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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS


UPON THE UNITED STATES

TEAM #6 WORKPLAN

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS


INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Team Members: Barbara Grewe


Michael Jacobson
Peter Rundlet
Lance Cole

Premise Statement

Item 1 Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2 Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan

Item 3 Document Requests

Item 4 Interview Candidates


UNCLASSIFIED

Team #6
Premise Statement

The September 11 terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who lived
openly and freely in the United States for varying periods of time prior to the attacks.
The six leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the United States for the
attacks, traveling throughout the country during this time. The U.S. Intelligence
Community generally, and the FBI more specifically, were aware prior to attacks that
three of these individuals had ties to al-Qa'ida. Although the plot was primarily financed
and orchestrated from overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received
assistance from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of the hijackers'
associates were known to the FBI prior to September 1.1 through its counterintelligence
and counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possible
attack in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC,
and the U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert. :,i ^ _

Based on previous reviewsv it is now_clear that the FBI did not respond
aggressively and appropriately to all of the available intelligence, and failed in many
respects to "connect the dots" prior to the attacks. Less closely studied is the extent to
which the FBI's inability to detect the hijackers' activities and associations while in the
United States represented a systemic intelligence failure. Was the hijackers' ability to
avoid detection by the FBI while in the United States an indication of excellent-
operational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of the
FBI? If the former, can changes be made to detect this type of tradecraft in the future? If
_the latter, what accounts for these failures? __

To answer these questions, our team will have to develop a comprehensive


understanding of the U.S. Government's efforts pre-September 11 to collect, process,
analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist activity in the United States. Our -
review will focus not only on the FBI itself, which had primary responsibility for these
matters, but also on the FBI's relationship with other entities with important roles in this
process, such as state and local authorities, other federal agencies, and foreign
intelligence and law enforcement partners. By understanding the problems with the
system pre-September 11, it will be clearer what the specific failures were, why they
occurred, and will help us better explain why the FBI was unable to learn about or stop
the attacks.

Finally, we will review the current state of the U.S. Government's domestic
intelligence efforts, to assess whether they are adequate to remedy the pre-September 11
systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation. If not, we will
make recommendations to address these problems.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Team #6
Item 1: Key Questions

1. What relevant information did the FBI have prior to the September 11 attacks?

• What information was available to U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement entities
prior to September 11 regarding the 19 hijackers and their associates? When was
this information known and by whom, and how was this information shared and
utilized prior to the attacks?

• Did the FBI have all of the information about the 19 hijackers available to other
U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and their foreign intelligence and
law enforcement partners?

2. What was the FBI's approach to combating international terrorist activity in the
Unite<TStates prior to September 11?

• How did the FBI collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence
information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States prior to September
-11, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and
weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information collection?

• How effectively did the FBI collaborate, coordinate, and shar$ information with
foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners, local and state law
. enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to,the attacks?

• How effective was the FBI'-s leadership and management in directing its
counterterrorism program prior to September 11?

• What role did the White House, Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the various Justice Department components play in the FBI's
counterterrorism program, from a policy, budgetary, and investigative standpoint,
prior to the September 11 attacks?

• What resources were available to the FBI? More specifically, what funds and
personnel did the FBI have and seek to have prior to September 11? What budget
allocations did relevant subcomponents of the FBI seek, what did they receive,
and who determined the budget priorities and how did they determine them?

• Were personnel resources adequately utilized prior to September 11? How was
staff allocated to combat terrorism, how were they trained, and who determined ~
personnel priorities and how? Did personnel policies and practices support the
counterterrorism mission? 'Su
\"
• To what extent did legal authorities and the resultant sensitivities regarding civil
liberties impact on the FBI's counterterrorism mission?

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UNCLASSIFIED

3. To what extent was the FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks an
intelligence failure, and was the FBI's approach to combating terrorism a critical
factor in the overall failure to prevent the attacks?

• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collect, process, analyze and
disseminate information relevant to the September 11 attacks, and what accounts
for any failures in this regard?

• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collaborate, coordinate, and share
information relevant to the September 11 attacks with foreign law enforcement
and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other
federal agencies prior to the attacks, and what accounts for any, failures in this
regard? :'

• What particularly glaring or significant failures_stand out in terms of the FBI's -


inability to prevent the September 11 attacks, and what accounts forjhese
failures? - -

• Are the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission and resulting organizational
structures and_cultures incompatible with a successful counterterrorism program?

4. How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the United


States collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated today? What has changed
since September 11, and how effectively is the system currently^ working?

• Does the current system provide for the adequate collection, processing,
analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism-related intelligence, and if not,
what are the primary barriers to success?

• How have budget and personnel allocations changed at the FBI for the purposes
of combating terrorism since September 11? ,1-,^

' • What role does the new Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") currently
have in the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence?
How is the DHS coordinating with the FBI, other federal agencies, and state and
local government authorities?

• How is the role of the CIA, NS A, and other primarily foreign-intelligence


focused federal agencies changing with respect to the collection, processing,
analysis, and dissemination of intelligence in the United States since September
11?

• What are the ingredients of a successful domestic intelligence/counterterrorism


system? What degree of collaboration, coordination, and information sharing is
required between the FBI, state and local authorities, foreign intelligence and

UNCLASSIFIED 3
UNCLASSIFIED

law enforcement partners, and other federal agencies to have a successful


system? What degree of collaboration exists today? What role should private
sector entities (e.g., data aggregating and information technology companies)
play in this system?

What are the pros and cons, including transition costs and feasibility, of
establishing a separate agency to handle counterintelligence and foreign
intelligence collection within the United States? Would it be more appropriate
to transfer these functions to the DHS?

What can we learn from other countries' approaches to and experiences with
domestic intelligence issues?

