, to beconsidered alone, but thatallthe provisions bearing upon aparticularsubject are tobe brought into view and to besointerpretedas to effectuate thegreat purposes ofthe instrument. Sectionsbearing onaparticularsubject shouldbe consideredand interpreted togetheras to effectuate thewhole purpose ofthe Constitution and onesection isnot to beallowed to

defeat another,if byany reasonable construction, the two can bemade to stand together. In other words, the courtmustharmonize them, ifpracticable, andmust lean in favor of aconstructionwhichwillrender every wordoperative, rather than onewhichmaymakethewords idle and nugatory. Dela Cruz v. COAFacts: The 20 petition ers herein were members of th e Boa rd of Directors of th e NHA from1 9 9 1 t o 1 9 9 6 . O n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 , 1 9 9 7 , t h e C O A i s s u e d a m e m o d i r e c t i n g a l l u n i t heads/a uditors/ team lead ers of th e na tiona l g overnmen t agencies and government-own ed and con trolled corpo rations wh ich ha ve effected pa yment of an y form of ad ditional compen sation orremunera tion to cab in et secretaries, their dep uties an d as sis tan ts , or th eir rep resen ta tives, inviolation of the rule on multiple positions, to immediately cause the disallowance of such additionalcompensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and to effect therefu nd of th e s ame from th e time of th e finality of th e Su preme Court En Ban c D ecis ion in theconsolida ted ca ses of Civil L ib erties Union vs. E xecu tive S ecretary and An ti -Gra ft Leagu e of th e Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22, 1991. The COA memo fu rther s tated that the said SC D ecis ion, which became fina l a nd executory on August 19, 1991, d eclared Ex ecutive Ord er No. 284 u ncons titu tiona l insofa r a s it allows Cabinetmembers, their deputies a nd a ss istan ts to hold other offices, in ad dition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor.Accordingly, on Octob er 23, 1997, NHA Res id ent Au ditor issu ed a Notice of Disa llowan cedisallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of "Cabinet memberswho were the ex- officio members of the NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective alternatesw h o a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d t h e p a y m e n t s . " T h e t o t a l d i s a l l o w e d a m o u n t o f P 2 7 6 , 6 0 0 p a i d a s representa tion allowances and per diems to each of the petitioners covering the period from August19, 1991 to August 31, 1996Petitioners, through then Chairman Dela Serna of the NHA Board of Directors, appealed fromt h e N o t i c e o f D i s a l l o w a n c e t o t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n A u d i t a r g u i n g t h a t t h e S C D e c i s i o n i n C i v i l Liberties Union and AntiGraft League of the Philippines, Inc. was clarified in the Resolution of theCourt En Banc on August 1, 1991, in that the constitutional ban against dual or multiple positionsapplies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants. It does not cover otherappointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant Secretary andthat the NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and that theyoccupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary. On September 22, 1998, the COAissued a decision denying petitioners' appeal. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the COA erred in disallowing the compensation i n f a v o r o f N H A B o a r d o f Directors Held: No. Under Sec. 7 of P.D. 757 or the law creating the NHA, the persons mandated by law to sitas members of the NHA Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportationa n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , ( 2 ) t h e D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l o f t h e N a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c a n d D e v e l o p m e n t Authority, (3) the Secretary of Finance, (4) the Secretary of Labor, (5) the Secretary of Industry, (6)th e Executive Secretary, an d (7) th e Gen era l Manager of th e NHA. While p etitioners a re notamong th ose officers, how ever, they are alterna tes of th e s aid officers, wh os e acts sh all b e considered the acts of their principals. The Supreme Court, in Civil Liberties Union and AntiGraftLeague of the Philippines, Inc., interpreted Sec. 13 of Article VII of the Constitution to mean that theprohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executiveofficials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided bylaw and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these postsdo not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but areproperly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The ex-officio positionbeing actu ally and in legal contemplation part of th e p rincipa l office, it follows tha t the officia lconcerned has no righ t to receive a d ditional compen sation for h is services in the sa id pos ition. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached tohis principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Boa rd a s a n ex -officio memb er th ereof, h e is a ctua lly and in lega l con templation performing the p rimary fun ction of his p rin cipal office in defin ing policy in monetar y ba nking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he isn o t e n t i t l e d t o c o l l e c t a n y e x t r a c o m p e n s a t i o n , w h e t h e r i t b e i n t h e f o r m o f a p e r d i e m o r a n honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated,such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.Sin ce th e Ex ecu tive Depa rtmen t S ecretaries, as ex-oficio members of th e NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diemor an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners whosit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rulewould give petitioners a better right than their principals. G. R. No. 147392March 12, 2004 BITONIO JR. V. COA

FACTS:In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and thereceipt of compensation therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997,implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509.In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified itsearlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries,Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretaryor Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not coveredby the prohibition. He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Unioncase became final, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per diems, Congressshould be conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibitionas interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. ISSU: Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in thePEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor. RULING:The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receiveper diem for his board meetings sitting asrepresentative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receivingcompensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow thepetitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better rightthan his principal.Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to theConstitution. No law can render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. Theframers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect. The option of designating representative to the Board bythe different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the paragraph as to payment of per diems to themembers of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly inconflict with the proscription set by the Constitution. Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011 Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution. Issue:Whether or not PET is unconstitutional. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power. Held:Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. UNITED STATES v. NIXON, (418 U.S. 683 (1974)) FACTS:On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging seven named individuals. with various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although he was not designated as such in the indictment, the grand jury named the President, among others, as an unindicted coconspirator. On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued pursuant to Rule 17 (c) to the President by the United States District Court and made returnable on May 2, 1974. The subpoena required the production of certain

tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the President and others. On April 30, the President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations; portions of 20 conversations subject to subpoena in the present case were included. On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel filed a "special appearance" and a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17 (c). This motion was accompanied by a formal claim of privilege.On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and the motions to expunge and for protective orders., it further ordered to deliver to the District Court, on or before May 31, 1974, the originals of all subpoenaed items, as well as an index and analysis of those items, together with tape copies of those portions of the subpoenaed recordings for which transcripts had been released to the public by the President on April 30. The District Court rejected jurisdictional challenges based on a contention that the dispute was nonjusticiable because it was between the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Executive and hence "intra-executive" in character.The District Court held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of a claim of executive privilege. The court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the presumptive privilege was overcome by the Special Prosecutor's prima facie "demonstration of need sufficiently compelling to warrant judicial examination in chambers . . . ." On May 24, 1974, the President filed a timely notice of appeal from the District Court order, and the certified record from the District Court. On May 31, the petition was granted with an expedited briefing schedule. On June 6, the President filed, under seal, a cross-petition for writ of certiorari before judgment. This cross-petition was granted June 15, 1974, and the case was set for argument on July 8, 1974. ISSUE:Whether or not the subpoena duces tecum is binding upon the President of the United States based on the principles of executive privilege and separation of powers. DECISION:Yes, the subpoena is binding upon the President of the Unites States. Decision: Affirmed. RATIO/REASON: I. JURISDICTION The threshold question presented is whether the May 20, 1974, order of the District Court was an appealable order and whether this case was properly "in" the Court of Appeals when the petition for certiorari was filed in this Court. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals encompasses only final decisions of the district courts. In applying this principle to an order denying a motion to quash and requiring the production of evidence pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, it has been reportedly held that the order is not final and hence not appealable. This Court has, in an earlier case: "consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law justifies putting one who seeks to resist the production of desired information to a choice between compliance with a trial court's order to produce prior to any review of that order, and resistance to that order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal." This would mean that a third party who has been issued a subpoena to produce documents would basically have only 2 options: first, to comply with such order and second, to resist to the order with the possibility of being held in contempt if the third partys claims are rejected on appeal. In the case at bar, the traditional contempt avenue to immediate appeal is peculiarly inappropriate due to the unique setting of the case. These considerations lead us to conclude that the order of the District Court was an appealable order. II. JUSTICIABILITY In the District Court, the Presidents counsel argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoena because the matter was an inter-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the Executive branch. Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, it is contended that a President's decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. Although his counsel concedes that the President has delegated certain specific powers to the Special Prosecutor, he has not "waived nor delegated to the Special Prosecutor the President's duty to claim privilege as to all materials . . . which fall within the President's inherent authority to refuse to disclose to any executive officer."However, the mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute," without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry. The issue is the production or nonproduction of specified evidence deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case. It is sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the scope of his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive on the ground of his duty to preserve the confidentiality of the communications of the President. Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are "of a type which are traditionally justiciable." In light of the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict arises, the fact that both parties are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a barrier to justiciability. III. RULE 17(c)The subpoena duces tecum is challenged on the ground that the Special Prosecutor failed to satisfy the requirements of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c), which governs. the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum in federal criminal proceedings. If we sustained this challenge, there would be no occasion to reach the claim of privilege asserted with respect to the subpoenaed material. Rule 17 (c) provides: "A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys." A subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production would be "unreasonable or oppressive," but not otherwise. This case recognized certain fundamental characteristics of the subpoena duces tecum in criminal cases: (1) it was not intended to provide a means of discovery for criminal cases of subpoenaed materials. Under this test, in order to require production prior to trial, the moving