5. In the context of striving to improve the collection and dissemination of


intelligence in the United States, what legal issues arise and what are the potential
tradeoffs, if any, in civil liberty for the achievement of greater security?

• What-is the current legal landscape for the collection and use of information and
how has it changed since September 11 (e.g., FISA, Title ffl.USA PATRIOT
ACT, etc.)? " - ,0.

• What is the current status of Attorney General Guidance on these issues and how
has the guidance evolved since Attorney General Levy's Guidelines were issued?

• What is the status of the so-calledTotal Information Awareness program and how
will it assist in domestic counterterrorism, if at all? Whattechnological barriers
or breakthroughs exist for enhancing domestic intelligence with respect to
counterterrorism (e.g., data-mining, data aggregating, etc.)?

• What role does the private sector have in collecting and utilizing personal
information to combat terrorism? What role should it have? How is the
government currently coordinating with the private sector in this regard and what
safeguards exist to prevent abuses arising out of such collaboration? On the other
hand, can the role of the private sector be enhanced appropriately to improve our
security?

• What additional legal and policy changes, if any, are necessary and appropriate
for the U.S. Government to establish a successful domestic intelligence
capability?

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Team #6
Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan

A. Reading List

1. Relevant portions of the Joint Inquiry Classified Final Report, including Senator
Shelby's Additional Views [Why it is relevant: The Joint Inquiry has already
performed considerable investigation on the performance of the FBI relating to
the September 11 attacks. In determining the scope and focus of our
investigation, the Commission should be aware of what the Joint Inquiry found
and concluded. Senator Shelby's additional views contain important and relevant
conclusions about the systemic problems with the FBI prior-to the attacks".]

2. Joint Inquiry Unclassified Staff Statements, dated: September 24, 2002 (as
supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. [Why it is relevant:
these statements cover a number of topics relevant to our investigation including:
the Phoenix Electronic Communication, the Moussaoui investigation, the ~
information regarding aircraft as weapons, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's
handling of the information regarding the hijackers prior to the attacks.]

3. Selected portions of the October 2002 Markle Foundation Task Force report on
National Security in the Information Age. [Why it is relevant: contains important
policy recommendations for the U.S. Government relating to the impact of
information and information technology on national security.]

4. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 one page fact sheet on the proposed
creation-of a Homeland Intelligence Agency. [Why it is relevant: the fact sheet
contains some of the arguments in favor of the creation of a new domestic
intelligence agency.] .

5. Jeff Smith's June 18, 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, entitled'%aste and the
Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence. [Why it is
relevant: the op-ed briefly describes the problems with the current system, and his
. proposals to remedy these problems.]

6. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kumagai, published in IEEE Spectrum on-


line Journal, dated April 7, 2003 on the FBI's information sharing and
technological problems. [Why it is relevant: the article discusses the well-known
problems with the FBI's technology and information systems, and assesses
whether the current proposals are likely to remedy these problems.]

7. The Cell by John Miller [Why it is relevant: the author provides a detailed
explanation of why he believes the FBI and CIA failed to prevent the September
11 attacks. He traces the origins of al-Qa'ida in the United States, beginning in
the early 1990s, and how the U.S. Government failed to adequately respond to
this growing threat.]

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UNCLASSIFIED

B. Recommended Briefers

1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff

2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice

3. Jeff Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency

4. Mike Leavitt, Governor of Utah during 2002 Salt Lake Olympics

5. Jeff Jonas, CEO of Systems Research and Development

6. Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NSA

7. Gilman Ixiuie, In-Q-Tel __

8. Professor Philip Heymann, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Team #6
Item 3: Document Requests

1. In consultation with team #1, requests on hijackers' associates, al-Qa'ida


detainees, and updated timelines and lists of pending investigations from the
FBI's 9/11 investigation (codenamed "PENTTBOM.")

2. Training curricula from new agent training, counterterrorism in-services, and


from FBI College of Analytical Studies. '

3. Statistics from select FBI Field Offices, regarding agent assignments to


counterterrorism investigations (referred to as "burn rates," which indicate agent
man-hours actually spent on particular matters) from 1993-Present.

4. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Investigative and


Operational Guidelines.

5. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Administrative


and Operational Procedures'.

6. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterterrorism reforms, including


documents relating to the creation of the Office of Intelligence and the Reports
Officer program.

. 7. Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and state/local law enforcement


agencies in cities where the hijackers resided or operated.

8. In consultation with team #3, written communications from'the National


Security Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containing
counterterrorism strategy, policy and guidance, 1998-September20, 2001

9. Written communications from the FBI to the National Security Council on


international terrorism matters, 1998-September 20,2001

10. Any DOJ or NSC briefing materials relating to counterterrorism or domestic


intelligence issues created for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team.

11. Any policy statements, directives, or guidance from the Attorney General,
Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division
to the FBI or to U.S. Attorneys' Offices on Counterterrorism matters from 1998-
Present, not relating to individual investigations^

12. Annual Field Office Reports or other documents outlining annual


counterterrorism priorities and strategies from select from FBI Field Offices,
1998-Present.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

13. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Attorney General


Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations.

14. Copy of policy directives regarding the creation of the Department of


Homeland Security, and its role in counterterrorism policy, operations, analysis,
and collection.

15. Copy of annual report on the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget, produced by the Director of Central Intelligence's Community
Management Staff, FY1995-FY2004.

16. FBI's annual Congressional Budget Justification Books, FY1995-FY2004

17. Department of Homeland Security's budget request for FY2003-FY2004

UNCLASSIFIED
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions


SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/20/2008

BOX: 00001 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 70 DOC ID: 31206577

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 4

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Teams Workplans & Action Plans

DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: Appendix

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT: Team #6:


Item 4: Interview Candidates

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):


9/11 Closed by Statute
9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive
9/11 Personal Privacy

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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