party must show: (1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general "fishing expedition." Our conclusion is based on the record before us, much of which is under seal. Of course, the contents of the subpoenaed tapes could not at that stage be described fully by the Special Prosecutor, but there was a sufficient likelihood that each of the tapes contains conversations relevant to the offenses charged in the indictment. We also conclude there was a sufficient preliminary showing that each of the subpoenaed tapes contains evidence admissible with respect to the offenses charged in the indictment. The most cogent objection to the admissibility of the taped conversations here at issue is that they are a collection of out-of-court statements by declarants who will not be subject to cross-examination and that the statements are therefore inadmissible hearsay. Here, however, most of the tapes apparently contain conversations to which one or more of the defendants named in the indictment were party. The hearsay rule does not automatically bar all out-ofcourt statements by a defendant in a criminal case. Declarations by one defendant may also be admissible against other defendants upon a sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a conspiracy among one or more other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in furtherance of that conspiracy. The same is true of declarations of coconspirators who are not defendants in the case on trial. Recorded conversations may also be admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of any defendant who testifies or any other coconspirator who testifies. Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial. Here, however, there are other valid potential evidentiary uses for the same material, and the analysis and possible transcription of the tapes may take a significant period of time. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the District Court erred in authorizing the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum. [w]e are persuaded that the District Court's denial of the President's motion to quash the subpoena was consistent with Rule 17 (c). We also conclude that the Special Prosecutor has made a sufficient showing to justify a subpoena for production before trial. The subpoenaed materials are not available from any other source, and their examination and processing should not await trial in the circumstances shown. IV. THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE A. The first contention is a broad claim that the separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial review of a President's claim of privilege. The second contention is that if he does not prevail on the claim of absolute privilege, the court should hold as a matter of constitutional law that the privilege prevails over the subpoena duces tecum. Our system of government "requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch." Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 549. And in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 211 , the Court stated: "Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to say what the law is" with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. B. In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President's counsel urges two grounds, one of which is common to all governments and one of which is peculiar to our system of separation of powers. The first ground is the valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties. Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers. The second ground asserted by the President's counsel in support of the claim of absolute privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of powers. Here it is argued that the independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere, it insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential communications. Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. When the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide. To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of "a workable government" and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III. C.In this case the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third party requiring the production of materials for use in a criminal prosecution; he does so on the claim that he has a privilege against disclosure of confidential communications. He does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are military or diplomatic secrets. The presumptive privilege [confidentiality of his conversations] must be considered with the historic commitment of the rule of law, specifically the twofold aim that guilt shall not escape or innocence shall not suffer. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the

right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" and "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law.In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases. We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality. It cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. D -We have earlier determined that the District Court did not err in authorizing the issuance of the subpoena. If a President concludes that compliance with a subpoena would be injurious to the public interest he may properly, as was done here, invoke a claim of privilege on the return of the subpoena. Upon receiving a claim of privilege from the Chief Executive, it became the further duty of the District Court to treat the subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged and to require the Special Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential material was "essential to the justice of the [pending criminal] case." E-Those issues now having been disposed of, the matter of implementation will rest with the District Court. "[T]he guard, furnished to [the President] to protect him from being harassed by vexatious and unnecessary subpoenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a [district] court after those subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance which is to precede their being issued." Statements that meet the test of admissibility and relevance must be isolated; all other material must be excised. It is elementary that in camera inspection of evidence is always a procedure calling for scrupulous protection against any release or publication of material not found by the court, at that stage, probably admissible in evidence and relevant to the issues of the trial for which it is sought.It is therefore necessary in the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice. The need for confidentiality even as to idle conversations with associates in which casual reference might be made concerning political leaders within the country or foreign statesmen is too obvious to call for further treatment. Marcos v Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989) Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. North cotabato vs. GRP gr no. 183591FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought aboutby the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed inKuala Lumpur, Malaysia.This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus andProhibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TemporaryRestraining Order. The agreement mentions "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which itgrants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of theBangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. Theagreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for

autonomous region inMuslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). ISSUE:Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions onpublic consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation andthe right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it areunconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof. REASONING:The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on bothnational and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and themobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.Article III (Bill of Rights)Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access toofficial records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, ordecisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shallbe afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.Article IISec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts andimplements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. Noproject or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with andapproval mus be obtained.Article VII (Executive Department)Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurredin by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.Article X. (Local Government)Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are theprovince, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in theCordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharingcommon and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures andother relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the nationalsovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions toensure that laws are faithfully executed.Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majorityof the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, providedthat only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall beincluded in the autonomous region.Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution andnational laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powersover:1. Administrative organization;2. Creation of sources of revenues;3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;4. Personal, family, and property relations;5. Regional urban and rural planning development;6. Economic, social, and tourism development;7. Educational policies;8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfareof the people of the region.The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or2. A constitutional convention.Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shallbe valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held notearlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment orrevision.MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the presentconstitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact andupon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority islimited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.

Flores vs. DrilonG.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993 FACTS:The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "BasesConversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay MetropolitanAuthority (SBMA), is challenged in this case. Paragraph (d) reads Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manageras administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined bythe Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority:Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations fromtheeffectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed asthe chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. ISSUE:Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is constitutional. RUlING:The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in anycapacity to any public office or position during his tenure.Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of hisposition, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in theGovernment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.In the case at bar, the subject Proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official,i.e.,the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief ExecutiveOfficer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, there isnot doubt to conclude that theproviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-

B, of the Constitution.In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed bylaw or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two(2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holdingof multiple offices by an appointiveofficial when allowed by law or by the primary functions of hisposition, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the ruleagainst appointment or designation of an electiveofficial to the government post, except as areparticularly recognized in the Constitution itself.The appointment of Gordon as Chairman of the SBMA is null. However, despite his appointment to the said office, Gordon did not automatically forfeit his seat as Mayor of Olongapo City.Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automaticallyforfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary,since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment ordesignation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provisionshould not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of theHouse of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . . during histerm without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference between the two provisions is significant in thesense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointedto another government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their postsbefore they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not beingappointed to the other post.As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the positionof Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to alegislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer who may retain the benefits he may received from the position he may have assumed. Ulpiano Sarmiento III et al vs Salvador Mison & Carague This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget. Their appointment was done without the concurrence of the CoA. Ulpiano, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of the two sans confirmation by the CoA. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid. HELD: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the CoA? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the CoA.Because of the conflicting extremes provided in the 2 previous Constitutions, the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the CoA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the 2nd and 3rd groups as well as those in the 4th group, i.e., officers of lower rank.As to the 4th group of officers whom the President can appoint, it was pointed out by the intervener CoA that the 3r sentence in Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the CoA; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the CoA. Ulpiano et al argued that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word alone in said third sentenceThe SC ruled that both arguments are not correct. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 is, more than anything else, a slip or lapse in draftsmanship.In the 1987 Constitution the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the CoA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the CoA, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article 7.Therefore, the 3rd sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word alone in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import

from the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, are not subject to confirmation by the CoA. Misons and Caragues appointments are affirmed affirmed. GR No. 131429, August 4, 1999 FACTS: The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent

ConradoQuiaoit, to take contrasting views on the proper interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary TeofistoGuingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997, President Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that assumption. On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the trial court considered the petition submitted for resolution and, in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The subsequent move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a denial. ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent ConradoQuiaoit. HELD: The petition is denied. An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof. When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. G.R. No. 83216, September 4, 1989Quintos-deles vs COA FACTS: The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the

Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives, Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. suspended the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives which was scheduled at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business. In view of this development, Executive Secretary CatalinoMacaraig, Jr. transmitted on April 25, 1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representatives. Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. (Annex V) appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since no attempt was made to subject the sectoral representatives ** already sitting to the confirmation process, there is no necessity for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be discriminatory. On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation from the Commission on Appointments for the deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for women. Petitioner sent a reply dated May 11, 1988 explaining her position and questioning the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments over the appointment of sectoral representatives. In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles. ISSUE:Does the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments? HELD:The petition is dismissed. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution, referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments aresubject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra). Petitioners appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 which gives the President the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The records show that petitioners appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her. Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority, that petitioners appointment requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. As a matter of fact, the President had expressly submitted petitioners appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioners appointment, said

of the Rules of respondent Commission and unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission. Calderon vs Carale

Calderon vs Carale8APR GR No. 91636, April 23, 1992 FACTS: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: xxx The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. xxx Pursuant to RA 6715, President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity. Petitioner claims that in the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of such appointments.The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis. ISSUES:Is the permanent appointment extended by the President of the Philippines to the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715, constitutional and legal? HELD:The petition is dismissed and Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect. The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the third groups of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of

appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23

members of the Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional convention or Congress sitting as a constituent (constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987 constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want it interpreted. Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002 FACTS: COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the EID. Such appointment was renewed in temporary capacity twice, first by Chairperson Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office and assumed their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments, PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments. ISSUES:1.Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C 2.Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC xxx Was the renewal of appointment valid? There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years. De Rama vs. CA G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001 Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitonerConrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioners allegation that these were midnight appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position. Issue: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution Held: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998 Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.

RULING: Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows: The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. xxx ...the term ad interim appointment means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitution protection that *n+o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process. How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees. Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment

Lacson-Magallanes Co. vsPao& Executive Secretary Pajo Facts: Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculturelikewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of thePresident to act personally upon the matter. ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Exec Sec and may it be further delegated by the Exec Sec. HELD: The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the Presidentreposes upon the Presidents power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means the power of anofficer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists thePresident. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order thatthe Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

AND Presidents control is only refers to matters of general policy: means a settled or definitecourse or methodadopted and followed bygovtAlso, officials cannot bearbitrarily removed from officeby heads (section 4, article12 of Consti).Decision:Ang-Angco reinstated toposition. De leon vs carpio FACTS:Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to theReview Committee, the said body declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil ServiceCommission.The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement.However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to CSC without action, claiming that they were null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice HELD:It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines.The Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the President as their immediate superior. Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior).In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretarys directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines. DECISION CORONA, J.: Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to annul the decision[1] and resolution[2], dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA) affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor which diminished the monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC) stationed in Mandaue City. The undisputed facts are as follows: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that: xxx xxx xxx

Ang-Angco vs. Castillo Natu re: Original Petition in th e SC. Certiora ri, proh ib ition an d mand amus with preliminary mand atory injunctionFacts: Commissioner of Customs Manuel Manahan filed an administrative complaint against Collector of CustomsAng-Angco; Forgraveneglect of dutyand observanceof a conduct prejudicial to the interest of the customsserviceIN RESPONSE TO THAT: President Magsaysay created a committee to investigate on Ang-Angcos case. At the time ofMagsaysays death, investigationwas still ongoing. After Magsaysays death, Executive SecretaryCastillo, with authorityfrom President, Rendered final judgment onAng-Angcoscase finding the latter GUILTY of conduct prejudicialto the best interstof the customsservice And consideredhim resigned from the position.I s s u e : W O N E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y , w i t h a u t h o r i t y f r o m P r e s i d e n t c a n r e n d e r f i n a l j u d g m e n t o n a n administrative case without submitting such direct action to the Commissioner of Civil Service and removeofficial from officeHeld: NORatio:Under Section16(i) of theCivilServiceAct of1959: the Commissioner ofCivilService has originaland exclusivejurisdiction to decided administrativecases of all officers and employees inthe classified service limitation to that provision: the Commissioners decision may be appealed to the Civil ServiceBoard of Appeals, whose decision shall befinal (Section18, RepublicAct 2260)But..aah..does the President have aah..the power to remove anybody from office? Yes. Section 79 of RAC provides an implied vested power on President, as Department Head of theCivil ServiceCommission. HOWEVER, italso provides that the removal should be pursuantto Civil Service Actof 1959 AND Civil Service Act of 1959 p rovides tha t officers and employees wh o belong to th e clas sified service (Collector of Customs is an example) shall be tried by the Commissioner of Civil Serviceor the Civil Service Board of Appeals. ( grabe ang galing ng logic ng d ecision na to. to qu ote a friend: what an orgasmic piece of legislation)

2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the Local Government Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government officials and employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be granted subject to the following conditions: a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs; b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget; c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160.[3] (italics supplied) xxx xxx xxx

The said circular likewise provided for its immediate effectivity without need of publication: 5.0 EFFECTIVITY This Circular shall take effect immediately. Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete, Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess ofP1,000 from April to September, 1994. The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be denied. On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The COA held that: The issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether or not the City Ordinance of Mandaue which provides a higher rate of allowances to the appellant judges may prevail over that fixed by the DBM under Local Budget Circular No. 55 dated March 15, 1994. xxx xxx xxx

On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari by the petitioner judges, submitting the following questions for resolution: I HAS THE CITY OF MANDAUE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO JUDGES STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO THE CITY? II CAN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR OR GUIDELINE SUCH AS LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 RENDER INOPERATIVE THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY OF A CITY BY SETTING A LIMIT TO THE EXTENT OF THE EXERCISE OF SUCH POWER? III HAS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 TO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY IN FIXING THE CEILING OF ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS TO BE PROVIDED TO JUDGES STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO MANDAUE CITY BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT AT P1,000.00 PER MONTH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ALLOWANCES OF P1,500.00 MONTHLY FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS? IV IS LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 DATED MARCH 15, 1994 ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS NOT DULY PUBLISHED IN ACCODANCE WITH LAW?[5] Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. They further allege that said circular is void for lack of publication. On the other hand, the yearly appropriation ordinance providing for additional allowances to judges is allowed by Section 458, par. (a)(1)[xi], of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that: Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: xxx xxx xxx

Applying the foregoing doctrine, appropriation ordinance of local government units is subject to the organizational, budgetary and compensation policies of budgetary authorities (COA 5th Ind., dated March 17, 1994 re: Province of Antique; COA letter dated May 17, 1994 re: Request of Hon. Renato Leviste, Cong. 1st Dist. Oriental Mindoro). In this regard, attention is invited to Administrative Order No. 42 issued on March 3, 1993 by the President of the Philippines clarifying the role of DBM in the compensation and classification of local government positions under RA No. 7160 vis-avis the provisions of RA No. 6758 in view of the abolition of the JCLGPA. Section 1 of said Administrative Order provides that: Section 1. The Department of Budget and Management as the lead administrator of RA No. 6758 shall, through its Compensation and Position Classification Bureau, continue to have the following responsibilities in connection with the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991: a) Provide guidelines on the classification of local government positions and on the specific rates of pay therefore; b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of all allowances and additional forms of compensation to local government employees; xxx. (underscoring supplied) To operationalize the aforecited presidential directive, DBM issued LBC No. 55, dated March 15, 1994, whose effectivity clause provides that: xxx xxx xxx

(xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the city; (italics supplied) Instead of filing a comment on behalf of respondent COA, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation supporting the position of the petitioner judges. The Solicitor General argues that (1) DBM only enjoys the power to review and determine whether the disbursements of funds were made in accordance with the ordinance passed by a local government unit while (2) the COA has no more than auditorial visitation powers over local government units pursuant to Section 348 of RA 7160 which provides for the power to inspect at any time the financial accounts of local government units. Moreover, the Solicitor General opines that the DBM and the respondent are only authorized under RA 7160 to promulgate a Budget Operations Manual for local government units, to improve and systematize methods, techniques and procedures employed in budget preparation, authorization, execution and accountability pursuant to Section 354 of RA 7160. The Solicitor General points out that LBC 55 was not exercised under any of the aforementioned provisions. Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional and statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local government units. One such law imposing a limitation on a local government units autonomy is Section 458, par. (a) (1) [xi], of RA 7160, which authorizes the disbursement of additional allowances and other benefits to judges subject to the condition that the finances of the city government should allow the same. Thus, DBM is merely

5.0 EFFECTIVITY This Circular shall take effect immediately. It is a well-settled rule that implementing rules and regulations promulgated by administrative or executive officer in accordance with, and as authorized by law, has the force and effect of law or partake the nature of a statute (Victorias Milling Co., Inc., vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, cited in Agpalos Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. P. 16; Justice Cruzs Phil. Political Law, 1984 Ed., p. 103; Espanol vs. Phil Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314; Antique Sawmills Inc. vs. Tayco, 17 SCRA 316). xxx xxx xxx

There being no statutory basis to grant additional allowance to judges in excess of P1,000.00 chargeable against the local government units where they are stationed, this Commission finds no substantial grounds or cogent reason to disturb the decision of the City Auditor, Mandaue City, disallowing in audit the allowances in question. Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal of the MTC and RTC Judges of Mandaue City, insofar as the same is not covered by Circular Letter No. 91-7, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. xxx xxx xxx
[4]

enforcing the condition of the law when it sets a uniform maximum amount for the additional allowances that a city government can release to judges stationed therein. Assuming arguendo that LBC 55 is void, respondent COA maintains that the provisions of the yearly approved ordinance granting additional allowances to judges are still prohibited by the appropriation laws passed by Congress every year. COA argues that Mandaue City gets the funds for the said additional allowances of judges from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). But the General Appropriations Acts of 1994 and 1995 do not mention the disbursement of additional allowances to judges as one of the allowable uses of the IRA. Hence, the provisions of said ordinance granting additional allowances, taken from the IRA, to herein petitioner judges are void for being contrary to law. To resolve the instant petition, there are two issues that we must address: (1) whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President and for not having been published and (2) whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation laws enacted by Congress. We rule in favor of the petitioner judges. On the first issue, we declare LBC 55 to be null and void. We recognize that, although our Constitution[6] guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that: Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x In Pimentel vs. Aguirre[7], we defined the supervisory power of the President and distinguished it from the power of control exercised by Congress. Thus: This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,[i][5] the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: "x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."[ii][6] In Taule v. Santos,[iii][7] we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"[iv][8] we said. In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,[v][9] the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.[vi][10] The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.[vii][11] In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local

affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement? Yes. LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges when the finances of the city government allow. The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor the point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city government with locally generated annual revenues of P40 million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant additional allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can afford it. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, in violation of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera[8] where we held that: xxx. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of an administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Respondent COA claims that publication is not required for LBC 55 inasmuch as it is merely an interpretative regulation applicable to the personnel of an LGU. We disagree. InDe Jesus vs. Commission on Audit[9] where we dealt with the same issue, this Court declared void, for lack of publication, a DBM circular that disallowed payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees. In refuting respondent COAs argument that said circular was merely an internal regulation, we ruled that: On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Taada v. Tuvera, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowance and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency. (emphasis supplied) In Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Commission on Audit[10], we again declared the same circular as void, for lack of publication, despite the fact that it was re-issued and then submitted for publication. Emphasizing the importance of publication to the effectivity of a regulation, we therein held that: It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for publication in the Official Gazette per letter to the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were disallowed in audit? The answer is in the negative, precisely for the reason that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo due to its nonpublication. As was stated in Taada v. Tuvera, prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with, for the reason that it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.[11]

We now resolve the second issue of whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by Mandaue City providing for fixed allowances for judges contravenes any law and should therefore be struck down as null and void. According to respondent COA, even if LBC 55 were void, the ordinances enacted by Mandaue City granting additional allowances to the petitioner judges would still (be) bereft of legal basis for want of a lawful source of funds considering that the IRA cannot be used for such purposes. Respondent COA showed that Mandaue Citys funds consisted of locally generated revenues and the IRA. From 1989 to 1995, Mandaue Citys yearly expenditures exceeded its locally generated revenues, thus resulting in a deficit. During all those years, it was the IRA that enabled Mandaue City to incur a surplus. Respondent avers that Mandaue City used its IRA to pay for said additional allowances and this violated paragraph 2 of the Special Provisions, page 1060, of RA 7845 (The General Appropriations Act of 1995)[12] and paragraph 3 of the Special Provision, page 1225, of RA 7663 (The General Appropriations Act of 1994)[13] which specifically identified the objects of expenditure of the IRA. Nowhere in said provisions of the two budgetary laws does it say that the IRA can be used for additional allowances of judges. Respondent COA thus argues that the provisions in the ordinance providing for such disbursement are against the law, considering that the grant of the subject allowances is not within the specified use allowed by the aforesaid yearly appropriations acts. We disagree. Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional allowances of the judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA presented were the amounts expended, the locally generated revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA received each year. Aside from these items, no data or figures were presented to show that Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just because Mandaue Citys locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the citys own revenues. Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue Citys appropriation ordinances, in accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327 of RA 7160 which provide that: Section 326. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area. The Department of Budget and Management shall review ordinances authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations of provinces, highlyurbanized cities, independent component cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the immediately succeeding Section. Section 327. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Component Cities and Municipalities.- The sangguninang panlalawigan shall review the ordinance authorizing annual or supplemental appropriations of component cities and municipalities in the same manner and within the same period prescribed for the review of other ordinances. If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies of such ordinance, the sangguniang panlalawigan takes no action thereon, the same shall be deemed to have been reviewed in accordance with law and shall continue to be in full force and effect. (emphasis supplied) Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue City and allowed the 90-day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the said ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the said city. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the Commission on Audit are hereby set aside.

allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for nonpersonal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation." ISSUES: 1. WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent is a valid exercise of the President's power of general supervision over local governments. 2. WON Section 4 of AO 372, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments. HELD: 1.YES. There are several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. 1 Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with the above requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, the respondents did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment. Although the Supreme Court agrees with the Petitioner that the requisites were not complied with, it still holds that the Presidents directive in AO 372 is in conformity with law, and does constitute interference to local autonomy. There is interference if Section 1 of AO 372 was couched in mandatory or binding language. While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 2 have a rather commanding tone, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. 2.NO. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue as mandated by the Constitution. The Local Government Code.specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. The use of the term "shall" shows that the provision is imperative. Therefore, Section 4 of AO 372, which orders the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily. Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited. Therefore, the President clearly overstepped the bounds of his lawful authority when he issued Section 4 of AO 372. Solar Team vs. Judge how FACTS: The question raised in this case is whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice has been resolved, without violating RA 8493,

Aquilino Pimentel vs. Aguirre (G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000) FACTS of the Case: On December, 1997, the President issued AO 372 (Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998). The AO provided that (a) 10% of the Internal Revenue allotment to LGUs is withheld. Further it (b) "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. Petitioner contends that by issuing AO 372, the President exercised the power of control over LGUs in contravention of law. Moreover, withholding 10% of the IRA is in contravention of Sec 286 LGC and of Sec 6 Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that the aforesaid AO was purportedly in order to cope with the nations economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation on that said period. Further, he claims that AO 372 was issued merely as an exercise of the Presidents power of supervision over LGUs. It

otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of 1998. HELD: The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court is wellsettled. Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. The decision to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. Thus, public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it suspended arraignment to await the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. The SC stressed that the court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the Speedy Trial Act. Section 7 of the Act prescribing the

30-day period for the arraignment of the accused is not absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the law enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. The exceptions provided in the Act reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Recently, the DOJ issued Memorandum Order No. 12 dated July 3, 2000 mandating that the period for the disposition of appeals/petition for review shall be 75 days. In view of this memorandum, the indefinite suspension of proceedings in the trial court because of a pending petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is now unlikely to happen.

in favor of respondentsHeld:Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency; Under this doctrine, all executive andadministrative organizations are adjuncts of the executive department and themultifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive areperformed through the Executive Departments.The trial court should have taken judicial notice of RA 6734 as implemented by EO429 as legal basis of the President's power to reorganized the ExecutiveDepartment, specifically those administrative regions which did not vote fortheir inclusion in the ARMMSeparation of Powers, courts cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of theacts of the Executive or the legislative. IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Bito-Onon vs Fernandez Facts: Bito-Onon was proclaimed winner as Executive VP of the Liga ng mga Brgy ProvincialChapter of Palawan. Quejano filed post proclamation protest w/ the Board of ElectionSupervisors (BES) which decided against him. Quejano filed petition for review w/ RTC.Onon filed MTD claiming that RTC have no JD to review BES decisions in any postproclamation protest.DILG MC 97-193: review of BES decision is w/ any regular courtsGuidelines by the Liga: review of BES decision is w/ National Liga Board Issue1: Does the presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga brgywhich is not an LGU . Held:YES.DOJ ruled that the liga ng mga brgy is a govt organization, being an association,federation or league or union created by law or by authority of law whose membersare either appointed or elected govt officals. The ligas are primarily governed bythe LGC. However, their respective constitutions and by laws shall govern allmatters affecting the internal organization of the liga not otherwise provided for inthe LGC, provided that such consti and bylaws shall be suppletory to Book II TitleVI of LGCode and shall always conform to Constitution and existing laws Issue2:WON the guidelines issued by the DILG within its supervisory powers. Held:NO.In authorizing the filing of the petition for review of BES decision w/ regular courts under MC97-193 , the DILG sec in effect amended and modified the Guidelines promulgated by theLiga which provides that review of BES decision is w/ National Liga Board.The amendment of the guidelines is more than an exercise of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control w/c the president doesnt have over the liga. NEA v. COA Facts:The National Electrification Administration is a GOCC with the responsibility oforganizing, financing and regulating electric cooperatives throughout thecountry.RA 6758 took effect. It provided, among others, a salary schedule for all governmentpositions, appointive or elective, including positions in GOCCs.In response to pressing economic difficulties, and the need to levitate the plight ofgovernment personnel, the Senate and the HR urged the President, througha joint resolution to increase the salary of government employees.President Ramos acted on the joint resolution and issued EO 389 which directedpayment of the fourth and final salary increases authorized under JointResolution No. 1 in TWO TRENCHES.NEA implemented the salary increase but it did not do so in two trenches.COA resident auditor issued a notice of suspension requiring the submission of thelegal basis for the full implementation of the new salary schedule. And thus,COA resident auditor issued a notice of disallowance.COA sustained the decision made by the resident auditor.NEA argues that it may accelerate the implementation of the salary increases due tothe availability of funds.Held:Budgetary appropriations under the GAA do not constitute unbridled authority togovernment agencies to spend the appropriated amounts as they may wish.Section 60, Chapter 7, Book VI of the Administrative Code provides that no portion ofthe appropriations in the GAA shall be used for payment of any salaryincrease or adjustment unless specifically authorized by law or appropriatebudget circularSection 33 of the 1997 GAA itself expressly provides that the salary increaseauthorized by the Senate-HR Joint Resolution or the salary standardization law are subject to the approval by the PresidentSection 10 of EO 289 does not authorize, expressly or impliedly, the advanceimplementation of the salary increases just because the GOCC has theavailable funds. DENR v. DENR Region 12Facts:The Regional Executive Director of DENR for Region 12 issued a memorandumdirecting the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices fromCotabato City to Koronadal Cotabato. The memorandum was issued pursuantto DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR secretary.Repondents filed with the RTC a petition for nullity of the order with preliminaryinjunctionRTC ruled

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Issues:(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNPMoreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. LACSON VS. PEREZ [357 SCRA 756; G.R. No. 147780 ;10 May 2001] Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them. Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same. Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in

which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang. G.R. No. 159085, Feb. 3, 2004 sanlakas vs reyes FACTS:In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proc. 427 and G.O. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After hours-long negotiations, the Oakwood occupation ended and the president lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion.

Sec. 23. (1) .(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-inChief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-inChief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

Case Digest: Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al. G.R. No. 171396 03 May 2006 FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did so citing the following bases:

ISSUE:Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional

The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President; Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued:

RULING:Presidents Commander-in-Chief Powers The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated power*s+. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, *t+hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.

February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend. February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I. February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration. The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military.

the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State.

Bataan.

The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. xxx Declaration of State of Rebellion is Superfluity The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Courts mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. But Declaration of State of Rebellion is not Declaration of Martial Law; Exercise of Emergency Powers by President does not necessarily follow The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution:

Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.

Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of SaturOcampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al. The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand. ISSUES: 1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic; 2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none of it; 3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble. HELD: 1. The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be decided provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case. 2. Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the

Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove. 3. Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in ones presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge both of which are not present in Davids warrantless arrest. This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal. Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio Factoran Facts: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post. HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. Wilfredo Torres vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales Facts:In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. HELD: The SC affirmed the following: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that

a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES, (LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.: We ruled consistently, viz., in Tesoro v. Director of Prisons, 1 Sales v. Director of Prisons 2 Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol 3 and Torres v. Gonzales, 4 that, where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor by final judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny. We have so ruled in the past, and we so rule now. In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. 5" Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. 6 On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment 7 against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment in the aforecited case of Torres v. Gonzales 8. There we ruled that: Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code . . . Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. 9

Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. Unfortunately, there is no adequate basis for us to oblige him. A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10 By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 11 It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000. Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993 Garcia vs COA Facts: Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman at the Bureau of Telecommunications. He was accused of stealing some materials in their company. Thus, public respondents filed a criminal case against him for qualified theft before a court and on the same ground respondents also filed an administrative case in which petitioner was found guilty and was later dismissed from the service. With respect to the criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted by the court due to insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is now claiming before the COA for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to present. But COA on the other hand reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an executive clemency (absolute pardon) by the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give due course to petitioners claim. Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency. Holding: The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitution and further articulates that the bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency. Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos& Mariano Ocampo III Facts:Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less

than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases. HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the President can grantreprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grantexecutive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. Drilon vs CA GR no. 91626 The Department of Justice has brought suit to annul the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on October 25, 1989, prohibiting the Government from pursuing criminal actions against the private respondents for the death of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during early martial law. It appears that sometime in 1973, the private respondents were charged with double murder before Military Commission No. 34. On July 27, 1973, the military promulgated a decision acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life imprisonment with hard labor. 2 Paredes was thereupon released from custody while Ganzon was made to serve sentence until he was released on March 25, 1978 and placed under house arrest under guard. 3 In 1985, Ganzon joined the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), the party in power, where he was designated as campaign manager. In 1988, administration having changed, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez directed State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against the private respondents for the above murders. The private respondents moved for dismissal, in Ganzon's case, on the ground that he, Ganzon, had been extended an absolute pardon by the President Ferdinand Marcos, and he, having been previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and in Paredes' case, on the ground that he, Paredes, had been acquitted. Trampe, however, denied both requests and reconsideration having been likewise denied, the private respondents went to the Court of Appeals on prohibition. As above indicated, the Court of Appeals granted prohibition and disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition filed by petitioners Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon and Raul Paredes is GRANTED. Respondent Acting City Fiscal Aurelio Trampe, or anyone in his stead, is hereby commanded to desist from filing criminal informations against petitioners Rodolfo Ganzon and Raul Paredes for the killing of Ireneo Longno, Jr. and Lonely Chavez, with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court, pursuant to Our Resolution of February 10, 1989, is hereby made permanent. IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 The petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals, in granting prohibition, committed a grave abuse of discretion: (1) Rodolfo Ganzon has not adequately proved the fact of presidential pardon; (2) there exists no evidence in the files of the Govemment to prove pardon; (3) Ganzon's copy is a bare machine copy and Ganzon has failed to adequately establish the loss of the original; (4) the alleged pardon (or copy of it) had not been properly sealed and authenticated, or executed in official Malacaang stationery; and (5) the disposition of the murder cases by the military does not preclude the filing of new informations by the civilian government. As to the private respondents' "liability" for (re)trial by civilian authorities, the Court of Appeals said, invoking the case of Cruz vs. Enrile: 5 3. As We closely read and perceive the Cruz case, the underlying reason for granting the petitions for habeas corpus and for excluding the civilian petitioners mentioned therein from the new informations which were ordered to be filed in the regular courts against the other civilian petitioners whose tribunal, to Our mind, is that it would be unjust and unfair for said civilian petitioners to again be prosecuted for the same offenses for which they had already served sentence, were acquitted and amnestied. The Hon. Supreme Court would want to spare them from the ordeals of another trial and to end their sufferings. We believe that the favorable treatment given to civilian petitioners in Cruzshould likewise be accorded to Mayor Ganzon and Paredes in the present case. In the Olaguer and Cruz cases, the civilian petitioners therein objected to their trial by the military commissions. They contended that the military commissions had no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed

during martial law, and that the proceedings before military commissions would be in gross violation of their rights to due process of law. On the other hand, in contrast, the record does not show that civilian petitioners Mayor Ganzon and Raul Paredes interposed their objection to their being tried by Military Commission No. 3; in fact, they submitted to the latter's jurisdiction. Mayor Ganzon accepted the verdict of conviction and Paredes that of acquittal. It turned out later, as held in Cruz, that military commissions had no jurisdiction to try and decide criminal cases over civilians. Under the circumstances, petitioners should not be made to undergo another prosecution, just like the petitioners-civilians in Cruz who, having served sentence, or having been acquitted or amnestied, were not ordered to be included in the informations to be filed against the other civilians whose cases were not dismissed/terminated by the military commission. The loss of freedom during the period of trial before the Military Commission No. 3 by petitioners, and after his conviction on the part of Mayor Ganzon until he was granted presidential pardon, could no longer be regained by them. 6 xxx xxx xxx As to the alleged grant of pardon in favor of Rodolfo Ganzon: 1. But first, We would like to state that from the evidence, We find that Mayor Ganzon was extended absolute pardon by the former President. Former Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin Venus, Jr. declared before us that Ganzon's absolute pardon was signed by the former President in Iloilo City on January 27, 1986 in his presence; that the pardon was accepted by Mayor Ganzon as signified by his signature thereon; that Exhibit C-1 is a photocopy of the signed original; that the original copy was given to Mayor Ganzon while he retained a photocopy for transmittal to former Presidential Executive Assistant Juan Tuvera ... Likewise, former Presidential Executive Assistant Juan Tuvera testified that he was given by Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Venus the xerox copy of the presidential pardon extended to Mayor Ganzon; that Exhibit C-1 is a copy of said pardon bearing the signature of the former president of which he is familiar; that he showed to the former President the xerox copy of the pardon and the latter confirmed having signed the original; that the former President asked him to give the copy to him as he would show the same to some visitors and to the former First Lady later in the evening ... We find no reason, and none has been offered, why these two high ranking officials of the former administration would trifle with and declare falsehood regarding the presidential grant of pardon Mayor Ganzon. We find them to be trustworthy and their testimony be deserving of full faith and credit. If Mayor Ganzon was not actually extended absolute pardon, then he should have remained incarcerated or under house arrest until the present time. But such is not the case, and the military or the Government has not explained why Mayor Ganzon has been enjoying unrestrained freedom all these years since January 27, 1986. 7 xxx xxx xxx As to the first question whether or not the Government may proceed criminally against the private respondents despite verdict earlier rendered by Military Commission No. 34 this Court reiterates its ruling in the case of Tan vs. Barrios, 8 as well as Cruz vs. Enrile's own modification, 9 giving Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 10prospective application. As Tan held: In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olague should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases an cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of process.

It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which sentenced him to death without receiving evidence in his fense. It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they have already been acquitted and released, or have accepted sentences imposed on them and commenced serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted by a military court, much less those were acquitted and released, desires to undergo the ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit in a civil court. Indeed, why should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of a military court who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty? Even if there is a chance of being acquitted second time around, it would be small comfort for the accused if he held without bail pending the completion of his second trial which take as long as, if not longer than, the sentence he has been serving already served. The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year perio martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proc ings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which prevent us from carryingOlaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus, did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 5 where the question arose as to whether the declaration of nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wipe out all the act the local government thus abolished. 11 In Cruz, the Court, further issued the following guidelines. The Court DECREES that all the petitioners in said proceedings "who have been serving (but not yet completed) their sentence imprisonment" shall have "the option either to complete the servic their sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction they should be credited in the service of their sentence for the period of their previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal, they shoul set free." 12 The records show that the private respondents had been arraigned by the military court, pleaded not guilty, and, with respect to Raul Paredes, acquitted, and with respect to Ganzon, convicted and sentenced. The records also show that Ganzon had served time until 1978, when he was placed under "house arrest" by then President Marcos. He also claims that in 1986, he was pardoned by the then President, an alleged pardon he is invoking to deter the reinvestigation by the Department of Justice. To the mind of the Court, Ganzon has accepted the judgment against him, and as Tan asked, "why should [he] who has accepted the justness of the verdict of the military court who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty?" 13 To the mind of the Court, the private respondents' case falls squarely within Tan's ruling, and as we tolerated no reinvestigation there, we can not tolerate one here. Apparently, the question is whether or not, with respect to Ganzon, he has completed the service of his sentence, since as we held in Cruz, 14 civilians serving sentences "may be given the option either to complete the service of their sentence," 15 the option Ganzon has apparently accepted, "or be tried anew by the civil courts," 16 the option he is obviously rejecting. The Court believes that the question is material since if he, Ganzon, has completed the service of his sentence, Tan and Cruz are with more reason applicable, and second, if he has served his sentence, the question of pardon is moot and academic. As we indicated, Ganzon served six years in the stockades of the military no doubt as a result of his conviction but was released in 1978 and put under socalled house arrest (although then President Marcos never apparently carried this out seriously as Ganzon was free apparently, to move in and out of his residence). The Court is of the considered opinion that these twin developments six-year service of sentence and subsequent release are significant, since if then President Marcos ordered Ganzon's release after six years of imprisonment, he then President Marcos, unavoidably commuted Ganzon's imprisonment to six years (give or take a few days), although as a condition, Ganzon shall remain under "house arrest." Court is of the opinion that if Ganzon's sentence had been commuted, he, Ganzon, has therefore served his sentence and if he has served his sentence fully, he can no longer be reinvestigated, or, as the Cruz cases decreed, be made to "complete the service of [his] sentence."

Under the 1973 Constitution, as is under the present Cha the "pardoning power" of the President (that is, to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures 17 ) is final and unappealable 18 so is commutation of sentence, in which the Chief Executive reduces a sentence. 19 It extinguishes criminal liability partially, 20 and has the effe changing the penalty 21 to a lesser one. 22 The Court does not believe, in Ganzon's case, that commutation of sentence need be in a specific form. It is sufficient, to mind, that Ganzon was voluntarily released in 1978 wit terms or conditions, except that he should remain under house arrest. The Court can not consider Ganzon's house arrest as a continuation of his sentence, first, because in no way is arrest a penalty, but rather a mere means of "taking ... a person custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer fo commission of an offense," 23 or, during early martial law, a means to carry out Proclamation No. 1881,24 and second, because of the records own scant condition as the exact terms of his "house arrest" (which, parenthetically, no longer exists. 25 ) Hence, the view of the Court is that irrespective of the "pardon," Ganzon has served his sentence and to reiterate, he can no longer be reinvestigated for the same offense, much more undergo further imprisonment to complete his service. The fact that Ganzon might have gotten off too lightly, so to speak, is immaterial, and even as we sympathize with his victims' bereaved families, we can not ignore the legal effects of then President Marcos' acts as we did not ignore the legal implications of trials by military tribunals, although void, 26 as faits accomplis. 27 The Court therefore need not consider whether or not Rodolfo Ganzon had been pardoned, and whatever "pardon" the former President may have extended to him did not erase the fact that as early as 1978, he was a free man. Of course, he was supposed to have remained under house arrest but as we said, not as a continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos' vast arrest and commitment powers during martial rule. The question of whether or not he should continue to remain under house arrest is also a moot question as we noted, 28 and arrests except upon lawful judicial orders are no longer possible. The Court's disposition, it is true, leaves Ganzon to all intents and purposes "scotfree", yet whatever liberal treatment he may have received is not his fault either, and in the second place, "worse" people have been better rewarded in this regime. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. People vs. Patriarca, Jr. G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000 Facts: Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant appealed the decision of the RTC. Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs. Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accusedappellant? Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal. Accused-appellant is acquitted of the crime of murder. People vs sale jr. DAVIDE, JR., J.: For resolution is the enforceability of the conditional pardon granted to accusedappellant Ricky Mengote during the pendency in this Court of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. In the decision 1 dated 18 November 1991 of Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11835, the accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay, jointly and severally, an indemnity in the sum of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim. 2 The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, this Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court then required his counsel,

Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the aforesaid motion. In her Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Atty. La'o informed this Court that her verification disclosed that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion was merely a bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on 9 December 1993. He was discharged from the NBP on 28 December 1993. She further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote was, on the same dates, granted a conditional pardon and released from confinement, and that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She then prays that this Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Until now, Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. In the resolution of 23 March 1994, this Court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and considered this case closed and terminated insofar as he is concerned. On 3 June 1993, Assistant Director Jesus P. Villanueva of the Bureau of Corrections submitted certified photocopies of the conditional pardon granted separately to Salle 3 and Mengote 4 and of their certificates of release. 5 The said copies of the conditional pardon state, among other things, that it is upon acceptance of the pardon that the appellants will be released from confinement. But there is nothing to show when the appellants accepted the pardon. In its Comment of 17 August 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General asserted that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed. 6 After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the President may, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by final judgment, this Court resolved to require. 1. The Office of the Solicitor General and the counsel for the accused-appellants to submit, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, their respective memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon; and 2. The Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why it recommended to the President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal. 7 In a Comment submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, or Pardon, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano avers that the Secretariat assisting the Committee has a standing agreement with the FLAG and other human rights organizations that it will recommend to the Presidential Committee for conditional pardon by the President of convicted persons who may have been convicted of crimes against national security and public order or of common crimes which appear to have been committed in pursuit of their political objectives; and that where the said convicted persons have pending appeals before the appellate court, the lawyers of the said organizations, particularly the FLAG, will take care of filing the appropriate motions for the withdrawal of their appeal considering that presidential pardon may be extended only to those serving sentence after final conviction. Notwithstanding that agreement, before it recommends to the Committee the grant of conditional pardon, the Secretariat also checks with the Bureau of Corrections the carpeta or records of recommendees whether they have pending appeals so that those concerned may be properly advised to withdraw the same. Mariano further contends that per information given to the Secretariat by Assistant Director Villanueva, Mengote's carpeta or prison record does not show that he has a pending appeal with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. For that reason, the Secretariat was not able to advise those concerned to take appropriate steps for the withdrawal of the appeal before it recommended to the Committee the grant of conditional pardon in favor of Mengote. Mariano then assures the Court that there was no intention on the part of the Secretariat and the Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, and that what happened was a clear misappreciation of facts due to the incomplete records of Mengote. In its Memorandum filed for the Appellee on 15 December 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of his appeal. On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 8 it argues that although Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his conviction.

The pivotal issue thus raised is the enforceability of a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court. This calls for a review of the Philippine laws on presidential pardons. We shall start with the Jones Law. 9 Section 21 thereof provided in part as follows: Sec. 21. That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer, whose official title shall be "The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.". . . He is hereby vested with the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures. . . . Then came the 1935 Constitution. Paragraph 6, Section 10, Article VII thereof provided as follows: (6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the Congress. This provision differed from that of the Jones Law in some respects. Thus, in People vs. Vera, 10 this Court held: Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil. 293). The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". The requirement of after conviction operated as one of the limitations on the pardoning power of the President. Thus: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. 11 The 1973 Constitution went further by providing that pardon could be granted only after final conviction. Section 14 of Article IX thereof reads as follows: The Prime Minister may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, after final conviction, and, with the concurrence of the National Assembly, grant amnesty. (emphasis supplied) The 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution, however, removed the limitation of final conviction, thereby bringing us back to the aforementioned provision of the Jones Law. Section 11, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as thus amended, reads: The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and, with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. But the said limitation was restored by the present Constitution. Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (emphasis supplied) Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is " final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. 12 Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant. We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling of this Court in People vs. Crisola 13 that the grant of executive clemency during the pendency of the appeal serves to put an end to the appeal. Thus: The commutation of the penalty is impressed with legal significance. That is an exercise of executive clemency embraced in the pardoning power. According to the Constitution: "The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and, with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty." Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to this appeal. It must, nevertheless, be noted that the constitutional provision quoted is that of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which authorized the exercise of the pardoning power at anytime, either before or after conviction. Also, in Monsanto vs. Factoran, 14 this Court stated that the acceptance of a pardon amounts to an abandonment of an appeal, rendering the conviction final; thus: The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality. This statement should not be taken as a guiding rule for it is nothing but an orbiter dictum. Moreover, the pardon involved therein was extended on 17 December 1984 or under the regime of Section 11, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which allowed the grant of pardon either before or after conviction. The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment" requirement, reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power. 15 Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powers demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully respected and kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the "conviction by final judgment" limitation, the President could, at any time, and even without the knowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to any one whom he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning power which did not require conviction, the President had unimpeded power to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard. And under the 1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either case, there could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration of the system of administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court. Where the President is not so prevented by the Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a presidential folly. 16 Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision consisting in the imposition of "conviction by final judgment" requirement can change the rule. The new Constitution did it. Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal,i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality. Accordingly, while this Court, in its resolution of 21 March 1991 in People vs. Pedro Sepada, 17 dismissed the appeal for having become moot and academic in view of the parole granted to the appellant, it explicitly declared the necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended. Thus:

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS the appeal for having become moot and academic. To avoid any possible conflict with the judicial determination of pending appeals, the Court further DIRECTED the Board of Pardons and Parole to adopt a system which enables it to ascertain whether a sentence has become final and executory and has, in fact, been executed before acting on any application for parole or pardon. The Court Administrator shall coordinate with the Department of Justice on how this may be best achieved. (Emphasis supplied). Recently, in its resolution of 31 January 1995 in People vs. Hinlo, 18 this Court categorically declared to be "in clear violation of the law" the "practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals." This Court resolved therein as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, in order to put a stop to the practice of processing applications for pardon and parole despite pending appeals which is in clear violation of the law, the Court Resolved to: (1) REQUIRE Atty. Conrado H. Edig, counsel de parte of accused Bernardo Hinlo, Catalino Capin, Martin Hinlo and Cecerio Ongco, who were given pardon, to secure and file the withdrawal of the appeals of said accused within ten days from receipt of this Resolution; (2) CALL the attention of the Presidential Committee to observe the proper procedure as required by law before granting bail, pardon or parole in cases before it; and (3) REMIND the Board of Pardons and Parole about the Court's directive in the People v. Sepada case. (Emphasis supplied). The above pronouncements of this Court in Sepada and in Hinlo may still be unheeded, either through deliberate disregard thereof or by reason of an erroneous application of the obiter dictum in Monsanto or of the ruling in Crisola. Hence, the need for decisive action on the matter. We now declare that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement. And now on the instant case. Considering that appellant Ricky Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal up to this date the conditional pardon extended to him should not have been enforced. Nonetheless, since he stands on the same footing as the accusedappellants in the Hinlo case, he may be freed from the full force, impact, and effect of the rule herein pronounced subject to the condition set forth below. This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency of the grantee's appeal. WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the President, the Department of Justice, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, or Pardon. People vs nacional This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City in Criminal Cases Nos. 4854-4855.

On December 18, 1989, Walter Nacional alias "Ka Dennis," Absalon Millamina alias "Ka Alvin," Efren Musa, Rudy Luces, Javier Mirabete alias "Commander, " and Zacarias Militante alias "Care" were charged with murder in two separate informations. The first information reads as follows: That on or about the 21st day of February 1985 at Brgy. Salvacion, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court , the above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with a firearm one QUIRINO LAGASON, inflicting upon the latter injuries resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of his immediate heirs. 1 The second information reads: That on or about the 21st day of February 1985 at Brgy. Salvacion, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with a firearm one JOEL LAGASON, inflicting upon the latter injuries, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of his immediate heirs. 2 When arraigned, all the accused, except Absalon Millamina who was at large, pleaded "not guilty." The two informations were later consolidated and assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City. 3 Trial thereafter ensued. On May 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused (except Millamina) guilty of two counts of murder qualified by evident premeditation and attended by a conspiracy. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, having been convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, Walter Nacional, Efren Musa, Rudy Luces, Javier Mirabete and Zacarias Militante of the crime of Murder in both of the above-entitled cases, judgment is hereby rendered: In Criminal Case No. 4854: 1. Sentencing each of the abovementioned accused to undergo the penalty ofReclusion Perpetua; 2. To indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00; and 3. To pay the costs. In Criminal Case No. 4855: 1. Sentencing each of the above-named accused to undergo the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; 2. To indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00; and 3. To pay the costs. 4 All five (5) accused appealed to this Court. We accepted their appeal in a Resolution dated November 8, 1993. 5 On March 1, 1994, Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante and Efren Musa, through counsel, moved to withdraw their appeal. They claimed that the charges against them were political in nature "committed while they were members of the New People's Army (NPA). 6 They informed the Court that as political prisoners, they applied for and were recommended by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon for conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines. 7 The Court granted their motion on May 11, 1994. 8 On February 1, 1995, Rudy Luces, through counsel, also moved to withdraw his appeal for becoming moot and academic. 9 He claimed that he had been granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines and had been released from prison per instruction. In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General opined that Rudy Luces abandoned his appeal when he accepted the pardon granted him. We now therefore dismiss his appeal.

With these developments, only accused Javier Mirabete has remained and pursued his appeal to this Court. The judgment convicting the five accused is based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. It is derived mainly from the testimonies of two eyewitnesses Bienvenida Lagason, Quirino's widow and Joel's mother, and Crisanto Miranda, a neighbor of the Lagasons and accused Walter Nacional. The findings of the trial court as supported by the evidence are summarized as follows: The six (6) accused, including accused-appellant, were all civilian members of the barangay organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) NPA at Daraga, Albay. 10 A few days before February 21, 1985, their organization had a pulong-pulong (conference) at Barangay Lacag, Daraga for the purpose of identifying suspected informers of the military whom they perceived as posing a threat to the NPA's operations within the vicinity. They identified Quirino and Joel Lagason, both residents of Barangay Salvacion, Daraga as military informants and were targeted for liquidation. Elevino Rincopan, their team leader, however, disapproved the proposal for lack of clearance and approval from the higher NPA authorities. 11 On February 21, 1985, at 4:00 p.m., the six (6) accused and Wilson Lita alias "Ka Cris" were gathered in front of the RCPI building at Lacag, Daraga. Wilson Lita informed them that they were to go on a mission at Salvacion, Daraga to talk to two (2) military informers, Quirino and Joel Lagason. Some members of the group were to confront the two about their being informers and if they "resisted" they were to be killed. 12 The others were instructed to provide maximum security during the confrontation. 13 Wilson Lita and Absalon Millamina were each armed with a short firearm and the whole group left Lacag at 4:30 p.m. and walked towards Salvacion, four kilometers away. 14 At about 5:00 p.m., the group stopped at the sari-sari store of Genita Miranda and asked Genita for directions to the house of Quirino and Joel Lagason. 15 They continued walking and passed by a waiting shed where they met Crisanto Miranda. They requested Crisanto to accompany them to the Lagason's house. Wilson Lita, Zacarias Militante and accused-appellant remained at the waiting shed and the rest of the group proceeded on their mission. 16 Along the way, the group saw two men walking on the road whom Crisanto identified as Quirino and Joel Lagason. Rudy Luces told Crisanto to leave but the latter did not. Walter Nacional approached Quirino and said something to him. Walter then pulled out a gun from his waist and shot Quirino in the face, hitting him between the eyebrows. Quirino fell to the ground and died instantly. A few seconds later, Absalon Millamina shot Joel Lagason on the head. The group then fled towards the direction of the RCPI Relay Station. Joel's mother, who was at the scene of the crime, rushed him to the hospital where he died a few hours later. 17 The defense set up by the accused consisted of denials. Walter Nacional claimed that Quirino was killed by Wilson Lita alias "Ka Cris" while Joel was allegedly shot by Absalon Millamina. 18 He further averred that he and the other accused merely provided security to Absalon Millamina and Wilson Lita who later on was reportedly killed in an encounter with the military. 19 Rudy Luces, Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Javier Mirabete denied being members of the NPA. They denied any participation in the killings. They declared that their presence in the vicinity of the crime was merely incidental. Rudy Luces testified that he merely showed Wilson Lita and Absalon Millamina the way to the Lagasons' house. 20 Zacarias Militante claimed that he gave the two the directions to the RCPI building. 21 Efren Musa alleged that he gave a glass of water to Wilson Lita and Absalon Millamina who were passing by his house. 22 Javier Mirabete testified that he was watching a volleyball game near the scene of the crime when the shooting happened. 23 The trial court rejected the denials of the accused and convicted them. In this appeal, accused-appellant Javier Mirabete insists on his claim that he was merely watching a volleyball game when the shooting happened. 24 He denies being a member of the NPA or any rebel organization. He likewise denies the existence of a plot and a conspiracy to kill the Lagasons. Accused-appellant claims that he is a mere farmer, already 69 years old and had barely finished Third Grade in school. According to him, his advanced age made it impossible for him join the NPA at the time of the incident. He contends that the testimonies of Bienvenida Lagason and Crisanto Miranda identifying him with the group that killed the Lagasons are unreliable and hearsay because both witnesses never knew him. It was only four years after the shooting that Crisanto Miranda purportedly learned of the members' identities and revealed the same to Bienvenida. 25 Reviewing the records, we find that accused-appellant was part of the group that conspired to kill and actually killed the Lagasons. The identification of accusedappellant was made not only by Bienvenida Lagason and Crisanto Miranda but by other witnesses as well, including prosecution witnesses Elevino Rincopan, Genita Miranda, and appellant's co-accused Walter Nacional himself. Elevino Rincopan, a former CPP-NPA team leader at Daraga, Albay identified accused-appellant as one of the civilian members of their barangay organization. Elevino testified that accused-appellant was present at thepulong-pulong before February 21, 1985 where the Lagasons were identified and proposed to be liquidated. 26The fact that Elevino Rincopan alias "Ka Boy" was the NPA team leader

at Daraga, Albay was corroborated by Walter Nacional himself. 27 Walter Nacional likewise identified accused-appellant as present at the meeting on February 21, 1985 at 4:00 p.m. in front of the RCPI building at Lacag, Daraga. It was at this meeting that the group was instructed by Wilson Lita alias "Ka Cris" to seek out the Lagasons and shoot them. 28 Later, Genita Miranda, who was tending her sari-sari store recognized and identified accused-appellant as part of the group that passed by her store and asked her for directions to the victims' house. 29 Accused-appellant was also identified by Crisanto Miranda who testified that he recognized all of the accused when they approached him at the waiting shed. 30 Crisanto explained that he recognized them because they all came from neighboring barangays. 31 In fact, Crisanto was able to clearly identify and distinguish three of the group who remained at the waiting shed and the rest whom he accompanied in their search of the Lagasons. 32His credibility is not adversely affected by the fact that he did not reveal their identities to the authorities immediately after the shooting. He averred that Efren Musa threatened him to remain silent. For fear of his life, Crisanto fled to Manila. 33 He stayed in almost two years and returned to Daraga, Albay after some time. 34 It was only in 1989 that Crisanto revealed to Bienvenida Lagason the identities of her husband's and son's assailants, and voluntarily gave his statement to the police. 35 Clearly, the evidence proves beyond doubt that accused-appellant was a civilian member of the CPP-NPA at Daraga, and was part of the group of CPP-NPA members that deliberately planned the killing of the Lagasons. The events that led to the victims' deaths also show that this group of CPP-NPA members deliberately planned, plotted and premeditated their victims' deaths. Evident premeditation exists when the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. There must be, between the reflection and execution of the crime, a space of time sufficient for the offender to arrive at a calm judgment. 36 Indeed, there was more than sufficient time for the group to reflect on their criminal intentions between the decision to shoot the victims and the actual shooting itself. At the pulong-pulong a few days before February 21, 1995, the Lagasons were identified as military informers and the idea of killing them was openly suggested. On February 21, 1985, all the accused were gathered at one place where the decision to kill the Lagasons was made. The group planned the execution of the crimes, assigned the participation of each member, and armed two of them. The group thereafter deliberately and intentionally searched for the victims and more than an hour later, shot them as planned. We also hold that the prosecution has clearly and convincingly established the existence of a conspiracy in the planning and execution of the crimes. Conspiracy arises at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. 37 The conspiracy in the instant case was established at the meeting of February 25, 1985 at 4:00 p.m. Apparently, nobody disagreed with the plan to shoot the victims because immediately after the meeting, all the accused and Wilson Lita were seen walking as a group towards Barangay Salvacion. When they saw their intended victims, they shot them and fled towards the RCPI building. Even those left at the waiting shed likewise fled towards the same direction. Clearly, the shooting of the Lagasons was characterized by a unity of purpose, intention and design. 38 It hardly matters that accused-appellant was not actually present at the specific place of the shooting. He was at the waiting shed but this was for the purpose of providing security to those who carried out the shooting. The waiting shed was located along the way to the Lagasons' house, strategically at the entrance to and exit from it. 39 A conspiracy, once established, makes each of the conspirators liable for the acts of the others. 40 All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 41 We also agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against the appellant. Mere superiority in number does not prove abuse of superior strength. 42 We likewise find no mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crimes. The analogous circumstance of age of over 70 years cannot be considered mitigating because accused-appellant was only 59 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Since there is no mitigating nor generic aggravating circumstance, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court against the accusedappellant. Finally, we rule that the grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal of the appeals of Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy Luces does not exempt them from payment of the civil indemnity. A conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime. 43 The indemnity of P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court for each of the deaths of Quirino and Joel Lagason must be shared solidarily by all the accused.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the criminal liability of accused-appellant Javier Mirabete is concerned, and insofar as the civil liability of all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4854-4855. Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999 Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice.The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government. Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading Facts:EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate. HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the

settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation. Bayan v. Executive SecretaryGR No. 138570, October 10, 2000 FACTS:On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the US forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, both countries entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. In view of the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement both countries negotiated for its possible extension. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the extension of the US military bases which was now called RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. During the term of Pres. Ramos, he approved the VFA which was the result of a negotiation on the complementing strategic interests of the US and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. On October 5, 1998, Pres. Joseph Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon, ratified the VFA. The Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA were then transmitted to the Philippine Senate for concurrence pursuant to Sec 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The necessary 2/3 votes of the members of the Senate were gathered thus concurring with the ratification of the VFA under Resolution No. 18. On June 1, 1999 the VFA officially entered into force. The petitioners argue that the VFA is governed by the provision of Sec. 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. ISSUE:Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution? HELD:Sec. 25, Article XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities should apply in the instant case. Being a special provision, Sec. 25, Article XVIII will prevail over the general provision of Sec 21, Article VII of the Constitution. Also, the argument that Sec 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities are involved in the VFA is untenable. The clause found in Sec 25 does not refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects as evidenced by the use of comma and the disjunctive word or. This interpretation which contemplates three different situations a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities and any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Sec 25 is also manifested in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the said section. Moreover, the establishment of military bases within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by the new weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without returning to their home country. Therefore first requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII already satisfied by considering the VFA as a treaty. The second condition of Sec 25 requires that the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate should be viewed in light of Sec 21 Art. VII of the Constitution requiring a 2/3 votes for treaties or international agreements in general. The 2/3 votes is again satisfied after the approval of the VFA by the Senate through Resolution No. 18. The third requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII is that the other contracting party acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. The records of the US Government, through the US Ambassador to the Philippines, show that the US government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. Also, the deliberations of the Consitutional Commission show that,through the words of Fr. Bernas, ...we will accept whatever they say.If they say that we have done everything to make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty.. Also through Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International law Commission in 1949 provides that Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. This is also known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Therefore, the third requisite is also satisfied. LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts:Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the Balikatan is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDTs objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Issue:Whether Balikatan 02-1 activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement? Ruling:To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It

clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .activities arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nations marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that .Balikatan 02-1, a mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise, falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.